ML100670252
| ML100670252 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/2010 |
| From: | Justin Poole Plant Licensing Branch III |
| To: | Jim Costedio, Hale S Point Beach |
| Poole Justin/DORL/LPL3-1/ 301-415-2048 | |
| References | |
| Download: ML100670252 (2) | |
Text
From:
Poole, Justin Sent:
Monday, March 08, 2010 11:22 AM To:
'Hale, Steve'; 'COSTEDIO, JAMES'
Subject:
Draft - Request for Additional Information from Electrical Engineering on LOV Relay and HELB RE: Extended Power Uprate Steve By letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dated April 7, 2009 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML091250564), FPL Energy Point Beach, LLC, submitted a request to increase each units licensed core power level from 1540 megawatts thermal (MWt) to 1800 MWt reactor core power, and revise the technical specifications to support operation at this increased core thermal power level.
The Electrical Engineering Branch has reviewed the information provided, relating to time delay of the loss of voltage relay and high energy line breaks, and determined that in order to complete its evaluation, additional information is required. We would like to discuss the questions, in draft form below, with you in a conference call.
This e-mail aims solely to prepare you and others for the proposed conference call. It does not convey a formal NRC staff position, and it does not formally request for additional information.
Justin C. Poole Project Manager NRR/DORL/LPL3-1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (301)415-2048 email: Justin.Poole@nrc.gov
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
DRAFT The proposed change will extend the time delay of the loss of voltage (LOV) relay to 2.3 seconds when it actuates at approximately 3156V. The proposed change also extends the closure time for emergency diesel generator (EDG) breaker to 3.55 seconds. The degraded voltage (DV) relay is set at approximately 3937V with a time delay of 5.68 seconds with a concurrent safety injection signal (SIS) and 39.14 seconds without a SIS available. The DV protection scheme does not directly start the emergency diesel generator (EDG). A trip of the DV relay actuates the LOV relay which adds 2.3 seconds for relay actuation and 3.55 seconds for breaker closure, to the total time for start of EDG.
EEEB-1: Provide a summary of the analyses that demonstrates that the safety related equipment will not be degraded when required to operate at a voltage level marginally above the LOV relay setpoint for approximately 39 seconds.
EEEB-2: Provide a summary of the analyses that demonstrates that plant safety is not compromised if EDG start is delayed by approximately 42 seconds and EDG breaker closure is delayed by additional 3.55 seconds following degraded grid conditions with plant bus voltages marginally above the LOV relay setting for 39 seconds.
EEEB-3: The undervoltage protective schemes (LOV and DV) are not bypassed during EDG A operation. Point Beach Technical Specifications do not stipulate transient or steady state EDG voltage requirements. Provide details on acceptance criteria established in plant procedures to ensure that EDG achieves acceptable voltage band within the allowed time during an emergency start. Provide a comparison of the LOV and DV relay reset values and the criteria for acceptable EDG voltage.
EEEB-4: Plant licensing basis assumes simultaneous loss of offsite power (LOOP) coupled with a design basis accident. For events such as a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LBLOCA), a SIS starts the EDG at the onset of the event. For other events that may not generate a SIS immediately (such as steam generator tube rupture) occurring simultaneously with a LOOP, provide details on consequences of delaying EDG start by 2.3 seconds and adding 3.55 seconds for breaker closure when the plant is operating at uprated conditions.
The following questions pertain to High Energy Line Break (HELB) Environmental Qualification (EQ) of the equipment or components.
EEEB-5: The staff requests the licensee to provide a detailed comparison of the following EQ temperature and pressure profiles:
- a.
Current conditions
- b.
Existing bounding EQ profile
- c.
At proposed EPU conditions EEEB-6: The staff requests the licensee to provide a detailed discussion regarding whether the existing EQ profiles envelop the proposed EPU conditions.
EEEB-7: The staff requests the licensee to provide radiation doses for the inside and outside containment due to the EPU condition. Provide a discussion and confirm that the EQ components are still qualified.
EEEB-8: The staff requests the licensee to identify the existing components that are being replaced due to the EPU conditions and confirm that replacements are qualified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49.
EEEB-9: The staff requests the licensee to identify any new components added to the EQ program due to the EPU conditions. Furthermore, the staff requests the licensee to confirm that these components, if of the same model or make, as components already in the EQ program, are also maintained per the EQ program.
DRAFT