ML100260271

Suspicious Visitor Encounter at Kansas State University Reactor Facility on January 13, 2010

ML100260271
Person / Time
Site:	Kansas State University
Issue date:	01/15/2010
From:	Geuther J Kansas State University
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML100260271 (2)

Text

Kansas State University Department of Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering IKSTATE 3002 Rathbone Hall Department of Mechanical and Nuclear Engineering Manhattan, KS 66502 3002 Rathbone Hall Manhattan, KS 66506-5205 785-532-5610 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fax: 785-532-7057 Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 January 15, 2010

SUBJECT:

Suspicious Visitor Encounter at Kansas State University Reactor Facility on January 13, 2010 ABSTRACT At 3:18 PM on January 13, 2010, a woman approached the control room to the Kansas State University (KSU) research reactor. She asked several specific questions about facility security and appeared hesiiant tog:gi% -personal informatidn' *Following her departure, the University 'Poli'c¢yrDepartnient (UPD) and NRC r'e:contacted. The-UPD identified the Woman as a harmless paranoiac Wvho attended school & KSU. -

EVENT DESCRIPTION At 3:18 PM on January 13, 2010,- trie KSU TRIGA Mark II research reactor was operating at full power when a Woman approached the open control room door. The woman was Caucasian, 5'7'? - 5'11" tall, had black hair, a black pea coat; and tan pants.

She carried a white mesh bag which contained-an unknown red object. She appeared to be 35 -45 years old.

The woman commented about the open control room door, and asked if it was always open, such that she could just walk inside. (Facility security policy does not require the control room door to be secured if operators are present). She commented about our biometric hand readers, and appeared to glance at the door strikes. She asked if she would need a background check in order to take a tour of the reactor. The student operators commented that she would need to surrender her bag and sign in to take a tour.

She said that she was a student, so an operator asked what her major course of study was.

She replied "Oh, a little bit of everything." -She then left the facility.

Due to concern over her specific, security-related questions, and her seeming unwillingness to disclose personal information, the staff called the UPD. The security video recording was rewound; and a still shot ofthewoman entering the building was sh6wn to the UPD. The Reactor Manager, Jeffrey Geuther' called the NRC Project Manager, Cindy Montgomery, instead of calling the Operations Center due to the low

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perceived threat. It is also of note that the event did not constitute a reportable occurrence. Later in the afternoon the KSU staff contacted the Headquarters Operations Office to brief them on the event. An email was sent to the Training, Research, and Test Reactor (TRTR) mailing list to warn other reactor staffs of a possible threat.

The UPD later identified the woman as a psychology graduate student at KSU with mental health problems. In particular, she is known to be paranoid about perceived security problems at KSU. UPD does not consider her to be a threat to the reactor facility.

FOLLOW UP ACTIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED The NRC instructed the KSU Reactor Manager that the KSU staff should have contacted the Operations Center at NRC IHIeadquarters immediately despite the low perceived threat of the suspicious visitor, and despite the.fact that the event was not classified as a reportable occurrence. The UPD instructed the reactor manager that the police department should have been called earlier, even if that meant responding to a false alarm, since they were not called until the visitor had left the building. Both of the above instructions were passed on to the reactor staff, and are expressions of the preference toward erring on the side of caution. In other words, it is better to respond to false alarms than not to respond to true alarms. Clearer guidance or a briefing on proper response to non-reportable occurrences would be useful.

The use of video surveillance equipment with a recording function allowed the rapid identification of the visitor. Staff training on the use of the video equipment and recording software is necessary to expedite the use of this capability. Proper and sufficient ambient lighting is necessary to identify persons on surveillance video, especially at reactor access points.

The reactor staff will be trained on unescorted access procedures and the handling of facility security information.

Sincerely, Dr. ffrey Geuther Nuclear Reactor Manager Kansas State University Cc: NRC Region IV Office Texas Health Resources Tower 612 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-4125