ML093100169
ML093100169 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Davis Besse ![]() |
Issue date: | 09/09/2009 |
From: | NRC/SECY |
To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
SECY RAS | |
References | |
ASLBP 06-845-01-EA, IA-05-052 | |
Download: ML093100169 (319) | |
Text
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i R A-ý (C- /L,:ý,2-=- Prasoon .K. Goyal Prasoon.K. Goyal To: Andrew To: Andrew J. Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy El 12/13/00 01:26 PM 12/13/0001:26 PM cc:
Subject:
DavId C. cc: David Geisen/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Theo C. Geisen/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Swim/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Glenn Swim/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Mcl Mcl ntyre/TFEJFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy
Subject:
Oconee ntyre/TEIFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy Oconee Feedback Feedback Glenn R. R. Theo S. S. FYI Forwarded by Prasoon K. GoyalI/TE/FirstEnergy on 12/13/2000 01:25 PM ...................... Forwarded by Prasoon K. Goyal/TE/FirstEnergy on 12/131200001:25 PM
~ <wgray@framatech.com>@framate<:h.com on 12/13/2000 <wgray@framatech.com>@framatech.com 12/13/2000 07:58:04 07:58:04 AMAM Please respond to wgray@framatech.com Please respond wgray@framatech.com Sent by: by: wgray@framatech.com wgray@tramatech.com To:
To: pkgoyal@firstenergycorp.com *. robert.p.lemberger@fpc.com, dspond@entergy.com, pkgoyal@firstenergycorp.com,
.dspond@entergy.com, robert.p.lemberger@fpc.com, sleshnoff@pet::o*energy.com, greg.s sleshnoff@peco.energy.com, .gerzen@exeloncorp.com greg.s.gerzen@exeloncorp.com cc:
cc: dewhitak@duke.energy.com, sfyfitch@framatech.com, mdevan@tramatech.com, dewhitak@duke*energy.colT], sfyfitch@framatech.com, mdevan@framatech.com, dfirth@framatech.com dfirth@framatech.com
Subject:
Oconee
Subject:
Oconee Feedback Feedback David Whitaker David Whitaker called called yesterday yester.day and asked me to pass along les.son learned along aa lesson learned from from the Oconee 1 ongoing RV RV head head penetration situation. David wanted me to make penetration situation. make .sure sure that all of you understood understood that that the amount amount of boric acid observed observed in in the visual inspectioninspection was very small small and that that itit is important to have a clean is important clean head for a good visual inspection. inspection. If If the head is clean, the chances of is not clean, of finding boric acid such such as that observed at Oconee Oconee 1 are not very good. good. 8i Bill 11 u.s. U.S. NRC NRC mre DAVID GEISEN 'l." S~ /.( ~..wwt t. 1-( In re DAVID GEIENf t::JUIIUR Dg Docket # 1A..()5-052 h JI) ?JZ5" Marked lor ID~ Date Marke<:i'for ID" 2' (Tr. P-ý--) 2008 (Tr. p.. .) EV:.Lij:L.., 2008 Offered in Ev: L. Date Offered
, Date 2008 (Tr. pp.*.3 l & ~i=:
7hrough l A DOCKETED USNRC Action: hatifl M d REJECTED Wl1liDRAWtt"
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WITHDRAW' USNRC lDlOa: t . ,2006tTr.p.gZ5
,2008(Trr.p ))
September 9, September 9, 2009 (11:00am) 2009 (11 :OOam) OFFICE OF OFFICE OF SECRETARY SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS STAFF Proprietary S14H-00892 514H-00892
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U.S. NRC /' N '1I '1 In re DAVID GEISEN *P" In J f '-H ExhIbIt ,"';z:::£:::;...
#..,tEh ý4s C- /(,3 Docket # 1A-05-052 1A-05-052 ID,,
Marked for IDil/L.
. Date Marked L 2008 (Tr. .! . 25-. )
(Tr. pp..., Offe~d in Ev:
. Date Offered EV:.Jl:./1-. 20082 (Tr. p. 2 z&
(Tr. ) INTRA-COMPANY INTRA-COMPANY MEMORANDUMMEMORANDUM Through Wrtness/Panel:,_""'f-ol.j.>/~f, Wtness/Pan Z./// eI:i ______ _ m_ A~ ===================== Action: Action: ~AD.nTE REJECTED WITHDRAWN REJECTED WITHDRAWN J.2f.L.. 2008 (Tr. Date: _124 1Tr, p. &Z0) _ . To 10 Mechanical/Suuctural Engin Supervisor - Mechanical/Structural Swi1p, Supervisor T. S. Swi Engin-----.c ~",.c. Sjanuary iU, January 2001 jU, 2001 FROM FROM P. K. Goya Mechanical/Structural Engineering Engineer - Mechanical/Structural or Engineer lor Engineering MINL srop MAlL STOP 3210 3210 sacr SUBJECT Trip Materials Committee Meeting Trip Report - BWOG Materials Meeting PHONE PHONE 7351 7351 I attended the B&WOG Materials Committee meeting on January Materials Comrilitt.ee January 22. 2001. in Atlanta, 22,2001, Atlanta. Georgia. The meeting schedule and list of attendees attendees is attached. purpose of this meeting was to discuss the impact of Oconee The main purpose Oconee 1 Reactor Reactor Vessel Head (RVH) thermocouple thennocouple Nozzles and CRDM Nozzle CRDMNozzie Weld Leak Leak identified identified during the last outage. Dave Whiteker Whiteker of Duke discussed the incident at Oconee land I and provided the following highlights: .
** Boric Acid -crystals crystals were detected on RVH during the routine visual head head inspection. They were able to find this leak because their CRDM flanges do not CRDMflanges leak and the head was in pristine condition.
lcakand
- Eddy current and ultrasound inspections were performed on all eight thermocouple were performed themiocouple nozzles (rC). and defects nozzies(T/C)and defects found in all nozzles. None of the TIC nozzles were None were in service at Oconee 1. TMfI-I isthe Oconee 1. TMI-l isthe.only only other B&W plant B&Wplant with T/C TIC nozzles. Only Only TMI-I are in service.
T/C nozzles at TMI-l two TIC servicz. Oconee removed Oconeercmoved TIC all T/C nozzles and penetrations from the bottom of the head. The remaining plugged six penetrations remaining two were plugged from the top of of the head.
"* PT identified identified cracking craclcing in J-groove J-groove weld of CRDM Nozzle 21. The cracking weld ofCRDMNozzle cracking extended into the 00 extended OD of the nozzle. A boat sample was taken metallographic taken for metallographic examination... The most probable root cause examination cause of the Alloy 600 CRDM CRDM Nozzle # 21 was primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). There was no indication of aggressive chemical species on the crack aggressive crack face. All the crack and its branches branches were ground out. The final weld repair was performned accordance with the ASME perfonned in accordance ASME code using using the temper the temper bead technique. Fillet weld technique. Fillet weld was was applied to the structural strucruraI performed.
weld and final PT perfonned. the total cost of these repairs indicated that thetota:l
** Dave indicated approximately $5.0 repairs was approximately $5.0 million and total dose was 60 REM. !taIso It also extended extended the outage by two weeks.
that all It was also noted that all the the previous B&WOG efforts previous B&WOG were directed efforts were towards directed towards nozzle cracks and not the welds. identifying and repairing the nozzle identifying DOCKETED DOCKETED S14H-00550 USNRC USNRC September 9, 2009 (11 September (11:00am)
- OOam)
-rE}U~LAZ£*~6C.Y 02-~eb6D£od-OJ-f* C cý OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS Exhibit Exhibit 24 24 NRC002-0150 NRC002-0150 ADIUDICATIONS STAFF AD.lUDICATIONS STAFF
.INTRA-COMPANY INTRA-COMPANY MEMORANDUMMEMORANDUM ... ...
eo 026". ED II26IH TO T*. S. Swi?, Supervisor - Mechanical/Structural Enginee'ing OATE Januar 30, 2001 TO T. S. Swi Supervisor - Mechanical/Structural Engineering DATE January 30. 2001 FROM P.K. Goaleior Engineer - Mechanical/Structural Engineering MDL stop 3210 FROM P. K. Goyal. e lOT Engineer - Mechanical/Structural Engineering MAIL STOP 3210 suwjEcr SUBJECT Trip Materials Committee Trip Report - BWOG Materials Committee Meeting Meeting PHoNE PHONE 7351 I attended the B&WOG Materials Committee meeting Materials Committee meeting on January January 22, 2001, in Atlanta, 22,2001, Atlanta. meeting schedule and Georgia. The meeting and list of attendees is attached. The main purpose purpose of of this meeting impact of Oconee meeting was to discuss the impact Reactor Oconee 1 Reactor Vessel Head Vessel Head (RVH) (RVH) thermocouple thermocouple Nozzles Nozzles and CRDM Nozzle Weld Weld Leak identified Leakidenttfied Whiteker of Duke discussed the incident at Oconee during the last outage. Dave Whiteker during Oconee 1 and and provided the following following highlights:
- Boric Acid crystals crystals were detected on RVH during the routine visual head inspection. They were able to find this leak because their CRDM leakbec:ause flanges do not CRDMflangesdo leak and the head was in pristine condition.
** Eddy current and ultrasound inspections were perfonned performed on all eight thennocouple thermocouple nozzles (TIC) and defects nozzlcs(f/C)and defects found in all nozzles. None of the T/C TIC nozzles were in were Oconee 1.
service at Oconee 1. TMI-I is the only other B&W plant with TIC otherB&W T/C nozzles. Only two TIC T/C nozzles at TMI-I are in service. Oconee atTMI-l removed all TIC Oconeercinovedall T/C nozzles and plugged six penetrations from the bottom of the head head... The remaining remaining two were were plugged plugged from the top of the head. cracking in JJ-groove
** PT identified CTa(:king -:gIOOve weld of CRDM Nozzle Nozzle 21. Thecracking The cracking extended into the 00 extended OD of the nozzle. A boat sample was taken for metallographic metallographic examination... The most probable root cause of the Alloy 600 CRDM Nozzle # 21 examination was primary water stress corrosion cracking (pWSCC). (PWSCC). There was no indication indication of aggressive chemical species on the crack face. All the crack and its branches were final weld repair was performed ground out. The flna1 accordance with the ASME performed in accordance technique. Fillet weld was applied to the structural code using the temper bead -technique.
weld and final PT perfonned. performed. the total cost of these repairs was approximately $5.0 million
** Dave indicated that thetota:l and total dose was 60 REM. It a1so also extended the outage by two weeks.
It was also noted that all the previous B&WOG efforts were directed towards identifying and repairing the nozzle cracks and and not the welds. S14H-00550 Exhibit 24 Exhibit Exhibi 24 24f NRC002-0150 Dpnm P~no 11 nf
*f* ~I~*P~noc NRC002-0150
January 30. January 30, 200 20011 BWOG Materials SWOG Materials Committee Committee Meeting Meeting Page 2 The Materials The Materials Committee Committee is concemedabout concerned about the future inspections of of B& B&W W plants outages. There will be five outages during the coming outages. outages this year. ANO-l ANO-I and Oconee-2 Oconee-2 spring outages. 1M-I. have spring TM-1, CR-3CR-3 and and Oconee-3 will have fall fall outages. CR-3 has a outages. CR.;3 commitment for CRDM CRDM nozzle ID ID inspection from under the the head head during this this faIl. fall. The inspection is B&WOG funded but not the the repair (s). (s). The Materials Committee is is recommending the following actions to address the above issues to support spring outages. 1.
- 1. Perform safety Perfonn safety analysis to justifycon~nued justify continued operation operation with CRDM nozzle cracking.
- 2. technique for CRDM Develop inspection technique CRDMnozzlenozzle weld and consider delivery approach.
approach.
- 3. Oconee-1 repair and develop generic Optimize Oconee-l generi~ repair procedures.
- 4. Evaluate other repairs.
5.
- 5. Support Alloy 600 MRP ITG to develop develop an industry industry plan.
The Materials Committee also stated that complete head cleaning during outages should Materials Committee should be aa top be priority. Also tOP priority. Also the the CRDM CRDM flange leaks should flange leaks should bebe fixed. TheThe headstand headstand should be modified fOr modified for Roman (tool) access access and inspection inspection openings openings added to service struc~.structure. The VC Summer Summer hot leg leg weldcraeking weld cracking was also discussed. discussed. The cracking cracking and leakage was confirmed in "A" wasconfinned "A" hot leg Alloy 821182 weld between between RV nozzle nozzle low alloy steel and and stainless steel. B&WOG hot leg and cold legRV stainless steel. leg RV nozzle nozzle materials materials and welds are not the the same design as VC Summer. However. However, similar materials materials and weld configurations weld configurations are found atat other piping locations in B&W plants. B&WOG inB&W B&WQG NDE NnE committee committee is working working on dissimilar dissimilar metal weld qualification qualification program (Report 47-5006903-00). 47-5006903-00). The The NRC has mandated mandated the use of use of Appendix VIII, "Performance Demonstration YIn. "Performance Demonstration for Ultrasonic Ulttasonic Examination Systems", of Examination Systems", of Section Section XI ofof ASME ASMEB B & PV code for the PVcode the inspection inspection of LWRL WR plant components. components. The required required date to implement implement the requirements requirements of Supplement Supplement 10, 10, "Qualification "Qualification Requirements ReqUirements for Dissimilar Dissimilar Metal Metal Piping Welds", Welds", is November November 22.2002. 22, 2002. This This program program is is being being managed managed by by EPRI EPRI coupled coupled with with NSS design specific specific mockups. mockups. ANO-I ANO-l is planning planning to inspect inspect 12 12 dissimilar dissimilar welds welds in in the spring spring outage. S14H-0055 S14H-00551 1 NRC002-0151 NRC002-0151
January January 30, 30, 2001 2001 BWOG BWOG Materials Committee Materials Committee Meeting Meeting Page Page 33 The The EPRI EPRI Alloy Alloy 600 600 MRP MRP ITGITa isis addressing addressing the the NRC NRC concerns concerns particularly particularlythethe extent extentofof condition, condition, industry industry NDE NDEcapability capability and andthe the impact impact ononleak leak before beforebreak. break. B&WOG B&WOGhas has been been reques^z.d reques=::d to to develop develop Safety Safety Analyses Analyses in in support support of ofAlloy Alloy 600 600 ITG. ITG. The The Materials Materials committee committee hashas been been working working onon Alloy Alloy 600 600issues issues for for the the past past six six years. years. Appendix Appendix A A (attached) (attached) shows shows the the summary summary of ofthe the Alloy Alloy 600 600 program. program. IfIfyou you have have anyany questions, questions, please please contact contactme me at at extension extension7351. 7351. PKG/lmk PKGllmk Attachments Attachments cc: cc: B.B. R. R. Gallatin Gallatin 1056 1056w/aw/a D. C. D. C. Geisen Geisen 3105 3lO5 w/a w/a G. G. T. T. Hayes Hayes 3lO5 w/a 3105 w/a T. A. Lang T.A. Lang 3105 3105 wla w/a G. N. G. N. LeBlanc LeBlanc 3205 3205 w/a w/a T. T. A. A. McDougall McDougall 3105 3105 w/a w/a D. D. J.J. Mominee Mominee 3335 3335 wia w/a Mechanical/Structural Mechanical/Structural Unit Unit 3210 3210w/aw/a S14H-00552 S14H-00552 NRC002-0152 NRC002*0152
t A13C - 1(4, q
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Prasoon K. K.Goyal To: Andrew J. Slemaszko/FiRstEnergy@FirstEnergy Slemoszke/RrstEnergy@FhstEnergy cc: Thee Swlm/TE/RrstEnergy@FirstEnergy. David C. S. Swrm/TE/RirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Theo S. 03/26/2001 01 :03 PM 01:03 Geisen/TE/ArstEnergy@First~rgy. Mark Geisen/TE/RrstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Mark A. McLaughlin/TE/Flrs'fEnergy@ArstEnergy. McLaughlin/TE/Flrsitnergy@RrstEnergy. John B. B. Cunnings/TE/FirstEnergy@ArstEnergy Cunnings/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy Subject Cracking
Subject:
Oconee3 CRDM Nozzle Cracking Following Oconee Following Oconee 3 nozzles/ nozzles/ J-grov~ J-grove weld weld have have cracks: 3,7, 3, 11,23,28,34,50,56,68 7, 11, 23. 28. 34. 50. 56, 63 AJI of the above All nozzles have heat # M above nozzles M 3935. DB nozzles # 1, 08 Z 3,4
- 1. 2. 3. 4 and 5 have the same heat # M3935. Special Special attention should be paid to to these nozzles during the next visual examination of the RV RVhead U.S. NRC U.S. NRC <)- {l.J> '/ Z Inre DAVID GEISEN 54;oEtfibR EINbIt.~
InreDAVIDGEISENJA11 Docket # 1IA-052 A-05-052* . Date Martead-for IDLi 20083(Zr.. "
. Date Markedior IOl1/.J-. 2008 (Tr.p.§Z> )
DOCKETED USNRC USNRC Date Date Offe*ed'in Offered in Ev: fi/i.-. 2008 (Tr. p.) '2 Y ) 2008 (Tr. Through~I: Thmugh Witne I-L4.~J;t September 9, 2009 (11:00am) September 9,2009 (1 1:00am) Acbm Action: -
.. / . REJECTED wmtDRAWN REJECTED WFTNDORAWN Da* 2--.. .2008 (Tr. p- 9) 2-& >> .
OFFICE OF OFFICE OF SECRETARY SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND DaB 2 r.p?~ M.uo RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS ADJUDICATIONS STAFF STAFF
~-A-T~I - 0~) S Sc~
PIT.s 27/6< U.S. NRC In Inre NRC re DAVID DAVIDGEISEN c" L J It-. t-- GEISEN__BON {\ ? n L; Exh&bIt ,~ .J.. Docket # 1A-OS-OS2 Prasoon K. Prasoo" K.Goyal Goyal To: Andrew J. Siemaszko/Fi .. . J7 ) o0 215 04/06/01 1l:19,AM MCLaughlin/TE/FirstEn McLaughtin/TE/FirstEn Date Date Marked Marked for ID:L..:f-L-. ID 2008 (Tr. 2008_(Tr2008 p,-~ L-.
~~~ ~~:~~: ~::~~~~:~!~
04/06/01 11:19 AM cc: Theo S. Swim/TE/FirstE .r / 0 (Tr.p..... cc: Theo S. Swim/TE/FirstE Date Offered Date Offered inin Ev: /ilq 2008 (Tr. p.oZ&
,2008 pZL(. ))
nT_./JI.&;~/~t:
Subject:
FW: CRDM
Subject:
""" s Thrugh WrtnessIE CRDM Safety Analys Through l./"ne _______
The generic questions raised by CP&L are good questions also. questions and f(
~.
f( Action: AO'fLh E 6 REJECTED WITHDRAWN REJiCTED
..................... Forwarded by teo /pLL ,2008 (T p. 32A~)
a/so. Prasoon K.Goyal/TE/FirstEnergyon ...................... Forwarded by Prasoon K. Goyal/TE/F(rstEnergy on 04 a
- 04 DDate:
-r--' . 2008 (Tr. '. -
- r. p......:.......
~ Ar%- "Gray, "Gray. William William R" 04/06/2001 07:12:10 AM <WGray@framatech.com> on 04/06/2001 R" <WGray@framatech.com> AM <ndr,77'11 To: 'dewhitak@duke-ener~gy. com 'dewhitak@duke*energy. corn (E*
(E-mail)' <dewhitak@duke.energy.com>, 'dspond@entergy. com mail), <dewhitak@duke*energy.cor'n>, corn (E-mail)' <dspond@entergy.com>, (E*mail)" <dspond@entergy.com>, 'pkgoyal@firstenergycorp.
"pkgoyal@firstenergycorp. corncom (E*
(E-mail)" mail)'
<pkgoyal@firstenergycorp.com>, 'robert. <pkgoyal@firstenergycorp.com>, "robert. p. lemberger@fpc.
lemberger@fpc. comcorn (E*mail)' (E-mail)*
<robert.p.lemberger.fpc_com>, 'greg. <robert.p.lemberger@fpc.com>. gerzen@exeloncorp. coam 'oreg. gerzen@exeloncorp. (E-mail) com (E*mail)" <greg.gerzen@exeloncorp.com> <greg.gerzen@exeloncorp.com>
cc: "Fyfitch, Stephen'<SFyfitch@framatech.com>
'Fytitch, Stephen* <SFyfitch@framatech.com>
Subject:
FW: CRDM CRDM Safety Safety Analyses Questions Questions FYI---Questions about the B&W plant plant situation and its generic implications DOCKETED DOCKETED FYI***Questions implications USNRC from Vaughn Wagoner of CP&L. September September 9, 2009 (11:00am)(11 :OOam) Bill OFFICE OF SECRETARY OFFICE Original.....
- -Original Message .....
Message----* RULEMAKINGS From: Wagoner, Vaughn [mailto:vaughn.wagoner@pgnmail.com) [1] RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF STAFF Sent: Thursday, April 05, 2001 7:37 PM PM . To: Warren Bamford (E*mail); (E-mail); John Hall (E*mail); (E-mail); steve Steve Fyfitch (E-mail); (E-mail); Steve Hunt (E*mail); (E-mail); William William R (E-mail) R Gray (E*mail) Cc: Chuck Cc; Chuck Welty (E* (E-mail); mail); Larry Mathews (E-mail); Larry Mathews (E-mail); Tom Alley (E-mail); (E-mail); Gary Moffatt (E-mail) Moffatt (E*mail)
Subject:
CRDM Safety Analyses Questions Analyses Questions After reviewing the summary information from Oconee (attached), I/ have summary information have put put together a list of questions questions that I'd like you folks to be in a a postion to address address at the pre*m~ting pre-meeting next Wednesday. Wednesday. The questions questions are aimed at at seeing if there is ANYTHINGANYTHING we can deduce from the current inspections, previous previous inspections, and worldwide information information that can be used to take the the heat off plants with near-termroutages, such that they don't have to alter with near-term\outages, current outage plans. We need to collectively think about this real hard, because because IforseeI forsee two possible outcomes outcomes of the meeting meeting next Thursday. One is that the NRC concludes that the INDUSTRY, NRC concludes INDUSTRY, as represented represented by the PWRMRP, PWRMRP, really is working together to solve this problem and the NRC can count on us us do the right thing; or that the industry cannot. to (jo cannot, in fact, work work together together to solve this problemproblem and generic communications communications are in order. II hope the first one is their conclusion. conclusion. Please Please don't justjust look look at these narrowly* narrowly. keep in mind mind the industry objectives of 1)safety industry objectives l)safety first, first. 2)minimizing 2)minimizing cost cost and exposure. exposure. If yanking the insulation off all heads heads right now is the right thing to do, then so be it. But II don't want to look look back in 6 months months or a year year and see that we spent a lot of dose dose and money chasing the wrong wrong S14H-00458 NRC010-0458 NRC010-0458
Prasoon K.Goyal Prasoon K. Goyal To: Andrew J. Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Mark A. A. McLaugh lin ITE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy McLaughlin/TE/FirstEnergy@Fi rstEnergy 04/06/01 11: 1:19AM 19 AM cc: Theo S. Swim/TE/FirstEnergy, Swim/TE/FirstEnergy. David C. Geisen/TE/FirstEnergy Geisen/TE/FirstEnergy cc: rheoS. Theo .S. Swim/TE/FirstEnergy, Swimn/TE/FirstEnergy, David David C.C. Geiseri/TE/FirstEnergy Geisen/TE/FirstEnergy
Subject:
FW: CRDMSafety CRDM Safety Analyses Analyses Questions Questions The generic questions raised by CP&L are good questions and few of them (are applicable applicable to DBDB . also.. also ...................... Forwarded by Prasoon ...................... Forwarded Prasoon K.K. Goyal/TE/FirstEnergy Goyal/TEtFirstEnergy on 04/06/200 04/06/200111:221 11:22 AM AM c=8t. _-;;;J
~ "Gray. William .R" "Gray. R" <WGray@framatech.com> <WGray@framatech.com> on 04/06/2001 07:12:10 AM 04/06/200107:12:10 AM To: *dewhitak@duke.energy. corn *dewhitak@duke*energy. com (E-mail)* <dewhitak@duke-energy.com>, *dspond@entergy.
(E* mail)" <dewhitak@duke*energy.com>, "dspond@entergy. comcorn (E-mail)' <dspond@entergy.com>, "pkgoyal@firstenergycorp. com (E*mail)" <dspond@entergy.com>,*pkgoyal@firstenergycorp. corn (E*mail)* (E-mail)"
<pkgoyal@firstenergycorp.corn>, *robert. <pkgoyal@firstenergycorp.com>, "robert. p. lemberger@fpc. corn (E-mail) com (E* mail)" <robert.p.lemberger@fpc.com>. "greg. <robert.p.lemberger@fpc.com>. gerzen@exeloncorp. com *greg. gerzen@exeloncorp. corn (E*mail)"
(E-mail)"
<greg.gerzen@exeloncorp.corn> <greg.gerzen@exeloncorp.com>
cc: 'Fyfitch,Stephen' "Fyfitch, Stephen" <SFyfitch@framatech.com>
<SFyfitch@framatech.com>
Subject:
Subject:
FW: FW: CRDM Safety Analyses Questions Analyses Questions FYI---Questions about the B&W plant situation and its generic implications FYI***Questions about the B&W plant situation and its generic implications from Vaughn Wagoner of CP&l. CP&L. Bill Original.....Message*****
- Original Message-....
From: Wagoner, Vaughn [2] [mailto:vaughn.wagoner@pgnmail.com) Sent: Thursday, April 05, 2001 2001 7:37 PM PM To: Warren Warren Bamford (E*mail); (E-mail); John Hall (E*mail);Steve (E-mail); Steve Fyfitch (E-mail); Fyfitch (E*mail); Steve Hunt (E-mail);(E*mail); William R R Gray (E-mail) (E*mail) Cc: Chuck Welty (E-mail); Larry Welty (E*mail); Larry Mathews (E* (E-mail); mail); Tom Alley (E* (E-mail); mail); Gary Moffatt (E-mail) (E~mail)
Subject:
Subject:
CRDM Safety Analyses Questions Questions After reviewing the summary information from Oconee (attached), I have put summary information put together aa list of questionsquestions that I'd like you folks to be in a postion to address at the pre* pre-meeting meeting next Wednesday. The questions are aimed at at seeing if there is ANYTHING ANYTHING we can deduce from the current inspections, inspections, previous inspections, previous inspections, and worldwide information that can be used to take the heat off plants with near*term near-term outages, such that they don't have to alter current outageoutage plans. We need to collectivelycollectively think about this real hard, because II forsee two possible outcomes because outcomes of the meeting next Thursday. One is that the NRC concludes that the INDUSTRY, INDUSTRY, .as as represented by the PWRMRP, PWRMRP, really is working together together to solve this problem and the NRC can count on us us to do the right thing; or that the industry cannot, in fact, work together together to solve this problem problem and generic communications communications are in order. I hope the the first one is their conclusion. Please Please don't just look at these narrowly.* narrowly :- keep in mind mind the industry objectives of 1)safety industry objectives 1)safety first, 2)minimizing 2)minimizing cost and exposure. exposure. If yanking the insulation off all heads right now is the right thing to do, then so be it. But II don't want to look back in 6 months months or a year and see that we spent spent aa lot of dose and money chasing the wrong wrong S14H-00458 S14H-00458 NRCOI0-0458 NRC010-0458
n things. Any responses that you can supply earlier than next Wednesday, including Wednesday. including other/better thoughts, please do so. Thanks!!
<<ONS3 CRDM Summary.doc>> <<Questions <<ONS3 CRDMSummary.doc>> Analyses.doc>> <<Questions for Generic Safety Analyses.doc>>
oD . . Summary.doc CRDM Summary.doc ONS3 CRDM oD. Analyses.doc Questions for Generic Safety Analyses.doc S14H-00459 NRC010-0459 NRC010-0459
RAE 0- 1(0(ý u.s. U.S. NRC In In re re DAVID DAVID GEISEN GEISEN_ ) Docket #A 1I A-05-052 rkrv'I,%+ AJnfLnR9
/
I J ('f\ c-.t-r Exi/4 I 1'),) 5 bt ._...!:_-__ ExhibIt 5 . From: Kevin A. Spencer/rE/FirstEnergy A. SpencerfTElFirstEnergy Marked for Date Marked ID, for ID:1.l/.J-. 2008 (Tr. 2008 p.12 . ) (Tr. p. To: To: Prasoon K. Prasoon K. GoyalfTEI~irstEnergy@:i.rstEnergy, Goyal/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Thea C. Geisen/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, GeisenfTElFirstEnergy@FlrstEnergy, Wilham William A. Theo S S...Swi Mugge/TE/FirstE A. MuggefTElFlrstE* SWi Offered Date Offered Date in Ev: J.i./.i-, ______, (Tr. p. 22 2008 (Tr. 1fJ.
& )
Z (, Moffitt/C~IIFirstE Through WitnessPanel: Eshelman/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Steven P. Moffitt/CEI/FirstE E.ShelmanfTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy,Stevenp. Wrtn~~~~el:--1f..;'IlJ-f/"':""-------
!UJ/11 Leisuref/E/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Dale R. Wuokko/TE/FirstEner LeisurefTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, WuokkofTElFlrstEner A Action: . AOMm~ REJECTED RE WITHDRAWN WITHDRAWN cc:
cc:
Subject:
CRDM CRDM Nozzle Nozzle Cracking Cracking Action: Date: (iff '
.REJECTED Date: 42...., 2008 2008 (Tr. p. 3llA )
(Tr. p. Date: 4/16/2001 6:40:161010 4116/2001 6:40:161010
-.- ..-----------.--.. Forwarded by Kevin A. Spencer/TE/FirstEnergy on 04/1612001 06:41 AM -------------------- Forwarded by Kevin A. SpencerfTEiFirstEnergy on 04116/200.106:41 AM -------------------DOCKETED . . DOCKETED USNRC USNRC September September 9, 9, 2009 2009 (1.1:00am)
(1.1 :OOam)
"Roger Huston" <Roger@licensingsupport.com> <Roger@licensingsupport.com> on 04/1312001 09:08:31 09:08:31 AM OFFICE OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS AND To: "'Wuokko" <drwuokko@firstenergycorp.com>, Wuokko <drwuokko@firstenergycorp.com>, *'David "'David Lockwood" Lockwood" <David"';H. <DavidH.
ADJUDICATIONS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS S-rAFF
-Lockwood @firstenergycorp.com>, <Kevin_A._Spencer@firstenergycorp.com>
_Lockwood@firstenergycorp.com>, <KevinA._Spencer@ firstenergycorp.com> cc: S~ubject: CRDM Nozzle Cracking
Subject:
Cracking attended a meeting at NRC yesterday I attended yesterday whichwhich will likely likely be *of of interest interest for for your your upcoming visit visit by Commissioner Commissioner Merrifield. Merrifield. DaviS-Besse Davis-Besse is is not one of of the plants about the about which there is is safety concern. concern, .but but I would eXpect expect the Commissioner to take advantage advantage of his visit visit to .trytry to understand understand better better a current "hot" current "hot" issue. issue. The issue is is CRDM CRDM nozzle cracking. cracking. Cracks were detected detected at Oconee Oconee 1 late last last year. year, one of .them through-wall and allowing them through-wall allowing leakage.leakage. Cracks were detected detected at Oconee 3 in February. 9 of them leakers. in February, leakers. A k crack crack was found at at ANO-l in ANO-l in March. March. 8PRI's Materials EPRI's Materials Reliability Reliability Project (MRP) (MRP), . with licensing assistance from licensing assistance from NEI, NEI. has been addressing addressing this issue for the industry. industry. It It has been been coupled with the with the MRP MRP response to hot leg cracking cracking at Summer.Summer. I have have attended previous previous meetings on the subject, subject, most of which which described planned actions re: CRDMS, CRDMS. since the program is is in its .earlystages. in its early stages. technical The technical arguments arguments used in in those earlier meetings to alleviate alleviate near-termnear-term concern largely centered centered around .the the stress regime regime in in the CRDM nozzles. nozzles, in in which hoop stresses are expected dominate. and the expectation expected to dominate, expectation that anl' any cracking would therefore therefore be axially axially oriented. oriented. Inspections at Oconee Oconee 3, 3. and now at at ANO, ANO. have have detected detected circumferential circumferential cracking. cracking, which appears to have have highlighted highlighted NRC concern. concern. Yesterday'S Yesterday's meeting was apparently apparently requested by by Brian Sheron Sheron as a result of those concerns. concerns. The The industry presentations presentations were excellent, and satisfied were excellent. satisfied NRC to the point point that no immediateimmediate regulatoryregulatory action action is expected. Issues and questions is expected. remain, remain. however, however, as described described further below. below. First, I will briefly briefly describe the phenomena that have been identified. S14Q-016 44 S14Q-01644 L~cL ~,L T~ s~~- NRC01 9-1644 NRC019-1644
From: Kevin A. Spencer/TE/FirstEnergy A. SpancerfTEiFirstEnargy To: Prasoon K. Prasoon Goyal/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Theo K. GoyalfTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, SwimiTE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, David Thea S. SwimfTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, David Geisen/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, William A. C. GeisenfTE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, A. MuggefTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Mugge/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, David L. L. Eshelman/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Steven P. MaffittlCEI/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, EshelmanffEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Moffitt/CEl/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Michael Michael K. K. Leisure/TE/FirstEnergy @FirstEnergy, Dale R. WuokkafTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy LeisureffEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, WuokkolTE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy cc:
Subject:
CRDMCRDM Nozzle Cracking Cracking Date: bate: 4/16/2001 6:40:161010 4/16/20016:40:161010
- ---------***** Forw arded by
----........ Forwarded Kevin A by Kevin Spencer/T E/FirstE nergy on A.. SpencerfTEiFirstEnergy 06:4 1 A 04/16/200 1 06:41 on 04116/2001 M.-**
AM . . .- ..---****
- "Roger Huston" <Roger@licensingsuPPclrt.com>
Roger .Huston" <Roger@icensingsupport.com> on 04/13/2001 04113/2001 09:08:31 AMAM To: To: "'Wuokko'" <drwuokko@firstenergycorp.com>, "David
*'Wuokko'* .<drwuokko@fir.)tenergycorp.com>, Lockwood" <David~H. *'David Lockwood" <DavidH.
_Lockwood @firstenergycorp.com>, .<Kevin_A._Spencer@firstenergycorp.com> _Lockwood@firstenergycorp.com>, <KevinA._..Spencer@ firstenergycorp.com> cc:
Subject:
CRDM CRDM Nozzle Cracking Cracking I attended a meeting at NRC yesterday which will likely be of interest interest for for your upcoming upcoming visit visit by Commissioner Commissioner Merrifield. Merrifield. Davis-Besse is is not one of of the plants about which which there is is safety concern., concern, .but but II would expect the Commissioner Commissioner to take advantage of his visit to try to Understand understand better better a current "hot" issue. issue.. The issue issue is is CRDM CRDM nozzle cracking. nozzle cracking. Cracks Cracks were detected detected at Oconee 1 late last year, year, one of .them them through-wall through-wall and allowing leakage. leakage. Cracks were were detected at Oconee 3in 3 in February, February, 9 of them leakers. leakers. A A crack was found at at ANO-l ANO-lin in March. March. EPRI's Materials Materials ReliabilityReliability Project (MRP) (MRP), , with licensing licensing assistance assistance from from NEI, has been addressing this issue for the industry. NEI, industry. It It has been been coupled with the MRP response to hot leg cracking cracking at Summer. Summer. I have attended attended previous meetings on the subject, subject, most of which described planned planned actions re: CRDMS, CRDMS, since the program is is in in its early stages. technical stages. The technical arguments used in arguments in those earlier earlier meetings to alleviate near-term concern alleviate near-term largely largely centered centered around the stress around .the stress regime in in the CRDM nozzles, nozzles, in in which hoop stresses stresses are expected expected to dominate, dominate, and the expectationexpectation that any cracking therefore be axially oriented. would therefore oriented. Inspections Inspections at Oconee 3, 3, and .nownow at at ANO, have detected ANO, circumferential cracking, detecte.d *circumferential cracking, which appears appears to have have highlighted highlighted NRC concern. concern. Yesterday's meeting meeting was apparently apparently requested requested by Brian Brian Sheron as a result of those concerns. concerns. The industry presentations presentations were were excellent, excellent, and satisfiedsatisfied NRC to the point point that no immediate regulatory action action is expected. is expected. Issues and questions questions remain, remain, however, however, as describeddescribed further below. below. First, I will briefly describe the phenomena phenomena that have have been identified. identified. S14Q-01644 44 S14Q-016 NRC019-1644 NRC019-1644
The joint The joint connecting connecting a CRDM CRDM nozzle nozzle to to the the vessel vessel head, head, and and forming forming the pressure boundary, pressure boundary, is aaJ-weld is j-weld on on the the underside underside of of the the head head around around the the nozzle. The nozzle. rhe material material usedus.ed in in most plants plants isis susceptible susceptible to stress stress corrosion cracking. Residual cracking. Residual stresses stresses fromfrom initial initial welding welding provide provide the the driving driving force. force. It is It is here here .that the cracking that the cracking has been been expected expected to to be axial, axiaL and and that that isis what what has been has been found. found. The new problem problem occurs above above that, that, within the thickness thickness of of vessel head. the vessel head. The nozzles nozzles are installed installed in in the vessel vessel with aa slight slight interference interference fit. fit. were cooled They were cooled to -140F,
-140F, inserted, and inserted, and allowed allowed to expand expand to to roughly roughly aa half half to one one mill interference interference at at 70F.
70F. At operating operating temperature t.emperature and pressure, pressure, differential expansion differential expansion creates creates aa small, small, onon the order order of one mill, mill, annular annular crevice around crevice around thethe nozzle. nozzle. Stresses Stresses here,here, away away from the the residual residual stresses stresses of the J-weld, of J-weld, are different. different. What is is happening happening is is that primary primary water water is is leaking through leaking through axial axial cracks cracks in in the welds welds and and filling filling thethe crevice crevice area. area. OD OD stress corrosion stress corrosion cracking cracking is is then then initating initating in in the
.the nozzle nozzle and and progresses progresses circumferentially.
circumferentially. Cracking of as much as 180 degree extent Cracking extent has been been found at Oconee Oconee 3.3. The safety safety concern concern is is heightened heightened by the fact fact that this cracking cracking is is outside outside the structural structural boundary boundary formed formed by the J-weld. J-weld. If If a crack progressed progressed completely around the nozzle completely around nozzle and through-wall through-wall for most of of that that distance, distance, then then primary primary system system pressure forces forces alone alone would result in a result .in CRDM ejection CRDM ejection accident. accident. Other loads, loads, such such asas seismic, seismic, could cause a "near-full" crack to break, break, and questions questions were posed about that yesterday. yesterday. The major major argUment argument in in justifying justifying continued operation of the continued operation the fleet is that is that the processes processes that create create these cracks cracks would would take take many years to to prOduce prdduce cracks cracks that could could create create a safety safety problem. problem. There is some disagreement is some disagreementabou,:about how many years w.ouldwould be required, required, since the availableavailable crack growth growth rate data is conditions inside is based on conditions inside the primary system and conditions conditions inin the crevice region are expected crevice region expected to be diffe;ent. different. How different, different, and .how how that that affects crack crack growth grow.th are unknown. unknown. Even without that question, however ,NRC question, however, NRC is is having withwith the industry reliancereliance on a long growth growth period. NRC's concern about that argument is is that for most plants, plants, other than B&W, B&W, operators might operators might not know that the problemproblem had initiated, initiated, and thus might not be able to take action within action within the time required required for it it to progress to a level of concern. concern. plants are not affected B&W plants affected by this concern, concern, because because they cancan detect detect the leakage. small leakage. This isis a function function of the way the reactor Vessel vessel head is is insulated. insulated. The service service structure over a B&W head means that the head
- surface, surface, at the nozzle nozzle penetrations, penetrations, is is available available for visual inspection.
inspection. All of the known cracks were first first detected by observing boron precipitate precipitate around nozzles during GL 88-05 visual inspections. inspections. service structures The service at Oconee have beenrnodified been :modified by adding large view portholes (approx. (approx. 6 6 inch diameter) at mid-height facilitate these inspections. mid-height to facilitate inspections. Other B&W plants, plants, presumably including Davis-Besse, presumably including Davis-Besse, inspect through smaller smaller "mouse ho.les" nea!" holes" near where the vessel service structure meets the head. head. Westinghouse and CE westinghouse CE plants are insulated in in different different ways,ways, but all all have insulation on the head itself itself in some way. The number of nozzles available for visual inspection in is is limited unless insulation is removed. It is removed. It isis at these plants that NRC is is concerned a problem could exist without the operator's concerned? operator's knowledge. knowledge. (The (The amount amount of leakage leakage is is far too small to be identified by monitoring primary system leakage or even by detecting radioactivity in in the containment containment atmosphere) atmosphere). . NRC staff remained remained concerned concerned aboutabout this at the the end of yesterday'S yesterday's meeting. meeting. S14Q-01645 NRC019-1645 NRC019-1645
Brian Sheron specifically Brian She:::-on spec-4fically noted that the industry arguments told him nothing about the cur:::-er..t current risk of an accident resulting from this problem. accident resulting problem, or the current current state of the rest of the Eleet.. fleet. (It was at least implied that this (It this problem likely likely exists at other other plants and has only been been detected detected at B&W B&W plants to dace becal.. . se of their unique date because unique ability to detect it). it). MRP is t1RP is committed corru:nitted to providing providing a safety assessment to NRC 4/27. 4/27. That That coincides :with coincides .... it!1 your visitvisit from Commissioner Commissioner Merrifield. Merrifield. Given Given. the apparent apparent significance be~ng significance being placed on this issue by the staff. staff, it is almost it is almost certain that Merrifield's Merrifield's staff. staff, if i f not the Commissioner Commissioner himself, himself. will have have been been briefed on the issue before before his visit. visit. I would expect expect him to use the opportunity opportunity of the plant plant visit visit to learn learn more about it. about it. tI recommend recommend that you have people ready ready to respond in in detail detail to any questions. questions. Drawings Drawings and, and. yet, pictures better yet. pictures (if (if any) should should be available. available. A description description of how D-B its visual does its visual inspections, inspections, if if possible possible presented presented by the engineer engineer who inspections, would performs those inspections, '",ould be helpful. helpful. I do not know that I would would include the issue directly directly in in any presentations presentations you are planning, planning, but would would rather be prepared prepared to jump on any questions he would ask. ask. Please call call me if if you have any additional additional questions. questions. Roger W.W. Huston Huston Licensing Licensing Support Services Support Services 703-671-9738 703-671-9738 http://www.licensingsupport.com S14Q-01646 S14Q*01646 NRC019-1646 NRC019-1646
c~l&2 DOCKETED USNRC September 9,- 2009 (11:00am) DotaW # I1A-05-052 Date Marked for ID.Ž 2006 (Tr .- (Tr.P 2008 ( Date Otfsed inEv:/-4'L ThmoUgh n s p n t: ,:1, L Action:) REJECTED Wffl4DRWVN QIAAK-03205 NR0005 3 tS~ ARMTM-Y 0 t1- APL O9r 51c-kcZ4
I
A 4 I S4A-03208 S14A-03208 'I 4 NRC005-3184 NRC005-3184
I
April 19, 2001 o-
F-0
15
,CRDM Nozzle and. Weld Cracking l:*Info'rmation Excha!nge Meeting*
- Lyn:chb=urg,
*Ai April 19, 2001' 19 IilApril 19,2001 20 *S14A-03218 1 NRCOO,5.-3gq
I I
I
U.S. NRC U.S. NRC 5 f fT" In In re DAVID GEISEN re DAVID GEISEN c... -" ExhibIt.?- Exhibt '1 Docket # 1 A-DS-DS2 Docket # 1A-05-052 . Date Date Marked Marked for for IDIJ/L. 2008 (Tr. p. IDLý.$.. . 2008(Tr. p. 225' )
",.,,,,. ,,,",.,,.;'. Date Offered Date Through Offered in in Ev: il/L.,
Ev: /_2-.,2008 Wltness/Panel:--,-;V~' 2008 (Tr. I-,-e~ ____
- p. 22 (Tr. p. &Z(P ))
Through Witness/Panel:L*'// Acti~n: Action: ~ 4WEIED REJ~CTED REJECTED WITHDRAWN WITHDRAWN
, Date:
Date; tJ41-, 2008 2*05,2 (Tr. p,£lU
- p. i DOCKETED USNRC September 9, 2009 (1l1:00am)
OFFICE OF OFFICE OF SECRETARY SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS RULEMAKINGS AND AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS STAFF iaIlenperbead
,tead fgrinding to * .$1A-133226 I' -5ecy 67J--<l NRC6 5:4202.;.
-1
CRDM Nozzle and WeldC~¶racking Information Exchanige Meeting L~ynchb~urgVA~ April 19, 2001' Or~i~ginal Inspetion wa~s 4
- . .. Remote crawler video performed aound all
.... ~nozzle . .D~eveoped Modific~ation.... .. Package to Cut Access~ . even~t temper~ bead wel repair required~
aloe pnnsi the service supfport structure above the head
. "Access would be, reqiir' d to place cooe h~eat blankets on tpof head. "'-On~eaccess qpehing~cut,ýn&ar nozl . ..
although'not re quir'e~d
*S14A-022
I I
I
Ap Actual Flaw Repair Circumferential crack cutoff perpendicular ~to nozzle IDof nozzle. not grind si nce no ID flaws 152/1152 Weld Overlay fo~und and crack Amal Flaw depth in n~ozzle less
- than allowable crack d~epth for OD flaw 26 Si4A-0323&8 13 NRCQO5-32141
27 Major Chr9onoogy of <Events
~Began Outage 3/16/01 ýMTearn shift coverage, began 3/18/01 ,,.Day3/1/0 to 3/19/01 modifi ed headstand ~ -..3/18/01 com~pleted -vido exam and boron found 3/2091(1st time) and 3/24/01 (2nd ~time) installed head on headstan6d 28 SI 4A-03239 4 14
DOCKETED .--U.S. U.S. NRC , £' L t'f '/ v USNRC USNRC "In In re DAVID GEISEN ;:{ i" a... r V exhibit DAVID GEISEN a #~L. L . fTý) Docket # 1A-OS-052 1A-05-052 September September 9, 2009 (11:00am) (11 :OOam) . Date Marked Marked for ID.JJd!-. ID' " 2008 (Tr. p. 2ZL {Tr. p.o..4 OFFICE OF SECRETARY OFFICE SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS Date Offered Offered in Ji/.1-. in Ev: _., (Tr. p. 2008 (Tr. p. ;gzL~)
..- )
A-COMPANY MEMORANDUM A-COMPANY MEMORANDUM ADJUDICATIONS STAFF Through WJtnesslPanel:_t.::./U+-/~P Through Wnqess!_PaneI: /-,//4 _ _ _ _, ActiOn~ ~DD REJE,~TED Action: REJECTED WITHDRAWN WITHDRAWN Date: i1{I-,,2008 2008 2*. (Tr, (Tr. p. gZ-& ) ro TO Swim Supervisor, Mechanical/Structural T.S. Swim, Mechanical/Structural UnitUnit .. -c---- --,. --..., ... FOM FROM pzaso~enior Prasoon .Goyal, Senior Engineer, MechanicaVStnu:tural Mechanical/Structural Unit MAIL stop STOP 32"10 32"10 suBJECr SUBJECT NEVIMRP NEIIMRP Alloy 600 ITG and NRC Meeting PHONE 7351 I participated participated in the NEI/EPRI NEIlEPRI MRP 600 LTG meeting on April 11, 2001 and NRCIMRP MRP Alloy 600ITG NRC/MRP meeting on on April 12, 2001. l2,2oo1. Both of these meetings were were held in Washington, D.C. The meeting meeting' agenda and the list of 'attendees attendees is attached. The purpose purpose of NRW Alloy 600 ITG meeting was ofMRP was to prepare and coordinate coordinate the industry responseresponse to NRC letter sent to NEI on April 3,2001. 3, 2001. The .letter letter expressed concerns regarding the generic generic implication of Oconee implication Oconee 3 *circumferential circumferential cracks cracks on CRDM nozzles. NRC raised the following concerns/questions:
** A A discussion of how the results of the CRDM cracking (circumferential)
(circumferential) found at Oconee is being being utilized utilized byby the the lv1RP MNRP toto address address this this issue on a generic basis, basis.
- Discussion of the inspection plans, schedule, scope scope and method to be utilized in performing NDE of of the CRDMs.
CRDMs. This discussion discussion is requested to include a listing of all PWR's that are either in, or will be coming down for, becoming for, an outage during the current current outage session.
** The The schedule schedule for and scopescope of a generic safety assessment ofPWR*CRDM's of PWR CRDM's supported supported by deterministic deterministic and/or risk-informed.assessments, risk-informed assessments, that technical justification for establishes a teclIDical continued operation continued operation with with potentially degraded penetrations penetrations until such time as comprehensive comprehensive inspections can be performed inspections can be performed of the PWR CRDMs
- A discussion discussion of the implications implications of the recent service experience experience (circumferential (circumferential crack) on the commitments commitments made made in response response to GL97-0.1, GL97~1, "Degradation "Degradation of of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Mechanism Nozzle Nozzle and Other Vessel Vessel Closure HeadPenetration,"
Head Penetration," dated April 1, 1997. 1, 1997. MRP ITG group spent considerable MRP considerable time in discussing the facts .about Oconee Oconee 3 event. Mike Robinson of Duke of Duke EnergyEnergy presented an overview overview of Oconee 1 and Oconee Oconee 3 CRDM nozzles cracking. cracking, Five out of of eight instrument nozzles at Oconee eight Oconee 1I were were found cracked cracked and leaking. There were no circumferential circumferential cracks at cracks at Oconee Oconee 1. 1. The The summary summary of Oconee 3 cracks cracks is discussed below. Nine nozzles out of 69 were found found to to be be leaking. Examination of leaking. Examination of nine additional nozzles was performed. This examination nine additional examination did not show any show any significant significant indications. shouldbe indications. It should be noted that Oconee 3 has same heat of material material for 68 nozzles. nozzles. S14A.03314 S14A ..03314 NRC005-3289 P?~L~LA-TG C-Jc, L* Oz-- 0 2--NRCOOS"3289
FINTRA-COMPANY INTRA-COMPANY MEMORANDUM ED 8268-ED8261H1 MEMORANDUM FirstEnew ArstEnerw ro TO T.S. Swim, Mechanical/Structural Unit Swim Supervisor, Mechanical/Structural DATE DATE April 26, 2001 FROM FROM Pmso~enior PrasoontKGoyal, Senior Engineer, MechanicaVStructurai Mechanical/Structural Unit MAIL sTroP MAIL STOP 32"10 3il0 SUBJECT SUBJECT NEIIMRP Alloy 600 ITG and NRC Meeting PHONE PHONE 7351 I participated participated in the NEI/EPRI NEIlEPRI MRP MPW Alloy 600ITG 600 ITG meeting on April 11, 11, 2001 and NRC/MRP NRCIMRP meeting meeting on April 12,2001. 12, 2001. Both of these meetings were held in Washington, D.C. The meeting meeting agenda and the list of attendees is attached. of-attendees The purpose ofMRPof MRP Alloy 600 ITG meeting was to prepare and coordinate coordinate the industry response to NRC letter sent to NEINElon on April 3,3, 2001. The Jetter letter expressed expressed concerns regarding the generic implication implication of Oconee Oconee 3 circumferential circumferential cracks on CRDM nozzles. NRC raised the following following concerns/questions: concerns/questions:
*0 A discussion of how the results of the CRDM cracking cracking (circumferential) found at Oconee (circumferential) found Oconee is being being utilized by the MRP to address this this issue on a generic basis. *a Discussion of the inspection plans, schedule, scope and method to be utilized in performing performing NDE of of the CRDMs. This discussion is requested to include a listing of all PWR's that are either in, or will be coming down for, for, an outage during the current current outage session. *" TheThe schedule schedule for for and scope of and scope of aa generic generic safety safety assessment assessment of of PWR CRDM's supported PWR CRDM's supported by by deterministic risk-informed assessments, that establishes deterministic and/or ris1c-infOimedassessments, establishes a technical technical justification justification for continued continued operation with potentially degraded penetrations penetrations until such time as comprehensive comprehensive inspections can be performed of the PWR inspections PWR CRDMs ** A discussion of the implications implications of the recent recent service experience (circumferential (circumferential crack) on the commitments.made commitments.made in response to GL97-0.1, "Degradation GL97-01, "Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Me.chanism Nozzle and Other Vessel Closure Head Head.Penetration,"
Penetration," dated April 1, 1, 1997. MRP WRP ITG group spent considerable considerable time in discussing discussing the facts .about about Oconee 3 event. Mike Robinson of Duke Energy Energy presented an overview of Oconee 1 and Oconee 3 CRDM nozzles craCking. cracking. Five Fi ve out of eight instrument nozzles at Oconee 1I were found cracked cracked and leaking. There were no circumferential cracks at Oconee 1. 1. The summary Oconee 3 cracks is discussed below. Nine nozzles out of 69 were summary of Oconee found to be beleaking. leaking. Examination Examination of nine additional nozzles nozzles was performed. This examination examination did notnot show any significant significant indications. It should be notednoted that Oconee 3 has same heat of material material for 68 nozzles. S14A-03314 S14A-03314 NRC005-3289 NRC005-3289
~:t~ '~ vc~by MAY -I2001 5/4/01 Note to Prasoon:
Prasoon: j _
-Prasoon:
Excellent Excellent report!! report!! Thank you. you. FILE'.. Campbell Guy Campbell
.. GGC:n1f GGC:nlf cc: T.
cc: T. S. S.. Swjm Swim . D. C. D. C. Geisen Ceisen FILE: 1-:3~' S. P. S. Moffitt P. Moffitt: SI4A-03315 S14A-03315 NRC005-3290 NRC005-3290
Page 3 April 26. 2001
*0 Total of 48 indications indications in nine leaking CRDMs CRDMs 39 were axial and located beneath the weld weld 16 .16 .out out of 39 indications were through wall
.0* Confirmed Confirmed two above the weld circumferential circumferential cracks Nozzle 56 crack crack was through wall, approximately approximately 17017000 Nozzle 50 except indications on ID was not through except pin hole indications through wall Inspection and metallurgical resultsinclicate circumferential cracks were 00 results indicate that the circumferential OD initiated. The NEI/MRP concluded after Alloy 600 ITG put together a presentation NEIIMRP meeting concluded presentation for NRC meeting. Mike Robinson presented the details of Oconee 3 CRDM cracking at the NRC meeting. NRC (B. MikeRobinson Sharon) Sharon) was very interested interested in knowing the basis of OD/weld OD/weld initiated cracks. Mike said that this was a surprise because the previous analysis showed showed that most of the cracks would be axial. NRC asked whether whether this type of cracking cracking is applicable applicable to other plants (Westinghouse (Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering) Combustion Engineering) besides B&W B&W plants. The answer answer was yes because because the CRDM material material and construction is similar to B&W plants. Mike also told NRC that Duke will be replacing RV head on all Oconee Oconee Units during during 2003 -2004
-2004 time period period when the steam generators will be replaced.
Steve Fyfith of FfI presented presented the Safety Assessment (SA) for B&WOG B&WOG plants. The SA basically basically indicated that these types of cracks cracks are very tight and the leakage leakage rate is very low. This is confirmed by by Oconee 3 unidentified leak rate being well below 1I gpm inspite of 9 leaking CRDMs. The leakage could be detected detected by the boron deposits on the head during the visual inspection inspection performed performed at every concluded that circumferential outage. SA also concluded circumferential crack could grow to approximately 27000 through wall approximately 270 and still maintain the structural limit. NRC was concerned that right now circumferential circumferential cracks would would not be detected unless these start leaking. They were especially especially concerned about W/CE plants which inspect their heads because of insulation. NRC asked how industry is proposing to address this can not inspecttbeir issue. MRP stated stated that nothing extra could be done during the 2001 2001 spring outages. Industry will be developing a model for weld/OD initiated cracks cracks and prioritize prioritize the plant rankings (similar to GL97-01 response) prior to 2001 fallfall outage. This ranking will based on the EFPY and head temperature. Industry (vendors (vendors and EPRI) is developing NDE and repair techniques to address weld/OD initiated addressweldlOD initiated cracking. NRC said theywiH they will like to participate in the demonstration of NDE techniques. MRP
- MRP Actions:
- 0 Submittal of preliminary Safety Safety Assessment (SA) (SA) - 4127/01 4/27/01
*- Revision of inspection inspection recommendations recommendations for fall outages-6/30/0 outages - 6/30/011 ** Final Safety Assessment - 6/30/01
- Long term inspection inspection and evaluation evaluation guidelines guidelines being developed.
- Continued communication.and Continued.communication .and meetings meetings with NRC as needed.
If you have any questions please contact contact me at extension 7351. PKG/gmw Attachments Attachments S14A-03316 S14A-03316 NRC005-3291 NRC005-3291
Page Page 3 April 26, 2001 April 26. 2001 cc: G.G. Campbell G.O. Campbell DB3080 w/a DB3080w/a D.C. Geisen w/a DB3105 w/a T.A. Lang Lang w/a DB3105 w/a G.N. LeBlanc LeBlanc w/a DB3205 w/a TA. McDougall T.A. DB3105 w/a DB3105 w/a L.W. Myers BY-ADM w/a BV-ADM w/a D.J. Mominee D.l. w/a DB3335 w/a .6 D.P. Weakland Weakland BV BY w/a w/a Mechanical/Structural Unit MechanicallStructural DB3210 w/a DB3210 w/a SI4A-033l 7 S14A-03317 NRCOO5-3292 NRC005-3292
~'MAY 12001 5/4/01 Note to Prasoon:
Prasoon: J-I Prasoon: Excellent report!! Excellent report!! Thank you. you.
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cc: T. S. Swim T. S. D.C. Geisen D. C. Geisen FILE: /. j _')J S. S. P. Moffitt P. Moffitt SI4A-03318 S14A-03318 NRC005-3293 NRCOO5-3293
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INFORMATION NOTICE 2001-05: NRC INFORMATION THROUGH-WALL CIRCUMFERENTIAL 2001-05: THROUGH-WALL CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACKING CRACKING OF REACTOR REACTOR PRESSUREPRESSURE VESSEL HEAD CONTROL ROD DRIVE CONTROL DRIVE MECHANISM MECHANISM PENETRATION NOZZLES AT OCONEE NUCLEAR NOZZLES NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT UNIT 3 Addressees Addressees operating licenses for pressurized All holders of operating nuclear power pressurized water nuclear power reactors except those who who have ceased operations operations and have certified have certified that fuel has been permanently removed permanently removed from the the reactor vessel. Purpose Purpose The U.S. Nuclear Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice notice to alert
.addressees addressees to the recent detection recent detection of through-wall circumferential circumferential cracks in two of the control rod drive mechanism mechanism (CRDM) penetration penetration nozzles nozzles and weldments at the Oconee Nuclear Nuclear Station, Unit 3 (ONS3).
It is expected It expected that that recipients will review review the information information for applicability to their facilities and consider consider actions, as appropriate. However, -suggestions contained appropriate. However,suggestions contained in this information information notice are not NRC requirements; requirements; therefore, no specific specific actions or written response is required. required. Description of Circumstances Circumstances February 18, 2001, On February 2001, with ONS3 in Mode Mode 5; 5, Duke Energy Corporation Corporation (the licensee) licensee) performed a visual examination visual examination (VT-2)(VT-2) of the outer surface of the unit's reactor reactor pressure pressure vessel (RPV) head head to inspect for indications indications of borated water leakage. leakage. This RPV head inspection was was performed performed as part of aa normal surveillance surveillance during a planned maintenance maintenance outage. The VT-2 VT-2 revealed revealed the presence of small amounts amounts of boric acid residue in the vicinity of nine of the the .
.69 CRDM B9 CRDM penetration penetration nozzles (Figures 1 and 2). SubsequentSubsequent nondestructive examinations nondestructive examinations (NDEs) identified 47 recordable (NOEs) identified recordable crack indications in in these nine degraded degraded CRDM penetration nozzles.
nozzles. The licensee initially characterized licensee initially characterized these flaws as either axial or below-the-weld below-the-weld circumferential indications, and initiated repairs circumferential repairs of the degraded areas. NOEs NDEs of nine additional CRDM penetration nozzles nozzles from the same heat of material material were conducted conducted for "extent of 1 ) condition" purposes, but did not detect recordable indications.0 recordable indications.(1) . ML011160588 ML011160588 (1)1) Axial flaws are flaws that propagate propagate along the inside or outside diameter diameter length of the the CRDM nozzle. Below-the-weld circumferential nozzle. Below-the-weld circumferential indications indications are apparent flaws oriented around around the circumference circumference of the nozzle, beneath beneath the RPV head and below the area area where where the nozzle the nozzle is welded to the RPV head. A recordable indication indication is one that exceedsexceeds the NDE NDE acceptance acceptance criteria.
STATES UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY REGULATORY COMMISSION COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION REGULATION WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555-0001 April 30, 2001 INFORMATION NOTICE NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2001-05: THROUGH-WALL THROUGH-WALL CIRCUMFERENTIAL CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACKING CRACKING OF REACTOR PRESSURE PRESSURE VESSEL HEAD CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM CONTROL MECHANISM PENETRATION NOZZLES AT OCONEE NOZZLES OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 3 Addressees Addressees All holders of operating licenses for pressurized operating licenses pressurized water nuclear nuclear power reactors except those who who have have ceased ceased operations and have certified certified that fuel has been permanently permanently removed removed from the the reactor reactor vessel. Purpose Purpose The U.S. Nuclear Commission (NRC) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing issuing this information information notice notice to alert addressees addressees to the recent detection detection of through-wall circumferential cracks in two of the control through-wall circumferential rod drive mechanism mechanism (CRDM) penetration nozzles (CRDM) penetration nozzles and weldments weldments at the Oconee Nuclear Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3 (ONS3). Station, (ONS3). ItIt is expected that recipients recipients will review the information information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate. appropriate. However, suggestions containedcontained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; requirements; therefore, no specific actions or written response is required. required. Description of Circumstances Circumstances On February 18, 2001, 2001, with ONS3 ONS3 in Mode 5, Duke Energy Corporation Corporation (the licensee) performed a visual examination performed examination (VT-2) (VT -2) of the outer surface surface of the unit's reactor pressure pressure vessel (RPV) head to inspect for indications indications of borated borated water leakage. This RPV head head inspection was inspection was performed as part of a normal surveillance performed surveillance during a planned maintenance maintenance outage. The VT-2 VT-2 revealed revealed the presence presence of small amounts amounts of boric acid residue in the vicinity of nine of the the 69 CRDM penetration penetration nozzles (Figures 1 and 2). Subsequent nondestructive examinations Subsequent nondestructive examinations (NDEs) (NDEs) identified 47 recordable recordable crack indications in these nine degraded degraded CRDM CRDM penetration nozzles. The licensee characterized these flaws as either axial or below-the-weld licensee initially characterized below-the-weld circumferential circumferential indications, and initiated repairs of the degraded degraded areas. NDEs of nine additional CRDM penetration penetration nozzles from the same heat of material were conducted for "extent of indications.01 ) condition" purposes, but did not detect recordable indications.(1) ML011160588 ML011160588 (1) Axial flaws are flaws that propagate (1) propagate along the inside or outside diameter length length of the the CRDM nozzle. Below-the-weld circumferential nozzle. Below-the-weld circumferential indications are apparent apparent flaws oriented oriented around around the circumference circumference of the nozzle, beneath the RPV head and below the area where where the nozzle nozzle is welded welded to the RPV head. A recordable recordable indication indication is one that exceeds exceeds the NDE NDE acceptance acceptance criteria.
IN 2001-05 IN Page 2 of 5 Subsequent dye-penetrant dye-penetrant testing (PT) revealed additional indications in two of the nine revealed additional nine degraded penetration nozzles. degraded penetration nozzles. While affecting further repairs of these indications, the licensee licensee identified that each nozzle nozzle had significant circumferential cracks in the nozzle above the weld. significant circumferential investigations and metallurgical examinations Further investigations examinations revealed that these cracks had initiated from the outside diameter (00) (OD) of the CRDM penetration circumferential crack in penetration nozzles. The circumferential in the #56 CRDM nozzle was through-wall, through-wall, and the #50 #50 nozzle had pin hole hole through-wall 0 indications. These cracks followed the weld profile contour, and were nearly nearly 165 1650 in length. The licensee licensee stated pre-repair ultrasonic testing (UT) stated that pre-repair (UT) examinations identified examinations had identified indications in these areas during indications during the initial inspections, but these indications had been misinterpreted as craze cracking with unusual misinterpreted characteristics. The characterization unusual characteristics. characterization for these two nozzle indications was revised after the initial post-repair PT examinations. The licensee nozzle indications licensee concluded that the root cause concluded penetration nozzle cracking was primary cause for the CRDM penetration primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). This conclusion conclusion was based on metallurgical orientation, and finite element examinations, crack location and orientation, element analyses. Discussion The 69 CRDM nozzles at ONS3 ONS3 are approximately approximately 5 feet long and are J-groove welded welded to the the inner radius of the RPV head, with the lower end of each nozzle extending extending about inches about 6 inches inside of the RPV head (see Figure below the inside Figure 2). The nozzles constructed from 4-inch 00 nozzles are constructed OD Alloy 600 Inconel Inconel procured procured in accordance accordance with the requirements Specification SB-167, requirements of Specification Section IIIIto Section to the 1965 Edition the 1965 Edition (including (including Addenda Addenda through through Summer 1967) 1967) of of the American American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. During initial Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. During initial construction, each nozzle was machined machined to final dimensions dimensions to assure a match between between the the RPV head bore and the 00 OD of the nozzle. nozzle. The nozzles were were shrink-fit by cooling cooling to at leastleast minus 140 140 degrees degrees F, inserted inserted into the closure head penetration, and then allowed to warm to temperature (70 degrees room temperature degrees F minimum). minimum). The CRDM nozzles were were tack-welded tack-welded and then permanently permanently welded to the closureclosure head 182-weld metal head using 182-weld metal (see Figure 2). The shielded manual metal arc welding process was used for both the tack weld and the J-groove manual J-groove weld. During weld buildup, the weld was ground and PT inspected inspected at each 9/32 inch of the weld. The final weld surface surface was ground inspected. The weld prep for installation of each ground and PT inspected. nozzle accomplished by machining nozzle in the RPV head was accomplished machining and buttering buttering the J-groove with 182- 182-weld metal. Axial cracking in pressurized pressurized water reactor (PWR) CRDM nozzles has been previously previously identified, evaluated, identified, evaluated, and repaired. Numerous repaired. Numerous small-bore Alloy 600 nozzles nozzles and pressurizer pressurizer heater sleeves have experienced heater experienced leaks attributed to PWSCC. Generally, these components components temperatures of 600 degrees F or higher and to primary water, as are the are exposed to temperatures the ONS3 CRDM ONS3 CRDM nozzles. However, circumferential circumferential cracks cracks above the weld from the 00 OD to thethe inside diameter (ID)(10) have not been previously identified in the U.S. been previously An action plan was implemented implemented by the NRC staff in 1991 1991 to address PWSCC of Alloy 600 penetrations (VHPs) at all U.S. PWRs. This action plan included a review of the vessel head penetrations the safety assessments by the PWR owners groups groups (Westinghouse Owners Group, Combustion Combustion
IN IN 2001-05 Page 3 of 5 Engineering Owners Group, and Babcock Engineering Babcock & & Wilcox Owners Group) submitted for staff review on Ju"ne June 16, 1993, by the Nuclear Nuclear Management Management and Resource Resource Council (NUMARC, (NUMARC, now the the Nuclear Energy Nuclear Energy Institute [NEI]). Institute [NEIl). After reviewing the industry's safety assessments and examining examining the overseas overseas inspection findings, the NRC staff staff concluded, in a safety evaluation safety evaluation (SE) dated November 19, 1993, that PWR CRDM nozzle nozzle and weld cracking was not an immediate immediate safety concern. The bases for this conclusion were that ifif PWSCC occurred occurred (1) the cracks cracks would be predominately predominately axial in orientation, orientation, (2) the axial cracks would result in detectable detectable leakage leakage before catastrophic failure, before catastrophic and (3) the leakage would be detected examinations performed detected during visual examinations performed as part of surveillance walkdown walkdown inspections befor~ before significant significant damage damage to the RPV head would occur. However, the NRC staff noted concerns about potential circumferentialcircumferential cracking cracking (which would need to be addressed addressed on a plant-specific basis), high residual stresses from initial manufacture manufacture and from tube straightening sometimes done after welding, straightening sometimes welding, and the need need for enhanced leakage monitoring. leakage monitoring. By letter dated March March 5, 1996, NEI submitted a white paper entitled "Alloy 600 RPV Head Penetration Penetration Primary Stress Corrosion Corrosion Cracking," which reviewedreviewed the significance significance of PWSCC in in VHPs, described PWR \,THPs, described how the PWR licensees were managing the issue. NEI assumed assumed that the issue issue was primarily an economic issue issue rather than a safety issue, and describeddescribed an economic economic decision tool to be used by PWR licensees licensees to evaluate the probability of a VHP VHP developing developing a crack or a through-wall leak during a plant's lifetime. This information would then be used by a PWR licensee to evaluateevaluate the need to conduct conduct a VHP inspection inspection at their plant. To verify the conclusions in the industry's safety assessments, sampling inspections inspections were were performed at three PWR units in 1994. performed 1994. The results of these domestic inspections were were consistent with the February February 1993 analyses analyses by the PWR owners owners groups, the staff's November November 19, 19, 1993, SE, and the PWSCC found in European European reactors. On the basis of the results of the the first five inspections inspections of U.S. PWRs, the PWR owners owners groups' analyses, and the European European experience, experience, the NRC staff determined that itit was probable probable that CRDM penetrations penetrations at other plants contained contained similar axial cracks, but that such cracking did not pose an immediate- immediate- or near-term safety concern. Further, the NRC staff recognized near-term recognized that the scope and timing of inspections may vary for different inspections different plants, depending depending on their individual susceptibility susceptibility to this this form of degradation. In the long term, however, the staff determined determined that degradation degradation of thethe CRDM and other RPV head penetrations penetrations is an important safety consideration consideration because because of the the possibility of (1) exceeding exceeding the ASME Code safety margins margins ifif the cracks cracks are sufficiently deep and continue to propagate during subsequent subsequent operating cycles and (2) eliminating a layer of defense defense in depth for plant safety. On April 1, 1997, NRC issued GenericGeneric Letter (GL) (GL) 97-01, 97-01, "Degradation of Control Drive Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle Mechanism Nozzle and Other Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations," which which requested addressees addressees to inform the staff of their inspection activities activities related to VHPs. Based on the the industry's GL 97-01 response, which took credit for periodic inspections of the RPV head, the periodic inspections the staff agreed that the conclusions in its November November 19, 1993, SE remained valid. valid.
IN IN 2001-05 2001-05 Page Page 44 of of 55 The recent identification circumferential cracking significant circumferential identification of significant cracking ofof two CRDM nozzles at CRDM nozzles at ONS3 ONS3 raises raises concerns potentially risk-significant concerns about a potentially generic condition affecting risk-significant generic affecting all domestic domestic PWRs. RPV head head penetrations, penetrations, including including CRDMCRDM nozzles, provide function of provide the function of maintaining maintaining the reactor system (RCS) reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary. Cracking pressure boundary. Cracking ofof CRDM nozzles and welds CRDM nozzles welds is a degradation is a degradation of the primary the primary RCS RCS boundary. Industry experience Industry experience has shown that shown that Alloy 600 600 is susceptible is susceptible to stress cracking (SCC). Further, the stress corrosion cracking environment in the CRDM the environment housing housing annulus annulus will likely be far more will likely more aggressive after any through-wall aggressive after through-wall leakage, leakage, because because potentially highly potentially highly concentrated concentrated borated primary water borated primary water will become oxygenated, increasing become oxygenated, increasing crack crack growth growth rates. The repair activities activities at ONS3 were were extensive. The licensee stated that all flaws would be licensee stated be removed entirely from both weld material and nozzle base metal and repaired removed entirely repaired prior to plant plant restart. The licensee plans plans to perform thorough visual inspection perform aa thorough inspection of the Unit 2 RPV head penetrations during penetrations during the next outage outage and is investigating eventual replacement investigating the eventual replacement of the RPV heads heads on all three units to prevent recurrence of this event. Foreign PWRs prevent recurrence PWRs in France and and Japan Japan have already replaced already replaced a number of their RPV heads. The NRC held aa public meeting with the Electric Power Research Research Institute (EPRI) Materials (EPRI) Materials personnel on April 12, 2001, Reliability Project (MRP) personnel 2001, to discuss CRDM nozzle circumferential cracking cracking issues. During the meeting, the industry representatives said that they were industry representatives developing a generic developing recommendations for revisions of near-term generic safety assessment, recommendations inspections, and long-term inspection and flaw evaluation evaluation guidelines. The ONS3 cracking reinforces the importance importance of examining upper PWR RPV head area examining the upper (e.g., visual under-the-insulation examinations of the penetrations under-the-insulation examinations penetrations for evidence evidence of borated water leakage leakage or volumetric examinations of the CRDM nozzles) and of using appropriate volumetric examinations appropriate NDE NDE methods (e.g., UT, ET, PT, etc.) to adequately characterize cracks. Presently, licensees are adequately characterize not required remove RPV head insulation to visually inspect the head required to remove head penetrations; however, some licensees have recently performed examinations by using performed expanded VT-2 examinations cameras to inspect between the CRDM nozzles and the insulation. insulation. The NRC has recently developeddeveloped a Web page to keep the public informed of generic activities activities on PWR Alloy 600 weld cracking (http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/REACTOR/MRP/index.html). (http://www.nrc.qov/NRC/REACTOR/MRP/index.html). The The NRC will update this Web page and assess the need for further generic action as new information becomes available. This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If If you have any questions about the information in please contact one of the technical contacts in this notice, please listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
IN 2001-05 IN 2001-05 Page Page 5 5 of 5 of 5 Related Related Generic Communications Communications 0* Generic Generic Letter Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion Corrosion of Carbon Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants," March 1988 March 17, 1988 0* Generic Generic Letter 97-01, "Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Letter 97-01, Mechanism Nozzle and Other Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations," April 1, 19971997
- Information Notice 90-10, "Primary Water Stress Corrosion Information Corrosion Cracking of INCONEL 600,"
1990 February 23, 1990 0* Information Notice 96-11, Information 96-11, "Ingress of Demineralizer Demineralizer Resins Increases Increases Potential for Stress Corrosion Corrosion Cracking Cracking of Control Control Rod Drive Mechanism Mechanism Penetrations," February 1996 14, 1996 0* NUREG/CR-6245, "Assessment of Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Drive NUREG/CR-6245, Drive Mechanism Nozzle Cracking," Mechanism Nozzle Cracking," October October 1994 1994 I/RAI RAJ Ledyard B. Marsh, Chief Ledyard Events Assessment, Generic Generic Communications Communications and Non-Power Non-Power Reactors Reactors Branch Division of Regulatory Regulatory Improvement Improvement Programs Programs Office of Nuclear Nuclear Reactor Reactor Regulation Regulation Technical contacts: Technical Ian Jung, NRR NRR James Medoff, NRR 301-415-1837 301-415-1837 301-415-2715 301-415-2715 E-mail: ixj@nrc.gov ixj@nrc.gov E-mail: jxm@nrc.gov jxm@nrc.gov C.E. C. E. (Gene) Carpenter, NRR NRR 301-415-2169 301-415-2169 E-mail: cec@nrc.gov cec@nrc.gov Attachments: Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
- 1. Figure 1: Oconee Reactor Map Head Map
- 2. Figure 2: Oconee CRDM NozzleNozzle Penetration (Typical)
- 3. List of Recently Recently Issued Issued NRC Information Information Notices Notices
IN 2001-05 IN Page 5 of 5 This information information notice requires no specific action or written response. IfIf you have any questions questions about the information in this notice, please please contact one of the technical contacts contacts or' the appropriate listed below or Nuclear Reactor appropriate Office of Nuclear Regulation (NRR) project Reactor Regulation project manager. Communications Related Generic Communications
** Generic Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor PressurePressure Boundary Boundary Components in PWR Plants," March 1988 March 17, 1988 *0 Generic Letter 97-01, 97-01, "Degradation of Control Control Rod Drive Mechanism Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel Vessel Closure Head Head Penetrations," April 1, 1997 1997 *0 Information Information Notice 90-10, "Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of INCONEL INCONEL 600,"
February 23, 1990 February 1990
*0 Information Information Notice 96-11 ,"Ingress ,"Ingress of Demineralizer Demineralizer Resins Resins Increases Increases Potential for Stress Corrosion Cracking of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Mechanism Penetrations," February 14, 1996 1996 *0 NNUREG/CR-6245,"Assessment of Pressurized NUREG/CR-6245,"Assessment Pressurized Water Reactor Reactor Control Rod DriveDrive Mechanism Nozzle Mechanism Nozzle Cracking," October October 1994 IRA/
IRA! Ledyard B. Marsh, Chief Ledyard Events Events Assessment, Generic Generic Communications Communications and Non-Power Reactors Branch Non-Power Reactors Regulatory Improvement Division of Regulatory Office of Nuclear Improvement Programs Reactor Regulation Nuclear Reactor Regulation Programs I Technical Technical contacts: Ian Jung, NRR James Medoff, NRR NRR 301-415-1837 301-415-1837 301-415-2715 301-415-2715 E-mail: ixj@nrc.gov ixj@nrc.gov E-mail: jxm@nrc.gov C. E. (Gene) Carpenter, NRR NRR 301-415-2169 301-415-2169 E-mail: cec@nrc.gov Attachments: Attachments:
- 1. Figure 1: Oconee Oconee Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Map Reactor Pressure Map
- 2. Figure 2: Oconee Oconee CRDM Nozzle Nozzle Penetration Penetration (Typical)
(Typical)
- 3. List of Recently Recently Issued Issued NRC Information Information Notices Notices Distribution:
IN File IN PUBLIC PUBLIC ADAMS ACCESSION ACCESSION NUMBER: ML011160588 NUMBER: ML011160588 Temple #=NRR-052
#=NRR-052 El Publicly Available El Non-Publicly Available oEl Sensitive Sensitive 0El Non-Sensitive Non-Sensitive OFFICE REXB Tech Editor EMCB EMCB REXB C:REXB NAME IJung* PKleene* JMedoff* CCarpenter* JTappert/txk*l. ILMarsh DATE 04/25/2001 04/25/2001 04/26/2001 04/25/2001 04/26/2001 04/30/2001 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Figure 1: Oconee Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Head Map Map r iS I u_ (IN Sin_ _ Service Structure Support Flange
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- Confirmed CRDM leaks ilil~!l Additional CRDMs CRDMs
'~ inspected CRDM CRDM Nozzles (69) Thernocouple Nozzles (8)
Thenrocouple (8) (Oconee Unit 1I Only) (Oconee Only)
Figure Figure 2:0co nee CRDM 2:Oconee CRDM Nozzle Nozzle Penetr Penetration (Typical). ation (Typic al)
,I I Stainl ess S'teel Slainless Steal Fiatlg FRngee I.
AiIDoy Alloy 600 600 Weld CR,DM CIRDM NoWNoz~zlee (SB~1 67) (SB-167) Boron Deposit CoOOl9more Counleiboire
'Regi on Region A410y 600 Cladding 182- Weld 182-Weld
Attachment 3 Attachment IN 2001-05 IN 2001-05 Page 1 of 1 LIST OF RECENTL RECENTLYY ISSUED ISSUED INFORMATION NOTICES NRC INFORMATION NOTICES Information Information Date Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued Issued to 2001-04 Neglected Fire Extinguisher Neglected Extinguisher 04/11/01 04/11101 All holders of licenses for nuclear nuclear Maintenance Causes Fatality Maintenance power, research, and test reactors and fuel cycle facilities facilities 2001-03 Incident Incident Reporting 04/06/01 04/06/01 All industrial industrial radiography Requirements for Radiography Requirements Radiography licensees licensees Licensees Licensees 2001-02 Summary of Fitness-for-Duty Summary Fitness-for-Duty 03/28/01 03/28/01 ~olders of operating licenses All holders licenses Performance Reports Program Performance Reports for nuclear power reactors, and for Calendar Calendar Years 1998 and Years 1998 licensees authorized to possess possess 1999 or use formula quantities of strategic special nuclear nuclear material (SSNM) or to transport formula formula quantities of SSNM 1-01 Importance of Accurate The Importance Accurate 03/26/01 03/26/01 All material material licensees licensees I 01-01 Inventory Inventory Controls to Prevent the Unauthorized Prevent Unauthorized Possession of Radioactive Material 2000-17, Crack in Weld Area of Reactor Reactor 02/28/01 02/28/01 All holders of operating licenses licenses Supp.2 Supp. 2 Coolant System Hot Leg Piping for nuclear nuclear power reactors except at V.C. Summer those who has ceased ceased operations operations and have have certified certified that fuel has has permanently permanently removed from reactor vessel 2000-22 2000-22 Medical Misadministrations Medical Misadministrations 12/18/00 12/18/00 All medical medical use licensees licensees Errors Caused by Human Errors authorized to conduct gamma authorized gamma Involving Involving Gamma Stereotactic Gamma Stereotactic stereotactic radiosurgery stereotactic Radiosurgery (GAMMA KNIFE) Radiosurgery treatments treatments 2000-21 Detached Check Valve Disc Detached 12/15/00 12/15/00 All holders holders of OLs for nuclear nuclear not Detected by Use of power reactors except except those who who Acoustic Acoustic and Magnetic Magnetic have ceased operations and have have Nonintrusive Test Techniques Nonintrusive Techniques certified that fuel has been permanently removed permanently removed from the the reactor reactor OL = = Operating License License CP == Construction Construction Permit
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ADJUDICATIONS STAFF Action: ADMITTED REJECTED WITHDRAWN REJECTED TO TO Mechanical/Structural Unit T. S. Swim, Supervisor, Mechanical/Structural Date: Date: l1:/L. 2~(Tr. 2008 Tr. p.p 2> '1(;. ) Fom FROM Mechanical/Structural Unit P. K. Goyal, Senior Engineer, Mechanical/Structural MAIL STOP 3210 MAILsTroP 3210 suBJECT SUBJECT B&WOG Materials Committee Meeting PHONE PHONE 7351 I attended the subject meeting in Cleveland, Ohio on Monday, May 2i 21 through Wednesday, May 23, 200l. 2001. All members of the Materials Committee were present. The meeting agenda is attached. . Davis Besse is participating in the following projects: i)
- 1) RCS Materials Aging Management Management
- 2) Concerns **
CRDM Operability Concerns 3)
- 3) Alloy 690 Procurement Guidelines Procurement and Installation Guidelines.
- 4) Appendix H Compliance Appendix Compliance
- 5) CRDM Nozzle PWSCC
- 6) CRDM Nozzle Weld Inspection Inspection
. 7) Resolve Np Dosimeter Bias **
Resolve 8)
- 8) Internals Program * (partial)
RV Internals (parti~)
- 9) Plant Fatigue Monitoring Monitoring
- 10)
- 10) HPI/MV Nozzle Integrity **
HPJ!MV 11)
- 11) Pressurizer Cooldown Issues ** **
*Deferred *Deferred to year 2002, **DB is paying now others will buy in later later S14H-01079 Following are the main topics discussed in the meeting.
- 1) D.
- 1) Whitakear (Duke D. Whitakear (Duke Engineering)
Engineering) presented presented the results of CRDM nozzle inspection inspection for Ocenee Ocenee 2. Four nozzles (#4, 6, 18 & nozzles (#4,6, & 30) showed showed the axial and circumferential circumferential PT indications. UT examination examination showed axial indications on all four nozzles axial indications nozzles and circumferential circumferential flaw on nozzle number number 18 only. This circumferential circumferential flaw was approximately was approximately 36036° long and located located above the weld. (Note the inspection results results had been been I provided to C. Daft, A. Siemaszko Siemaszko andandM M. McLaughlin.) McLaughlin.) The overalloverall dose for the inspection inspection and repairs was approximately approximately 30 REM. . Dave emphasized the importance Dave emphasized importance of good PT. He said the PT results are used for analysis work to show the show the nozzles were functional/operable nozzles were functional/operable during during the the past past cycles. cycles. UT is helpful helpful in detecting detecting the circumferential circumferential cracks. cracks. Dan Dan Spond Spond (ANO-1) (ANO-i) provided provided the details of ANO-1 ANO-l repair. One nozzle (#21) (#21) had had a crack, which was repaired repaired manually. manually. The The flaw above the weld was left in place. place. SIA SIA performed performed the embedded embedded flaw analysis. The repairs analysis. The repairs were were performed performed by FTI. TheThe repairs repairs were non-code (Section XI) repairs. Total does does for for repair repair and inspection inspection was approximately approximately 1818 REM REM and cost cost approximately approximately $2.0 $2.0 million. million. 7-t:-: A4 7t3ýýC:2-C4V7 cz gK DS C2-- NRC01 0-1079 NRC01 0-1 079
nl""""",",MPANY MEMORANDUM 08TRA-COMPANY MEMORANDUM Rn TO T. S. Swim, Supervisor, Mechanical/Structural Mechanical/Structural Unit DATE DATE June 11,2001 11, 2001 FROM FROM K. Goyal, Senior Engineer, Mechanical/Structural P. K. Mechanical/Structural UnitUnit MAILSTOP 3210 MAILSTOP 3210 SUBJEcT SUBJECT B&WOG Materials Committee Meeting B&WOG Meeting PHONE PHONE 7351 I attended Monday, May 21 through Wednesday, May 23,2001. meeting in Cleveland, Ohio on Monday, attended the subject meeting 23, 2001. All members of the Materials Committee were present. The meeting agenda is attached. participating in the following projects: Davis Besse is participating 1)
- 1) Materials Aging Management RCS Materials Management
- 2) CRDM Operability Concerns Concerns
- 3)
- 3) Procurement and Installation Alloy 690 Procurement Installation Guidelines Guidelines
- 4) Appendix H Compliance AppendixH Compliance
- 5) CRDM Nozzle PWSCC S6)
- 6) CRDM Nozzle Weld Inspection 7)
- 7) Resolve Np Dosimeter Bias
- Resolve 8)
- 8) RV Internals Program Program * (partial)
- 9) Plant Fatigue Monitoring Monitoring * .
- 10) HPIIMV Integrity **
HPJIMV Nozzle Integrity 111) L) Pressurizer Cooldown Cooldown Issues **
*Deferredto *Deferred to year 2002, **DB year 2002, **DB is is paying now others paying now will buy others will buy in in later later SI4H-01079 S14H-01079 Following are the main topics discussed in the the meeting.
- 1) D. Whitakear
- 1) presented the results ofCRDM Whitakear (Duke Engineering) presented of CRDM nozzle inspection for Ocenee nozzle inspection Ocenee 2. Four nozzles (#4,6,
(#4, 6, 18 & circumferential PT indications. UT
& 30) showed the axial and circumferential lIT examination showed showed indications on all four nozzles and circumferential axial indications circumferential flaw on nozzle number 18 only. This nozzle number This circumferential flaw was approximately 360 circumferential flaw inspection 36° long and located above the weld. (Note the inspection results had been been provided to to C. Daft, A. Siemaszko and M. McLaughlin.)
andM. McLaughlin.) The overall dose for the the inspection approximately 30 REM. inspection and repairs was approximately importance of good PT. He said Dave emphasized the importance said the PT results are used for analysis work to show the nozzles were functional/operable were functional/operable during the past cycles. lIT UT is helpful in detecting the circumferential circumferential cracks. Dan Spond (ANO-1) (ANO-i) provided provided the details of ANO-l (#2 1) had a ANO-I repair. One nozzle (#21) a crack, which was repaired manually. The flaw above the weld was left in place. SIA performedperformed the embedded flaw performed by FTI. The repairs were non-code (Section analysis. The repairs were performed (Section XI) repairs. Total approximately 18 REM and cost approximately does for repair and inspection was approximately approximately $2.0 million. NRC010-1079 NRC010-1079
Duke Duke had to submit about about seven seven relief requests requests to to perform perform the required required CRDM CRDM repairs. repairs. B&WOG's B&WOG's Materials Committee proposed Materials Committee proposed a task for submitting submitting a Topical Topical Report Report (for (for all B&WOG B&WOa plants) plants) for getting getting NRC NRC approval approval onon these these relief relief requests requests at one one time. Recent Recent discussions discussions with NRC NRC indicate indicate that NRC support the NRC does not support the issuance issuance of this Topical Report. Individual TbpicalReport. Individual utilities would would have toto file their their own relief reports. reports. FTI is is developing second set of developing second of tools both both for the the repairs andand inspection from the top of the RV head. These tools will be ready ready to support support the the fall 2001 outages. FTI had FfI had completed completed both thethe proprietary proprietary and non-proprietary non-proprietary version version of RVRV Head Nozzle and Weld HeadNozzle Weld Safety Safety Assessment Assessment (Doc #.51-5011603-01
# SI-501l603-01and and 51-5012567-00 51-5012567-00 respectively).
respectively). EPRI MPR had issued issued an interim interim Alloy 600 Safety Assessments to US Power Safety Assessments Power Plants (MPR-44). This This report includes a bar chart (attached) showing barchart time-temperature histogram for addressing showing time-temperature addressing the head nozzle nozzle cracking. B&W plants are are in in the group group of <3 EFPY. . Duke is having problems with the certified design specifications for the new RV head prepared by FTI. Dukeis having problems with the certified design specifications for the new RV head prepared by ¥II. The specification does not have enoughenough details to allow manufacturing manufacturing of head by other than FTI. FfI.
- 2) Committee Committee Business and PMT Results Committee Committee budget has been been revised revised several times because because of the emerging CRDM nozzle cracking ofthe cracking issues. approximately $2.2 million for the year 2001.
budget is approximately issues. Currently the budget 2001. The materials materials committee committee will be issuing a letter justifying the cancellation cancellation of CR CR-3..J inspection supported by the B&WOG. Steering Committee (SC) accepted the overrun on the first repair tool. Steering Committee will Steering Committee develop .aa standard policy on royalties for tooling when the tooling is used byFfI by FTI on non-B&WOG non-B&WOG plants. SC has numerous questions questions on IMI nozzles. Materials Materials committee chairman/project manager chairmanlprojectmanager will provide this information information to SC in the next meeting.
- 3) Dosimetry/Fluence analysis Program
- 3) Cavity DosimetryfFluence E. Giaredoni Giaredoni (FTI)
(FT!) provided provided the background background information on RV fluence monitoring andembrittlement andembrittlement one of the high priority project is to resolve resolve Np dosimeter dosimeter bias issues. This is required to to show thethe fluence uncertainty to be 20% or lesS less when the fluence is used to determine RTPTS RTprs and RT RTNDT. NDT* The copy of the handout is attached. Future Meetings: 11)
. I) MRP RV internals IrG meeting planned for August 27-28 in Portland, Maine. This ITa ITG meeting ITG has requested a meeting with NRC on September 12th 12'h through 14th, 140, 2001
- 2) Materials Committee is planning to meet in September September in Washington, D.C., prior or after the ITa after-the ITG meeting with NRC.
If you have any questions please contact me at extension 7351. If PKG/gmw S14H-01080 S14H-01080 NRC010-1080 NRC01 0-1 080
Attachments Attachments bcc: bct: D.C. Geisen DB3105 w/a DB3105w/a T.A. Lang Lang DB3105 w/a DB3105w/a G.N. LeBlanc DB3205 w/a DB3205w/a T.A. McDougall McDougall w/a DB3105 w/a Mominee DJ. Mominee D.l. w/a DB3335 w/a MechanicaVStructural Unit Mechanical/Structural Unit w/a DB3210 w/a SI4H-01081 S14H-01081 NRCOIO-1081 NRC010-1081
~A?2-Q ~U.S. 'U.S. NRC NRC Ct' (\ (' ,elmm i"7 1 In re In re DAVID GEISEN *2 ,fA.
DAVID GEISEN tt ExhibIt#-___ ~l_ -NTRA-COMPANY ~t#1A~5~52 '
- NTRA-COMPANY MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM Docket # 1A-05-052
- 0826a-.
_____________________________,____________ for IDfl:/l- 2008 Marked forlDLk..... Date Marked Date 2008 (Tr. (Tr. p..._...
- p. 825)
Offered in Ev: Date Offered Date EV:!!:::/.J-,,2008 (Tr. p. ?flU;-J 2008 (Tr. ro Distribution TruhWnsf... el ro 'bution y**..,n/*' " 'Action:,-f ThroughWltnessIPanel:.REJECTED ttd,1,4 WnITDRAWN. -
, O.JwAl _ ' Action: ~ 'REJE~TED ~WN -oR P. K. Gorai, ~elfuo';Engineer -Mechanical/Structural Engineering Date:.
P. K. Go , enior Engineer -Mechanical/Structural Engineering Date: JJ:jL., 2008 ( Tr..EC 2008 (Tr.p. 3Z~ WH.DRAWN
)
DOCKETED uBJECT Mode 5 Reactor Vessel Head Inspection Recommendation PHONE 7351 USNRC DOCKETED' iUBJECT Mode 5 Reactor Vessel Head Inspection Recommendation PHONE 7351 September 9,USNRC 2009 (11:00am) September 9. 200~ (11 :OOam)
.DBE-O 1-0010 1 OFFICE OF SECRETARY DBE-O 1-001 01 OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAK/NGS AND ADJUDICATIONS ADJUDICATIONS STAFF SMFF The purpose ,The purpose of of this this memorandum memorandum is is to to provide provide anan engineering engineering evaluation evaluation for for responding responding to to the the question "Should Davis-Besse perform a visual head inspection question "Should Davis-Besse perform a visual head inspection if the plant shutsdown to if the plant shutsdown to Mode Mode 55 conditions?"
conditions?" Currently, Currently, the the visual visual head head inspection inspection isis planned planned in in 13RFO. l3RFO.
References:
References:
1)
- 1) Generic Generic Letter Letter GL-97-01 GL-97-01 "Degradation "Degradation of of Control Control RodRod Drive Drive Mechanism Mechanism Nozzle Nozzle and and Other Other Vessel Closure Head Vessel Closure Head Penetrations." Penetrations."
- 2) BAW-2301.
BAW-2301July, July, 1997, 1997, B&WOG B&WOG Integrated Integrated Response Response to GL-97-01. toGL-97-Ol.
- 3) BAW-10190P BAW-10190P May, May, 1993, 1993, B&W B&W Designpesign RV Head CRDM RVHead CRDM Nozzle Nozzle Cracking.
Cracking.
- 4) B&WOG B&WOG Materials Materials Committee Committee "RV "RV Head Head Nozzleý Nozzle andand Weld Weld Safety Safety Assessment" Assessment" preparedprepared by byFTI FrI ANP Document Number ANP Document Number 51-5011603-01. 51-5011603-01.
"- 5) EPRI EPRI PWR PWR Materials Materials Reliability Reliability Project Project (MRP)"Interim (MRP)~Interim Alloy Alloy 600 600 Safety Safety Assessment Assessment for for U.S.
U.S. PWR Plant (MRP-44), Part PWR Plant (MRP-44), Part 2; Reactor Vessel 2; Reactor Vessel Top Head Penetrations "TP-100 TopHeadPenetratiol}s "TP-lO01491, 1491, Part Part 22 (May (May 2001). 2001). J
- 6) Letter from B.Sheron (NRR), to Alex Marion
- 6) Letter fromB.Sheron (NRR), to Alex Marion (NEI) dated April 17, 2001 (NEI) dated April 17, 2001 7)
- 7) NRCNRC Information Infonnation Notice Notice 2001-005 2001-005 "Throughwall "Throughwall Circumferential Circumferential Cracking Cracking of of Reactor Reactor Pressure Pressure Vessel Head Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetration Nozzles Vessel Head Control Rod Drive Mechanism Penetration Nozzles at Oconee Nuclear Station, at Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit Unit 3."3." ::. -
Background:
Background:
The The NRCNRC issuedissued aa Generic Generic Letter Letter (Reference (Reference 1) 1) during 1997, describing during 1997, describing the degradation and the degradation and cracking cracking of CRDM (Control Rod Drive Mechanism) nozzles. Each Owners of CRDM (Control Rod Drive Mechanism) nozzles. Each Owners Group (W, B&W and CE) prepared Group (W, B&W and CE) prepared aa Safety Safety Assessment Assessment and and submitted submitted to to the NRC. B&WOG theNRe., B&WOG submitted submittedBA BAW-2301 W -2301 (Reference (Reference 2) 2) inin response response to to the the Genehic Generic Letter.Letter. ItIt stated stated that that the the B&WOG B&WOG plant plant safety safety evaluation evaluation (Reference (Reference 3) 3) remains remains validvalid and and there there isis nono short-termn short-term safety safety concern. concern. ' S14A-00587 S14A-00587 Exhibit Exhibit 131131 Page Page 11 of of 44 Pages Pages NRC005-0587 NRC005-0587
-D-L ~ 7)s 02---
June 27,2001 27, 2001 Page 3 Davis-Besse's Davis... Besse's susceptibility ranking compared to Oconee-3 Oconee-3 is approximately approximately 2.5 years. This means it it would take approximately approximately 2.5 additional years ofoperation of operation for Davis-Besse to observe observe the same th degradation degradation as noted at the Oconee 3 baselined to February, 200 2001.
- 1. The next (13
( 13th) ) refueling outage outage for DB is scheduled scheduled in the spring of 2002. Considering Considering the same baseline baseline for DB would show that th approximately approximately 1.3 years are remaining till the next planned head visual examination examination in 13 13t" RFO. This duration is conservative conservative as compared to 2.5 years. This is based on simplified operating time and head temperature comparison. temperature comparison. B&WOG Safety B&WOG Safety Assessment Assessment (Reference (Reference 4) 4) evalu. evaluated both the ated both the axial axial and and circumferential flaws. It circu.mferential flaw.s. It I cL provides time taken for both types of flaws to grow through the wall. It would take approximately approximately 4 i .~ v,' i" years years for an axial 00.OD flaw that is initially O.5~m more years for a through-wall through-wall flaw to .to extend 2 inches through-wall. l~ 0.5 mm deep to grow through..;wall. Inches above weld, thereby creatmg then take four SA-~.': It would thentake creating a leak path. An e
~.'-1...{f!
isolated OD isolated 00 initated circumferential circumferential flaw above the weld would take take more than thah 10 years to grow b~ 6 through-wall. through-wall. A A long circumferential long circumferen. crack. (like tial crack (like ONS ONS 3)3) would take approx. would take approximately im. ate.I Y 3.5 years to 3.5 years to grow. grow . through-wall. Considering these time periods and that DB has 2.5 years available through-wall. Considering available to reach the Oconee3 degradation Oconee3 degradation level. level, it is acceptable acceptable to delay the head inspection until 13RFO. (Spring 2 2002). (02).' catastrophic failure of CRDM nozzle is not expected. Should a catastrophic A catastrophic catastrophic failure occur, the rod rod ejection accident accident and/or LOCA (Loss Of Coolant Accident) Accident) associated with rod ejection ejection are analyzed analyzed accidents accidents in the USAR. MRP MRP interim interim safety assessment (Reference (Reference 5) also provides provides response response to questions from B. Sheron (USNRC). The questions deal with any expanded/required expanded/required operator operator training on beyond design basis accident (DBA) scenarios scenarios involving involving rod ejection(s), ejection(s), small, small, medium and LOCA etc. and any recommendations recommendations regarding increasedincreased operator actions during period of highest rod width (e.g. startup, cool-down cool-down and hot standby standby periods). The failure of one or more CRDMs would Would be similar to that of a hot leg break LOCA in small to mediuinsize medium size range. The response to thisJscenario this scenario is within the guidance provided in existing generic Emergency Guidelines. The resulting LOCA Emergency Response Guidelines. LOCA. wouldwould be bounded bounded by existing design basis analysis. Existing Emergency Emergency Operating Procedures Procedures (EOPs) provide provide guidance for for all ranges of LOCAs and include coverage coverage for multiple events including including Therefore no additional reactivity excursions. Therefore operator action recommendations additional operator recommendations are needed. Recommendation: Recommendation: No catastrophic catastrophic failures are anticipated anticipated in delaying the head inspection from now to 13RFO. There is no short-term short-term safety issue associated with the CRDM nozzle cracking. Based Based on simplified susceptibility susceptibility ranking Davis-Besse Davis-Besse can operate operate for an additional additional 2.5 EFPY (July, 2003) prior to to reaching the same susceptibility as Oconee reaching Oconee 3. 3. Considering Considering these factors Mode 5 head inspection may be deferred. However, 13RFOheadinspection 13RFO head inspection must be performed performed as scheduled. Davis-Besse must continue to participate in in industry/NRC industrylNRC meetings meetings 10 to monitor developing issue. monitor this developing S14A-00589 S14A-00589 NRC005-0589 NRC005-0589
June 27, 2001 Page 4 Prepared by:- Date: 6-27-2001 PI?k.oYAL-Reviewed by:
-rSOUIM Date: ---==~+fP~rG...=.'(Jf--,,--'. ._-:-'-~
Approved by: ýL ýý /-;ý-3,/
ý' D ,. Cý -c-;r-/TýW z4ra___
Date: Date: al-71cJ:"t.I:.....-....,.-_ _ _......::*v,:.t:.d-.:'B:....:;7.:.£.,0-.: t". I ; Distribution: G.G. Campbell MS3080 MS3080 S.A. Coakley MS1045 MSI045 D.L.Eshelman D.L. Eshelman MS 1056 MS1056 D.C. Geisen MS3105 S.P. Moffit Moffit MSI054 MS 1054 T.S. Swim Swim MS3210 MS3210 Records Mgmt. MS3020
.ID. _ _ DD' S14A-00590 S14A-00590 NRC005-0590 NRC005-0590
kMý (- 113 U.S. In NRC U.S. NRC DAVID GEISEN 2 n,-; In re DAVID
~ 1 (f a '")
ExhIbIt O..2Jt::- ELxhlblt , Docket # 1A-oS-OS2 1A-05-052 . ID~ Date Marked for ID.d /g 2008 (Tlr..,Z , Date Marked for 2008 (tr. p. 2 Z ;~ From: Prasoon K. K GoyaTEl/FirstEnergy GoyallTElFirstEnergy //L /9 . To: Andrew J. Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy Offered in Ev::l::f1-. Date Offered Ev: I , 2008 (Tr. p. ~Z~ (tr. p..*L4 cc: John John B. Cunnings/TElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, CunningsITElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Theo Thea S. Witness/Panel: filA Through Witness/Panel: /.A* _ Swim/ITE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, David C. Geisen/TE/FirstEneA SwimlTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, GeisenITElFirstEnel *~ j EshelmanlTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy EshelmanITElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy* Action: ~D Action: /* *D REJECTED WITHDRAWN REJECTED WITHDRAWN' Plant-specific data verification
Subject:
Plant-specific Date: Date: L14l-. L , 2008 (Tr. p. 82,& ) 2008 (Tr. p. . , )
*Date:
Date: 8:0:191010 7/10/2001 8:0:191010 Please complete the Table 1 (Plant Specific Data Verification Verification Form) RVheadRV head Previous Inspection Previous Inspection Status columns-- FulVPartia/ Statuscolumns-- Full/Partial and results. The table currently shows 100% inspection inspection which is not correct because because of the large boric acid deposits on the head very few CRDMs could be inspected. Also the table shows under PResul!" leakage detected. This will need to be' "Result" no leakage modified. Also be'modified. Also revew Table 2. This form has to be signed and .faxedby faxed ýby July 23rd 23rd....
--------------- Forwarded Forwarded by Prasoon K. K.GoyalfTE/FirstEnergyon.07/1012001 GoyaVlTE/FirstEnergy .on 07/10/2001 07:35 AM AM DOCKETED DOCKETED . USNRC September 9, 2009 (11:00am)
September (11 :OOam) . Mark-Fleming Mark <mfleming@domeng.com> on 0710912001 Fleming <mflemlng@domeng.com>.on 07/09/2001 05:30:34 PM 05:30:34 PM OFFICE SECRETARY OFFICE OF SECRETARY! To: pkgoyal@firstenergycorp.com pkgoyal@firStenergycorp.com RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS I cc: ADJUDICATIONS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS STAFF Plant-specific data verification
Subject:
Plant-specific verification L I. Attached are two pdf files which contain plant-specific plant-specific temperature, EFPY and design data which may be be included included inin safety-related calculations/data safety-related calculations/data tables prepared by the MRP MRP as part ot of the industry-wide response response to reactor head nozzle cracking. These data data were compiled by the MRP MRP from publicly available data sources sources (e.g.; (e.g., Nucleonics Nucleonics Week, utility utility responses to GL GL 97-01), 97 -O1}. as well as information individual utilities and NSSS information provided by individual NSSS vendors. Some of the data were previously used to support the calculations calculations described described in ("Time-Temperature Comparisons") of "PWR Materials in Appendix B ("Time-Temperature Materials Reliability Project -- Interim Alloy 600 Safety Safety Assessments for US PWR -Plants ,Plants (MRP-44): Part 2: Reactor Reactor Vessel Top Head Penetrations* Penetrations" (TP-1001491. (TP-1 001491, 2001). May 2001). Since the attached attached data may ultimately ultimately be included included in incalculations calculations or tables prepared under a safety-related safety-related QA program, each utility is being being requested to verify these data. To support requested support this data verification verification effort, please do do the following: STEP 1: Print a hard hard copy of both of the attached attached *.pdf
* .pdf files (Table 1 and Table 2).
STEP 2: Review the data in each table. Note that you do not need to verify data/results data/results which appearappear in shaded cells, since these are either shaded cells. S14H-00997 S14H ..00997 NRC01 0-0997 NRC010-0997
From: Prasoon K. GoyallTElFirstEnergy Goyal/TE/FirstEnergy To: Andrew J. Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@ Andrew FirstEnergy Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy cc: John B. Cunnings/TFEFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Theo S. CunningsffElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Swim/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, David C. GeisenITElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, SwimffElFirstEnergy@Fin;tEnergy, Geisen/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, David L. L. EshelmanfTE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy E:shelmanffElFirstEnergy@.FirstEnergy Plant-specific data
Subject:
Plant-specific data verification verification Date: 7/10/2001 8:0:191010 7/10/2001 8:0:191010 Please complete Please complete the Table 1 (Plant Specific Data Verification Form) RV head Previous Inspection RV head Inspection columns-- FulVPartial and results. The table currently Status columns--Full/Partial currently shows 100% inspection which is not correct because of the large large boric acid deposits on the head head very few CRDMs could be inspected. inspected. Also the table shows under under uResult" leakage detected. This will need to be modified. Also "Result" no leakage Also revew Table 2. This form has to be signed and faxed by July 23rd 23rd....
~---- Forwarded Forwarded byby Prasoon Prasoon K.
K.Goyal/TE/FirstEnergy .on 07/10/2001 07:35 GoyallTE/FirstEnergyon07/10/2001 07:35 AM AM Mark Mark Fleming <mflemlng@domeng.com>.on
<mfleming@domeng.com> on 0710912001 07/09/2001 05:30:34 PM To: pkgoyal@firstenergycorp.com pkgoyal@firstenergycorp.com cc:
Subject:
Plant-specific data verification
Subject:
Plant-specific verification Attached are two pdf files which contain plant-specific plant-specific temperature, EFPY and design data which maybe may be included in safety-related safety-related calculations/data calculations/data tables prepared by the MRP MRP as partpart of the industry-wide response to reactorreactor head head nozzle nozzle cracking. These These data were compiled by the MRP from publicly available available data sources (e.g., Nucleonics Week, utility responses Nucleonics Week, responses to GL 97-01), as well.as well as information information provided by individual individual utilities and NSSS vendors. Some of the data data were were previously used to support the calculations calculations described ("Time-Temperature Comparisons") described in Appendix B ("TIme-Temperature Comparisons") of "PWR MaterialsMaterials Reliability Project -- Interim Alloy 600 Safety Safety Assessments Assessments for US PWR Plants (MRP-44): Part 2: Reactor Vessel Top Head Head Penetrations" (TP-l001491, (TP-1 001491, May 2001). 2001). Since the attached attached data may ultimately be included in in calculations or tables prepared under a safety-related safety-related QA program, each each utility is being requested requested to verify these data. To support this data verification effort, please please do the following: STEP 1: Print a hard copy of both both of the attached **.pdf
.pdf files (Table 1 and Table Table 2).
STEP 2: Review the data in each table. Note that you do not need need to verify data/results data/results which appear in shaded cells, since since these are either S14H-00997 S14H-00997 NRCOI0-0997 NRC010-0997
derived from or equivalent derived equivalent to other data data values in in the table. IfIf any of the data currently currently shown in in the attached attached tables are incorrect, please cross cross out the incorrect values and denote denote the correct values on the printed hard copy (please initial and date any data changes): STEP 3: After you have verified (and corrected corrected as necessary) the data, please sign and date date both of the forms and fax both of the signed tables to Mark Fleming at .DEI DEI at 703.790.0027. Please note thefol/owing the following regarding Table 11:: a) Information a) Information regarding regarding the "Insulation Type" and "Insulation Clearance" (first row of Table Table 1) has not not yet been obtained from all plants. IfIf this this information does information does not currently appear appear in the attached please attached table, please annotate this information information on the hard copy. In6ulation Il16ulation types reported thus reported thus far are "Reflective," "Blanket," "Block," ,and and "Encapsulated" (however, if if another type is used, please denote it.). To denote insulation clearance, please use the key shown on the table (i.e., (i.e., "C"=
"C" = contoured insulation Insulation geometry, "H" "H" = horizontal insulation geometry, horizontal insulation geometry, and "S" "S"= stepped insulation geometry). Please provide the clearance inSUlation geometry). clearance between the insulation insulation and the top headhead surface ifif it is not already already shown in the table. For example, an entry of "S(1~4n)" "S(1-4")" would denote a stepped insulation geometry with a clearance between 11" clearance of between and 4". "and 4".
b) IfIf the month and year of the next planned refueling refueling outage are not already shown on the attached attached table, please please note them in the "Next Refueling Outage Date" column column (second Jaw row of Table 1). 1). Fora For a number of plants, the season 2001 ') of the next refueling season and year (e.g., "fall 2001") refueling* outage are known, known, but the MONTH and year of the next refueling outage are preferred ifif available. c) Data cells associated associated with past inspection inspection experience experience appear blank if if the MRP has not been been informed informed of any previous inspection inspection experience experience fora for.a given plant (other than the basic 88-05 walkdowns). walkdowns). If If previous previous RV headhead / CROM nozzle inspection CRDM inspection experience experience is not currently currently reflected reflected in the table, please annotate. annotate the hard copy with the appropriate appropriate inspection information information (second row of Table 1). . If If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call Mark Fleming Fleming at 703.790.5544 (if 703.790.5544 (if you need need to reach someone on July 12-13, 12-13, please please ask to speak with Steve Hunt). The MRP requests requests that the signed copies copies of both of the data tables be faxed to DEI by July 23, 2001.2001. Thanks in advance advance for your assistance in in this matter. Mark R. Fleming, Fleming, P.E. Dominion Engineering, Engineering, Inc. MFleming@ DomEng.com E-mail: MFleming@DomEng.com Phone: 703.790.5618 703.790.5618 x239 (direct) 703.790.5544 (general) Phone: 703.790.5544 Fax: 703.790.0027 703.790.0027 Web: . www.domeng.com www.domeng.com S14H-00998 S14H-00998 NRC010-0998 NRC010-0998
Job Name: Dorgan_81154_CDO1 1r"1IIl ............. n_81154_CD01 Internal Unique 10: Internal ID: 429 File Path:
\\Dctsfs05\Blowback\Morgan\81154\C001 \\DctsfsO5\B Iowback\Morgan\81154\CDO1 \Investigation\Folders \lnvestigation\Folders \Action Items OTHER\0000000138OTHER\0000000138 \First Energy Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Data QA - Tabl e 1.pdf 1.pdf
\0
$14H-00999 S14H-00999 NR.nf1 n.nQQQ
PLANT-SPECIFIC DATA VERIFICATION FORM DATA VERIFICATION Table 1. Operating Time, Temperature, Fabrication, Fabrication, and Inspection Information Information for Reactor Vessel Vessel Head NozzleNozzle PWSCC Assessments Design and Operating Time and Desilln Head Remaln. Diametral Temp. EFPYsto Nozzle EFPVs Range Current EFPY. ReRCh Nozzle thru Head Norm. Oconeel Histogram
-Interference Over Vnlt NSSS Material Head Feb. Temp. . to from Group Fit Life Name DesIgn Suppller l Fabrlcatorl (mils) Type ClearanceJ 2001 (oF) (oF) 600ci~ 3/1, (EFPYs)'
B&W BIH BW 0.5 - I.S ,Reflective H(2") 14.7 605 605 Table 1. O Table 0 ~erating ratlng_ Time. Temperature. Fabrication, ime, Temperature, Fabrication, and Inspection Information for Reactor Vessel Head Nozzle Inspection Information Nozzle PWSCC Assessments (cont.) Pre,,;ous Inspection Previous Inspt!ction Status Status Next Next Bare-Bare-Scheduled Metal Metal Refueling Refueling Visual Vnlt Unit or ID Outage Name Name Otage DiIt; or ID Date Full /I Partial Partial Result Comments NDE Davis-Besse Davis-Besse 2()O2 [ spring 2002 Visual I Mar-OO Mar-00 ] 100% 100% No leakage FNo leakage detected detected IB&W insulation B& W plants have gap under insuhidon Notes: Notes: 2 4
'Key for Material Suppliers: Key for for Head Head Fabricators:
Fabricators: 3Key forclearance between insulation and top surface of head: Calculated using a thermal activation I Key for Material Suppliers: lKey J Key for clearance between insulation and top surface ofhead: *Calculatcd using a thennal activation
- BB == B&.
B&W W Tubular Products BW = B&W BW=B&'W contoured insulation geometry C = contoured geometl)' (sits on top head surface) energy of 50 kcal/mole. kcalhnole. HH - Huntington Huntington CBI - Chicago Bridge & &.Iron Iron H a- horizontal insulation H insulation geometry geometry SS = Sandvik CE =- Combustion Combustion Engineering Engineering S a- stepped insulation insulation geometry lIeometl)' W (Huntington) W = Westinghouse (Huntington) RDM = Dockyard
- Rotterdam DockYard Data Verification Verification and Approval Annroval for Use:
The plant-speCific plant-specific data presented above in Table Table 1I (in unshaded cells) have been verified verified and are deemed suitable for use as inputs to safety-related safety-related calculations. calculations.. Any required required changes to the data in Table (in unshaded Table 1(in annotated above and initialed and dated to denote accuracy/suitability unshaded cells) are annotated accuracy/suitability for use as inputs to safety-related calculations. Signed Date cn Printed Printed 6.o 0. z 0
- u 0 o 0 Davis-Besse Data QA - Table First Energy Davis-Desse I~xis Table I.xls 7/9/01 719101 Q
~ Q I ~0L Q0 CD Q0 Q
Job Name: Job Name: P organ_81154_CDO1 rgan_81154_CD01 Internal Unique ID: Internal ID: 430 430 .File File Path: Path: \XDctsfs05\BlowbacklMorgan\81154\C \\Dctsfs05\Blowback\Morgan\81154\CD01 DO1 \lnvestigation\Folders \lnvestigation\Folders
- Action
\Action Items Items OTHER\0000000138 OTHER\0000000138 \First \First Energy Energy Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Data Data QA QA - Tabi Tabl ee 2.pdf 2.pdf . SI4H-01001 S14H-01001 NReNINlinnil NRcn1 0.1 nn1
PLANT";SPECIFIC DATA PLANT-SPECIFIC DATA VERIFICATION VERIFICATION FORM Table 2. Table 2. Time-Temperature Time-Temperature Calculations Calculations for for Reactor Reactor Vessel Vessel Head Head NozzleNozzlePWSCC Assessments PWSCC Assessments TOIDI EFPYs thru Total Februa 20017 thru February 1001 Total Total Current Current Nuc/Weu. Nucl Week Nuc/ Week Nuei Week source
*Source *Gross Current Gross Groll Gross Operating Operating Operatlng Operating IsNW Ia NW Operating Operating Operatlng Operating Head NSSS Production Capacity Time Time Time Time Source of EFPY Data Uori' Time .Time Head Temp.
Unit NSSS Supplier Production (MWh)t Capadty (MWe), (EFPHs)` (EFPYs)' SroEiDaof EFPY Data or Time (EFPHs) Time (EFPYs) 0171 Source Temp. Unit SuppUer (MWb)' (MWe)' (EFPHs)' (EFPYs)' Utility (EFPHs) (EFPVs) 0* Davis*Besse jDavissBesse _II B&:W
&W .... ... /18,733,025 11,3Vur-r 925 925 MII _ _ __ .leonics __ _ Week-Nucleonics _
Week _ _ __ _ _ _ _ .N W .5. or NW 605eTi0 605.0 Time-Tem erature Calculations Table 2. Time-Temperature Calculations for Reactor Reactor Vessel Vessel Head Head Nozzle Nozzle PWSCC PWSCC Assessments Assessments (continued). Head Temp. #1 Head Temp. #2 Head Temp. #3 Head Temp. N4 Operating Operating Operating Operating Head Head Operating Operating Operating Operating Head Head Operatlag Operating Operating Operating Head Head Operating Opentlag Operating Operatlng Head Head Period Period Period Temp. Temp. Period Period Period Period Temp. Temp. Period Period Period Temp. Period Period Period Period Temp. Temp. Source of Source of Unit Unit (EFPOs) (EFPHa) CEFPYI) (EFPYs) (oF) (OF) (EFPol) (EFPHs) (EFPYs) (EFPYs) (OF) (CF) (EFPHs) (EFPHs) (EFPYs) (EFPYs) (oF) (OF) (EFPHs) (EFPHs) (EFPYs) CEFPYs) ("F) MHead Temnerature Dat Davis-Besse 0-Deane WOC GL 97-01 Response
~
DATA IN SHADEDSHADED CELLS DO NOTREQUIRE DO NOT REQUIRE VERIFICATION. V.:RIFIC/\TION. I.I. Total gross gross generation generation through through February 2001 as tabulated tabulated by the April April 12, 12, 2001, 2001, Issue issue of Nueleollies Ntcleonics Week Week capacity as
- 2. Gross capacity as tabulated by the April 2001, issue April 12, 2001, issue of or Nucleonics Nucleonic.! Week power hours Effective full power
- 3. Effective hours calculated calculated as ratio of gross production total gross ortotal produciion to gross gross capacity (effective full power capacity (effective power years calculated by dividing by 8760).
calculated by
- 4. Operating Operating time normalizedto Donnalizcdto a head temperature of 600°F 600eF using using an activation activation energy of50 of 50 iccaVmole kcallmole and the Arrtoeniusrclationship Arrhenius relationship Data Veriflcation and Data Verification Approval for Use:
and Aunroval Use; The plant-specific data presented in Table Table 22 (in(inunshadcdcells) unshaded cells) have been verified and and are deemed deemed suitable suitable for use as inputs inputs to safety-related calculations. calculations. Any required changes to the data in Table 2 (in unshaded reUs) cells) are annotated above above and initialed and dated to denote denote accWllcy/stiitability use as accuracy/suitability for usc inputs to safety-related safety-related calculations. Signed Signed Date Printed Printed C,) CA
,a:.-
Xz 6... z o 0 ~ o0 n N Fitst Energy Davis*Besse First Dala QA *-Table Davis- Besse Daia 2.xls Table 2.ds 7/9/01 Q Q Q Q N
RAS 0-ox U.S. u.s. NRC NRC c+ ,'r- <?.L RA-S C-'1f In re In re DAVID GEISEN -m DAVIDGEISEN Docket## IA-05-052 Docket 1A-05-052 J Ii-*[ ft O-""2) t-r EExhibIt.~ Markedfor Date Marked Date forID / ID.JJ./....L. 2008 (Tr. 2008 (Tr. P.~-:L A-COMPANY MEMORANDUM . Date EV:.ilJ!.-,, 2008 Offeredinin Ev:... Date Offered 2008 (Tr. p.~~ (Tr. p.-R&.)
~====================== Through Through Wit Wrtn nel: h/J anel: filA* _
Action:. REJECTED WITHDRAWN REJECTED WITHDRAWN T.S. Spyim, Supervisor, Date: ~...... , 2008 008(Tr.(Tr. p.9L)
- p. &2, U )
TO TO T .S.1r,,,::. S,upervisor.Mechanical/Structural MeChanicaliSlIUC1m"al Unit Unit DOCKETED DOCKETED FROM FROM ~or P.K. Goa,Senior Engineer, P.K. Mechanical/Structural Unit Engineer, Mechanical/Structural Unit MJAILSTOP MAILSTOP 3210 3210 USNRC USNRC September September9,9, 2009 2009 (11:00am) (11 :OOam) suajEr EPRIMPR Alloy SUBJECT *EPRIlMPR Alloy 600600 Workshop Workshop .PHONE PHONE 7351 7351 OFFICE OFFICE OFOF SECRETARY SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS RULEMAKINGS AND AND ADJUDICATIONS ADJUDICATIONS STAFF STAFF participated in II participated in the MRP Alloy the MRP Alloy 600 Workshop and 600Workshop Alloy 600 and Alloy 600 Assessment meeting held Subcommittee meeting Assessment Subcommittee held on on June June 13',13th , 14' an~ 15t'. 14th and 15th* Both Both the the workshop workshop and and meeting meeting were held in Atlanta, w.ere.heldin Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia A A copy copy of of the meeting agenda and the list of participants the meeting agenda and the list of participants is attached. is attached. Lessons Lessons Learned Learned for for Davis Davis Besse: Besse: Following Following are are the the lessons lessons learned learned from from Oconee Oconee and and ANO-1 ANO-l headhead inspections inspections for for boric boric acid: acid:
** Service Service structure structure access access is is needed needed in in order order toto clean clean and and inspect inspect the the head.
head. (Note (Note Davis Davis Besse Besse doesdoes not not have have service service structure structure holes) holes) The The leaking leaking nozzle nozzle may may produce produce very very little little -boric acid acid The head needs to be clean in order The head. needs to be clean in order to see a leaking nozzle to see a leaking nozzle .
*- The The inspection inspection to to look look forfor boric boric acidacid should should be be done done in in accordance accordance with with aa procedure procedure (DB needsneeds to to develop develop aprocedure) a< procedure) \ ** Train VT inspector for Train VT inspector for inspection inspection ** Base Base line line pictures pictures (video)
(video) areare needed needed for for next next inspection inspection
** Welding engineer should review the Welding engineer should review the repair methods and repair methods and procedures procedures ** Make record of each nozzle inspection - not Make record of each nozzle inspection..., not a generic statement a generic statement *-. Develop Develop EWR EWR or or Modification Modification package package for for the the repair repair of of CRDM CRDM ** Procure CRDM storage box. It Procure CRDM storage box. It can store 18 CRDMs . can store 18 CRDMs The The purpose purpose of. of. the the workshop workshop was was to to update update the the industry industry on on recent recent inspection inspection history history and and repair repair ofof CRDM CRDM penetrations, penetrations. discuss discuss "lesson "lesson learned" learned" andand discuss discuss near-term near-tenn recommendations recommemIations for for fall fall 2001 2001 andand spring spring 2002 outages.outages.
L. L. Matthews Matthews (Chairman (Chainnan of MRP Alloy ofMRP Alloy 600 600 ITG) ITG) provided provided the overall view the overall view of of Alloy Alloy 6000 6000 issues. issues. AlloyAlloy 600 material has cracked in BWRs, steam generators, pressurizer penetrations, 600 material has cracked in BWRs, steam generators, pressurizer penetrations. PWR pipe and welds PWR pipe and welds andand CRDM penetrations. penetrations. The issues are The issues are asas follows: follows: .
*0 If cracks. how If it cracks, how fast will it fast will. it grow?
grow?
- If itit grows,how If grows, how far far can can itit grow grow before before it it becomes becomes aa safety safety concern concern 0
- Can NDE detect it before it is a safety concern?
Can NDE detect it before it is a safety concern? S
- Will Will it leak?
it leak? S14A-0378 4 514A-03784
ý-- jlýEcv' DS 6-z.-, NRC005-3734 NRC005-3734
J, W A-COMPANY ftA**GUtmF'AI'lIY MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM TO TO TWS. srr}X~:A~upervisor, T.S. Mechanical/Structural Unit S im, Supervisor, Mechanical/Structural Unit DATE July 12,2001 12,2001 FROM bofafs;ior Engineer, Mechanical/Structural P.K. G~oya],Senior Mechanical/Structural Unit MAIL STOP MAILSTOP 3210 3210 SUBjECT SUBJECT EPRVMPR EPRIlMPR Alloy 600 Workshop PHONE 7351 I participated participated in the MRP Alloy 600 Workshop and Alloy 600 Assessment Subcommittee meeting held Assessment Subcommittee on June th th June 113 3 "h, 14 th and 15
, 14th 1 5th.* Both the workshop and meeting were held in Atlanta, Georgia. A copy of of the meeting agenda and the list of participants participants is attached.
Lessons Learned Learned for Davis Besse: Besse: Following are the lessons learned learned from Oconee and ANO-l ANO-1 head inspections for boric acid: S *" Service Service structure access is needed in order to clean and inspect the head. (Note Davis Besse does not have service
*& The leaking service structure holes) leaking nozzle may produce produce very little boric acid acid *" The head needs to be clean in order to see a leaking nozzle leaking noZzle *" The inspection inspection to look for boric acid should be done in accordance accordance with a procedure procedure (DB needs to develop a procedure)
O develop procedure)
*" Train VT inspector for inspection *" Base line picturespictures (video) are needed for next inspection
- Welding
- Welding engineer should review the repair methods and procedures procedures
*" Make record of each nozzle inspection - not a generic statement statement .0
- Develop EWR or Modification package for the repair ofCRDM of CRDM
** Procure Procure CRDM storage box. It can store 18 CRDMs The purpose The purpose of. of.the workshop was the workshop was to to update the industry on recent inspection inspection history and repair repair of CRDM penetrations, penetrations, discuss "lesson"lesson learned" learned" and discuss near-term recommendations for fall 2001 and near-teno recommendations and spring 2002 outages.
L.L. Matthews Matthews (Chairman of MRP Alloy 600 ITG) provided provided the overall view of Alloy 6000 issues. Alloy Alloy .,. 600 material material has cracked in BWRs, steam generators, pressurizer pressurizer penetrations, PWR pipe and welds and penetrations,PWR and CRDM penetrations. penetrations. The issues are as follows:
** If it it cracks, cracks, how how fast fast will it grow?
will it grow?
*" If it grows, how far can it grow before before it becomes becomes a safety concern.
concern
*" Can NDE Can NDE detect itdetect it before it safety concern?
it is a safety concern?
"* Will it leak?
S14A-0378 4 S14A-03784 NRC005-3734 NRCOOlS*3734
Date Date Received by -JIJl Received by. -JL I16 2001 2001 Vice Vice President President ,.
- .I IRoute Route A Bv Iinit. Data \1;\::
Et:§. DlR.
!'Y..1\PJg*
"":;;.('5I D IR. yP, __,... DJJ\']QR. t-~~~ *!-f~1.- ~.o!}PHP COMMENTS: COMMENTS: FIL .LE; -H - FILE: ALE: SI4A-037 85 S14A-03785
',. July 12,2001
.July 12, 2001 PageZ Page .2 S *Will leakage be seen? *.CanCan leakage seen?
leakage be detectable
- Will leakage before a break?
detectable before break?
** Are there volumetric techniques acceptable volumetric there acceptable techniques available?
available?
** How should we How should we inspect?
inspect? How often should
** How should wewe inspect?
- How cracks be repaired How can the cracks repaired and mitigation to and is there mitigation topreventlstop cracking?
prevent/stop cracking? We the induStry inspection and evaluation industry must deal with these issues and ensure safety, develop inspection evaluation guidance and guidance develop repair and mitigation techniques/strategies. and develop techniques/strategies. M.Robinson M. Engineering) presented Robinson (Duke Engineering) presented thethe details details of of Oconee Oconee 1,1,2 and 3 CRDM 2 and CRDM nozzle nozzle cracking cracking Following are the details: details. Following details. Oconee 1I Oconee Nozzle #21 and several Nozzle #21 several thennocomple nozzle were cracked. thennocomple nozzle Total dose for repairs repairs 67 Rem Rem Oconee 2 Oconee #4,6, 18&30 Nozzle #4,.6, Nozzle 18 &.30 had cracks. Total dose for repairs, 31 31 Rem. Oconee 3 Oconee #3, 7, Nozzles #3, 7, 11. 23, 28, 34, 50, 56 & 63 had cracks. Total does 11, 23, repairs, 300 Rem. for repairs, He provided following insight into the nuclear He nuclear safety significance circumferential cracks significance of the two circumferentia,Icracks 1600) at Oconee 3. (approximately 160°) (approximately
** Acddent Accident associated ejection accident, associated with complete failure of weld is rod ejection which is covered in accident,which in design basis.
Structural failure requires circumferential
*" Structural considerable margin - 4 years before circumferential crack. Oconee 3 had considerable reaching ASME code allowable.
reaching circumferential crack initiates, it would take more than 6 years to grow through wall.
- Once circumferential Duke's future plan is to work with NEI, EPRI and industry group on inspection and repair techniques.
with NEI,EPRI w. W. Simms (AN01) (ANO1) presented the details of ANOI nozzle cracking. Nozzle #56 had a circumferential circumferential extending 51° OD crack extending* circumferential crack 51' around the nozzle and an axial crack extending from the circumferential crack about 1.3" Circumferential crack was removed by grinding. The axial 1.3" above the weld. Circumferential crack was left in the nozzle. The embedded embedded flaw repair does not require a temperbead. Total dose for the repairs was 17 Rem. The copy of handout is attached. Jack Strosnider, Director. Jack Engineering NRC presented the regulatory perspectives on CRDM Director, Division of Engineering Management attention to address this issue. He outlined the identified the need for Senior Management cracking. He identified following main points of an inspection plan. . S ** Method-Method - Visual, Volumetric, Qualification
- Scope - Sampling Statistics
.Scope **Acceptance Acceptance Criteria - ASME Code 814A-03786 S14A.03786 NRC005-3736 NRCOO!?-3736
/ July 12,2001 Page 3
- Frequency - Crack Growth Rates
,0 Rates *0t Short Term - Generic Communication Communication (bulletin)
(bulletin).addressing addressing short term inspection inspection needs. I
- Long Term - Augmented inspection inspectiQn program requirements.
requirements. Jack reminded industry of various GDCODC requirements requirements e.g. GDC ODCI4;14; Reactor Coolant Coolant Pressure Boundary, etc. He also said that leakage leakage detection, alone, may not constitute compliance compliance with the regulations. NRC isis planning to issue this bulletin in the early August, 2001. 2001. This bulletin will require a response within 30 days. V. Wagoner, Chairman of Assessment Assessment Committee Committee discussed the key results of preliminary safety safety assessment assessment sent to the NRC. The attached meeting notes dated June 28, 2001 provide provide the details. These These notes also provide recommendations for future inspections. provide recommendations If H you have any questions questions please contact me at extension extension 7351. PKG/gmw Attachments Attachments* cc: G.G. Campbell DB3080 w/a DB3080w/a D.C. Geisen DB3105w/a DB3105 w/a T.A. Lang T.A.Lang DB3105 DB3105w/a w/a G.N. LeBlanc ~ D133205 w/a DB3205w/a M.A. McLaughlin McLaughlin DB1048 DB1048w/a w/a T.A. McDougall McDougall DB3105 DB3105w/a w/a L.W. Myers L.W.Myers BV-ADM BV-ADMw/a w/a D.J. Mominee DB3335 DB3335w/a w/a A.J. Siemaszko Siemaszko DB 1056 w/a DBI056w/a Weakland D.P. Weakland BV-GP BV-GPw/a w/a Mechanical/Structural Mechanical/Structural Unit DB3210 w/a DB3210w/a S14A-03787 S14A-03787 NRC005-3737 NRC005-3737
0-19ýr u.S. U.S. In NRC re NRC Inre GEISEN *5Cif ."- ('{' DAVID GEISEN DAVID PP t e.tIM ..... '74
# .)...........-
A..()5-()52 j /) /0 Docket ## 11A-05-052 Docket Date Date Marked Marked for ID lD:hL. 2008 2006 (fr. Po 2S ,or (Ti. 3 ~ Data bttered Date EV:.l2/i--;/2008(Tr.P~ Offered: ininEv: 2008 (Tr. p. g l (P ) From: Frank From: Frank W. W. KennedyfTElFirstEnergy Kennedy/TE/FirstEnergy Thmo ~I:* Through w"gkn MIA1 . To: To: Rodney M. Rodney M.Cook/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy Cook/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy ArctiorwL ~. Action: A&#TE6 REJECTED REJECTED ~ W~TDM*M cc: cc: ~: l~(, ....(Wr./f) K~& l
. I .
Subject:
FW: NRC
Subject:
NRC Telcon. Telcon. Alloy Alloy 600 Bulletin Bulletin DOCKETED DOCKETED Date: 8/8/2001 15:28:121010 B/8/2001 15:28:121010 USNRC USNRC September 9, 9, 2009 (11 (1 1:00am)
- OOam)
---- Forwarded
Forwarded by Frank W. KennedylTElFirstEnergy KennedyfrElFirstEnergy on .08/08/2001 03:25 on .08/0812001 03:25 PM --------
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OFFICE RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS ADJUDICATIONS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS Prasoon K. K. Goyal To: 02:55 PM 08/08/2001 .02:55 08108/2001 PM An An drew J. Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, SiemaszkolFistEnergy@FirstEnergy, FrankW. Frank W. Kennedy/TE/FiretEnergy@FirstEnergy, Mark A. KennedylTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy,MarkA. McLaughlinr/--FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy
*McLaughlinlTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy cc:
Subject:
FW
- NRC Telcon.
Telcon. Alloy 600 Bulletin ItItappears appears that that NRC is looking for plant specific info. Thi~ This would create a difficult situation for us when they review they review ourour past past inspection inspection results results....
Forwarded
Forwarded by by Prasoon Prasoon K. K.GoyalfrEIFirstEnergy.on Goyal/TE/FirstEnergy on 08(08/01 08/08101 02:48 02:48 PM ---
"Gray, William William R" <WGray@framatech. .<WGray@framatech. To:
corn> com> 'de whitak~duke-energy. whitak@duke-energy.com corn (E-mail)* <dewhitak@duke-(E-mail)" <dewhitak@duke-08108/01 01:45 PM 08/08/01 .01:45 energy.com>, 'dspond@entergy. com energy.com>, *dspond@entergy. corn (E-mail)' (E-mail)"
<-dspond@entergy.com>, 'pkgoyal@firstenergycorp. <dspond@entergy.com>, 'pkgoyal.@firstenergycorp. com (E-mail)" <pkgoyal@firstenergycorp.com>, 'robert.
(E-mail)"<pkgoYal@firstenergycorp.com>. "robert. p. p. lemberger@fpc. lemberger@fpc. corn com (E-mail)' (E-mail)'
<robert.p.lemberger@ fpc.com>, 'greg. <robert.p.lemberger@fpc.com>, 'greg.
gerzen @exeloncorp. corn (E-mail)* gerzen@exeloncorp.*com(E-mail)"
<greg.gerzen@exeloncorp.com> <greg.gerzen@exeloncorp,com>
co: cc:
"Fy "Fy fitch, Stephen" <SFyfitch@framatech.com>
fitch, Stephen" <SFyfltch@framatech.com>
Subject:
Subject:
FW FW
- NRC NRC Telcon.
Telcon. Alloy 600 600 Bulletin Bulletin The The attachment attachment is is aa set set of of notes notes from from aa phone phone call call between between NRC, NRC, NEI, NEI, and and CP&L CP&L on on Bulletin Bulletin 2001-01. 2001-01. The The discussion discussion focused focused on on the the use use of risk risk assessment assessment in in response response to to 2001-01. 2001-01. Based Based onon thethe notes, notes, It It appears appears that that the the NRC is skeptical about the use of risk assessment NRC is skeptical about the use of risk assessment for for this this situation. situation. S140-04243 S14D-04243 NRC007-1596 NRC007-1596
'.~ "
- J
, '.: ,,;'~ ~"- * ~ I ' ..: ,~~~. ~,:Greg':~ .Grg--Thanks ThankSfOr'~~iigih~efor sending these notes. nofeS:" "
~"""".}If'4J~ij~ . ,!~,,'::,,/::::;...:>' ,:,.., .....,~: '::r ... ::::... Bill. Bill, ..'
.~ .... :'-~~.... -':' ... ,.i .. ;i; ) .~; :.i$.~ ., ... ", '~".'.' * *~:{~ ---OriginalOriginal Message---
Message--- From: greg.gerzen@exeloncorp.com From: greg.gerzen@exeloncorp,com [3] @exeloncorp.com
.Sent: Tuesday. Tuesday,: August 07; 07, 2001 7:28 PM PM .
To: dewhitak@duke-energy.com; dewhitak@duke-energy.com; WGray@framatech.com WGray@framatech.com
Subject:
FW:
Subject:
FW: NRC NRC Telcon. Telcon. Alloy Alloy 600 600 Bulletin Bulletin I just got this. Itsort of sounds like risk assessment isn't something the I just got this. It sort of sounds like risk assessment isn' something the NRC wants to hear. Bill would forward to others please. Greg Gerzen Exelon Nuclear Phone 630-657 630-657-3845 ~3845 Pager 630-307-5124 630-307-5124 email - Greg.Gerzen @exeloncorp.com email-Greg.Gerzen@exeloncorp.com
---- Original Message--- > ----Original Message---
From: Wagoner, Vaughn
> Frorn:Wagoner, [SMTP.vaughn.wagoner@ pgnmail.com]
Vaughn [SMTP:vaughn.wagoner@pgnmail.com] Sent Tuesday.
> Sent Tuesday, August August 07.2001 07, 2001 6:22 PM PM > To: Greg Gerzen (E-mail)
Subject:
FW: NRC Telcon. Telcon. Alloy 600 Bulletin
>* >> ---- Original Message--- -~--Original Message--- >>*> From: From: lonescu, Cristina lonescu. Cristina >* > Sent: Sent: Tuesday, Tuesday. August August 07,2001 07, 2001 4:06 4:06 PM * > To: Wagoner. > Wagoner, Vaughn Vaughn
Subject:
> NRC Telcon. Alloy Alloy.600 Bulletin 600 Bulletin >>> > Vaughn.Vaughn, >>> > Please see attached attached for comment. Thanks, >> Cristina Cristina > >> <<NRC <<NRC telcon August 7.doc>> 7.doc>> <<NRC <<<NRC talcon telcon August 7.doc>>
7.doc>> This e-mail This e-mall and and any any of its Its attachments attachments may may contain contain Exelon Corporation proprietary information. information, which is privileged. privileged, confi,dential, confidential, or subject to copyright to copyright belonging belonging to to thethe Exelon Corporation Corporation family family of of Companies'. Companies. This e-mail This e-mail isis Intended Intended solely solely for the use use of ofthe the individual or entity individual or entity to which ititis addressed. addressed. If If you are not the intended recipient of this this e-mail, you e-mail, you are are hereby hereby notified notified that that any dissemination, distribution, any dissemination, distribution, copying, or copying. or action action taken taken in relation to in relation to the contents of the contents of and and attachments attachments to this to this e-mail e-mail is is strictly prohibited and strictly prohibited and may may be be unlawful. unlawful. IfIfyou you have have received received this this e-mail in in error, please notify the sender immediately immediately and 44 S140-04244 SI4D-042 NRC007-1597 NRC007-1597
permanently delete permanently delete the the original original and and any any copy copy ofof this this e-mail e-mail and and any any printout. Thank printout. Thank You You..
- ~..********************.**.**.... ***.*..* ....*****....*****..*..***
5140-042455 S14D-0424 NRC007-1598 NRC007-1598
August 7, 2001 200 1 NRC/NEI telcon. <Bulletin NRCINEI (Bulletin 2001-01) 2oo1-Oll
Participants:
NRC: Jake Zimmerman, Zimmerman, John Zwolinski, Brian Shearon, A. Hiser, Jack Strosnider, Rich Berret, etc. NEI: Alex Marion, Marion, Kurt Cozens CP&L: Joe Donahue, Donahue, Vaughn Wagoner, Cristina Ionescu Ionescu Purpose of call was for NRC staff to set some expectations expectations for the level of information information that they expected to see in the bulletin responses, especially if risk-infonned risk-informed arguments or probabilistic probabilistic fracture mechanics mechanics was used. Risk Informed If risk informed arguments are used in support support of inspection "standard" for inspection deferrals, the "standard" adequacy will be RG 1.174, including calculations of delta CDF and delta LERF. Comparisons were made to the ANO and Farley submittals for S/G inspection deferrals, deferrals, where one was accepted and one was not. It was emphasizedemphasized that the RG analysis does not allow non-compliance Dot non-compliance withwith the regulations. If the utility determines that is in non-compliance from the regulation, regulation, they should submit an exemption request. Defense in depth must be preserved. The example example sited was if one assumes the LOCA occurs, then you must address factors like insulation/sump insulation/sump interaction, collateral collateral damage, etc. PFM Bottom line is that NRC does not believe that sufficient sufficient data exists to develop meaningful distributions for formany many of the key variables in a PFM analyses - crack growth rates; flaw number, size and location; stress levels, levels, etc. The statement statement was made that it would appear appear to be impossible to develop develop the data in 30 days. This apparently apparently was a topic ofof much interest in the ACRS briefing. Other Other Some licensees have indicated that they may need more time to respond to the "above "above the head" configuration question. NRC indicated that they were not contemplating head" configuration generic contemplating generic extensions, extensions, and would evaluate each plant specific specific response. Because Because 30 days falls on Labor Day, the NRC indicated indicated that the responses must be dated NLT 9/4. The NRC is gearing up to perfonn perform quick reviews of the responses responses and take appropriate appropriate action as required, required, based on the contents of the response. They don't intend to spend weeks with RAIs, etc. The NRC acknowledges acknowledges that the responses are "very "very plant specific" specific" and the licensees licensees should call the NRC PM for plant specific strategy discussions. 8140-04247 S14D-04247 NRC007-1600 NRC007-1600
VaughnWagoner Vaughn industrywas thatindustry indicatedthat Wagonerindicated evaluatinga anumber wasevaluating areas,including numberofofareas, including inspection scope, and definition of "qualified" VT, including figuringout PPM,inspection PFM, scope, and definition of "qualified" VT, including figuring outwhat what means. Staff indicated that they also have effortsunderway leakagemeans.
"demonstration"ofofleakage "demonstration" Staff indicated that they also have efforts underway PPMand ononPFM andaccident andwould analysis,and accidentanalysis, verymuch wouldvery liketotowork muchlike withususon workwith onapproaches, approaches, avoidsurprises totoavoid theend surprisesatatthe month.The themonth.
endofofthe meetingon Themeeting 8/15 may be a timetotododothis, on8/1S may be a time this, but both industry and NRC needs to determine if that's the right time and forum but both industry and NRC needs to determine if that's the right time and forum for any for any suchdiscussions. such MRPneeds discussions. MRP communicateour needstotocommunicate desirestotoNRC. ourdesires NRC. S14D-04248 5140-04248 NRC007-1601 NRC007 -1601
U.S.NRC U.S. In NRC DAVIDGEISEN InremDAVID
/ +
GEISEN '7 fI.: r [1' Exhibit#J P--Exhibit
/}5 5 # .:"....;;:J_ __
Docket#1IA-05-052 Docket # 1A-OS-OS2* . . ~... Markedfor DateMarked Date to:.$- forID .. 2008 (Tr. p.Q. l 8 (Tr. ) )) From: PrasoonK. From: Prasoon To: Andrew To: K.GoyallTE/FirstEnergy GoyallTElRrstEnergy Siemaszko/RrstEnergy@FirstEnergy,John AndrewJ.J. Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, John B. B. EV:~. OfferedininEv: DateOffered Date _., err.p.p.X Z&L) ) 2008(Tr. 2008 Cunnings/FE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy CunningsrrElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy Through w~.~panel:_fJ~If-l/A-~ ThroughWitnesslPanel:- )'ý/ _ _ _ __ cc: cc: Idm~ ~__ ((~T1 Aa~Ion: RE E ,D W REJECTED f TH 0R.4f WITHDRAWN bcc: bcc: bttl: !.3jli:.. 2008'2W (fr. 8 r Pp. 2 t..e )) .
Subject:
NRCBulletin
Subject:
NRC Bulletin Date: 8/9/2001 14:18:111010 Date: 8/9/2001 14:18:111010 Please seemy Pleasesee comments in mycomments bold letters. in bold letters. DOCKETED DOCKETED USNRC USNRC September 9, 2009 September.9, 2009 (11:00am) (11 :OOam) OFFICE OF SECRETARY OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS STAFF S14P-01208 514P-01208
~a U- GZ . ., Exhibit 91 Exhibit Pagelof4 91 NRC024-1207 c...-- Page 1 of 4 NRC024-1207
..... ****v ** Job Name: Job Name: .-, . MORGAN - 82127CD01 MO'RGAN 82127_CD01_ANDREWSIEMASKO.
- ." - ANDREW- SIEMASKO.- CRDM_N CRDM N ~ . . SF SF ' .... '...:' .
Unique ID: ". Internal Unique-ID: Internal,
- 0939 0939 File Path:
\\Dctsfs05\BIowback\Morgan\82127\,cdO1 \\DctsfsOS\Blowback\Morgan\82121\cd01 \Andrew~Siemasko\crdm\AnDocuments \AndrewSiemasko\crdm\AllDocuments, \0000000i10000000600 \0000000;\0000000600 , \Response \Response to NRC BuUetin2001 Bulletin 2001 (inspectio (il1spectio ns).doc SI4P-01209 S14P-01209 NRC024-1208 NRC024-1208
Response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01
Response
(Circumferential Cracking (Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Reactor Pressure Head Penetration Penetration Nozzles). Nozzles). scope to discuss the issues response is limited in scope The response associate with the type, issues associate qualification requirements, scope, qualification acceptance criteria for the Reactor requirements, and acceptance Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Pressure Vessel inspections within the last Head inspections last 4 years. years .. A Service Service Structure (SS) envelops Structure (SS) Davis-Besse Reactor envelops the Davis-Besse Vessel (RV) head. Reactor Vessel head. There are 18 openings (weep holes) 18 openings bottom of holes) at the bottom of the SS through which SS through which inspections inspections are performed. are performed. There are 69 Control Rod Drive Mechanisms Mechanisms (CRDM) nozzles penetrate RV head. The thermal nozzles that penetrate insulation is located well thermal insulation above the head and above and does not interfere with the visual inspection. The visual interfere with performed by the use of aasmaU inspection is performed mounted on a wire pole. small camera mounted This camera inserted through the weep holes. There camera is inserted There were two inspections inspections performed during the last 4 years. Thefirstlns~Ction years.* The first inslction was performed during performed during the 1111"th RFO (1998) and the second second dllring 12 .. RFO (2000)~ during 12.* (2000). The scope of the inspection was to inspect the entire head visual inspection head (bare metal) metal) area accessible accessible through the weep holes to identify through acid leaks identify any boric acid / deposits. The general leaks* 1 guidance of procedure guidance procedure DB-PF-03010 DB-PF-03010(RCS (RCS Leakage Leakage and Hydrostatic Test)( this and Hydrostatic this procedure need to use boric acid contol procedure is not the right procedure procedure IdoI do not know the # But old PCAQR PCAQR will give the procedure procedure #) was used used for these these Davis-Besse also inspected 100% inspections. Davis-Besse 100% of CRDM flanges for leaks under program. The results of two recent inspections are described 88-05 program. described below. performed during inspection results performed 1998 inspection refueling outage. The boric during 11 RFO refueling boric uneven layer. There were some lumps of scattered over the head in an uneven acid was scattered boric acid. The color of the lumps varied from brown to white. Outside diameter diameter of the motor motor tubes also showed white streaks indicative of leaking leaking CRDM flanges flanges (Need to add what did we do with flange leaks). The boron deposits were were attributed attributed to the leaking CRDM flanges. The head head was cleaned by the use of manual scrubber and vacuum. The head cleaning was limited by the location location and opening size of the weep holes. The head was cleaned cleaned as best as itit could could be considering the dose and the method. performed during 2000 inspection results performed 12RFO refueling outage. during 12RFO inspection was conducted on 4/5/2000. Framatome Reactor Vessel Head inspection Reactor Framatome NPS performed 100% CRDM flanges. Five leaking Control Rod 100% video inspection of CRDMflanges. Drive flanges were identified at locations: F10, 010, Cl 1, F8, and G9. Main D10, C11, Main source of leakage was associated with 010 D10 drive. Positive evidence evidence existed that F8, F10 drives F8, Cl I have limited gasket leakage. AU F1 0 and C11 All 5 CRDM gaskets were replaced and 010 D10 flange machined. All work was performed by Framatome Framatome S$4P-012 1 0 S14P-01210 NRC02~~-1209 NRC024-1209
NPS NPS (delete this sentence). No leaks were identified during subsequent during the subsequent RCS heatup. Visual Visual inspection inspection of the flanges was performed performed via lexan covers covers installed installed on the Service Service Structure. leaking CRDM flanges boric acid deposited Resulting from the leaking deposited on the top of the the insulation was cleaned (vacuumed). After cleaning the area area above the the insulation was videotaped for future use. Initial inspection of the head/no:zzle head/nozzle area indicated indicated some accumulation accumulation of boric boric acid. Deposited on the head boric acid was locatedlocated below the leaking flanges flanges with a clear evidence evidence of down down flow. No evidence of nozzle leakage leakage was detected.(how detected.{how do you know when there was so much boron boron on the top of head?) 95% (Are you comfortable comfortable with 95%) of the nozzles nozzles were inspected. The head cleaning cleaning was limited by the opening size of the weep holes. The head was cleaned cleaned with the demineralized demineralized water as best as it could be considering the considering the dose and the method. method. Subsequent Subsequent video inspection inspection of the clean head and was performed nozzles was performed for future use. SIUP-0 S14P"()1211 12 1 1 NRC024-1210 NRC024-1210
D 9~S C~- (f) ~~ ~~~ID ,5 t,,- ,3 ~ U.S. NRC (1)179 f) In re DAVID GEISEN GEISEN....LE~..xhbtw {:f Exhibet 0~L V\ TJ I Docket # 1A-05-052 Docket # 1A-05-052 1'7/;' Date Marked for ID Date Marked ID~ 2008 (Tr. p.. p. 815 ) From: From: Prasoon Prasoon K. GoyalTEfFirstEnergy K. GoyalfTElRrstEnergy Si lh u h ..- Date Offered Date Offared in Ev: Wttn sle -"st JJJ-. nal' N ! fr p.¥ 2008 (Tr. pi.ý -ý(P ) To: David C. GeisenffEIRrstEnergy@RrstEnergy.TheoS.Swim Geisen/TElFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Theo S. Swim mug !=!.5-~. *-'""ltif>4.;. . : . - - - - - - cc: Dale R. Wuokko/TlEFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy WuokkoffEiRrstEnergy@ RrstEnergy Action:~pJ Action: .1j) REJECTED wlTHDF~WN REJECTED wrIHDRA*WN
Subject:
NRC Bulletin:
Subject:
Bulletin 2001 2001-01 CircumferentialCracking of RV
-01 CircumferentialCracking Head I Date:
RV Head Date: L.~7,008 2008 (Tr.(Tr. p.& 2 G ) Date: Date: .8/11/2001 12:7:251010 8111/200112:7:251010 AA meeting meeting was was held held today today at at 8.30 8.30 am am in in D. Lockwood's office. Following D. Lockwood's Following were were the attendees: attendees: D D Lockwood Lockwood ' DOCKETED DOCKETED , F Kennedy Kennedy USNRC USNRC D Wuokko DWuokko LL Worley Worley September 9, September 9, 2009 2009 (11:00am) (11 :OOam) SS Moffitt Moffitt D Esherman OFFICE OFFICE OFOF SECRETARY SECRETARY DEsherman RULEMAKINGS AND JJMessina Messina RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS ADJUDICATIONS STAFF STAFF PPGoyal Goyal The The subject subject bulletin bulletin waswas disussed disussed for for identifying identifying the the actions actions requiredfor required'for completing completing our our response response by the end of this month by the end of this month 9see 9see attachment). attachment}. It was was agreed agreed that that the the response response willwill include include aa committment committment to perform aa 100% to perform 100% qualified qualified visual visual examination examination of of all all the the nozzles nozzles during during 1,3thRFO. 13thRFO. The MOD 5 head inspection recommendations (JCO The MOD 5 head inspection recommendations (JCO for not inspecting the head by for not inspecting the head by 12/31/01) 12131101) have have beenbeen approved approved by by the the SRB. SRB. Directors Directors would would like like it also also reviewed reviewed by by Jim Jim Martin, Martin. Tim TIm Martin Martin namd MPR amd Beaver MPR (Now(Now Dominion Dominion Engineering). Engineering). F. F. Kennedy Kennedy will will be be sending sending this to this to both both thethe Martins Martins and and Beaver ValleyValley forfor comments. comments. My My action action isisto to send send this this MOD MOO 55 recommendations recommendations to to S.Hunt S.Hunt of of Dominion Dominion and and get get itit reviewed reviewed by by him by 8/16/01. If they are unable to do then contact L. him by 8/16/01. If they are unable to do then contactLWorley. Directors would alsoWorley. Directors would also like like to to write write aa new new or or revise revise thethe existing existing JCOJCOto to cover cover thethe cracks(different crackS(different scenarios) scenarios) which which maymay be befound found during during TMI TMI and and CR3eR3 inspections. inspections. II indicated indicated that that II do do not not enough enough information information or orthe the expertise expertise to to write write this this type type of ofJCO. JCD. TheThe recommendation recommendation is is to to issue issue aa P.O P.O to to an an outside outside consultant consultant to to do do this this work. work. The The work workshould should be be started startedearly early enough enough such such that that we we do do not nothave have toto shutdown shutdown ififTMI/CR TMlICR finds finds cracks. cracks. II will contact Steve Hunt on Monday and ask him will contact Steve Hunt on Monday and ask him if he could meet our if he could meet our schedule schedule or or provide provide his his completion completion date. date. We We will will need need funding funding forfor these these projects. projects. II indicated indicatedtha tha wewe plan ptah for for 100% 100% volumetric volumetric examination examination even even ifif we we do'not do not commit commit to to NRC. NRC. Directors were in agreement
,. Directors were in a9Jeementthat thatwe weshould should plan plan for for ititin in the the 13thRFO.
13thRFO. ItItwas was pointed pointed out outthat that wewe can can not notclean clean ourourhead head thru the mouse thruthe mouseholesholes andandAndrew Andrew Seimaszko Seimaszko isis requesting requesting 33 large large holes holes -be becut cutinin the the Service ServiceStructure Structurefor tor viewing viewing and and cleaning. cleaning; DBDB ranking ranking was was also also discussed discussed.. We Weareare ranked ranked #:# 77 higher higherthanthan TMITMI (#11) (#11) because because of of higher higherhead head temperature temperature (see (seeattachment).The attachIi19nt).The plants plants ranked ranked #5#5 andand## 66 hadhad agreed agreedto todo do 100% 100% volumetric volumetric examination. examination. t: S14H-01819 S14H-01819
-r L 9,-Z £f62...:-Page Exhibit Exhibit 88 056-z-Page 1 of 11 Page 1 88 of Page NRCOIO-1819 NRC010-1819
W From: Prasoon K. GoyallTEIFirstEnergy From: GoyaViTE/FirstEnergy To: David C. GeisenffElRrstEnergy@RrstEnergy, David Geisen/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Thea Theo S. SwimfTElRrstEnergy@FirstEnergy SwimfrE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy cc: cc: Dale R. WuokkoffEiRrstEnergy@RrstEnergy Dale WuokkoTFE/FirstEnergy @FirstEnergy
Subject:
NRC Bulletin 2001-01 2001-01 CircumferentialCracking CircumferentialCracking of RV Head Head Penetration Penetration Nozzles Nozzles Date: 8/111/2001 12:7:251010 8111/2001 12:7:251010 A meeting was held today at 8.30 am in in D. D. Lockwood's Lockwood's office. Following Following were the attendees: DD LOckwood Lockwood F Kennedy 0 Wuokko DWuokko Worley LL Worley S Moffitt o D Esherman Esherrnan JJMes!)ina Messina P Goyal PGoyal The subject bulletin was disussed disussed for identifying the actions required for completing our response response by the end of this month 9see attachment). attachment). ItIt was agreed that the response response will include a committment to perform perform a 100%100% qualified qualified visual examination of all Ihenozzles ViSUlll examination the nozzles during 13thRFO. The MOD 5 head inspection recommendations (JCO (JCO for not inspecting the head head by 12131/01) 12/31/01) have been approved have approved by the SRB. Directors would like itit also reviewed by Jim Martin, Martin, Tim Martin Martin amd MPR (Now Dominion Engineering).Engineering). F. Kennedy will be sending this to both the Martins and Beaver Beaver Valley for comments. action is My action to send is to send this this:MOD MOD 5 5 recommendations recommendations to S.Hunt S.Hunt of Dominion and get itit reviewed reviewed byby him by 8/16101. 8/16/01. IfItthey are unable to do do then contact L. Worley. Directors would also like to write a contactLWorley. new or revise the existing JCO to cover the cracks(different cracks(different scenarios) which may be found during during TMI and CR3 inspections. I Indicatedindicated that II do not enough information information or the the expertise expertise to write this this type type of of JCO. JCO. The recommendation recommendation is to issue a P.O P.O to an outside outside consultant to do this work. The The work should be started early early enough such that we do not have to shutdown if if TMIICR TMI/CR finds cracks. I will contact contact Steve Hunt on Monday and ask him ifif he could meet our schedule schedule or provide his provide his completion date. completion date. We willwill need funding for these projects. need funding projects. I indicated indicated tha we plan for 100% 100% volumetric volumetric examination examination even if if we do not not commit to NRC. Directors were Directors were in agreement agreement that we we should should plan for it in the 13thRFO. 13thRFO. ItIt was pointed pointed .out out that we we can can notnot clean our head head thru the mouse holes and Andrew thruthe Andrew Seimaszko Seimaszko is requesting 3 large holes large holes be cut in the Serviceý Structure for viewing and cleaning. Service-Structure DB DB ranking ranking was also discussed. was also discussed. We We are ranked ranked # 7 higher higher than TMI (#11) (#11) because because of higher higher head temperature temperature (see attachment).The plants (see attachment).The plants ranked ranked #5#5 and #6
# 6 had agreed agreed to do 100%100% volumetric volumetric examination.
examination. S14H-0181 S14H-01819 9 Exhibit 88 Exhibit 88 Page of 1 Page Page 1 Page NRC010-1 NRC010-1819 819
O~s {<AS C-/ 9ý C-I?ff Prasoon K. Goyal J. Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, To: Andrew J. Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Mark Mark A. A. McLaugtllin/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy McLaughlin/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy 08/13/01 08:45 AM 08/13/0108:45 AM cc: John B. CunningslTEIFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Cunnings/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy,. Dale R. Wuokko/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy Wuokko/TEIFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy JCO
Subject:
MOD 5 JCO Attached is the lCO JCO for head inspection. inspection. This had been approved approved by D.Geisen and SRB. SRB. This was was written written on 6/27/01 6/27/01 well before the bulletin. bulletin. Andrew Andrew please please read this and your inspection results (written for the bulletin) bulletin) for the last outage'-for differences. My outage'for any differences. My concern is that all these outside outsi.de people may focus fotus on our lack of complete or limited inspection inspection of CROMs. CRDMs. This JCO will also be reviewed byby Tim Tim and Jim Martin Martin and some consultant.
~
U.S. NRC U.s. NRC In In re DAVID 18 GEISEN2 DAVID GEISEN
'f S' t.'fA. iL.Edf Exhbt.~
3 7 Mode 5.doc Mode S.doc IA-05-052 Docket # 1A-05-052 Oockat DateBIG M Date Markedior 4 2 2008 ailed for IIO:lldL. (Trm p...:g~ 0026M (Tr. Date Off8l'9d
*Date Offered in in Ev: E:./J-.
Ev: ( 2008 (fr.r. p.2?~)
, 2008(
Through~WItne$slPa(leI: ) / A Trugh WinesPawel:'- Action: ActIon: fJ/ A REJECTED WIfHDP*4WN REJECTED WI'THDRAWN Dat: *.=~(re* g 2A.R* ) DIde: rJ . ' _t.___0
.2008 (Tr. p. ,) .
DOCKETED USNRC USNRC September 9, 2009 (11 September :OOam) (11:00am) OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS STAFF S14H-00475 7~kQ6~L~741~: §*GL4Z~? ~ 6L Exhibit 134134 Page 1 of 1 Pages NRC010-0475 NRC01(I*0475
R h--S; C- / /27 u.s. U.S. NRC tn re DAVID GEISEN InreDAVID GEISEN s++sztt#.~..
~
f'Pr-t-t exhibit #.;LL-
~2 a Docket # 1I1A-0505 Docket # A-05-052* .
ID-L~ 2008 (Tr. Marked ior ID:.l2:J.L. Date Marked10r (T. p.] AL Z5' ) From: Frank W. From: W. KennedyITElFirstEnergy Kennedy/TE/FirstEnergy Date Offered in m 4=(Trr.2008 (Tr. p.l} ~ ) Er j.O6 i EV:.IijL. p.2(
.To:
To: Rodney M. M. CookiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy Cook/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy hMOu0 W~ftSWTWW ......}J~/;.:.p.._* lhroughWltnesslPanel:, 4- _ _. _ -
~
cc: Action: Ac~o- REJECTED WITHIIAM REJECTED WIlHDRAWN
Subject:
CRD Nozzle Cracking Meeting SubjectCRD Meeting t..: aq.r: t.~~ZTr 2 2008 err. p. [.~ Le ) Date: 8/15/2001 14:6:51010 8/15i2001 14:6:51010
---,- Forwarded -Forwarded by Frank by Frank W. KennedyfTElFirstEnergy KennedyfTEJFirstEnergy on 08/1512001 08/15i2001 02:03 PM ----- -----
David J. Stephenson alfl1520~o nei To: Charles E. E. 08/15/2001 5 PM
.01 :50 PlAM Ackermrani'E/FirstEnergy@ Fi AckermaniTElFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy rstEnergy cc: HenryW Henry W..
Stevens/'TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Edward V.
.StevensfTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy,Edward V.
Chimahusky/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Frank ChimahuskyfTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Frank W. W. KennedyiTE/FirstEnergy @FirstEnergy KennedylTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy
Subject:
CRD Nozzle Cracktng~1E~: Cracking -Me-Frank Kennedy Kennedy and I attended (by phone) the .8/15/01 8/15/01 NRC/Industry NRC/Industry meeting concerning the NRC request for additior2. additiorta regarding CRD nozzle cracking (NRC Bulletin 2001-01). Guy Campbell, .and information regardingCRDnozzle and Steve Moffit were also in attendance (phone) for a period. Other DB personnel attendance (phone) .Lockwood, Andrew Siemaszko, and Prasoon personnel including David Lockwood, Prasaon Go,GG' were scheduled to be physically physically at the meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to provide provide NRC Expectations for responding to Bulletin 2001-01. Expectations .for 2001-01. The NRC wants to know the currentocondition currentconditicin of the plants (results of inspections to date), date), individual plant configurations, planned configurations, planned inspections, and how the .pl~ntscontinue inspections, plants continue to meetthe meet the applicable applicable regulations. regulations. Plants have been catergorized within 3 been catergorized , groups g'roups (cracks .already already detected)/(within detected)/(within 5 EFPYs of Oconee Oconee 3 (ONS3)/>5 (ONS3)/>5 EFPYs EFPYs of ONS3. The response requiremen response reqUiremen' are broken are broken up into 55 parts. The first part requests requests informantion regarding regarding -details details of the reactor reactor head, CRD nozzles, head,CRDnoz.zles, missile shields, and the results of previous inspections. inspections. The next three questions questions is based on which of the three three categories categories that your plant falls, the more likely that a crack exists plant" failS, requires a more exists requires, concerning plar~ more expedited response concerning plarn inspections inspections and corrective actions. The fifth question question requires notification inspection r~sults, notification of inspection results. Most of the discussio['~ discussiors regarded regarded how to answer these questions, evaluation triteriaforindications/flaws criteria for indications/flaws detected detected as part of the inspection, inspection, arnc arc
,the possibility the possibility of of regulatory regulatory enforcement enforcement for deficiencies.
deficiencies. One One of thethe major unknowns unknowns is crack propagation propagation rate. Another Another major unknown is detectability major unknown -of cracks. detectability.of Since the cracks. Since nozzles nozzles have .a a very tight fit, very small small leak rates have been experienced. experienced. Davis-Besse Davis-Besse falls into the the within 5 EFPys. EFPys. However, Mr. Campbell Campbell noted noted [outside [outside of the meeting] meeting] thatthat DB personnel r÷, personnel ~'3, to confirm confirm .that this catagorization is correct catagorization is correct since there may be individual be individual plant differences that have not plant differences not been conscder-cons;de'<
. such as the continuous continuous headhead vent vent line, line, raised RCS loop, etc.
As' As stated stated during the meeting, the responseresponse due due date is 9/4/01. 9/4/01. DOCKETED DOCKETED USNRC USNRC' September 9, 2009 (11:00am)
$eptember 9, 2009 (11 :OOam)
OFFICE OFFICE OF OF SECRETARY SECRETARY 52 RULEMAKINGS RULEMAKINGS AND AND S140 ..07252 S14D-072 ADJUDICATIONS ADJUDICATIONS STAFF STAFF t~i)LA-r6 - 05' CY1...../ NRC008-1904 NRC008-1904 NRCOO8-1 904
KA5 C-_- kAs c- !go Igo ~~:~,oGE'SEN5'r~Cf U.S. NRC In re DAVID GEISEN )1t-L 7/
..33-EExhibItb#_....2L..
Date 1A-05-052 Docket ## 1A,,()S-QS2 Docket Marked Date Marked for 10' (1f~ ID:'/,
,2008 2008 (Tr. p.-,~
p. 82 > . From: Prasoon K. GoyalfTE/FirstEnergy From: Prasaon GoyalfTE/FirstEnergy Date Offered Date Offered in Ev: I:I:IP JilL, I tl / 2008 (Tr'.
/Y p.~~
(Tr. .,..2008 To: To: sfyfrtch@framatech.com, styftch@ wgray@framatech.co framatech.com, wgray@framatech.co Wrtne~ane: tJ!/ Through WitnessI~anel:_ Through r L - ca: cc: Dale OaleR.R. Wuokko/TEJFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, WuokkolTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, David David C. ~D Action: A6ý0ýD REJECTED Action: REJECTED WITHDRAWN WITHDRAWN
~eisenrrElFJrstEnergy@FirStEner.gy., -.G eisen/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Theo TheoS. S. Swim/TE/FirstEnergy SWimrrElFirstEnergy' Date; I'17) ILL,Y-.. (T 2oo8 (Tr, O'Zu)).
KennedyrrEJRrstEnergy@FirstEnergy., Kennedy/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy Date:~, 2008 r. p.... a.____ Subject NRC Subject NRC BUlletin BUlletin Date: 8117/2001 8/1712001 11:5:291010 11 :5:291010 performing a 100% Steve ,we will be performing Steve examination in the qualified visual examination 100% qualified neXt outage the next outage April 2002. Framatome Framatome is requested requested toto provide provide a response response to: , 3.b.1 3.b.1 and and 3 b.2 b2 We had a meeting meeting with the directors yesterday. Our future inspection dir9Ctorsyesterday. inspection in 13th RFO in 13thRFO will will be be 100% 100% qualified qualified visual exam exam and wherewhere wewe can not perform perform 100% 100% visual exam of of a nozzle nozzle (s) a volumetric (6) volumetric examination probably ECT) examination (most probably ECn will bebe performed. The results inspection will results of inspection be handled handled via our condition report report program program as to the extent of condition and repair or leave as-is as-is etc. I assume you will addess the leakageleakage thru the annulus annulus to show that we have have adequate adequate or similar gaps as as Oconee Oconee plants allowing the leakage leakage to be detected. detected. Also crack growth (current knowledge) in an eXisting existing circumferential crack(s) would not circumferential crack(s} not result-in aa nozzle(s) nozzle(s} failure failure untill next next RFO. Is it possible possible to go back back to 1998 1998 that is when when a good good head exam was done with no nozzle nozzle leakage.(meaning leakage.(meaning not not taking any credit for 2000 inspection). inspection). When can we We expect expect your response? response? We are asking Framatome to look/explore asking Framatome look/explore the following: Is it possible for DB to move out of <5
)sitpossible <:5 EFPY to > 5EFPY 5EFPY bin in the ranrankings? Considering the kings? Considering the following:
following: Both Oconee andANOand ANO plants had identified occurance of PWSCC identified occurance PWSCCin .in their steam generators generators 3 to to 4 years earlier than the CRDM nozzle cracks/leaks. May be it is because nozzlecrackslleaks. because of the chemistry practices. practices. DB had not identified any PWSCC in their SGs. This may give us few more years till the the cracks are detected. , cracks . DB is unique in in the B&W fleet (raised loop} loop) 'and and we have a head ,vent vent line which may move the the coolant around the head providing a unform temperature coolant temperature across across the top of head head compared to other plants plants where where stagnation of hot water water could create higher temperatures and may trap higher temperatures air/hydrogen. Most.of airlhydrogen. Most of the Oconee Oconee crackes were were on the top section section of the head. Also we could use the old equation which uses specific equation whiqh specific nozzlestrsses, nozzle strsses, tensile& tensile& yield strengths strengths besides the head temperature. Please provide your Please your response date. DOCKETED DOCKETED
*USNRC USNRC September 9, 2009 (11:00am)
September 9, 2009 (11 :OOam) OFFICE OF SECRETARY OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF S14H-01995 S14H-01995 Exhibit 136 Page 11 of of 1 Pages O~1994 NRCOI0-1994 NRC01 -Ft--k kATC' -!,SC (t4o - DS<S2- 6 2_
From: Prasoon From: Prasoon K. GoyalTE/FirstEnergy Goyal/TElFirstEnergy To: sfyfltch@framatech.com, wgray@framatech.co sfyfitch@framatech.com, wgray@framatech.co cc: Dale Dale R. Wuokko/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, David WuokkoffEIFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Davi<i C. GeisenffElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Geisen/TE/FirstEnergy@ SwimffEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, FirstEnergy, Theo S. Swim/TE/FirstEnergy@ Frank W. FirstEnergy, Frank Kenne<iyffElFirstEilergy@FirstEnergy KennedyfUE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy Subject NRC BUlletin Subject BUlletin 8117/2001 11 Date: 8117/2001 :5:291010 11:5:291010 Steve ,we will be performing Steve performing aa 100% qualified visual 100% qualified examination in the visual examination the next neXt outage outage April April 2002. 2002. Framatome is requested Framatome requested to provide response to: provide a response 3.b.1 3.b.1 and and 3 b2b.2 We had had aa meeting meeting with with the the directors yesterday. Our
<iirectorsyesterday. Our future future inspection inspection in 13th RFO in 13th will 100% qualified will be 100% qualified visual exam exam and and where where we can not perform 100% 100% Visual visual exam exam of a nozzle nozzle (s)
(s) aa volumetric examination (most probably ECT) will volumetric examination wi"~ perf()rmed. The results of inspection be performed. inspection will be handled via our condition report program as to the extent of condition and report program and repair repair or leave as-is as-is etc. II assume assume you will addess addess the leakage leakage thru the annulus annulus to show that we have adequate we have adequate or similar gaps gaps as Oconee plants allowing the leakage leakage to be detected. Also crack crack growth growth (current knowledge) in an existing circumferential circumferential crack(s) crack(s) would not result ininaa nozzle(s) nozzJe{s) failure untill next failureuntill RFO. RFO. Is it possible possible to go back to 1998 1998 that is when a good head exam was done with no nozzle nozzle leakage.(meaning not ta~ing leakage.(meaning taking any credit credit for 2000 inspection). When 2000 inspection). When can we expect can We expect your response? your response? We are asking Framatome Framatome to look/explore look/explore the following: Is it possible for DB itpossible DB to move move out of <5 EFPY to > 5EFPY 5EFPY bin inin the rankings? Considering the ran kings? ConSidering the following: following: Oconee and ANO plants had identified occuranceof Both Oconee occurance of PWSCC in in their steam generators generators 3 to 4 years earlier earlier than the CRDM nozzle nozzle cracks/leaks. May be it is because because of the Chemistry chemistry practices. practices. DB had not identified any PWSCC in their SGs. This may give us few more years till the identified anyPWSCC the cracks are detected. unique in the B&W fleet (raised loop) and DB is unique and we have a headhead vent line which which may move the the coolant around the head providing a unform temperature across across the top of head compared compared to other plants where where stagnation stagnation of hot water could create create higher higher temperatures temperatures and may trap air/hydrogen. airlhydrogen. Most of the Oconee crackescrackes were on the top section of the head. Also we could use the old equation which tensile& yield strengths whiqh uses specific nozzle strsses, tensile& strengths besides besides the head temperature. temperature. Please provide your response date date... S14H-01995 S14H-01995 Exhibit Exhibit 136136 Page 11 of 11 Pages NRCOIO-1994 NRC01 {I-1994
DOCKETED DOCKETED s USNRC 5ti.. tl6
~A-S L-/~l USNRC u.s. NRC U.S.
In In re NRC DAVID GEISEN re DAVID I i'f r * #2 exhibit *Lx() September September 9, 2009 (11:00am)
- 9. 2009 (11 :OOani) Docket#
Docket# 1A-05-052 1A-OS-OS2 INTRA*COMPANY MEMORANDUM INTRA-COMPANY £08268 ED S28... MEMORANDUM OFFICE OF OFFICE OF SECRETARY SECRETARY Marked for 1D431 Date Marked IDtk/.i.-. 2008 p.~Z5 . ) 2008 (Tr. p.-.1.2 RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS ADJUDICATIONS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS AND STAFF Date Date Offered Offered in in Ev: Ev: Ji/.:L. 2-*h-, 2008 err. pP*.At~) 2008 (Tr. wrtness/panel:--'C'-+/....;~ T. S. T. S71J S. SwIcn, Supervisor, Supervisor. Mechanical/Structural Mechanical/Structural Unit Unit Through Winess/Pane: Through A~ 6 C _______ REJECTED WITHDR-AWN c!;al1~kgin Action: A09j Action: REJECTED WITHDHAWN FROM FROM P. K. K. Goya , Senior Engineer, ...., MechanicaUStructural Mechanical/Structural Unit Date: \-~ I<l ,2008 (Tr. p. is' 2=k 2008 (Tr ) SUBJECT susJEcT Trip Report Trip Report- NRC Bulletin
- NRC 2001-01 Meeting Bulletin 2001-01 Meeting PHONE PHONE 7351" 7351 attended the NRC meeting with EPR!
I attended Bulletin 2001-01, EPRI on Bulletin 2001-0 I, "Circumferential Cracking of RPV "Circumferential Cracking RPY Head Head Nozzles" on Penetration Nozzles" Penetration on August 15,.2001. meeting was held in the NRC 15.2001. The meeting Rockville, Maryland. NRC Office, Rockville, Maryland. purpose of this meeting was for the NRC The purpose NRC to explain expectations for the bulletin response. ex.plain their expectations Following are the lessons learned for Davis Besse. Following 1)
- 1) qualified visual examination Develop a qualified (VT-2) procedure examination (VT-2) specifically for CRDM nozzle visual procedure specifically inspection.
inspection.
- 2) Qualify inspectors for this inspection Qualify inspectors inspection
- 3) credible technical basis for the course of action outlined in the bulletin response.
Provide credibletechrtical
- 4) Commit additional additional resources resources to manage this issue.
Jack Strosnider, Director of Engineering, Engineering. NRC presented an overview of the bulletin and its purpose. The presented anroverview The information to assess the potential bulletin is to gather information purpose of the bulletin determine ifif significance and to determine potential safety significance additional regulatory action is.~uired. is required. industry in the technical areas: challenges facing the induStry He discussed the following challenges
- 1) The initiation time and initiation ,time arid the growth*rate of cracks ate growth-rate of are not known or established.
- 2) conditions (temperature, boron co~entration) environmental conditions Annulus environmental concentration) are not known. Also, their impact on the crack growth is unknown.unknown ..
- 3) Above the weld crack cra~k may go part through the wall then become circumferential or it may start as become circumferential through wall. The mode of crack propagation is not known. He also discussed that visual examination needs to be done in accordance VT-2 procedure that includes defined accordance with a qualified VT-2procedure defined criteria. Visual examination acceptance criteria capable of reliable detection and source examination must be capable Similarly volumetric identification. SiInilarly volumetric examination qualification should demonstrate the capability examination qualification of detecting 00 OD crackhlg.
cracking. . Hiser, NRC, presented the technical issues involved with Allen Hiser. with the CRDM n<?zzle nozzle cracking. He stressed this issue since more cracking is anticipated in the to manage thisissue that additional resources will be required to-manage communication (NRC/industry) is the key in managing this issue. He emphasized that communication future. He emphasized discussed the following main points: . . I)
- 1) Code inspections (VT-2) are not adequate and NRC inspections (VT.2) NRC is working on resolving this issue.
- 2) occurrence of leakage at the same site may be subject to enforcement Second OCCUlTence enforcement.
3)
- 3) Corrective Corrective action should comply compJy with Criteria XVI of Appendix B.
- 4) Technical Specifications do not pemit TechnicalSpecifjcations permit pressure boundary leakage.
S14H-00600 514H-00600
-A-PZ_-A7-E-- NRC010-0600 NRC010-0600
INTRA-COMPANY MEMORANDUM INTRA-COMPANY EO S26l,.e eo 8268.. MEMORANDUM FtEnergy TO T.S. Supervisor Mechanical/Structural T. S.SS71J Supervisor, Mechanical/Structural Unit DATE DATE August 22, 2001 200 1 FROM FROM c!';al:'k~gineer, P. K. GoaY. 4 enior Engineer, MechanicaVStructural Mechanical/Structural Unit MAILsTop MAIL STOP 3210 3210 suBuECT SUBJECT Report - NRC Bulletin 2001-01 Trip Report- 200 1-0 1 Meeting PHONE 7351 I attended the NRC meeting with EPRI on Bulletin 2001-01, "Circumferential Cracking of RPV Head 200 1-01. "Circumferential Penetration Nozzles" Penetration Nozzles" on August IS, 15, ZOOt. 2001. The The meeting was held in the NRC Office, Office, Rockville, Maryland. The purpose of this meeting was for the NRC to explain their expectations for the bulletin bulletin response. Following are the lessons learned for Davis Besse. 1)
- 1) Develop Develop a qualified specifically for CRDM nozzle visual examination (VT-2) procedure specifically qualified visual examination inspection.
- 2) Qualify Qualify inspectors for this inspection 3)
- 3) Provide credible technical Provide credible technical basis for the course course of action outlined in the bulletin response.
thehulletin
- 4) Commit additional resources to manage this issue.
Jack Strosnider, Director of Engineering, NRC presented ofEngineering, overview of the bulletin and its purpose. The presented an overview purpose of the bulletin is to gather information to assess the potential togather significance and to determine if potential safety significance additional regulatory action is required required. He discussed the following challenges challenges facing the industry in the technical areas: 1)
- 1) the growth rate of cracks are not known or established.
The initiation time and the.
- 2) environmental conditions (temperature, boron concentration)
Annulus environmental concentration) are not known. Also. Also, their impact on the crack growth is unknown.
- 3) Above the weld crack may go part through the wall then become become circumferential circumferential or it may start as through through wall. The mode of crack propagation is not known. He also discussed that visual crack proi-agation examination accordance with a qualified VT-2 procedure examination needs to be done in accordance procedure that includes defined defined acceptance criteria. Visual examination examination must be capable capable reliable detection and source of reliable volumetric examination qualification Siniilarly volumetric identification. Similarly qualification should demonstrate the capability of detecting OD cracking.
Allen Hiser, NRC, NRC. presented technical issues involved with the CRDM nozzle cracking. presented the technical cracking. He stressed stressed that additional resources will be required to manage this issue since more cracking is anticipated in the future. He emphasized that communication communication (NRC/industry) (NRC/industry) is the key in managing managing this issue. He discussed discussed the following main points:
- 1) Code inspections (VT-2) are not adequate and NRC is not.adequate is working working on resolving this issue.
2)
- 2) Second occurrence of Second occurrence leakage leakage at the same site may be subject to enforcement.
enforcement
- 3) Corrective action should comply with Criteria Corrective Criteria XVI of Appendix B.
- 4) Specifications do not permit pressure Technical Specifications pressure boundary leakage.
S14H-00600 S14H-00600 NRC010-0600 NRC01 0-0600
August 22, 2001 2 of 2 Page 20f2 Carsuo discussed the use of Mark Cilrsuo regulation. If risk-informed regulation. ofrisk-infonned If utilized then it should comply with analysis should maintain defense-in-depth Also risk-informed analysis Regulatory Guide 1.174. Alsorisk":jnfonned defense-in-depth philosophy and sufficient safety margins. maintain sufficient concact me at extension information please contact If you need additional information extension 7351. PKG/gmw PKG/grnw cc: 0. G. Campbell G. 3080 w/a w/a J. B. Cunnings 1056 w/a B. R. Galetan 1056 w/a w/a D. C. Geisen 3105 w/a T. A. Lang T.A.Lang 3105 w/a 310~ w/a G. N. LeBlanc LeBlanc 3205 w/a D. H.Lockwood H. Lockwood 3065 w/a McLaughlin M. A. McLaughlin w/a 1048 w/a S. S. P. Moffitt Moffitt 1054 w/a w/a D. J. J. Mominee Mominee 3335 w/a w/a Mechanical/Structural Mechanical/Structural Unit 3210 w/a 32.lOw/a ( SI4H-00601 S14H-00601 NRC010-0601
P_ Ps Qt tS - From: From: Prasoon Prasoon K. K*GoyaIlTE/FirstEnergy
.GoyalfTElFirstEnergy To:
To: Rodney Rodney M. Cook/FirstEnergy@ M. FirstEnergy CooklFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy cc: cc: Andrew Andrew J. J. Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, SiemaszkolFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Dale Dale LL Miller/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Dale MillerITElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Dale R. R. Wuokko/TFE/FirstEnergy@ WuokkoITElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, FirstEnergy, DavidDavid H. H. Lockwood/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, LockwoodITElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Frank Frank W. W. Kennedy/TE/FirstEnergy@ KennedyITElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. FirstEnergy, MarkMark A.A. McLaughlin/TElFirstEnergy@ McLaughlinITElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy FirstEnergy
Subject:
Subject:
Re:Re: Serial Serial 2731 8-27-of Version 2731 8-27-01 Version lb 1b Date: Date: 8/2712001 8/27/200111:41 11:41:311010
- 311010 II have have following following comments:
comments: 1)1) April April 1998 1998 inspection inspection .Last
.Last sentence sentenceThe The head head was was videotaped videotaped after aftercleaning.
cleaning. We We need need to to make make sure sure that we have the tapes. It also applies to 2000 that we have the tapes. It also applies to 2000 inspection inspection also. also. . 2)
- 2) Subsequent Subsequent reviewreviewot of 1998 1998 andand 2000 2000 inspection inspection videotape videotape results.
results. The The discussion discUSSion herehere gives gives an an impression impress/onto to the the reader reader that that we we were were able abletoto look look atatall all the the CRDMs. CRDMs. It It isis very very difficult difficultto to look look atatthe the CRDMs CRDMs when when there there isis boric boric acid acid around around it. it. Do Do wewe want wantto*to-reword reword this?. this?
- 3) Item i.e requests-a description
- 3) Item 1.e requests a description of of the the cabling cabling fromfrom the the top top of of the the RV RV headheadto to the the missile missile shield.
shield. WeWe are are silent on this subject. silent on this subject. 4)
- 4) Please Please delete delete the the straight stra:ight line line shown shown on onthe the right right hand hand sidesideofof Figure Figure 33 and and page page 1919 ofat 19.
19. U.S. NRC ,i
~~ ~~~D in re DAVID GEISENGEISEN 51 ~ ff Exhibit #.~
Docket # IA-05-052 Docket # 1A..()5.()52 5 i7j!.< 2& Date Date Marked Marked for ID~2008 or ID.. (Tr.p.. Z ) 2008(Tr.D-DateOffered Date Offeredin in Ev:
-Ev:1 .Ji/.fi-.2008 (Tr. Pp. gZ- ~ )
2008 (Tr. DOCKETED DOCKETED USNRC USNRC Through Wi&*ss/Panel: Through wrtnesS/Panel:* Nj.fo " September 9, 2009 (11:00am) September 9, 2009 (11 :OOam) AciOOn~ 4,MREJECTED Action: ~. REJECTED WIMhDRAW#N WIJHDRAWN Date: J1111 Date. +2008 (Tr. p. 22- (e ) _
- r. P&L.)
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OFFICE RULEMAKINGSOF SECRETARY AND RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS STAFF S14D-04404 5140-04404 Exhibit Exhibit 145 145 Page 1 of Page 1 of 11Pages Pages NRC007-1 755 NRCOOj' -1755 DS OL-
ý-A-S .- 1ý3 Prasoon K. Goyal To: Andrew J. Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Mark A. A. McLaughlin/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy Mclaughlin/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy 08/30101 07:17 AM 08/30/01 AM M. Cook/FirstEnerly@FirstEnergy, Dale l. cc: Rodney M.Cook/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, L. Miller/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy Miller lTE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy
Subject:
Head inspection
Subject:
inspection I have not seen any EWR to cut openings in the service structure in 13th
.1 13th RFO. IfIf we need these it funded and P.O issued should be funded Framatome immediately. We do not say anywhere issued to Framatome anywhere in our our response to the inspection thru the mouse holes creates the bulletin that inspection an impedement for 100%
creates animpedement 100% visual examination. (management (management need to know this). Even with crawler we may not be able to inspect head because of only 2" gap.. inspect the nozzles at the top of the head gap .. U.S. In NRC GEISEN 5-.). DAVID GEISEN 5ý&4bt reDAVID In re ff I (;.. . am Exhibit ,_'1__ I/,,) cf-..._ Docket ## 11A-05-052 'I S A-05-052 Date Marked-for Mari<e<Hor 10'/4 z-I~ ; ID z-j
- 2008 (Tr. (Tr. p.
- p. gb ,) ")
DOCKETED DOCKETED USNRC USNRC Date Offered Offered in Ev: Ev:_J.i..tf. 2008 (Tr. p.
, 2008 Through WitneSS/Panel:--,(dp:::.t...,J/-IP-L..-.
p.~Y? September 9, 2009 September 9, 2009 (11 (11:00am)
- OOam) Through Witness/Panel. 1 /
Action:. ~ REJECTED REJEC~ED Wfn<<)RAWN WIThDRAWN OFFICE OF SECRETARY OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS ADJUDICATIONS STAFF "ADJUDICATIONS AND STAFF Date: J1fi..
.. 4 2008 2008 (Tr. p.~
(sr. p. S-U2-~ ) S14H-00503 514H-00503 Exhibit 89 89 Page 1 of 1 Pages mpRinnn.rnn
~ £l.-Q /? <--)-2 10 ct( U.S.
U.S. NRC NRC ~I ('(' 4-"7 r \...] '-- - tl D DAVID GEISEN ,) t It-- t-t ExhibIt 0 _ 2 - K krs re DAVID In re Docket 1A-DS-DS2 I ~ J Q Docket ## 1A-05-052 Marked for Date Marked ID~ 2008 for ID is'?5. )) 2008 (Tr. p. 2*6"
. ./~lg* 0Z~
From: From: Dale R. Dale R. WuokkolTE/FirstEnergy WuokkofTElFirstEnergy Date Offered Date Ev.~, In Ev: Offered in (L ., 2008 2008 (Tr.p...-.Ž.4 (Tr. P.L_) To: Rodney M. Rodney M. CooklFirstEnergy@ CooklFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy,FrankW.Kennedyn Witness/Panel:_~N~/..:.p., FirstEnergy, Frank W. Kennedy/'I Through Witness/Panel:. P_ _ _ _, LockwoodfTElFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Lockwood/TE/FirstEnergy@ Prasoon K. FirstEnergy, Prasoon K. GoyaVTE/FirstEnei GoyaVTElFirstEnel * .c.::=~ / FirstEnergy, Mark GeisenffEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Geisen/TElFirstEnergy@ Mark A. McLaughlinITEiFirstEner! Action: A. McLaugh~lniTvEFirstEnerl ~ . REJECTED Action: AgiMT REJECTED WITHDRAWNWITHDRAWN cc: . . Date: ~, 4.-, 2008 (Tr. (Tr. p. S~le ). ). CEOG meeting on
Subject:
CEOG
Subject:
on BL BL 2001-01 Date: 9/4/2001 10:39:241010 Oate:9/4/2001 10:39:241010 fyi Forwarded by Dale R. Wuokko/TElFirstEnergy
--- Forwarded
--- WuokkoffElFirstEnergy .on on 09/04f01 10:30 AM 09/04101 10:30 AM --- Huston" "Roger Huston"
.cRoger@licensingsu <Roger@licensingsu To: "Wuokko" <drwuokko@firs "Wuokko'"<drwuokko@firs pport.com> cc:
Subject:
CEOG meeting on.BL CEOG meeting 2001-onBL 2001* 08127/01 05:31 PM 08/27/01 PM Dale, I attended between the CEOG attended a meeting between CtOG andand the NRC regarding the NRC staff today regarding the proposed response of CE plants to the Bulletin on vessel penetration vessel head penetration nozzle cracks. Since the Bulletin responseresponse is due thought some due next week, II thought some feedback might be useful. The CEOG purpose purpose was to grease the Skids skids for their members to request deferral by one cycle for their inspections. deferral None of their plants are high inspections. None high susceptiblity (per the Bulletin scheme). susceptiblity scheme). One (Palisades) is low. One (Palisades) DOCKETED USNRC USNRC The presentation emphasized the difficulty of doing the requested inspections on CE plants. Their drives are a uniform distance above the distance above the September 9, September 9, 2009 (11:00am) 2009 (11 :OOam) and B&W. All plants have some form .. elevation like W andB&W. head, not at a uniform elevation OFFICE OF OFFICE OF SECRETARY SECRETARY on-head insulation. Most involve tight-fitting collars around the of on-head the RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS AND resting on the head. Insulation removal is going to be nozzles and resting be ADJUDICATIONS STAFF STAFF Time is needed to develop mockups, ADJUDICATIONS required, and will be destructive. Time train, design new insulation, etc. respondents were NRC staff was not particularly receptive. The principal respondents Strosnider;,who was diplomatic, and Brian Sheron, who was not. They Jack Strosnider(who arguments to stated that this is a safety issue, and that they need safety .arguments different. While one of the justify doing anything different. .theNRC goals is unnecessary unnecessary burden reduction, they knew there were going to be burdens from this Bulletin. They found them necessary, and are not particularly receptive to arguments of hardship or excess burden now. are concerned that they now. They are.concerned have a safety issue, and they are not EPRI/MRI/NEI that not as convinced as EPRIIMRIINEI Oconee is the worst plant or that the susceptibility model model accurately relative standing, much less establishes relative less time to aa problem. Sheron stated that the model is just time and temperature, and we all know there are other are other S14D-04539 S140-04539 Exhibit 153 153
ýE9/7472 S cS LQ CNRO2-15 71~
TK.:z ~ ~ge Page 11 of "7--- of 22 Pages Pages NRC002-0153 NRC002-0153
From: Dale R. A. WuokkolTE/FirstEnergy WuokkofTElFirstEnergy To: Rodney M. Rodney Cook/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Frank W. Kennedy/TElFirstEnergy@ M. CookiRrstEnergy@RrstEnergy,Frank KennedyfTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, H. FirstEnergy, David H. LockwoodFrE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Prasoon K. LockwoodfTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, K. GoyaVE/TFJirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, David C. GoyallTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, GeisenTrE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Mark GeisenrrEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Mark A. McLaughlinfTE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy McLaughllnfTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy cc:
Subject:
CEOG meeting on BL 2001-01 CEOG meeting Date: 9/4/2001 10:39:241010 .Date:9/4/2001 10:39:241010 fyi Wuokko/TEFirstEnergy on 09/04/01 10:30 AM Forwarded by Dale R. WuokkofTElFirstEnergy
Forwarded. AM---
"Roger Huston" ,<Roger@icensingsu <Roger@lIcenslngsu To:
To: "Wuokko'" <drwuokko@firs-
'Wuokko" <drwuokko@firs pport.com> cc:
PM 05:31 PM
Subject:
Subject:
CEOG meeting onBL CEOG meeting 2001 on BL 2001* 08/27/01 05:31 08127101 Dale, I attended a meeting meeting between between the CEOG and the NRC staff today regarding the theCEOG the response .of proposed response of CE plants plants to the Bulletin Bulletin on vessel head head penetration nozzle cracks. Since Since the Bulletin response is due next week, II thought some some feedback might feedback might be useful. useful. The CEOG purpose was to grease the skids for their members members to request deferral deferral by one cycle for their inspections. inspections. None None of their plants are highhigh susceptiblity susceptiblity (per the Bulletin scheme). One (Palisades) (Palisades) is low. The presentation emphasized the difficulty of doing presentation emphasized doing the requested inspections on CE plants. Their drives are a uniform distance inspections distance above the the head, notat not at a uniform elevation like W and B&W. Wand B&W. All plants havehave some form of on-head insulation. Most involve tight-fitting collars around the the nozzles nozzles and resting .on on the head. Insulation Insulation removal is going to be be required, and will be destr.uctive. destructive. Time Time is needed needed to develop mockups, train, train, design new insulation, etc. NRC staff was not particularly NRC particularly receptive. The principal prinCipal respondents werewere Jack Jack Strosnider, who was diplomatic, diplomatiC, and Brian Sheron, who was not. They stated that this is a safety issue, and that they need safety safety arguments arguments to justify doing anything different. While one of the NRC goals goals is unnecessary burden reduction, they knew therethere were going to be burdens from this this Bulletin. They found them necessary, and are not particularly particularly receptive receptive to arguments of hardship hardship or excess excess burden now. They are concerned concerned that they have a safety issue, and they are not as convinced as EPRIIMRIINElthat have a safety issue, EPRI/MRI/NEI that Oconee is the worst plant or that the susceptibility Oconee accurately susceptibility model accurately establishes relative standing, much less time to a problem. establishes problem. Sheron Sheron stated that the mOdel model is just time and temperature, and we all know there are other 8140-04539 SI4D-04539 153 Exhibit 153 Page 11 of Page 2 Pages of 2 Pages NRC002-0153 NRC002-0153
involved -- we just factors involved factors don't know how to model them. just don' them. The The staff staff has has also concluded that inspection concluded that inspection of a fewtew penetrations penetrations ---- on one one plant plant or on sample of representative sample on a representative ofaa fleet -- doesn't fleet-- have much doesn't have much validity validity as as proof proof that there there isn't a problem problem where where there have have not been been inspections. inspections. They They have have put a memo on the web to that that effect. A copy is attached. attached. The TheCEOGCEOG had ~econd.back-pocket. had a second, back-pocket, presentation presentation on a risk argument for why risk argument why OK to defer. If it's OK If anything, reception to that presentation anything. the reception presentation was moremore hostile. hostile. The The analysis analysis was was mostly qualitative. qualitative. It relied on EPRIEPAI pipe pipe break probabilities probabilities to estimate what the the chances chances of of a nozzle nozzle ejection ejection LOCA were. It did did notappear not appear to take anyany factors specific specific to this situation into account. account. NRC NRC thinks there there are are plenty. There There isis a known known cracking cracking problem. problem. The The corrosion corrosion environment environment is aggressive. aggressive. Simple Simple useuse of of pipe pipe break probabilities is therefore probabilities therefore inappropriate. inappropriate. Etc. If If you You are contemplating contemplating asking for fora a delay in performing perfonning inspections that are requested requested by by the Bulletin, Bulletin. be advised advised that a strong strong safety argument argument will be needed. Simply demonstrating demonstrating difficulty difficulty or hardship hardship is not going going to get a very very warm reception. II don't wann reception. don't think that will will be your approach, approach, based based on our past conversations, figured I'd pass along the warning anyway. conversations. but figured Roger W. Huston Huston Licensing Licensing Support Services Services 703-671-9738 703-671-9738 http://www.licensingsupport.com http://www.licensingsupport.com S140*04540 S14D-04540 NRC002-0154 NRC002*0154
<c-I Piedmont Management Piedmont Management & Technical Services, &. Technical Services, Inc.
DOCKETED DOCKETED USNRC USNRC U.S. NCLZ L{ L1 September September 14. l-t. 2W 2(X)1l
-- September September 9, 9, 2009 2009 (11:00am)
(11 :OOam) U.S. NRC in reDAVID In 19 DAVID GEISENGEIS2 iv-tT I' / f' r EJdtil._--
ý4,1_Edlbt.. -_l OFFICE OF OF SECRETARY SECRETARY DocWe Docket 0 1A-06-06
- 1A-05-052 RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS ADJUDICATIONS ADJUDICATIONS STAFF AND Date MarkediortD'lUL.
Date Marfted-for I 2008 (Th 200 cn-. p. g2 S ) Date Offered Inev. 1~(8
**OateOtferedInEv: 'rrcn-.p.gZG )
(f2 .-- Mr.:"lark Mr. ?vICLaughlin Mark McLaughlin Davis-Besse Nuclear Davis-Besse ~uclear Power Power Station Station lhrough~WltnesslPaneI: ThmuouhesPn Action: - Acion: NI REJECTED WMIIDAWN REJECTED WlnIOAAWN 550 1 N. State Route 22 5501 Mail Stop 1048 Mail L048 te.. ~ 241a0 Date: .%2oocrr.(Tr. pP-8'Z G )
~ , .2008 Oak Harbor, OH 43449
Dear Mark:
your and Mr. Steve Moffitt's request. I reviewed Davis-Besse's At your preparations to date.foraddressing Davis-Besse's preparations date Joraddressing the reactor reactor vessel top heaad CRDM toph~ CRDMpenetration penetration cracking issues issu~s andthe station's response to NRC and the station's NRC. 7 " Bulletin 2001-01, 1001-01. "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure "Circumferential Cracking Pr6ssure Vessel Head PenetrationNozzles~" Penetration Nozzles." - - The observations observations listed listed in Attachment Attachment (l) (1) are provided characterize the status and degree provided to characterize degree ofof preparations preparaiions to date. The planning elements. elements below are are emphasized emphasized for consideration consideration by the project project team assembled
.team assembled to conduct the planning for this effort.
CRDMInspectio~ L. .CRDM Inspection and Repair Project team team rriembers members are are not in agreement concerning the need agreement concerning need to. to proceed with cutting access holes holes in the Reactor Reactor Service. Structure at the start of l3RFO. 13RFO. Some.Some see this as a contingency contingency action for which all preparationspreparations should be in place and implemented only if required. Itis ifrequired. his noted that on .completion completion of 12RFO, 12RFO, the Reactor Vessel head did have boric
-acid crystal deposits of considerable considerable depth left in the center center top area of the head, since cleaning cleaning of this area at that time was not successfulsuccessful in removing removing all the deposits deposits (partly duedue.to limited access).
to limited Davis-Besse Davis-Besse stated in its response response to NRC Bulletin 200 1-01 L-01 that the top head visual inspections inspections would riotnot be comprorriised compromised due to any pre-existing pre-existing boric borjc acid crystal crystal deposits. Given previous experience in removing boric acid deposits from the head, the likely
.experience likely need to remove these deposits at the center center top head by mechanical mecnanical means, means, the severely restricted restricted access allowed by the service service -
structure structure mouse holes for mechanical cleaning, the industry industry experience of Duke Power that clearly clearly emphasizes the need for good access to the emphasizes the head for cleaning inspection and the NRC cleaning and inspection commitments and inspection inspection requirements requirements.for for the visual inspection, the most prudent course of of action toto.avoid outage delays would be to access holes in the Reactor Service Structure Structure as soon as possible in 13RFO.
- 2. The project team intends to perfonn
- 2. perform a mockup demonstration demonstration of the remotely operated visual inspection equipment. The goal of the demonstration process should be to identify any equipment inadequacies inadequacies and to validate the inspection procedure. If the mockup to be used is generic for .for B&W plants. it is important that any differences, B&Wplants. differences, between the mockup and the actual conditions conditions and access restrictions presented by the configuration of Davis-Besse Reactor Service Structure Structure and RPV head arrangement.
arrangement, be addressed in the qualification of the inspection technique. 2505 South 17"' Street Suite I IS " Wilmin2ton. NC 28-101 1)4101452-3088 Fax q101 452-4413 "email: Pmtsnc@aol.uom S14R-00781 Exhibit 164 164 IT '? T& )t4Pi -Ir./Gj =-- 0k'f o~* DS' ~age D6-0Z__P age 11 of of 55 Pages Pages NRC002-0432 NRC002-0432
- 3. A \\Intten pro-.:edure should be developed to conduct the visual inspection and should includc written procedure Include a
( diagram of diam-am ot the head:.penete.ation head'-penetr.;l[ion to document document and catalogue inspections to ensure catalogue the inspections ensure complete 360 360 W~,.~,.~..;~~, .degree';';?speSr(i:mc'e)verage,of
.de.2ree'inipetion co,.eraoerdf each eilch penetration, penetration. Useful guidance is provided in the EPRI report 'Visual E\~irlllhatio'n "Visual E',iiin.Itiori for~akage foi4ýLakage of PWR Reactor Head Penetrations". Penetrations~. ~o No. 1006296.
(~"~~f ._ """~_ .. "" .. '-,~~ ,~ ~ , " ,.*~<','i..""" n~:':*'. t. .
- 4. To allo\%for the best Tll allo\\ hest possible poss*ible outage scoping. engineerng engineenng analYSIS proceed quickly t6 analysis should proceed to'
" ,t / , ,< . confirm confirm th~lt ihit g~lrs;~rctua:tly:exist iups;ýictuily.exist between the penetrations penetrations and reactor \'essel vessel head. so that leakage
. .from crcackngncpe-etrat onsor welds will be evident from a bare .t.rQrll.orac\.;.lng.{)I!uetratJ9f.ls:0f bare metal top he3.d inspection It[t IS head inspection. is .... ,.... : anticipated that lack of confirmation ot' con finnation of such a gap would \"'ould require NDE of-those penetrations oLthose*penetra[lons 50 so ~: .*; """"id~i1ti flea. *F*"* ..if..::': ......~. "'~'''''''"_~ 1.., i~-~l ...*~ .*'*. ~s.. __ ,_.~ "_.r_,, -<' ~~('/.. ' ***
- 5. A significant potential for scope growth exists on thIS this project requiring sophisticated degree of requiring a sophisticated contingency planning. The project team should identify the individual elements contingency elements that can drive increased increased inspection. inspection, repairs or unforeseen equipment problems. problems, For example, ex.ample. mandated inspection expansion expansion requirements from unfavorable unfavorable results in upcoming inspections at TNMI TMl and Crystal River, inspection equipment Crystal equipment failures. difficulties in weld repair or preheat and a greater*
failures, difficulties greater. number of penetrations penetrations requiring requiring NDE NnE as a result of unfavorable visual. inspection results unfavorable initial visuaUnspection are a few of the elements elements that should be beconsidered. considered. . rmtigation strategy should be developed Jor A mitigation for each of the scope growth elements elements the project team identifies. The project team tearn should then make a judgment on the extent that conringencyplans. make ajudgqtent contingency.plans,
'equipment and procedures 'equipment procedures should be developed deve1opedb as basededonon the consequence consequence of each contingent contingent element if it were to materialize. The contingencies element contingencies should be reassessed reassessed for mitigation once the results and lessons learned from the TMI and Crystal results Crystal River inspections are available.
- 6. To ensure ensure all project project team members members have a common understanding understanding of expectations expectatioris for the scope of input and involvement required required of them,them. the next team meeting meeting should discuss this and clarify expectations if needed. Additionally, expectations Adclitionally. the expected involvement of team members during the team members execution execution phase of the project should be addressed, Framatome will actually be performing addressed. since Framatome much of the work. For example, example, is any oversight role expected expected of project projectteam team members.
Frequent team meetings are suggested at least until detailed det~led planning milestones and a comprehensive project plan are developed. This is an experienced comprehensive experienced and capable team and it is important important to obtain team team synergy in identifying ickntifying needed actions and best work flow and sequence. actions From From the observations observations noted in Enclosure Enclosure 1I it is evident that the project project' team has a good start. '
. There is much yet to do in turning tuming cncepttual'plans conceptual' plans into detailed detailed inspection inspection plans, plans, schedules schedules andand procedures. The procc:dures. The project project team. teamplans to observe plans to observe some some of of the the inspections inspections and and repair activities for repair activities for CRDM CRDM penetrations penetrations scheduled scheduled in the fall outages at TMI TMl and Crystal Crystal River to take advantage advantage of the kS50nslessons learned. This information will be utilized in providing This infonnation wi 11 be utilized in providing the best possible detailed the best possible detailed planning for the same same effort at Da"'is-Besse Davis-Besse during the spring 13RFO.
Sincerely, Sincerely. Gregory A. Gibbs Gibbs Principal Principal Consultant Consultant 2 SI4R-00782 S14R*00782 NRC002-0433 NRC002*0433
cc:'
<:c;"Steve ~"Ioffin Steve Moffitt Scott Coaklev Scott Coakle\"
Dave Geisen Dave G\!isen Andy Wilson Andy\Vi Ison . Project Team Members Project Team '\lembers
.\ttachment (1)
Attachment (L) CRDM Penetration Actions Nozzle Penetration CRDM Nozzle Actions
-V
. 1 J3 SI4R-00 78 3 - 514R-00783., NRC002-0434 NRCOO~~-0434
Attachment Attachmelu I1 CRDM Nozzle CRDM Penetration Actions Nozzle Penetration Actions The foI owing are some of the actions that have been or are planned to be taken to address the The rol k)\\in~ arc some of the actions that have been or are planned to be taken to address the industry industry CRDMCRD\[ nozzle penetration cracking nozzle penetration cracking issue issue at Davis-Besse.
. A team has been assembledlo focus planning been assembledto planning efforts efforts in preparation preparation for 13RFO.visual l3RFOvisual inspection inspedion of of the CRDM CRDM nozzle nozzle top head head penetrations evidence of penetrations for evidence of leakage. cleaning cleaning of the RPV head head to provide baseline for future inspections, provide a baseline inspections, NDE examination examination and flawfla ....; characterization, characterization. and and repair repair of of any identified identified leaking leaking CRDM CRDM nozzle nozzle penetrations. team consists of penetrations. The team of Messrs. Marjk Mar.k Mclaughlin (Project McLaughlin (project Manager),
Manager), Prasoon Goyal Goyal (Design), (Design), Andrew Siemaszko Siemaszko (RCS System (ReS System Engineer). Chuck Daft Engineer), Daft ([SI (lSI and NDE), NOE), Frank Kennedy Kennedy{Licensing), (Licensing), Mel Mel Hurley Inspection) Hurley (QC Inspection) Brad Baumgardner and Brad Baumgardner (RP).
) A Long Range Plan Plan Project Project Business Business Case Case exists to plan, plan, prepare prepare and purchase purChase materials to be ready to repair nozzles and perform repair CRDM nozzles perform CRDM nozzle inspections assuming the nozzle inspections the need to repair four nozzles for planning planning and budgeting purposes.
purposfi;.
" A Plant Review Committee conducted on September 13, Comminee meeting was conductedonSepteinber 13,2001 2001 that authorized authorized proceeding with the work identified proceeding identified above and obtaining obtaininglhethe necessary necessary executive executive approvals approvals for funding. -,." NRC Bulletin 2001-01 was responded Billletin 2001-01 responded toon September 4, 200t.
to on September 2001. Davis-Besse Davis-Besse committed corrimitted to a ~ final response by January 29.2002 29, 2002 to incorporate incorporate experience experience based on inspection results from d facilities, the ongoing work of the MRP, and the advancement other facilities. advancement of NnE NDE technology technology aridarid development of remote tooling adequate to perform effective development effective an'd and timely surface surface or volumetric volumetric examination from examination underneath the RPV head. fromundemeath
" A milestone schedule -,. project plan for the CRDM penetration inspection and potential schedule and detailed project repair activities does not exist at this time andis and is currently developed.
currently being dev.eloped.
-,. A meeting was held September " 11, 2001 to identify and integrate September 11,2001 key CRDM "inspection integrate keyCRDM inspection andand Services Work 13 RFO schedule. ~ome repair activities into the Reactor Services Some items addressed include Iding a shielded access J~om building bui from the water tanks that surround the head st;l.nd stand to the the' head stand for equipment access, consideration worker and equipment consideration of preservation preservation of the as-found-condition as-found-condition of boric boric acid crystals on the top head during head cleaning for installation during any headcJeaning installation of the RV stud de-seismic plates and clamps vice just those for the PI coils, -installation tensioners, removal of all seisrtlic of installation of much equipment as possible under the head stand before positioning of the head stand, as much consideration of when in the RV disassembly sequence to decon under the head ifrequired.
consideration if required, the need to lock the lead screws in place for personnel safety, determination determination of the need to cut holes the. service structure to provide access to the top of the head and addition into the addition to the schedule of the underhead inspection activity.
> A proposal has been recei -,. received Inc.. dated August 24. 200 ved from Structural Integrity Associates, Inc.-.dated 2001.
- 1. for technical consulting support for for stress analysis. fracture mechanics evaluation, crack growth .
evaluation leakage calculation, evaluation, inspection scope expansion and any needed calculation, structural evaluation. licensing support. licensing S14R-00784 S14R-00784 Exhibit 164 164 Page 4 of 5 Pages NRC002-0435 I11YLUUZ-U4,)O
,. ° A proposal has ..\ proposal b~en received has been Fmmatome ANP recei\ed from Framatome A~P for CRDMCRD\l nozzle visual inspection. NDE \*isual inspection. \"DE Jnd repair and repair including pre-deployment workscope including pre-deplovment \\orkscope and deli\Oerables inc[uding input and deliverables*including input on ASME AS\lE code Cl)lk rdie.f requests, rTelie.f re4ue:-;I<;. fracture mechanics and analysis.
fracture mechanics analysis.
,. A pn~r!\>alhas ..\ pn'poýal ['een received has been recei\Oed from S&L S&L for associated with preparing senoices associated tor services preparing aa specitiOcation specification tor(or the procurement. design Ihe pruicu.emcnt. installation design and installation the of the reactor vessel head/senoice 5tructur~ ;.tnd vessel head/service structure and ClInt'UIHnent hatch.
containment hatch.
,." Conceptual Conceptual planning planning hashas been initiated for RV head replacement in 1I-RF0.
headreplacementin l-l-RFO. dr.lft decision tree has been
,. A draft potential results and addressing the potential been prepared addressing and necessary activities for necessary activities for visual inspection of the head.
the Visual head.
> A work request, tag WO ., WO #875. has has been prepared to been prepared to cut three 12 l2 inch x 24 inch holes. holes~ [20L20 degrees delrrees jJeginning of 13RFO. There apart,oat the beginning apart,,at There is a companion Engineering Wprk companion Engineering Work Request No. 01-0378- Ol-O'373-support for cutting engineering support 00 that requests engineering cuuingthe the access holes.
.~
\ >- Unlike other B& > B&Wreactors, Davis-Besse does hot hive W .reactors, Davis-Besse access holes to the head in have access the.Reactor intheoReactor Structu~ except Service Structure e~cept the s~allmouse small mouse holes. Inspection and Repair -CRIDM Inspection hoies.CRPM Repair project team project °team members members disagree concerning concerning the need to proceed proceed with cutting access access holes in the Reactor Reactor Service Sen ice Structure at the start of 13RFOo Structure 13RFO. Some see this as a contingency asac(}otingeilcy action for which all preparations preparations should be beinin place. It is noted that on completion completion of Reactor Vessel t!2RFO the Reactor ofU2RFO Vessel head did have boric bonc acid considerable depth left in' crystal deposits of considerable acid crystal iri the center top area of of the the head, since since cleaning.of this area cleaningof at that time was areaoat successful in° was not successful removing all the deposits. Cleaning was in removing hampered by lack of adequate hampered adequate access through the service structure. Previous ~xperiehce hcisbeen Previous experience has been that.boric deposits have to aciddeposits that boric acid to be removed by mechanical mechanical means as water washing alone is is not successful.
Davis-Besse Davis~Besse committed in its response to the NRC to perform inspections of the top RPV head surface and CRDM nozzle inspections bare metal surface recommended:by MNP 48, "PWR inspections as recommendedbyMRP "PWR Materials Materials Program Response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01" Reliability Program 200 l-O 1" and further stated that these inspections compromised due to any pre-ex.isting would not be compromised boric acid crystal deposits. pre-existing oboric Given Gi yen previous previous experience removing boric acid deposits from the head, the likely need to experience in removtng remove these deposits at the center top head by mechanical means, the severely restricted access
,allowed by the service oallowed service structure mouse holes too toallow mechanical cleaning, the induStry allow Tnechanica! industry experience of Duke Power. Power that emphasizes the need for good access to the head for that clearly emphasizes cleaning and inspection andthe NRC commitments and,the i'l'RC commitments and inspection requirements for for the visual inspection, the most prudent course of action to avoid outage delays would be to cut access holes Service Structure as soon as possible in l3RFO.
in the Reactor Service 13RFO. From the above it is project team has a good star!. is evident that the projecttearn start. There is a lot yet to do in turning plans, contingency plans, schedules conceptual plans into detailed inspection pians,contingency schedules and procedures. 22 S14R-00785 S14R-00785 NRC002-0436 NRC002*0436
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401 Pbý 'týS 0 - Ný From: Dale From: Dale L. l. Miller/TE!FirstEnergy MilieriTElFirstEnergy To: To: George.Rombold@exeloncorp.com, mknight@amergenenergy.com. Erdal.Caba@pgnmail.com, George.Rombold@ exeloncorp.com. mknight@amergenener/y.com, ErdaI.Caba@pgnmail.com. Vaughn. Wagoner@pgnmaiLcom. Loretta.v.cecilia@pgnmail.com, Vaughn.Wagoner@pgnmail.com, Loretta.v .cecilia@pgnmail.com. LesSpain@dom.com, Les_Spain@dom.com. Gary_Miller@dom.com. Steve-sarver@dom.com, GaryMiller@dom.com, Steve_sarver@dom.com. sbenne2@entergy~com, sbenne2@entergy;com. mrwilder@duke-energy.com, mrWilder@duke-energy.com, JhamiI2@entergy.com. sherry.bernhoft@pgnmai.com, Jhamil2@entergy.com, sherry .bernhoft@pgnmail.cam. wfoster wfoster@duke-energy.co
@duke-energy.co cc:
cc: DavidH. David LockwoodiTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Rodney H. Lockwood/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Rodney M. Cook/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Mark CooklFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Mark A. McLaughhnfTE/FirstEnergy@ A. McLaughllniTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Prasaon K. FirstEnergy, Prasoon K. Goyal/TE/FirstEnergy@ GoyaliTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. David C_ FirstEnergy, David C. GeiseniTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Dale Geisen/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Dale R. WuakkoiTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Theo R. WuokkolTE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Thea S.S.
- Swim/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Andrew
,SwimrrEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Andrew J. J. Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy Siemaszko/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy
Subject:
CRD
Subject:
CRD Nozzle Nozzle Bulletin 2001-01 Recent Bulletin 2001-01 Recent Developments URGENT Developments --URGENT Date: Date: 15:35:381010 9/28f2001 15:35:381010 9/28t2001 This morning This morning the the CNO CNO of of FENOC FENOC was was contacted contacted by Brian Sheron, NRC Brian Sheron, Associate Director NRC Associate of Project Director of Proleet Licensing and Licensing and Technical Technical Analysis Analysis with regard regard toto our response to the our response bulletin. 'The the bulletin. caller was The caller was strongly strongly suggesting that suggesting that Davis-Besse reconsider our Davis-Besse reconsider our response response to the bulletin and the bulletin consider shutting and consider down by shutting down te by tre end of. end of the year year andand perform perform an vessel head reactor vessel inspection of the reactor an inspection head CRD nozzles. We at Davis-Besse CAD nozzles. Davis-Besse would like would like to conduct conduct a teleconference teleconference of of all of.the susceptibility plants of .the high susceptibility plants on on Monday afternoon (10 Monday afternoon (10 ,*.* -*
- J share share any any information information available available relative relative to similar similar contacts contacts and and progress progress on plants plants performing performing inspec:.cr-,
inspee:c,-<; this fall. We will be contacting everyone be.contacting everyone by by phone and/or e-mail phoneandlor e-mail Monday firm up arrangere--'s morning to firm Monday morning arranger.>:,*'*<; Again, Again. my my telephone number is (419) telephone number 321-7284. (419)321-7264. u.s. NRC U.S. In NRC DAVID GEs 1& DAVID In re GEISEN . Jtt 5'
< 4. P 5 t" H ae EJta,.!::i bt" i/ I -... \0 i4(0 Dock8t # IA.04*052 Dooke 1MJ5.052 ---
DdsMarkedfor Date MartcactfotlO: 0~/I~I g' 2008 2=08(Th (n'. Po.p &2.5 ) Date Offaract:in Daie Offered in Ev:Ev:.Ji4i-. 2008 (fr. 2008 (Tr.hp-p.glltJ )
"'rough~: Nih .
Aclton: ~ AlIo:n *I D REJECTED W WITHDRAWN HDAN Date:~. D4t.: .4 . 2008 p.g (Tr. p. uP 2008 (fr. U ) DOCKETED USNRC USNRC September 9. September 9, 2009 (11(11:00am)
- OOam)
OFFICE OF OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS
'ADJUDICATIONS STAFF 'ADJUDICATIONS S14Q-0 1 1 9 7 S14Q-D1197 Exhibit 151 151
- 1) S D~ Page 11 of 11 Pages Pages NRCOOI-1751 NRC001-1751 A7
DOCKETED DOCKETED Inre DAVID GEISEN 5
- Ex-hib*
USNRC September 9, 2009 (1 1:00am) September 9, 2009 (11 :OOam) Discussion Agend Docket U.S. NRC In re DAVID # 1A-05-052 ([ + I'r GEISEN) DC t"t ExhibIt , ! ( L .t U/J OFFICE OF SECRETARY Discussion A,gen,' dG Docket DD a #Mke dfor D5 1A-QS-QS2 ) 7J Q 2 ( OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS AND Date Date Marked Marked for IDi 2 ID:l...::t1... 2008 2008 (r. p.~) 25 , ) (Tr. p.. , ADJUDICATIONS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS STAFF DBNPS DBNPS Bulletin Bulletin 20012001-01-01 R R Date Offered '.in Ev:-j... Izls , 2008 2 08(li 8Z~) (Tr. P........) Date Offered In Ev:~, 0 r. p. ...;;;;;;;~_ BACKGROUND.: BACKGROUND: Through Through Witness/Panel:_________ Wltness/Panel: t-?/P< -
" Action: ~~,
Action: AREJECTED ,REJECTED WITHDRAWNWITHDRAWN
" DBNPS is 3.1 EFPY from ONS-3 as of March 20 Date. (".
(T008
- DBNPS is 3.1 EFPY from ONS-3 as of March 20 Date: ~2008 (Tr. p. YZ-f...,)
Dae Ip _
"* Looking Looking at at only only 0.25 0.25 additional additional EFPY EFPY to to April 20 c. ... ........
April 20C- "VII,', , ICNI/U I " ONGOING ONGOING ACTIVITIES ACTIVITIES SINCE SINCE BULLETIN BULLETIN RESPONSE
RESPONSE
- SIA SIA Finite Finite Element Element Analysis Analysis forfor Nozzle Nozzle GapsGaps (McLaughlin/Goyal)
(Mclaughlin/Goyal) Gaps Gaps will will permit permit leakage leakage to to be observed on RPV
~observedon RPVhead head' "* Visual Inspection and Head Cleaning Visua,llnspection and Head Cleaning perfonned inperformed in 11 11 RFO RFO (McLaughlin/Siemaszko)
(McLaughlin/Siemaszko)
"* Visual Visual Inspection Inspection andand Head Head Cleaning Cleaning Performed Performed in in 12RFO 12RFO (McLaughlin/Siemaszko)
(McLaughlin/Siemaszko)
"* Video Vid$o Inspection Inspection Review Review andand Examination Examination Statistics Statistics (McLaughlin)
(Mclaughlin) Further confirmation of no indication of leakage
- Further confiimation of no indication of leakage attributable to attributable to CRDM CRDM '
Nozzle leakage; clearly CRDM Flange Nozzle leakage; clearly CRDM Flange leakage leakage
"* Planned Planned Qualified Qualified Visual Visual Inspection Inspection to tobebe Performed Perfonned During During 13RFO 13RFO (Spring (Spring 2002) 2002) ** " SIA Fracture Mechanics SIAF~cture Mechanics on on Crack Crack Growth Growth Rate Rate (McLaughlin/Goyal)
(McLaughlin/Goyal) Assuming Assuming 180 180degree degree crack, crack, will not reach wlllllot reach allowable allowablecrack cracksizesize inin 22 year year cycle cycle a-Consistent Consistent withwith Oconee Oconee and ANO-1 FM andANO-1 FM analysis analysis
- Review Review North North Anna-l, Anna-1, CR-3, CR-3, TMI-1 TMI-1 ,, Surry-1 Surry-1 ,,and and ONS-3 ONS-3,fallfall outage outag~
results resultsfor for applicability applicabilitytoto DBNPS, DBNPS, including including lessons lessons learned leamed on on inspection inspection techniques techniques (McLaughlin) (Mclaughlin)
- Actively Actively evaluating evaluating RPV RPV head head Replacement Replacementduring during RFO14.
RF014. ALARA ALARACONCERNS CONCERNSOF OFEARLY
,EARLYSHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN (Coakley) (COakley) ** Personnel Personnel DoseDoseforfor22'inspections inspections (12/01 (12101 andand 03/02) 03/02) ** Radwaste Radwaste Generation Generationfor forearly earlyshutdown shutdown and and restart restart For ForFENOCFENOC Eyes Eyes Only Only ECONOMIC ECONOMICIMPACT IMPACTOF OFEARLYEARLYSHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN(Coakley) {Coakley} "* Direct DirectCosts Costsofofearly shutdown by earty.shutdown by 12/31/01 12131/01 versus versus3/30/023130/02 "* Outage Outage Length Lengthand andreplacement replacementpower powercosts costs S14M-04099 S14M~04099' Exhibit Exhibit 177 177 Page 1 of Page 1 of66Pages Pages NRC017-1258 NRC017 -1258
Discussion Agenda Discussion Agenda DBNPS DBNPS Bulletin Bulletin 2001-01 2001-01 Response
Response
BACKGROUND: BACKGROUND:
- " DBNPS DBNPS is is 3.1 3.1 EFPY EFPY from from ONS-3 as of March March 2001
- " Looking Looking at at only only 0.25 0.25 additional additional EFPY EFPY to April 2002 from 12131/0112/31/01 ONGOING ACTIVITIES SINCE BULLETIN ONGOING ACTIVITIESSINCE RES~ONSE BULLETIN RESPONSE
** SIA Finite Nozzle Gaps (McLaughlin/Goyal)
Element Analysis for Nozzle Finite Element (Mclaughlin/Goyal) Gaps will Gaps will permit leakage to be.observed
~rmit leakage on RPV head:
lH?observe(/cmRPVhead***
** Visual Inspection Inspection and HeadHead Cleaning performed in Cleaning performed in 11 RFO (McLaughlin/Siemaszko)
(McLaughlin/Siemaszko)
** Visual Inspection Inspection and Head Cleaning PerformedPerformed in in 12RFO 12RFO (McLaughlin/Siemaszko)
(McLaughlin/Siemaszko) ... . '
** Video Inspection Reviewand Inspection Review and Examination (McLaughlin)
Examination Statistics (Mclaughlin) confiimation of no indication
- Further confirmation leakage attributable to CRDM indication of leakage leakage; clearly CRDM Flange leakage Nozzle leakage; leakage
** Planned Qualified Performed During 13RFO Inspection to be Performed Qualified Visual Inspection 13RFO (Spdng 2002) .
(Spring
*- SIA SIAFracture Mechanics on Crack Fracture Mechanics Growth Rate (McLaughlin/Goyal)
Crack Growth (McLaughlin/Goyal) Assuming 180 degree crack, will not reach degree crack, allowablecrack size in 2 year reach allowable year cycle
** Consistent with Oconee andANO-1 analysis and ANO-1 FM analysis ** Review North Review North Anna-,
Anna--1, CR-3, TMI-1 , Surry-1 ,and , and ONS-3 fall outage outage applicability to DBNPS, including results for applicability learned on inspection including lessons learned inspection techniques (McLaughlin) techniques (Mclaughlin)
*" Actively Actively evaluating evaluating RPVRPV head head Replacement Replacement duringduring RF014.
RFO14. CONCERNS OF EARLY SHUTDOWN (Coakley) ALARA CONCE.RNSOF (Coakley)
** Personnel Dose for 2 inspections (12101 03/02)
(12/01 and 03102)
** shutdown and Generation for early shutdown Radwaste Generation Radwaste restart and restart ForFENOC Eyes Only For ECONOMIC IMPACT OF EARL ECONOMIC EARLYY SHUTDOWN (Coakley) *" Direct Direct Costs Costs of of early early shutdown shutdown by by 12131/01 12/31/01 versus versus 3130/02 3/30/02 *" Outage Outage Length Length andand replacement replacement power power costs costs S14M-04099 S14M-04099 Exhibit 177 Exhibit 177 Page 11 of Page of 66 Pages Pages NRC017-1258 NRC017-1258
Discussion Discussion Agenda Agenda I DBNPS Bulletin 2001-01 Response Bulletin .2001-01 Response a* Looking Looking at at only only 0.25 0.25 EFPY EFPY extension extension past past end of year ~) n- Video Video Inspection Inspection Review Review and Examination Statistics (McLaughlin) and Examination (McLaughlin)
'. " ' .. = ... . . .. ' .1-9 ~c...,,.;t# j-f,.~-I t.~ <
I) -)* SIA
- SIA Gap Gap Analysis Analysis (McLaughlin/Goyal)
(McLaughliniGoyal) .... . J~4 .~AoJt *.. -I,~. , ~Uli- *. 4(. V, ~
.. . rwl~. . b..~~ Am 1)0.J,' 7".t *-Results Results of of North Anna-1 and North Anna-1 and CR-3 results and CR-3 results application tt ~ 1)1 and application , r-" -"e's I"~~.s DBNPS, including lessons including lessons learnedlearned on on inspection inspection techniques techniques U ~ (.~
( Z;,:(- (McLaughlin) f)e1 ~ lI-t.\... )e.f,,: I .pin'" cc1Ji ( JJ (Lc..;~ 8" r'r; t ~ .1.)' o~ r:.,.~ t.(..I. ute.. flV<t;7 e.t/!rY I) A ! .. 'J);/~ E- Nozle NoZ4Je Characteristics Characteristics and and potential potentl~1 for for cracking [matrix] (Goyal) cracking [matrtx] (Goyal)
- .,f,. .H ~~L $-.......c- t.~lt..f~ f"',~I.(;),lrw",/c... ~.,*... .sl J-(,$, t
- '/~'
** SIASIA Fracture Fracture Mechanics on on Crack Growth (McLaughlin/Goyal) Mechanics p,,C, Crack . Growth (:v,,*Rate Rate (McLaughlin/Goyal) Pfltt Q. ~~~c. t:lJ.t!. /'0°' /' -f /,;.4 (to,' _ ~ /J() craCICfS , *~to cY'acics 1.~.R k.(M>C ~- b~- - .0-, .s:L6~.f~{J L3- a ;~,:,~C' /( 4-( -" - ;..~.:... .. . ' . ....I,r- ........ ,.,/,---,
Financial/Schedule FinanciaVSchedule Picture Picture of of early early shutdown shutdown (Coakley) . ,'b.-s'--o. -::.. -.J
** Direct Direct Costs Costs ofof early early shutdown shutdown I *- Outage Outage Length Length andand replacement replacement power power costs costs ** Personnel Personnel Dose Dose forfor 22 inspections inspections (12/01 (12101 and and 03/02) 03/02) *- Radwaste Radwaste Generation Generation for for early early shutdown shutdown and and restart restart 514M-04100 S14M-04100 NRC01 7-1259 NRC017-1259
Discussion Agenda Agenda DBNPS Bulletin 2001-01 ResponseResponse Conference Call Conference . October 3, 2001, 2001, 9:30 a.m. BACKGROUND: BACKGROUND:
- " DBNPS DBNPS is is 3.1 EFPY from ONS~3 ONS-3 as of March March 2001
- " Additional Additional 0.25 0.25 EFPV EFPY from 12131/01 12/31/01 to March2002 March-2002 (13RFO):
Remains
- Margin of 2 EFPY Remains ** Qualified Qualified Visual Inspection Inspection to be Performed Performed During During 13RFO 13RFO ONGOING ACTIVITIES ACTIVITIES SINCE BULLETIN BULLETIN RESPONSE:
- Plant-Specific Finite SIA Plant-Specific Finite Element Analysis for Nozzle Nozzle Gaps Gaps
- Video Inspection Review Review from RF010, RFO10, RF011, RFO1 1, and RFO 12:
Further confirmation of no indication of leakage
-Further - leakage attributable attributable to CRDM Nozzle leakage; leakage; clearly Flange leakage clearly CRDM Flange leakage *" SIA Plant-Specific Fracture SIA Plant-Specific Fracture Mechanics Mechanics and Allowable Allowable Crack Size Analysis Analysis *" Review Review North North Anna-i, CR-3, TMI-1 Anna-1, CR-3, TMI-1 , Surry-1, Surry-1, and ONS-3 fall outage outage results results for applicability lessons-learned .
applicability to DBNPS, including lessons-Ieamed .
" Actively evaluating
- Actively evaluating RPV head Replacement Replacement during RF014 RFO14 ALARA ISSUES ISSUES FOR SHUTDOWN 12/31/01:
SHUTDOWN BY 12131/01:
*" Personnel Personnel Dose Dose for 2 inspections inspections (12101 (12/01 and 03/02) " Additional Radwaste
- Additional Radwaste Generation Generation for 12131/01 12/31/01 shutdown shutdown and restart restart S14M-04101 NRC017-1260 NRC01 7-1260
Discussion Agenda Agenda Bulletin 2001-01 Response DBNPS Bulletin Response BACKGROUND: BACKGROUND:
" DBNPS is
- DBNPS is 3.1 EFPY from 3.1 .EFPY from ONS-3 as of March 2001
- " Looking Looking at at only 0.25 additipnal only 0.25 additional EFPY EFPY toto March March 2002 from 12131/01 12/31/01 ONGOING ~CTIVITIES ONGOING ACTIVITIES SINCE BULLETIN BULLETIN RESPONSE
RESPONSE
- SIA Plant Specific Finite Element Element Analysis Analysis for Nozzle -Gaps Gaps Gaps will permit leakage Gaps leakage to .beobseTV!HJon be observed.on RPV head
- Video Inspection Review Review and Examination Examination Statistics (Mclaughlin)
(McLaughlin)
- Further confirmation confirmation of no indication of leakage attributable attributable to CRDM leakage; clearly CRDM Flange Nozzle leakage; Flange leakage leakage
** Planned Planned Qualified Qualified Visual Visual Inspection Inspection to be be Performed Performed During During 13RFO 13RFO (Spring 2002)
..* SIA Plant Specific Fracture Fracture Mechanics Mechanics andand.Allowable Crack Size Analysis
- SIA Plant Specific Allowable Crack Size Analysis
- Review North Anna-i, Anna-1, CR-3, TMI-1 , Surry-1 ,and CR--3, TMI-1 , and ONS--3 ON5-:-3 fall outage outage results for applicability applicability to DBNPS, including lessons learned inspection learned on inspection techniques and model crack growth predictiveness techniques predictiveness.
** Actively evaluating evaluating RPV.head Replacement during RF014.
RPV.head Replacement RFO14. ALARA CONCERNS OF EARLY EARLY SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN
** Personnel Personnel Dose for 2 inspections inspections (t2l01 (12/01 and 03102) 03/02) ** RadwasteGenerationfor Radwaste Generation for early shutdown shutdown and restart S14M-04102 S14M-04102 NRC01 NRC0177-1261 -1261
Discussion DiScussion Agenda Agenda DBNPS DBNPS Bulletin Bulletin 2001-01 2001-01 Response
Response
BACKGROUND: BACKGROUND:
"* DBNPSDBNPSis is 3.1 3.1 EFPY EFPY fromfrom ONS-3 ONS-3as as of of March March 2001 2001 ~t.(,. "* Looking Looking at at only only 0.25 0.25 additional additional EFPY to Aprll 2002 from EFPYtoAprtt2002 from 12131/01 12131/01 ONGOING ACTIVITIES ONGOING ACTIVITIES SINCE BULLETIN RESPONSE SINCE BULLETIN RESPONSE . , / ,
- SIA Finite Element SIA Finite Analysis for Element Analysis Nozzle Gaps for Nozzle Gaps (McLaughlin/Goyal)
(McLaughlin/Goyal) ' Gaps will permit leakage Gspswlll permit leakage to be to be observed on RPV RPV head. heae!.
"* Visual Visual Inspection Inspection and and Head Head Cleaning Cleaning performed performed in in 11 11 RFO RFO (McLaughlin/Siemaszko)
(McLaughliniSiemaszko)
"* Visual Visual Inspection Inspection and and Head Head Cleaning Cleaning Performed Performed in in 12RFO 12RFO (McLaughlin/Siemaszko)
(McLaughliniSiemaszko)
"* Video Video Inspection Inspection Review Review and and Examination Examination Statistics Statistics (McLaughlin)
(McLaughlin)
- Further confirmation of no indication of leakage attributable to Further confirmation of no indication of leakage attributable to CRDM CRDM Nozzle leakage; clearly CRDM Nozzle leakage; clearty CRDM Flange leakage Flange leakage
** Planned Planned Qualified Qualified Visual Visual Inspection Inspection to to be be Performed Performed DuringDuring 13RFO 13RFO (Spring 2002)1,; f .
. / (Spring 2002) SIA Fracture Mechanics on -'" " ... - r-{
"-l". .,u~#lHc h.'
y ~ If :';"? <"
* ... r4 .. ...... R ,,,(McLaughlin/Goyal)
- SIA Fracture Mechanics eA GFEiek Gr&'.'ttfol Rate (McLaughlin/Goyal)
Assuming C--" 180 degree O.tcrack, will not not reach m~vallowable diaiysis crack cracksize size in in 22 year year cycle Assuming 180
"-~t~ 1 c degree crack, ,* will n A;4g-i reach allowable cycle - GOllsiete"t willi Debllse and Id40=1 Fftdlai lalYsls "* Review Review North North Anna-i, Anna-1, CR-3, CR-3, TMI-1 TMI-1 ,,Surry-1 Surry-1 ,, andand ONS-3 ONS-3 fallfall outage outage results results for applicability to for applicability to DBNPS, DBNPS, including lessons learned including lessons learned on on inspection inspection techniques (McLaughlin) techniques (Mclaughlin) "* Actively Actively evaluating evaluating RPV RPV headhead Replacement Replacement during RFO14.
duringRF014. C('(~"' . . 4J/6G:) (/7.#' .- /6* ':) ALARA ALARA CONCERNS CONCERNS OF OF EARLY EARLY SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN (Coakley) (Coakley)
** Personnel
-...v Personnel DoseDose forfor 22 inspections inspections (12/01(12101 and and 03/02) 03/02) .:5;tb-.-,..-...{ttH L
** Radwaste Radwaste Generation Generation for for early shutdown and eanyshutdown and restart restart For For FENOC FENOC Eyes Eyes Only Only ECONOMIC ECONOMIC IMPACT IMPACT OF OF EARLY EARLY SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN (Coakley) (Coakley) "* Direct Direct Costs Costs of of early early shutdown shutdown by by 12/31/01 12131/01 versus versus 3/30/02 3/30102 "* Outage Outage Length Length and and replacement replacement power power costs costs S14M-04103 S14M-04103 NRC017-1262 NRC017' -1262
2:,;;:.:.1;;j:':i~"~~;:':':'\;l:~~~ . . . !:~~<:::~~~~::,::.,,';':~~"":'~" '~:.:;:'.:<<.~:.\:;:~~~~~:';':;.'~~'~.';;: ;';::.","~-::,,:.~, :,' ".,:;:."::::"::';'~:'i'<':'~<'h\\:::,,;~,~':*:;:';N:,),:,,(,:.i':".~>.>~;..o:.,,"~':"",,;)':.,;, .' ~,).*..;.:-.-: ;""~+.>:",.:n".:":'*r,, ." ..,>:.:..:~,,,,',,,>,)&.:,.., ~'I."" ..*.~~",:"'~"'-':'*':'*"")"'~"_"'~"*w.*."""?.......,. *...-_~._,,~,,'~.. r..____ ....... . Discussion Agenda Agenda DBNPS Bulletin 2001-01 Response Response BACKGROUND: BACKGROUND:
*" DBNPSis3.1EFPY.fromONS-3 DBNPS is 3.1 EFPY from ONS-3 ,tIC $ 0°f *" Summarize Summarize Past Past Inspections Inspections and and Head Head Cleaning ~Ieaning (McLaughlin/Siemaszko) (McLaughlin/Siemaszko) :. ~ *" Video Video Inspection Inspection Review Review and Examination Statistics Statistics (McLaughlin) (McLaughlin) *" Looking Looking at at only only 0.25 0.25 additional additional EFPY to April 2002 ONGOING ACTIVITIES ONGOING ACTIVITIES SINCE BULLETIN BULLETIN RESPONSE ** SIA Finite Element Analysis for Nozzle Nozzle Gaps (McLaughlin/Goyal) (McLaughlin/Goyal)
Gaps will permit Gaps perm!t leakage leakage to be observed observed on RPV head / ________
~;~ . ~
- v* Results of North Anna-i, Anna.-1, CR-3, TMI-1 TMI-1 ,Surry-1 , Surry-1 ,,and and ONS-3 fall outage outage results and application application to DBNPS, including lessons learned leamed on inspection inspection techniques techniques (McLaughlin) (Mclaughlin)
** Nozzle Characteristics Characteristics and potential for cracking [matrix] (Goyal) -
- SIA Fracture Mechanics Mechanics on Crack Growth Rate Rate (McLaughlin/Goyal) (McLaughlin/Goyal)
Assuming 180 degree degree crack, crack,will not reach reach allowable allowab/ecrack cracksize in 22 year cycle
!4el;vL?' 4c->. t...4-1,-o ..' ** Recoil f*,,,,IlIi II I lre, .daUol I C t;uI II to,i I 1 I 1m ,,,,-,t1 lagement for 11 RPV head Replacement Replacement during RFO RFO114.
14. ALARA ALARA CONCERNS CONCERNS OF EARLY EARLY SHUTDOWN (Coakley) (Coakley)
'.* Personnel Dose Personnel Dose for 22 inspections inspections (12101 (12/01 and and 03102) 03/02) ** Radwaste Generation Radwaste Generation for early early shutdown shutdown and restart It::~,'c :r_I!.~ . '
F*,AlA rl~JA~~GIAb'GeHEDULEPlel'URE IL.....,,,,,. , E ICTU. OF EARLY EARLY SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN (Coakley)
** Direct Costs Direct Costs of of early early shutdown shutdown by by 12131/01 12/31/01 versus versus 3/30/02 3/30/02 ** Outage Outage Length Length and and replacement replacement power power costs S14M-04104 S14M-04104 NRC017-1263 NRC017-1263
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kA- S C, (' C-l;D to DOCKETED USNRC USNRC September 9, September 2009 (11 9,2009 (11:00am)
- OOam)
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS RULEMAKINGS AND AND From: Prasoon K. GoyalfTE/FirstEnergy Goyal/TEiFirstEnergy ADJUDICATIONS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS To: David C. C.GeisenfTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy GeiseniTEFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy cc: Dale R. R. Wuokko/TEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Wuokko/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Dale L. L. MillerfTE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Miller/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Mark A. A. McLaughliniTE*FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy
.McLaughliniTEi'FirstEnergy @FirstEnergy .
Subject:
Crack Growth Gro"wth Rate (CGR) Date: 7:40:40101.0 10/3/2001 7:40:401.otO Yesterday Yesterday we mainly discussed/focused discussed/focused the CGR GGA of crack crack in the CRDM CADM nozzle tube i.e CGRCGA in Alloy 600 material. The purpose purpose of my my note is that we should also be aware of the CGA CGR in of Alloy 182 ( the weld material CGR in alloy 182 .(crack material ). The eGR (crack in the weld) is expected expectedtoto be 2 to 5 times faster than Alloy 600. MRP expert panel is expected expected to provide provide a r.ecommendation recommendation on alloy 182 182 CGA CGR also. We do not need to to discuss this with NRC. Should NRC ask a question on this subject we need to say that the industry(expert) industry(expert) are in process process of establishing the rate. U.S. NRC u.s. In NRC In re DAVID IML 5+' GEISEN DAVID GEISEN "f
~t ' E #
LI. a EJChibtt:'l...L-Docket Docket ## 1A-05-052 1A-06-052 Delta Marked'for Date ID:.1lJ.a.. 200 marked for IDJ4z 2008 m. (Tr. p.Q.2 P S' Date Offered In EV:~. Date Ev: i2 i 2008 (Tr. p.8 2(P ) (Tr.I.ELP Through WitnesslPanel:---IfJ:..* Thmugh Witness/Panel:I- if-I:..,.!>. P\._ _ _*_ _ Action:~ ~ REJECTED WITHDRAWN Action: WITHDRXAWN Date; Date.
¥. 2008 {Tr. p. f3 2~ >>
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DOCKETED ~A- s C-['7 Rfit- C- c:7/I USNRC USNRC September 9, 2009 September (11:00am) 2009 (11 :OOam) From: Rodney Rodney M. CookiFirstEnergy CookiFirstEnergy OFFICE OF SECRETARY
-OFFICE David H.
H. LockwoodfTE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Lockwood/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Dale R.
, RULEMAKINGS AND To: DaVid RULEMAKINGS AND ...SDJUDICATIONS STAFF , '.1111 J'Il .... TIONS STAFF WuokkoiTE.FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Dale Wuokko/TE.'FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. L. MilierITE:FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy Dale L. Miller/TEFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy cc:
Subject:
Date: 10/312001 7:41 10/3;2001 :441 010 7:41:44101.0 Forwarded by Rodney M.
** , .. Forvvarded M. CooklFirstEnergy Cook:FirstEnergy on 10.03;'0107:38 10.03101 07:38 AM*****
AM ----- Mark Mark A. Mclaughlin McLaughlin 1 0.10.3/01 06:36 10/03/01 AM 0.6:36 AM To: Rodney M. Cook/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy cc:
Subject:
Cook/FirstEnergy@:FirstEnergy This is not good newsnews
..... Forwarded **.*. Forvvarded by Mark A. McLaughlinFTEiFirstEnergy on 10/03/01 A. MbLaughlinlTEfFirstEnergy 06:30 AM -----
10.10.310. 1 0.6:30. ..***
. 'R. "R. A. Mattson'; <rmattson@structint.com>
A. Mattson'; 10/02/01 05:53 PM .
<rmattson@structint.com> 10/0210.1 To: "Prasoon Goyal" <pkgoyal@firstenergycorp.com>,
Goyal" <pkgoyal@firstenergycorp.com>. "Mark McLaughlin". <mmclaughlin@firstenergycorp.com> cc: "Nat McLaughlin"<mmclaughlin@firslenergycorp.cOJl1> Cofie" <ncofie@structint.com> Colie" <ncofie@structint.com>
Subject:
We have done some some checking checking on the gap calculation, calculation, and two of the nozzles nozzles may not have gaps. We will continue checking, but II thought I would tell you this this prior to your NRC call tomorrow tomorrow so that you don't mis-.state mis-state where where we are at. U.S. NRC u.s. In re In NRC DAVID GEISEN.} re DAVID if ,,-.ff GEISENL&t _80M r' 50 edIIbIt ,._____ O _ Docket*, 1A-05-052 Docket# 1A-05-052 . Date Martced'for Date Marked-for IDJJ:JIi. IDL/. 2008 (Tr. (Th p.a.Z5
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RA-SC~l73-Davis Davis Besse Conference Call: BesseConference Call: 10/3/2001 101312001 NRR--W. NRR Bateman, S. W. Bateman, Sanders, A. S. Sanders, Hiser,A. A. Hiser, Lee, J.J. Zimmerman A. Lee, Zimmerman Region III - Jacobson, Holmberg, Collins Region III(See Licensee - Jacobson, attachedHolmberg, included Guy Collins Cambell - Site VP) Ucensee (See attached included Guy Cambell - Site VP) Questionedthe NRR Questioned NRR scope of the scope theApril ofthe 2000 head April 2000 examinations. The head examinations. licensee stated The licensee that100 statedthat 100 percent of the head was inspected which included the CRD percent of the head was inspected which included the CRD housing to head interfaces. housing to head interfaces. However, for However, for 5-6 nozzles near 5-6 nozzles nearthe center of the center ofthe
~he head, boric acid head, boric from ORD acid from CRD flangeflange leakage leakage precluded definitive conclusions that the CRD nozzle welds were not leaking. NRR .precluded definitive conclusions that the CRD nozzle welds were not leaking. NRR requested requested video tapes the video the tapes of of the examinations and head examinations the head nozzle by and aa nozzle by nozzle listing of nozzle listing of inspection inspection results/conclusions. Licensee:
results/conclusions. Licensee to provide this to provide this to NRR by to NRR October25th. byOctober 25th. Ucensee has Licensee estimated aa crack has estimated growth rate crack growth based on rate based on the Peter/Scott model the Peter/Scott model which predicts that Which predicts that -it will take 7.5 years to reach a structurally limiting circumferential flaw size after first detecting it will take 7.5 years to reach a structurally limiting circumferential flaw size after first detecting leakagearound leakage around the the CRDM housing. This CRDM housing. information could This information could be available to be available tothethe NRCNRC inin aafew few weeks. weeks. . NRR stated NRR that ifif the stated that the April inspectionwas 2000 inspection April 2000 considered "a was considered "aqualified" inspection by qualified" inspection bythe thestaff, staff, that the maximum acceptable operating time based on staff that the maximum acceptable operating time based on staff analysis is 18 months. The staff's analysis is 18 months. The staff's analysis assumes analysis assumes that circumferential flaw pre-existing circumferential that aa pre-existing less than flaw less than 165 degrees inin extent 165 degrees extent grows grows an additional 165 degrees in18 months. The staff analysis is based on Oconee data with an additional 165 degrees in 18 months. The staff analysis is based on Oconee data with input input from from an an expert expert panel documented by review documented panel review RES. The by RES. The staff position and staff position analysiswill and analysis will be be documented in documented NUREG with in aa NUREG with an indeterminate issue an indeterminate issue date. date. The licensee noted The licensee noted thatthat growth growth rate is dependant on CRDlocation (residual stress is greater at periphery rod housing welds) rate is dependant on CRD location (residual stress is greater at periphery rod housing welds) and that and that an inspection was unqualified inspection an unqualified done at was done Oconee in at Oconee in the However, the past. However, the past. the licensee licensee intends to
- intends review the to review the NRRNRRstaff analysis basis staff analysis basis in detail with more detail in more support from with support their contractors.
from their contractors. Licensee is Licensee is pursuing through the approval through pursuing approval company board the company board of directors for of directors vessel head for vessel head replacement in RFO -14 (next outage after RFO-13 replacement in RFO -14 (next outage after RFO-13 scheduled for April 2002). scheduled for April 2002). informed the NRR informed NRR licensee that the licensee they do that they intend to not intend do not to let let this drag out. issue drag this issue out. Based Based on on NRR NRR analysis operation beyond analysis operation beyond 18 months could 18 months could result result inin operation with structurally significant flaws operation with structurally significant flaws and therefore the staff will continue to pursue and therefore the staff will continue to pursue regulatory actions. regulatory actions. UJ.S.M ?RC u.s. NRC /f' f' f c- n
~m )n 18 DAVIO DAVID GM GEISEN 'J 1 v..tt 84 acNtJIt t2I d-....
Do"k # IA-05-052 DocMet.,A-0H52 17)0 ~ S* Date Markedior ID~ 2008 ('. (Tr. ~_,L) DOCKETED DOCKETED Dete Matiedor lDU 2008 USNRC USNRC DeW Offered in Date Offered in Ev: I ~/g .2008 Ev: 1.19 2008 (Tr. P.~) (Tr. P. -) September 9, September 2009 (11:00am) 9, 2009 (11 :OOam) lhrough witnesslpanel:_...J,~~/4}~ Thmu Witnessi/P anL ____ 4*LL - OFFICE OF OFFICE SECRETARY OF*SECRETARY Action: Ag Actiom: ~ REJECTED WITH~)RAWN REJECTED WITh)RAWN RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS AND ~\4L.2008 I-. I 2 , (Tr. p. (fr. p. 8Zlr.) ADJUDICATIONS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS STAFF OS' O~
"L--- L-t 1 AS/,**--
7 5 Q _ 2. Exhibit 181 Exhibit 181
, Page 11 of Page of 55 Pages Pages NRC001 -0571 NRCOO,1-0571
lQ/Q2/2001 TLIE 10/Q2/2001 Tt~ 20:29 20:29 FAXFAX 419 419 321 321 8138 8138 SYSTEM SYSTEM ENGRG ENGRG 60oo1 141001 . .l-" .
.' Discussion Discussion Agenda Agenda DBNPS Bulletin Bulletin 2001-01 2001-01 Response
Response
Conference Conference Call October October 3, 3, 2001, 2001, 9:30 9;30 a.m. a.m. BACKGROUND: BACKGROUND: a* DBNPS DBNPS is is 3.1 3.1 EFPY from ONS-3 EFPYfrom ONS-3 as as of of March March 2001 2001 0 Additional II Additional 0.250.25 EFPY EFPY from 12/31/01 12131/01 to March 2002 (13RFO): (13RFO):
-- Margin Margin of 2 EFPY EFPY Remains Remains II Qualified Qualified Visual Inspection Inspection to be Performed During 13RFO be Performed 13RFO ONGOING ACTIVITIES SINCE ONGOING SINCE BULLETIN BULLETIN RESPONSE:
RESPONSE
" SIA II SIA Plant-Specific Plant-Specific Finite Element Analysis for ElementAnalysis for: Nozzle Gaps Nozzle Gaps *" Video Video Inspection Review from HF01 Inspection Review RFO10, RFO11, , and RFO 12:
0,* RF011
-- Further Further confirmation confirmation of no indication indication of leakage leakage attributable attributable to CRDM Nozzle leakage; clearly NozzJeleakage; clearly CRDM flange leakage leakage -* SIA Plant-Specific Fracture Mechanics SlA Plant-Specific Mechanics and Allowable Crack Size Analysis Allowable Crack Analysis M Review North Anna-l, CR-3, TMI-1 , Surry-1, and ONS-3 fall outage results
- Review North Anna-1 CR-3) TMI-1 ,Surry-1, and ONS-3 fall outage results J
for applicability applicability to DBNPS, DENPS, including including lessons-leamed lessons-learned
-* Actively evaluating evaluating RPV head Replacementduring Replacement during RF014 RF014 ALARA ISSUES FOR SHUTDOWN SHUTDOWN BY 12/31/01: 12131/01: ** Personnel Personnel Dose for 2 inspections inspections (12/01 and 03102) 03/02) t.:.'.i(;~~: *' **V -Additiona[Radwaste Generation for 12/31/01 shutdown and restart -AdditiQoarlFBaawasteGeneration s-,
6/o
\'Ii.
NRCOOI-0572 NRC001-0572
10/02/2001 10/02/2001 TUE 20: 29 FAX TIlE 20:29 FAX 419 321 8138 419321 8138 SYSTEM ENGRG SYSTEM ENGRG Z002 I4J 002
.. y.
, .... r., ....
\.,' ".
DAVIS-BESSENUCLEAR DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEARPOWER POWERSTATION STATION CONFERENCECALL PLANNEDCONFERENCE PLANNED CALLPARTICIPANTS PARTICIPANTS BULLETIN2001-01 BULLETIN 2001-01RESPONSE
RESPONSE
October 9ctober 3, 2001 3,2001
.9:30 AM . 9:30AM Davis-Besse Davis-Besse StevenMoffitt, Steven Technical Services Director-~Technical Moffitt.Director Services DavidGeisen, David Geisen. Manager Manager- - Design BasisEngineeing DesignBasis Engineerjng DavidLockwood, David Regulatory Affairs Manager-.-'Regulatory Lockwood,Manager Affairs Scott Coakley, Manager - Outage Management Scott Coakley, Manager- Outage Management MarlcMcLaughlin, Ma& Manager-1600 ProjectManager McLaughlin.Project - 1600 PrasoonGoyal, Prasoon Senior NuclearEngineer Goyal, Senior Nuclear Engineer Miller, Supervisor Dale Miller, Dale Compliance Supervisor--Compliance Rod Cook, Rod ComplianceEngineer Cook. Compliance Engineer Wuokkot Supervisor DaleWuokko, Dale Licensing Supervisor-.~Licen5ing Framatome ANP Framatome ANP Alvin AlvinMcKlmMcKim SreveFyfitch Steve Fyf'rtch Doug Killian Doug Killian NRC001 -0573 NRC001-0573
!o.: ]M
.3tlW USfNRC NO. 449 P.5 NO. 449 P.S tot., *A. -> _,*. <,, £ I-i, -; S-4Mia ttASfrrZ NRCOOI-0574 NRC001-0574
i-IRY. .u 1: 4 0 I6[3/~ax5I
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DOCKETED C- ~ USNRC September 9, 2009 (11:00am) September (11 :OOam) OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS ADJUDICATIONS STAFF STAFF From: Mark A. McLaughlinlTEfFirstEnergy McLaughlin/TEIFirstEnergy To: Andrew J. SiemaszkolFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Andrew WilsonITElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. SiemaszkofFirslEnergy@FirstEnergy, Andrew S. Wilson/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Bradley J. BaumgardneriTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Daft/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Frank W. BaumgardnerlTEiFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Charles T. DaftfTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Kennedy,TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Kennedy/TEiFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy. James James A. KalmbachiTEiFirstEnergy@ Kalmbach/TEiFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Melvin Melvin D. D. HurleyrTEfFirstEnergy@ HurleyITEiFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, FirstEnergy, Prasoon K. Goyal/TE.FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Rodney GoyaliTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Rodney M. M. LeMay/TEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Terry A. CookiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Thomas E. LeMayITEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Cook/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, A. T abbi3rt1FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, David JJ.. JakseticiTEiFirstEnergy Tabbert/FirstEnergy@IFirstEnergy, @FirstEnergy, William JakseticfTE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, William D. Hilkens/FirstEnergy @FirstEnergy Hilkens/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy cc:
Subject:
FW: Photo of the Crystal River VHP indication indication Date: 13:37:491010 10/3/2001 13:37:491010
- .* Forwarded-Forwarded Mark A.
by Mark McLaughlin/TEiFirstEnergy on 10/03/01 12:41 PM A. McLaughlinlTEfFirstEnergy PM-.**** Prasoon K.K. Goyal To: Mark A. McLaughlin.Te.:: McLaughlin;TE. = 10/03/01 01:20 PM 10/03/0101:20 FirstEnergy Daft/-E/FirstEnergy @FirstEnergy DaftfTElFirstEnergy@ cc: GeiseniTEF;rs:E David C. Geisen/TEFirs:~ Swim/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Scott SwimfTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Scott A. Coakley/'FEFirstEnergy @ A.CoakleyfT5FirstEnergy g FirstEn-ýe Firstl=~e'
Subject:
FW: Photo of FW:Photo of the the Cr'is~a: Cr.sa: : FYI. FYI.
.**.* Forwarded-Forwarded by Prasoon K. GoyallTE/FirstEnergy on 10/03/01 01:15 K. Goyal/TE/FirstEnergy PM -----
01: 15 PM .***. greg.gerzen @exelon greg.gerzen@exelon corp.com corp. com To: scott-boggs @fpl.com. b,r scott_boggs@fpl.com, b'- Richard. Labott@PSEG.com, dspond@entergy.com, Richard.Labott@PSEG.com, GMOFFATT@scana.com. dspond@entergy.com. GMOFFA IT@scana.com. 10103/01 12:40 10/03/01 12:40 PM LKMATHEW @southernco.com, pkgoyal 0firstenerg', KMoore @framatech.com. LKMA KMoore@framatech.com. THEW @southernco .. com. pkgoyal@firstenerg, SFyfitch @framatech.com, teherrmann@cal.ameren.com, SFyfitch@framatech.com, vaughn.wagoner# pg: teherrmann@cal.ameren.com. vaughn.wagoner@pg* cc: cc:
Subject:
FW: Photo Photo of the Crystal -; U.S. In re in NRC U.S. NRC m DAVID GEISEN)V, AID GElSEN I
~ J. f\t 1Vlt' t~ ExhIbIt.,
Exihbkt#2. 5 ~
- .ri Oockst # 1IA-05-052 Docket A-05-052 .'
G::-eg :::;e::-zen Greg 7erzen Date Marked Marksdfof for 10: ~/"i ID: I z. 2008 (Tr.p. 200 (Tr. gZS
- p. ŽL-Ev: ~
Nuclear Exel-on :-;1...!.clear 2xe2..*~:-:.
?~o~e 630-657-3845 Phone 630-657-3845 Offef6(Hn Ev-Date Offemdlin 2- 2 2008 (fr. p/!£W (Tr. P--)
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Through w~anet: Thirough *wREnkE~zL. ,ttl jt:- emaii - Greg.Gerzenaexeioncorc.cc-e~ail Greg.Gerzen@exelo~co:;.cc~ Action: ~ A~TdREJECTED REJE~ WrrHCAAWN W13NORAWN
> Original.Message--- -----Ori~inal ----- Message---~- .- L 2 O(PZ-'~
f2'-te Date: J1:j..L.2008 (rio'. p. ~0Lr )
> ?ro~:
From: Gerzen, Greciorv Gerzen, G::-egory S.S. Sent:
> Se~t: Nedr:.esday, Oczober Wednesday, Oc;:ooer 03.03, 2001 11:33 AM1 11:33 A.J.' > To: Bohlke, William :!.;
Bohlke, 'thlliam Xeei.szer, James R..; H.; :*:e::'s;:er. Warner, Mark R.; 'tlar:-:er, Gesior, Roman Mark E; Gesior, Ror:-.ar: A.; Kramer, Jack; Oliver, Bradley
> i\.; :<::-amer, Jac:c; 0:" i','e::-, 3::-adley S. S.
S14D-015786 5140-05786
'xc.ro~ *)U Exhibit 184 Tý_ý
- 0L A-FE -i -
l) Exhibit 184 Page 1 of 4 Pages NRC002-0427 NRC002-0427
> S'Tbect: Photo ?ho-:o of 0: ~he the Crystal C::-ysta! Ri-:er 74? indication ?:..-;e:- '.":-!? :"::dicat:..orr " Here ",e::-e .s
- '5 The Crystal
- e C::-ys::.al River Ri';er vessel vessel hed ::02 -j penetration (CRDM) pe:;.e~:-ation (CRDM) indicanion.
i::dicati.o:1_
> <<C<>S*aL 9 m'.er czrn32_ l.jpg>> " <<:::-.:.:::;:=': ?:.-:e::- ::::::-:::,32_1. jpg>>
Greg e
> =::-:e l.o:"'~ : :*..:.c::" -::"::::- *hone P 630-657-3345 > ?::c~e 63Q-657-33~~
Pager 530-307-5124
>?age::- '530 -3 0-512 4, > enail e~ai: -- Greg.Gerzen"e-'eloncorp.ce=
G::-eg_(;e::-::er:~e:<elor;corp_co::-. This
'::tis e-maiI e-:r.ail and ar:d any any of of its its attachments attacl"_'!'.en::.s may
- '.8.y contain contain Exelon Exelon Coroora:ion Co::-po::-a::ior:
proprietary proprietary information, i,.fo::-ma::'ion, which which is is privileged, pri'Jileged, confidential, confidential. or or subject subjec::. to to copyright copy::-:'g::'t belonging belorrgi:-:g to to thethe Exelon Sxelor_ Corporation Corporation family :amily of of Companies. Companies_ This T~is e--ail e-:t.ail is is intendedi:1tended solely solely for for the::.:'e use
.:lse ofof the the individual individual or or entity e:1tit:,r
- 0 which to -",hich it it: is is addressed.
addressed. If IE you you areare not :lot the the intended intended recipient recipient of h of:::::"s e-mail, e-r;:ail, you yoU are are hereby he:::-eby notified notified that that any any dissemination, dissemi:;.ation, distribution, dist::-ibutio::., copying, copyi:;.g, or or actionac'.:ion taken taken .in .i:1 relation relatim: to to the the contents contents of of and and attachments attac~-::e::::s to this e-mail is to thi.s e-mail is stricc:ly prohibi::ed and strictly prohibized and mayrr.ay be be unlawful. unlawful. If If you you have
- -.a-ie received this e-mail in error, please received this e-mail in error, please notify the sender irr~ediately and notify the sender immediately and permanently per:nanen::.ly delete delete -he the original original and a:-:d any ar.y copy copy of of this this e-mail e-mail and and any a::y orintouz.
p:-i:1tou::.. Thank Than~ You. You,
, ,I, ".-:' ~:\ .', "'.' ,"
S14D-05787 5140-05787 NRC002-0428 NRC002-0428
\. From: From: Mark Mark A.A. McLaughlintTEiFirstEnergy McLaughlih/TEiFirstEnergy To: Andrew Andrew J. J. SiemaszkoiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, SiemaszkoiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Andrew Andrew S. S. Wilson/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy. Bradley WilsonfTE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Bradley J. J. BaumgardnerFTEiFirstEnergy@ BaumgardnerfTEiFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Charles T. FirstEnergy, Charles T. Daft/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy. Frank DaftfTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Frank W. W. KennedypTEFirstEnergy@ KennedyiTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, FirstEnergy, James James A. A. KalmbachfTE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. KalmbachfTEiFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Melvin Melvin D.D. HurleyrTE'FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Prasoon K. GoyalfTE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, HurleyfTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Prasoon K. GoyalfTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Rodney Rodney M. M. Cook/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy. Thomas CooklFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Thomas E. E. LeMay/TE!FirstEnergy@ LeMayfTE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, FirstEnergy, Terry Terry A.A. Tabbert/FirstEnergy @.FirstEnergy, David TabbertlFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, David J. J. Jaksetic/TE/FirstEnergy @ FirstEnergy, William JakseticfTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, William D. D. HilkensiFirstEnergy @ FirstEnergy Hilk.ensiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy cc: cc:
Subject:
Subject:
FW: FW: Photo Photo of of the the Crystal Crystal River River VHP VHP indication indication Date: Date: 10/3/2001 10/3/2001 13:37:491010 13:37:491010
----- Forwarded by by Mark Forwarded----- Mark A. A. McLaughlin/TEiFirstEnergy McLaughlinlTE/FirstEnergy on on 10/03/01 10103/01 12:41 12:41 PM- PM .----
Prasoon Prasoon K. K. Goyal Goyal 10/03/01 01:20 PM To: To: Mark Mark A. A. McLaughlinTE. McLaughlin,T:=:. ~ 10103/0101:20 PM Daft/TE/FirstEnergy@ DafVTElFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy FirstEnergy cc: cc: David David C. C. GeiseniTEFirs:E GeisenITEFirs:~ Swim/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Scott SwimITEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Scott A. Coakley/TfEFirstEnergy @FirstfEýe' A.CoakleyIT5FirstEnergy:@ FirstE~e'
Subject:
Subject:
FW: FW: Photo Photo ofof the the Cry sta: :: Cry5!a: FYI. FYI.
----- Forwarded -Forwarded by by Prasoon Prasoon K. K. GoyalTE/FirstEnergy GoyaliTEIFirstEnergy on on 10/03/01 10103/01 01:15 01: 15 PM -----
PM----- greg.gerzen @exelon greg.gerzen@exelon corp.com corp.com To: To: scott.boggs @fpl.com. b,r scott_boggs@fpl.com. blr Richard.Labott@PSEG.com, Richard. Labott@PSEG.com, dspond@entergy.com, dspond@entergy.com, GMOFFATT@scana.com. GMOFFATT@scana.com. 10103/01 12:40 PM KMoore@framatech KMoore@framatech.com. .com, LKMATHEW @southernco.com, pkgoyal Q firstenerg', LKMATHEW@southernco.com.pkgoyal@firstenerg't. SFyfitch @framatech.com, teherrmann@cal.ameren.com, SFyfitch@framatech.com. teherrmann@cal.ameren.com. vaughn.wagoner vaughn.wagoner@pg.*O pg-cc: cc:
Subject:
Subject:
FW.: FW: Photo Photo of of the the Crystal Crystal -; Greg 3erzen G::-eg::;e::-zen Exe2.D.r 2ze~G:: )uclear
):I..!cl-ear Phone ?~o~e.30-657-3845 630-657-3845 Pager Page::- 630-307-5124 630-307-512~
emaiL ecail -- Greg. Gerzenaexeioncos,.cc-. Greg.Gerzen@exe1o~co=;.cc~
>S---.-- Original Message ---~-Origina1 ----- ~essage----- >> From: ?rom: Gerzen, Gregory Gerzer., G::-egory S.5. >> Sent:
5e::t:: Wednesday,
\'ledr..esday. Oczober Occober 03, 03. 2001 11: 33 AM 2001 11:33 .A.'1 >> To:
To: Bohike, Bohlke, William ~.; Xeister,
*.-Ji11iam ?t.; :*:e:'s:::er. James James R.;R.; Warner, 'i'Ia!:"::er, Mark Mark E;E; Gesior, Gesior, Roma-Kor..ar:. >> A.;
fl..; Kramer,
!<ramer. Jack.;
Jac~; Oliver, 0: :.*..e:::. Bradley 3radley S.5. 86 S14D-057 5140-05786 Exhibit Exhibit 184 184 Page Page 11 of of 44 Pages Pages NRC002-0427 NRC002-0427
0 SSub~ezt: hoto of :he Crystal Ri.'er V:HP indication
> -e.e ~s
>::e:-e
- s :.:::e
> <<*'SPa the C:-ys:;al Crystal ih'/er *=.er River vessel vessel-et cr, ý32_l.Jpg>>
- e*j pe:;.e~::-ation penetration (CRDMI (CRDM) i::dicacio:1.
indication. 0 > <<::--,':3~:::' ?: __ :e:- ~:-.::::,32_1. jpg>>
> Greg Ier-e: > ::::(elo:-,
Ex..elon :;-..:.c:'.:::,:::-
- ula 6 3
-65 7 ,5 Phone 630-657-33~5
>> ~hc~e
> :Pager 603752
> :?age~ S30-307-S124 email- - Greg.Ger=e~~exeloccorp.co~ >> e~ai: Greg.Gerzengexeloncorp.com This e-:r.ai1 '::tis e-mail ar.dand any of its its ::tttacl'~'T.en,:s attachments ;::>.aymay contain contain Exelbn Exelon Corporation Corpora::ion proprietary ir.forma::ion. proprietary information, which is is pri'Jileged. privileged, confidentiaL confidential, or subject: subject copyright belongi::gto to copy;:,':'g::t belonging to the .=:xelon Exelor. Corporacion Corporation :amily family of Corr.panies. Companies. e-mail is This e-:r.aE is intended solely fo;:' for ':he use of the individual zhe :lse en!it,/ individual or e!1tity which it to ~hich it isis addressed. addressed. If you are not the intended recipient IE recipient of :histhJs e-mail,.* you e-r..aL! you are hereby notified zhat any dissemination, notified ;:1-:a;: dissemination, discributio~. distribution,
- copying, copyi~g. or ac'.:ion action taken taken in in relatio::
relation to the contents contents of andattac:-,,..::e::::s and attac"ýments to this e-mail is is scrict::!.y strictly prohibited prohibi:;ed and rr.ay may be unlawful. unlawful. If If you have
- -.a';e received -.::histhis e-mail in in error.
error, please notify notify the sender sender itr.reediately inmrediately ar.d and permanently permanen:;ly delete delet.e the original original and any aroy copy of this e-mail and ar.¥ any orinzout. printout:. Thank Than~ You, You. 5140-05787 S14D-05787 NRC002-0428 NRC002-0428
Job Name:
- ORGAN_80957_CD03_ROD_COOK_NOTES ORGAN~80957 _C D03_RO D_COOK_NOTES Internal Unique 10:
ID: 068 File Path:
\\dctsfs05\blowback\Morgan\80957\CD03 \\dctsfs05\blowback\Morgan\80957\CD03 \ROD_COOK_NOTES\crdnos\00000001 \ROD_COOK_NOTES\crd_nos\00000001 \0000000039\Crystal River crdm32_1.jpg* \0000000039\Crystal crdm32_1.jpg S14D-05788 5140-05788 NRC002-0429 NRC002-0429
S14D-05789 514D-05789 v NRC002-0430 NRC002-0430
ý A-S C- r7-ý( DOCKETED DOCKETED USNRC USNRC September 9, September 9, 2009 2009 (11:00am) (11 :OOam) OFFICE OF OFFICE OF SECRETARY SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS AND From: From: Prasoon K. Prasoon K. Goyal/TEFFirstEnergy GoyalfTEiFirstEnergy ADJUDICATIONS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS STAFF To: To: David C. GeisenfTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy GeisenrTEFFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy cc: Mark A. Mark A. McLaughlin/TE/FirstEnergy@ McLaughlinfTEiFirstEnergy@FtrstEnergy, Dale L. FirstEnergy, Dale L. MillerfTEiFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, MilleriTE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Dale WuokkofTEiRrstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Theo Dale R. Wuokko/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Thea S. SwimFE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy SWimfTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy
Subject:
Oconee3
Subject:
Inspection Oconee3 Inspection Date: Date: 10/3/2001 14:7:141010 10/3/2001 14:7:141010 discussed OC I discussed DC 3 inspection inspection results with Dave results with Whitekar. He Dave Whitekar. chairman of the materias He is The chairman materias committe and committe and is involved involved with material material and and welding welding issues issues at all Duke nuclear at all plants. He stated nuclear plants. stated DC 33 last outage was that OC was in Spring Spring 2000. OC came down in Feb. 2001 DC 3 came 2001 to leaking valve to fix aa leaking valve problem. At that problem. that time they decided decided to inspect head and found a 165 degree inspect the head circumfer~ntial degree circumferential crack on on nozzle 56. II asked him why they missed the leakage nozzle # 56. detection on this leakage detection nozzle in this nozzle in the the spring of 2000. He He said there were two reasons 1) they did not know what they were looking know what looking for ( quantities of boron sitting on they were looking for large quantities on the head) and 2) the head was was notnot clean. I told him that NRCNRC thinks that there may be an existing 165 there.may 165 degree circ. plants which may circ. crack in plants have detected by the visual examination have not been detected based on DC examination based inspection. NRC estimated OC 3 inspection. estimated that it will take 1818 months allowable size which months for this size crack to grow to allowable which is 330 degrees. Therefore Therefore plants should plants qualified visual perform qualified should perform inspection after visual inspection every 18 after every 18 months. Duke had told NRC NRC several times several degree crack did 165 degree times that this 165 did not grow in one cycle. Also in one have taken would have Also itit would taken several cycles several cycles to grow to this size. Duke had also told NRC that NRC crack growh rate is on high NRC crack growh high side as compared
- side indicated that we should continue challenging compared to the industry. Dave indicated challenging NRC crack crack growth rate.
Other information: Other discussing with Duke for one of their new planning to replace their head. TMI is discussing TMI is planning new heads. CR3 replacing their head. We should is also thinking of replacing should immediately get in line to order the new head head.... U.S. NRC U.S. In NRC ~ Ii. f'{ ttX ~ ExhtbIt#~....... c [j Inre DAVID GEISEN reDAVIDGEI 1A-05-052 ,/, Docket ## 1A.()5-()52 00ckBt J z,J ~ 0'2'--- Date Marked Dat Marked ftor ID for Io-~ , 2008 (Tr. (Tri p. p..~.~.2 ..)
~. 11")9 (li gz~)).
Otfetr in Ev: Date QffeftKtIn
.Date Er.~ 2008 (Tr.r. P p.~ ,
1'Io.PnI.".. *wttnessIP.anal: *,,)1 Through IIh~~". Wtespni.4Lh-.--- "/ t;-, -- Action: A Mon: ' REJECTED WITHDRAWN REJECTED WITHDRAWN Date~ Date.0
..
- 2008 (Tr. p.
(4r.
? ~Le )
SI4H-04106 S14H-04106
~~6J..----'
Exhibit 186 186 TP, QL AW~m~'6 Exhibit Page Page 1 of 1 of 11 Page Page NRC002-0111 NRCOO:~-0111
IcM (2- U.S. NRC ini DAVID wft.eL.ý Date Mailcedtwowr 200_M._p jE A~ion:REIJ jjD 1 WITHDRAWN~
)4 J.~2OO(Tr.D. 7 Date I
i DOCKETED I rA DOCKETED I. I USNRC USNRC September 9, 2009 (11:00am) I I September 9, 2009 (11 :OOam) OFFICE OF SECRETARY OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS RULEMAKINGS AND AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF ) ADJUDICATIONS STAFF GO 0
.~,
i . I p.)'67--- Exhibit Page Exhibit193193 1 of 18 Pages Page 1 of 18 Pages NRC004-0815 NRC004-0815
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. "Circumferential "CircumferenfialCracking Cracking of of Reactor Pressure Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Penetration Nozzles" 3.~ . .;.-;... .:.
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~ Ranked Davis-Besse Davis-Besse .'as~ 7th out of 69 plants. ~~ 6.6 actual EFPY, EFPY ,,:pw . *nee nee* 3 but3.1EFPY but 3.1 EFPY away after away after normal.zii norrrl~' . ':' .9 g ,o. ' ..: ., . . ineratures ':" ratures down down to to 600 degre*es "'600 degrees.. .' . ~,.-:~."'.','" .... , .. ," -:', . : :~ :r(;.t!--;"'(" .... I . :, .' .' Jl~':~'l~-: :::' . ~Model R pur-po' Model is purpoey.1 ttPy'vSCC PWSCC is influenced by Environnw(Ch influenced Envir~1] ," t" istry & * &, Temperature),
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. .N INb~Iune SIN i II ý_ . . I.. ý/f/ 1 ....... ..... .. .. lip ~ Conducted ýLe Conducted and .recoi recorded rded video inspections inspections of qf the the head head during during 11 11 RFO RFO (Ap (April ril 1998) 1998) and and 12 12 RFO (April 2000) 2000) .
R R>- Re-reviewed Re-reviewed video videoiir )ctions*ons of head head in in light light of of boron leakage leakage seen seen *at: at'l ma-ladd .Arkansas Arkansas Nuclear.
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~ All CRDM penetrations ?All penetrations were verified to be free from "popcorn" "popcom"type boron boron deposits deposits using using video recordings recordings from 11 IIRFO RFO or 12RFO.
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~L All through through wall cracks cracks in; industry have been identified in the industry by visualvisual inspection. ~ Plant Plant specific finiteoI" fip* e \~;~MJ!'~;!!l{:3Jr:::~': ~',shows ...shows that that 65 out of 69 will open up suffidc41,L suffi " """" " to . " . .' :-. qiG.9.*tion. ~" Remaining V, Remaining 4 CP? sti'6~s area 'Att stess where area where there have therehavebeenno Cru.
been no o!r9;l1 n",~, . *.~~c~s ntiPl cracks found in in the industry. industry.
~c Critical Criticalcrack ~e§filltWhjCh is 273 degre crack size is'273 -SI whch is still still a safety factor of 3 (aligns (aligns with A ASME SME code).code).
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$e~ NSSS vendor-specific risk assessment th-NSSSvendor-specific assessment provides estimated c( ree.,.pamage damage frequency frequency of 3.4 0 A E-7 C: 7 ~':'.::' . '., .1..f.*-- *" Per RG1i _*this!". zees a "very small" increase in : -
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~There \There is a reasonable isa reasonable basis for Assurance Assurance Davis-Besse is s.safe that Davis-Besse fe to operate based on deterministic and, deterministic and .pr..btIc assessments until
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Electric Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) - PWR Materials Power Research Materials Reliability Reliability Program Program Interim Interim Alloy 600 Safety Assessments Assessments for u.s. PWR Plants (MRP-44), U.S. (MRP, ' " TP-1001491,TP-I00149 1, Part 2, dated May 2001. 2001. : .,': EPRI - PWR Mat, Vi Ti- ro am " Response Response to NRC Review Commethd ansm . ,.Dat 'Ditted"Juned.June 22, 1\ ,','.'
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Response to NRC Bulletin Bulletin 2001-01 2001-01 (MRP-48),` (MRP~48)~'1000284,dated 100628`84, dated August August 2001 ,,*.ATIO 1 ,, FENOC FENOC 4CELLOG13 13 p3-
1991 *- Originally CRDM cracking was identified identified at Bugey Unit 3in 3 ýin France France June, 1993 - Safety Assessment Written by all three NSSS Owners Group (NUMARC) October,\J1994 October 1994 - NUREG/CR-6245, NUREG/CR-6245, "Assessment of Pressurized Water Reactor Reactor Control Rod Drive Mechanism Mechanism Nozzle Nozzle Cracking April, April. 1997 - NRC Generic Letter 97-01 "Dearadation "Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel . Closure Head Penetrations", was issued. Industry Industry Responded Responded with Probabilistic Rankings and head inspection plans. Electric.Power Research Institute (EPRI) -Crack G.~~wth 1997 - ElectricPower Growth and Microstructural Microstructural Characterization Characterization of Alloy 600 Vessel Head Penetration Materials, TR Penetration Materials, ..109136 (Propriet.. TR-109136 LJrn,\riot!!3'fl1 j . . June,}OOO Jun~ Re~ea!C.h lnstitut 2000 - Electric Power Research '. ro of Alloy 182 Weld Metal ininPWR Environments Environments (MRP-21) (MRt' 21)
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Leaki~g:N"O*:::~*~;IIe.**~ December, 2000 - One Leaking INonee .0colnee .. Leaking- i" 2001 - Nine Leaking' February, 2001- Oconee' :t "
,~. I March, 2001-March, 2001- One Leaking N .zz. . mllf]Im.':TJl~~1 . ::~ ... .,........--' ~ .'
April, 2001-2001 - Four Leaking Nozzes .afOconee~-2'*~ Leaking Nozzles at'Ocoriee.' :2 ,.*; .., '-':' .,£
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April 2001 - Framatome Apri12001- Framatome ANPANP:- RV Head:.N¢~l~aOa.\Xel~af~~-Assessment, Head: v*l*.'and Wel&Safety-Assessment, 51-5011603-01 51-5011603-01 (FTI ANP Proprietary) and 51-5012567-00 (Non-proprietary) {) 1-5012567-00 (Non-propnetary) .~. '.. ':'~:?".:;.:;?;,lij~~;".~j*~' ~" April 30, 2001 - NRC IN Ap'ril30, IN 2001-05, "Through-wall Circumferential Circumferential Crackin! Crac~in9 of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Control Rod Drive Mechanism PenetraUon Nozzles Mechanism Penetration Nozzles at Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit atoconee Umt 3 May, 2001 - Electric Power Research Research Institute (EPRI) (EPRI) -- PWR Materials Materi~ls Reliability Program Interim Alloy 600 Safety Assessments for U.S,U.S. PWR Plants (MRP-44),(MRP-44), TP-1001491 TP-1001491,, Part 2
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June 29, 2001-2001 -EPRI EPRI-- PWR PWR Materials Materials Reliability Program Response to NRC Review Comments Transmitted Transmitted by Letter Dated June 22, 2001, 2001, to the NEI Relating to MRP-44(MRP-50) MRP-44 (MRP-50) August 3,3, 2001 --NRC 2001-01, "Circumferential NRC Bulletin 2001..;01, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles. August .19, 2001 --EPRI August.19,2001 EPRI-- PWR Materials Reliability Reliability Program Response to NRC Bulletin Bulletn 2001-01 (MRP-48), (MRP-48), 1006284 1006284 August 24, 2001 - Davis-Besse enters contract with SIA. September 4, 2001 - Davis-Besse responds to' Nf:.{!~tiIJllelm B -t00.1-01 September 28,o2001 24, 201EI..
.September --NRR NRR ira transmitsý yia.* *ee n .... t NEI.
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..September 28, 2001 -- Dr.a;rian~n.~ I R Saunders urging fall inspection at Davis-S Besse :'. :' . . >* "', . -. :.
- October 3, 2001 -:NRR confererl ith Davis.- to undertarid.NRC Bulletn 2001-01, October 3, 2001 -NRR con:terelnc,ef~au!WI Cracking of "Circumferential Cracking ReactorF...,~OQQIiI~!*"~.l~
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RV HEAD INSU1.A.TION INSULATION SERVICE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE CRDM NOZZLES THERMOCOUPLE NOZZLE-THERMOCOUPLE NOZZLE-(ONS-1 AND TMI--1 TMI-1 ONLY) ONLY) SUPPORT SUPPORT STEEL ACCESS* HOLES 8 OR 9 ACCESS HOLES IN SERVICE STRUCTURE IN STRUCTURE SUPPORT (ONS-1, (ONS-1, ONS-2, ONS-3, CR-3, AND TMI-1 TMI-1 ONLY) ONLY) 18 18 ACCESS OPENINGS OPENINGS 2" 2" MIN GAP BETWEEN "MOUSE-HOLES" "MOUSE-HOLES" ALL TOP INSULATION AND TOP B&WOG PLANTS B&WOGPLANTS / OF RV HEAD I I z FENOC
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I-DOCKETED USNRC USNRC F/ý-s C--ý ? R2 U.S. U.S. NRC In re In NRC re DAVID DAVID GEISEN GEISEN 51It\ tt N' exhibit ,_ Exhbkt #
*S { _ \.0 I'Mv~kt a 1A.Nr-,-tIK September 9, 2009 September 2009 (11:00am)
(11 :OOam) Docket # 1A-D5-052 . OFFICE OFFICE OF SECRETARY SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS RULEMAKINGS AND AND Commission Tehna CommIssion. Asstant E Tech leal Ass' n IStant E Date Marked Date Marked for ID 10'~ 4 d Jv 2008 (fr. p. 2008 (Tr. p. 825- . ) ADJUDICATIONS ADJUDICATIONS STAFFSTAFF October 11, October 11 t 2001 Date Offered Date Offered in Ev:Ev:~, .. , 2008 2008 (Tr. (fr. p...2 p.jj}G> ( )
Introduction:
WrtnesslPanel:~cJ~/P.~ Through Witness/Panel: .4aI/ _ _ _ _ _ __
Introduction:
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Action: Action: A[ A~ ITT REJECTED WITHDRAWN WITHDRAWN On October 11,2001, October 11. 2001, members management team provided
~e FiretEnergy members of the Fi~rgy Nuclear Nuclear O the Commission Tec O~ Date:
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r=-, 2008 2008 (Tr. (Tr. p. 8w ) ) management provided a briefing to the Oavis-Besse position related to NRC Bulletin Davis-Besse 2001-01, "Cirun,,i,,,uLiI Bulletin 2001-01, "Clrcunm:mmm:u %ajiCKrng vraCKmg OT OJ ieactor Meaaor Pressure Vessel Head Pressure Head Penetration Penetration Nozzles: attendees are Nozzles." The attendees are listed isted in Attachment. in the Attachment. meeting objective FENDe'S stated meeting FENOC'S objective was to provide reasonable basis for assurance provide aareas'Onable assurance that Davis-Besse is Besse Is safe to operate operate until the next next scheduled scheduled refueling refueling outage March 2002 and that the outage in March the plant should plant should continue continue on 24 month month operating operating cycles. PosItions: Plant-Specific Positions: Plant-Specific FENOCprovided FENOC provided the following positions Identified Identified during their review of the bulletin:
- All All CRDM CRDM penetrations penetrations werewere verified verified to be free from the characteristic characteristic boron deposits deposits using video recon;lings recordings from the previous 2 refueUngoutages.
refueling outages. Theseyvideos These ,videos were made made before and after cleaning cleaning the head.
- Plant speCific Plant element analysis shows specific finite element shows that *65 65 out of 69 penetrations penetrations will open up sufficiently Indication.
sufficiently to provide visual indication. .
- remaining four CRDM penetrations The remainingfourCRDM penetrations are located located in the lowest stress area. No No circumferential cracks have -been circumferential identifilKf at other been identlflf other plants In in this .region (Top of the the head). .
* "TheDavis-Besse The Davis-Besse critical crack size is 273 degrees. That includes a safety factor of three in accordance accordance with the ASME ASME code. -
- Davis-Besse haS has a better as-built record of their head head and the interference interference fits than other plants. .AsAs such, Davis-Besse Davis-Besse has done done more and better better quality inspections than other plants.
Analytical Assumptions: Analytical analyzed potential.cracking. Given these positions, the licensee analyzed potential cracking. They determined that, by conservative analysis, a potential crack would not grow to critical crack size before their next refueling outage. The following assumptions utilized. assumptions were utiflzed:
** An initial crack size of 180 degrees at the beginning of Cycle 12 (1998). This crack was not identified hiifi either of the next 2 visual inspections; ** propagates in two directions:
The crack propagates directions;
- Industry accepted crack growth rates rates for Alloy 600 are applicable; and
- No credit was given for decreasing stresses as the crack grows.
$--37 D~62-Exhibit 194 194 ?~L A~7~z~ Page 1 of 4 Pages NRC004-1782 NRC004-1782
" -- I Lolz-'Oo3c7 Commission Technical AsslstantAssistant Briefing Briefing October October 11,11, 2001
Introduction:
Introduction:
On October 11, 2001, members of ~e 2001, members ArstEnergy Nuclear the FirstEnergy Operating Company (FENOC) Nuclear Operating (FENOC) management team provided a briefing to the Q,rnmlsslon management Technical Assistants regarding the Commission Technical the Davis-Besse position position related to NRC .Bulletin 2001-01, "Circumferential Bulletin .2001-01, uCircumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzl~." attend~es are fisted Nozzles." The attendees listed in in the Attachment. FENOC'Sstated FENOC'S stated meeting objective objective was to provide provide a reasonable reasonable basis for assurance assurance that Davis-Besse Is safe to operate aperate.until until the next scheduled refuefing refueling outage in March 2002 and that the the plant should continue on 24 month operating operating cycles. Plant-Speclflc positions: Plant-SpeciflePositions: FENOC provided the following positions Identified FENOCprovided Identified during their review of the bulletin:
- All CRDM penetrations penetrations were verified to be free from the characteristic characteristic boron deposits deposits using video recon;Jings recordings from the previous 2 refuefingrefueling outages. These videos were made before and after cleaning the head.
cleaning .the
** Plant specific specific finite element analYSis analysis shows that 65 out of 69 penetrations penetrations will open upup sufficiently sufficiently to provide visual indication.
indication.
- The remaining four CRDM penetrations penetrations are located fnthein the lowest stress area. No No circumferential circumferential cracks have*been IdentifllKlat havebeen identifbd at other plants In plants in this region (Top of the the head).
- Davis-Besse critical crack size is The Davis-Besse includes aa safety factor of is 273 degrees. That includes three in three accordance with the ASME code.
In accordance
- Davis-Besse has a better as-built as-built record ofthefr of their head and the interference interference fits than other plants. As such, Davis-Besse has done done more and better quality inspections inspections than otherpJants.
other plants. Analytical Assumptions: positions, the licensee Given these pOSitions, licensee analyzed cracking. They determined that, by analyzed potential cracking. conservative analysis, conservative analysiS, aa potential crack would not grow to critical crack size before their next refueling refueling outage. The following assumptions were utilized:
** An initial crack size of 180180 degrees at the beginning beginning of Cycle 12 (1998).
(1998). This crack was not identified if either identifiediti either of the next 2 visual inspections; visuallnspedions;
** The crack propagates propagates In in two directions; directions; ** Industry accepted accepted crack growth rates lor for Alloy 600 are applicable; and *° No credit was given for decreasing stresses as the crack grows. $-37 Exhibit 194 Exhibit 194 Page 1 Page 1 of of 44 Pages Pages NRC004-1 782 NRC004-1782 \
o ficensee also presentee The licensee presenteti their vendor-specific risk assessment thelr-vendor-specific assessmeint that provided provided an estimated estirTlated core damage frequency of 3.4 E ..-7. damage frequency 7. Differences Differences wIth with Staff: representatives stated that their anaJyticai FENOC representatives analytical results differed with the staff's on the
$laff's oil the fo1lowing following points (Note that thatthe the .."staff positions" stated below are as provided by FENOC):
staff positions-1.
- 1. The staff does not believe that Davis-Besse has a qualified method for visual inspection inspection penetration welds.
of the penetration FENOC stated that while whlle the inspections performed during the past 2 outages theinsp~ctions outages were not conducted with these t~esespecific specific failures Inmind, they were video taped. These video fallures in video tapes were of sufficient quality that permitted reinspectlonreinspection of the head looking for the de~its. FENOe characteristic boron deposits. FENOC stated that they are completing completing the process to qualify qualify this visuaJ technique for 65 of the 69 penetrations. visual inspection technique penetrations.
- 2. The staff stated that a given crack could grow to critical size within 18 months.
FENOC's analysis indicates As discussed above, FENOC'sanalysis Indicates that it would take more than 4 years years for that amount of growth to occur.. occur** Request for Additional Dialog: Dialog: FENOC management requested FENOe requested that additional dialog take place prior to the NRC taking action additional,dialog in this area. They stated that Davis-Besse Davis-Besse has been placed In in a high-risk group based on their their Inspections, and their vendor type, past inspections, theIr effective effective full-power years. However, FENOe FENOC stated process requires that the plant-specHic that due p.rocess plant-specific nature ,of evaluated. The of this phenomena be eValuated. management managementstated stated their intent to take whatever whatever action Is is necessary. Therefore, they considered Imperative that NRC provide the basis for their conclusions. The following specific considered it imperative specHic concerns were raised:
- 1. FENOe managers stated that, during an October 3, 2001 teleconference, FENOC managers teleconference, they requested that NRR provide the specifics of the analysis and the models used that indicates indicates appreciably appreciably faster growth rate than that determined FENOC. The staff has determined by FENOC.
provided documentation of this analysis. not provideddocumentatfon
- 2. FENOC stated that they also requested the specific NRC risk analysis that resulted in a FENoe core damage frequency of 2E-2 to 1.4E-3, differed from their vendor specific 1.4E-3, as this dHfered specHic analysis of 3.4 E-7, noting that their number was categorized categorized as a very small increase in increase in risk in in accordance accordance with Regulatory Guide Guide 1.174. The staff has not provided provided documentation documentation~ of this analysis.
- 3. that, during the October 3 call, they informed the staff that they had FENOC stated that,duringthe video tapes of the head, a finite element analysIS, and a crack growth rate model that element analysis,
. differed differed from the NRC's. FENOe FENOC also informed the staff that they would submit all data arso informed data for staff review. The staff has not requested requested to review this data.
Summary: NRC004-1783 NRC004-1783
FENOC closed FENOC olosed their indicating that presentation by Indicating their presentation that their their plant-specific deterministic and plant-13pecHic deterministic and assessments of probabHistic assessments probabilistic of the cracking issue CijDM cracking the CRDM provided a reasonable basis issue provided a reasonable basis for for assurance that assurance Davis:Besse is that Davis-Besse Is safe safe toto operate until March 2002. operateuntil.March Tl'1eystated that, as 2002. They-stated as such, such, FENOC does FENOC does not not have have indicatibn indication of need for of aa need early shutdown for early They stated Davis-Besse. They shutdoWn of Davis-Besse. that the that the prmary need at the primary need present time the present time is for .the staff for review the staff review Davis-Besse's analysis and Davis-Basse's analysis and prOVideFENOC provide FENOC with with specific specific information information related related to to the the NRC's NRC's analysis. analysis. Staff Staff Meeting: Meeting: following the briefing, Immediately following Immediately officials met briefly FENOe officials briefing, FENOC the staff. The briefly with the follOwing was The following was decfded: decided:
- The NRC staff would
'The would continue
(:ontinue to to take action as was deemed take action deemed necessary throughout the necessary throughout the review of new FENOC information. of new information.
- The ongoing staff review and The analysis Is and analysis is in preparation predecisional, and as such, preparation and predecisional, cannot can not be provldedto FENOe at this time.
provided to FENOC .
- FENOe would FENOC provide, on October would provide. October 12, submission of their data schedule for submission 2001, aa.scheclute 1Z 2001, data next few business over the next business days. ensuring the quality of the submittals.
days, while ensuring
- NRRstaff
.NRR documentation provided in preparation staff would review the ,documentation a staff-level preparation for astaff-level meeting with FENOC.
meeting FENOC.
- meeting would be held.
A meeting during the week ending October presumably during held, presumably October 20, 2001, 2001. to discuss the FENOC analysis, provided that diScuss tflat the information represented a new information submitted represented
.pasHian . position to the staff. ** Both sides agreed to attempt a rapid .resolutionresolution of this issue.
NRC004-1784 NRC004-1784
;I Attachment Attachment Technical Assistant Briefing Attendees Attendees Presenters: ~ President - FENOe Campbell. Vice President Guy G. Campbell, FENOC .. Steven P. Moffitt, Director, Technical Services.
Services-
.. David C. Geisen.
Geisen, Manager, Design Basis Engineering Engineering
.. David H. Lockwood, Manager. Regulatory Affairs Manager, Regulatory Affairs .. Steve Fyfitch, Engineering Fyfitch, Framatome Engineering FENOC FENOC Attendees: .. Roy Lessy, Attorney, Attorney. Akin, Gump, et. al, ai, .. Mike Doweling Doweling .. Gerald Wolf Technical Assistants Assistants Darrell Roberts, OCM/Merserve Roberts. OCMlMerserve Rich Croteau, OCMIDiaz Croteau. OCMlDiaz Sunil Weerakkody, Sunil Weerakkody. OCMIDicus OCM/Dicus Tom HII~
Hiltz, OCMIDlcus OCM/DIcus Beall, OCM/McGaffigan Jim Beall, OCMlMcGaffigan Other NRC Attendees:
.. OEDO David Loveless, OEOO ~ Stacey Stacey Rosenberg, OEDO Rosenberg, CEOC ..a Bateman. NRR Bill Bateman. NRA .. Allen Hiser. *Alen NRR Hiser, NRR NRC004-1785 NRC004-1785
ýA-s c-(
(2- (ýcr ý- ~ From: Dale Dale R. Wuokko/TE/FirstEnergy WuokkorrElFirstEnergy To: Lockwood/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Mark David H. LockwoodfTElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Mark A. A. McLaughlinfTE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, David C. GeisenrrEiFirstEnergy@ McLaughlinrrElFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy. Geisen/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, FirstEnergy. Rodney Rodney M. Cook/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Michael K. M. CooklFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy.Michael K. DOCKETED DOCKETED Leisure/TE/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, leisurerrElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Prasoon K. GoyalrrElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Prasoon K. Goyal/TfEFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, USNRC USNRC Steven Steven P. Moffitt/CEI/FirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, MoffitVCEIlFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. Lonnie W. WorleylTE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy. Dale l. WorleyrrElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy. L. MillerrrElFirstEnergy@FirstEnergy, Miller/TE/FirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy, Kendall . September 9, 2009 September 9, 2009 (11 ('11:00am)
- OOam) ByrdfT~JFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy W. Byrd/TEiFirstEnergy@ FirstEnergy cc:
OFFICE OF OFFICE OF SECRETARY SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RUlEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS
Subject:
Your Two em ails emails STAFF ADJUDICATIONS STAFF Date: 10/19/2001 9:40:351010 9:40:351010 Please note note the second second paragraph paragraph below. below. Our letter on Wed. 10/17101 letter sent onWed. 10/17/01 will correct their misunderstanding. misunderstanding.' ,
---- Forwarded Forwarded by :Dale Dale R. WuokkorrEiFirstEnergy Wuokko/TJEFirstEnergy on 10/19/01 09:36 AM AM---- ."Doug-las. Pickett" DV.P1@nrc.g0v> 10/17/01 10:29 AM To: <Dale-r.
_wuokko@firstenergycorp.comf> cc:
Subject:
Your Two emails Dale - I received your two emailsthis emails this morning. I have have received inputs from the received the last two SE inplJts the tech staff on the the spent fuel re-rack amendment. II hope to put together together the package today and get itit to OGC tomorrow morning morning and request their concurrence concurrence by noon on Friday.
\
II have not received received any word from tech staff regarding the bulletin response. I've heard encouraging encouraging words describing describing your 100% 100% inspection inspection from your last outage. I'll keep you informed. informed. Doug I UANRC
~bww ~ DAVID OEMSEN.If-{
DAVID GEISEN 5' ftýEkd ExhIbIt,S BM 7 Do"ks ## 1M)5.()52 Docket IA-06-052 .
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.2008 CTr. p. gw ,
WITHDRAWN SI4Q-016 514Q-01648 4B
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7-eVvý- P L Pýjý--- - NRC003-1211 NRC003-1211
DOCKETED USNRC U~NRC U.S. In is NRC U.S. NRC L -I-L2If GEISE14- 'T4L DAVID GEISEN:J r9 DAVID C'-11 Efht#J 5 t1 ExhibIt ,_ () In September September 9, 2009 2009 (11 (11:.00am)
- OOam) Docke # 1Ml6-052 Doctcst 1A-06-052 Maliredfor'~
OFFICE OF OFFICE OF SECRETARY ADJUDICATIONS SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND RULEMAKINGS ADJUDICATIONS STAFF AND STAFF November 6, 2001 November 6,2001 DetB Da~oMai*ed forlý Date Offewd Data Off.ecHn In ev:* Er.W 2008 (Tr. 2 p.W ) (Tr.p.,...... p,x 2008 (Trp.2. 20 (Tr. Z 4)
~~
Thmug WFus- an- /L/ Action:AcftL Nih EJECTED WITHDRAWN REJECTED W1TH[lftAWN LICENSEE: LICENSEE: FirstEnergy Company FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Gompany Date: . 2008(LZ
,2008 'R (Tr. Po V-t ) .'
FACILITY: FACILITY: Davis:'Besse Unit 1 Nuclear Power Station, Unit Davis-Besse Nuclear
SUBJECT:
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
MEETING OCTOBER 24, 2001,
SUMMARY
OF OCTOBER 2001, TO DISCUSS DISCUSS THE LICENSEE'S LICENSEE'S RESPONSE TO BULLETINBULLETIN 2001-01 On October October 24, 2001, 2001, the Nuclear Nuclear Regulatory Regulatory Commission statt met in Rockville, Maryland; Commission staff Maryland, with representatives of FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating CompanyCompany-and their contractors. The purpose purpose meeting was to discuss the licensee's proposal to defer inspections of the meeting recommended by inspections recommended 2001-01, "Circumferential Cracking of Bulletin 2001-01, of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Penetration Nozzles," to their 13th 13th refueling outage which is scheduled scheduled to begin begin in March March 2002. The bulletin recommends inspections be performed recommends that inspections performed prior to December 31, 2001. A list of the meeting 31, 2001. participants is included participants included as Attachment Attachment 1, and a copy of the meeting handout handout is provided as Attachment 2. Attachment The meeting meeting was requested by the licensee licensee in order order to provide newhew information information to the staff to justify their proposal proposal to defer reactor vessel head penetration inspections until their March penetration inspections March 2002 licensee had recently submitted two technical refueling outage. The licensee technical reports for staff review review that supplemented supplemented their original bulletin response. The reports consisted of "RV Head Nozzle and Head Nozzle Weld Safety Assessment" by Framatome Framatome ANP and "Finite Element Element Gap Analysis of CRDM Penetrations Penetrations (Davis-Besse)" by Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. .Inc. The staff had performed a preliminary preliminary review of these documents provided a request for additional documents and provided additional information information (RAI) (RAI) that the licensee would need to address. The meeting focused focused on the licensee's licensee's assessment assessment that reasonable reasonable assurance assurance exists to defer performance of the recommended performance recommended inspections and that a 24-month 24-month fuel cycle could be justified. The staff and licensee discussed discussed varying assumptions used to generate generate crack growth rate models. The staff indicated that they could not make any conclusions regarding the the acceptability of the licensee's acceptability mode~ prior to seeing the licensee's licensee's model responses to the RAJ. licensee's responses RAI. In In addition, the licensee addition,the licensee requested requested documentation documentation of the staffs generic technical assessment. The staff committed to issue their crack growth rate model approximately approximately one week prior to the the Advisory Advisory Committee Committee on Reactor Safeguards Safeguards meeting scheduled for November 9, 2001. 2001. r*&-, PAT- 7:- -SY1/2 2- W' m~ O2~-~
NUL-IIJLj -
--2 In closing statement~,
In statements, the staff staff requested videotapes of previous .inspections inspections of the reactor pen~tration leakage vessel head where no penetration leakage was identified. identified. The licensee stated their intentions intention.s to provide a docketed response response to the staffs RAI early next week. IRA! IRA! Stephen P. Sands, Project Manager, Section 2 Directorate IIl Project Directorate 1\1 Division of Licensing Management licensing Projects Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-346 List of Meeting Participants Attachments: 1. list Attachments: Participants Meeting Handout
- 2. Meeting Handout cc w/atts: See next page page
1111..'
- 2-In closing statements, the staff requested In videotapes of previous requested videotapes previous inspections inspections of the reactor ofthe reactor leakage was identified. The licensee stated their intentions penetration leakage where no penetration vessel head where intentions to provide a docketed staff's RAI early next week.
docketed response to the staffs IRA! Section 2 Stephen P. Sands, Project Manager, Section Stephen Ill Project Directorate 111 Division of Licensing Projects Management Management Office of Nuclear Regulation Nuclear Reactor Regulation 50-346 Docket No. 50-346 Attachments: 1. Meeting Participants
- 1. List of Meeting Participants
- 2. Meeting Handout Handout cc w/atts: See next page page ADAMS ACCESSION NO: NO.:. ML012980360 ML012980360 OFFICE OFFICE PM:LPD3 LA:LPD3 LA: LPD3 SC:EMCB SC:EMCB SC:LPD3 NAME NAME SSands THarris KWichman KWichman AMendiola AMendiola IRA! by IRA/by GDick DATE 11/01/01 11/02/01 11/02101 11/05/01 11/06/01 RECORD COPY OFFICIAL RECORD COpy
MEETING PARTICIPANTS PARTICIPANTS OCTOBER OCTOBER 24, 2001 NRC FirstEnergy Nuclear FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Operating Company Strosnider Jack Strosnider Steven Steven Moffitt Moffitt John Zwolinski David Geisen Bill Bateman Kendall Byrd Keith Wichman David Lockwood Lockwood Allen Hiser Hiser Gerald Wolf Gerald Larry Burkhart Doug Pickett Collins Jay Collins David Loveless Loveless Dominion Resources Resources Jin Chung Bajwa Singh Bajwa Fontecilla Herb Fontecilla Jabbour Kahtan Jabbour Simon Sheng Andrea Lee Bechtel Stephen Sands Stephen Sands Steve Long Long Altheia Wyche Wyche Framatome ANP Framatome ANP Calvert Calvert Cliffs Fyfitch Stephen Fyfrtch Getachew Getachew T Tesfaye esfaye Alvin McKim McKim Peter Scott Stanley Levinson Scientech Enzinna Bob Enzinna Shoppman Mike Shoppman Deana Raleigh Deana Raleigh Jim Mallay Mallay Licensing licenSing Support Services Services Akin, Gump & & Strauss Strauss Roger Huston Roy Lessy HGP. Inc. Structures Inteciritv Associates, Structures Integrity Associates. Inc. Dan Salter Dick Mattson Mattson In addition to the above In above attendees, a telephone conference bridge was set up and individuals telephone conference individuals tied into the the bridge identified identified themselves representing the Davis-Besse themselves as representing Davis-Besse site, the Electric Power Research Research Institute Institute (EPRI), Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Southern Nuclear, Dominion Dominion Resources, Salem Generating Generating Station, and the Nuclear Information Resource Nuclear Information Resource Service. Attachment Attachment 1
OIL. . ni-. 11 DISTRIBUTION FOR DISTRIBUTION FOR MEETING
SUMMARY
OF MEETING
SUMMARY
OF OCTOBER 2001, WITH OCTOBER 24, 2001, FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR WITH FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY OPERATING COMPANY Hard Copy w/atts Hard Copy w/atts PO 111-2 PD 111-2 Reading Reading PUBLIC PUBLIC GGrant, Rill GGrant, Rill SSands SSands AMendiola AMendiola Hard Hard Copy wIAtt 1 Copy w/Att OGC OGC ACRS ACRS E-mail wIAtt E-mail w/Att 1 SCollins SCollins BSheron BSheron JZwolinski JStrosnider JStrosnider WBateman WBateman KWichman KWichman AHiser AHiser SBajwa SBajwa lBurkhart LBurkhart JColiins JCollins DLoveless DLoveless JChung JChung KJabbour SSheng ALee ALee SLong SLong JZimmerman JZimmerman
NRC FORM 658 U.S. NUCLEAR NUCLEAR REGULATORY REGULATORY COMMISSION COMMISSION I (9-1999) NRC FORM 658 TRANSMITTAL TRANSMITTAL OF MEETING HANDOUT OF MEETING HANDOUT MATERIALS MATERIALS FOR FOR IMMEDIATE
-'MIVIED'A TE PLACEMENT PL.ACEMENT IN IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN PUBLIC DOMAIN This form is to be filled out (typed or hand-printed)
Thisform person who announced hand-printed) by the person announced the meeting (i.e., the person who issued the meeting notice). The completed form, and the attached form,_ and attached copy of meeting handout o/meeting handout materials, materials, will be sent to the Document Control Desk on the same day of ContrOJ-Deskon of the meeting; under underno circumstances Circumstances wi/I will this be done later than the working day after the meeting. later than meeting. Do not include includeproprietary materials. proprietary materials. [AT DATE OFMEEIG OF MEETING attached document(s), The attached waslwere handed document(s), which was/were handed out in this meeting, is/are to be placed meeting. iSfare placed L10/420 10/24nOOl public domain as soon as possible. The minutes in the public near future. tuture. Following are administrative details are administrative minutes of the the meeting will be issued details regarding this meeting: issued in the the Docket Docket Number(s) 05000346 PlantlFacility Plant/Facility Name Name Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Davis-Besse Nuclear TAC Number(s) TAC Number(s) (if (if available) MB2626 MB2626 Meeting Notice Reference Meeting Notice October October 18, 2001 Meeting Purpose of Meeting (copy from meeting notice) To discuss the licensee's proposal to defer reactor vessel recommended by Bulletin head penetration inspections recommended Bulletin 2001*01 2001-01 to their April 2002 2002 refueling outage. NAME OF PERSON WHO ISSUEO ISSUED MEETING MEETING NonCE N01ICE TITLE Stephen Sands Forthcoming MeetingMeeting with FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating OFFICE NRR DIVISION DLPM BRANCH LPD3 Distribution of this form and attachments: Docket File/Central File PUBLIC14Q prol NRC FORM 658658 (9-1999) 91°g PRINTED ON PRINTED ON RECYCLED RECYCLED PAPER PAPER was designed using This form was using InForms InForms
NRC NRC .Bulletin 2001-01, 2001-01, "Circumferential "Circumferential Cracking Cracking of of Rea'ctor ReactorPressure Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Head Penetration Nozzles" Nozzles" Attendees: Steven Steven Moffitt, Director Director ..- Technical Services Technical Services David Geisen, Manager Manager ..- Design Design Basis Engineering Engineering David David Lockwood, Manager - Regulatory Lockwood, Manager Affairs Regulatory Affairs Kendall Kendall Byrd, SupervisorSupervisor .. Nuclear Nuclear Engineering Engineering Gerald Wolf, Gerald Wolf,Senior Senior Engineer Engineer ..- Regulatory Regulatory Affairs Affairs Mike Dowling, Vice President Mike Dowling, President - First Energy Services Services Alvin McKim, McKim, Framatome Framatome Steve Fyfitch,Framatome> Fyfitch, Framatome ..... Stanley Levinson, Levinson, Framatome. Framatome Peter Scott, Framatome Framatome
*Bob Enzinna, Framatome Bob Enzirlna, Framatome Dick Mattson, Structural Integrity AssociatesAssociates Roy Lessy, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. -Akin, Gump,Strauss, FENOC
I'f;'''1D'~~~, C1*
---'--~~
C NRC ~NRC 2001-01 response Bulletin 2001-01 provided response provided 7~ Telephone September 28 Telephone call received on September 28 Teleconference on October i:rVTeleconference October 3
~Briefdrop SBrief drop by oil on 'October October 11 11 0 ,-.1< "':'.FENOC
- , *q .,';"2 FENOC 2
Reasonable Assurance Provide Reasonable that Davis-Besse Assurance that Davis-Besse is safe to o.perate operate until next refueling outage outage (March 2002) (M'arch 2002) and should continue 24 month operating o'perating cycles cycles FENOC 3
- ,1 0
II
N/IC IIRCRui 81111111in2551-1O 2001-01 Titled, "Circumferential "Circumferential Cracking Cracking of Reactor Pressure Press:,u:re Vessel Head Head Penetration Nozzles," Penetration Nozzles," dated dated Aug:ust August 3, 2001 . i~ 'Requests Requests that plants plants, provide provide design design , information,
!nform~tion, previous previous inspection inspection results, and future future inspection In:,s'pe'cilon plans. pia ns,' ,
7~ Response requirements were
~esp'onse*req.u.jr~r:ne'nts based upon were,base~ upor) plant plant rankin ra. ,.n.,. k. ln. g.'._. . in ln. Susceltibility Sus.ceptlblhty Model Model as published published in In EPRI EPRI I1RP-48. N/I*RP-48. '
FENOC FENOC 4
beuilityModel
$PSCllllllbiIilJllJ!.tl.dlll S
EPRI - PWR Materials Materials Reliability Program Response to N-RC Response NRC Bulletin 2001-01 2001-01 (MPR-48), 1006284, dated August 2001 1,,006:-284, Davis-Besse as 7th out of 69 plants. i:lr Ranked Davis-Besse
~ ) 6~6actual 6.6 actual from Oconee EFPY away fro'm Oconee 3 but 3.1 EFPY away after normaUzing normalizing on head temperatures temperatures down to 600 d~egrees.
SOO degrees. " *
'i:lr Mod:el Model is purposely simplistic. in: that PWSCC is simplistic in influenced by Envir~nment(Chemistry tl7lfl*uenced Environment (Chemistry & Temperature),
Stress, and Tim'e. Stress, Time. The model model does not account account for Stress, Chemistry, Material Variability, or specific plant as-built conditions. FENOC FENOC 5 ~i III
IDaivs-Resse NSRC RullelinReSlonse SReferenced inspections f-lReferenced inspections of the head during 11 RFO (April 1998) and 12 RFO (April 2000) f-lr :Re-reviewed Re-reviewed vi'deo video inspections inspections of head in light of boron leakage leakage seen at Oconee and Arkansas Nuclear Nuclear One.
ý~N:ohead No head penetration penetration ,leakage leakage was identified. ~r Committed to . submit follow-.up follow-up response on January 29, 2002 based u'pon:further upon further industry *developments.
developments.
- i. Com'mitted fl Committed to perform perform aa qualified qualified visual inspection inspection of Reactor Pressure
. Reactor Pressure Vessel head in 13RFO13RFO currently scheduled to begin in March 2002. scheduled FENOC FENOC 6 v
AnalyslJs
...... iAi.it....... .3 ..*. .1......... ............. iI **.* '.l..... 5.1.1 ..
DBNPS's evaluation evaluation is based on our visual inspections inspections performed in 10,11, 10, 11, and 12 RFO (May 1996, April 1998, and April 2000 respectively) The inspection results afford us assurance that all but 4 nozzle penetrations penetrations were inspected in 1996. All but 19 penetrations were inspected penetrations inspected in 1998. And all but 24 24 penetrations penetrations were inspected in in 2000. The limiting nozzle population isthose is those nozzles that could could 1998 or 2000. not be inspected in '1"998' It is conservatively conservatively assumed assumed that that.for for these penetrations, an axial through through weld flaw occurs immediately immediately upon startup from 1ORFO (May from'10"R'FO (May 1996) . 106 FENOC FENOC 7
AnallSes, conl
.001'",. .F .** ..1. ..... 1 PAi., ... ..M... ,.IiL ... ). i.e.Mi¥.. .*. " ........ 1.1........................ .
Assuming Assuming flaw initiation at the beginning beginning of cycle 11 11, , a circumferential circumferential through through wall flaw will not reach the the allowable allowable flaw size before before November November 2003. Clearly, operating operating to March March 2002 is acceptable acceptable given that we have analyzed analyzed conservatively conservatively at each step of our evaluation. /\1 0%
--- FENOC FENOC 8
Facts. (. penetrations were verified to be free from All CRDM penetrations All "popcorn" type boron deposits using video recordings "popcorn" recordings I ORFO, I11IRFO from 10RFO, RFO or 12RFO.12RFO. i:l: A review of of visual recordings well as eye-witness accounts recordings as well served as the accounts served the means of the inspection. inspection. ,r ~ The original VHS format was original VHS was transferred formal to allow a frame by transferred to .avi file format by frame review. review. FENOC 9
Facts Feets All through wall flaws in the US industry All through industry reported reported to date have been identified date identified by by visual inspection. visual inspectionM ~ There have been no through 7 There circumferentialflaws above the J-weld through wall circumferential region J-we/d region that visual leakage that have not exhibited visual reactorvessel head. OD of the reactor leakage on the 00 head. ~ CRDM nozzles that underwent sampling of CROM The sampling NDE type inspections underwent NOE part of an inspections as part an extent of condition circumferential flaws above the J-weld. condition did not exhibit circumferential J-weld. FENOC 10 10
Facts A conservative conservative plant plant specific specific finite finite element analysis analysis shows that least 65 out of 69 penetrations that at least penetrations will open open up sufficiently to provide provide visual visual indication. indication. ~SStructural Integrity Associates Structural/ntegrity Associates (SIA) performed performed the finite finite element analysis. analysis. ~ Drive penetrations Drive penetrations1, 1, *2; 2;2,- and 4 did 3, and did not relax theirinterference relax their interference fits sufficiently enough to claim claim that an unimpeded path exists from the top of the J-weld to the 00 unimpeded path OD of the head. interference fit is head. The minimum interference 0. 00002". only 0.00002". is.only drives did 'tl These drives did not nece:ssarily necessarilyhave the highesthighest interference fits. Their interference fits. Their location location differential stress and exhibited the lowest differentia/stress and that thatlimited limited their their penetration penetration elongation. elongation. absence of high differentia/. This absence differential.strf3ss stress may also also explain why no circumferential circumferentialflaws have been found in the industry industry at these locations. locations. 7X A detailed detailed Framatome Framatomeanalysis analysis of B&W B&W plants plants shows all penetrations penetrations opening opening up. F..-NC' e, FENOC 4 c11 FENOC 11
Facts Maximum allowable allowable flaw size is at least 273 degrees which is still a safety factor degrees (aligns with factor of 3 (aligns ASME code) ASME code) . ~ ,%'~ specific SIA Davis-Besse specific PreliminaryDavis-Besse Preliminary analysis indicates SIA analysis indicates that the maximum achieve a safety factor allowable flaw size to still achieve allowable factor of 3 may be as as high as as 302 degrees. degrees. 12' FENOC
.... "' .. , C*'12 FENoe 12
iI$$HI1P luff Initial flaw depth of 0.5 mm, 172 17200 around the the nozzle, is assumed assumed to exist immediately immediately upon achieving a full penetration achieving penetration axial flaw. BASIS:
~ ,N This is a conservative conservative flaw initiation site size.
z-i..~ It is further conservatively It assumed that multiple starting flaws could exist conservatively assumed and that these would eventually link* together.* eventually link together. .
~ ~It It is conservative conservative in by assuming this starting point, we also are in that by assuming that we have already had several years of flaw propagation assuming propagation axially through the Alloy 182 weld material.
/ FENOQ~ FENOC FENOC <VC (' C) 13 13
takes at It takes least 3.5 at least years to grow 3.Syears grow circumferentially through through wall wall to aa flaw size of flaw size of 1800 1800 BASIS: BASIS:
~ V 1800 1800 used by was used was Framatome in their by Framatome Safety Assessment.
their Safety Assessment.
~ conservative in ,ý It is conservative in that t.he Framatome that the analysis showed Framatomeanalysis that aa single showed that single initiation take 10years would take initiation site would 10 ,years to 'grow pOint but this point grow to this that multiple but that multiple initiating flaws initiating could link flaws could up to shorten linkup flaw growth the flaw shorten the timeframe to groWth timeframe to 3.5 3.5 years. ' "...C"*'14 1"FENOC FENOC CE LI.fIN 14
As AssumptioRS J,' .J, . . . . . . . . . . . . . f . . liws
.... .. * ;P,m. Ii ..
Industry accepted crack Industry accepted crack growth growth rate rate models models for for Alloy 600 Alloy 600 are are applied. applied. BASIS: BASIS: {;{SThe propagation rate used crack propagation The crack used in Framatome analysis in the Framatome was derived analysis was derived from applying from Peter Scott the Peter applying the Scott model model which which is (stress intensity is K (stress intensity factor) factor) dependent. dependent. 1}{ The ýOr materials based model is aa materials The model based model developed from model developed steam generator from steam generator and is data and empirical data empirical applied conservatively is applied conservatively to CRDM CRDM material database. material database.
~
5- The environment The equivalent to environment is equivalent to primary water chemistry. primary water chemistry. FENOC 15 15
~-------- ~~-
Assumptions 1... ( ..*. :... ;,.1 I..,.. "...: "..0 .J.. "" I ,11 J.s.............. s. '. takes at It takes least 44 years at least years to grow grow from the the flaw size size of 1800 maximum allowable 1800 to aa maximum allowable flaw flaw size size of 2700 270 0 BASIS: BASIS: Modeled by
- iX Modeled Framatome in by Framatome in their Safety Assessment.
their Safety alternative method Applying an alternative
*f.l Applying method we we see that the see that the Framatome method is Framatome method is conservative.
conservative. ForFor example, using mean radius of nozzle which equates to using mean radius of nozzle which equates to aa circumference of circumference 10.62, to of 10.62, to flaw flaw from from **180180 to 270. degrees to 270 d~grees would to 45 equate to would equate 45 degrees in each direction degrees each direction for a circumferential distance a circumferential distance of 1.33 inches. Then of 1.33 inches. Then applying accepted linearized applying an accepted lineari~ec:l.grpwth growth rate rate of of 0.2 inches/year through Alloy inches/year through Alloy 600. material 600 years to 6.6 years yields 6.6 material yields 'propagate the to"propagate the 1.33 1.33 inches in each inches in direction. each direction. C,
) --66 1.. FENOC FENOC 16 -v
RBasonable Reasonuble Assurance
.1 i i ** i. ..... "_". X:'i ......... J ; :. . .. 1.. d.
Assurance
.,P,.:' 1 1.......... " .. , . .; ......... h.l!1. .. _, .... .lilli.M Ii.
Results of Analysis: Analysis: conservative analysis shows This conservative ~hows that a potential flaw would not grow to maximum allowable allowaole flaw flaw before the ,13th size before 3th refueling refueling outage. 17 FENOC 17 17
Iisk-inlfurmedfEvalluhtion Risk-llllormBdEvaluation
- SNSSS estimated vendor-specific risk NSSS vendor-specific incremental core estimated incremental assessment provides risk assessment provides frequency of damage frequency core damage 3.4 E-7 of 3.4 E-7 iJ? Preliminary t, specific risk assessment plant specific Preliminary plant assessment conservatively estimates conservatively incremental core estimates incremental core damage damage frequency as frequency which is 6.7 E-6, which as 6.7 categorized as is categorized "small" per as "small" per RG 1.174.
1){SPreliminary Preliminary specific risk plant specific risk assessment assessment conservatively incremental large estimates incremental conservatively estimates early release large early release 1.0 E-8, which frequency as 1.0 frequency categorized as "very small" which is categorized 1.174. per RG 1.174. FENOC FENOC 18
*v
Summaty:
~$irA. ........ ;:e,JtQs .... c;;. . . . . t%CXt=:u:::zas::s:.:z::ae::c_ ~ ..
Reasonable Assurance There is Reasonable Assurance that Davis-Besse Davis-Besse is safe to operate operate based on deterministi.c deterministic and and assessments until the next refueling probabilistic assessments probabilistic refueling outage (March 2002) and continue on 24-month operating cycles. K!7 FENOC FENOC 19 19
RV RV HEAD HEAD INSULATION INSULATION SERVICE SERVICE STRUCTURE STRUCTU RE CRDM NOZZLES THERMOCOUPLE THERMOCOUPLE NOZZLE-NOZZLE (ONS-1 (ONS-1 ANDAND TMI-1 TMI-1 ONLY) ONLY) SUPPORT SUPPORT STEEL STEEL OR 99 ACCESS 88 OR ACCESS HOLES HOLES IN IN SERVICE SERVICE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE SUPPORT SUPPORT (ONS-i, (ONS-1. ONS-2, ONS-2. ONS-3, CR-3, ONS-3. CR~3. AND AND TMI-1 TMI-1 ONLY) ONLY) 18 18 ACCESS ACCESS OPENINGS-OPENINGS 2" 2" MIN MIN GAP GAP BETWEEN BETWEEN "MOUSE-HOLES" "MOUSE-HOLES" ALL ALL INSULATION AND INSULATION AND TOP TOP B&WOG B&WOG PLANTS PLANTS OF OF RV RV HEAD HEAD I 4 L. 20 FENOC 20
P,A7 Q2-e2D 357 357 UNITED UNITED STATESSTATES OF OF AMERICA AMERICA DOCKETED DOCKETED USNRC USNRC ( NUCLEAR NUCLEAR REGULATORY REGULATORY COMMISSIONCOMMISSION Sept(ember 9, 2009 (1 1:00am) September 9, 2009 (11 :OOam)
+ + + + + OFF-ICE OF SECRETARY OFFICE OF SECRETARY R ULEMAKINGS AND AND ADJRULEMAKINGS UDICATIONS STAFF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS (ACRS)
REACTOR SAFEGUARDS (ACRS) ADJUDICATIONS STAFF 5 487TH MEETING 487TH MEETING 6 -I-++ + +
+ + + + +
7 FRIDAY, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9,9, 2001 NOVEMBER 2001 9 + + V+E+ ++ ++M+ ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 10 ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
+ ++ + ÷+
11 + + + + + 12 12 13 13 The The conmittee committee met met at at thethe Nuclear Nuclear Regulatory Regulatory 14 1 Commission, Connnission, Two Two White White Flint Flint North, North, T2B3, T2B3, 11545 11545 15 Rockville ROckville Pike, Pike, Rockville, Rockville, Maryland, Maryland, at at 8:30 8:30 a.m., a.m., 16 1 George George E. E. Apostolakis, Apostolakis, Chairman,Chairman, presiding. presiding. 17 COMMITTEE COMMITTEE MEMBERS: MEMBERS: U.S. U.S.NRC NRC InIn rereDAVID L i r-
.18 1 GEORGE GEORGEE. E. APOSTOLAKIS, APOSTOLAKIS, Chairman Chairman DAVIDGEISEN GEISEN ./TO-=t Docket## 1A-05-052 Docket 1A-05-052 .
19 19 MARIO MARIO V. V. BONACA, BONACA, Vice Vice Chairman Chairman Da% jfo Date Marked for 10: 1~1 2 t $ m.p. 2z5 ) 20 20 NOEL F. NOEL DUDLEY, Member F. DUDLEY, Member Date Offeradin Ev: )'1.- / 'f..,2)W DateOffeudniEv_"_ (Tr.p,RzW 10(Tr. p ) Thn'Jugh WJtnessIPaneI:~~~ _ _ __ 21 F. F. PETER PETER FORD, FORD, Member A E'CT AdioR:, _~ REJEC 2 Member -D WITHDRAWN WlTlHDRAWN 22 22 THOMAS S. THOMAS KRESS, Member S. KRESS, Member /DaIa:.1.J4L.2008 err.
,2 O: ~ ) .
23 23 GRAHAM M. GRAHAM LEITCH, Member M. LEITCH, Member 21 2 DANA DANA A. A. POWERS, POWERS, Member Member 22 STEPHEN STEPHEN L. L. ROSEN, ROSEN, Member Member S14J-1661 S14J-1661 NEALR. NEAL R.GROSS GROSS COURT REPORTERSAND COURTREPORTERS ANDTRANSCRIBERS TRANSCRIBERS RHODE ISLANDAVE., 1323RHODE:ISLAND 1323 AVE., NKW. N.W. (202)234-4433 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 WASI-:IINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 wwwiealrg=oss.com www.nealrgross.com os: 0 ~ NRC014-1656 NRC014-1656
358 358 COMMITTEE MEMBERS: COMMITTEE MEMBERS: (CONT * ) (CONT.) i/" WILLIAM J.J. WILLIAM SHACK, Member SHACK, Member JOHN D. JOHN D. SIEBER, SIEBER, MemberMember 4 GRAHAM B. GRAHAM B. WALLIS, WALLIS, MemberMember 5 ACRS STAFF PRESENT: PRESENT: 6 JOHN D. JOHN D. SIEBER, SIEBER, ACRS ACRS 7 DURAISWAMY, ACRS/ACNW SAM DURAISWAMY, 8 HOWARD J. HOWARD LARSON, ACRS/ACNW J. LARSON, ACRS / ACNW 9 BAHADUR, ACRS/ACNW SHER BAHADUR, ACRS/ACNW CAROL A. HARRIS, ACRS/ACNW A. HARRIS, ACRS/ACNW
- io JOHN T. LARKINS, ACRS T. LARKINS, ACRS/ACNW
/ ACNW .12 MAGGALEAN W. WESTON MAGGALEAN WESTON 113 MEDHAT MEDHATM. M. EL ZEFTAWY 114 MICHAEL MICHAEL T. MARKLEY T. MARKLEY 15 ALSO PRESENT:
PRESENT: 116 LARRY MATHEWS MATHEWS 117 STEVEN MOFFAT STEVEN MOFFAT
"-.:. ;-1 -18 wAR'R'EN WARREN 'BANFORD ANFORD
' * .* ,19 ALLEN* H~SER ALLEN. HI-SErR,.,'., 20 ED'* HACKETT ED 'HACKE-T*T
*q .', 21 KEN ,BYIW, ,,
22 ..kTY MERRION - 2323 JACK STROSNIDER 224 RAJ PATHANIA 2525 GEISEN DAVE GEISEN* S14J-1662 S14J-1662 NEAL R.R.GROSS AND TRANSCRIBERS COURT.REPORTERS AND COURT.REPORTERS TRANSCRIBERS AVE, N.W. ISLAND AVE., RHODE ISLAND Epp 1323 RHOOE N.W. (202) 234-4433 (202) WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 WASHINGTON, www.neabgrass.corn www.nealrgross.com UI NRC014-1657 NRC014-1657
359 359 1 22 ALSO PRESENT: ALSO PRESENT: (CONT.) (CONT * ) 33 MARK REINHART MARK REINHART 4 TOM KING TOM 5 PRASAD KADAMBI N. PRASAD N. KADAMBI 6 ERIC J. ERIC J. BENNER BENNER JIM LYONS JIM LYONS McGAF:FIGAN (Comni EDWAIUJ McGAFFIGAN EDWARD ssioner) (Conunissioner) TONY ULSES STEWART BAILEY STEWART 1 14 13: 15 16 .17 18 19 2C 21 22 22 23 23 224 25 S14J-1663 S14J-1663 22f NEAL R. NEAL R.GROSS GROSS COURT REPORTERS COURT AND TRANSCRIBERS REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS ISLAND AVE.. RHODE ISLAND 1323 RHODE 1323 N.W. AVE. N:W. (202)234-4433 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C... 20005-3101 WASHINGTON, D.C 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.corn www.nealrgross.com NRC014-1658 NRC014-1658
396 396 1 visible leakage visible leakage boron boron deposit. deposit. 2 MEMBER MEMBER POWERS: POWERS: All All right.right. Thank Thank you. you. 3 MR. MR. MOFFAT: MOFFAT: Additionally, Additionally , we perform our we perform our 4 own plantplant specific specific analysis analysis that essentially would essentially would
.5 look at the end point point as as it relates to safety it relates safety factor factor 6 of 3 using using the code code we've we've discusseddiscussed previously previously and 7 have have a number number that's slightly slightly bigger bigger than than the industry a data to date as it applies i tapplies to Davis-Besse.
Davis-Besse. That That 9 number number is is 302 degree flaw as safety safety factor of 3. 3. 10 We also believe believe -- -- 11 MEMBER MEMBER FORD: Excuse me, me, physically, physically, what what 12 12 allows you to make that difference difference in in material material 13 13 properties? properties? I mean what's the -- -- 14 MR. MOFFAT: MR. MOFFAT: II'll'11 let you take that, Dave. Dave. 15 MR. MR. GEISEN: Well, Well, we had the -- the 1 analysis was done by Structural analysis Structural Integrity Associates Integrity Associates 17 and when they did their analysis analysis they were looking at at 18 the -- -- using the fracture mechanics mechanics with the noz.zles nozzles 19 and looking at our worse case nozzle nozzle in in our particular particular 20 strengths of materials what does that take us out to. 21 MEMBER FORD: MEMBER So it'sit's aa larger qualifying, 22 larger than you mentioned than who? Industry average? Industry 23 MR. MOFFAT: MR. Nominally 270 plus or minus 224 several several over over here. here. Quite aa body of information 25 yesterday, but that's the general characterization characterization NEAL NEAL R. R.GROSS S14J-1700 S14J-1.700 REPORTERS AND COURT REPoRTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE 1323 RHODE ISLAND ISLAND AVE., AVE., N.W. N.W. (202) 234-4433 (202) 2344433 WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON, D.C. D.C. 20005-3701 20005-3701 w Jwwealrgross.com www.neaJrgross.com NRC014-1695
397 397
.1 between between roughlyroughly 260 and and 272.
272. 2 MEMBER FORD: MEMBER FORD: Okay. Okay. 3 MR. MR. MOFFAT: MOFFAT: Additionally, Additionally, in in order order to to 4 look back,back, as I said previously, with a said previously, new set of of 5 eyes, eyes, assumed an initial initial flaw size size thatthat would have have
,E occurred occurred immediately immediately subsequent subsequent to our 1996 1996 7 retrospective, if retrospective, if you will,will, and believe believe that we would would 8 still still reasonable assessment have a reasonable assessment that we can proceed proceed 9 refueling outage based on that until our refueling that initial initial flaw flaw 10 size.
size. 1i And then finally the last deterministic deterministic 12 aspect I'd I'd like to go over briefly briefly is just the fact as is just as .13 13 Larry was showing, showing, we are over the three adjusted adjust~ 14 effective effective full power power years plus at Oconee Unit 3. 3. 15 Essentially, Essentially, we're at roughly 6EFPY 6 EFPY as far as the ,1 EFPY, but as adjusted EFPY, adjusted for time and temperature, temperature, we're 17 a bit a bit 3. over 3.* 18 CHAIRMAN BONACA: VICE CHAIRMAN question on the A question the 19 1998 1998 and 2000 inspections, .you inspections,' you said that they were were 20 limited. 21 MR. MOFFAT: MR. Yes sir.sir. 22 VICE CHAIRMAN BONACA: What was the extent extent 23 of the inspection? of 224 MR. MR. GEISEN: I'll I'll talk to that. What we 225 did is did is recognize recognize -- -- this is is Dave Geisen.Geisen. With Wi th regard NEALR.GROSS NEAL R. GROSS S14J-1701 S14J-1701 COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS TRANSCRIBERS RHODE ISLAND AVE~ 1323 RHODE AVE.. N.W. (202)234-4433 (202) WASHINGTON,. 2000-3701 D.C. 20005-3701 WASHINGTON, D.C. www.nealrgross.comr wwwnealrgross.com NRC014-1696 NRC014-1696
398 398 1 to to these these inspections, inspections, recognize that they recognize they were were not not 2 done looking for this done looking particular phenomenon. this particular phenomenon. They They 3 were looking for other were looking other things. things. The The two two inspections inspections 4 done in done 1998 and 2000 in 1998 2000 were really looking looking for the
- 5. impact impact of boric boric acid leakageleakage from leaky leaky flanges that that 6 we we had subsequently repaired had subsequently repaired and what what waswas the impactimpact 17 to that.
that. So the viewview thatthat we we got from those was was in in 8 many cases some of of the drives you couldn't even get a you couldn't 9 good view of. of. 110 There were many cases, cases, the camera angle angle 11i was looking upwards because because it it was looking at looking the 112 structural material structural. material of the service structure on top of service structure of 13 the head. 114 When we looked looked at a 1996 data, you got got
- 1. more of aa downward look at these nozzles because because we we 116 specifically following around a vacuum and probe were specifically probe 117 that was looking for head wastage wastage as result of the 118 boron being deposited deposited on head. So what really comes Sb comes 19 down to it the best video we have on this goes all it, ,the all 220 the way back to 1996. 1996.
221 MR. MOFFAT: MR. essentially those are some So essentially 222 of the characteristics characteristics specific to our power plant ?-s as 23 plant specific speci~ic information, as we discussed, given 2 that the body of knowledge related to this issue, what what 25 we've done is Framatone and our own engineering is using Framatone NEALMRR. GROSS NEAL S14J-1702 COURT REPORTERS COURT REPORTERS ANi:> TRANSCRIBERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE
.1323 RHODE ISlAND AVE. N.W.
ISLAND. AVE.. (202) 2344433 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 WASHINGTON. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.oom www.riealrgross.com NRC014-1697 NRC014-1697
ý P - P rs U.S. NRC In Inre NRIC re DAVID DAVIDGEISEN fLrff ~v.. ExhibIt ,_k2 I 0 **** UNITED UNITED STATES STATES Docket # 1A-OS-OS2 Date Marked GEISEN______it_
d flO' for IDii d1#- Y (Tr. p. .'SZS) 2008 (1i
-2008 . / .,,,,, NUCLEAR NUCLEAR REGULATORY COl COI Date Ma.rke . or r. p.- ..~
,~. . ,:- WASHINGTON. D.C.20m*ooc WASHINGTON. D.C. 205S-GDO Date Offered in Date Offered inEv:Ev: JidL. p. (Tr. p.j?2w 2008 (Tr. )) i -/.9~s~i25~ ~~~Q'-l ~ ~t) . <o<tCV\~ Nove,;;:er N.e , Nov~ember 27 Through 27., 27, WitnesslP-ael: 2;f. Through WrtnessJP-anel: / .
.91~0* -25*
I/i'll/I-E~ a O()f,... . ~.R. . Action:. 11 J ~ Action:"A4 AZ--.J REJECTED REJECTED WITHDRAWN () WITHDRAWN Date: ~.2008(Tr.p.~) 1/1"11/ I' \ r7 /
. _.. - -. .. \...V. Date: . !'.~~~7 a .j tiCr. I- ~SeciIon 22 2/1 , 2008 (Tr. p.
MEMORANDUM M1"MUNM*NUUMV] TO: I .U: A..nthony J.
.' Anthony j. Mendiola, Menluola, Chief, CnHeO, Section ' .
Project Project Directorate Directorate III III I I 1--L-lJ I " " ... L.;.UV CUI~UN CJIbUN .,I Division of Licensing Division Licensing ProjectProject Management Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Office Reactor Regulation Regulation FROM: Stephen sa.ndS, Stephen Sands, Project Project Directorate III Project Project Man. III Manager, Section 2
- a. ger, Section 2~.~ / r--J \: .1 Division 0' Division o' Licensing Project Project Management Management '
Office of Office of Nuclear Reactor Requlation Rer4ulation (
SUBJECT:
SUBJECT:
FORTHCOMING MEETING NITH FORTHC0MING WITH FIRSTENERGY FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY OPERATING DATE & DATE & TIME: Wednesday, November2~, Wednesday, November 28, 2001 10:00 a.m.*a.m. - 12:00 12:00 a.m. LOCATION: LOCATION: u.s. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike, Rooen Room 0-684** O-6B4"" Rockville, Maryland Rockville, Maryland PURPOSE: To discuss information To information related to supplemental supplemental information information regarding regarding inspection inspection plans and commitments for the Davis-Besse Nuclear the.Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, in response Station,Unit response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01. NRC Bulletin 2001-01. (Portions(Portions of this this
-meeting may be closed due *meeting due to discussion of Proprietarv proprietary information.)
information.) PARTICIPANTS:* PARTICIPANTS:- NRC NRC FirstEnergy FirstEnergy S. Collins Collins R. Saunders R. Saunders J. Strosnider G. G. Campbell Campbell W. Bateman W. Bateman D~ Lockwood D. Lockwood K. Wichman Wichman D. Geisen D. A. Hiser Hiser S. Moffitt S. Moffitt S. Sands Sands Docket Docket No. No. 50-346 cc: See See next page page CONTACTS: CONTACTS:. Stephen Stephen Sands, 301-415-3154 301-415"3154 Dougias Pickett, Douglas 301-415-1364 Pickett, 301-415-1364
*Meetings "Meetings betweenbetween NRC technical staff NRC technical staff and and applicants applicants .or or licensees licensees areare open open for:interested for interested members members of of the the public, public, petitioners, petitioners. intervenors, intervenors, or or other other parties parties to attend attend as as .observers observers pursuant pursuant to to Commission Commission Policy Policy Statement Statement on "Staff Meetings Meetings Open Open to thethe Public:
Public: Final Final Policy Policy Statement," Statement," 65 65 Federal Federal Register 56964, 56964, 9/20/2000. 9/2012000. However, However, portions portions of this this :meeting meeting .may may not not be be open open to 10 the the public. public. A non-proprietary non-proprietary summary summary of of the the meeting meeting will be prepared will.be prepared and and will will bebe available available. uponupon request. request.
** Stakeholders Stakeholders wishing wishing to to participate participate via via telephone telephone may m'ay call call the the bridge bridge atat (301)
(301) 231-5539 231-5539 or or (800) (800) 638-8081 638-8081 and and enter.8873# enter .8873# at at the the prompt prompt DOCKETED DOCKETED USNRC USNRC 514D-07273 S104D-07273 September September 9, 9, 2009 2009 (1l1:00am) (11 :OOam) OFFICE OFFICE OF.SECRETARY OF.SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS RULEMAKINGS AND AND ADJUDICATIONS ADJUDICATIONS STAFF STAFF 77~A~~-L A-7 6-~{~LK~NRCOO08-1 925
AM44.*****6&*"UNITED STATES
-- -'. UNITED STATES
- .. ~. ....... NUCLEAR NUCLEAR REGULATORY REGULATORY. COMMISSION COMMISSION
':. . <, WASHINGTON. WASHINGTON. D.C. O.C. 20555-0001 20555*0001 ~
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- November 27, 2001 E)CT- 0 \ - OOlo3<1 Offie oNNovembere27, 2001
'"' DEC J 3XlI MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM TO: Anthony Anthony J. Mendiola, Chief, J. Mendiola, Chief, Section 22 TOLEDO EEDISON TOLEDO S Project Directorate Project Directorate III IllLD---* N licensing Project Division of Licensing Division Project Management Management Office of Nuclear Office Reactor Regulation NuClear Reactor Regulation FROM:
FROM: Stephen Sands, Project Stephen Sands, Project Directorate Directorate IIl III Manager, Section 2 _ Project Manager, ~/~ ..r-J \: ,I Division o' Management o'~ 0' Licensing Project Management Nuclear Reactor Office of Nuclear Reclulation Reactor Rec,ulation
SUBJECT:
SUBJECT:
FORTHCOMING MEETING FORTHC0MING FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR MEETING NITH FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY OPERATING DATE & DATE & TIME: November 28, 2001 Wednesday, November2l:i,2001 Wednesday, 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 10:00 12:00 a.m. LOCATION: LOCATION: Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Commission Regulatory Commission One One White White Flint North North 11555 Rockville Pike, Room 11555 Rockville O-6B4"" Room 0-6B4** Rockville, Maryland Rockville, Maryland PURPOSE: PURPOSE: information related to supplemental To discuss information supplemental information information regarding regarding inspection plans and commitments Davis-Besse Nuclear commitments for the Davis-8esse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, in response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01.2001-01. (Portions this (Portions of this meeting may be closed due to discussion of proorietary meeting information.) proprietary information.) PARTICIPANTS:* PARTICIPANTS:' NRC FirstEnergy FirstEnergy S. Collins R. Saunders Saunders J. Strosnider Strosnider G. Campbell W. Bateman W. Bateman D. Lockwood D.Lockwood K. Wichman K. D. D. Geisen A. Hiser A. S. Moffitt Moffitt Sands S. Sands Docket No. 50-346 See next page cc: See page CONTACTS: Stephen Sands, 301-415"3154 301-415-3154 Douglas Pickett, 301-415-1364 Dougias 301-415-1364
*Meetings between 'Meetings licensees are open for interested between NRC technical staff and applicants or licensees interested members of the public, petitioners.
petitioners, intervenors, or other parties to attend as observers observers pursuant to Commission Policy Statement on "Staff Meetings Meetings Open to the Public: Final Policy Statement," 65 Federal Register 56964, 9/20/2000. However, portions of this meeting may not FederalRegister be open to the public. A oe non-proprietary summary of the meeting will be A non-proprietary be prepared prepared andand will be be available upon request.
**- Stakeholders wishing to participate via telephone m*ay may call thethe bridge at at (301)
(301) 231-5539 or (800) 638-8081 and (800) and enter 8873# 8873# at the prompt 5140-07273 S14D-07273 NRC008-1 925 NRC008-1925
Mr. Guy Guy G. G. Campbell Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Nuclear Power Power Station, Station, Unit Unit 1 Nuclear Operating FirstEnergy Nuclear FirstEnergy Operating Company Company cc: cc: Mary"E. O'Reilly Mary'E. O'Reilly Harvey Harvey B. Brugger, Supervisor Supervisor FirstEnergy FlrstEnergy Radiological Assistance Radiological Assistance Section Section 76 South Main 76 Main Street Bureau Radiation Protection Bureau of Radiation Protection 44308 Akron, OH 44308 Akron, Department of Ohio Department of Health Health P.O. Box 118 Box 118 Manager - Regulatory Manager Regulatory Affairs Affairs Columbus, OH 43266-0118 Columbus,OH 43266-0118 Nuclear Operating FirstEnergy Nuclear FirstEnergy Operating Company Company Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Nuclear Power Station O'Claire, Chief, Carol O'Claire, Radiological Branch Chief,Radiological Branch 5501 5501 North State - Route North State Route 2 Ohio Emerger. Emerger:;y Management Agency
-y Management Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760 43449-9760 2855 West West D Granville Road Alin Granville D: )lin Columbus, C t1 43235-2206 43235-2206 Jay E. Silberg, Jay Silberg, Esq.
Shaw. Pittman, Potts Shaw, Pittman, Potts Director Director and Trowbridge Trowbridge Depatment of Commerce Ohio Depa.tment Commerce 2300 N 2300 Street, NW. N Street. Division Division of Industrial Compliance Industrial Compliance Washington, DC 20037 Washington, 20037 Bureau of Operations Bureau Operations & & Maintenance Maintenance Tussing Road 6606 Tussing Road Regional Administrator Regional Administrator P.O. Box 4009 U.S. Nuclear NuClear Regulatory Commission Reynoldsburg, OH Reynoldsburg, OH 43068-9009 43068-9009 801 Warrenville RoadRoad Lisle, IL 60523-4351 lisle,IL.60523-4351 Ohio Environmental Protection Agency Ohio Environmental DERR--Compliance DERR--Compliance Unit 0 Michael A. Schoppman Michael Schoppman ATTN: A TIN: Zack A. Clayton Clayton Framatome Framatome ANP ANP p.o. 1049 P.O. Box 1049 1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525 Columbus, OH 43266-0149 Col!Jmbu5,OH 43266-0149 Rockville, MD 20852 Rockville. 20852 Ohio State of Ohio Inspector Resident Inspector Public Utilities Commission U.S, Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Regulatory Commission 180 East Broad Street
.East Broad Street North State Route 2 5503 North Columbus, OH 43266-0573 43266-0573 Oak Harbor.
Harbor, OH 43449-9760 43449-9760 Attorney General Manager Plant Manager Department of Attorney Operating Company FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating 30 East Broad Street Davis-Besse Nuclear .Station Nuclear Power .Station Columbus, OH 43216 Columbus,OH 43216 5501 North State - Route 2 43449-9760 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760 President, Board of County Of county Commissioners of Ottawa County Port Clinton, OH 43252 S144D-0727 4 5140-07274 NRC008-1926 NRC008-1926
DOCKETED USNRC USNRC kITS C-LO~
~.~re DAVID ~~~ID GEISEN U.S. NRCc September 9, 2009 (11 September 9,2009 (11:00am)
- OOam) In GEISEN 5-I- ft f- ExhibIt 8d t &1 I NRC NRC FORM 658 q(9-1999)
(9-1999) 0 FFICE OF OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND
- - - - - - - Docket # 1A-05-052 fl,~r~p.fin~ I A-c-n%
Date Marked for ID: Il/i/ V 2008 (Tr p Date Marked for ID:.L4JL. .. 2008 (fr. p....... g25 ) AlDJUDICATIONS STAFF ADJUDICATIONS STAFF Date Offered Date Offered in in Ev: Ev: JJ1f1:. , 2008
~008 (fr. (Tr. p.. 31 0 )
TRANSMmAL OF MEETING HANDOUT TRANSMITTAL HANDOUT M, Through WltneSS/Panel:'""""":""+-tJ~/:.....8 Witness/Pane:___ / ___P ___ _ __ IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN IN THE PUBlPUBL Action: _~ M REJ~~ED WITHDRAWN REJECTED WITHDRAWN Date: .J24L. , 2008(Tr, 2008 (fr. p. p.- gkV )) . This form is to be filled out (typed or hand-printed)by the person or hand-printed) announced the meeting person who announced meetiilg (i.e., the person person who issued the meeting notice). notice). The completed form, and the attached attached copy of meeting handout handout materials, will be sent to the Document materials, Document Control Control Desk on the same day of the meeting; under no meeting; under circumstances will this be done later circumstances than the working day after laterthan after the meeting. meeting. Do not include proprietary materials. include proprietary materials. DATE OF OF MEETING MEETING The attached document(s), which was/were attached document(s), handed out in this meeting, is/are to be placed was/were handed 11/28/2001 1112812001 in the public domain as soon as possible. The minutes of the meeting meeting will be issued in the the near future. Following are administrative regarding this meeting: administrative details regarding Docket Number(s) Docket 50-346 50-346 Plant/Facility Name Plant/Facility Name DAVIS-BESSE DAVIS-BESSE TAC Number(s) TAG Number(s) (if(if available) available) MB 2626 Reference Meeting NoticeNotice ADAMS NO. ML013310537 ML013310537 Purpose of Meeting Meeting (copy from meeting meeting notice) notice) information related to supplemental To discuss information supplemental information regardind inspection information inspection plans and commitments for Davis-Besse commitments Davis-Besse in response response to Bulletin 2001-01 NAME OF PERSON WHO ISSUED MEETING NOTICE NAME TITLE TITLE STEPHEN P. SANDS STEPHEN PROJECT MANAGER PROJECT MANAGER OFFICE NRR NRR DIVISION DLPM BRANCH PD 1II-2 111-2 Distribution of this form and attachments: !Docket File/Central File / M06BLIC I NRC FORM 658 658 (9-1999) (9.'999) PRINTED RECYCLED PAPER PRINTED ON RECYCLED. This form was designed designed using using InForms InForms T OL yc-c - ýf 'na--e 6S:---
NRC FORM 658 U.S. U.S. NUCLEAR NUCLEAR REGULATORY REGULATORY COMMISSION COMMISSION (9-1999) TRANSMITTAL OF MEETING HANDOUT TRANSMITTAL HANDOUT MATERIALS MATERIALS FOR FOR PLACEMENT IN IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IMMEDIATE IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN DOMAIN This form is to be filled out (typed or This orhand-printed) hand-printed) by the personperson who announced announced the meeting (i.e., (i.e., the person who issued issued the meeting notice). The completed form, attachedcopy of meeting handout form, and the attached handout materials,will be sent to the Document Control materials, Control Desk on the same day of the meeting; meeting; under under no circumstances circumstances will this this be done done later later than.the the working day afterafter the meeting. meeting. include proprietary Do not include materials. proprietary materials. DATE OF MEETING MEETING attached document(s), The attached document(s), which was/were was/were handed out in this meeting, is/are to be placed 11/28/2001 1112812001 in the public domain domain as soon as possible. The minutes of the meeting meeting will be issued in the the administrative details regarding this meeting: near future. Following are administrative Docket Number(s) 50-346 50-346 Plant/Facility Name Plant/Facility Name DAVIS-BESSE DAVIS-BESSE TAe Number(s) (if TAC (ifavailable) MB 2626 MB2626 Reference Meeting Notice Reference Notice ADAMS NO. ML013310537 ML013310537 Purpose of Meeting Meeting (copy from meeting notice) To discuss information related to supplemental information related supplemental information regardind regardind inspection plans and commitments commitments for Davis-Besse in response to Bulletin Bulletin 2001-01 NAME OF NAME OF PERSON PERSON WHOWHO ISSUED MEETING NOTICE TITLE TITLE STEPHEN STEPHEN P. P. SANDS SANDS PROJECT MANAGER PROJECT MANAGER OFFICE OFFICE NRR DIVISION DLPM BRANCH BRANCH PD 111-2 111-2 IDistribution of this form and attachments-Distribution of this form and attachments:
)ocket File/Central File )UBLIC INRC FORM 658 (9-1999)
(9*1999) PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER Th;s foon was designed using InForms This form (nForms
Igfefifs Agenda ~ Introduction/Background Introduction/Background Steve Moffitt ~ Deterministic Model Deterministic Dave Geisen ~ Probabilistic Risk Assessment Probabilistic Assessment Ken Byrd ~ Inspection Plans Inspection Plans Mark McLaughlin McLaughlin
',~' 'T:",1 :1,' I'
~ Closing Summary Steve Moffitt Moffitt FENOC I
Today'sOuicftive Todays Objective ProvideReasonable Provide Assurancethat ReasonableAssurance that Davis-Besseisissafe Davis-Besse operateuntil safetotooperate until February 16,2002*.: February16, 2002~t TION4
- oc* FENOC fENOC 2
Background:
Background:
~r NRC Bulletin 2001-01 2001-01 response provided ~z Telephone Telephone call received September 28 received on September 28 ~ Teleconference *- Teleconference on October 3 ~O Brief drop by visit on on October October 11 11 ~ October 24 Meeting with NRR Staff on October ,iý-Meeting 24 ~
i N NRR RR Staff and ACRS meetings on November and-AC.R"S &9 November 8 &
~ ,i- NRR Staff on November Meeting with NRR November 13 ~- Teleconference Teleconference November 26 on November
ýFATION 4 FENOC FENOC
'3 cELLE 6 3 -
DeterministicAspects DeterministicJAspects DBNPS's evaluation is based on visual inspectIons inspections performed performed in 10, 11,11, and 12 RFO (May 1996, April 1998, and April 2000). The inspection inspection results afford us assurance that all but 4 nozzle nozzle penetrations were inspected in 1996, all but 19 inspected penetrations inspected in penetrations inspected 1998, and all but 24 penetrations inspected in 2000. nozzle population is those nozzles The limiting nozzle nozzles that could not inspected in 1998 be inspected 1998 or 2000. It is conservatively It conservatively assumed assumed that for these penetrations, penetrations, an axial through-weld through-weld flaw oCGurs occurs immediately immediately upon startup from from 10 RFO (May 1996).1996). FENOC 4
ILniIalFlnwSize lo/lial Flaw Size Initial flaw depth of 0.5 mm, 172 17200 around the the nozzle, is assumed assumed to exist immediately immediately upon achieving achieving a full penetration penetration axial axial flaw. BASIS: BASIS: i This is a conservative i:.l conservative flaw initiation site size.
- ItIt is further conservatively i:.l conservatively assumed that multiple starting flaws could exist and that these would eventually eventually link together.
i It is conservative i:.l th~tby conservative in that by assuming this starting point, wewe assuming that wehave also are assuming we ""have already already had several years of flaw propagation propagation axially through the Alloy 182 weld material. material.
% *FENOC FENOC 5
Use ol Nso ofModified ModiHed Scoff Seon ModelModel Modified Scott The Modified Model is still deemed Scott Model credible as deemed credible as mean curve for crack growth a mean growth rates. i:l Data received received to date negate the curve. date does not negate curves have been Numerous curves i:l- Numerous developed and to aa certain been developed degree, they all rest on engineering degree, engineering judgement. ii:l The data from OTSGs for Alloy 600 is relevant Alloy 600 relevant for developing developing the CGR conservative in that the Alloy CGR curves and in fact is conservative Alloy are still relevant .and properties are properties and because cold-working of the because any cold-working the tubes at the tube support sneet would increase support sheet increase the failure rate 600, will make non-worked Alloy 600; over non-worked make this conservative. /_P FENOC FENOC 6
Iisk-Ilnformed Risk-InformedEvaliiationlEvaluation i:lSDavis-Besse provides a~ bounding assessment provides Davis-Besse risk assessment bounding estimation of risk. Bounding estimation conservative assumptions Bounding or conservative assumptions were were used used to to resolve uncertainties. uncertainties. i:l Studies of sensitivitywas i" Studies sensitivity was performed significant performed for all significant parameters. parameters. i:l indicate incremental ir Results indicate would* be bounded incremental CDF would bounded in the "small" category'and expected to be "very small" categol)rand expected per RG 1.174. Incremental LERF and Public health risk is expected
- i){ Incremental expected to be negligible.
negligible. TION4
- ý,,?7 FENOC 7T7 FENOC. =-
7
Risk-InformeduEvaluation Risk-Informedlvaluation Nozzle leak IenkFreguency Frequency The Davis-Besse Davis-Besse plant specificspecific PSA has used u~ed the method method Framatome analysis which from the generic Framatome which applies a constant leak initiation frequency. i The constant i:l constant rate over predicts the number of leaks in in early cycles. ',"'",' .','0' i:lr Impact Impact of inspection inspection on conditional probability of a conditional probability leak at at a future date is not quantified. quantified. FENOC FENOC 8 ' . . : , _ ...... r ( .;;::-....
Risk-informed Risk-InformedEvalualion Evaluiation Nozzle leak Noole LakFrequ~ency Frequency Other approaches approaches have assumed that the onset of leakage leakage can be approximated approximated by a two parameter parameter Weibull cumulate probability cumulate probability distribution.
~ *-The The Davis-Besse risk assessment Davis-Besse assessment was modified to apply a Weibull WeibuJi distribution.
distribution. ~Studies
*Studies were perforrned performped to investigate investigate the sensitivity to to the Weibull scale and shape parameters.
~i-The The conditional conditional probability of a leak by a future date date given no leak now can be calculated calculated if a nozzle nozzle has been leakage detected. inspected and no leakage FENOC FENOC 9
Risk-InformodEvalualion NozzlueLek Nozzle leakFreguenlcy Ilequency Leaks for various Predicted Leaks Predicted Weibull Leak various Weibull Initiation Models Leak Initiation Models Expected Number Expected Number of Leaking Leakine CRDM Nozzles Nozzles Davis- EPRlMRP EPRI MRP Davis-Davis- Davis- Upper Davis- Besse Median Median EPRlMRP EPRI MRP Shape Shape Besse Besse Davis- Besse Upper Besse EFPY (95%) Refueline Refueling Besse EFPY (95%) Projection Projection WeibuU Weibull Parameter Parameter EFPY Corrected Projection Outaee Outage EFPY Corrected Projection I.S Shape 1.5 Shape Model Model Modified Modified to 600F 1.5 Shape 1.5 Shape Parameter Projection Parameter Pro.iection Scale Scale Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter to 10 10.56 10.56 12.91 12.91 5.0 1.0 1.0 9.5xl0- s 9.5x10o- 0.02 0.02 11 II 12.33 15.07 6.3 6.3 13 1.3 1.7xlO-33 1.7x10- 0.36 0.36 2 12 14.06 17.18 7.6 1.6 1.9xlO-1.9x10- 4.00 4.00 13
-13 15.81 19.32 19.32 8.9 8.9 1.9 1.9 0.17 28.3 - 16.37 16.37 20.00 20.00 9.3 2.0 0.32 43.7 FENOC I0 10
Is-Iiformed Risk-Informed iEIvalualio Evalualion Past/InspICft/ons Pas/lnspec/ions i:r Inspections Inspections were were assumed assumed to havehave aa failure failure probability probability ofof 1.00 1.00 if boron boron inhibited inhibited detection detection ofof nozzle nozzle leakage. leakage.
~r Inspections Inspections were were assumed assumed to havehave aa failure failure probability probability ofof 0.05'if no boron 0.05.)([19 boron was was present. ~r Sensitivities Sensitivities were were performed performed to to investigate investigate the the effect effect of of various various leakage leakage detection detection probabilities.
probabilities. 4CE'1'r% U.401o , FENOC FENOC 11
Risk-Informed Risk-IuformedEvaluation Ivalualion Probabi/hityOf Circumf ~erent/iuCracking ProbabilityofCircumferential Cracking -2r Evidence i:l Evidence from recent B& B&W inspections W plant inspections indicated that not all axial cracks has indicated have cracks have resulted in initiation of ofcircumferential circumferential cracking. cracking.
*- B&W plants have experienced i:l experienced 27 axial cracks cracks and 6 circumferential circumferential cracks.
i:lSProbability initiation of a circumferential Probability of the 'initiation crack is estimated estimated to be 0.22 based on B&W B&W evidence. OC FENOC FENOC 12
Iisk-luformedEvuliuatio Risk-Informed Evaluation Noole Failure Nozzle FailufeProbability ProliabliAY
~r Probability of CRDM nozzle failure is determined by performing a Monte determined Monte Carlo Carlo simulation on the Scott deterministic deterministic crack growth model.*
model. 7~ Conservative.:or assumptions were Conservative or bounding assumptions were used when data Wa's"tiot .used wags*not available. ~ Studies were performed performed to investigate investigate the the sensitivity to all significant significant inputs. FENOC FENOC 13
,I.,J
Risk-Informed Risk-IiformedfEvaluationvalufaion Noole Nozzle Failure FailureProbability Proljauiift--Consel1lative Assumptions Conservative Assumplitns ~SInitial Initial crack size - Applied a uniform distribution from 0-180 degrees. ~ f Stress Profile - Uses the worst case stresses. ~*" Crack Growth _Rate Coefficient - Applies crack growth rate coefficient-from coefficient from heat 69. kTJON4
" ' _ . C 4 ~ v1 FENOC 14 14
Iisk-lIf ormedEvalufation Risk-Informed Evalualion FailureProbablutVY-NooleFailure Nozzle SCnsitflity Su ProbabilitY -SensitivitY ries Studies f~ Initial crack size Initial crack size i:lr Initial crack depth... Initial crack depth . . i~ Temperature Temperature ir Stress Profile
~ Stress Profile FETIOC Crack Growth n~ Crack Rate Coefficient Growth Rate Coefficient 41LI- =11%FENOC FENOC kCELLO G 15 15 -- . ~
Risk-Informedlvaluation i~sk-~lnformneIEvauIatiuo Conditional COle Damage/Release CoonlitioalCore M/mage leelasse PlobabililY IBM=ia uiItV
~ Davis-Besse "i- Davis-Besse conditional conditional core damage damage probability probability for aa 0.1 ft2 medium LOCA 3 0.1 ft2 is 2.7 x 10-10-3.. ~
n Conditional Conditional large-large- early early release probability probability for aa medium LOCA is about about 4.0 x 10- 6 10-6..
~ The conditional. *" cor,e.,.q~mage conditional core,,, amage probability probability for this this analysis analysis is less less than applied in the PSA because because the the medium LOCA LOCA range range in the PSA is 0.02 ft ft2 -- 0.5 ftft2.
2 2. RATION FENOC FENOC 16 IV
IiSk-lfurmedfvaliiafiui Risk-Infolmed [valuation Results Results Upper (95%) EPRI MRP EPRIMRP Constant Initiation Initiation Projection Projection Shape Parameter Parameter Frequency Frequency 1.5 Shape Modified Modified Scale Scale Parameter Parameter Parameter Best Best Best Best Bounding Bounding Bounding Bounding Bounding Bounding Estimate
. Estimate Estimate CDF 1.8 E-6 9.9 E-8 1.1 E-6 6.3 E-8 3.3 E-7 1.9 E-8 LERF 2.6E-9 2.6 E-9 1.5E-10 1.5 E-I0 1.7E-9 1.7 E-9 9.4E-11 9.4 E-ll 4.9E-10 4.9 E-lO 2.8E-1I 2.8 E-11 Person REM 0.16 9.2 E-3 .11 .Il 5.9E-3 5.9 E-3 3.1 E-2 1.7 E-3 1.7 FENOC FENOC 17
Iisk-IiformedfEvaluiation Risk-Informlld Evaluation Unique Aspects ofDavis-Besse Ufniuuelspects RiskAssessment Olavis-BesseIiskAssessmenI
*- Inspection Information 'tf Inspection Information - Davis-Besse Davis-Besse inspections do do not indicate evidence evidence a nozzle nozzle leaks. ~- Information - 64 of 69 Davis-Besse Material Heat Information Davis-Besse nozzle material heats have no history of axial or circumferential circumferential leaks at other plants. ',1 " ."'~ *.' 11:".~ .
ATIOAv EWP * ,- FEN O C FENOC 18
,IL,*
Risk-inf Risk-Infolmod ormedfvIIiuationIvaluation Conclusions CORiCIMPHSi1$ ii:.f CDF CDF -- The The plant specific risk plant specific risk assessment assessment conservatively conservatively estimates a bounding- incremental core damage frequency estimates a bounding- incremental core damage frequency to to be in be in the range which the range which is categorized as is categorized as "small" "smafl" per RG 1.174. per RG 1.174. The The actual incremental core actual incremental damage frequency core damage frequency would would bebe categorized categorized as as "very small" per RG smal!""per RG 1.174.1.174. it tl LERF LERF -- The The plant plant specific specific risk risk assessment assessment conservatively conservatively estimates a bounding incremental large early estimates a bounding i_':l~.f~!!1ental large early release release frequency which frequency which is categorized as is categorized as "very "very small" small" per RG 1.174. per RG 1.174. The actual incremental release frequency The actual incremental release frequency i~,negligible.i.s negligible. ttPublic Health Risk - The plant specific risk person rem per tl Public Health Risk - The plant specific risk person rem per year year is is negligible. negligible. TION. c"% FENOC FENOC ,. *,e 19 19 --- 1._-.-.-,_Z
Inspection IiispectioiiPlans Plans 13RFO:
, 13RFO:
iX
~ 1000/0 i- 100% qualified visual 1:l100%)
100% NDE NDE
~*- characterization if found.
Flaw characterization
~*- Data will be made available for industry use.
iXA- Vessel HeadHead Replacement available Replacement at first available opportunity RATIO 4 e F~MFENOC. FENOC 20 K
Davis-Besse lavis-ResseSpecific Specific Features andActions asodActios
-Record of inspection ilRecord inspection from last three outages.
i-Only B&W ttOnly B&W plant with a plant with a continuous continuous head head vent vent which which provides high confidence confidence in temperature measurements. temperature measurements. iýReduce reactor vessel head temperature ilReduce 605OF to temperature from 605°F 598 0 F. 598°F. 7Additional il Additional training for Operators iss~~s raised in Operators on issues Bulletin 2001-01. 2001-01.
,Maximize availability of redundant i!Maximize redundant critical safety systems. ~tRATJON CRs ~) Scope reductions reductions @@ T-9 r-9 && T-6 );>P Additional FIN FIN team supervisors ý );0 Additional shop scheduling Additional coordinator positions scheduling coordinator Challenga C.halh~nge of an Ir:ldetenninate Indeterminate RFO Schedule Schedule to Outage Management Vlanagement Effectiveness EffectivenE:ss ** Expedited Expedited new fuel delivery schedule schedule " Balancing
- Balancing budgets, cost, and schedule risks in determining determining when needed parts will be be ordered ordewd
** Revised Revised background background check process process implications implications ** Shrinking Shrinking number "N" "N" stamp vendors & commercial commercial grade dedication dedication
- Development Development of of revised radiation worker training practical practical factor curriculum curriculum Discussion summary rid actions:
Mr- Bergendahl Mr. Bergendahl indicated that the reason site management management selected Work Management Management as the focus tocus area forfbr this CNRB meeting was their concern concern for why we're in such a reactionary reactionary mode to emergent emergent issues. Mr. Campbell Mr. Campbell indicated that as the FENOe FENOC sponsor sponsor of Work Management Management he was surprized and embarrassed embarrassed that we are not using Change Change Management Management more effectively effectively and management and management clearly clearly needs to be more intrusive and define define what "good" "good'" is and monitor monitor performance for perfi>rmance meeting expectations. He thanked for meeting thanked the membership membership for their observations. Operate Plant/Training (On Operate the Plantlfraining (OT) Mr. Kane repol1ed Mr. reported on the OT Subcommittee Subcommittee review. The following Subcommittee Subcommittee presented. A discussion summary is presented at the end of the section. observations were pre!;ented. Focus Work focus Work Management Management (Mr. Kane's field notes are included included in Attachment Attachment A) A)
- Roll up of interviews Roll observations interviews and observations
-- There are communication There are communication problems problems -- There are perceived There are perceived teamwork problems - Implementation Implementation of the process ineffective 5 FEDB. 000011 FEDB* 000011 DOJ003-000562 DOJ003-000562
ComPany Nuclear Comp:omy Revi,~w Board Nuclear' Review Mc{:ting November 29, 2001 Meeting Date November
-- Not Nul capturing capturing work management management failures -- Planning & & scheduling scheduling of work not integrated ** Considerations Considerations - Need analysis/d~lta-resist analysis/dnta-resist quick fixes t.ixes - Dowment Document accountability accountability for all schedule schedule changes - Staff FIN with parts, Radiation Protection Protection (RP),
(RP). && Opcrationss frolks Ifolks
- ImplemenC Implement short cycle scheduling tool for low eM CM BfLB/L plants - Move to all Work Work Week Week Manager (WWM) being being active SRO and man Work Control O~nter Contr'ul Center (WCC)
(WCC) on their work week days
- CrAftCraft resources resources removed with no regard regard to getting work done; training commitment commitment time must be integrated integrated with work schedule-tail is wagging the dog - Every Every work management management meeting meeting should document negative em!cts effects on on schedule schedule --- Priority Priority orof work is driven by personality; personality; everything everything can't be of equalequnl importance importanfe - Need Need to move to where we plan work before we schedule, insure System Health work is done, and risk of aggregate B/L is evaluated-improve H{~alth evaluated-improve, material material condition condition -- Tagging Tagging staff understaffed-need understaffed-need electrical electrical and I&C tagging research aid; packages late Q.perate Q.ru;rate the Plant.'Training Subcommittee Observations Plant/Training Subcommittee
- Management
- l\.lanagement
-- Resource Resource reductions reductions are perceived perceived to be adversel,y adverselly affecting performance in affecting performanct: in chemistry, training, and operations -. Repeated Repeated Tagging Taggi.ng Program failures demand management attention-cormnon management attention-common process weaknesses process weaknesses suggested by interviews Operations
.' Operations Equipment Equipment issues are EDG air start system, RPS couch relay failur<:s, failures, & AFW
& AFW MOV BTI!aken.
MOV Breakers
-- Staffing plan suggests adequate adequate SROs 4s #5 in 2003 -- Several openings requiring over time coverage Procedure changes -- Procedure changes are being done on shift
..* Chemistry
-- Equipment issues are condenser inleakage, fuel failures, MIU M/U water syst.em, system, MSDD skid inadequate, inadequate, RE4597 (Containment RMS) TIM T/M operations operations RE4597 operating operating w/o wlo charcoal canister-question if grab samples required to charcoal canister-question source term during unmonitored release provide source releasl!
- Training training
-- Consider Consider using water plant as a training lab after MiU MIU water modification is water modUfication installed installeeJI with witb budget cut of new lab building building 6 FEDB-000012 FEDB- 0000 12 DOJ003-00056-3 DOJ003-000563
Comp;:my Nuclear Company Nuclear' Review Review Board Board Mecting MedingDate Date November November 29, 29,2001 2001
-- Management Management involved involved inin observations, observations, teaching, teaching, CRCs, CRCs, STCSIC -- Management not responding to resource needs Management not responding to resource needs forinstructional for instructionalneeds needs like like FITS FITS mod mod
- Tour/Cbservations Tour/Observations Turbine TurbineBuilding Buildinghousekeeping housekeepingmuch much improved improved
- - , Radiological Radiological Restricted Area (RRA) access Restricted Area (RRA) accessarea area very very professional professional -._. Work areas in Personnel Shop Facility Work area~, in Personnel Shop Facility improved improved -- Control Control room roomcommunications communicationsprofessional professional -.-. RRA RRA and andEDG EDG #1 I housekeeping housekeeping improved; improved;leaksleaksnoted noted ononEDG EDGfuel fuel filters filters Noted some labeling problems on tanks -, Noted some labeling problems on tanks & breakers & breakers Discu;sior. summary and actions:
ItItwas wa:~ suggested suggested thatthat Mr. Mr. Steve Steve Moffitt Moffitt follow follow up up on 011 aa Temporary Temporary Modification Modification on on Containment Containment MonitoringMonitor'il1lg in in light light of of the the Reactor Reactor HeadHead Control Control Rod Rod Drive Drh'e nozzle nozzle cracking issue cracking llssue and and possible possibJeleakage. leakage. Mr. Bergendahl took Mr.IBergendahl took an an action action to to look look atlit developing developing guidance guidance for for Opeirators OpeJ:-ators toto recognize Reactor recognize ReactorVessel Vessel Head Head and and Steam Steam Generator Generatortube tubeleakage leakage telltales telltalesand :tnd their their potential implications. (Action - DH pot'~[ltial implications. (Action- DB 11/29/01-01) 11f29/01-01) Mr. Mr. KandaKanda tooktookan an administrative administrative action action toto ensure ensure that that the theTuesday's Tuesday's PlantPlant Status Status presentations presf'ntations include include the the identification identification of of plant plant challenges challenges to to safety safety for for CNRB CNRB probing. probing. Contiauration ConiigurMion Control/Equipment C;ontrol!EguipmentReliabilityReliability(CMi (eM) Mr. Mr. jackJack Martin Martin reported reported on onthe the CM eM Subcommittee Subcommittee reviewreview results. results. Mr. Mr. Tim TimRausch Rausch and and Ms Ms Jeannie Jeannie Rinckel Rincke! participated participated inin the the presentation. presentation The The following following Subcommittee Subwmmittee obser-vations observationswere wef1~presented. presented. AA discussion discussionsummary summaryisis presented presentedatat the the end end of the section. oftlle section_ Work WorkManagement Managem~nt 1.1. Over Overthe thelast lastyear yearthe the System SystemHealth HealthReports Reports(SHR) (SHR)havehavebeen beenupgraded upgradedtoto identify identify what work items are needed to be completed to resolve
\,,,hat work items are needed to be completed to resolve problemswith problems withsystems systemsin in ,"red" or in "yellow" status. These items together with the operator concerns are the "red" or in "yellow" status. These items together with the operator concem; are the ones (mes most most aflecting affectingsystem systemand and plant plantreliability.
reliability. The Theintent intenthas hasbeen beento togive give these these items particular visibility and priority in the work management system. items particular visibility and priority in the work management system. This has not This has not worked workedout outasaswell wellasashoped. hoped. For Forexample, example,for for2Q01, 2QOI,41 41 of 64 critical of64 criticalwork workitemsitems were were scheduled scheduled and and only only 3232actually actuallycompleted. completed. For For3Q0 3Q01,1, 50 50of 70 critical of70 criticalwork work items were scheduled but only 22 completed. Two CRs have items were scheduled but only 22 completed. Two eRs have been written onthis been written on this inatter. matter. 77 FEDB- 000013 FEDB~000013 DOJ003-000564 DOJ003-000564
Cornpnny Company NuclearNuclear Review Review Board Board Meeting Meeting Date Date November November 29, 2001 29,2001 This This situation situation needs needs close close attention attention by by the the production pmd'(Jction managers managers (production (production team). Each of these work items should team). Each of these work items should be revi4!wed and its be reviewed and its status status assessed. assessed. Priority Priority should should be be given given toto planning planning all all of of these these jobs, jobs, identifying identifying all all restraints fe!straints and and resolving resolving items. items. The The status status of of these these critical critical SHR SHR itemsitems together together with with operator concerns should be reviewed weekly by operator concerns should he reviewed weekly by the production team until the production team until itit is is under under management manag(':ment control.control.
- 22. ItIt would would appear appear that that aa large large backlog backlog of of engineering engineering work work will will be be needed needed to to support support mainterance work that has accumulated. I was unable mainterance work that has accumulated. I was unable to get a clear idea of howto get a clear idea of how much much workweek work has been impacted, however, this situation workweek work has been impacted, however, this situation needs resolution. II have needs resolution. have several several suggestions suggestions that that have have proven proven effective effective at at other other sites.
"* AllAll engineering enginel~ring work work requests requests should sbould be be screened screened by by aa multi-discipli.ary multi-disdplinary committee committee to to ensure ensure the the work work isis really really needed needed and and whether whether aa non- nOI1-engineering solution might be more engineering solution might be more appropriate. appropriate. "* AllAll new new work work should should be be initially initially planned planned within within 30 30 days days and and engineering engineet"iog and and long lead parts identified. Not planning the work long lead I)arts identified. Not planning the work until the workweel, processuntil the workweek process starts starts isis not n~)t aa success success path.
p:lth. We We need need to to schedule schedVlle already already planned planned work work not not vice vice versa. versa.
" Avoid Avoid engineering engineering work worl{ that that is is not not needed.
needed!. As As during during CycleCycle 12, 12, considerable considerable engineering effort went into Cycle 13 MODs engincerirng effort went into Cycle 13 MODs that will not be done. that will not be done. It It would would appear appear th th at at about about 30 30 MODs MODs were were designed designed yet yet will will not not be be installed. installed. This This was was despite a CNRIB discussion and agreement that despite a CNRB discussion and agreement that this situation would be this situation would be avoided. avoided. This This hashas aa further fUJ'ther negative negative downside downsidf! on on morale morale in in the the engineering engineering groups. gr*()ups.
- Better Bdter management m~lnagemelI1t and and screening screening of of the the engineering ellgineering workloadworkload to to those those items items genuinely genuinely needed needed to to support support the the station station cancan likely Iillcely improve improve productivity producti'vity and and create a desire to work create a desire 'Work longer hours.longer hours.
- The The newnew Rapid Rapid Response Response Team Team in in engineering engineering will will likely likely be be most most helpful belpful ifif the the above abovli: items items are ate addressed.
addressed. II will will put put Glenn Glelln McIntyre McIntyre in in touch touch withwith thethe supervision of a successful effort su pervision of a successful effort at PSE&G at PSE&G 3.
- 3. The production team Thel.roduction te:am meeting meeting needs needs to to be be accountability accoullitability forum forum to to deal deal with with work that leaks out of the schedule after T-12.
work that leltks out ofthe schedule after T-12. Work management: needs Work management needs to to generate geoel'ate the data data to make make this this meaningful. meaningful. 4.
- 4. The.Theequipment equipment reliability reliability program program is is now now starting starting to to develop develop and and apply apply thethe equipment
(~uipment reliability templates to our major systems and components. reliability template~; to our major systems and components. This is starting to This is starting to result result in in changes changes needed needed to to the the PMs. PMs. Based Based on on experience experience at at other other plants plants this this will, willbebe aa large large and End unanticipated unanticipated workload workload on on the the planning planning organization organization for for aa number number of of years years toto 8 FEDB. 0000 14 8 FEDB_ 000014 DOJ003-000565 DOJ003-000565
Company Nuclear]Nuclear ReviewReview Board Meeting Date November 29, 2001 Meding core. lI unde.-stand corne. understand that that the the planners are already overloaded and an~ are resisting planning the F'M planning PM changes changes that have been submitted in in aa timely manner. This Trhis needs to needs to be as!iesse
- program, program, and and so'ftware so~ftware areas.
- Q QA CA Audit Audit Organization Organization and and Auditing Auditing Developments Developments
- Recert Audits/Surveillances Recert Audits/Surveillances
- Self-Assessments Self-Assessments
- Emergency Emergency Preparedness Preparedne:ss Activities Activities
- Staticn Trending/Self-Evaluation Station Trending/Self-Evaluation
- Corrective Corrective Action Ac:tion Program Program
- Regulatory Performance Regulatory PerformanGe quality**ssessment Audýt Program The Thc~ Subcommittee Subcommittee reviewed reviewed the the current current staffing staffing of ofthe the group group and and the the current current status status of ofthe the 200 1 audit plan and plans for 2002. It was noted that in 2001 audit plan and plans for 2002. It was noted that in 2002 the group would be2002 the group would be implementing impll~menting aa continuous continuous audit audit strategy.
- A-idits AJdits and and surveillances sUiveillances are are detailed detailed and and ofofgood good quality.
- Self-Assessments Self-Assessments seem seem to to be be using using moremore benchmarking.
- een as c.a strength.
- here is a FENOC FENOC commoncommon process safety tagging procedure procedure and that the station
- agging procedure
- agging procedure has has been been altered altered to support support the IENOC FENOC procedure. It is not clear clear
- hat this relationship rela.tionship between common process procedures proc.edures and site specific sp(;:cific guidelines is consistent with management IS management expectations.
- he review process
- he review process under the under the new new program.
- Power Level Power ltvel== 100 100 percent percent 38 Days DilYS cn on Lin-Line
- " Capacity Factor Capacity Factor Cycle - 99.91 percent Cycle percent Year-to-Date Year-to-Date (YTD) percent (YTD) - 99.50 percent
- lIfuel uel Reiiability Reliability We crossed crossed -our our action level 1 in early April and ReactorReactor Coolant activity activity trended up tLntil crossed action level 2 in late September. The Iodine 131 activity has been l.ntil we crossed hovering hoveling just. just below Action Action level 2 since our October down power.
- iperating History Operating History The Th~ Plant has run Plant has run atat 100 100 percent per,:;ent power power for for the the cycle cycle except except forfor short short reductions reductions forfor Main l\1",in Turbine valve testing and condenser cleaning. The plant was also off Turbine valve testing and condenser cleaning. The plant was also offline line for for aa total total of of20 hours inin October 20 hours October during during aa short short outage outage for Turbine Stator for Turbine Stator Cooling CoolingWater Water s':niner cleaning and Condenser tube leak repair. Sodium levels on the secondary side srainer cleaning and Condenser tube leak repair. Sodium levels on the secondary side remain remain high indicating that high indicating there isis still that there still aa leak.
- II Pant P: ant and ar1d NRC NRC Performance Perf.Jrnlance Indicators Indicators
- Licensee Licensee Event Event Reports Reports (LElRs)
- MRC Notice NRC Notice of ofViolations Violations (NOVs)
- . Organizational Effectiveness in Resolving Safety in Resolving Safety Tagging Tagging and and WorkWork Maiagement Ma'lagement
- unently, Beaver Valley detcr-table fuel defects.
- .. completed Audits compl,eted
- nitiated LAR -- 01-0008 - The IAR -*0)-0008 rhe proposed changes delete the action of either either: reducing core thermal reducing cart:
- <II Perform va:idationvalidation and verifica':ion verififca'ion of Policy and obtainobtain VP approval for use a: Perry
- '. De Develop
- C(~J1i\2iUJ..YJ*1 od!~
- .. R.anked Ra'lkcd Davis-l3esse Davis-Besseasas 7th outof 7thout of6969 plant!,
- 6-(61': actual actual EFPY away flom Oconee33but EFPY away fiom Gconee but3.13.1 EFPY EFPY awayaway after afternormalizing nonnalizingon 011head head ter-Aperatures ter'1peratures down downto to600 600 degrees.
- 19 Re-reviewed Re-revitwed.video VIdeo irisl)(ctions insp(:ctions of ofhead head inin light lightofof boron boron leakage leakageseen seen atatOcon.ee
- 110 Ccmmitted.
- e1mL:_ULe~tfu;_ Det ~:rmini:ili~ Asp(~1S
- Failure Definition F::ilure Definition Lt:akage Detection
- Heat 6), Case
- .. This 1:1is isisaaconsei conservativevative flaw flaw initiation initiationsite site size.
- ~ ItIt i;i:; further conservatively assumed further conservatively assumed that multiple that multiplestarting startingflaws flawscould could exist exist and and that that the~e would eventuall.y the;e would eventually link together. link together.
- .. Nu merous ;urves havebeen Numeroljs~ur\es have been developed developed and and toto aacertair.
- 20 additional 3 1:~ Me:an* 20 additiomJ months. months.
- )pemte outage (March 2002).
- o[ow;:
- 1. The
- 1. rhe subcommittee has performed perfomle:d an assessment assessment of the effectiveness effectiveness of the the: QA QA Program tc tc ensure en~ure that it it: meets the NR&R NR&R Program, regulatory, and and FENGe FENOC recluirements by reviewing the QA audits and surveillances requirements surveillances performed for this this 34 FEDB- 000040 34 FEDB- 000040 DOJ003-000591
- \1.-. Kane's F,eld Feld notes fr-om f,-om Work Mafiageinent IlIsses:;ment:
- \l;;nager -with manager outage management OUUtgc management
- Need
- Very g())d
- ~y Plant St;itus Stltus . 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 +
- ~ CNO 3 faled. :o look at head penetration issue, staff awareness O*mB fa.led. :0 lo*)k a1 head penetration issU(:, staff awarene~;s sllould aaleak should leak occur occur w/conseqnences w/conseqnences 4<I- CN013 f(l ilc(~ o'0 address Cj*mB failec adjress clle:etive c:)lle:;tive rsk nsk fromn frolll RCS leakage, S/G RCS leakage, S/G tube tubelcak leak potential, potential, RCS Activity, Fuel RCS Activity, Fuel Failires Fail .Ires
- )fthe basic bas.i: process proGess and and howhow itit isis designed designed to[0 work.
- -4> Parficiparion of all WK Directors or their representatives Pa rlicipa*.ioIl of all WK Director, or their representatives ill W.I. in WM Subconmiftee Subcommittee provided provided significani signiIicalll bcnefit bendi1 toto DB DB staff.
- SuveiJance Surveil lance SR-00-RPRWP-01 SR-OO-RPRWP-Ol
- Self-A ssessment Repcrt Report Critique Dated 4/3/01
- Audit AR-O II AR-01-FLREP-01 l-FlREP-O 1 II Suveillance SR-01-MAINT-01 Surveillance SR-Ol-1Vl!AINT-Ol
- Strveillance II Slrveillance SR-01-ENGRG-04 SR-OI-ENGRG*04 Transtr ittal Date = July 12 ,_2001 Transmittal Number = DBCNRB 01-0050 DBCNRB 01-0060
- Condition Rep0I1s:
- Monthly
- \IIclnthly Quality Reporl Rep0l1 '" September
- Quality Trend Report Report"-- 3'd 3 Quarter Qu arter R[W UIRED .R.I!:Vl~W REQIIIR~D REVIEW FOR OP SUBCOMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE
- Suriveillance :.R-.01-TRAJN-02 SL:lveiliance SR-O 1-TRAlN-02
- Station Revi{:w Boare! meeting minutes 3188 - 3201 3201 Transnii:tal Daate =S eptember 13 2,)01 Number -=ý DBCNRB Transmittal Nlmber 01-(0073 DBCNRB 01-0073
- 1. Did you review the contents of Docket 50-346, Serial 2731, dated September 4,2001 4, 2001 ADJUDICATIONS STAFF before it was issued?
- 2. How much time were you given to review the letter?
- 3. Why were you to review the letter?
- 4. Did you find any inconsistencies inaccuracies in the letter?
- 5. How did you confirm Not asked confinn accuracy?
- 6. On page 2, what in your mind was meant by the phrase that the "inspection "inspection was to inspect the bare metal RPV head bare metalRPV that was accessible?"
- 7. Were
- 7. you aware Were you aware that there was that there was boric boric acid on the head impeding impeding a complete complete inspection inspection of of the RPV head? (If RPV head? (Ifso so did can can you quantify it? Did you tell anyone?)
- 8. Was the boric acid on the head limiting accessibility accessibility to a bare bare metal inspection?
- 9. The question requirement requirement satisfied satisfied in your mind at the time?
- 10. Also on page 2, it states the head was inspected in accordance NG-EN-00324.
- 12. Was the procedure complied with relative to the head?
- 13. (If not. accordance with procedure NG-EN-00324?)
- 14. (If not, was DBNPS in confonnance with GL 88-05?)
- 15. What NG-EN-00324 say does NG-EN-00324 What does possible cause say is a possible cause of red-brown boric acid?
- 16. Was there red-brown
- 16. Was boric acid on red-brown boric on the head?
- 17. On page 3, 3, the letter discusses that no visible evidence of visible evidence nozzle leakage of nozzle leakage was evidence nozzle leakage?
- 18. Could you detect evidence
- 18. accumulated?
- 19. Were you ever concerned head?
- 20. (If so, how Not asked referenced that occurred
- 21. Were you involved in the videotape review referenced
- 21. May 2001 occurred after May re-confirm indications to re-confirm and ANO- 1?
- 22. (If so, what was the criteria? Pictures or tapes? Descriptions?)
- 23. (If so, who else?)
- 24. (If (If so, any concern about what any concern could be the cause of the boric what could boric acid on the the head?)
- 25. (If so, would characterize the boric would you characterize head as significant?)
- 26. On page 4, the letter-states thatDBNPS identified either DBNPS had not previously identified either leakage leakage ot cracking from or cracking adequately answer the question from its nozzles. Did this adequately presented was question presented was if DB had experienced either previously experienced had previously leakage from or cracking either leakage VHP nozzles?
- 27. On page 18 there is a CRDM inspection chart Does this flow chart performing CRDM inspections at DBNS?
- 28. In reviewing obscured nozzles?
- 29. Why weren't the obscured noziles nozzles talked about in the letter?
- 30. Did you review the October 17 2735)?
- 1. On page 1, 331. I, the wording again states "did identify." Does this mean there could "did not identify." could have been leakage, but it just wasn't identified?
- 32. (if concern you?)
- 33. The text areas that could be be inspected. What did this mean to you?
- 34. It says video-tapes video-tapes had be re-reviewed. Do you participate in this review?
- 35. On page 2 it states that whole head visual inspections inspections of the RPV head was performed performed in IORFO, lORFO, IIRFO, 1IRFO, and arid 12 RFO. What What does whole head inspection inspection mean to you?
- 36. Was a whole head inspection inspection performed
- 37. (If no, what objection did you raise?)
- 38. On page 3 it states that the boric acid deposits were "clearly "clearly attributable" attributable" to leaking motor tube flanges. Did you agree with that statement?
- 39. (If yes, what evidence was there that made it "clearly attributable?)
- 41. (If no, how did you address your disagreement?)
- 41. disagreement?)
- 42. Page 3 also states that the boric acid accumulations accumulations were indicative of CRDM flange leakage. What do deposits from CRDM flange leakage leakage; Jeakage look like?
- 43. On attachment attachment 2, page 2 of 2, it states the entire entire RPV head was inspected. Is that true? (Note page 2 of 5 says 65 of 69 inspected).
- 44. The letter references and applies Framatome ANP document 51-5012567-01 51-5012567-01 several times, and it is attached times. attached to the letter. Did you review this document?
- 45. Did you provide any infonnation information for this evaluation by Framatome?
- 46. It states that the B&WOG safety evaluation concludes a leak would be detected during a walk-downinspection walk-down inspection of the RPV head area. interpretation, what area In your interpretation, would this walk-down walk-down inspection inspection entail?
- 47. On page 7 of 56, the document characterizes characterizes that boric acid from flange leakage would leave leave behind a "snow" "snow" of boric acid crystals. Does this characterize characterize the boric boric acid accumulation accumulation seen on the head?
- 48. On page 28 it discusses a human reliability analysis for detecting CRDM nozzle leakages, based on not doing inspections.
- 49. (If of growing boric the head, did this section boric acid on the concern section concern you? Another you? Another way of with 24 of of asking, with nozzles obscured, how of 69 nozzles how was the 6%
- 50. October 3&t 50.October 30th letter: Page Page 3 notes that supplemental inspections that supplemental are required inspections are required for all all obscured nozzles. Was there any thought obscured inspections were the fact these inspections thought that the done for were not done previous outages previous merited shutting down to do it?
- 50. On page II 11 it stated that some deposits were small. How could some boron deposits could we detect these these boric acid on the head?
- 51. There was a question on page 11
- 51. 11 relative DB exam in April of 2000 relative to if the DB 2000 used a written procedure?
- 52. Okay, but was the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Program procedure followed in 2000? \ \( \
- . \.'
- 53. It also states that a head cl~ing performed in 2000 to pp~fora cleaning was performed qualityRPV, for a quality RPV ,.j'~ c...,5 \.}O' bare metal visual inspection in April 2002. How How is this true i 3.5 is /~ '" 1) oJ the head is covered with boric acid? .' -
- 55. Did you read the attached B&W owners group materials committee safety evaluation evaluation from December 19971 1997?
- 56. On page A2-3 A2-311 it discusses there basis for determining this was not an unreviewed unreviewed safety question. It takes credit for wastage inspections every refueling outage. We clearly weren't doing that for the entire head, so how could we take credit credit for this?
- DOCKETED USNRC DOOk0t#1A)-50 Oockst # 1A-05-052 1'7) a 82 c;-
- 2. 008 (r.
- ReACTOR VESSEL BOLTING ClOSURE DETAILS FIGUREHEAO
- Camera View
- Boric: Acid Depccila kEY PLAN REACTOR BOLTINGVESSEl DETAILSFIGR~EAO ClOSURf 1101. TlNG DETAILS FI GURE nr).innA-n1QRA*i
- 1) S 0)-
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