ML092870783
| ML092870783 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/2009 |
| From: | Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 50-259/09/301, 50-260/09/301, 50-296/09/301 | |
| Download: ML092870783 (152) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:ES-201 ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1 q Facility: Browns Fe[!Y Ferry Nuclear Power Plant Date of Examination: Jul~ 6 - 30, 2009 Developed by: Written - Facility 181 NRC 0 If /I Operating - Facility 181 Il!l NRC 0 Target Task Description J I Reference Date* DATE
-180 1. Examination administration date confinned confirmed (C.1.a; (C,1 ,a; C.2.a and b) January 7
-120 2. NRC exam examinersiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e) March 6
-120 3. Facility contact briefed on security & other requirements (C.2.c) March 6
-120 4. Corporate notification Jetter letter sent (C.2.d) March 6
[-90} [-901 [S . [S. Reference material due (C .1.e; . I .e; C.3.c; Attachment 3)] 3)1 NIA N/A S.
- 6. Integrated exami~~~~n outline{s)
Integrated examination outline(s) due, i~cluding Forms due, including CC ~n1 - ;' ES-201-3, Forms ES-201-2, ~~-.). {-7S} (-7S) ESi~I-I , ES*.301 ; .(~S-301-~, f~~:~d) s, ES-401 -1/2, ES-401 ES-301 - 1, ES-301-2, ES-301 -S, ES-D-1's, ES-401 -1/2 , " -3,- 0 , and and ES-ES- April 22 401 401-4, as applicable I .... I .eand (C.1.e .. and f; C.3.d) {-70} (-70) {7 . {7. licensee vh."~";(~\~ Examination outline(s) reviewed
- -' ,ro:'.2.h; (C , C.3.e)}
i I by NRC and feedback provided to facility April 27
- 8. Proposed examinations (including written written,, walk-through I , JPMs, and
{-4S} scenarios , as applicable) , supporting documentation (including ~:' I ,"";~..:.~. Forms ES* ES-May 22 301-3, 301-3 , ES-301-4, ES-301-S, ES-301 -6, -S. and ES-401 ES-401-! -6, and any Form ES-201-3 updates), and reference materials due (C (C.I .e, f,, 9
.1.e, g and h; h: C.3.d)
C.3 d\
-30 9. Prelim Preliminary inary license applications (NRC Fonn Form 398's) due (C (C..1.1I.!;; C.2.g; ES-202) June 5
-14
- 10. Final~~n~llicense 202) license applications due and Form ".
Fonn ES-201-4 preparedI (C (C..1.1 I.!:; C .2i; ES-C.2.!: June 23 11 . ~;.~ination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review (C.2.h; Examination (C .2.h:
-14
-1 4 June 23 23 C.3.f)
-14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C .1.j .1.j;; C.2.f C.2.f and h; C .3.g)
C.3.g) June 23
-7 "~h\
- 13. Written examinations and operatingI tests .approvedI by
- 13. C.3.h) by NRC NRC supervisor "" r (C.2.i; June 30
- 14. Final applications reviewed : 1 or 2 ~if (if >10) applications appl ications audited to confirm
-7 I qualifications I/ eligibility; eligibility ; and examination . i approvalI and waiver wa iver letters sent June 30 i'. ? i Attachment S; ES-202.
I(C.2.i. ES-202 , C.2.e; ES-204) 1S. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines reviewed with facility IS.
-7 June 30 licensee (C .3.k)
IS.
- 16. Approved scenarios, job performance perfonnance measures,measures. and questions distributed to
-7 NRC examiners (C.3.i) (C .3.i)
June 30
.* Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. letter. They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in C
(' coordination with the facility licensee.licensee .
.! [Appliesi ,Only)
Only] {Does { Does~' Not Apply} to examinations preparedI by the NRC.
F, F i ALL
- ES-201 Facility:
Examination Outline Quality Checklist fj'tZdWttlf f{4121 A/(jt((~ ?o"tf(-1 !{ANY Date of Form ES-201-2 Examination:J2/tillf ~!0;1J Examination:J2/tillf Initials
~!0;1l Item Task Description a b* C;#
1. w
- a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401.
~ RJ- ll!!>
t¥+/--
"<<(o:t
~Oif.t .:..-I>:(l'.t
.:..-1>:((,,,,
IJ6 IJL fib R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with I Section 0.1 of ES-401 and whether all KJA categories are appropriately sampled. ~ !.it. M T T
- c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.
~ IIlIL1!lIL I~ .~
E N
- d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KJA statements are appropriate.
~J',- IlL-
!IL- It~) ,t~)
- 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number S
of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, and major transients. r£~
~£~ tt- ~)
I M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number U and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L A without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated from the applicants' audit testes), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.
~ ~ ~\
T 0 c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative R and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.
~ 1J;t-~t- ty\
- 3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:
(1 ) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks Fyi W distributed among the safety functions as speCified on the form T
/ (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is wijhin the limits specified on the form (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit testes) ~
(ft it-(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.
- b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:
(1 ) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing licensing_ examinations m
~~ ~,::,
- c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days. da~s. ~
@ Ilt /It l~" ~,"l '
~ ~ I'1jY('
- 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections.
(fo G b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate. (Yft IL,L- II,,)..>
~ 11.,)..> J E "
N c. Ensure that KJA importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. ~ tl.. I/A~\ IM~\ E R
- d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. !.P- til lQ:JL IlL f./"';} lj.... }
A L
- e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage. ~ tIL !~{'
- f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO). ~ LI'-: tlJL l,if,
- a. Author ~NAtIJ t fj';AJ.t[t"( 7"JJt~e~Jf8r~<~
7"Jlt,;~ar~<~j:. ? ~
- b. Facility Reviewer (*) ~5, J/..N~6Ji-i{/
~EJ
- '7 K.NIA tH//
Hi) .s..J. 6+ ... ~)'</,~*
/Z/(IY.r--
/Z/trr-Lf5 ;t,.
,LJ.#5
~)' <i ,~. I~ ,)" ~~~£~
\}
\) ,
7ft1.e 7f&.e
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) /?
- d. NRC Supervisor
< -#.)-1..1)
~I.+t.(" .JL~~**.
~L+t.(".JL r t.tJ b,tJ ).tt~-' ..f,!lJ....-.
).{.(~_,..f I ;r-- L . IJ.~'
IJ.~ I (~-r. (~k crJ).,J'y II ll.JV ...... Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column ~chief ~chief examiner exa'miner concurrence required. I NRC-prep_ared examination outlines
- Not applicable for NRC-prepared
/Vd(( J: flfnf/tt ?Lw vJlf f}Zur//f}{-?) (0 ffN r/2diA (fit ;JL(
- ES-201, Page 26 of 28
PERSONNALL Y IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION - WITHHOLD UNDER 10 CFR 2.390 Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 September 11, 2009 10 CFR 50.49 Mr. Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street S.W., Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8931 Attention: Mr. Malcolm T. Widmann Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 NRC Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296
Subject:
Final Senior Reactor Operator and Reactor Operator License Examinations - Examination Security Agreement In accordance with 10 CFR 55.49, "Integrity of Examinations and Tests," and NUREG 1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," TVA has determined that appropriate measures have been taken to ensure examination integrity and security for the NRC Operator License Examination completed on July 22, 2009. The completed Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3 is provided in the enclosure to this letter. Also, enclosed are certification statements from the Browns Ferry license candidates. These certification statements were deemed necessary by the NRC examiners in order to satisfy closure of the Examination Security Agreement. This alternate method was needed because an individual listed on the Examination Security Agreement that was terminated by TVA prior to the administration of the examination. To date, this individual has not responded to TVA's efforts to contact and reach closure on this matter.
* '15.2009
Mr. Luis A. Reyes Page 2 September 11, 2009 The enclosure to this letter is considered by TVA to be of a personal nature and, as such, is to be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390(a)(6). There are no new regulatory commitments in this letter. If you have any questions, regarding this information, please telephone Mr. B. P. Stetson at (256) 729-7039. R. G. West Vice President Enclosure cc: (w/o Enclosure): U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 NRR Project Manager - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
PERSONNALL Y IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION - WITHHOLD UNDER 10 CFR 2.390 ENCLOSURE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 FINAL SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR AND REACTOR OPERATOR LICENSE APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION SECURITY AGREEMENT FORM AND OPERATOR CANDIDATE CERTIFICATION STATEMENTS (SEE ATTACHED)
ES-201
- HLT - 0801 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre-Examination " tt -I{[k 4.?t ~/..
I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 07/06/09 - 071lfff09 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licenSing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 07/06/09 - 07/20109. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY DATE 4c#~ ~,,~ I /6~h9. .. I
. ~-.t<Arn ~~, Mfr* Ifo,/o1~lt!11fI J /"& lei~L.,....v(<<~r 1)..C:;/lH¢',"" '/CJ9!~"i'
- ."dtt::. R C~I\97:1(.)(Q.J 3C1?I:~;I}f.M91f ,;~ ~ r~-,,::-- ~ ".\!'U:'I-C S,,,,,,,Je:Cl.en %1~ 1/9/0')
.\;IY",h.+6f 1:::"'C,lf'I"~,
S"1-1't7.,p;.. . F.tc:---::-;c..r-S;l'>t ,,(.7~ r ::z-. c.
~~:JZ*~:;(i.~L NOTES:
~
(2) ..s-£~ 4"T-rA(/~10 {::,x;:o ...... p':'S-7E'x", _ _ J"
.0-:010.....
or, <;..,<1,""" Sf. 4}(L
.,./. J
<//1./1>'1, (j) ~pj') OiutHrl'CU) Ii OUr of rife t>><<'#1tb-/, if Aliff CcAJ11r<<H> tWo ffAj( r~ Irrf~ffc..;j tHf(;,(, !br( 5t6/J off CoA1/it2l11lftc-rJ
(}) /J1rU C,fJl1it1{ !1M Uf( ((It wl11PlnN ,f/JP iJi/3 jJ)}l{6tf fo dt' toc!f1'{-;) , !'c"z Mjrt.df/er,J ~t/t.;6&J pm C!ltfffirt ItJ?) IYl/{JCbtlJ( tVlt)AfIfAlt1J/ I{fflr}J9Y/7'~ f(6AJft) {JEI /}J{JIVINl!l t/,(fj #fI11rtlJ /ff2f- IIif?) /lJ LI&t. pr 1111& t..11J7t!t"t,,) floJI(1/{& (ff' /tf(irc/IC-fJ ,P/Ic~?).
ES-201 HJ-T oSo I Nt(C &.A~.
- Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre-Examination It n'" I tlo;"I" Z(.. 6-1.",,"
I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 1~ j.1liJdtas of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) Of//Il of//It ;)bt,1c1~,
;)bt,1c1~. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY DATE DATE NOTE L')(AN- A."r\.cA... 2, -hLfi;(lL-LL!~~-I--fL-Pl---'=:=";-'- _-,~~vf=,,/f.-,-,i..:...cr1-"-,-/
? X/tiff/ Af--"' Af:-Y2 :tf?t.J
---'--a"""---"""ff;---'?tJ _ _ _ ---4--=F~~~~"'-'--~<f---
_ '-I---'---rl--f ---4~~~t...4~C'4;L M/ 6~
- 3. -=:...!....L!:----L-'-'----'-.L-"--""---"""'-- -1?-Et::--:A=~~'-'-':::...:.7-'-'J'i-~""-£/--""*=-t..:::::*" - _ - - - - ----:;,4i'-4:~~~=_r-~-- -Lf.C;'$t~~~~~~....,t~
!3X;9r))
i?)( n -. -4 U-I-I,n ,- DfJS OPS (.,>>)'s ()/'S
~7 U ()
UO Or:5
.01":5 i
~5' C'1 J .>
uS o/-lj o~~ vo tJP~ v~ UM.,+S.~~rvl'>>_ LtD - L", R.-iv1pv ms
.b .. \_ "k:t- -71 ,i{;.IV---;:r ES-201, Page 27 of 28
ES-201 HLT - 0801 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre-Examination 1- Z fJI(',J!,
I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 07/06/09 - 07,J¢~ of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 07/06/09 - 07/20/09. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY DATE SIGNATURE (2) DATE NOTE
-=, , - ? ~~~~;~~ ~...) p\
).J_
>J9vpA
\ W'
- 5' O;ij 1 ; A/t_
=n'-t~) _
-:;:xt:::.r/I;t / ~ ~.
. ~<\I~I..<..L~---:::'/'--=*=L) \2\:!\
v , - ...
'I,*;..
A 7
.; ~7
.!o.
C/.PS /.,</:rrA?V<::.?,a/P DLJ6. 5A/'B- ~.....J Fp.." rtVS'~,zvC ,~~ @ p~tt /lltl
- .,-..-- ~1t ~~~; ~~~':'<l21 a:;:--- ,B!.r fJ1!lt;'i§;
1'AlP tlJlP IW/#/,wll vf6A1&b ()AJ1o Tilt fcbiJ1/ ,tfGIt~A(6I1 l.v ~. tAl P/tl-f>4"INtr td IlVN rH~ 1~#9 t()NfDlf /tNt> 1"/Jcv'/~f j7/~f ttJlJfWlIlAiIC411crl{ ,Hit. n# ,!tI£lt'tK,f(H, &111 IA)PIt!I!>lAftJ 11ftJu,tH '1lfey dC&J8> fo !ftAl. 1~fI tlG<~lffP d2 l<.Nol(}~/)Gll)r Tilt A)12C !Kif", IIfIff'HLIA-tJ ,lf1fJ/J fH~ J'ECI(IlE hA1l1 P.tllr,f -rllry w?lZf P!2tJt/!P6) ttJltlf41lfictJ AJ-O Cf4-#( ~~r&lll-"J !Et41'f!) to 11ff AJtfC !KA-", /fJ/l #t1' Of() I. 4J,rJI(~cI.(J'~ (,;,~, ( C~A/ffUtIt1fa<) 1k1t-ttJ ,.frflfCllc!v)
ES-201 HLT - 0801 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. P re-Examination' Pre-Examination t'L1. ':rrt~
tJttr~ I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 07/06/09 - 07/2t110Tf"as of 07~~S the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 07/06/09 - 07/20/09. From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY SIGNATURE (1) DATE SIGNATURE (2) DATE NOTE 1.fl.J:J;-~ Rn~ ~~7-q_
~~7-q ot-
~. ~-,;..)-''-$-'- ~~~~~$:/:~:~:-n::5~\:'ft...,:~'-~'"""~-;)~f'L::~~~~~~=----'~,c.
f.~. S'k-~
+-~-. . :. :~" ":.=-_-.,.:.-----",.,~~~::=::~~=~:~::~*~~~~*7_~_Z3_~_~_~_~_
- 2. $e't:O . "
- iu:t
- 3. 7F~-;;;";v ifi>-n= - .~~_
4.~...., LiC£L. ' ..... $'" +N'$'.'0.;<.-,..'<Jf'L i~~
"'-0,,-...:...'...,....:::;,-J..... ~ 7~Z3*Cr.D_~_
- 5. ----- --------- - - ----------------- -- - - --------------------------
6.
- 7. -
8.
- 8. -__________________________________________________________
- 9. - -
- 9. - --------- -----------------------------------------------------
110.0_______________________________________________________________ 11.1 1 _____________________________________________________________
- 12. __________________________________________________________________
12._________ _ _ ___ 113.3_________________________________________________________ 14.,_
- 14. __________________________________________________________
- 15. _ _ _ _ _ __ ----
NOTES: NOTES:
c.... r; ES*201 HLT*0801 Examination Security Agreement Form ES*201-3 N
.oJ
..J
- 1. PntExam}n!tlon o CD I acknowledge that t have acquired IpeclaHz.ed knowledge about tho NRC licensing examlnalkms scheduled for the week(s) of 1lZL06/Rt - 071fto,~ ...
the date of my signature. I agree that I wi" not knowingly divUlge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been 8uthorileci by the NRC chief .xamln.... I understand that I am not to instruct. evaluate, or provide performance feedbeok to th0&8 applicants scheduled to be of N UI m administered thMa Ilcenllng examinations from thla date until completion of examInation adminlstraUon, except as specif\cally noted below and "8 authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a sImUlator booth oper81or or communicator is aooeptablalf the individual does not select the training content Of provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requlrements (81 documented in the facility licensee', procedures) and understand that violation of the conditio/l$ of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an 'lI enforcement actiOn against me or the faeillty license.. I wllimmedlately report to faciUty management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may twve been compromised. II o
- J
- 2. PQlt.£xamlnatlAn III To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unaulhorizid persons any InformatiOn concerning the NRC IIcen&I~ examinations admlntstel'eci during the week(a) of OU9I1O' QVOIlO' - 07l2OlO!. From ttt. date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performenoe feedback to those applicants who were administered these Ilcenaing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authOrized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME Joe TITLE "RESPONSIBILITY SIGNATURE (2) DATE NOTE
~
S' I""...l.;a., ~ 1""W' co 5~:J;t*'4;;t:;.::.. l-~I~ ~, ':.yu~' I
'oJ N
t i..1ftt. ...t.~ r. c=._ lD I CAl
~
~"Kn ~=::-f t&r:1~~i/6~1'"
~
. Ni&l' .....- - Fma S',t.tllt",= .. ,..9---1
- ===
~~~~-¥-~":-' ~""""'1;.4 ~_~
~~ - ~f.
~~~~=::::......-.--~~~------ - -
N
F A A x c o v E R
~te:
Date: 08/06/2009 To: Richard Choate CDmp#lny Company _ _t TVA Department From, From: Adela Kennelly KennellY TECHNOLOGY TECFFNOLOGY Number Of p;,ges: NumberOf~: 2
.-~~£'l~'i
";:" ~.:::
!eriC!.:. /..,>
I~i.
' ('
e_'t..iti~ J' ~~I(' !t:::.m~
, "'::"'!Jlt:';.
itiC!ai' m~ FaxNumbtN FaxNumlHN" 256-729-3_ 256-729-3444 UPS. Batteries. Generators, UPS, GeneJ"ators~ A Ale, Fire I C. l-lre Comments: Richard, Attached please find the duly signed Examination Security Agreement you requested trom from Rob Erickson. Please review it and ret let us know if you have any further questions or need additiOnal additional information. Best Regards, Adela Kennelly 2417 Technology Inc 24f7 770971 770 971 8480 )(112 x112 adela@247technology.com adela@247IechnolOQy.com 24/7 Technol'ogy Technofogy Inc 1349 Old 11 41 Hwy, SUite Suite 2.40, 240, Marietta, GA 30060 Phone: 770-971- 17().971~ 8480 Fax: no 971 8458 adeia@247tedmology.com Email: iIdeIa@247technclogy.com http://www.247technology.com Website: http://www.2<47technotogy.com L'd C IIi7Q i71 C nil 110 "'IC ('II J
"!'"!"'III ,,.II 'I .(,.,....,n'II' .... "" I ,J .......
,(F\r\'("\1II I",Q IJ..?
August 14, 2009 Having been on the security agreement for the recent NRC exam administered at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, I attest I have not divulged any information related to the exam or discussed any specific information with anyone not likewise on the security agreement. N. Todd Brumfield
June 1,2009 TO: Donald C. Binkley Jr. FROM: John A. Hartmann
SUBJECT:
NRC Examination Security
- Donald, On June 1, 2009, I was scheduled to provide support for the HLT 0801 Audit Examination as a Console Operator / Phone Communicator. I had to obtain a flash drive from Scott Franks, a contractor with the Exam Team, with scenarios saved on them. I assumed, at that point, that there was a potential for NRC Exam-related files to be on the flash drive and requested to sign onto the Security Agreement for the HLT 0801 NRC Exam. This was an invalid assumption and we verified that no NRC Exam-related materials were contained on that flash drive. Thus, I signed onto the Security Agreement in error and do solemnly attest to the fact that I have not been exposed to any NRC Exam-related materials for the HLT 0801 Class.
If you need additional verification, please don't hesitate to contact me. Sincerely,
June 1,2009 TO: Donald C. Binkley Jr. FROM: Dale E. Hill
SUBJECT:
NRC Examination Security
- Donald, On June 1, 2009, I was scheduled to provide support for the HLT 0801 Audit Examination as a Console Operator I Phone Communicator. I had to obtain a flash drive from Scott Franks, a contractor with the Exam Team, with scenarios saved on them. I assumed, at that point, that there was a potential for NRC Exam-related files to be on the flash drive and requested to sign onto the Security Agreement for the HLT 0801 NRC Exam. This was an invalid assumption and we verified that no NRC Exam-related materials were contained on that flash drive. Thus, I signed onto the Security Agreement in error and do solemnly attest to the fact that I have not been exposed to any NRC Exam-related materials for the HLT 0801 Class.
If you need additional verification, please don't hesitate to contact me. SiF'1 ii ~ JiU Y D~
May 28, 2009 To: Donald Binkley From: Michael K. Cantrell
Subject:
NRC Examination Security
- Don, Please fmd the subject NRC exam (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, HLT 0801 NRC Exam), signed out to me on April 30, 2009. I can verity that the examination has been either in my possession or in a secure location since being signed out to me, and as such there has been no threat of compromise.
If you need additional verification, please don't hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, Michael K. Cantrell
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 August 24,2009 Mr. Brian Stetson Interim Operations Training Manager Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000
Dear Mr. Stetson:
This is to certify that I have had no contact with Mr. Michael K. Cantrell that in any way would have compromised the integrity of the NRC exams administered at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in the month of July, 2009. Sincerely, ~b\J\2 ~-:s::.~...J (Print Name) Pnnted on recycled paper
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 August 24, 2009 Mr. Brian Stetson Interim Operations Training Manager Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000
Dear Mr. Stetson:
This is to certify that I have had no contact with Mr. Michael K. Cantrell that in any way would have compromiseo the integrity of the NRC exams administered at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in the month of July, 2009. Sincerely, (Signature) Date: <6 ~ 2,:\:01 Pnnted on recycled paper
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 August 24, 2009 Mr. Brian Stetson Interim Operations Training Manager Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000
Dear Mr. Stetson:
This is to certify that I have had no contact with Mr. Michael K. Cantrell that in any way would have compromised the integrity of the NRC exams administered at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in the month of July, 2009. Sincerely, Date: -----=o~~~/3..J...4-1
- =o: ;. . . ;:; ;l~f- /3- '-I+1t___.!J--+-9 1 __
!t~!J---I-9 Pnnted on rocycfed paper
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 August 24,2009 Mr. Brian Stetson Interim Operations Training Manager Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000
Dear Mr. Stetson:
This is to certify that I have had no contact with Mr. Michael K. Cantrell that in any way would have compromised the integrity of the NRC exams administered at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in the month of July, 2009. Sincerely, Date: 5' -aif -duo! Printed on recycred paper
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 August 24, 2009 Mr. Brian Stetson Interim Operations Training Manager Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000
Dear Mr. Stetson:
This is to certify that I have had no contact with Mr. Michael K. Cantrell that in any way would have compromised the integrity of the NRC exams administered at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in the month of July, 2009. Sincerely, (Print Name) (Signature) Date: <:j /2. t// 1 0 Pnnted on recycled paper
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 August24,2009 Mr. Brian Stetson Interim Operations Training Manager Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000
Dear Mr. Stetson:
This is to certify that I have had no contact with Mr. Michael K. Cantrell that in any way would have compromised the integrity of the NRC exams administered at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in the month of July, 2009. Sincerely, AJAdd, (Print Name) Pnnted on recycled paper
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 August 24,2009 Mr. Brian Stetson Interim Operations Training Manager Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000
Dear Mr. Stetson:
This is to certify that I have had no contact with Mr. Michael K. Cantrell that in any way would have compromised the integrity of the NRC exams administered at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in the month of July, 2009. Sincerely, I (Print Name) Date: 1/;;4/c'1
/ I Printed on recycled paper
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 August 24, 2009 Mr. Brian Stetson Interim Operations Training Manager Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000
Dear Mr. Stetson:
This is to certify that I have had no contact with Mr. Michael K. Cantrell that in any way would have compromised the integrity of the NRC exams administered at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in the month of July, 2009. Sincerely,
}
(Print Name) ( (Signature) Date: DBhr/05 Printed on recycled pafJ""f
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 August 24, 2009 Mr, Brian Stetson Interim Operations Training Manager Tennessee Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000
Dear Mr. Stetson:
This is to certify that I have had no contact with Mr. Michael K. Cantrell that in any way would have compromised the integrity of the NRC exams administered at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in the month of July, 2009. Sincerely, (Print Name) (Signature) Pnnted on recyded paper
ES-301 ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 o Facility: Examinalion Browns Ferry NPP Examination Level (circle one): one): RO '(SRO) Date of Examinalion: Examination:
.cSRO) Operating Tesl Test Number:
July 6 - 30, 30, 2009 HLT 0801 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed Code* Code * (see Note) Conduct of Operations M M Determine Adequate Performance Detenmine Perfonmance of License Reactivation JPM 541 (RO I SRO) Conduct of Operations P Evaluate Recombiner Performance Perfonmance JPM 510 (RO/SRO) Equipment Control o D Perform Jet Pump Surveillance 2-SR-3.4.2.1 Perfonm 2-SR-3.4.2.1 JPM 120F (RO I SRO) ( i Control I Radiation N Calculate the maximum penmissible permissible stay time within emergency determine the approving authority dose limits and detenmine JPM 528 (RO I SRO) Emergency Plan N,S N ,S Classify the Event per the REP (Primary System Leakage (Torus Pressure) Exceeding PSP Curve) JPM 487TC (SRO Only) NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required. required .
** Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol (C)ontrot Room (D)irect from bank <!:
(D)ireci (s 3 for ROs; ~ 4 for SROs and RO retakes) relakes) (N)ew or (M)odified from bank (~ ~ I) 1) (P)revious 2 exams <!: (s 1; I : randomly selected) (S)imulator o F FIN I AL. NALonlYJPMSShOWninifaliCS only JPHs shown in ifillles
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Browns Ferry NPP Date of Examination: July 6 - 30, 2009 Exam Level (circle one): RO 4RO>>/ 4ROY/ SRO-U Operating Test No.: HLT 0801 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF) Safety System / JPM Title Type Code* Function
- a. Altemate RPV Injection - Standby Coolant S,E,EN,L,N 2
- b. RWM Functional Test for Startup 3-SR-3.3.2.1.2 S, L,N 7
- c. Place RCIC in Test Mode From Standby for Altemate S,A, 0, E, L 3 RPV Pressure Control
- d. Start and Inject SLC Solution Into the RPV S, A, M, E, L 1
- e. Emergency Ventilate Primary Containment S,D,E,L 5
- f. Parallel DIG With System 4KV SID Board at Panel 9- S,A,D 6 23
- g. Off-Gas Post-Treatment Radiation HI-HI-HI S,A,D,E,L 9
- h. Placing Standby Steam Jet Air Ejector in Operation S,E,N 4 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. Shift From 'A' Set of CRD Stabilizing Valves to 'B' Set D,E,L,R 1
- j. Place B2-3 .+/- 24V Neutron Monitoring Battery A,N 6 Charger in Service to Battery'Board Charqer Battery Board 3
- k. Bypass RCIC Low Pressure Isolation 3-EOI 0, E, EN, L, 2 Appendix-16A R
@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO I SRO-II SRO-U (A)ltemate path 4-6 1 4-6 1 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank ~9/~8/~4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant .=::1 I.=::1 I.=::1 (EN)gineered safety feature 1 .=:: 1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power 1 Shutdown .=::1 I.=::1 I,=::1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) .=::2 I.=::2 I.=::1 (P)revious 2 exams ~ 3 1 ~ 3 1 ~ 2 (randomly selected) (R)CA .=::1 I.=::1 I.=::1 (S)imulator
HLT 0801 Control Roomlln-Plant Room/ln*Plant Systems JPM Narrative
- e. Emergency Ventilate Primary Containment (JPM 55 U2)
- Direct from bank /I Emergency or Abnorma Abnormall In-Plant I/ Low-Power I/ Simulator
- 2-EOI Appendix-13, Emergency Venting Primary Containment, Rev. Rev. 6
- 223001 Primary Containment System and Auxiliaries Au.lllarl .... A2..07 A2.07 Ability Ability to (a) predict the Impacta Impacts of the following on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM AND AUXlUARlES; AUXILIARIES; and (b) based on those predictions, predlctlona, use procedur .... to correct, procedures control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal control, abnonnal conditions or
~rywell pressure IMPORTANCE: RO 4.2 S~O operations: High drywell SRO 4.3
- f. Parallel DIG With System 4KV SID Board at Panel 9-23 (JPM 104F U2)
- Direct from bank I/ Simulator
- Alternate Path : Once paralleled with offsite source, source, a voltage transient will occur requiring candidate to trip the output breaker
- 0-01-82, Standby Diesel Generator System, 0-01-82, System. Rev.
Rev. 99, Section 8.1 8.1
- 264000 Emergency Generators (Diesel/Jet) A4.04 Ability to manually operate andlor monitor In and/or in the control room: Manual start, loading, and stopplng stopping of emergency generator: Plant-specific IMPORTANCE: RO 3.7 SRO 3.7
- g. Off-Gas Post-Treatment Radiation HI-HI-HI HI-Hi-HI (JPM 390F U3)
- Direct from bank I/ Emergency or Abnormal In-Plant in-Plant /I Low-Power I/ Simulator
- Alternate Path:
Path: Offgas System Isolation Valve, Valve. 3-FCV-66-28 fails to close automatically requiring candidate to close manually
- 3-ARP-9-4C, Panel 9-4 3-XA-55-4C, 3-ARP-9-4C, 3-XA-55-4C. Rev. 29, Window 35 (Page 45 of 45) and Rev. 29, 3-AOI-66-2. Offgas Post Treatment Radiation Hi Hi Hi.
3-AOI-66-2, Hi, Rev. 9
- 271000 Offga.
Offgas System A2..04 A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the Impacta impacts of the following follOWing on the OFFGAS SYSTEM SYSTEM;; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures procedur.... to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Offgas systern system high radlatio" radiation IMPORTANCE: RO 3.7 SRO 4.1 4.1
- h. Placing Standby Steam Jet Air Ejector in Operation (JPM 346 U3)
- New I/ Emergency or Abnormal In-Plant I/ Simulator
- 3-01-66,, Off-Gas System, 3-01-66 Rev. 56.
System , Rev. 56, Section 8.4
- 239001 239001 Main and Reheat Steam System syStem A2.08 A2..08 Ability to (a) predict the impacts impacta of the following on the MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions eonditlons or operations: Low conde. condensern ser vacuum IMPORTANCE: RO 3.6 SRO 3.6 3.6SRO
HLT 0801 Control Room/In-Plant Systems JPM Narrative Control Room Systems:
- a. Alternate RPV Injection - Standby Coolant (JPM 347 U3)
- New I/ Emergency or Abnormal In-Plant I/ Low-Power I/ ENgineered Safety Feature I/ Simulator
- 3-EOI Appendix-70, Appendix-70, Alternate RPV Injection System Lineup Standby Coolant, Rev. 2
- 203000 RHRlLPCI: Injection Mode (Plant Speclflc) A4,07 Ability to manually Specific) M.07 oparate andlor operate In the control room: Reactor Water Level IMPORTANCE:
and/or monitor in RO 4.5 SRO 4.5 4,5
- b. RWM Functional Test for Startup 3-SR-3.3.2.1.2 (JPM 399 U3)
- New I/ Low-Power I/ Simulator
- 3-SR-3.3.2.1.2, 3-SR-3.3.2.1 .2, RWM Functional Test for Startup, Startup, Rev.
Rev. 3
- 201006 Rod Worth Minimizer Syotem System (RWM) (Plant SpeclHc)
Specific) A2.05 Ability to (a) predict the Impacto impacts of the following on the ROD WORTH MINIMIZER SYSTEM (RWM); and (b) based basad on thoee those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, control,: or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: operetlons: Out of sequence rod movement: Plant-5peclflc (Not 8WR-6) Plant-Speciflc(Not BWR-6) ..IMPORTANCE: RO 3.1 3.1 SRO SR03.5 3.5
- c. Place RCIC in Test Mode From Standby for Alternate RPV Pressure Control (JPM 43F U2)
- Direct from bank I/ Emergency or Abnormal In-Plant I/ Low-Power I/ Simulator
- Alternate Path:
Path : RCIC Trip Throttle Valve (71-9) is tripped and must be reset opened.. RCIC Flow Controller fails while in service and candidate must and opened take manual control
- 2-EOI Appendix-11 S, B, Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems RCIC Test Mode, Rev.
Rev. 5
- 241000 ReactorlTurblne Reactorrfurblne Pressure Regulating *System System M.02 A4,02 Ability to manually and/or monitor in the control room operate andlor room:: Reactor pressure IMPORTANCE:
RO 4,1 4.1 SRO 4.1
- d. Start and Inject SLC Solution Into the RPV (JPM 613F U2)
- Modified I/ Emergency or Abnormal In-Plant I/ Low-Power I/ Simulator
- Alternate Path: must start other pump due to no flow
- 2-EOI Appendix-3A, Appendix-3A, SLC Injection, Rev. 5
- 211000 Standby UquldLiquid Controt A4,08 Ability to manually operate andlor Control M.08 and/or monitor In in the control room room:: Syotom System InlUation:
Initiation: Plant-speclfic Plant-specific IMPORTANCE: RO 4.2 RO.4.2 SR04.2 FINAL
HLT 0801 Control Room/In-Plant Room/ln*Plant Systems JPM Narrative In-Plant Systems:
- i. Shift From 'A' Set of CRD Stabilizing Valves to 'B' Set (JPM 113 U2)
- Direct from bank I/ Emergency or Abnormal In-Plant /I Low-Power low-Power /I RCA Entry
- 2-01-85, 2-01-85. Control Rod Drive System, System. Rev. 112, Section 6.4
- 201001 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System A3.01 Ability to monitor monKor automatic au10matlc operations of the tha CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM including: Including: Valve operation IMPORTANCE: .. RO 3.0 SRO 3.0
- j. Place B2-3 + 24V Neutron Monitoring Battery Charger in Service to Battery Board 3 (JPM 30aF 308F U3)
- New
- Alternate Path:
Path: When the Battery Charger is placed in service, service, voltage and amps will be out-of-specification requiring candidate to open breakers and notify the Unit Supervisor
- System , Rev.
0-01-570, DC Electrical System, 121 , Section 5.13 Rev. 121,
- 263000 D.C. Electrical Distribution K1.02 Knowledge of the physical
,connections and/or cause-effect relationships between c onnections andlor betwoan D.C. ELECTRICAL follow~ng: Battery charger and.
DISTRIBUTION and the following: and battery IMPORTANCE: RO 3.2 SRO 3.3
- k. Bypass RCIC low Low Pressure Isolation 3-EOI Appendix-16A (JPM 323 U3)
- Direcl from bank I/ Emergency or Abnormal In-Plant Direct Low-Power I/ ENgineered In-Plani / low-Power Safety Feature I RCA Entry
- 3-EOI Appendix-16A, Appendix-16A, Bypassing RCIC Low RPV Pressure Isolation Interlocks,Interlocks, Rev. 1
- 217000 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) A2.03 Ability to (a) la) predict the impacts of the following on the REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING
(.RCIC); and (b) baaed SYSTEM IRCIC); based on those predictIons, corre~ predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: "alve Valve closures IMPORTANCE: RO 3.4 3,4 SRO 3.3 FINAL
- ES-301 Facility: Ififyt</lff .rf7Z/2 V ,{ P;o Operating Test Quality Checklist Date of Examination:fUZV /.?Z Form ES-301-3 2 ,#klperating Test Nurrftf!r:~V(
Initials
- 1. General Criteria a b*
b' elf.
- a. The operating test conforms with the previously approved outline; changes are consistent with sampling requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 55.45, operational importance, safety function distribution). r{JLIr !2t ,£:ft)
~
- b. There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered during this examination. It llifti
- c. The operating test shall not duplicate items from the applicants' audit testis). (see Section 0.1.a.) ttY!- IJL fv:Hj
- d. Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acceptable limits. m It fiJI>
e.
~ ~ /t;)/J It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent applicants at the designated license level.
- 2. Walk-Through Criteria -- -- --
- a. Each JPM includes the following, as applicable:
initial conditions
** initiating cues references and tools, including associated procedures
** reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee operationally important specific performance criteria that include:
-- detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature JHIl
~ /Z/I.
-- system response and other examiner cues
-- statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant
- criteria for successful completion of the task
- identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards
- restrictions on the sequence of steps, if a2plicable
- b. Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through fJ~ ~11) outlines (Forms ES-301-1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified on those forms and Form ES-201-2.
lCfk
- 3. Simulator Criteria -- - --
The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with Form ES-301-4 and a copy is attached. ~ tK- /1>1> a. b. Author Facility Reviewer(') Zl"d/vJ {' o;:;;i;>>~"~(&~/( Kw&t ~ iAJ,fJ,;1" 7 r2/~ yr 7ft-LlYi l40 i'" ~<t.{) ':> ',';A-L> ~ ,....; ~L.A1:.,("'_"//f~ 1-/"
* /of
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)Qit
- d. NRC Supervisor Ni.LteL,\ ,- ",oj, t) ~f1......J ,J f f4..,.,
A '\ r ~
. ~khL4'1 f ~11Il1U 't] lLt.M-
'-?'"
NOTE: The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests. Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence required. required . FI NAL
- FINAL ES-301,Page24of27
- ES-301 CJ/) dfi Mo/JA/5 /fbi( AfIP Facility:. fJ/(()/JAi5 ICUi!
Facility: Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist
. , /lIJ AJri
,:(j/tfl 2; (1'(2;
;J)/tf/ (f' Date of Exam: &1 Scenario Numbers:.!/
Numbers:.L / 'I Z / )-/J/ 7 / "i Form ES-301-4 erating Test No.: !ftt~I
...operating
~d 6111 QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Initials a b* c#
C#
- 1. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out
~erators into expected events.
of service, but it does not cue the operators (){Lf Rt /-YO
- 2. The scenarios consist mostly of related events. I)ft IJL- r~
3. Each event description consists of
- the pOint in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew f)r Ii ~(~
the expected operator actions (by shift position) the event termination point (if applicable)
- 4. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible precedinQ preceding incident such as a seismic event. f)Jv !#- J~
- 5. The events are valid with regardreQard to physics and thermodynamics. l))) IlL r-(i!'
- 6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. OJ; /liL fJ1>
ft~ IL fJH~
- 7. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates.
Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints. Cues are given.
- 8.
9. 10. The simulator modeling is not altered. The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios. Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario. All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section 0.5 of ES-301. (tiJ, mU , (}J;
/It: ~~
IlL ~}i) fJ>'"
- 11. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios). rfJfl II- ~i')
- 12. Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events speCified specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios). ~ ft- iv~
- 13. The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position. I~ IlL "W1;i\
?r19/!Z/" /~ (n Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.S.d) Actual Attributes - -- -
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-8)
(5--8) iD / C, / ~ /q li?!~ PL flY'
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) ...s / '-1/ :2/'f ~Py tl ft~:
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) .5 /3 / ;)/4 ~ tL ,f~
- 4. Major transients (1-2) :l / ';).. / ~,I~ ~y{ IlL ~)
- 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 3 / 3/ 31;1. W .ft- it- I~')
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0--2) ~ // t / JII).. ~y,J.~ I~
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) L{ / ;)../ r'1'I IA~ # ~
- ES-301, Page 25 of 27 FINAL
ES-301 ES*301 Transient Transient andand Event Event Checklist Checklist Form Form ES-301-5 ES*301*5 F.~ ~ Facility: Browns Ferry NPP Operating Test No.: HL T 0801 n A E Scenarios p M V
~ T
- ~
p: E 11 (HL (HLTS-3-09) T5-J...09) 22 (HL (HLTS.3-12) TS-3-12) 33 (HLTS*3-16) (HL T5-3-16) 0 ~ I
, ,V"g LL NN CREW
,CREW CREW CREW N t TT POSITION
, v7~
POSITION TT I POSITION C C A A U S A B S A B S A B A NN T Y T V R~ ~ T ~ 0 ~ R ~ T 0~ ~ R ~ T ~ 0 LL U
~,
MI*} p RO-TT P E: 0 C C P 00 C C PP 00 C C P RR I U IU RX 00 1 1I 0 r NOR NOR , t 1,2.3 1,2.3 , 55 1 11
°11 fr-
~ VC VC 2.4 2.- ' .7 5.7 4.5 6
*.. ..* .* 22 SRo-U F..".";U r;;#1 MAJ TS 6
* '.9 8.9 6
- 22 2 11 RQ Ii'"
TS RX 3.5 3.' 01,5,6 4.5,6 2.3 11 7 1 0
...0.
11
-'-2 11 0 22 r
NOR NOR 11 1,2.3 1,2.3
- 1 4 1
°11 a ..* ~Ro-t ff,";' ~""
11 1 SRO-O r IIC IIC MAJ TS 2.4 2.' 6 3.5 3.' 5.7
'.1 8.9 4,5.6 4.5.6 3.5 3.'
6 6
..* 2 5 _0,0 4
2 2 22 2 11
"-z
~
RO Ii'" RX 11
°01 r 11 11 11
~'!';'
~~O-I NOR NOR 11 1,2,3 1.2.3 ..* 1 1 1 r~
~
#2 VC IIC MAJ 2.4 2.-
6
' .7 5.7 8.9 3.5 3.'
6 4 6a
- 4 2
4 2 2 1 r TS TS 3.5 3.' .4.5.6
,5,6 55 ~. 0 2 2 W, ~01l1 RX 1 1 1 0 NOR 1
1 1 1 1
°1 ~
F VC IIC 2.3 5,6,7 5.6.1 5 4 ..* .2 2
~ MAJ 6
8.9
- 3J 2 2 2 1 iTS TS 2 W"
1110 #2 RX 0
°0 1
2 1
°01 2 1 NOR 2 3 2 1 1 ~ F ..* ..*
VC IIC -.* 4,5 '4.7.7 4 2 I~ SRQ.U r MAJ
- 6 8.9 3 J 2 2 1 ITS 2
~3
~0#3 TS 0
°0 2 1
RX
°0 1 1 1 NOR NOR 11 1 1 1 1 F
F-' IIC VC 2.3 5.6,7 5,f1,1 5 4 4 2
~RQ-Y fr.o"'
r " MAJ 6 8.9 3 J 2 2 1 TS TS 0
°0 2 2 Page 1 of2 Paget of 2
ES*301 ES*301 Transient and Event Checklist Fonn Form ES*301*5
~
FaclJlty: Browns Ferry NPP iEE! Scenarios
~ OperaUng Tesl No .: HL T 08011 E
~
A Pp V T M 6 ~ 1 (HL TS*3-09) TS* 3-12) 2 (HL T5.3-12) TS*3-16) 3 (HLT5-3-16) Pp E 0 I L I N N T CREW OK." POSITION CREW OK.' POSITION I I CREW OK." POSITION I T T A N I .. C M
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
S A B S A B S A B A N V T Y
~
R ~T ~ 0 ~ R T 0 R T 0 L
~,.
U M ,*\ P 0 C P 0 C PP 0 C P IR I IU U
~E T ~O i ~O .N4 . RX 2 1 ,1 1 0 NOR 2 3 2 ,1 1 1 ~i ~~
IIC VC 4,5
<.' 4,7
<.7 2,4 2.<
6 4
*4 2 ~
IF' * *** * *
-z MAJ 6 8.9 6 4 2 2 1 TS T5 0 0 2 2 Iw"~O#5 RX NOR 1
1 1 1 1 1 I 11 I 00 1 1 fro""
~Q-I r IlC IIC 2.3 5.6,7 5.6.7 5 4
*4 2 IF"SRQ.Y r
MAJ 6 6.9 3 2 2 1
~ ROt6 po TS 15 RX 2 0
1 0 11 I 11 2 2 0 r NOR NOR 2 3 2 1 1 1 Ir""
~~
IIC 4,5
<.' 4,7
<.1 2.<
2.4 6 4
*2 4 2 IF"~RO-Y MAJ 6
8.9 6 4 2 2 1 TS 15 0 0 2 2 Insl11Jctlon,,:
- 1. -~ ~"""
Check !he !eYe! and apPlicant ..... onter!he
....., . oper..-.g
. . Ire operal lng 1ft, .......... and test rMl\ber ....., Form ES*O*1 _ _ ......... 1oI_.....-c ES.[). ' evanlllUllbers for each event type: ~ TS fl are
_ 1101not applicable IGr
~ FtO appl 101 RO ~ canla. ROs ROo mllst muN serve
_ .. boCI'Ilhe In both the .... ~ (ATC)"
"eHl)e-oontrois _ .......-c.g(
(Al Cr and "bllla",*of*.....ptenl (BOP)" (SOP) ' posftlons:
~ . IMlenl ' !lI1II'II SRCs must seNe In SROImuatMtW bolh IN hDClllh the SRO SAO and " ATC~.
' " the ATC positlans, ~ Including at . .least two lnsllUnetll 01"
. ., """...-...- 01 cOlnponl!nt CGIII(ICIIWnI (IIC) matfur1c1lons ancI (1IC)1I'IIIIIU'aCIN_
or..". One ma or trans 11'_..... WIIn . the
. ATC ATC pOsit on. If an Instanl SRO .
~".,1nlIIII'f IIddltionatly In the BOP posltlon.
S8fVes In,.
. . .-') ........ ~ one _lie IIC matflTlCtion
~_tNt can be cnca..
credited - . t I !he toward lie mallunclions two lIC
"'tM:I fIIIIIIIrIcIiao~'"reqUIred for the for . . ATC posftion.
ATC POI4Ion. 2, React ReidIWy ~ m,y Ily manipulations m3Y be lit ~ondUCIed rootmll or
...- normal
(:OO"oCIuCI1d lnIIOr 1Ibro'm" cond~1ons CIDf'IIfOIed abnonnal 01" COfltroiled ~ (nsf ,,..... to Section D.S.d) 10 5oto;bon D 5 ell but~ must muat be tNt
~ per slgrifoeant 1* Section
$ecIIan C.2-.a C 2.a 0' ~ D. (0) of ApjIendlx R~ and
") Reaelivlly ..-cI normal
..."..... evolutions ....., be
\r¥OIuIIoIa may ~ WIth tit naplaced ...oth addllionol 8CdllanII lnstrument
...tn.m ..... 01 or componenl c:omponwil maJfunctjons m~OtI. ,*b*.
on a 1*101"-1 basis. bItsII
- 3. w_
Whenever practical . boll'linstn.menl and componont ~ ........ C'OIIlp(ll1el'C malfllnclJOns shoUd be tNt 1ncIuIIIod, on, those InCluded; only IIuH thatIhIM require ~ actJons
'1IQUJtI verffiabIG IdIorw II'IaI d'III I" **
prcwidl! Insight to !he applle&nt's competence COlInt lowBfd Ihe minimum m......... requlramenlt ___ .. _ . specifled
~ for lot lhe . . . . . . . 1lie 1M applicant's ..............
1cen5C Jovel ln tho right-llano columns. Paga2of2 Page 2 of 2
ES*301
- Competencies CO ist FormESO £ :
Facility: Facility. Browns; FA"" Ferry NPP Dale, Date of Exam: July JU!y 13 -
- 22.
22, 2009 Operating TestI No.: HLT 0801 HlTJ!!!!1. APPLICANTS R..~~ ~
~ ~
~~ RG ~
~' ~n~ ~'
RGI SRO-I I @lSRG+/ ~S ROI! @/SRO II (@)ISRG+/ Competencies
~1 SRO-Y 1 S~ 2 SRG-U 1 SRO-Y 2 SRG-Y 3 SRO-Y 4 SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO S(~
SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Interpret I Diagnose 2.3, 4,5, 2,3, 2.3, 2, 3, 4,5. 4,5, 3,5, 2,3, 44,5,
,5, 3,5, 2,3, 5.6, 5,6, 2,3, 5,6, "., 2,4, 44,7,
,1. 2.4, 44,5,
,5. e,7, 6.7, 4,5, 4,5, 4.5, 6,7,
- 44,5,
,5, 6,7, 6,7.
2.3, 7,8. 7,8, 2,4. 2,4, 44.7,
,7, l 7,8, 1.8, .. .-
Events Events and Conditions 86 8,9 8,' 6 86 8,0 8.9 6 86 8,0 8,9 6 6 09 5,6 5.8 8,0 B.9 .... 86 9 5.8 5,6 8,0 8,9 6 1,5, 1.5, : 2,3, 2,3, 1,5, 2,3, 2.3, j Comply With and ALL ALL ALL ',3, 1,3, 1,3, 1,2, 2,4, 1,2, 2,4, 2.4. 2.4, AlL All All ALL All ALL All ALL All AL L ALL 5,6 3,6 6,7, 5,6 4,7, 3,6 6.7, 8,7, 5,6 4,7, Use Procedures (1) 5.8 5.8 5.6 5.' 3.6 5.' 6 8.9 8,' B.O B.9 " B,O 8,9 B.9 B,' Operate Control 1,3, 1,3, 1.5, 1,5, 2,3, 1.5, 1,5, .. 2,3, 2.4. , 1,2, 2,4, 1,2. 1,2, 6,7, 2,4, 4,7, 2.4, 5,6 5,6 6.7, 8,7. 4,7. 4,7, 3,6 5,6 Boards (2) 5,8 5.' 3,6 3.' 5,8 5,6 3.6 5,' 6
'B,9
.0 .. , B,9 B,' 8,9 B,' B,O 8,9 I
Comm unicate and Communicate ALL All AL AllL ALL All ALL All ALL All ALL All ALL AlL ALL All ALL All AL L All ALL All ALL AlL ALL All
- ALL All ALL AlL ALL All AL L AlL AlL ALL I Interact Demonstrate Supervisory ALL AlL ALL All AL L All ALL AlL ALL AlL ALL All AL L All I I
Abimy Ability (3) Comply With and 4,5, 4.5, 4,5, 4,5, .. " 3,5 2,3 2.3 3,5
- 3,5 Use Tech. Specs, Us. Specs. (3) B 6 6 6 ,
Noles: (1 ) Includes Technical Specification (1) SpecIfication compliance for an RO. (2) Optional for an an SRO-U. (3) Only applicable to SROs. SRCs. Instructions: Circle the applicant's license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. applicant.
~
I F ?Jif((,V:'
- ~:
" "~fA ~\"""-
0 r: ... ES*301 ES*301 Competencies Competencies C( CO )ist ist --_......- Form Forme$ESOQ~ L Fadlltv: Facility: Browns Ferry Ferrv NPP Date of Exam: July Julv 13 - 22,2009 OperalingTest ()petating Test No.: No,: HLT 0801 APPLICANTS Competencies c.Y
@SROII SRG4-1 @9)1 SRO I !
@SRO+I SRO-Y 5 SRG-Y 6 SRQ..Y SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 1 2 3 5,8, 5,e, Interpret I Diagnose 2,3, c , 2,4,,
2,4 4,7, 4.7. 2.4, Events and Conditions * * . 8 7,8, 1,8. 9 5,8 5,' 8,1 8,9 6 1,5, 1,S, 2,3, 2,3. Comply W ith and 1,2, 6,7, 2,4, U . 4,7, 22.4, 3,. 8,1, ,'." 4,7. Use Procedures (1) 3,6 5,6 5,' 60 B,9 8,' a,1 8,9 1,5, 1.5, ~ 2,3, 2,3. Operate Control 1,2, ,':. 2,4, 2,4, 2.4, 2.", Boards (2) 3,6 3.6 8,7, 8,1, 8,1 8,9
.. 5,6 5,.
4.7, 4,7, 8,9 a,'
- 6 Communicate and ALL AlL ALL AlL ALL AlL ALL AlL ALL AlL Interact Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3) , ,'" .'
_,<0.'. Comply With and '. ""'.:*.1; Use Tech. Specs. (3) . Notes: 11 )) InCludes (1 Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO. (2) Optional for an SRO*U SRO*U.. (3) Only applicable to SROs. SRDs. Instructions: Circle the applicant's license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. FI AL FINAL
Browns Ferry- July 2009 ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-1 Facility: Browns Ferry Date of Exam: July 2009 RO KIA Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4
- Total
- 1. 1 4 3 4 3 2 4 20 4 3 7 Emergency &
Abnormal Plant 2 2 I I N/A 1 1 N/A I 7 2 I 3 Evolutions Tier Totals 6 4 5 4 3 5 27 6 4 10 1 4 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 26 3 2 5 2. Plant 2 2 I I I I I I I I I I 12 0 2 I 3 Systems Tier Totals 6 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 38 5 3 8
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 I Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable KJA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each KJA category shall not be less than two).
2, The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions, The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points, 3, Systems/evolutions within each group are Identified on the assodated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, Site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D,1 ,b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate KJA statements. 4, Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution. 5, Absent a plant-specific priority, only those KJAs having an Importance rating (IR) of 2,5 or higher shall be selected, Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6. Select SRO topiCS for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KJA categories.
7: The generic (G) KJAs in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KJA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1 ,b of ES-401 for the applicable KJAs. 8, On the following pages, enter the KJA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category, Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply), Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams. 9, For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the KJA catalog, and enter the KJA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401*3, Limit SRO selections to KJAs that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43,
Browns Ferry - July 2009 ES*401 2 Form ES*401*1 ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Fonn ES-401-1 Emerqency and Abnonnal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group Emergency 1/GrOUD 1 (RO I SRO) E/APE # 1 Name 1 Safety Function K K K A A G KIA Topic(s) IR # 1 2 3 1 2 295001 Partial or Complete Loss of Forced R R: AAI.02 R3J Core Flow Circulation 1 1 & 4 295003 Partial or Complete Loss of AC I 6 R S R: AKI.03 R2.9 s: S: G2.4.50 S4.0 295004 Partial or Total Loss of DC Pwr 16 R R: AKJ.02 AK3.02 R2.9 295005 Main Turbine Generator Trip 1 3 R R; G2.4.21 R4.0 295006 SCRAM I 1 R R: K2.02 R3.S 295016 Control Room Abandonment 17 R R: G2.4.30 R2.7 S S; G2.4.3 S3.9 295018 Partial or Total Loss of CCW 18 R S R: AAI.02 R3.3 S: A2.01 S3.4 295019 Partial or Total Loss of Ins!. Air 18 R R: AK2.lS R3.5 Coolinq I 4 295021 Loss of Shutdown Cooling R R: G2.2.4 R3.6 295023 Refueling Acc 1 8 R $ S R: AAl.04 R3.4 S; AA2.0! S4.0 295024 High Drywell Pressure 1 5 R R; EA2.03 R3.8 295025 High Reactor Pressure 1 3 R S R K2.04 R3.9
$: EA2.0!
S: SO 295026 Suppression Pool High Water Temp./5 295027 High Containment Temperature I 5 R S R: EK3.02 R3.2 S:
$: EA2.0l $3.7 S3.7 295028 High Drywell Temperature 1 5 R R: EKI.Ol R3.5 295030 Low Suppression Pool Wir Lvi 1 5 R R; EK3.03 R3.6 295031 Reactor Low Water Levell 2 R R; EA2.03 R4.2 295037 SCRAM Condition Present R R: G2.2.12 R3.7 and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Unknown I 1 295038 High Off-site Release Rate I 9 R R: EKI.OI R2.5 600000 Plant Fire On Site I 8 R R: AK3.04 R2.S 700000 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid R S R: AKl.OI R3.3 Disturbances I 6 $; G2.4.31 S; S4.!
I KIA Category Totals: (RO) 4 3 4 3 2 4 Group Point Total: 2017 (SRO) 4 3
Browns Ferry - July 2009 ES*401 3 Form ES-401*1 ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401*1 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO) E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G KIA Topic(s) IR # 1 2 3 1 2 295002 Loss of Main Condenser Vac / 3 295007 High Reactor Pressure / 3 295008 High Reactor Water Level / 2 295009 Low Reactor Water Level / 2 R R: AK2.04 R2.6 295010 High Drywell Pressure / 5 R R: G2.4.49 R4.6 295011 High Containment Temp / 5 295012 High Drywell Temperature /5 R S R: AKl.OI RJJ S: 02.4.34 S4.1 295013 High Suppression Pool Temp. / 5 S S: AA2.02 S3.5 295014 Inadvertent Reactivity Addition /1 295015 Incomplete SCRAM / 1 295017 High Off-site Release Rate / 9 R R: AK3.03 RJ.3 295020 Inadvertent Cont. Isolation / 5 & 7 295022 Loss of CRD Pumps / 1 R R: AA2.03 RJ.I 295029 High Suppression Pool Wtr Lvi / 5 R R: EAl.04 RJ.4 295032 High Secondary Containment Area Temperature /5 295033 High Secondary Containment S S: EA2.03 S4.2 Area Radiation Levels / 9 295034 Secondary Containment Ventilation High Radiation / 9 295035 Secondary Containment High Differential Pressure / 5 295036 Secondary Containment High R R: EKl.Ol R2.9 Sump/Area Water Level / 5 500000 High CTMT Hydrogen Conc. / 5 KIA Category Category Point Totals: (RO) 2 I I I 1 1 Group Point Total: 7/3 (SRO) 2 1
Browns Ferry - July 2009 4 Form ES*401*1 ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-1 Plant ~tems - Tier 21Group 1 (RO / SRO) System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G KIA Toplc(s) IR # 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 203000 RHRlLPCI: Injection R R: KS.O! R2.7 Mode 205000 Shutdown Cooling R R: K2.02 R2.S 206000 HPCI R S R: K4.16 RJ.! s: A2.16 S4.1 207000 Isolation (Emergency) R R: A4.03 RJ.O Condenser 209001 LPCS R R: K1.l2 R29 209002 HPCS R R: A3.04 RJ.7 211000 SLC R R: A4.0B R4.2 212000 RPS R 8 R: K3.11 R3.0 S A220 84.2 2150031RM R R: K4.04 R2.9 215004 Source Range Monitor R R: A3.01 RJ.2 215005 APRM / LPRM R R: A2.07 RJ.2 217000 RCIC R S R: K3.02 RJ.6 R R: K3.04 R3.6 S: G2.4.41 S4.6 218000 ADS R R: Kl.02 R4.0 223002 PCIS/Nuclear Steam R R: Kl.03 RJ.O Supply Shutoff R R: K1.I3 R2.7 239002 SRVs R S R: Al.OI RJJ S: G2.4.4S S4) 259002 Reactor Water Level R R: G2.4.45 R4.1 Control 261000 SGTS R S R: K6.09 RJ.I S: A2.1! S3) 262001 AC Electrical R R: G2.2.39 RJ.9 Distribution 262002 UPS (AC/DC) R R: K6.02 R2.B R R: K6.03 R2.7 263000 DC Electrical R R: A2.01 R2.8 Distribution 264000 EDGs R R: KS.OS R3.4 300000 Instrument Air R R: K2.01 R2.8 400000 Component Cooling R R: Al.OI R2.8 Water KIA Category Point Totals: (RO) 4 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 Group Point Total: 26/5 (SRO) 3 2
Browns Ferry - July 2009 ES-401 5 Form ES-401-1 ES-401 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-1 Plant Systems - Tier 21Group 2 (RO / SRO) System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G KIA Topic(s) IR # 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 201001 CRD Hydraulic R R: K6.04 RJ.6 201002 RMCS 201003 Control Rod and Drive Mechanism 201004 RSCS R R: Al.OI RJ3 201005 RCIS 201006 RWM 202001 Recirculation S S: A2.10 S3.9 202002 Recirculation Flow Control 204000 RWCU 214000 RPIS 215001 Traversing In-core Probe R R: A3.03 R2.5 215002 RBM R S R: Kl.02 RJ.2 S: A2.05 S3.3 216000 Nuclear Boiler Inst 219000 RHRlLPCI: Torus/Pool R R: K2.02 R3.1 Cooling Mode 223001 Primary CTMT and Aux. 226001 RHRlLPCI: CTMT Spray Mode 230000 RHRlLPCI: Torus/Pool Spray Mode 233000 Fuel Pool Cooling/Cleanup S S: G2.435 S4.0 234000 Fuel Handling Equipment 239001 Main and Reheat Steam 239003 MSIV Leakage Control R R: K4.02 RJ.O 241000 ReactorlTurbine Pressure Regulator 245000 Main Turbine Gen. / Aux. R R: K5.07 R2.6 256000 Reactor Condensate R R: G2.1.30 R4.4 259001 Reactor Feedwaler 268000 Radwaste 2710000ffgas R R: A4.06 RJ.3 272000 Radiation Monitoring 286000 Fire Protection 288000 Plant Ventilation R R: A2.0S R2.6 290001 Secondary CTMT R R: KJ.Ol R4.0 290003 Control Room HVAC 290002 Reactor Vessel Internals R R: Kl.04 RJ.4 KIA Category Point Totals: 2 I I I I I I I I I I Group Point Total: 1213 (RO) (SRO) 2
Browns Ferry - July 2009 ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: Browns Ferry Date of Exam: July 2009 Category KIA # Topic RO SRO*Only IR # IR # 2.1.39 (R) 02.1.39 3.6 2.1.6 (R) G2.1.6 3.8 1. Conduct 2.1.13 (5)G2. Ll3 :u of Operations 2.1.4 (5) G2.1.4 3l! Subtotal 2 2 2.2.20 (RJ G2.2.20 2.6 2.2.22 (R) 02.2.22 4.0
- 2. 2.2,19 (S) G2.2.19 3.4 Equipment Control 2.2.23 (S) G2.223 4.6 Subtotal 2 2 2.3.14 (R) G2.3 14 34 2.3.4 (R) G2.3.4 3.2
- 3. 2.3.7 (R) 01.3.7
{R} 3.5 Radiation Control 2.3.11 (5) 02.3.1 t 4.3 2,3.7 (5) G2.37 36 Subtotal 3 2 2.4.18 {R)G2A.18 (R)G2A.18 },3 2.4.26 (R) 02.4.26 3.1 4. Emergency 2.4.6 (R) 02.4.6 3.7 Procedures I Plan 2.4.8 {S) tS) O2.4.!! 4.5 Subtotal 3 I Tier 3 Point Total 10 10 7 7
ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A 1 A2 A3 A4 G Kl TOPIC: RO SRO 295001AA1.02 Partial or Complete Loss 01 Forced 3.3 3.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ [] 0 0 0 RPS .................... Core Flow Circulation f 1 & 4 Ability to operate and 1 f or monitor the following as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.7/45.5 f 45.6) 295003AK1.03 Partial or Complete Loss 01of AC f 6 2.9 3.2 ~ 0 0 0 :=J 0 0 0 0 0 0
~OOO=:JDODOOO voftage/degraded voltage effects on electrical Under voltageldegraded loads ................................................ .
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.8 to 41.10 f 45.3)
-=----.--=,--_._----_.... _ - - - - . - - - - - - - - -
295004AK3.02 Partial or Total Loss of DC Pwr 16/6 2.9 3.3 o0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i' 0 0 Ground isolation/fault determination................ .. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.5/41.101 41.5/41.10/ 45.6/45.13) 295OO5G2.4.21 Main Turbine Generator Tripi TripI 3 4.0 4.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 000 000 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.
- - - - - - - - - - - - _ . _ - - - _ . ...,...-------- ----=---------
295006AK2.02 SCRAM 11 /1 -----3-:83.8 3.8 3.8 0 ~ dO~
~ 0 0 0 [J 0 0 0 0 0 Reactor water level level-control control system .................. ..
Knowledge of the interrelations between (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and the following:(CFR: 41.7/45.7/45.8) 29501002.4.30 Control Room Abandonmentl7 2.7 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2J Knowledge of events related to system operations/status that must be reported to internal orginizations or outside This is a Generic, no stem statement is agencies. associated. Page 1 of 4 1211812008 8:38 AM
ES-401 , REV 9 T1G1 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SRO 295018AA 1.02 Partial or Total loss of CCW 1 /8 3.3 3.4 0 0 DOC 1= ~ 0 0 0 0 System loads ........................................ .. Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTlON):(CFR: 41.7/45.51 41.7/45.5/ 45.6) 295019AK2TaPartial 295019AK2.18 Partial or Total Lossoflnst. Air/8 Loss ollns!. Air / 8 -3:5-3.5 3.5 3.5 [f~ [J ~ 0'0-0 LJ 0 0 0 [l [1 0 DOD0 0 0 ADS: Plant-SpecifIC ................................ .. Knowledge of the interrelations between (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and the foUowing:(CFR: 41.7/45.7 41.7 I 45.7 I 45.8) 295021G2.2.4 Loss of Shutdown Cooling I 4 3.6 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ (multi-unit) Ability to explain the variations in control board layouts, systems. instrumentation and procedural This is a Generic. no stem statement Is actions actions between between units units at at aa facility. facility. associated. _._--- ---- -- -- , ---- ---------------_. -~-.'--- 295023AA 1.04 Ace Cooling Mode 1 Refueling Acc /8 3.4 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 ...... _............... .. Radiation monitoring equipment ...................... Ability to operate and I/ or monitor the following as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.7/45_51 41.7/45.51 45.6) 295024EA2.03 High Drywall Pressure 1 /5 3.8 3.8 DOC 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Suppression pool leveL level... ............................ . Ability to determine and Interpret the Abitity following as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10/43.51 41.10 143.51 45.13) 295025EK2.04 High Reactor Pressure 1 3 3.9 4.1 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AAI/APT/ATWS: Plant-Specific........................ . AAIIAPT/ATWS: Knowledge of the interrelations between (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION) and 41.7 I 45.7 I 45.8) the following:(CFR: 41.7/45.7/45.8) Page 2 of 4 12118/2008 8:38 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T1Gl BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM E5-401-1 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 KS K6 A 1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SRO 295027EK3.02 High Containment Temperature 15 3.2 3.2 0 0 ~ 0 DOn 0 0 0 0 Containment spray Plant*SpeciflC................... . Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.S 141.10 145.61 4S.13) 29S028EK1.01 High Drywell Temperature / 5 35 3.7 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Reactor water level measurement... ................... Knowledge of the operatJonal implications of the following concepts as they apply to the EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTlON):(CFR: 41.8to 41.10 {45.3) EVOLUTlON):(CFA: {45_3) 295030EK3:ro-Low 29S030EK3.03 Lvi 1 5 Low Suppression Pool Wtr Lvt 3.6 3.7 0 C ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 [J 0 RCIC operation: Plant*Specific ...................... . Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTtON):(CFR: 41.5/41.10 f 45.61 45.13) 295031 EA2.03 Reactor Low Water Level/2 4.2 4.2 0 0 DOC 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Reactor pressure .............................. . Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10/43.51 41.10 I 43.51 4S.13) 295037G2.2.12 29S037G2.2.12 SCRAM Condition Present and Power 3.7 4.1 0 0 0 0 [J 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of surveillance prOCedures. Above APRM Downscale or Unknown . . . 11 This is IS a Generic, Genenc, no stem statement is IS associated. 295038EK1.01 Off*site Release Rate / 9 High Off-site 2.S 3.1 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Biological eHects of radioisotope ingestion ......... . Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.8 to 41.10 / 45.3) Page 3 of 4 1211812008 8:38 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T1Gl BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM E$-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Kl K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SRO 6OOOOOAK3.04 Plant Fire On Site { 8 2.8 3.4 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 [] [] 0 [] Actions contained in the abnormal procedure tor plant tire ensile Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.5 {41.10 ( 45.6/45.13) _ _ '0 700000AK1.01 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 3.3 3.5 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 [] 0 [J 0 0 Definition of the terms: volts, watts, amps, VARS, power Distrurbancecs factor Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTlON):(CFR: 41.8 to 41.10 145.3) Page 401 4 1211812008 8:38 AM
E5-401, REV 9 T1G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: fR Kl K2 K3 K4 KS K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SRO 29S009AK2.04 Low Reactor Water Level 12 2.6 2.6 0 M 0 [] [] 0 0 0 [] [] [] .......................... . Reactor water cleanup ........................... Knowledge of the interrelations between (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and 45.7/4S.8) the foftowing:(CFR: 41.71 45.7 I 4S.8) 29501002.4.49 High Drywell IS Orywell Pressure /S 4.6 4.4 [] [ ] [] 0 [] [] [] [] 0 [] 0 [] 0 ~ Ability to perform perfonn without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system This is a Generic, no stem statement is components and controls. associated. 295012AK1.0l Temperature f 5 High OryweU TemPerature HighOfyw6U 3.3 3.5 ~ [] 0 u [] 0 [] 0 [] 0 00 0 [] 0 Pressureltemperature relationship .................... . Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTlON):(CFR: 41.8 to 41.10 145.3)/45.3) 295017AK3.03 High Off-site Release Rate 19 3.3 4.5 0 [] [] [] ~ 0 0 0 [] 0 [] [] 0 [] 0 []0 Implementation of site emergency plan ............... .. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.5/41.10/ 41.5/41.10 I 45.6/45.13)
.-=-=::---.,-------::- -,....-,:-- - ---------::-----
295022AA2.03 Loss of CRD Pumps 11 0 [] 0 0 [] 00 00 3.1 3.2 [] [] ~ 0 0 0 00 0 CRD mechanism temperatures ............................ CRO Ability to determine detennine and interpret the follOwing as they apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTlON):(CFR: 41.10/43.51 45.13) 295029EA 1.04 High Suppression High Suppression Pool Pool Wtr Wtr Lvi 1 5 -3.43.5-0=--C::[J=---CO=--O-O=--O-~-1 Lvi ;-5 3.4 3.5 0 [J 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 []
~ O'-O-O--O---R-C-'C'--:
RCIC: 'P-Ia-nt--S-pec-lfic .................... . Plant-Specific..................... Ability to operate and 1 I Of monitor the following as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOlUTION):(CFR: 41.7/45.51 45.6) Page 1 of 2 12/18/2008 12118/2008 8:38 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T1G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 KS K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SRO 295036EK1.01 Secondal)' Containment High 2.9 3.1 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 LJ 0 Q 0 Radiation releases ................................... . Sump/Area Water Level 15 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTfON):(CFR: 41.8 to 41.10 145.3) Page 2 of 2 12118/2008 8:38 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T2Gl BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 KS K6 A 1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: AO SAO 203000KS.01 203000KS.Ol AHRiLPCI: Injection Mode 27 2.9 ODD 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 Testable check valve operation Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (SYSTEM):(CFR: (SYSTEM):(CFA: 41 .S / 4S.7) 205OOOK2.02 Shutdown Cooling 2.S 2.7 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Motor operated valves Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the foliowing:(CFA: foliowing:(CFR: 41.7) 206OOOK4.16 HPCI 3.1 3.3 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Minimizing fission product concentration in the condensate storage tank (valve closures on system Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design feature(s) initiation): BWR-2.3,4(P-Spec) and or Inter1ock(s) which provide for the following:(CFA: 41.7) 207000A4.03 Isolation (Emergency) Condenser 3 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 BWR-2.3 Primary and shell sidetemperatures: BWA-2.3 Ability to manually operate andlor monitor room:(CFA: 41.71 45.S to in the control room:(CFR: 45.8) -20900--1-K1-.12 - - - ---_._---
---L-PC-S- --------- ----
-- -- ---.------",.-.-0--- - - - - - - - - - - -
209001K1.12 LPCS 2.9 3.1 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [] 0 000 ECCS room coolers Knowledge of the physical connections andlor cause-effect relationships between (SYSTEM) and the 101Iowing:(CFA: following:(CFA: 41.2 to 41.9/45.7 to 45.8) 209002A3.04 HPCS 3.7 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 System flow: BWA-5.6 Ability to monitor automatic operations of the (SYSTEM) including:(CFR: 41.7/45.5) - - - _ . - - - ' - . _ - - - - - - - - - - _ . - - - _.. =--,-.....,...-- -:=-,....--:= _._--- - - - - - - - 211000A4.08 211000A4.08 SlC SlC 4.2 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 System initiation: Plant-Specific Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:(CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8) Page 1 of S 12/18/2008 8:38 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A 1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SRO 2120001<3.11 RPS 3.0 3.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~J 0 Recirculation system Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on foliowing:(CFR: 41.7 I 45.6) the following:(CFR: 215003K4.04 IRM 2.9 2.9 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Varying system sensitivity levels using range switches Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the foliowing:(CFR: 41.7) 215004A3.01 Source Range Monitor 3.2 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [] 0 Meters and recorders Ability to monitor automatic operations of the (SYSTEM) including:(CFR: 41.71 45.5) 21SOOSA2.07 APRM/lPRM 32 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Recirculation flow channels flow mismatch Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5/43.51 45.3 1 45.13)
- - _ *. _ _ _ _ 0. _ _ _
- 0 **
217000K3.02 RCIC 3.6 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 DOC 0 [] 0 Reactor vessel pressure Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7/45.6) 217000K:io4-RC~-----' 217000K3.04 RCIC 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 0 0 IilI !ill 0 0 0 0 0 0 [J U o Adequate core cooling Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:(CFR: 41.71 45.6) Page 2 of 5 12118/2008 8:38 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Kl K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: AO SAO 2180001<1.02 ADS 4.0 4.1 ~ [] [] [] [ ] [] 0 0 0 [J 0 Low pressure core spray: Plant-Specific Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between (SYSTEM) and the following:(CFA: 41.2 to 41.9/45.7 to 45.8) 223002K1.03 PCIS/Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff 3.0 3.2 ~
~ [] 0 DOn 0 0 [] 0 [] Plant ventilation Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between foliowing:(CFA: 41.2 to (SYSTEM) and the following:(CFA:
41.91 45.7 to 45.8) 223002K1.13 PCISlNuciear Steam Supply Shutoff 2.7 2.9 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 [] [J [] 0 [] [] 0 Traversing in-core probe system Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between andlor (SYSTEM) and the foliowing:(CFA: 41.2 to 41.9/45.7 to 45.8) 239002A 1.01 SAYs 3.3 3.4 0 [] [] 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 [] 0 Tail pipe temperature Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the (SYSTEM) controls including:(CFA: 41.5/ 45.5) 259002G2.4.45 Aeactor Water Level Control 4.1 4.3 0 [] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [] [] [ ] 0 ~ Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm. This is a Generic. no stem statement is associated.
..------ - -------_. -=,..---::---------:------=--------- ---------
261000K6.09 SGTS 3.1 3.3 0 0 0 0 0 ~ [] 0 0 0 0 Primary containment high pressure: Plant-Specific Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.7/45.7) Page 3 of 5 1211812008 8:38 AM
E$-401, REV 9 T2Gl BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM E8-401-1 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: fR Kl K2 K3 K4 KS K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: AO SRO 262001G2.2.39 AC Electrical Distribution 3.9 4.S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n 21 Knowledge of less than one hour technical specification action statements for systems. This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated. 262002K6.02 UPS (ACIDC) 2.8 3.1 ODDOO~OOD[.JLJ ODDOO~OOD[J[] D.C. electrical power Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the (SYSTEM):(CFA: 41.7 / 4S.7) -_._-.----_ ---------------------~--------~--~----------------------- 262002K6.03 UPS (AC/DC) 2.7 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 Static inverter Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following wit! have on the (SYSTEM):(CFA: 41.7/41.7/4S.7) 4S.7) 263000A2.01 DC Electrical Distribution 2.8 3.2 0 LJ 0 0 0 DOli') COO Grounds Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictionS, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those aboormal operation:(CFR: 41.S/43.S 41.S / 43.S / 4S.3 / 4S.13} 264OOOKS.05 EOOs 3.4 3.4 0 [J 0 0 2l 0 0 0 0 U 0 Paralleling A.C. power sources Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (SYSTEM):(CFA: 41.5/ 4S.7)
----=- ------_.- ------- - - - - --------------
300000K2.01 Instrument Air 2.8 2.8 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Instrument air compressor Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the 101Iowing:(CFA: 41.7) Page 4 of 5 1211812008 8:38 AM
E5-401, REV 9 T2Gl BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SRO 4{)()O()()A 1.01 Component Cooling Water 2.8 2.8 0 0 [J 0 [J 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 CCWflowrate Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the (SYSTEM) controls including:(CFR: 41.51 45.5) Page Sot 5 1211812008 8:38 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T2G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Kl K2 K3 K4 KS K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: AO SRO 201001K6.04 CAD Hydraulic 3.6 3.7 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 [J 0 RPS Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.7/ 4S.7) 201 004A 1.0 1 RSCS 3.3 3.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Aeactor manual control system: BWR-4,S Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the (SYSTEM) controls including:(CFR: 41.S / 45.S) 215001A3.03 Traversing In-core Probe 2.S 2.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 Valve operation: Not-SWA1 Not-BWA1 Ability to monitor automatic operations of the (SYSTEM) including:(CFR: 41.7/ 4S.S) 215002K1.02 RBM RSM 3.2 3.1 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LPRM: BWR-3,4,S SWR-3,4,S Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect cause-effecl relationships between following:(CFR: 41.2 to (SYSTEM) and the following:(CFA: 41.9/ 4S.7 to 4S.8)
----_._-------:=-_._-_._---------
219000K2.62-219000K2.02 AHRlLPCI:TorUS/PooiCooIingMode RHRlLPCI: Torus/Pool Cooling Mode 3.1 3.3 0 ~
~ boo
[] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Pumps - - - - . - - - Kno'NIedge of electrical power supplies to the following:(CFR: 41.7) 239003K4.02 MSIV Leakage Control 3 3.4 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Performance of intended safety function following any Knowledge single single active active component component failure: failure: BWR-4.S.6(P-Spec) Knowledge of of (SYSTEM) (SYSTEM) design design feature(s) feature(s) BWR-4.S.6(P-Spec) and or inter1ock(s) which provide for the following:(CFR: 41.7) 0 0 0 0=-=-=-----=------_ 245000KS.07 Main Turtline Gen. / Aux. 2.6 2.9 0 0 0 0 ~ [] 0 Generator operations and limitations Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.S /4S.7) Page 1 of 2 1211812008 8:38 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T2G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A 1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SRO SAO 256OOOG2.1.30 Reactor Condensate 4.4 4.0 nOD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2J Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls. This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated. 271000A4.06 Offgas 3.3 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2J 0 System indicating lights and alarms Ability to manually operate and/or monitor room:(CFR: 41.7/45.5 to in the control room:(CFA: 45.8)
- -:--- -----::-:----:::------=:---=- =-.. . . . .-=-
288000A2.05 Plant Ventilation 2.6 2.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2J 0 [J 0 Extreme ou1side weather conditions: Plant-Specific Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5 I 43.51 45.3/45.13) operation:(CFA: 290001K3.0l SecondaryCTMT 4.0 4.4 0 [1 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Off-site radioactive release rates Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:(CFR: 41.7/ 45.6) 29OOO2Kl-:D4~eactor-VeSsellntemals 29OOO2Kl.04 Reactor Vessellntemals 3.4 3.5 ~
~ 0 COO 0 0 0 0 0 0 HPCI: Plant-Specific Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between (SYSTEM) and the foliowing:(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9/45.7 to 45.8)
Page 2 of 2 1211812008 8:38 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T3 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: fA Kl K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SRO G2.139 Conduct of operations 3.6 4.3 0 0 0 0 [.1 0 0 [.1 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of conservative decision making practices G2.1.6 Conduct of operations 3.8 3.8 4.8 4.8 0 0 ODD 0 0 0 [J 0 ~ ~ Ability to manage the control room crew dunng plant transients. G2.2.20 Equipment Control 2.6 3.8 0 [.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~
~ Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities.
- - - -Equipment G2.2.22 Control Equipment Control 4.0 4.7 0 0 0 0- -=-==--=--=--=-
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 &2l Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. G'-- : : -:-14-:-----Ra-d-ia-tio"O-C-on-tr-oI-
=2-:.3=-. -:c-,------- - - - - - ---
=---=--=-=-=.-,----..,.--_.-
G2.3.14 Radiation Control 3.4 3.8 DOC 0 DOD D 0 0 0 0 0 ~
~ Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal. abnormal. or emergency conditions or activities G2.3.4 Radiation Control 3.2 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [J 0 -------.----------------
~
~
Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal and emergency conditions G2.3.7 RadiatIOn Control Radialion 3.5 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [.1
-------~----------.--.-
0 0 0 ~
~ Ability to comply WIth
---~--
with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions Page 1 of 2 1211812008 8:38 AM
ES-401, REV 9 T3 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: fR Kl K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: AO SAO G2.4.18 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.3 4.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [1 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. G2.4.26 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.1 3.6 0 DOC 0 0 0 0 0 0 621 Knowledge of facility protection requirements including fire brigade and portable fire fighting equipment usage.
._------=-._-_.
_------=-._-- G2.4.6 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.7 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge symptom based EOP mitigation strategies. Page 2 of 2 1211812008 8:38 AM
E5-401, REV 9 SRO T1Gl BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SAO SRO 295003G2.4.50 Partial or Complete Loss of AC / 6 42 4.0 0 0 0 [1 [J 0 0 0 0 LJ ~ Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.
- - - - - - - _ . _ - - _ .. - - - - - - - --- ------------- --- ---~-.------ - ------
295016G2.4.3 Control Room Abandonment /7 3.7 3.7 3_9 3.9 0 0 0 lJ U 0 0 [J [J 0 0 21 ~ Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation. This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated. 295018AA2.01 Partial or Total Loss of CCW / 8 3.3 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Component temperatures ...... _........................ . Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10/43.5/ 45,(3) 295023AA2.01 Acc Cooling Mode 18 Refueling Ace 3.6 4_0 4.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Area radiation levels .............. _.... _._........... .. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 I 43.51 45.13)
----------=,.--:---~-=-
295025EA2.01 High Reactor Pressure I 3 4_3 4.3 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 .. _............ _.................... Reactor pressure ............... ........................ Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 I 43.51 45,13) 45.13)
-*-------c:--------
295027EA2.01 High Containment Temperature 15 3.7 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Containment temperature: Mark-III ........... .......... .... Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41_10 41.10 I 43.5 / 45.13) Page 1 of 2 12/1812008 8:38 AM
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1Gl BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 KS K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: AO SAO 700000G2A31 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 4.2 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of annunciatOfS alarms. indications or Dislrurbancecs response procedures This is a Generic. no stem statement is associated. Page20f 2 1211812008 8:38 AM
E$-401, REV 9 SRO T1G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM E5-401-1 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 KS K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SRO 295012G2.4.34 High Drywall Temperature IS 4.2 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [J ~ Knowledge of RO tasks performed outside the main control room during an emergency and the resultant This is a Generic, no stem statement is operational effects associated. 295013AA2.02 High Suppression Pool Temp. 15 3.2 3.5 0 0 DOC 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 localized heating/stratification..................... . Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOlUTION):(CFR: 41.10/43.51 4S.13) 295033EA2.03 High Secondary Containment Area 3.7 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Cause of high area radiation ........... Radiation levels 1 9 . Ability to determine and Interpret interpret the following as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EYOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 1 43.SI 45.13) Page 1 of 1 12118/2008 8:39 AM
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T2G1 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Kl K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2. A3 A4 G TOPIC: AO SAO 206000A216 HPCI 4 4.1 COO 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 High drywell pressure: BWR-2,3,4 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13) 212000A2.20 RPS 4.1 4,1 4.2 o0 0 -[j-0----0--0------0----0 --0--_
~
Full system activation (full-SCRAM) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal 41.5/ 43.5/ 45.3 / 45.13) operation:{CFR: 41,5/ 2-17-000G2.4-.4-1-=R-=C:-:IC~--- - - ------- - 217000G2.4.41 RCIC 2.9 4,6 4.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. This is a Generic, no stem statement is aSSOCiated.
--'-- --=-~------.---. ----.
239OO2G2.4.45 SAYs 4.1 4,1 4.3 4.3 0OOODOOODOD~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [] 0 ~ Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm. This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated. associated, 26-iOOOA2~ SGTS 261000A2.11 ----- 3.2 3.3 0 0 0 0=--==--::::--0 0 0---'--- ~
~ -00 []
-=---:-c-0 0 High containment pressure Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13)
Page 1 of 1 1211812008 8:39 AM
ES401, REV 9 SRO T2G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 KS K6 A 1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SRO 202001 A2.1 0 RecirculatiOn 3.S 3.9 0 0 0 0 DOD DOD 0 0 0 !i2J ~ Ll 0 [] Recirculation pump seal failure Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.S/ 41.S / 43.SI 45.3 / 4S.13) 215002A2.0S 215002A2.05 RBM 32 3.3 0 ---------
-----------------=-=--
0 [] [J 0 0 0 [J !i2J 0 0 0 RBM high or inoperable: BWR-3,4,S Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based predictions, use procedures to on those predictiOns, correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal 43.S / 4S.3 / 4S.13) operatlon:(CFR: 41.S / 43.S/4S.3/4S.13) 233OOOG2.4.3S Fuel Pool Cooling/Cleanup 3.8 4.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [J [-] 0 0 0 !i2J ~ Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during emergency and the resultant operational effects This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated. Page 1 of 1 1211812008 8:39 AM
ES-401, REV 9 SRO T3 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: AO SAO G2.1.13 Conduct of operations 2.5 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 ~ Knowfedge of facility requirements for controlling vital / controlled access.
- - - - -Dod------.- -- - ---------._-
G2.1-.-4------Conduct of operations 3.3 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 OODODOOOOO~ 0 ~ Knowfedge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements,
*oo-solo* operation, maintenance of active license statur, lOCFA55 etc.
G2.2.19 Equipment Control 2.3 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowfedge of maintenance work order requirements. G2.2.23 Equipment Control 3.1 4.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to track Technical SpecifICation limiting conditions for operations. G2.3.11--'RadiationControl G2.3.11 Radiation Control 3.8 4.3 0000 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 ~
~ Ability to control radiation releases ---_.- ----- -----_._- ----_. -----=---------_._----------------
G2.3.7 Radiation Control Radiation Control 3.5 0 [J 3*S---0 3.6 [J ODD 0 -0 0 0 0 '[To 0 0 00 0 ~
~ rad~tion work Ability to comply with radiation wOrk permit requirements-requirements during normal or abnormal conditions G2.4.8 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.8 4.5 0 0 00 00 DOC U 0 COO 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowfedge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.
EOPs_ Page 1 of 1 1211812008 8:39 AM
ES-401 Record of Rejected KlAs Form ES-401-4 Tier 1 Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KiA Rejected KiA EK3.02 on the premise that it is plant design specific to Mark III Containments. BFN is a Mark I Containment. Replaced EKiA K3.02 with KiA EK3.02 from 295026 1 11 295027 EK3.02 Suppression Pool High Water Temp. (previously not sampled); which was randomly selected by the NRC (S. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. Rejected KiA EK1.01 on the premise that we could not develop a discriminating question at the RO level. Replaced KiA EK1.01 1 11 295038 EK1.01 with KiA EK1.03; which was randomly selected by the NRC (S. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. Rejected KiA EA2.01 on the premise that it is plant design specific to Mark III Containments. SFN is a Mark I Containment. 1 11 295027 EA2.01 Replaced KiA EA2.01 with KiA EA2.01 from 295028 High Drywell Temperature; which was randomly selected by the NRC (S. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. Rejected KiA K5.01 on the premise that there is no reasonable linkage at BFN. Testable feature, controls, and indicating lights 2/1 203000 K5.01 were removed on all three units for valves 74-54 and 74-68. Replaced KiA K5.01 with KiA K5.02; which was randomly selected by the NRC (B. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. Rejected KiA K4.16 on the premise that it is plant design specific to HPCI Systems and there is no design basis for this 2/1 206000 K4.16 HPCI design feature at BFN. Replaced KiA K4.16 with KiA 4.03; which was randomly selected by the NRC (S. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. Rejected KiA A4.03 on the premise that it is plant design specific to SWRs 2-3. BFN has no Isolation Condensers. 2/1 207000 A4.03 Replaced KiA A4.03 with KiA A4.03 from 205000 Shutdown Cooling; which was randomly selected by the NRC (B. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. Rejected KiA A3.04 on the premise that it is plant design specific to BWRs 5-6. SFN has no High Press Core Spray 2/1 209002 A3.04 System. Replaced KiA A3.04 with KiA A3.04 from 262001 AC Electrical Distribution; which was randomly selected by the NRC (B. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. Rejected KiA K6.09 on the premise of overlap with the SRO portion of the Written Exam (T2/G1 261000 A2.11). Replaced 2/1 261000 K6.09 KiA K6.09 with KiA K6.05; which was randomly selected by the NRC (B. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. 1/20/2009 - 8:34:19 AM Page 1 ~f 2-
ES-401 Record of Rejected KIAs Form ES-401-4 Tier 1 Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KIA Rejected KIA A 1.01 on the premise that it is plant design specific and there is no reasonable linkage at BFN. BFN has no Rod Sequence Control System. Replaced KIA A1.01 with KIA 2/2 201004 A1.01 A1.01 from 241000 ReactorlTurbine Pressure Regulator; which was randomly selected by the NRC (B. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. 1/20/2009 - 8:34:19 AM Page 2 01 2.
ES-401 Record of Rejected KlAs Form ES-401-4 Tier 1 Group Randomly Selected KIA
~ i\ A 1\ A ~son for Rejection Rejected KIA EK3.02 on the premise that it is plant design specific to Mark III Containments. SFN is a Mark I Containment.
Replaced EKiA K3.02 with KIA EK3.02 from 295026 1 11 295027 EK3.02 Suppression Pool High Water Temp. (previously not sampled); which was randomly selected by the NRC (S. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. Rejected KIA EK1.01 on the premise that we could not develop a discriminating question at the RO level. Replaced KIA EK1.01 1 11 295038 EK1.01 with KIA EK1.03; which was randomly selected by the NRC (S. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. Rejected KIA EA2.01 on the premise that it is plant design specific to Mark III Containments. SFN is a Mark I Containment. 1 11 295027 EA2.01 Replaced KIA EA2.01 with KIA EA2.01 from 295028 High Drywell Temperature; which was randomly selected by the NRC (S. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. Rejected KIA K5.01 on the premise that there is no reasonable linkage at SFN. Testable feature, controls, and indicating lights 2/1 203000 K5.01 were removed on all three units for valves 74-54 and 74-68. Replaced KIA K5.01 with KIA K5.02; which was randomly selected by the NRC (S. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. Rejected KIA K4.16 on the premise that it is plant design specific to HPCI Systems and there is no design basis for this 2/1 206000 K4.16 HPCI design feature at SFN. Replaced KIA K4.16 with KIA 4.03; which was randomly selected by the NRC (S. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. Rejected KIA A4.03 on the premise that it is plant design specific to SWRs 2-3. SFN has no Isolation Condensers. 2/1 207000 A4.03 Replaced KIA A4.03 with KIA A4.03 from 205000 Shutdown Cooling; which was randomly selected by the NRC (S. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. Rejected KIA A3.04 on the premise that it is plant design specific to SWRs 5-6. SFN has no High Press Core Spray 2/1 209002 A3.04 System. Replaced KIA A3.04 with KIA A3.04 from 262001 AC Electrical Distribution; which was randomly selected by the NRC (S. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. Rejected KIA K6.09 on the premise of overlap with the SRO portion of the Written Exam (T2/G 1 261000 A2 .11). Replaced 2/1 261000 K6.09 KIA K6.09 with KIA K6.05; which was randomly selected by the NRC (S. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. 7/13/2009 - 3:26:26 PM Page 1
ES-401 Record of Rejected KlAs Form ES-401-4 Tier I Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected KiA Rejected KiA A1.01 on the premise that it is plant design specific and there is no reasonable linkage at BFN. BFN has no Rod Sequence Control System. Replaced KiA A1.01 with KiA 2/2 201004 A 1.01 A 1.01 from 241000 ReactorlTurbine Pressure Regulator; which was randomly selected by the NRC (B. Caballero) per phonecon on 1/14/2009. This KiA doesn't make sense and may not be applicable for Region 2 BWRs, i.e., effect that a loss or malfunction of RPS 2/1 212000 K3.01 will have on Recirc. (the converse could be true .. but this is confusing). Suggest replacing KiA. Discuss wi licensee .. 06/04/09: Replaced KiA wi 212000 K3.05 Could not write a discriminating question at the RO level for administrative control of troubleshooting activities. Chief 3 (RO) G2.2.20 Examiner randomly selected replacement G2.2.13 (Tagging & Clearance procedures) If"
~'I*I\I,
.~
7/13/2009 - 3:26:26 PM '-:INAL Page 2
ES-401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES-401-6
- Facility: Browns Ferry NPP Date of Exam: July 6 - 30,2009 Item Description Exam Level: RO [Sl SRO [Sl a
Initial b* c#
- 1. Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility.
~I! QD
~It ~ .,"*:f, ">/'
- 2. a. NRC KlAs are referenced for all questions.
- b. Facility leaming objectives are referenced as available.
~ ~ lyb 1'-
I'*
- 3. SRO questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES -401
~ ~ liPf) /iP1)
- 4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exam, consult the NRR OL program office). I{)U '~ Dflj;
- 5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate:
~ the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or
_ the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or _ the examinations were developed independently; or
~ the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or
_other (explain) dJ£ ~ I~
- 6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent Bank Modified New from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO / SRO -only question distribution(s) at right.
1010 14/3 51/22 riJq ~ ~
- 7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO Memory CIA
~W exam are written at the comprehension /analysis level; RO/SRO RO/SRO 1l,1J~
the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected KAs support the higher cognitive levels; enter 34 1 7 41 1 18 45.3%/28% 54.7%172% I .' the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right.
~ ~ f~
- 8. Referenceslhandouts provided do not give away answers or aid in the elimination of distractors.
- 9. Question content conforms with specific KIA statements in the previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the Tier to which they are assigned; deviations are justified f0- ~ r~
- 10. Question psychometric quality and format meet the guidelines in ES Appendix B.
W?-- ~ fV,U> itJ?- ftM)
- 11. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items; the total is correct and agrees with value on cover sheet £ti \ rtp)
P:j;:l7t(... & ff4. P:;J;:A7t e
~. ':/' .j;".
~
);".
Date
/' ..* I
- a. Author Donald C. BinkleyJr.
Binklev Jr. / Ii II (... _ PI II 6/25/09
- b. Facility Reviewer (*) Daniel L. Huahes HUQhes /
,~~
~_v.
III 6/25/09
~'r1/;~~fl4-***-
~'r1/;~~.d4
- %~lh 1Z[CI-\?\Z.O S,cbAL-{)
1Z[CI-\i\Z.O SCbAL-L) -_. ----,--
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)
- d. NRC Regional Supervisor N t>.c U ..;) V'I
..;) / )
fA} i 0 'W('/N ,..J ) f1DN~-7r1 T ., fA}if)><.AAcN'...J f,Jl;;;liJ'Li rUi- ~- 1J~-" Note:
- The facility reviewer's initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-d~oped examinations.
# Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "CO; chief examiner concurrence required, required.
- ES-401, Page 29 of 33
ES-403, Rev. 9 Written Examination Grading Form ES-403-1 Quality Checklist Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: July 22,2009 ExamLeve~~ ExamLeve~) Initials Item Description a b c
- 1. Clean answer sheets copied before grading RSB NA PGC
- 2. Answer key changes and question deletions justified and RSB NA PGC documented
- 3. Applicants' scores checked for addition errors RSB NA PGC examinations)
(reviewers spot check> 25% of examinationsl
- 4. Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, RSB NA PGC as applicable, +/-4% on the SRO-only) reviewed in detail
- 5. All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades RSB NA PGC are justified
- 6. Performance on missed questions checked for training deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity of RSB NA PGC a~licants questions missed by half or more of the applicants
~_~ _________ ~~ErJnted _t--Jame/Signature Date
--~------
- a. Grader Richard S. Baldwinl, 6~~ ~ 08/25/09
- b. Facility Reviewer(*) NA
~ I I
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (*) Phillip G.Capeharti ~WS\...,.
~Ca.U\"'~ ~~ {3; ).-(, 01
- d. NRC Supervisor (*) Malcolm T. Widmannl
!JJ(JlIJ~7ij "1,'JJJJ~
I I o::c.. it.u"r------~- t:tf2fJ. l! cr~
\..::.Y
(*) The facility reviewer's signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent indeQendent NRC reviews are required.
ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only Gen Before in-office visit (I2relimina[y assessment): [Allowing credit for changes to previously identified Unsat items on 4/22109 and 5/11/09 submittals; i.e., only tallying Unsat items on the 5/21/09 submittal) Sixteen Unsat RO Items: 4, 20, 21, 23, 33, 45, 48, 51, 53, 54, 55, 59, 62, 65, 70, and 72 [16/75 = 21.3%) 76, 78, 81, 82, 84, 92, & 93 [7/25 = 28%) Seven Unsat SRO Items: 76,78,81,82,84,92, Overall # of Unsat Items: 23/100 = 23%. After in-office visit: Eleven Unsat RO items: 21,33,45,48,51,53,54,55,59,62,and 21, 33, 45, 48, 51, 53, 54, 55, 59, 62, and 70 [11/75 = 14.6%) Seven Unsat SRO Items: 76, 78, 81, 82, 84, 92, & 93 [7/25 =28%) = 28%) Gen If annunciator(s) referred to in a question, use EXACT nomenclature engraved on Alarm Window (also specified in ARP) followed by parentheses containing the shortest possible abbreviated window location designation that the applicants are familiar with. Gen Each question should contain "Which ONE of the following .. ." in the primary stem of the question. If it is a fill-in-the-blank question, utilize "Which one of the following completes the statement?" Gen If providing a reference to the candidate, place a bracketed statement "[REFERENCE PROVIDED)" between the stem and the first possible answer choice. Gen Limit the amount of references provided to the candidates to the maximum extent possible. Gen In a two-part question format with more than one element contained in each choice, limit the number of elements to two (for each choice). Gen Whenever applicable, ensure the phrase "in accordance with ... ." Is pasted after the stem question. This ensures that there is only one correct answer. In all procedure related questions, ensure that the stem question includes "in accordance with .. .[procedure name)"
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws S. Other 6. 7. 8.
0# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-S) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only Gen Please submit reference discs (in addition to "selected" procedure references) because this will:
- 1) allow research on questions [For example, on question #82, the procedure used to verify the correct answer was linked on the IronKey (AOI-S71E, Grid Instability); however, the "distractor procedure" (AOI-S7-1B) was not provided.] and
- 2) facilitate development of alternative suggestions for questions needing replacements.
Additionally, sometimes the "link" provided on the IronKey document doesn't work for the EOP flowcharts? (e.g., 0#1S) Gen Avoid using the word "should" in any test questions because this can often be argued as correct by an applicant. Gen SRO-only Clarification Guidance Rev 0, page 12 contains an example of a good SRO-only question that is linked to 10CFRSS.43 (S) procedure selection. Also pages 7 & 8 provide clarification in the first bullets by stating that if the question involves prescribing a procedure, then it may be SRO-only. To further clarify: One area of SRO-Ievel knowledge (with respect to prescribing or selecting procedures) is know/edge of the content of the procedure (SRO knowledge) versus know/edge of the overall mitigative strategy of the procedure (RO knowledge). To satisfy the 10CFRSS.43.S topic, the question must be linked to procedure selection. The SRO portion of a question may include procedure selection, tech specs, and/or E-plan classification, among the 7 areas listed in 10CFRSS.43. Discuss wI licensee. Gen Ensure that the stem question is followed with a question mark (?) instead of trailing ( .... )
Instructions [Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]
- 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable).
- 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information). The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc). The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements. T~!d!~n'!~.t!?rs aren,<:lH!<:lib!J; s!(1J1le.im~~~!!~ible dis~ractors s~ould be repaired, more than one i.s unacceptable. .
~~~1ii'_ (e.g., If the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).
- 4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:
The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not operational in content). The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory). The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.
- 5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KIA and license level mismatches are unacceptable).
- 6. Enter question source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Check that (M)odified questions meet criteria of ES-401 Section D.2.f.
- 7. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?
- 8. At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).
ES-401 2 Form ES-401-9
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Crecl. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/MiN utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. B.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UlE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 1 H 2 x x x x N E 295001 AA1.02
- 1. Cred Dis!: (Discuss wI licensee) "C" and "0" are not plausible because of the 1st portion of each one of these choices ("verify tripped Recirc Pump 1A") implies that the Recirc Pump is still running even though the annunciator in alarm is "Recirc Loop 1A Out of Service. Suggest re-working question to a 2-part format asking whether the core flow subtraction circuit is subtracting (or is not subtracting) AND whether an immediate manual scram is required (or normal reactor shutdown).
- 2. Stem Focus: Did the discharge valve spuriously close? If so, then state this in the stem. May be plausible since valve has an auto-closure feature, i.e., 310 psig LOCA Signal.
- 3. Cue: The stem states that 1-SR-3.4.1 (SLO) is complete. This information is not necessary to elicit the correct response and is also a required RO knowledge item; could potentially provide answers to other questions on the exam.
- 4. 5/11/09: Licensee submitted revision wI corrected items #1 - 3 ;
however, the suggestion to re-work question to 2-part format on core flow subtraction circuit and immediate manual scram required was not incorporated.
- 5. Job-Link: Ask licensee if Browns Ferry has commenced startup wI only 1 recirc pump in service. GOI allows this; however, could an applicant successfully argue that this is not operationally valid?
~ the following:
Unit 1 is starting up at 20% power when both recirc pumps trip. WOOTF identifies the status of the RPS OPRM trip at this power level and also identifies the required operator actions in accordance with 1-AOI-68-1 and TS 3.4.1? A OPRM trips are bypassed; IMMEDIATEL Y scram the reactor B. OPRM trips are bypassed; Within 24 hours re-start at least one recircpump C. OPRM trips are armed; IMMEDIA TEL Y scram the reactor D. OPRM trips are armed; Within 24 hours re-start at least one recircpump
- 6. 5121/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 7. Cred Dist: "C" is not plausible because no leak in stem. Suggest using my question or split yours into two part using "A" & "B" & "0" B. Stem Focus: add "in accordance with" to stem question.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UlE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KJA Only 2 H 4 X MB E 295003 AK1.03
- 1. Stem Focus: The 2nd sentence is not dear with respect to which DG has a lockout. i.e., "a lockout occurs on Diesel Generator Y.
o due to .... n [what does" Y. 0 >> mean?]
- 2. The 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement is cumbersome to read; Discuss how it can read easier; possibly suggest eliminating both fill-in-the-blank statements and incorporating stem focus as follows:
WOOTF identifies how the loss of power will affect the Unit 1 Low Pressure ECCS systems as reactor pressure lowers below their shutoff head?
- 3. 05121/09: Licensee's submittal induded the same question because no feedback (induding suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flam 4. Job Content Flam 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 3 F 2 X B E 295004 AK3.02
- 1. Tough KIA to hit. Question appears to be from past NRC exam?
- 2. Cred Dis!: "B" is not plausible because an inadvertent overcurrent trip on a breaker that was quickly returned to the ON position would not adversely affect anything because the breaker was just turned OFF. "C" is not plausible because one breaker being cycled too quickly will not cause a battery charger to trip on "large swings in current."
Suggest the following: WOOTF identifies the type of ground detection system used for Battery Board 2 and the reason why 0-GOI-3OO-2 directs leaving each cycled breaker open for one minute during ground hunting? A. Photocell; allow time for ground detector indication to respond B. (some other type); allow time for ground detector indication to respond C. Photocell: prevent inadvertent initiation of the equipment D. (some other type); prevent inadvertent initiation of the equipment
- 3. 05121/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN UlE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 4 F 2 X N U 295005 G2.4.21
- 1. Q=KlA: Tier 1, Group 1 is Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions. KIA not being hit because the question is not testing the applicant's knowledge of parameters used to assess the "status* of the turbine-generator following a trip; as written, the question is testing applicant's Tier 2 knowledge. This question should ask an applicant how to assess the status of the main turbine generator to verify it is tripped.
Suggest the following: Unit 2 was operating at 30% power when a reactor scram occurred. During the implementation of 2-AOI-100-1 the operator reaches the following step: VERIFY TRIPPED Main Turbine on Panel 2-9-8 WOOTF identifies the expected status of the Generator Exciter Field Breaker indication and a reason why the turbine is required to be verified tripped in accordance with 2-AOI-100-1, Reactor Scram?
- 1. Red light OFF and Green Ught ON; avoid motorizing the main generator
- 2. Red light DIM and Green Ught brightly ON; ensure turning I gear operation
- 3. Red light OFF and Green Ught ON; ensure turning gear I operation
- 4. Red light DIM and Green Light brightly ON; avoid motorizing the main generator I
- 2. 05/21/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been I received from the NRC as of this date.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
I Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Oist. Link units ward KIA Only I 5 F 2 X B E 295006 AK2.02
- 1. Cred Oist: "C" is not plausible because a feedpump being in I
MANUAL would not transfer to AUTO since it was wanming. May want to use "B" and "0" and find another piece of knowledge to convert into two-part question.
- 2. 05/21/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
6 H 2 X MB E 295016 G2.4.30
- 1. Tough KIA to hit for RO exam. Question appears to have been used on previous NRC exam ... SRO??
- 2. Job-Link: Ask licensee if E-plan classification is appropriate for RO applicant.
Suggest re-working question to ask for EPIP Appendix B expectations for RO who is perfonming offsite notifications because classification is SRO knowledge.
- 3. 05/21/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Creel. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N u/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 7 ~ 2 X B ~ 295018 AA1.02 H E 1. Q=KlA: The question (as written) appears to be targeting the reason for reducing power, i.e., see KA 295018 AK3.02. Suggest asking a question that requires knowledge of specific required actions in 1-AOI-70-1 OR alternatively, ask a question regarded to control board indications for a system load following a partial or complete loss of RBCCW.
- 2. 5/11/09: Licensee submitted the same question.
Suggest the following: Unit 1 is operating at 80% power when a PARTIAL loss of RBCCWoccurs. WOOTF identifies highest pressure that will cause the RBCCW Sectionalizing Valve, 2-FCV-70-48, to automatically close and a subsequent action to control or reduce drywell temperatures in accordance with 1-AOI-70-1, Loss of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water? O. RBCCW Pump Discharge Header pressure at or below 57 psig; Locally place one of the 10" RBCCWHx Temperature Control Valve controllers in MANUAL and adjust open
- 1. RBCCW Pump Discharge Header pressure at or below 57 psig; Reduce reclrc pump speeds
- 2. RBCCW Pump Discharge Header pressure at or below 50 psig; Locally place one of the 10" RBCCW Hx Temperature Control Valve controllers in MANUAL and adjust open
- 3. RBCCW Pump Discharge Header pressure at or below 50 psig; Reduce recirc pump speeds
- 3. 5121109: Licensee submitted revised question testing applicant's knowledge of which load still has cooling available (essential loop) following 1A RBCCW Pump trip.
- 4. Stem Focus: delete the word "atmospheric" from "A" to be consistent wI other plant references.
- 5. Stem Focus: the phrase "Based on current plant conditions" is not necessary.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 8 F 2 x x x x N E 295019 AK2.18
- 1. Cues: replace the words "on a complete loss of Control Air to the Drywell ... " with "on a complete loss of pneumatic supply to the accumulator. . ."
- 2. Partial: insert the words "for a minimum of just prior to the second fill-in-the-blank to ensure that only one choice is correct.
- 3. Stem focus: insert the words ""valve actuations can still occur" just after the 1st fill-in-the-blank to replace the words "will occur";
an applicant could successfully argue that not enough information was presented in the stem to predict whether an ADS valve actuation would occur.
- 4. Cred Dis!: Why is "3" plausible? (for choices "A" and "CO)
Also ... the question worksheet that was submitted has different numbers (Le., 6) than the clean copy submittal sheet. Do normal SRVs have accumulators?
- 5. 5/11/09: Changes incorporated.
Suggest re-wording the fill-in-the-blank to clarify:
"Following a complete loss of pneumatic supply to the ADS Safety Relief Valves, the accumulators are sized to ensure at least - - - valve actuations OR that the valve can be maintained open for at least ___ .
- 6. OS/21/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
9 H 2 X N E 295021 G2.2.4
- 1. Interesting way to hit Loss of Shutdown Cooling KIA. Browns Ferry has sharing restrictions (different for each unit) for RHRSW system; therefore generic portion is being hit.
- 2. Stem Focus: Add .."in accordance with 2-AOI-1 00-2?" to the stem question to ensure question is bullet proof with respect to the word "preferred."
- 3. 05/21/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Oist. Link units ward KIA Only 10 H 2 X X N + 295023 AA1.04 e 1. Cred Oist "A", "CO, and "0" are not plausible because the capitalized and bolded word "ALL" in the 1st and 3rd bullets; Le., S same as correct choice "B." Ask the licensee if there is ever a time when only one or two SBGT will auto-start? If not, then "CO and "0" are not plausible for this reason. [question may be unsat]
- 2. Stem Focus: Is this trash being transferred inside the dryer storage pit? It was confusing to me as to what the word "area" meant with respect to underwater.
It is acceptable to only state that a refueling accident has occurred that results in the following rad monitor readings ... This will avoid potential confusion. [KIA still met]
- 3. Job Link: Verify wi licensee that the proximity of the reactor and refuel detectors is dose to the dryer pit being described.
Otherwise, simply provide rad monitor readings for the entire refuel floor. If an accident occurred on the refueling floor, would the reactor zone detectors be affected? Verify wi licensee.
- 4. 05121/09: Licensee's submittal induded the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 5. In-office: New proposed question doesn't hit KIA; went back to original but eliminated choices wI partial SBGT running by making into a 2-part question testing knowledge of CREV.
Added bullet for ClI Bay RM-259NB @ 100 cps. QUESTION IS SAT
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UtEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 11 H 5 x e 295024 EA2.03 S 1. LOD = 5 without Curve 5 being provided to the applicant. An applicant could successfully argue that recalling the DWSIL curve from memory requires too much recall. Discuss wI licensee. Choices "A" and "B" may not be plausible if this reference is not provided to applicant.
- 2. Job Link: If reactor pressure is 50 psig, why is drywell temperature still rising? Is this operationally valid? Discuss wI licensee.
- 3. Suggestion: For a high DW pressure situation, ask the applicant when DW spray is required fatter torus pressure exceeds 12 psigj and the highest torus level that DW spray is permitted
[below 18 ttj.
- 4. 05/21/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 5. In-office: Licensee incorporated suggestion. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 12 H 2 X N e 295025 EK2.04 S 1. Stem Focus: In order to streamline and eliminate potential appeals, suggest the following: Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a spurious scram signal occurred with the following conditions:
- Bypass Valves failed to operate and 13 SRVs initially lifted
- Hydraulic ATWS occurred and reactor power remains at 32%
- Main Turbine still on-line WOOTF predicts the current status of the Recirc Pumps?
- 2. This question includes 3 malfunctions: 1) spurious scram signal;
- 2) Bypass Valve failure; and 3) Hydraulic ATWS. (may be okay; discuss wi licensee) Group 1 isolation may be better than Bypass Valve failure. Discuss wi licensee.
- 3. 05/21/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 4. Stem Focus: The phrase "Given that NO operator actions have been taken" is not necessary in the stem question. Suggest re-wording as WOOTF predicts the status of both recirc pumps?"
- 5. In-office: Item #1 changes incorporated. Discussed premise of question wi Ops Management: purpose to test applicant's knowledge of Recirc Pump ARI trip given SRV lift S. Appears to be okay as written. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 13 F 2 X MB e 295026 EK3.02 S 1. Q=KlA: The question does not hit the KIA because it is not testing the applicant's knowledge of the reason for pool cooling. As written, the question asks for the temperature limits during RCIC testing. Suggest the following: 01-71, ReIC, states that the US is required to evaluate placing suppression pool COOling in service prior to initiating any event which adds heat to the suppression pool. WOOTF identifies the reason for this caution and the lowest suppression pool temperature that requires suppression pool cooling in accordance with 0/-71, RCIC? A. Provide assurance that the containment conditions assumed for the safety analysis are met; 90 deg B. Provide assurance that the containment conditions assumed for the safety analysis are met; 95 deg C. Potential of developing thermal stagnation; 90 deg D. Potential of developing thermal stagnation; 95 deg
- 2. 05/21/09: Licensee's submittal induded the same question because no feedback (induding suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 3. In-office: Licensee submitted different question asking for 01-71 I temperature precaution & limitation when torus cooling is required and also the reason for this P&L. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UlE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KJA Only 14 ~ -+ *
- B lj 295028 EK1.01 H 3 MB S 1. Q = KJA or LOD=1: This question targets generic fundamentals exam topics; Le., reference leg (vs variable leg) will flash causing erroneously high (vs low) level indications. This portion of the NRC licensing process is the "plant specific" written exam; therefore, plant specific knowiedge must be evaluated. Discuss wI licensee possibility of evaluating a knowledge item related to Caution 1 (may need to provide reference?).
- 2. Stem Focus: The first bullet in the stem is not necessary to elicit the correct response. Are the other bullets necessary?
- 3. 5/11/09: Licensee submitted the same question. Suggest writing a question that tests the applicants' knowledge of Caution 1.
- 4. 5121109: Licensee submitted a modified bank question that tests applicants' knowledge of which level range instruments are available following a leak in the drywell and proposes providing applicants with Caution 1. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 5. Stem Focus: The 1st bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 6. Stem Focus: The stem question should be re-worded as WOOTF identifies the level instrument(s) that may be used to determine or trend level in accordance with the EOPs?"
- 7. In-office: All changes incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
Requires reference Caution 1, Curve 8, and Table 6.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 15 H 3 x x x N e 295030 EK3.03 S 1. Partial: An applicant could argue "CO as also correct because of the specific EOI-02 caution that warns the operator that RCIC may trip (vs "will trip") on high torus pressure (stem conditions have high torus pressure). In order to make "CO completely wrong, add a statement to "CO regarding HPCI operation (Le., leave HPCI running)
- 2. Cues: The last bullet in the stem provides a cue that "A" is an incorrect answer. Is it possible to modify stem such that applicant can interpret plant conditions to ascertain that feedpumps aren't available?
- 3. Stem Focus: The stem question ["WOOTF directives is required, at this moment, from the US?"] can be more precisely worded as follows: "WOOTF identifies the required operator actions for vessel level control in accordance with 2-EOI-01 and
-EOI-02?" What is the significance of the phrase "at this time?"
- 4. The link (to the EOI flowcharts) provided on the question worksheet did not work.
- 5. 5/11/09: Licensee re-submitted this question wI following changes; however, these changes still require addressing as follows:
Comment 1: Licensee added "HPCI continues to operate"; however, this does not now match the stem question. Modify to say "Transition Reactor Water Level control to HPCI: Comment 2: Licensee added "mode switch is stuck in RUN." This is a very unlikely event and still causes the same problem described in Item 2 above. Suggest providing bullet that condenser vacuum is less than [value] feedpump trip setpoint. Comment 3: incorporated.
- 6. 05121/09: Licensee's submittal induded the same question because no feedback (induding suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 7. In-office. Licensee incorporated all changes. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UlE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 16 H 3 x MB 295031 EA2.03 S 1. Stem Focus: Suggest re-wording stem question as follows:
'WOOTF predicts the total injection flowrate for the Loop 1 Core Spray pumps?"
- 2. 05/21/09: Licensee's submittal induded the same question because no feedback (induding suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 3. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
17 H 2 X N 295037 G2.2.12 S 1. This is a tough KIA to hit because of the generic tie to surveillance procedures [given an ATWS situationj.
- 2. Stem Focus: ~ re-wording the stem question as follows:
WOOTF identifies the earliest time when a coo/down can be commenced and a/so identifies the required coo/down rate in accordance with 2-EO/-1, RPV Contro/, RCIP? A. 0230; Maintain coo/down rate be/ow 100 deg/hr B. 0247; Maintain cooldown rate below 100 deg/hr C. 0230; Maintain coo/down rate be/ow 90 deg/hr D. 0247; Maintain coo/down rate be/ow 90 deg/hr
- 3. 05/21/09: Licensee's submittal induded the same question because no feedback (including (induding suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 4. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Creel. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 18 F 2 x x x x N e 295038 EK1.03 S 1. Cue: Stem states that a ground level release is occurring; this is a cue for the lowest met tower elevation to be chosen as correct. (could also make "B" and "0" not credible). Suggest re-wording the first sentence as follows: "A release is occurring due to an unisolable main steam line break in the turbine building. "
- 2. Stem Focus: Suggest re-wording the stem question as follows:
WOOTF completes the following statements lAW EPIP-13, Dose Assessment? (split out the fill-in-the-blank statement into two sentences since these are two separate thoughts.
- 3. Cred Dist: Ask licensee to explain plausibility for dose assessment team gathering weather data locally on plant site.
- 4. Stem Focus: Avoid the word "should" in any test questions because this can often be argued as correct by an applicant.
~ re-wording the fill-in-the-blank statement as follows:
"Meteorological Tower data from _ is required to be collected for the dose assessment. IF the normal SPDS METDAT screen is not available, THEN obtain wind speed and direction from the
- 5. Job-Link: EPIP-13, Step 3.1.2 states that the RP Shift Supervisor is responsible for gathering Appendix B data (ground level release info). Ask licensee if RO task list indudes data gathering for offsite dose assessment. Can an applicant argue that this task is not performed by Operations? Discuss wI licensee.
- 6. 5/11/09: Licensee re-submitted the same question to discuss.
- 7. 5/21/09: Licensee submitted a different question that tests applicants' knowledge of WRGERMS constitutes an "elevated" release path and wind direction measurements are provided "from" the direction.
- 8. In-office: Discussed Job-Link wI Ops Management, who approved the test item as relevant to RO tasks. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 19 F 2 X X X N e 600000 AK3.04 S 1. Partial: An applicant can also argue "B" as correct because supporting fire activities is equivalent to "ensuring SSI actions."
- 2. Stem Focus: The fill-in-the-blank statement could be confusing because it does not specifically refer to the extra AUOs. (i.e., "all other AUOs may not be clear to the applicants taking the exam.)
- 3. Job-Link: Which ARP (procedure?) directs an operator to sound the site fire alarm? Discuss wI licensee to determine correct answer for suggested question below. Suggest the following:
A fire has occurred in Unit 3 and the AUOs assigned to Unit 3 have been notified to report to the Unit 3 control room. WOOTF identifies who is responsible for sounding the site fire alarm and the reason why extra AUOs (i.e., those not assigned to Unit 3) are directed to assemble in the Unit 2 control room in accordance wot O-AO/-26-1, Fire Response?
- o. The Unit 3 RO; personnel accountability
- 1. The Unit 1 RO; personnel accountability
- 2. The Unit 3 RO; in the event SSI actions are required
- 3. The Unit 1 RO; in the event SSI actions are required
[Discuss correct answer wi licensee.}
- 4. OS/21/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 5. In-office: Licensee incorporated changes. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 20 F 1 X B V 700000 AK1.01 e 1. Q = KIA or LOD=1: This question targets generic fundamentals exam topics; i.e., a generator carrying an isolated bus can affect S frequency. This portion of the NRC licensing process is the "plant specific" written exam; therefore, plant specific knowledge must be evaluated. Discuss w/ licensee. Suggest the following (or similar) to be plant specific: The unit is operating at 80% power and the crew has entered 0-AOI-57-1E, Grid Instability, due to the 530KV system voltage being at 513KV. The crew reaches the following step in the procedure: RAISE reactive power until voltage returns to 520KV. WOOTF identifies how to raise reactive power and the 161KV Capacitor Bank status that will restore the system voltage in accordance with O-AOI-57-1E? A. Depress the EHC load set RAISE pushbutton. 3-HS 75C; Check the 161KV Capacitor Banks are IN service B. Depress the EHC load set RAISE pushbutton, 3-HS 75C; Check the 161 KV Capacitor Banks are OUT of service C. Place the Generator Field Voltage Auto Adjust (OOP), 3-HS-57-26, to the RAISE position; Check the 161KV Capacitor Banks are IN service D. Place the Generator Field Voltage Auto Adjust (gOP), 3-HS-57-26, to the RAISE position; Check the 161KV Capacitor Banks are OUT of service.
- 2. 05121/09: Licensee's submittal induded the same question because no feedback (induding suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 3. In-office: Licensee said that it was not fair to grade as unsat since this is an enhancement. Re-assessed initial question as enhancement. Licensee incorporated the proposed re-worked question I wrote. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. B.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KJA Only 21 H 2 X X N ~ 295009 AK2.04 S 1. Cred Dis!: "A" is not plausible because if a scram on low level occurred, an applicant would consider this as "abnormal" and choice "A" states "in a normal operating lineup." Additionally, "A" is the only choice that is "tripped"; the question choices are not symmetrical; therefore an unknowledgable applicant may correctly deduce that "A" is not the correct choice. "CO is not plausible because if the applicant did not know the isolation occurred, then he/she would have no reason to think that a high temperature condition could develop.
- 2. Partial: "B" can be argued as correct because the stem does not preclude an indirect relationship between the isolation valves closing [correct answer "0"] and a low flow condition which would occur following the isolation.
Suggest asking applicant status of the return to reactor valve (in addition to 69-1 &2) to create more symmetrical choices and eliminate potential partially correct answers.
- 3. Verify wi license that no overlap exists between audit and NRC
- 4. 5/21/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 5. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 22 H 2 x x x N e 295010 G2.4.49 S 1. Partial: "A" and "0" are partially correct answers. An applicant can argue that "0" is also correct because it does not include a statement which says that a manual scram is NOT required. Because choice "0" is silent with respect to whether a manual scram is required, then an applicant can argue that placing HPCI in Manual is prudent since RPV level is adequate (+28"). Suggest adding a statement to "0" to clarify that a manual scram is NOT required (incorrect). An applicant can argue that "A" is correct because AOI-64-1, Section 4.2.2, Step 15 states that "If OW pressure rise rate indicates that a reactor scram at 2.45 psig is imminent, then reduce recirc flow to minimize the impact of a scram from high power." An applicant could argue that inserting a recirc runback (before the manual scram is inserted) is a required immediate operator action. Suggest adding a statement to "A" to clarify that a manual scram is NOT required (incorrect).
- 2. Cred Dis!: Suggest changing the last part of "C" (incorrect choice) to REFUEL position to make more plausible.
- 3. Stem Focus: Suggest re-wording the stem question as follows:
"WOOTF identifies the required IMMEDIATE operator action(s)?
- 4. 5/11/09: Licensee submitted revised question which addressed comment #1 and #3. [Comment #2 not incorporated]. Question is SAT.
- 5. 5/21/09: Licensee submitted same revised question.
QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Crecl. Partial Job- Minutia #I Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 23 F 1 X ~ 295012 AK1.01 e 1. Q = KIA or LOD=1: This question targets generic fundamentals exam topics; i.e., what is the saturation temperature that S corresponds to 56 psig. This portion of the NRC licensing process is the *plant specific" written exam; therefore, plant specific knowledge must be evaluated. Discuss how the question is plant specific wI the licensee. Suggest testing the applicant's knowledge of DWSIL graph, including the 2 different reasons for the 2 unsafe regions on the graph.
- 2. 05121/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 3. In-office; Licensee said these comments were enhancements and that original question was not unsat. Re-classified original question as enhancement. Re-worked question to ask for the definition of the DWSIL, including the reason for limitation.
Verified EOI PM 2-VI-D, Page 3 of 32 stated reason as Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker capability. Note that the Rx Bldg to Torus Vacuum Breaker Isolation valvs auto-open on delta-P; however, this will de-inert the containment. (not assumed in EOI PM). QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 24 F 3 X X N e 295017 AK3.03 S 1. Job-Link: This is a tough KIA to hit for an RO. The question (as written) could be successfully argued by an appellant as being too difficult for an RO. [General Emergency dassification and PARs] Discuss wI licensee. Need to verify that RO's are responsible for this knowledge by Operations Management and lesson plan objectives.
- 2. Cred Dist: "A" and *C" are not plausible because of the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement; Le., since the fill-in-the-blank statement refers to PARS, then the plausibility of Site Area Emergency is removed.
~ testing the RO applicant's knowledge of when EOI-04 is required to be entered [Any Offsite Release meeting EPIP-1, Section 11-4 event dassification vs some other plausible reason]
AND when this flowchart directs ED [If dose rate OR Release reaches GE EPIP dassification vs ONLY if dose rate reaches GE classification.]
- 3. 5/21109: Licensee's submittal induded the same question because no feedback (induding suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 4. In-office: Licensee like earlier version better than suggestion.
Re-worded the earlier version. Operations Mgmt approved as RO question. Note Lesson Plan OPL 171.075, Obt # C.2 I QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
0# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN utE IS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KJA Only 25 H 3 X X e 295022 AA2.03 S 1. Job-Link: The distractor analysis justification referenced the TS Bases 3.1.4. If the question can only be answered by knowing the TS Bases, then an RO applicant can successfully argue that the question is too difficult (because it requires knowledge of TS Bases 3.1.4; Le., at 350 deg the rod is required to be declared slow). The annunciator procedure includes guidance on declaring the rod inoperable, and, in that light, the question may be appropriate for an RO. Discuss wI Operations Management. Suggest the following question to clearly place the item in the annunciator realm (vs TS Bases): Unit 2 is operating at 100% power when the running CRD pump trips and actions to restore a CRD pump have not been successful. The following alarm is subsequently received during efforts to restore one CRD pump: CONTROL ROD DRIVE UNIT TEMP HIGH (9-5, W17) WOOTF identifies the setpoint for the following alarm and the required actions in accordance with the annunciator procedure? A. 250 deg; Dispatch personnel to check for HCU Scram Valve Leakage B. 250 deg; Deciare the control rod "SLOW" C. 350 deg; Dispatch personnel to check for HCU Scram Valve Leakage D. 350 deg; Declare the control rod "SLOW'
- 2. Stem Focus: The phrase "Assume no Operator Actions" is not necessary to elicit the correct response, The applicants will receive the NUREG 1021, App E briefing by the examiners while on site during the prep week. If not, the they will receive the briefing before taking the exam.
- 3. Ensure no overlap wI SRO 0#97 (slow control rods)
- 4. 5/21/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 5. In-office: Does not overlap wI 0#97 blc 0#97 deals wI scram time (not hi temp). Licensee incorporated changes; however, the 2nd part of "C" can also be argued as correct. Changed to "inoperable." QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 8ack- Q= SRO 8/M/N u/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 26 H 3
*
- M e. 295029 EA 1.04 S 1. Cred Dist: Are "C" and "D" saying the same thing? Discuss wI licensee. [In each of these choices, the wording implies that the RCIC is already (or must be) tripped and then the operator must re-establish RCIC operation by transferring its suction to the torus.] If these two choices, are saying the same thing, an applicant can deduce that the answer must be either "An or "8:
Suggest re-working to 2-part choices to predict the current status of RCIC after torus level rises to +7" (aligned to CST or aligned to Torus) and the required operator actions lAW EOPs (continue to allow operation on CST or manually swap suction to Torus)
- 2. Stem Focus: The first bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response because the 2nd bullet states that RCIC and CRD are being used to control level.
- 3. Stem Focus: The 3rd bullet uses Slang; re-word the 3rd bullet as follows: "The MSRVs are being used to control pressure AND HPCI was started in pressure control mode.
- 4. Stem Focus: Delete the 1st part of the 4th bullet because this is not necessary to elicit the correct response. (Keep the 2nd part of the 4th bullet, i.e., Suppression pool water level reaches +T)
- 5. Stem Focus: The phrase "taking into account EOI-1 RPV Control direction" and "the impact of the aforementioned plant conditions" can be better accomplished as follows: "WOOTF predicts the current status of RC/C and the required operator action lAW EOI-17'
- 6. 5/11/09: Licensee submitted revision that targeted Item #s 1,
#2, #3, #4, and #5. QUESTION IS SAT
- 7. 5121/09: Licensee submitted same revised question.
QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 27 F 2 X X N e 295036 EK1.01 S 1. 5/11/09 & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted this question.
- 2. Stem Focus: The first sentence should include the word "pump" after sump;, i.e., "Following a LOCA on Unit1, a leak in the RHR Loop 1 [ensure terminology for loop/train, etc. is familiar to applicants] Pump Area results in increased sump pump operation ... "
- 3. Job-Link: If the LOCA occurred causing a lot of inleakage to the sump, when will the operator be required to place the sump to P-T -L? If this sump is already supposed to be in P-T-L, then the stem premise {"increased sump pump operation] may be flawed.
Discuss w/ licensee.
- 4. The fill-in-the-blank statement should include a 2nd "if' after the first blank.
- 5. Q=KlA: Meets KIA >> the KIA requires operational implication of a rad release; as written the question meets this KIA because an operational implication of the RHR system leak is high ARM readings in the Loop 1 Pump Area, which leads to EOI-3 entry.
- 6. In-office: Changed question into 2-part which tested applicants knowledge of EOI-3 minimum RHR Pump Area Level entry condition AND RHR Pump Area Rad Level. QUESTION IS SAT.
28 H 2 X B S 203000 K5.02
- 1. 5/11/09 & OS/21/09: Question submitted by the licensee
- 2. Stem Focus: Add the following phrase to the end of the stem question: "in accordance with the EOP Bases?'
- 3. QUESTION IS SAT. Note: OPL171.201, Objective 10.a; Steam Cooling WITH Injection.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 8ack- Q= SRO 8/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 29 M 2 X N 1:1 205000 K2.02 F S 1. Cred Oist: "C" and "0" are not plausible because of Part 2 of these choices (i.e., closes due to a Gp 2 isolation signal). An applicant knows that a motor-operated valve does not have power to the motor even if a Group 2 isolation signal occurs.
"8" and "0" are not plausible because an applicant knows that the suction motor-operated valves cannot close.
The correct answer ("A") can be deduced without knowing the specific power supply panel to a SOC'g valve, i.e., the applicant can deduce the answer only by knowing that SOC'g valves require power to re-position. Suggest modifying question into a 2-part question that asks for the specific power supply to LPCI Injection Valve and the specific power supply to the min flow valve. Alternatively, eliminate the "reason" in part 1 of "8" and "0" (i.e., on loss of suction path) to make these two choices plausible.
- 2. 5/11/09: Licensee submitted revised question which incorporated suggestion. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 3. 5/21/09: Licensee submitted same revised question.
QUESTION IS SAT.
- 4. Stem Focus: Need to split up the 2 fiU-in-the-blank statements; i.e., eliminate the word "AND"
- 5. In-office. Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 30 H 2 X X N e 205000 A4.03 S 1. 05/11/09 & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Cues: The sentence stating that a flush has been completed is not necessary to elicit the correct response and could cue the applicant for another exam item.
- 3. Stem Focus: The phrase "assuming RHR Loop I is in standby readiness.: is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 4. Stem Focus: The fill-in-the-blank statement is confusing.
- 5. Stem Focus: Re-word the stem as follows:
Preparations were underway to place Unit 2 in CSD following a scram. When the operator started the 2B RHR Pump for shutdown cooling operation, vessel level lowered to 0 inches. WOOTF completes the following statement for using RHR Loop 1 LPCI to restore vessel level in accordance with 2-AOI-74-1, Loss of Shutdown Cooling? The RHR SYS I SO CLG INBD INJECT ISOL RESET pushbutton, 2-xs-74-126, to be depressed. Following the start of a Loop 1 LPCI pump, then the operator is required to open A. is required; 2-FCV-74-53 (inboard Inject/on valve) B. is NOT required; 2-FCV-74-53 (inboard injection valve) C. is required; 2-FCV-74-52 (outboard injection valve) D. is NOT required; 2-FCV-74-52 (outboard injection valve)
- 6. In-office: Licensee incorporated comments. QUESTION IS SAT.
31 H 2 B S 206000 K4.03.
- 1. 04/22/09, 05/11/09, & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Note: Southern Co Hatch RO question provided with DRAFT submittal (as justification) targeted KIA 206000 (HPCI) A 1.01 (ability to predict/monitor changes in water level associated w/
operating HPCI controls).
- 3. QUESTION IS SAT
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. B.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N u/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 32 F 3 X MB S 209001 K1.12
- 1. 05/11/09 & 05/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Question was previously used on last NRC exam
- 3. QUESTION IS SAT
- 4. Stem Focus: Change the 2nd part of "A" and "C" to read as follows: "will NOT automatically start'
- 5. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
33 H 2 X X MB 1J 211000 A4.0B S 1. 05/11/09 & 05/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Cred Dist: "A" and "CO are not plausible because the stem states that the red light is illuminated.
- 3. #/units: The 2nd bullet has the word" AUTO"; not sure if this is the exact engraving on the squib valve lights. Also need to include the Panel 9-5 in this bullet to ensure applicants know exactly which light the stem is referring to.
- 4. In-office: Licensee re-worked 2-part question to test applicant's knowledge of squib valve indication and required operator action.
QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 34 H 2 X N + 212000 K3.11 e 1. Licensee submitted question on 5/11/09 & 5/21/09 S 2. Q=KlA: This KIA doesn't make sense and may not be applicable for Region 2 BWRs, Le., effect that a loss or malfunction of RPS will have on Recirc. (the converse could be true .. but this is confusing). Suggest replacing KIA. Discuss wI licensee.
- 3. Backward: Because of Item #2, the question was written as a "not" question. (understandably so). Discuss wI licensee.
- 4. 06/04/09: Replaced KIA wI 212000 K3.05
- 5. In-office: Licensee proposed a new question that was minutia (Ops Management also agreed as minutia). Re-worked 2-part question to ask for status of HCU Scram Solenoids and Backup Scram Valves following MG set trip. Need to contact NEI about Item # 2 above. QUESTION IS SAT.
35 H 3 S 215003 K4.04
- 1. 5/11/09 and 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. QUESTION IS SAT 36 H 2 X B e 215004 A3.01 S 1. Stem Focus: For the 5th bullet, state "SRM D mode switch (S-1) in the standby position:
- 2. 5/11/09: Licensee submitted revised question that targeted Item #1 listed above.
- 3. 5/21/09: Licensee submitted same question that already targeted Item #1 listed above. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 37 H 3 X X X e 215005 A2.07 S 1. 05/11/09 & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Partial: An applicant can successfully argue "An as also correct because the upscale setpoint (O.66w+59%) will be lower than before the xmitter failure; possible to reach this setpoint at 85%
power. Discuss w/ licensee
- 3. #/units: all choices that list alarms should include the panel and window designation;, i.e., the APRM FLOW BIAS alarms, OPRM Trip alarm, etc.
- 4. Stem Focus: Is the stem fill-in-the-blank statement asking what required operator action is needed to move rods? The stem should elicit a response that matches the 2nd part of each choice.
As written it doesn't.
- 5. Suggest asking the following question:
Unit 1 is at 8S% power and 7S% core flow and a centrally located rod is currently selected. WOOTF identifies the expected alarm if the "An flow transmitter on the 1A Recirc Loop fails to zero output? A. ONL Y APRM FLOW BIAS OFF NORMAL (9-SA, w32) B. APRM FLOW BIAS OFF NORMAL (9-SA, w32) and APRM UPSCALE (9-SA, w11) C. APRM UPSCALE (9-5a, W11) and OPRM Trip Enabled 99-5A, W3D) D. ONLY APRM UPSCALE (9-Sa, W11)
- 6. In-office; Licensee incorporated changes. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 38 H 3 X X N e 217000 K3.02 S 1. 5/11/09 & 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Stem Focus: specify which accumulators are damaged, i.e.,
scram? , ADS?, MSIV?
- 3. Job-Link: Is it credible that all MSRVs are not available?
Discuss w/ licensee. Suggest using the following idea: Have RCIC in pressure control lAW App 11 B and subsequent Hi DWP condition occurs> > what happens to RCIC pressure control lineup? (E41-F011 closes). Alternatively, could have RCIC in pressure control (App 11 B) and torus area temperature reaches 155 deg and stable, what is status of reactor pressure?
- 4. Stem Focus: for the 2nd bullet, specify which area using the nameJid listed on EOI-3 flowchart for torus area for where temp is 155 deg. Also ensure that 3rd bullet area title matches the nameJid listed on EOI-3 flowchart for Core spray pump room temperature at 172 deg and rising.
- 5. In-office: Licensee incorporated suggestion to write question RCIC in pressure control and subsequent Hi DWP condition.
QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Oist. Link units ward KIA Only 39 H 5 X X N e 217000 K3.04 S 1. 5/11/09 & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted question.\
- 2. Q=KlA: Tough KIA to hit.
- 3. Stem Focus: the stem question does not elicit the responses provided in the choices.
- 4. Partial: Each of the choices has two much information which can lead to one or more partially correct answers (or no correct answer). Each of the 2 choices include 1) whether RCIC will stay running or not 2) a characteristic of how it stays running or if it doesn't stay running the reason it stopped; 3) a required action per the EOls or if no action is required, the bases for why RCIC is enough. This question is disjointed.
- 5. Stem focus: An applicant may actually choose an incorrect answer based on the awkward wording of the fill-in-the-blank statement and the correct choice "0"
- 6. Stem Focus: Suggest streamlining the stem:
Unit 3 has a small LOCA with the following conditions:
- Level is -30 " and stable w/ RCIC and CRO njecting
- Pressure is 970 psig w/ MSIVs closed and MSRVs being used to control pressure
- 8 control rods remain at position 48; reactor power is on IRM Range 3 and lowering.
- No other high or low pressure injection system is available Alternatively, suggest writing a question in Steam Cooling leg of C-1 where no injection is available. Subsequently RCIC becomes available as the only injection source (high or low pressure) but has a steam leak that exceeds isolation setpoint.
Test applicants' knowledge of whether ED is required/not required and whether the EOls allow/do not allow bypassing the isolation.
- 7. In-office: Licensee re-worked 2-part question to ask how inverter failure affected RCIC and whether RCIC alone is enough to assure adequate core cooling. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. B.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 40 H 2 B S 21BOOO K1.02
- 1. 5/11/09 & 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
41 H 2 X X MB Ii! 223002 K1.03 S 1. 5/11/09 & 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Stem Focus: Consolidate bullets as follows:
- Rx Level lowered to -20 " and is now at +20 " and stable
- Drywell pressure rose to 2.7 psig and is now 1.2 psig and steady
- Rx Bldg and Refuel Bldg HVAC tripped and was subsequently restarted in accordance with EOI Appendix BF and BE (include titles)
- 3. Job-Link: EOI-3 override states that when re-starting HVAC, overriding interlocks is optional, i.e., if necessary. The question as written does not specify whether BE was performed. Ask licensee when this procedure is required.
- 4. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
42 F 4 X X N Ii! 223002 K1.13 S 1. 5/11/09 & 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. This KIA may overlap wI 0#55: If necessary, Chief Examiner can select another KIA.
- 3. Stem Focus: The stem does not specify what type of isolation occurs. ["spurious" and stem question doesn't specify)
- 4. Minutia: Verify wI the Operations Management agrees that this test item doesn't require too much recall.
- 5. In-office: Operations Mgmt concurred that this was minutia.
Changed choice "A" to state "both directions' (instead of requiring applicants to know which direction.) QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN utEIS Explanation Focus Oist. Link units ward KIA Only 43 F 2 X X X B e 239002 A 1.01 S 1. Stem Focus: Re-word the fill-in-the-blank statement as follows:
"The annunciator is triggered by by observing the . and this can be verified
- 2. Cred Oist: Suggest replacing the 1st part of "CO and "0" (valve position indication) with ".. the MSRV Temperature Recorder, 1-TR-1-1, on Panel 1-9-47... ' Change the second part of "CO to "SPDS Screen Display ###, SRV Status." Note that this question was used on the previous NRC exam and was acceptable question; however, these minor changes may compensate by adding some discriminatory value)
- 3. Job-Link: Change the word "flow" to "acoustic" in "A", "B", and "0"
- 4. 5/11/09: Licensee submitted revised question with Item #1, #2, and #3 incorporated.
- 5. 5121109: Licensee submitted the same revised question with Item
#s 1, 2, and 3 incorporated.
- 6. Stem Focus: Subsequently discovered a problem with NRC suggestions in Item #1, #2, and #3 [question symmetry]. To correct, use two fill-in-the-blank statements as follows:
The annunciator is directly triggered by the _ _ . A SRV leaking can be verified by observing the _ _ . Change "A" and "B" as follows: A. tail pipe acoustic monitor; light indication above the control switch at Panel 9-3 B. tail pipe acoustic monitor; Temperature recorder 1-TR-1 on Pane/1-9-47.
- 7. In-oflice: Licensee incorporated comments. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 44 H 2 X X X X N e 259002 G2.4.45 S 1. 5/11/09 & 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Cred Dist: "A" is not plausible because the stem does not list any alarms indicative of an auto-scram.
- 3. Cue: The 4th bullet includes a phrase "due to low level" that is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 4. Stem Focus: Add "in accordance with 2-AOI-3-1. Loss of Reactor Feedwater or Reactor Water Level High/Low.. " to the stem question.
- 5. Suggest 2-part question testing applicants' knowledge whether a scram is Required or Not Required lAW 2-AOI-3-1 and also test applicants' knowledge of 5850 limit or 5050 limit.
- 6. Partial: Ask the licensee if an applicant is wrong to scram based on conservative decision with level slightly trending down.
- 7. In-office: Unit difference [ Unit 1 & 2 is 5850 rpm but Unit 3 is still 5050 rpm). Ops Mgmt stated that given these conditions a prudent decision to scram is incorrect. QUESTION IS SAT.
45 H X V 261000 K6.05 S 1. 5/11/09 & 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. LOD=1: This question will not provide an opportunity to discriminate between a competent and less-than-compet~nt operator because it is common knowledge that this system is an "all-or-nothing" system. i.e .* there is not a time (under normal conditions) when only one or two filter train fans will auto start. ["B" and "D1.
Suggest writing a 2 part question that tests applicants' knowledge (following a loss of Unit RPS MG set 1A) of whether none of the filter train fans start (or all 3) AND whether the all 3 units Rx Bldg HVAC isolates or only Unit 1.
- 3. In-office; Licensee incorporated comments. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 46 H 3 X X MB e 262001 A3.04 S 1. 5/11/09 & 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Stem Focus: Ensure the 1st sentence is worded that the LOCA also occurs on Unit 3.
- 3. Stem Focus: *WOOTF completes both of the following statements?'
- 4. Stem Focus: Re-word the first fill-in-the-blank statement as follows:
After the Unit 3 Diesel Generator output breakers close, then the first CS Pump will start seconds later. RHRSW Pumps assigned to EECW will start _ _ _ seconds after the Unit 3 Diesel Generator output breakers close.
- 5. #/units: Verify wI the licensee that the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement does/does not include EECW pumps.
- 6. In-office: All BF pumps are RHRSW pumps - - RHRSW assigned to EECW is best and clearest way to designate these pumps.
Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT. 47 F 3 X S 262001 G2.2.39
- 1. 5/11/09 & 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Stem Focus: Re-word the stem question as follows:
"WOOTF identifies the minimum required actions in accordance with Tech Spec 3.8.7, Distribution Systems - Operating?"
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UIEIS Explanation Focus Dist Link units ward KIA Only 48 H 2 X X MB lj 262002 K6.02 S 1. 5/11/09 & 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. This KIA may overlap wI 0#49: If necessary, Chief Examiner can select another KIA
- 3. Cred Dist: "C" and "D" are not plausible because their wording ("
is auto transferred to 25-32.. ") does not grammatically lineup with the fill-in-the-blank statement In other words, the word "to" should probably be "at" (???)
- 4. Q=KlA: The question (as written) tests the applicants' knowledge of the Backup Control Panel power supply arrangement, Le., whether the panel's alternate power supply is lost or whether it will automatically transfer to the adjacent unit's Backup Control Panel. The KIA requires testing the applicant's knowledge of how a loss of DC will affect an uninterruptible power supply. To avoid repetition wI 0#49 (Le., UNIT PREFERRED), suggest writing a question related to another 120 VAC uninterruptible power supply system at Browns Ferry.
Doesn't have to be a system wI an inverter. For example, can be Plant Preferred or Plant Non-Preferred system when a DC supply is lost to the M-M-G set
- 5. In-office: Licensee wrote 2-part question testing applicant's knowledge of normal power supply to the Plant Preferred MG set (DC) and the impact of totally losing the entire Plant Preferred Panel (C02). QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KiA Only 49 F 2 X X X N e 262002 K6.03 S 1. Partial: Suggest changing the 2 00 part of "CO and "D" to "... will NO T automatically transfer back to NORMAL... n to preclude an applicant potentially arguing that normal course of action is to manually transfer to normal after inverter output is restored in accordance with 01.
- 2. Stem focus: Specify what the word "ALTERNATE" is referring to in the fill-in-the-blank statement by identifying either a power panel or MMG.
- 3. 05/11/09: Licensee submitted revised question that incorporated Item #1 and #2
- 4. Cues: For the fix to Item #2 above, the licensee added the power supply for the alternate transformer. This information is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 5. 5121109: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 6. Stem Focus: Suggest re-wording the stem as follows:
"The Unit 1 UNIT PREFERRED Inverter fails, i.e., loss of inverter output. WOOTF completes the following statements?
The Unit Preferred System will transfer to its alternate transformer . When the inverter output is restored, n the Unit Preferred System will
- 7. In-<>ffice: The 2 00 fill-in-the-blank statement is confusing b/c the applicant could interpret that everything is back to normal. Licensee could not initially verify that the system would indeed auto-xfer back to normal when the inverter output was restored. After in-<>ffice research, licensee stated that the system would NOT auto-xfer back to normal. [Note: Panel 9-9, Cab 6 does auto-swap back but not BB Panel 11.) This question was re-worked to ask whether RFWCS PDS loses indication and whether static switch would auto-align to the inverter. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KiA Only 50 H 2 X X N e 263000 A2.01 S 1. 5/11/09 & 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. This KiA may overlap wI 0#3: If necessary, Chief Examiner can select another KiA.
- 3. Q=KiA: to ensure that the first part of the A2 KiA is being met
[Le., predict the impacts ... j, change the question as follows below.
- 4. Stem Focus: The word "acceptable" should not be used in the stem question.
WOOTF identifies the alternate supply battery for this RMOV Bd and when a DC MOVs is aI/owed to be operated while the RMOV Bd is on its alternate supply ,in accordance with 0-01-570, DC Electrical System? A. Alternate Supply Battery 1; To comply wi Tech Spec LCO Action Statements B. Alternate Supply Battery 1; To perform Tech Spec Surveillance Testing C. Alternate Supply Battery 3; To comply wi Tech Spec LCO Action Statements O. Alternate Supply Battery 3; To perform Tech Spec Surveillance Testing
- 5. In-office: Changed terminology in suggested question to Battery Board 1 (or 3) {instead of "alt suppy batteryj. QUESTION IS SAT.
51 F 2 X N 1J 264000 K5.05 S 1. 5/11/09 & 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Cred Dis!: "A" and "B" are not plausible because the stem uses nd 61 the word "parallel" twice. [2 bullet and the 1 fill-in-the-blank statementj. An unknowledgeable applicant would be drawn to "C" and "0" if he/she didn't know the correct switch position.
Suggest testing applicants' knowledge of the PARALLEL WITH SYSTEM mode; Le., speed and voltage droop are 5% (vs 0%) AND the required power factor lAW 3-01-82, Section 8.1 (0.8 lagging vs 1)
- 3. In-office: Licensee used different switch position, Le., "units in parallel" (instead of "1-unit1. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Oist. Link units ward KIA Only 52 H 2 X e 300000 K2.01 S 1. 5/11/09 & 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Job-Link: It is not certain to predict how the system power will affect loads during momentary interruptions. Suggest simple question testing applicants' knowledge of the power supply to the G air compressor motor and the G air compressor auxiliaries.
This will also help wi LOK quota for F/H.
- 3. In-office: Licensee removed "momentary" and streamlined question to eliminate confusion. QUESTION IS SAT.
53 F 2 X lj 400000 A 1.01 S 1. 5/11/09 & 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Q=KlA: The question (as written) tests the applicants' knowledge of Precaution & Limitation "0" in 01-24, Raw Cooling Water System related to preventing damage to the SO BO Room Chillers from silt and debris in the RCW system check valves.
The KIA requires testing the applicants' ability to predict or monitor changes in CCW flow rate after operating CCW system controls.
- 3. In-office: Licensee developed new question on the RBCCW Hx Outlet TCV controller and how xfer to MAN would alter flow.
However, "0" was still partially correct. Re-worked "0" to state Place to VALVE postion and "more open." QUESTION IS SAT. 54 F 2 X X lj 201001 K6.04 S 1. 4/22/09,5/11/09, & 5/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Cred Oist: "A" and 'B" are not plausible because the fill-in-the-blank statement includes the words "due to increased flow:
Suggest revising the 2nd portion of the question to include knowledge of whether or not RWCU pump seal water injection from CROH will continue or not.
- 3. Stem Focus: The 1st sentence can be reworded and still meet the intent of the KIA. In other words, "U2 was operating at 100%
power when a loss of both RPS MG sets occurred."
- 4. In-office: Licensee changed stem to eliminate cue. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Sack- Q= SRO S/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 55 H 2 X N 1J 215001 A3.03 S 1. 05/11/09 & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Cred Dist: "S" and "0" are not plausible because the stem states that an isolation occurs, i.e., the ball valve NOT auto-closing is not plausible unless specific switch positions are provided in the stem, i.e., Mode Selector Switch in the MAN position. Also, the "PARKED" position is not defined.
Suggest asking the applicant a 2-part question testing knowledge of whether the N2 purge valve receives an auto-close signal and/or the Group 8 isolation signal(s)
- 3. In-office: Licensee defined "parked" and also incorporated N2 changes. QUESTION IS SAT.
56 F 2 X X N e 215002 K1.02 S 1. 04/22109,05/11/09, & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. GEN: In a two-part question format with more than one element contained in each choice, limit the number of elements to two (for each choice).
- 3. Stem Focus: The word "besr should not be used in the stem question. Also, the phrase ""sets of attributes" is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 4. Cred Dist and/or Partial: "S" and "CO are not plausible because RSM is not "continuously" receiving input. Also, these choices may be partially correct because RSM is capable of receiving input from ALL LPRMs.
Suggest converting this into a 2-part question that tests applicants' knowledge of which LPRMs are used for a centrally located control rod AND what power level RSM is bypassed.
- 5. In-office: Licensee proposed replacement; however the proposal was minutia (ask applicants which RSM screen showed LPRMs on the left side of the control rod); Ops management agreed this was minutia. Re-worked a revision to the original question to ask for whether RSM uses all (or selected) LPRMS and also whether or not RSM generates the flow comparator function. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 57 F 2 N S 219000 K2.02
- 1. 05/11/09 & 05/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Question is SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 8ack- Q= SRO 8/M/N utEIS Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 58 F 2 X X X e 239003 K4.02 S 1. 05/11/09 & 05/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Stem Focus: The first paragraph and bullet are not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 3. Cue: The fill-in-the-blank statement includes the words "manually-aligned' which cues the applicant to "8" and "0", i.e.,
detracts credibility from "A" and "CO because the word NORMAL.
- 4. Q=KlA: The question (as written) tests the applicants' knowledge of the reason for the MSIV (A1temate) Leakage Control System. The KIA requires testing the applicants' knowledge of either a design feature or interlock. Suggest the following remedy:
WOOTF identifies the MSIV (Alternate) Leakage Control [whatever title the applicants are familiar with] f/owpath and reason for having the f/owpath? A. Drain Piping from the main steam lines to the main condenser; Ensure that equalization and re-opening the MSIVs can be performed in accordance with EOI Appendix 88, Re-opening MSIVs following Group 1 Isolation. B. Drain Piping from the main steam lines to the main condenser; Facilitates the 100 scth allowable leakage limit for each MS/V in accordance with TS 3.6.1.3, PCIVs, C. Main Steam Unes to the main condenser (no drain piping); Ensure that equalization and re-opening the MSIVs can be performed in accordance with EOI Appendix 88, Re-opening MSIVs following Group 1 Isolation. D. Main Steam Unes to the main condenser (no drain piping); Facilitates the 100 scfh allowable leakage limit for each MSIV in accordance with TS 3.6.1.3, PCIVs,
- 5. In-office: Licensee accepted proposed question, but modified each choice to eliminate the 100 scth and to simply state emergency equalize around MSIVs. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UtE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 59 F 2 X 1J 241000 A1.01 S 1. 05/11/09 & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Note: Southern Co Hatch RO question provided with DRAFT submittal (as justification) targeted KIA 295007 (High Reactor Pressure Emergency/Abnormal) AA2.01 (determine/interpret reactor pressure).
- 3. Q=KlA: The question (as written) targets an abnormal evolution (more applicable for Tier 1) when the 2-9-5A Rx Hi Press alarm is received. The question does not test applicants' ability to predict or monitor changes in reactor pressure after operating the EHC pressure regulator.
Suggest reworking the question to writing a question that involves a specific pressure set control adjustment in the startup GOI [ e.g., Step 57.2 or 60.2] and test applicants' knowledge of the expected rise in reactor pressure following one bump or selection on the pressure set adjustment or following another EHC parameter. Alternatively, the 1st part of the question (as written) can be deleted [keep the 2nd part on Pressure Setpoint] and a new 2nd part asking the applicant an 01-47, Section 5.6 knowledge item.
- 4. Stem Focus: The word "approximately" in the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement is subjective.
- 5. In-office: Licensee did not want to change (because believed that asking setpoints was hitting KIA); however, subsequently agreed to change question to test applicant's knowledge of nominal EHC press setpoint and predict how rx pressure was affected by 1 CV failing open at 93% power. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 60 H 2 X X X B e 245000 K5.07 S 1. 05/11/09 & 05/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Note: Progress Energy Brunswick RO question provided with DRAFT submittal (as justification) targeted KIA 700000 (Gen Voltage & Elec Grid Distub) AA2.04 (determinelinterpret VARS outside capability curve).
- 3. Cred Dist: "A" is not plausible because the stem states that hydrogen pressure lowered to 45 psig; therefore, raising hydrogen pressure is always a viable option.
Suggest providing a picture of the MVAR meter in the stem (indicating 140 MVARS outgoing - do not state "lagging") and converting into 2-part question that tests applicants' knowledge of whether this meter indication is leading OR lagging and implication of this point on spider graph (Le, remedy is placing AUTO voltage switch to RAISE AND also lowering MW .. OR. .. only lowering MW will remedy. Do not include adjusting gas pressure due to Item #2 above.
- 4. Stem Focus: Change "was operating" to "is operating" in the first sentence to match generator parameters.
- 5. Stem Focus: The phrase "the in-service Hydrogen Pressure Regulator failed closed.," is not necessary to elicit the correct response. Suggest only stating that generator hydrogen pressure is 45 psig as one of the bullets listed for generator parameters.
- 6. Cues; Re-word the stem question to eliminate possible cue (being in the unsafe area) as follows: 'WOOTF identifies the required operator actions (if any) lAW 3-01-47, Turbine Generator System?"
7.
- 7. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Creel. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N u/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 61 F 2 X X N Ii 256000 G2.1.30 S 1. 05/11/09 & 05/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. GEN: In a two-part question format with more than one element contained in each choice, limit the number of elements to two (for each choice). Suggest eliminating the 3rd column.
- 3. Q=KlA: The question does not test applicants' knowledge of location of components.
- 4. Stem Focus: First paragraph in the stem is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 5. In-office: Licensee re-worked question to ask for SJAE/OG CNDR CNDS Flow 2-FI-242 flow value AND location of component.
QUESTION IS SAT. 62 H 2 X B V 271000 A4.06 S 1. 05/11/09 & 05/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Q=KlA: The question does not meet the KIA because it does not test the applicants' ability to operator or monitor offgas indicating lights and alarms. This question more appropriately tests the applicants' knowledge of how valve dosures will affect condenser vacuum. [See KIA's: 271000, K6.05 (less than 2.5 IR) and A2.09].
Suggest modifying question to test applicant's knowledge of where (instrument) the recombiner temperature can be monitored [after receiving this alarm] and 01-66 recombiner performance (manual mode); or include knowledge item whether recombiner temperature is power dependent or not.
- 3. In-office: Licensee developed new question which tested applicant's knowledge of normal indicating lights for steam packing exhauster blowers and the auto start feature. QUESTION IS SAT.
e -_._- - - _ .. _---- -----
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 63 F 2 X X N e 288000 A2.05 S 1. 05/11/09 & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Cred Dist: Because the 2nd part of "A" is ALWAYS right (temperature sensitive components), then this indirectly detracts the credibility of "B" and "0." Suggest re-working question to only be a 1-part question (Le., 2nd part isn't necessary) and ask for REQUIRED actions for the REACTOR BUILDING HVAC when temperature gets this low lAW 0-GOI-200-1.
- 3. Stem Focus; add "in accordance with O-GO/-200-1, title, to the stem question somewhere.
- 4. Stem Focus: Eliminate subjective wording in the stem such as "will dip to around . ."; replace with "will reach." Also, the fill-in-the-blank statement contains a phrase "due to the fact that.. "; rep/ace by combining both fill-in-the-blank sentences into one using the word "because."
- 5. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
64 H 2 X MB e 290001 K3.01 S 1. 05/11/09 & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Partial: An applicant could successfully argue that there is NO correct answer because the stem fill-in-the-blank statement implies that with no HVAC in service a radiation release IS in progress. [OPL 171.018, page 24 states that failure of SGT to start COULD result in a POTENTIAL release.] Nothing in the stem indicates that high airborne and/or gaseous activity exists
[only shine]; therefore a "release" is not indicated; only shine.
- 3. Double-jeopardy: The question may overlap w/ Q#18 which tests applicants' knowledge of which MET tower elevation (ground or elevated) data is used for an elevated release.
To meet this KIA, suggest converting this item to a 2-part question where the Rx and Refuel Zone Rad monitor readings are provided [delete the values of dP provided] and test the applicants' knowledge of Secondary Containment Pressure wililwill not equalize with atmospheric pressure and whether EOI-3 allows/does NOT allow restarting HVAC per 8F/8E. Alternatively, this question may be used if the 2nd part (ground or elevated) is replaced with something else to avoid overlap w/ 0#18.
- 4. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Oist. Link units ward KIA Only 65 F 5 X N tJ 290002 K1.04 S 1. 05/11/09 & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Minutia and/or LOO=5: RO applicant recall of FSAR event groupings can successfully be argued as minutia and/or too difficult.
Suggest writing a question to test the applicant's knowledge of which FW line HPCI injects to ("An or "B") and how the potentially cold CST water impact on the vessel is minimized (fw nozzles directed inward & downward to avoid impingement on vessel wall OR thermal sleeve on the fw nozzle (wrong)) Altematively, the 81 current question can be used if the 1 element (FSAR event groupings) is replaced with something else.
- 3. In-office: Operations management concurred that RO applicant recall of FSAR event was minutia. Licensee asked question related to which FW line HPCI injects to and also the purpose of the FW line thermal sleeve. QUESTION IS SAT.
66 F 2 X X N i; G2.1.39 S 1. 04/22109, 05/11/09, & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Partial: "0" can also be argued as correct since it doesn't state that rod insertion is not required.
- 3. Stem focus: For the 1" bullet, add the phrase "during the approach to criticality."
- 4. Stem focus: Re-order the sentence as follows: "Following a notch withdrawal of rod 30-31, the RO observes a reactor period of 50 seconds. "
- 5. Stem focus: Include "in accordance with 3-GOI-100-1A, Unit Startup." In the stem question.
- 6. Partial: For "A", include a statement, "The reactor is not required to be Shutdown." For "B", replace the word "shutdown" with "Insert all control rods until a thorough ... For "0", include a statement, "Rod insertion is not required:
- 7. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UtE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 67 H 2 X X ? E G2.1.6 S 1. 05/11/09 & 05/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Partial: "B" can be argued as correct since once the air problem has been finally repaired. the operator is required to obtain RE assistance to restore the rod back to position 42. "CO can be argued as correct because a conservative decision to manually scram the reactor with a decreasing (?) control air pressure is always right.
Suggest writing a question related to communications protocol differences between normal. off-normal. and emergency evolutions in the control room. For example. when is the requirement to announce every alarm suspended. if ever? Another two-part item could be to test the applicant's knowledge of when an operator is allowed to continue operating after the SRO has announced a brief. These suggestions must be based on documented guidance in the Conduct of Ops (or similar) procedures.
- 3. Q=KlA: Ask the licensee how this question targets managing the control room during transients.
- 4. In-office: Licensee proposed a replacement question to test applicant's knowledge of when a peer check is required and whether critical/unexpected alarms are required to be announced. However.
there is still one partially correct answer blc critical alarms area a judgement call. Fixed by asked for unexpected ONLY or critical ONLY. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 68 F 2 X N e G2.2.20 S 1. 05/11/09 & 05/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Partial: An applicant could successfully argue "An and "cn as correct as follows. "An can be argued correct in the global realm that Operations controls all the plant activities on a day-to-day basis. "cn can be argued as correct because of "B"; Le.,
since the troubleshooting plan is incorporated into an approved work order, then it ultimately allows for fixing the equipment deficiency. Suggest developing a question that is more precisely related to the procedure and also includes an Operations perspective, as follows (or similar): WOOTF identifies the difference between the required controls for Troubleshooting Level "A" activity as compared to a Troubleshooting Level "B" activity in accordance with MMDP-3, Guidelines for Planning and Executing Troubleshooting Activities?" A. Troubleshooting plan is NOT required for Level "A" activities. B. Troubleshooting plan is NOT required for Level "B" activities. C. Plant Manager AND Shift Manager approvals are both required for Level "A" activities. D. Plant Manager AND Shift Manager approvals are both required for Level "B" activities.
- 3. In-office. Licensee Ops Mgmt was concerned about RO knowledge of MMDP-3. Licensee took this item back to re-work at a later time.
- 4. 6/18/09: Licensee requested a replacement KIA: Chief Examiner provided KIA G2.2.13 blc licensee was unable to write a discriminating question at the RO level. Replacement question was written regarding the freeze plug usage in the clearance process. QUESTION IS SAT
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Oist Link units ward KIA Only 69 F 2 X X X X MB e G2.2.22 S 1. 04/22/09,05/11/09, & 05/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Stem Focus: Re-word the stem question as follows: 'WOOTF describes RCS leakage in accordance with Tech Spec 3.4.4, Operational Leakage?'
- 3. Partial: "C" can be argued as correct because it does not imply that the increase in UIOL is within limits. Suggest re-wording "C" and "0" as follows:
A The increase in u/OL is within TS limits; however, the total amount of UIOL exceeds the TS Umit. B. The UIOL is within TS limits; however, the increase in UIOL wll the last 24 hours exceeds the TS Umit.
- 4. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT. S~_ _
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 70 F 2 X X X B Y G2.3.14 S 1. 05/11/09 & 05/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Partial: An applicant can successfully argue "AU as correct because he/she could "expect" any value for rad levels and the "normal" injection rate could potentially be different than 14 scfm.
Choice "A" is not plausible to an unknowledgable applicant for this reason.
- 3. Cred Dist: "CO and "0" are not plausible because the word "anticipated" is subjective and rad levels being "lower than anticipated" with HWC in service is not plausible at any injection rate.
Suggest writing the question to ask for 100% power predetermined setpoint AND for actual effect on MSL rad monitor readings as compared to when HWC is not in service. OPL 171.220 page 48 states that MSL rad levels are 4-6 times above what exists when HWC is not in service. Verify this wI Operations.
- 7. Stem Focus: the phrase "Based on this injection rate .." is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 8. In-office: License proposed new question related to lower MSL rad levels associated wI Noble Metal Injections. Note the following: Zinc injection is used to minimize outage does (does not carryover to MSLs). Nobel Metal injection is used to combat IGSCC and this allows a lower H2 injection rate. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 71 H 2 X X B e G2.3.4 S 1. 04/22109,05/11/09, & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted question.
- 2. Note: Used on a past NRC exam at BF.
- 3. Job-Link: Is this the 2nd time these poor folks have been needed during an emergency exposure event?! For realism, suggest replacing the previous emergency exposure values with zero.
- 4. Stem Focus: Suggest not using the word "best" to preclude applicant appeals. Instead, add "in accordance with EPIP-15, Emergency Exposures. "
- 5. Stem Focus: If the 2nd sentence ["ALL individual capabilities are considered equal with the exceptions noted below.. ' is targeted towards the female, then may be just as clear to state that she is not pregnant and is capable of reproduction. Discuss options w/
licensee.
- 6. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
72 F 1 \J G2.3.7 S 1. 05/11/09 & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Q=KlA: Sample plan has same KIA on SRO exam 0#99. May need to choose a different KIA if unable to avoid double jeopardy or overlap issues.
- 3. LOD = 1: This is GET knowledge. The question should be targeted at the licensed operator level. For example, ask a question related to the procedure that is required for a radioactive spill or airborne event that includes some aspect of RWP knowledge, etc.
- 4. In-office: Chief Examiner determined that this question as originally proposed met the KIA and was at an acceptable LOD because of the 2nd part of each choice requiring knowledge of admin restrictions for re-entry. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N UlE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 73 X X e G2.4.18 S 1. 05/11/09 & 05/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Stem Focus: The override referred to (EOI-1, RC/L-3) is worded differently than the stem. The exact wording of the step should be used in the stem to predude applicant appeals.
"EOI-t, RPV Control, includes the fol/owing override step RCIL-3."
WOOTF choices completes the override and identifies the basis for this override in accordance with the EOI Program Manual, EOI-t, RPV Control Bases?" IF Primary Containment Water Level CANNOT be maintained below THEN STOP injection to the PC not required for adequate core cooling. A. 70 feet; prevent covering the MSRV solenoids B. 70 feet; prevent covering the primary containment vent C. t05 feet; prevent covering the MSRV solenoids D. 105 feet; prevent covering the primary containment vent
- 4. Cred Dist: "C" and "D" actual level of 55 feet does not correlate to a plausible reason to stop injection from extemal sources. Recommend using 70 feet because this corresponds to SRV solenoid location in the dryweU.
- 3. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
L.-
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
0# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Crecl. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 74 F 2 X X e G2.4.26 S 1. 04/22/09,05/11/09, & OS/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. GEN: In a two-part question format with more than one element contained in each choice, limit the number of elements to two (for each choice).
- 3. Stem Focus: The stem states"A Unit 2 Rx Bldg/Refuel Floor fire .. .". Change to be more specific location because this could affect an applicant's choice wrt to choice of HVAC.
- 4. Partial: An applicant can successfully argue that there is more than one correct answer because AOI-26-1 does not include a prioritized list of "most to least preferred" HVAC systems. Step 10 includes guidance "as necessary" for all 3 HVAC systems; this is not equivalent to "most to least preferred."
- 5. Verify no overlap wI 0#19.
- 6. In-office: Re-worked question to ask for whether AOI-26-1 allowed SBGT to be used for smoke removal and if not, the reason for concern. QUESTION IS SAT.
75 H 2 X B S G2.4.6
- 1. 05/11/09 & 05/21/09: Licensee submitted question
- 2. Stem Focus: Modify the stem question to include procedure; WOOTF choices completes the following statement in accordance with 2-EOI-1, RPV Control?"
- 3. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 76 H 2 X X X X N lJ 295003 G2.4.50 S 1. SRO-only: The correct AOP (Plant Preferred or Unit Preferred) can be determined using the systems knowledge of power supplies, Le., alarms associated with Plant Preferred would not include reed switches). The 2nd part of "C" and "0" [determining that offgas isolation valve is not affected by loss of Unit Preferred and that the loss of reed switches precludes rod movement except by scram] is not SRO-only because an applicant can deduce the correct answer only using systems knowledge. st Suggest keeping the 1 part of the question (selection of correct AOP) and including a new 2nd half which evaluates SRO-only knowledge of required actions for Tech Specs associated with loss of rod position. (may need to provide reference, discuss wI licensee). Alternatively, new 2nd half could evaluate REP or NRC reportability to achieve SRO-only.
- 2. Stem Focus: Get better understanding from licensee why phrase "Assume no operator actions" is necessary.
- 3. 5121109: Licensee submitted change to initial question which tests applicant's knowledge of correct AOI (plant preferred or unit preferred) and required tech spec actions lAW TS 3.1.3.
- 4. Cred Dist: "A" and "C* are not plausible because of the phrase "disarm the associated CRD.. ", i.e., stem states that ALL rod positions have been lost; therefore only one rod being a problem is not credible to an unknowledgable applicant.
- 5. Job-Link: Will BFN declare all control rods inoperable for a loss of Panel 9-9, Cab 6? Discuss wI licensee management. (AOI-57-4 does not specifically direct.)
- 6. In-office visit: Ops Mgmt stated that BFN is required to declare all rods inoperable for this situation and verified that this is the correct TS action. Identified typo on alarm window numbers (corrected).
Licensee agreed to only provide pages of TS wI LCO and actions, i.e., no surveillances or bases. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. link units ward KIA Only 77 F 2 X X N e 295016 G2.4.3 S 1. Job-link: Discuss wI licensee: What are expectations for Tech Spec Calls during EOP/control room evacuation? (is it required?) An applicant could potentially argue that the question is not operationally oriented from this aspect; i.e., the need to determine TS required actions immediately while implementing AOI-100-2 at the remote aux control panel is not required "upon discovery: ("B"). If a situation that required the crew to evacuate the control room occurred, the implementation of TS required actions mayor may not occur; similarly, the implementation of EOPs may preclude the need for declaring components inoperable during a LOCA. Suggest eliminating the actual control room abandonment, and instead, evaluate applicant's knowledge of required TS actions associated with remote aux control panel instrumentation to hit the KIA and also be at the SRO level.
- 2. Include the noun name (exact label engraving) for 2-l\-3-46A in the stem.
- 3. 5/21/09: licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback (including suggested revision) had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 4. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 78 H 2 X X X N U 295018 AA2.01
- 1. SRO-only: Since Choices "A" and "B" are immediate operator actions (not procedure selection), then the SRO-only piece of the question boils down to Choices "C" and "D." "D" is not plausible because an RO applicant knows that after tripping 1A Recirc Pump entry to AOI-68 is always required, Le., delaying entry to AOI-68 until the #2 seal cavity also reaches 200 deg is not credible.
Therefore, since SRO-only knowledge is not required to eliminate Choices "A", "B", and "D", the applicant can arrive at the correct choice ("C") without any SRO-Ievel knowledge being tested. Suggest the following replacement: U1 is operating at 100% power when both of the following alarms are received: RECIRC PUMP MTR 1A TEMP HIGH (9-4A, W13) RECIRC PUMP 1A COOLING WATER FLOW LOW (9-4A, W34) WOOTF identifies the lowest #1 Seal Cavity temperature that requires the Recirc Pump to be shutdown and the corresponding annunciator procedure that directs the pump shutdown at this temperature? A. 200 deg; 9-4A, W34 B. 200 deg; 9-4A. W13 C. 212 deg; 9-4A, W34 D. 212 deg; 9-4A. W13
- 4. Stem Focus: The Recirc Pump Mtr 1A Temp High alann (9-4a, W13) will also be received given that the stem states #1 seal cavity temperature is 210 deg and rising. Discuss wI licensee since it is a consequence of the first condition.
- 5. 5121/09: Licensee submitted a revision to initial question (had not received suggestion listed above) that tested the applicant's knowledge of the required immediate actions following a loss of RBCCW and also tests the applicant's knowledge of whether OPRMs are operable or inoperable. Q=KlA: The 2nd part of the revision deals wI OPRM operability (Le., entry conditions for AOP 68-1 A or 1 B selection) based on a missed OPRM surveillance. This question is targeted towards a CCW KIA (vs NI). The SRO portion of the question must target component temperatures ... not OPRMs. See suggestion above
- 6. Job-Link: Stem states "division 1 channels"; is this correct?
What guidance is there for using procedures on admin-hold?
- 7. In-office: Licensee incorporated suggestion; will validate.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues TIF Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN utEIS Explanation Focus Oist. Link units ward KIA Only 79 H 2 X X X lj 295023 AA2.01 e 1. SRO-only: The Immediate Operator Actions (RO) from 2-AOI-79-1 are used to answer the 1st portion of this 2-part question. S From that point, RO knowledge can be used to deduce that the Refuel Zone Exhaust Rad High alarm causes a Refuel floor HVAC isolation; therefore, restarting the HVAC (Choices "A" and "B") can be eliminated using systems knowledge. Suggestion is to ask the SRO applicant a 2-part question involving which procedure is required to be implemented and what E-plan classification for this event. Alternative suggestion is to ask the SRO applicant what notifications are required.
- 2. Stem Focus: Ensure that the stem question has a question mark.
- 3. 5121/09: Licensee re-submitted question wI revisions to target Item #1 and #2 listed above. However, licensee proposes to distribute reference EPIP-1 claSSificatiOn index to applicants (similarly as 0#87 and 88).
- 4. Cues: To avoid distributing reference, suggest the following:
WOOTF identifies the MAXIMUM NORMAL operating radiation setpoint for the refuel floor area rad monitors and the required approval prior to resuming any fuel transfer operations fol/owing fuel damage during refueling, in accordance with EOI-3 and 2-AOI-79-1, respectively? A. FUEL POOL AREA RADIA TlON HIGH (2-9-3A, Window 1) alarm setpoint; Reactor Engineer B. FUEL POOL AREA RADIA T/ON HIGH (2-9-3A, Window 1) alarm setpoint; Plant Manager C. 1000 mrlhr; Reactor Engineer O. 1000 mrlhr; Plant Manager
- 5. Stem Focus: The fill-in-the-blank statement can be streamlined as follows:
contains the step to verify Secondary Containment is intact. The highest required emergency classification for this event is in accordance with EPIP-1.
- 6. In-office: Comments incorporated. NRC requested changing "cn and "0" to 500 mr/hr. Licensee incorporated request. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 80 H 2 X X N 1J 295025 EAZ.01 e 1. Q=KlA: The question must target an emergency plant evolution. The question (as written) targets the applicant's knowledge of S tech specs as they pertain to an infrequently performed test (hydrostatic test) during an outage.
- 2. 5/21/09: Licensee submitted new question testing applicant's knowledge of the reactor pressure equivalent to 4 SRVs open and the required EOP procedure.
- 3. Stem Focus: The fill-in-the-blank statement indudes unnecessary words such as 'Based on the above conditions" and "correct course of action."
- 4. Cue: The 3rd bullet is not necessary to elicit the correct response since applicant must not assume any condition per NUREG 1021, App E.
- 5. Stem Focus: The 2nd sentence in the stem is confusing.
Streamline the stem as follows A scram occurred on Unit 2 with the following conditions::
- RPV level initially lowered to -125" and is now stable at -75"
- Four SRVs remain OPEN at their setpoint
- SLC is injecting and tank level is 83% and lowering
- Drywell Pressure is 1.9 psig and slowly rising
- Torus Level is 17 ft and stable and slowly rising WOOTF identifies the required procedure legs for reactor power and pressure, respectively, in accordance with the EOls?
[Reference Provided - Discuss w/licenseej A. RCIQ and C-2 B. C-5 and EOI-1 C. RC/Q and EOI-1 D. C-5 and C-2
- 6. In-office: Verified that EOP allowance states "can it be maintained in the SAFE region" (vs can it be restored and maintained). Licensee agreed that testing applicant's knowledge at this level was acceptable.
Licensee used almost identical version of suggested question except asked for procedures legs for level and pressure. NRC agreed to distribute SRV Tailpipe Curve as only reference. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 81 F 2 X x N e 295028 EA2.01 V 2. Stem Focus: The stem introduces 2 un-related events which could potentially confuse the applicants, i.e., loss of OW cooling S and inadvertent drain down of the torus. Suggest limiting the question to one topic (high OW temp). Suggest the following wI fill-in-the-blank statements. Discuss wI licensee. WOOTF completes both of the following statements concerning high drywell (OW) temperature? In accordance with Tech Spec Bases, the highest initial OW average air temperature which ensures that the peak OW temperature of 336 deg F will not be reached following a DBA LOCAis In accordance with EOI-2, DWIT leg, a manual reactor scram is first required before OW temperature rises to A. 150 deg; 200 deg B. 150 deg; 280 deg C. 160 deg; 200 deg D. 160 deg; 280 deg [SRO-only because 1'" part of question requires applicant knowledge of tech spec bases.]
- 3. Minutia: Placing the applicant right-on-the-line (i.e., 11.6 tt) where ED is required (11.5 tt) may be potentially argued as testing on trivial information which requires too much recall.
- 4. 5/21/09: Licensee submitted a revised question which targets Item #1 and #2 above (Le., removed the torus inadvertent draindown and minutia concern). Licensee did not incorporate suggested question.
- 5. Double jeopardy: This question ("C" and "0") overlaps wI new proposed Q# 98 (App 12 or App 13).
- 6. Cred Oist: "CO and "0" are not plausible because the stem parameters are minor (145 deg) and limited to only a loss of drywell cooling; therefore, exceeding offsite release limits in order to vent is not plausible.
- 7. Stem Focus: Suggest streamlining the wording of the fill-in-the-blank statement.
- 8. In-office: Licensee incorporated my proposal. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Creel. Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 82 x x X + 700000 G2.4.31 lj 1. Q=KlA: Brunswick SRO question provided with DRAFT submittal was targeted for Progress Energy KIA 212000 (RPS) S A2.15. The required Browns Ferry KIA must target Grid Instability. Part 1 of this question requires applicant system knowledge of RPS load reject trip signals. Part 2 of the question requires an applicant to identifying the procedure wI a specific step for shutting down the unit should a grid instability condition exist. The SRO applicant is not being tested on Grid Instability. Suggestions include testing the applicant's knowledge of either grid system frequency deviating from the normal standard of 60 Hertz or an inability of the system to maintain the normal 500KV voltage schedule of 525 + 5kv at the BFN site.
- 2. Cred Dist: Ask licensee if it is possible for Browns Ferry to experience a load reject signal and the unit remain on-line. Are "A" and "B" plausible? Stem Focus: Does the stem suggest Unit 2 only is shutting down?
- 3. Cues: Either provide names & panel indications of all 7 offsite feeders OR only provide names of the 4 offsite feeders that were lost. Also, the third bullet provides a cue to the applicant; modify to provide voltage/frequency indications.
- 4. Stem Focus: Modify the stem question to specifically ask the SRO applicant which procedure contains the step (vs guidance) to commence a shutdown.
- 5. 5/21/09: Licensee submitted a different question testing the SRO applicant's knowledge of how reactive power must be adjusted (RO knowledge) and which AOI directed this action (overall mitigative strategy - RO knowledge).
- 6. Cred Dist: "A" and "B" are not plausible if stem states that only 2 feeders were lost and grid voltage remains.
~ that the SRO-only portion of the question test the applicant's knowledge of Appendix A in AOI-57-1E, Operability Issues for Switchyard and TRO-TO-SOP-1 0.128
- 8. In-office: Licensee submitted proposal for question that tested applicant's knowledge of whether to raisellower power AND the frequency required for DG operability (buried in bases - - minutia). Re-worked question to ask for req'd action during high freq scenario and whether LCO 3.8.1 AC Sources met w/o 161 KV available on Unit 3.
QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
00 LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 83 H 2 X X X N E 295012 G2.4.34
- 1. This is a tough KIA to hit for SRO-only because of the generic link to knowledge of RO tasks performed outside the control room. If replacement required, consult chief examiner. SRO-st only: The 1 two choices ["N and "B1 include procedures; however, the last two choices do not provide a procedure selection opportunity. Discuss how this question is SRO-only wI the licensee. Can RO knowledge of tripped breaker be used to deduce the correct answer?
- 2. Cred Dis!: "B" is not plausible because the 1st bullet in the stem states that RPV level is stable.
th
- 3. Cue: The 6 bullet is a potential cue that "D" [DW spray] is the correct answer. Because EOI-Appendix 17B and EOI-2 both include the steps to stop recirc pumps & blowers as prerequisites, the~ are not necessary to elicit the correct response. The 9' bullet is a strong cue p.e., manually open the valve] because it states that the breaker will not reset. These bullets are not necessary to elicit the correct response with respect to procedure selection for an SRO applicant. Discuss wI licensee. ~ the following:
A LOCA occurred on Unit 1 and the US has determined that DW Sprays are required to be initiated using Fire Protection System. WOOTF identifies a local operator action that must be performed and I the procedure used to spray the DW using Fire Protection? Note: 1-FCV-74-101 is the Units 1 & 2 Discharge Cross Tie I A. Locally OPEN the 480 V breaker for 1-FCV-74-101; 1-EOI-I Appendix - 7K, Alternate RPV Injection System Lineup Fire System B. Locally OPEN the 480 V breaker for 1-FCV-74-101; 1-EOI-Appendix - 17B, RHR System Operation DW Sprays C. Locally CLOSE the 480 V breaker for 1-FCV-74-101; 1-EOI-Appendix - 7K, Alternate RPV Injection System Lineup Fire System D. Locally CLOSE the 480 V breaker for 1-FCV-74-101; 1-EOI-Appendix - 17B, RHR System Operation DW Sprays
- 4. 5121109: Licensee's submitted revised question to target Item #2 above by incorporating procedures in "C" and "D." Other items not yet addressed.
- 5. In-office: Licensee agreed to suggestion after validation.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 84 H 2 X X X X X N Y 295013 AA2.02 S 1. Q=KlA: The KIA requires testing the applicant's ability to interpret localized heating/stratification in the torus. Because all SRVs initially lifted during the A TWS. testing the applicant's ability to interpret localized heating/stratification in the torus is difficult, .. if not impossible. The correct answer "a" can be determined via RO knowledge that a cooldown is not permitted during an A TWS. The question must target an applicant's knowledge of an abnormal plant evolution. As written. the question involves an ATWS (EOP evolution) and a rising torus temperature (92 deg - AOP evolution) which remains below the EOP-2 entry condition. [2-AOI-1-1 is still the controlling procedure for torus temperature even though the EOPs have been entered.] [As a note. KIA 295026 also targets high torus temperature but applies only during implementation of the EOPs] Suggestion is to write the question outside of EOPs space; i.e .* a leaking SRV where the applicant must recognize localized heating/stratification is occurring (or recognize the problems with this situation >> damage to the coating on the inner surface of the torus OR pressurization of the torus air space). The SRO applicant can further determine the SRV operability in accordance wI Tech Specs (or alternatively determine operability of torus temperature elements. etc.).
- 2. SRO-only: The question is designated 10CFR55.43.5 even though procedure selection is not involved. The correct answer "a" can be determined via RO knowledge that a cooldown is not permitted during an A TWS.
- 3. #/units: According to ARP 2-9-3A. Window 29 [SUPPR POOL TEMP SINGLE ELEMENT HIGH OR FAILED]. the setpoint for this alarm is 95 deg. This requires entry to EOP-2. i.e .* the controlling procedure for torus temperature. As such. the question would not be solely targeting an abnormal plant evolution. See comment #1 above.
- 4. Stem Focus: In all procedure related questions. ensure that the stem question includes "in accordance with .. .[procedure name}
- 5. 5121/09: Licensee submitted new question to target suggestion listed in Items #1 - #3 above. Cred Dist: An unknowledgable applicant could eliminate "A" and "C" because damaging tailpipe coatings is not plausible. Stem Focus: Suggest streamlining the fill-in-the-blank statement.
- 6. In-office: Re-worked to ask implication of SRV remaining open and procedure required for torus cooling.
~- - -
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 6ack- Q= SRO 6/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Oist. Link units ward KIA Only 85 H 2 X X 6 e 295033 EA2.03 S 1. Cred Oist: The word "execute" in the fill-in-the-blank procedure makes Choice "6" not plausible because normally that word is associated with EOPs (vs GOls). Suggest Changing "6" and "0" to 0-EOI-04, Rad Release Flowchart to make Choice "6" plausible and all choices symmetric.
- 2. Stem Focus: Place a question mark after the stem question.
- 3. 5121109: Licensee submitted revised question that incorporated feedback from Item #1 and #2 listed above.
- 4. Stem Focus: Suggest combining all bullets into one list preceded by a statement "Following the scram a primary system began discharging into Secondary Containment with the following alarms. Suggest re-wording the stem fill-in-the-blank question as follows: "In accordance with 1-EOI-3, Secondary Containment Control, the crew is required to enter and a potential isolation source is
[SRO-only justification is that EOI-3 decision point that scram and emergency depress will reduce discharge into Sec Cnmt.]
- 5. In-office: Licensee incorporated comments. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 86 H & X X X N e 206000 A2.16 3 S 1. LOD=5 and/or Minutia: Remembering the alarm setpoints for 3 annunciators and projecting a future time when drywell pressure will reach 2.45 psig can be argued by an applicant as too difficult. Additionally, the memorization of the 30 seconds TS allowable value can be argued by an applicant as too specific recall and/or "minutia."
- 2. Backward: Question is "disjointed" because it tests 4 unrelated items: 1) alarm setpoints, 2) HPCI setpoint, 3) Battery Warning lite, and 4) procedure selection (App 5D vs 01-73).
Suggest re-working question to test how HPCI will be affected in pressure control mode after a Hi DW press signal is received, including SRO knowledge of correct procedure selection for pressure control or jumper installation.
- 3. Stem Focus: Change "small-break LOCA" in the stem to "leak in the drywe/f
- 4. Stem Focus: The fill-in-the-blank statement is too short and the choices may be clearer as stand alone choices.
- 5. Stem Focus: Place a question mark after the stem question.
- 6. 5/21/09: Licensee submitted a different question that tested applicant's TS knowledge when a Hi DWP instrument calibration in progress with a subsequent instrument failure. Licensee proposes distributing TS 3.3.5.1 and an excerpt from a logic diagram which identifies which DWP instruments initiate HPCI.
- 7. Stem Focus: The PIS-64-58A & -58B instruments also provide Hi DWP input for functions 1.b and 2.b, (Core spray & LPCI).
Clarify in the stem that the applicant must limit their analysis to HPClonly. Stem Focus: Clarify in "A" and "B" choices that HPCI is NOT required to be declared inoperable lAW TS 3.5.1. Stem Focus: Clarify in "C" and "D" choices that HPCI is required to be declared inoperable lAW TS 3.5.1
- 8. Cues: In the 1st and 2nd bullets, the capitalized title of the instrument should not include CHANNEL A (B) since this information is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 9. Cues: Change the word "associated relay" to "Logic relay". Due to BF logic labeling, the logic diagram is necessary for an SRO applicant to determine that the initiation function is lost.
- 10. In-office: Comments incorporated. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 87 H 3 X X X N 1J 212000 A2.20 e 1. SRO-only: The correct answer ["01 can be deduced by knowing the RPS power supply arrangement; i.e., once "A" RPS is aligned S to the alternate power supply a subsequent problem with the alternate power supply will result in a full reactor scram. Suggest asking a question related to Panel 9-5 indications following an ATWS (requiring knowledge of correct procedure to insert rods - possibly RO knowledge) and the REP classification for ATWS.
- 2. 5/21/09: Licensee re-submitted a different question in response to the feedback listed above in item#1.
- 3. Cues: Licensee proposes distributing entire EPIP-1 classification matrix to applicants. The entire EPIP-1 matrix may compromise other questions and may not be necessary to hit the KIA.
th
- 4. Cues: Is 5 bullet necessary? Change to state "No rod can be selected" Ask licensee if stem of question can be boiled down to simply state that air is lost
- 5. Minutia: Does question require applicant's knowledge of HCTL Curve inflection points? If so, then an applicant could successfully argue that the question required too much recall of the curve.
Suggest that licensee not distribute EPIP-1 classification matrix and ask which procedure is required to insert rods + highest required E-plan declaration (site vs alert).
- 6. In-office: NRC agreed to distribute EPIP-1, Section 1 (E-plan classification index) and HCTL Curve. QUESTION IS SAT.
- - ---~
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 88 H 3 X X M Y 217000 G2.4.41 MB e 1. Q=KlA: The question is not testing the applicant's knowledge of RCIC. S Suggest writing a question regarding an unisolable RCIC steam leak requiring the SRO applicant to determine (using data and lor provided reference) whether one area has exceeded max safe operating value (for RCIC ambient area temps) and the corresponding E-plan dassification.
- 2. 5/21/09: Licensee submitted a modified bank question to target suggestion listed above.
- 3. Cues: For licensee's alternate question, licensee recommends distributing the entire EPIP*1.Event Classlflc3tionMatrix and also Table 3.1, Max Safe Operating Area Temperature Limits. The entire EPIP-1 matrix may compromise other questions and may not be necessary to hit the KIA. Discuss only providing a partial or "whited out" version of the matrix. Alternatively, suggest the following:
A unisolable RCIC steam leak occurred on Unit 2 and the following conditions currently exist:
- All rods inserted; RPV pressure is 850 psig and lowering
- RPV level is normal being maintained by HPCI
- 2-TE-71-41B, RCIC Steam Supply Area, 250 deg, steady
- 2-RM-90-26A, CS/RCIC Room, 800 mr/hr, steady WOOTF identifies whether Emergency Depressurization is required and the highest required emergency dedaration, in accordance with EOI-2 and EPIP-1, respectively?
A. ED is NOT required; ALERT B. ED is required; ALERT C. ED is NOT required; SITE AREA EMERGENCY D. ED is required; SITE AREA EMERGENCY For this suggested question, ask licensee whether a reference for the applicants is required. If so, then limit to either the Secondary Containment pages OR the Table 3.1 and 3.2 values (not both).
- 4. In-office:
In*Office: NRC agreed to distribute EPIP-1, Section 3 (E-plan dassification index) AND Table 3.1. Licensee agreed to NOT
, distribute EOI-3 flowchart. QUESTION IS SAT.
- ~- - - ~
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 89 H 3 X N e 239002 G2.4.45 S 1. Stem Focus: The last two bullets are not necessary since the stem states that ED has been directed. Stem Focus: Is the last st portion of the 1 bullet [ .. ."and the board is de-energized.l redundant to the annunciator. i.e .. the alarm is an UValarm; therefore. is it necessary to state that the board is de-energized? Stem Focus: Suggest replacing "small Loss of Coolant Accident" with "leak in the drywell." Stem Focus: To ensure SRO-only procedure selection. suggest the following enhancements. U1 was operating at 100% when a leak in the OW occurred and the following conditions currently exist:
- 250 Reactor MOV Bd 1C UV (1-9-8C. W18)
- Drywell Control Air Pressure Low (1-9-3E. W35)
- All control rods inserted
- Reactor pressure 940 psig
- The Unit Supervisor has determined that ED is required WOOTF identifies the maximum number of ADS MSRVs that will electrically open using the Panel 9-3 control switch and the required procedure in accordance with 1-EOI-2-C-2. Emergency RPV Depressurization?
A. ONLY 4 valves are capable of being manually opened; 1-EOI-Appendix-11B. Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems. RCIC Test Mode B. ONLY 4 valves are capable of being manually opened; 1-EOI-Appendix-17D. RHR Systems Operation Shutdown Cooling C. 6 valves are capable of being manually opened;; 1-EOI-Appendix-11B. Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems. RCIC Test Mode D. 6 valves are capable of being manually opened; 1-EOI-Appendix-17D, RHR Systems Operation Shutdown COOling
- 5. 5/21109: Licensee submitted new question (not seen suggestion
#4 above yet) involving concurrent loss of 3 SRVs and HPCI.
Suggest "boiling down" each choice to only provide a bottom line of how many hours to be in hot shutdown. etc. (vs listing actionsetc.) Licensee proposes distributing TS as reference to applicants.
- 6. In-office: Licensee incorporated comments. QUESTION IS SAT.
~
L-_ ,-
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 90 H 4 X N I; 261000 A2.11 S 1. Stem Focus: The initial conditions should also indude the status (mode) of U1 & U3.
- 2. Stem Focus: Change "small break LOCA" to "a leak in the drywell" to avoid any confusion related to EOP implementation.
- 3. Stem Focus: The 3m bullet should be continued to state"" .and cannot be repaired for the next 2 weeks." This will allow eliminating the "NOT" statement in the stem question.
- 4. Stem Focus: Add a 4th bullet stating that Unit 2 is cooling down to Mode 4 to focus the applicants only on the other units applicability.
- 5. Stem Focus: Modify the stem question as follows: 'WOOTF identifies the latest required time/date that Unit 1 and Unit 3 must be in Mode 37"
- 6. Verify wi licensee that the stated reference to be distributed to applicants.
- 7. 5/21/09: Licensee submitted revision wi all suggestions listed above. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 8. In-office: Verified wi licensee that U1/U2/U3 T.S. 3.6.4.3 (all 3 units) to be distributed; however. NO bases. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Oist. Link units ward KIA Only 91 H 2 X X x N e 202001 A2.10 S 1. Stem Focus: The 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement includes the wrong title for TS 3.4.1 in quotation marks; should be "Recirculation Loops Operating." Suggest re-wording the 2nd fill-in-the-blank statement as follows: The APRM Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - High setpoint is required to be adjusted to the single-loop allowable I value within ___ , in accordance with TS 3.4.1, Recirculation Loops Operating.
- 2. #/units: For the #2 seal pressure indicator, provide the instrument number and noun name of the Panel 9-4/9-5 meter
- 3. #/units: For the 2nd bullet, provide the corresponding annunciator triggered by a high seal leak off rate.
- 4. Partial: Verify wI licensee that there is no possible way these indications could also be indicative of a #2 seal issue, i.e., "0" could also be correct?
- 5. 5/21/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 6. In-office: Licensee re-worked question to test applicant's knowledge of a seal failure (vs a restricting orifice failure) and whether the LCO was 12 hours (vs 24 hours). No reference.
QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 92 H 2 X X X N Y 215002 A2.05 S 1. Partial: Could an applicant successfully argue that the plant conditions listed in the 4 bullets are also indicative of a mis-positioned control rod? Is the control rod being withdrawn continuously? Single notch? An applicant's assumption could invalidate the rod drop scenario if the control rod was at position 02 when these alarms occurred.
- 2. Q=KlA: Ask the licensee how the question (as written) targets the Rod Block Monitor. [appears to target rod drop accident].
The KIA requires testing the applicant's knowledge on the procedures required to correct, control, or mitigate the RBM high or inoperable signal.
- 3. SRO-only: AOP entry conditions are RO knowledge. The 2nd portion of the question requires the applicant to know subsequent action in AOI-85-1 [reduce power by 10%] which is overall mitigative strategy for dropped control rod. AOP entry conditions are typically RO knowledge; similarly, that major EOP entry conditions are RO knowledge. Suggest the following:
Unit 3 is operating at 75% power and a rod sequence exchange is in orogress. While the operator was withdrawing Control Rod 26-S9 26-59 from pOSition 00 to 48, the following annunciators began alarming: RBM HIIINOP, (3-9-SA, (3-9-5A, W24) CONTROL ROD WITHDRA W BLOCK (3-9-5A, (3-9-SA, W7) WOOTF completes the following statements? At this power level, the RBM Upscale High alarm setpoint is . If further
'nvestigation reveals that RBM "A n is inoperable, then an action statement in Tech Spec must be entered.
Note:TS 3.3.2.2, Control Rod Block Instrumentation; TR 3.3.4, Control Rod Block Instrumentation A. 111%; ONLY TS 3.3.2.2 B. 111%; BOTH TS 3.3.2.2 AND TR 3.3.4 C. 117%; ONL Y TS 3.3.2.2 D. 117%; BOTH TS 3.3.2.2 AND TR 3.3.4
- 2. 5/21/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question (except the choices order was different) because no feedback had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 3. In-office: Licensee incorporated suggestion. agreed no reference.
QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN utE/S Explanation Focus Dis!. Link units ward KIA Only 93 H 2 X 1J 233000 G2.4.35 S 1. SRO-only: The correct answer ["A" - xtie unit Y, pools] can be determined using RO systems knowledge as follows: "B" is incorrect because skimmer weirs are mechanically lowered to promote more flow; "CO is incorrect because closing demin bypass valve would not raise cooling flow; "0" is incorrect since fuel pool level is normal. Suggest the following: Unit 1 is shutting down for a refueling outage with the following plant conditions:
- Reactor power is 57%
- RHRlFPC HX OUTLET TEMP HI (9-3E, W18)
- Fuel pool temperature is 126 deg and rising
- Fuel pool level is xxx' xx' (put normal level here)
WOOTF identifies a local operator action and the required attachment to be implemented in accordance with 1-AOI-78-1, Fuel Pool Cleanup System Failure? A. CLOSE FlO Bypass Valve 1-FCV-078-0066 (0065) using local control switch; Attachment 1, SFP Heatup Rate at Normal Fuel Pool Level B. CLOSE FlO Bypass Valve using local control switch; Attachment 2, Aligning Emergency EECW Makeup to U1 SFP C. OPEN FID Bypass Valve using local control switch; ; Attachment 1, SFP Heatup Rate at Normal Fuel Pool Level O. OPEN FlO Bypass Valve using local control switch; Attachment 2, Aligning Emergency EECW Makeup to U1 SFP
- 2. 5/21/09: Licensee's submittal included a revised question that included all of the same choices, except that procedure name/numbers were added to each choice. Two procedures were 01-78 and the other two procedures were AOI-78 selections. The same problem as described in item #1 exists.
- 3. In-office: Licensee incorporated my question. QUESTION IS SAT.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO BIMIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 94 F 2 X X MB e. G2.1.13 S 1. Job-Link: Will the SM be involved with a maintenance personnel call-in request? Suggest replacing wI a licensed operator who is the only one available for call-in.
- 2. Partial: Can an applicant successfully argue "A" correct?
- 3. Partial: If the applicant chooses "CO, can he/she successfully argue as correct?
Suggest the following: WOOTF completes the following statements in accordance with SPP-1.2, Fitness For Duty? All individuals are expected to not consume alcohol for a minimum of least prior to reporting for scheduled work. For UNSCHEDULED work, this abstinence period may be waived ONL Y if A. 5 hours; the individual has been called by the Emergency Response Center automated electronic paging system. B. 6 hours; the individual has been called by the Emergency Response Center automated electronic paging system. C. 5 hours; a determination of fitness for duty is made using a saliva test or breath analysis. D. 6 hours; a determination of fitness for duty is made using a saliva test or breath analysis.
- 4. 5/21109: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 5. In-office: Licensee incorporated suggested question. QUESTION IS SAT.
-- - -~-
- -~
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F CrecL Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/MIN U/E/S Explanation Focus Oist. Link units ward KIA Only 95 F 2 X X N E G2.1.4
- 1. Partial: To avoid any possibility of an applicant appeal, boil down the question to identify requirements as stated verbatim in OPOP-10, for example, use Appendix F and list the items (verbatim) "An thru "0." Then use similar wording as already exists, i.e., ONLY items 1&2, ONLY items 1&3, etc. Also ask for minimum requirements to avoid potential subset issues.
- 2. Stem Focus: Is the reactivation of a SM any different than a US?
Ask the licensee if this is necessary in the stem.
- 3. Stem Focus: Suggest replacing the words "elements' with requirements.
- 4. 5121/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
5.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 8ack- Q= SRO 8/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 96 F 2 X X N E G2.2.19
- 1. Partial: The stem does not specify if the initiator and the SMiDesignee are the same person. If the same person, then all the answers could be argued as correct.
- 2. Cred Dist: In bullet # 6, the word "consider" is ALWAYS right; therefore, the applicant could deduce that "An and "CO are more credible than "8" and "0."
- 3. Suggest asking 2 distinct pieces of data as follows:
WOOTF choices completes the following statements in accordance with SPP-6.1, Work Order Process Initiation? Work Orders shall be evaluated and prioritized within a maximum time of Work Orders created for material procurement purposes ___ Supervisor or Operations. A. 16 hours; MUST be reviewed by the B. 16 hours; are NOT required to be reviewed by the C. 24 hours; MUST be reviewed by the D. 24 hours; are NOT required to be reviewed by the
- 4. 5121/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KIA Only 97 H 3 X X X MB E G2.2.23
- 1. #/units: Ask the licensee to define "adjacent"; could not find in TS bases. Is it "face" adjacent or "diagonally" adjacent? Need to ensure there is a reference or procedure that describes "adjacent."
- 2. Stem Focus: The first part of the stem question can be eliminated ("assuming no operator actions ... ") and each applicant will be briefed by the exam team using NUREG 1021, Appendix E. The word Tech Spec "applicability" is not exact.
Suggest rewording the stem question as follows: WOOTF identifies the minimum Tech Spec required actions?
- 3. Partial: To avoid any confusion (Le., "NOT" statements in the choices), suggest rewording each choice as follows:
A. Be in Mode 3 within 12 hours B. ALL 3 rods are SLOW lAW TS 3.1.4; however, NONE of the rods are inoperable lAW TS 3.1.3 C. Rods 22-23 and 30-31 are SLOW lAW TS 3.1.4; an INFORMA TlON ONL Y LCO is required for Rod 26-27 lAW TS 3.1.3 D. Rods 22-23 and 30-31 are SLOW lAW TS 3.1.4; an ACTIVE LCO is required for Rod 26-27 lAW TS 3.1.3.
- 4. 5121/09: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N utE/S Explanation Focus Dist. link units ward KIA Only 98 H 2 X X X IS V G2.3.11 N E 1. SRO-only: The question is not evaluating procedure selection because the correct answer can be deduced by knowing 1) ARP requires closing MSIVs (RO knowledge) on MSL Rad Hi-Hi and
- 2) an ED always requires at least 2 areas above max safe. (RO knowledge) Using only these two pieces of RO knowledge, the applicant can eliminate "A", "B", and "D" - - without having the SRO applicant perform procedure selection (10CFR55.43.5)
Suggest.. .. asking the applicant a 2-part question whether ED procedure is required/not required AND EOP basis and required procedure: A. 2-C-2 entry is required irrespective of offsite release rates B. 2-C-2 entry is required; offsite release rates are NOT allowed to be exceeded C. 2-C-2 entry is NOT required; Cooldown IA W 2-EOI-Appendix 11A, Alternate RPV Pressure Control Systems MSRVs D. 2-C-2 entry is NOT required; Cooldown using Main Condenser lAW EOI-1, RCIP Altematively, suggest asking a question related to liquid release authorizations required for radwaste liquid/gaseous release permit procedures.
- 2. 5121/09: licensee submitted new question which tested applicant's knowledge of App 12 (vs App 13) and venting wrt ODCM release limits (or irrespective of release limits).
- 3. Partial: Could an applicant successfully argue that "D" is also correct, i.e., using App 13 but staying within release rate limits?
Discuss w/licensee. What is the consequence of inappropriately using App 13?
- 4. Stem Focus: Are we saying that the MSIVs are open or closed?
Applicants will ask; consider clarifying stem.
- 5. Stem Focus: Re-word stem as follows: "WOOTF completes the following statement. "Venting the Primary Containment is required to be performed using th
- 6. Stem Focus: Why is the 5 bullet necessary? (MSL RAD Hi-HI)
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOO (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial Job- Minutia #1 Sack- Q= SRO S/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Oist. Link units ward KIA Only 99 F 2 X N E G2.3.7
- 1. Partial: The question may cause confusion wI the applicants because the two fill-in-the-blank statements deal wI two different situations. (normal and emergency) An applicant may assume that both statements are dealing with emergency situations. In that case, then there may be multiple correct answers.
- 2. Cred Dist: "S" and "0" are not plausible IF the first fill-in-the-blank statement is pertaining to normal conditions because RWPs are only controlled by RAOCON. (GET knowledge) IF the plausibility of "S" and "0" deals wI emergency situations, then see Item#1 above.
Suggest asking the following: WOOTF completes the following statements lAW RCDP-3, Administration of Radiation Work Permits for normal and emergency situations? During normal Situations, RADCON supervision authorize short-term deviations from RWP requirements (for example verbally requiring additional protective requirements) without revising the RWP. If the Shift Manager authorizes immediate entry to a radiation area during an emergency situation, then a RADCON escort A. may; is NOT required B. may; is STILL required C. may NOT; is NOT required O. may NOT; is STILL required.
- 3. Partial: Verify wI licensee that "S" is the only correct answer.
- 4. 5/21109: Licensee's submittal included the same question because no feedback had yet been received from the NRC as of this date.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F CreeL Partial Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dis!. link units ward KIA Only 100 F 2 X X X X N ~ G2.4.8 E 1. SRO-only and/or Q=KlA: The question is not SRO-only because the correct answer can be deduced by only knowing that a valid DW Hi Rad alarm requires injecting the entire SLC tank (RO knowledge) for alternate source term purposes. [Using only this piece of information, "A", "C", and "D" can be eliminated.] As written, the applicant's ability to assess plant conditions and select procedures is not being tested. Furthermore, the KIA requires knowledge of how AOPs are used in conjunction with EOPs ... if an applicant can deduce the correct answer by knowing the DW Hi Rad ARP requires injecting the entire SLC tank .... then how is the applicant being tested on AOP/EOP coordination? Suggest writing a question related to execution of an AOP and EOP, e.g., when would entry to AOI-100-1 be required and entry to EOI-1 NOT be required? Conversely, which AOPs are allowed to be implemented concurrently wI the EOls and which AOPs are NOT allowed to be implemented concurrently wI the EOls? Specific cases such as high torus temp OR loss of offsite power may provide the SRO applicant wI either REP call, reportability, or procedure selection opportunity.
- 5. 5121/09: licensee submitted revised quest;ion which requires SRO-only knowledge of procedures
- 6. Partial; "D" can still be argued as correct because "Upon exiting 1-C-5 ... " the crew will eventually exit 1-EOI-1 and go to cold shutdown lAW GOI-100-12A. An applicant can argue this as correct because it includes continuing boron injection. Discuss wI licensee. Suggest changing "D" to state "Continue Boron Injection; Remain in all 3 legs of EOI-1, Do NOT enter AOI-100-1."
(incorrect)
- 7. Cue: The short phrase in the stem question (Le., "Upon exiting 1-C-5") could potentially cue an unknowledgable applicant that exiting was appropriate. This phrase is not necessary to elicit the correct response.
- 8. Partial: Suggest that "N and "B" be enhanced by adding statement.. ."remain in RC/P and RC/L."
- 9. Stem Focus: Re-phrase the stem question "WOOTF identifies the required procedures?"
Q# 1. 1. LOK LOK I 2. 2.
- 3. Psychometric Flaws LOD I--~-..--r--..,....
LOD
- 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.
(F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Credo Partial J?b-I #! Job- Minutia I #/ I Back-I B/MiN IU/E/S Back- Q= I SRO I B/MiN UlE/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward KJA Only 1- I I I[=r~-CI I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I}}