ML092260559
| ML092260559 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/2009 |
| From: | Widmann M Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Heacock D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| 50-280/09-301, 50-281/09-301 IR-09-301 | |
| Download: ML092260559 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000280/2009301
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931
August 14, 2009
Mr. David A. Heacock
President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Innsbrook Technical Center
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711
SUBJECT: SURRY POWER STATION - NRC OPERATOR LICENSE EXAMINATION
REPORT 05000280/2009301 AND 05000281/2009301
Dear Mr. Heacock:
During the period July 20 - 23, 2009, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administered
operating tests to employees of your company who had applied for licenses to operate the Surry
Power Station. At the conclusion of the tests, the examiners discussed preliminary findings
related to the operating tests with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed report.
The written examination was administered by your staff on July 29, 2009.
All applicants passed both the operating test and written examination. There were two post-
examination comments concerning the written examination. These comments, and the NRC
resolution of these comments, are summarized in Enclosure 2. A Simulator Fidelity Report is
included in this report as Enclosure 3.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its
enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document
Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document
system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm.adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
If you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 562-4550.
Sincerely,
/FJE RA for/
Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos.: 50-280 and 50-281
License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37
cc w/Encl.: (See page 2)
Enclosures: 1. Report Details
2. Facility Comments and NRC Resolutions
3. Simulator Fidelity Report
_________________________ X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FJE
OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS
SIGNATURE MAB /RA/ FJE /RA for/
NAME MBates MWidmann
DATE 08/14/2009 08/14/2009
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
VEPCO 2
cc w/encl:
Gerald T. Bischof
Site Vice President
Surry Power Station
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
B. L. (Sonny) Stanley
Director, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq.
Senior Counsel
Dominion Resources Services, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution
Chris L. Funderburk
Director, Nuclear Licensing & Operations Support
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Ginger L. Alligood
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Virginia State Corporation Commission
Division of Energy Regulation
P.O. Box 1197
Richmond, VA 23209
Attorney General
Supreme Court Building
900 East Main Street
Richmond, VA 23219
Barry Garber
Licensing Manager
Surry Power Station
Virginia Electric and Power Company
5570 Hog Island Road
Surry, VA 23883
Michael M. Cline
Director
Virginia Department of Emergency Services Management
Electronic Mail Distribution
VEPCO 3
Letter to David Heacock from Malcolm T. Widmann dated August 14, 2009
SUBJECT: SURRY POWER STATION - NRC OPERATOR LICENSE EXAMINATION
REPORT 05000280/2009301 AND 05000281/2009301
Distribution w/encl:
C. Evans, RII
L. Slack, RII
OE Mail
RIDSNRRDIRS
PUBLIC
RidsNrrPMSurry Resource
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket No.: 50-280, 50-281
Report No.: 05000280/2009301, 05000281/2009301
Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company
Facility: Surry Power Station
Location: 5850 Hog Island Rd.
Surry, VA 23883
Dates: Operating Test - July 20 - July 23, 2009
Written Examination - July 29, 2009
Examiners: M. Bates, Chief Examiner, Senior Operations Engineer
F. Ehrhardt, Senior Operations Engineer
Approved by: Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief
Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure 1
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
ER 05000280/2009301, 05000281/2009301, 07/20-23/2009 & 07/29/2009; Surry Power Station;
Operator License Examinations.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) examiners conducted an initial examination in
accordance with the guidelines in Revision 9, Supplement 1, of NUREG-1021, "Operator
Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors." This examination implemented the
operator licensing requirements identified in 10 CFR §55.41, §55.43, and §55.45, as applicable.
The operating tests were developed by Surry Power Station staff and the written examination
was developed by members of the NRC.
The NRC administered the operating tests during the period of July 20 - 23, 2009. Members of
the Surry Power Station training staff administered the written examination on July 29, 2009. All
Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) applicants passed both the operating test and written
examination. Five applicants were issued licenses commensurate with the level of examination
administered.
There were two post-examination comments.
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure 1
REPORT DETAILS
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA5 Operator Licensing Initial Examinations
a. Inspection Scope
The operating tests were developed by members of the Surry Power Station staff and
the written examination was developed by members of the NRC. All examination
material was developed in accordance with the guidelines contained in Revision 9,
Supplement 1, of NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power
Reactors." The NRC examination team reviewed the proposed examination.
Examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee were made per
NUREG-1021 and incorporated into the final version of the examination materials.
The NRC reviewed the licensees examination security measures while preparing and
administering the examinations in order to ensure compliance with 10 CFR §55.49,
Integrity of examinations and tests.
The NRC examiners evaluated five Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) applicants using the
guidelines contained in NUREG-1021. The examiners administered the operating tests
during the period July 20 - 23, 2009. Members of the Surry Power Station training staff
administered the written examination on July 29, 2009. Evaluations of applicants and
reviews of associated documentation were performed to determine if the applicants, who
applied for licenses to operate the Surry Power Station, met the requirements specified
in 10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified. The NRC determined, using NUREG-1021,
that the licensees examination submittal was within the range of acceptability expected
for a proposed examination.
Five applicants passed both the operating test and written examination and were issued
licenses.
Copies of all individual examination reports were sent to the facility Training Manager for
evaluation of weaknesses and determination of appropriate remedial training.
The licensee submitted two post-examination comments concerning the written
examination. A copy of the final written examination and answer key, with all changes
incorporated, and the licensees post-examination comments may be accessed in the
ADAMS system (ADAMS Accession Number ML092260186, ML092260242 and
Enclosure 1
4
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On July 23, 2009 the NRC examination team discussed generic issues associated with
the operating test with Mr. B. L. Stanley, Director Nuclear Safety & Licensing, and
members of the Surry Power Station staff. The examiners asked the licensee if any of
the examination material was proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
L. Baker, Superintendent, Shift Operations
A. Barbee, Manager, Training
J. Dillich, Assistant Plant Manager
J. Ford, Nuclear Training
K. Grover, Manager, Operations
S. Irwin, Nuclear Training
P. Kershner, Station Licensing
W. Marshall, Nuclear Training
B. Stanley, Director Nuclear Safety & Licensing
D. Wilson, Supervisor, Nuclear Training
NRC personnel
J. Nadel, Resident Inspector
Enclosure 1
FACILITY COMMENTS AND NRC RESOLUTIONS
A complete text of the licensees comments can be found in ADAMS under accession number
SRO QUESTION 86
Licensee Comment:
The licensee contends that actions of Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.A.4 are not required to be
taken and actions of TS 3.1.A.5 are required to be taken, thereby making B the only correct
answer.
The licensee contends that TS 3.1.A.4 is intended to apply only to reactor coolant loops, and
that reactor coolant pump status does not impact TS 3.1.A.5. The licensee contends that the
position of reactor coolant loop stop valves primarily determines whether or not the loop is in
service and that the presence (or absence) of forced coolant flow has no impact on determining
whether or not a reactor coolant loop is in service.
The licensee supports their conclusion by stating that a separate TS (TS 3.17) exists to address
the impact of reactor coolant loop stop valves. TS 3.17 lists several items which are required to
be met in order to return a loop to service, none of which require a reactor coolant pump to be
operating.
The licensee also supports their position with Section 4.2 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report which lists the following criteria which are required to return a reactor coolant loop to
service:
2. Prevent opening of a cold-leg stop valve unless:
a. The hot-leg stop valve has been opened a specified time.
b. The loop bypass valve has been opened a specified time.
c. Flow has existed through the relief line for a specified time.
d. The cold-leg temperature is within 20oF of the highest cold-leg temperature in other
loops and the hot-leg temperature is within 20oF of the highest hot-leg temperature in
the other loops.
The licensee states that these conditions required for returning a loop to service do not include
any items that suggest that forced flow through the loop is required to consider the loop to be in
service.
Lastly, the licensee contends that the question statement is worded such that it asks for whether
or not action statements of the LCO are required to be performed, and TS 3.1.A.4 does not
contain any actions to be performed.
NRC Discussion:
The NRC agrees with the licensees assessment of the question. The NRC agrees that actions
of Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.A.4 are not required to be taken and actions of TS 3.1.A.5
are required to be taken.
Enclosure 2
2
Based on supporting information provided by the licensee, the determination of a reactor
coolant loop being in service is not dependent on forced flow existing within that loop. If the
loop stop valves are fully open, the loop would be considered in service and the conditions of
LCO 3.1.A.4 would be met, thus not requiring any action statements to be performed.
Lastly, the NRC also agrees that TS 3.1.A.4 does not contain any action statements to be
performed, regardless of whether the reactor coolant loop is considered to be in service.
NRC Resolution:
B is the only correct answer.
SRO QUESTION 93
Licensee Comment:
The licensee contends that alarm 1D-C6, PZR PWR RELIEF VV LO AIR PRESS, can
annunciate on either low backup air bottle pressure (1000 psig) or low backup air system
pressure downstream of the pressure regulator (80 psig). Due to backup air bottle pressure
being greater than 1000 psig, the cause of the alarm would have to be low backup air pressure
downstream of the regulator, which would render the PORV inoperable and the conditions of TS 3.1.A.6 would not be met. The TS actions of restoring the PORV backup air supply within 14
days OR be in HSD within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> would be required. Therefore, C is the only correct
answer.
The licensee contends that air bottle pressure was provided as 1050 psig in the stem of the
question, which is above the 1000 psig setpoint to cause 1D-C6 to annunciate. The licensee
further states that the alarm would have to be caused by a low backup air system pressure
downstream of the regulator since the potential cause of low air bottle pressure can be ruled out
due to the given air bottle pressure of 1050 psig. As specified in 1D-C6 and in TS 3.1.A.6
Bases, the PORV is required to be declared inoperable if backup air pressure downstream of
the regulator is less than 80 psig.
NRC Discussion:
The NRC agrees with the licensees contention that the conditions of TS 3.1.A.6 were not met
due to low backup air pressure downstream of the regulator and that the required actions of
restoring the PORV backup air supply within 14 days OR be in HSD within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />
would be required.
The NRC agrees that the alarm can annunciate due to low backup air bottle pressure less than
or equal to 1000 psig, low backup air system pressure of less than or equal to 80 psig
downstream of the regulator, or an instrument failure. The low backup air bottle pressure can
be ruled out as the cause of the alarm because air bottle pressure of 1050 psig was provided in
the question stem. No conditions in the stem were provided that would indicate that an
instrument failure existed for the pressure switch downstream of the regulator, which could
cause the 1D-C6 alarm to be lit. Therefore, the cause of 1D-C6 being lit would be a low backup
air pressure downstream of the regulator.
Enclosure 2
3
1D-C6 leads the operator to Step 4 in the presence of a low backup air system pressure
downstream of the regulator. Step 4 directs the operator to declare pressurizer PORVs
inoperable and start the 14 day clock in accordance with TS 3.1.A.6.f.
NRC Resolution:
C is the only correct answer.
Enclosure 2
SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT
Facility Licensee: Surry Power Station
Facility Docket Nos.: 05000280/05000281
Operating Tests Administered on: July 20 - July 23, 2009
This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit
or inspection findings and, without further verification and review in accordance with Inspection
Procedure 71111.11 are not indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.46. No licensee
action is required in response to these observations.
No simulator fidelity or configuration items were identified.
Enclosure 3