ML092260559

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IR 05000280-09-301 & 05000281-09-301 on 07/20/09 - 07/23/09 & July/29/2009 for Surry Power Station
ML092260559
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 08/14/2009
From: Widmann M
Division of Reactor Safety II
To: Heacock D
Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
50-280/09-301, 50-281/09-301 IR-09-301
Download: ML092260559 (12)


See also: IR 05000280/2009301

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER

61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

August 14, 2009

Mr. David A. Heacock

President and Chief Nuclear Officer

Virginia Electric and Power Company

Innsbrook Technical Center

5000 Dominion Boulevard

Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT: SURRY POWER STATION - NRC OPERATOR LICENSE EXAMINATION

REPORT 05000280/2009301 AND 05000281/2009301

Dear Mr. Heacock:

During the period July 20 - 23, 2009, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administered

operating tests to employees of your company who had applied for licenses to operate the Surry

Power Station. At the conclusion of the tests, the examiners discussed preliminary findings

related to the operating tests with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed report.

The written examination was administered by your staff on July 29, 2009.

All applicants passed both the operating test and written examination. There were two post-

examination comments concerning the written examination. These comments, and the NRC

resolution of these comments, are summarized in Enclosure 2. A Simulator Fidelity Report is

included in this report as Enclosure 3.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its

enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document

system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm.adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

If you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 562-4550.

Sincerely,

/FJE RA for/

Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief

Operations Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos.: 50-280 and 50-281

License Nos.: DPR-32 and DPR-37

cc w/Encl.: (See page 2)

Enclosures: 1. Report Details

2. Facility Comments and NRC Resolutions

3. Simulator Fidelity Report

_________________________ X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FJE

OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS

SIGNATURE MAB /RA/ FJE /RA for/

NAME MBates MWidmann

DATE 08/14/2009 08/14/2009

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

VEPCO 2

cc w/encl:

Gerald T. Bischof

Site Vice President

Surry Power Station

Virginia Electric and Power Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

B. L. (Sonny) Stanley

Director, Nuclear Safety and Licensing

Virginia Electric and Power Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq.

Senior Counsel

Dominion Resources Services, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution

Chris L. Funderburk

Director, Nuclear Licensing & Operations Support

Virginia Electric and Power Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

Ginger L. Alligood

Virginia Electric and Power Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

Virginia State Corporation Commission

Division of Energy Regulation

P.O. Box 1197

Richmond, VA 23209

Attorney General

Supreme Court Building

900 East Main Street

Richmond, VA 23219

Barry Garber

Licensing Manager

Surry Power Station

Virginia Electric and Power Company

5570 Hog Island Road

Surry, VA 23883

Michael M. Cline

Director

Virginia Department of Emergency Services Management

Electronic Mail Distribution

VEPCO 3

Letter to David Heacock from Malcolm T. Widmann dated August 14, 2009

SUBJECT: SURRY POWER STATION - NRC OPERATOR LICENSE EXAMINATION

REPORT 05000280/2009301 AND 05000281/2009301

Distribution w/encl:

C. Evans, RII

L. Slack, RII

OE Mail

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PUBLIC

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No.: 50-280, 50-281

License No.: DPR-32, DPR-37

Report No.: 05000280/2009301, 05000281/2009301

Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company

Facility: Surry Power Station

Location: 5850 Hog Island Rd.

Surry, VA 23883

Dates: Operating Test - July 20 - July 23, 2009

Written Examination - July 29, 2009

Examiners: M. Bates, Chief Examiner, Senior Operations Engineer

F. Ehrhardt, Senior Operations Engineer

Approved by: Malcolm T. Widmann, Chief

Operations Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure 1

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

ER 05000280/2009301, 05000281/2009301, 07/20-23/2009 & 07/29/2009; Surry Power Station;

Operator License Examinations.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) examiners conducted an initial examination in

accordance with the guidelines in Revision 9, Supplement 1, of NUREG-1021, "Operator

Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors." This examination implemented the

operator licensing requirements identified in 10 CFR §55.41, §55.43, and §55.45, as applicable.

The operating tests were developed by Surry Power Station staff and the written examination

was developed by members of the NRC.

The NRC administered the operating tests during the period of July 20 - 23, 2009. Members of

the Surry Power Station training staff administered the written examination on July 29, 2009. All

Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) applicants passed both the operating test and written

examination. Five applicants were issued licenses commensurate with the level of examination

administered.

There were two post-examination comments.

No findings of significance were identified.

Enclosure 1

REPORT DETAILS

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA5 Operator Licensing Initial Examinations

a. Inspection Scope

The operating tests were developed by members of the Surry Power Station staff and

the written examination was developed by members of the NRC. All examination

material was developed in accordance with the guidelines contained in Revision 9,

Supplement 1, of NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power

Reactors." The NRC examination team reviewed the proposed examination.

Examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee were made per

NUREG-1021 and incorporated into the final version of the examination materials.

The NRC reviewed the licensees examination security measures while preparing and

administering the examinations in order to ensure compliance with 10 CFR §55.49,

Integrity of examinations and tests.

The NRC examiners evaluated five Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) applicants using the

guidelines contained in NUREG-1021. The examiners administered the operating tests

during the period July 20 - 23, 2009. Members of the Surry Power Station training staff

administered the written examination on July 29, 2009. Evaluations of applicants and

reviews of associated documentation were performed to determine if the applicants, who

applied for licenses to operate the Surry Power Station, met the requirements specified

in 10 CFR Part 55, Operators Licenses.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified. The NRC determined, using NUREG-1021,

that the licensees examination submittal was within the range of acceptability expected

for a proposed examination.

Five applicants passed both the operating test and written examination and were issued

licenses.

Copies of all individual examination reports were sent to the facility Training Manager for

evaluation of weaknesses and determination of appropriate remedial training.

The licensee submitted two post-examination comments concerning the written

examination. A copy of the final written examination and answer key, with all changes

incorporated, and the licensees post-examination comments may be accessed in the

ADAMS system (ADAMS Accession Number ML092260186, ML092260242 and

ML092260259).

Enclosure 1

4

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

On July 23, 2009 the NRC examination team discussed generic issues associated with

the operating test with Mr. B. L. Stanley, Director Nuclear Safety & Licensing, and

members of the Surry Power Station staff. The examiners asked the licensee if any of

the examination material was proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

L. Baker, Superintendent, Shift Operations

A. Barbee, Manager, Training

J. Dillich, Assistant Plant Manager

J. Ford, Nuclear Training

K. Grover, Manager, Operations

S. Irwin, Nuclear Training

P. Kershner, Station Licensing

W. Marshall, Nuclear Training

B. Stanley, Director Nuclear Safety & Licensing

D. Wilson, Supervisor, Nuclear Training

NRC personnel

J. Nadel, Resident Inspector

Enclosure 1

FACILITY COMMENTS AND NRC RESOLUTIONS

A complete text of the licensees comments can be found in ADAMS under accession number

ML092260259.

SRO QUESTION 86

Licensee Comment:

The licensee contends that actions of Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.A.4 are not required to be

taken and actions of TS 3.1.A.5 are required to be taken, thereby making B the only correct

answer.

The licensee contends that TS 3.1.A.4 is intended to apply only to reactor coolant loops, and

that reactor coolant pump status does not impact TS 3.1.A.5. The licensee contends that the

position of reactor coolant loop stop valves primarily determines whether or not the loop is in

service and that the presence (or absence) of forced coolant flow has no impact on determining

whether or not a reactor coolant loop is in service.

The licensee supports their conclusion by stating that a separate TS (TS 3.17) exists to address

the impact of reactor coolant loop stop valves. TS 3.17 lists several items which are required to

be met in order to return a loop to service, none of which require a reactor coolant pump to be

operating.

The licensee also supports their position with Section 4.2 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis

Report which lists the following criteria which are required to return a reactor coolant loop to

service:

2. Prevent opening of a cold-leg stop valve unless:

a. The hot-leg stop valve has been opened a specified time.

b. The loop bypass valve has been opened a specified time.

c. Flow has existed through the relief line for a specified time.

d. The cold-leg temperature is within 20oF of the highest cold-leg temperature in other

loops and the hot-leg temperature is within 20oF of the highest hot-leg temperature in

the other loops.

The licensee states that these conditions required for returning a loop to service do not include

any items that suggest that forced flow through the loop is required to consider the loop to be in

service.

Lastly, the licensee contends that the question statement is worded such that it asks for whether

or not action statements of the LCO are required to be performed, and TS 3.1.A.4 does not

contain any actions to be performed.

NRC Discussion:

The NRC agrees with the licensees assessment of the question. The NRC agrees that actions

of Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.A.4 are not required to be taken and actions of TS 3.1.A.5

are required to be taken.

Enclosure 2

2

Based on supporting information provided by the licensee, the determination of a reactor

coolant loop being in service is not dependent on forced flow existing within that loop. If the

loop stop valves are fully open, the loop would be considered in service and the conditions of

LCO 3.1.A.4 would be met, thus not requiring any action statements to be performed.

Lastly, the NRC also agrees that TS 3.1.A.4 does not contain any action statements to be

performed, regardless of whether the reactor coolant loop is considered to be in service.

NRC Resolution:

B is the only correct answer.

SRO QUESTION 93

Licensee Comment:

The licensee contends that alarm 1D-C6, PZR PWR RELIEF VV LO AIR PRESS, can

annunciate on either low backup air bottle pressure (1000 psig) or low backup air system

pressure downstream of the pressure regulator (80 psig). Due to backup air bottle pressure

being greater than 1000 psig, the cause of the alarm would have to be low backup air pressure

downstream of the regulator, which would render the PORV inoperable and the conditions of TS 3.1.A.6 would not be met. The TS actions of restoring the PORV backup air supply within 14

days OR be in HSD within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> would be required. Therefore, C is the only correct

answer.

The licensee contends that air bottle pressure was provided as 1050 psig in the stem of the

question, which is above the 1000 psig setpoint to cause 1D-C6 to annunciate. The licensee

further states that the alarm would have to be caused by a low backup air system pressure

downstream of the regulator since the potential cause of low air bottle pressure can be ruled out

due to the given air bottle pressure of 1050 psig. As specified in 1D-C6 and in TS 3.1.A.6

Bases, the PORV is required to be declared inoperable if backup air pressure downstream of

the regulator is less than 80 psig.

NRC Discussion:

The NRC agrees with the licensees contention that the conditions of TS 3.1.A.6 were not met

due to low backup air pressure downstream of the regulator and that the required actions of

restoring the PORV backup air supply within 14 days OR be in HSD within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

would be required.

The NRC agrees that the alarm can annunciate due to low backup air bottle pressure less than

or equal to 1000 psig, low backup air system pressure of less than or equal to 80 psig

downstream of the regulator, or an instrument failure. The low backup air bottle pressure can

be ruled out as the cause of the alarm because air bottle pressure of 1050 psig was provided in

the question stem. No conditions in the stem were provided that would indicate that an

instrument failure existed for the pressure switch downstream of the regulator, which could

cause the 1D-C6 alarm to be lit. Therefore, the cause of 1D-C6 being lit would be a low backup

air pressure downstream of the regulator.

Enclosure 2

3

1D-C6 leads the operator to Step 4 in the presence of a low backup air system pressure

downstream of the regulator. Step 4 directs the operator to declare pressurizer PORVs

inoperable and start the 14 day clock in accordance with TS 3.1.A.6.f.

NRC Resolution:

C is the only correct answer.

Enclosure 2

SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT

Facility Licensee: Surry Power Station

Facility Docket Nos.: 05000280/05000281

Operating Tests Administered on: July 20 - July 23, 2009

This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit

or inspection findings and, without further verification and review in accordance with Inspection

Procedure 71111.11 are not indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.46. No licensee

action is required in response to these observations.

No simulator fidelity or configuration items were identified.

Enclosure 3