ML090970286
| ML090970286 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/2009 |
| From: | Stanley B Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 09-056 | |
| Download: ML090970286 (4) | |
Text
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 March 30, 2009 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.09-056 Attn: Document Control Desk SPS Lic JSA Washington, DC 20555-0001 Docket Nos.
50-280 50-281 License Nos. DPR-32 DPR-37 Gentlemen:
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 REPORT OF FACILTY CHANGES. TESTS. AND EXPERIMENTS AND REPORT OF REGULATORY COMMITMENT CHANGES Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2), Virginia Electric and Power Company submits the Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments identified in Regulatory Evaluations implemented during 2008.
In addition, the Report of Regulatory Commitment Changes implemented during 2008 is provided consistent with reporting guidance in NEI 95-07, revision 2, Guideline for Managing NRC Commitments. provides a description and summary of the Regulatory Evaluations and Regulatory Commitment Changes.
Should you have any questions regarding this report, please do not hesitate to contact Barry Garber at (757) 365-2725.
Very truly yours, B.L. tnley, Director Nuclear Station Safety and Licensing Surry Power Station Attachment Commitments made in this letter: None.
cc:
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23 T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8931 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station
-7 Surry Units 1 & 2 2008 - Summary of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Summary of Commitment Changes08-001 Regulatory Evaluation 03/27/08
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Description:==
Regulatory Evaluation 08-001 documented the acceptability of removing a failed cell from the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) #2 battery rack and reconfiguring the remaining cells to eliminate the empty space. A replacement cell was not available and the battery was reconfigured to operate with 55 cells instead of the normal configuration of 56 cells. The ability of the EDG #2 battery to meet its design basis requirements as documented in the UFSAR with 55 cells was verified as acceptable. The seismic adequacy of the reconfigured battery was determined not to be impacted. The removal of one battery cell was determined not to impact the ability of the EDG to start within the 10 second time limit. The operation or the load rating of the EDG or its output frequency and voltage regulation were determined not to be affected by the battery voltage or battery capacity.
Summary: The removal of one battery cell will not impact the ability of the EDG to perform its design basis functions.08-002 Regulatory Evaluation 11/25/08
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Description:==
Regulatory Evaluation 08-002 documented the acceptabiity of Unit 1 design changes necessary to comply with the NRC Generic Safety Issue (GSI) 191 and Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02. A new strainer replaces the existing containment sump screens to ensure that post-accident debris blockage will not impede the operation of the Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) and the Recirculation Spray (RS) systems in the recirculation mode during LOCA or other HELB accidents. The installation modifies the bleed lines to the suction of the RS pumps to prevent air ingestion into the new containment sump strainer header. The sump level instrumentation modifications prevent their malfunction due to clogging during an accident.
In addition, the revision documents the change of the long term sump pH upper limit from 9.5 to 9.0 to comply with the GSI-191 requirements for the sump strainer.
Summary: Surry's existing containment sump screen has been evaluated and determined to be unsatisfactory with respect to the GSI 191 and GL 2004-02.
A new strainer to address the GSI-191 concerns replaces the existing containment sump screens.
Attachment I Surry Units 1 & 2 2008 - Summary of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Summary of Commitment Changes08-003 Regulatory Evaluation 11/25/08
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Description:==
Regulatory Evaluation 08-003 documented the acceptabiity of Unit 2 design changes necessary to comply with the NRC Generic Safety Issue (GSI) 191 and Generic Letter (GL) 2004-02. A new strainer replaces the existing containment sump screens to ensure that post-accident debris blockage will not impede the operation of the Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) and the Recirculation Spray (RS) systems in the recirculation mode during LOCA or other HELB accidents. The installation modifies the bleed lines to the suction of the RS pumps to prevent air ingestion into the new containment sump strainer header. The sump level instrumentation modifications prevent their malfunction due to clogging during an accident. In addition, the revision documents the change of the long term sump pH upper limit from 9.5 to 9.0 to comply with the GSI-191 requirements for the sump strainer.
Summary: Surry's existing containment sump screen has been evaluated and determined to be unsatisfactory with respect to the GSI 191 and GL 2004-02.
A new strainer to address the GSI-191 concerns replaces the existing containment sump screens.
Attachment I Surry Units 1 & 2 2008 - Summary of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Summary of Commitment Changes Commitment Evaluation Summary 04/19/08
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Description:==
Virginia Electric and Power Company letter, Serial No.05-162, Surry Unit 1 Licensee Event Report (LER) 2005-001-00, Manual Reactor Trip Initiated Due to Misaligned Control Rod, concluded that the most probable cause for the control rod misalignment issue discussed in the LER was a build up of particulate (debris) in the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) internals. The LER stated that control rod exercising, prior to any unit startup, would be implemented to mitigate the effects of particulate in CRDM internals and prevent recurrence.
The extent of control rod exercising was not specified in the LER; however, the supporting root cause evaluation recommendation defined control rod exercising as full insertion/withdrawal.
A 2008 Engineering evaluation concluded that full insertion/withdrawal control rod exercising, following a forced shutdown, did not need to be performed.
This conclusion was based upon the review of a Westinghouse technical bulletin and InfoGram issued after the LER, discussions with the Westinghouse CRDM Project Manager on the flushing effects of a normal shutdown, and a review of current operating experience.
The Engineering and Commitment Evaluation modified the commitment to require partial insertion/withdrawal control rod exercising during any forced outage except when the CRDMs are not covered by water for an extended period of time (more than 30 days). During this condition, the full insertion/withdrawal control rod exercising will be performed.
Full insertion/withdrawal control rod exercising will continue to be performed during refueling outages.
Summary: The intent of the original commitment is maintained by ensuring that the CRDMs are maintained capable of performing their safety functions.
Commitment Evaluation Summary 06/30/08
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Description:==
In Virginia Electric and Power Company letter, Serial No. 91-738A, Station Blackout Safety Evaluation Reports Response to Request for Additional Information, Surry committed to testing its Station Blackout Diesel at intervals 'not longer than three months' as listed in NUMARC 87-00. This testing frequency is not consistent with the intervals specified in the Surry periodic test scheduling system as defined in Dominion's Nuclear Facility Quality Assurance Program Description, Topical Report DOM-QA-1.
Safety related equipment, specifically the emergency diesel generators, are tested on a quarterly basis and apply a grace period of +/- 25%. Applying this grace period on the periodicity of testing is in accordance with Surry Technical Specifications and is appropriate to assure reliability of the Station Blackout Diesel.
Summary: Implementing the quarterly testing with an grace period of +/- 25%, versus the original commitment 'not to exceed three months', maintains the original intent of NUMARC 87-00 to require periodic verification of AAC diesel operability and will allow the test performance interval requirements to be consistent with other testing activities.