ML082490241
| ML082490241 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/02/2008 |
| From: | Carpenter C NRC/OE |
| To: | Lochbaum D Union of Concerned Scientists |
| Starkey D,OE,301-415-3456 | |
| References | |
| Download: ML082490241 (5) | |
Text
September 2, 2008 Mr. David Lochbaum Director, Nuclear Safety Project Union of Concerned Scientists 1825 K Street, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20006-1232
Dear Mr. Lochbaum:
I am responding to your letters of July 30, 2008 and August 8, 2008. In your July 30th letter, you stated that, for two seemingly similar violations, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) enforcement outcomes were inconsistent. In particular, you questioned why the NRC has not taken enforcement action against individual employees of Entergy Nuclear Operations (Entergy) for their roles in Entergys failure to timely implement NRC Orders regarding the new siren system at Indian Point. You stated that there is reason to doubt the trustworthiness and reliability of the individuals at Indian Point responsible for noncompliance with the NRC Orders, but that NRC has not sanctioned those individuals, while in a recent case involving the Hatch Nuclear Plant, the NRC took enforcement action against an individual who was not trustworthy and reliable because of the individuals failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC. In your August 8th letter you alleged the individuals at Indian Point were untrustworthy and unreliable and the licensee had failed to evaluate the acceptability of their continued unescorted access.
As stated in the NRC Enforcement Policy, the NRC closely controls and judiciously undertakes individual enforcement actions.Section VIII of the Enforcement Policy states that enforcement action may be taken directly against an unlicensed individual when the actions of that individual have been determined to constitute deliberate misconduct. Before determining whether unlicensed individuals have engaged in deliberate misconduct, the NRC considers evidence gathered during investigations conducted by the NRCs Office of Investigations (OI).
The Hatch case and Entergys failure to comply with the NRC Orders are significantly different.
In the Hatch case, the NRC staff took enforcement action against the individual after OI had completed an investigation of possible wrongdoing by the individual. The NRC staff concluded, based on the evidence, that the individual had violated 10 CFR 50.5, Deliberate misconduct, when he deliberately failed to disclose required information that was material to NRCs regulatory oversight. However, with regard to Entergys ongoing failure to comply with the NRC Orders, the NRC has not received, nor identified, any information to date which indicates that any individual at Indian Point may have deliberately caused or contributed to Entergys violation of the NRC Orders.
On April 12, 2007, Entergy conducted a preoperational test that yielded unexpected results.
The next day, Entergy informed the NRC of the test results and requested relaxation from the order on April 13, 2007. At that time, Entergy had a FEMA approved design report and, had the preoperational test been successful, intended to place the new siren system in service by April 15, 2007, in accordance with the NRC order. The April 13, 2007, NRC letter to Entergy denying an extension of the implementation date to install the new siren system, stated, in part: NRC concludes that these factors were known or should have been known by Entergy at the time the first extension was requested. The statement in the NRC letter to Entergy is a retrospective
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look at Entergys actions based on the outcome of the unexpected April 12th test results. This statement highlighted the overall poor performance and weak oversight on the part of Entergy in completing the new siren system project. The statement is referring to our belief that Entergy should have better assessed the complex technical issues that needed to be resolved in January 2007 when the first relaxation request was submitted to the NRC and should have reflected this information into the proposed schedule. However, it was not a finding or an implication of deliberate misconduct by any individual(s). Rather, Entergys failure to achieve compliance with the terms of the Order reflects insufficient management attention at senior levels of the organization for which NRC has issued significant enforcement in the form of two civil penalties. Our statement was not meant to imply that we believe Entergy was being deliberate or deceitful in providing the NRC false or inaccurate scheduling information.
In your August 8, 2008, letter, you reference several NRC enforcement actions taken against individuals for failing to meet access authorization program requirements by not reporting arrests. You contrast these cases with the enforcement actions taken by the NRC with regard to the installation of the new siren system at Indian Point. You assert that individuals within Entergys siren project management staff knew that the order requirement to place the system in service by April 15, 2007, would not be met, and deliberately withheld this information from the NRC. However, your letter provides no information to support this basis other than referencing an NRC letter to Entergy dated April 13, 2007. If you have such information, please provide it for further evaluation.
Regulatory requirements regarding access authorization in 10 CFR 73.56(b) state, in part, that the objective of the access authorization program is to provide a high degree of assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public including a potential to commit radiological sabotage. One important element of the access authorization program is to conduct a criminal history background search. Clearly, arrests have a direct impact on an assessment of the trustworthiness and reliability of an individual. All individuals granted unescorted access are trained and sign an agreement that they will report any arrests. It is inappropriate to assume that the failure by Entergy engineering staff to adequately predict the schedule for installing a technically complex siren system would constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public including the potential to commit radiological sabotage. Therefore, in this case, the access authorization program would not require an assessment of trustworthiness and reliability as required for arrests.
We have referred your letters to the NRCs Office of Inspector General (OIG) for whatever action they deem appropriate.
Generally, the NRC would not make letters such as yours publicly available or include such letters in our publicly assessable ADAMS system, as it is policy to protect the identity of individuals who report concerns to the NRC, with certain exceptions. However, based on a staff
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conversation with you on August 21, 2008, and the statement in your August 8th letter that you waive your confidentiality, we plan to make your letters and this response publicly available in the NRC document management system (ADAMS).
If you have any further comments in this matter, please contact me. If you believe there was NRC employee misconduct involved in the handling of your concern, you may contact the OIG.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Cynthia A. Carpenter, Director Office of Enforcement
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conversation with you on August 21, 2008, and the statement in your August 8th letter that you waive your confidentiality, we plan to make your letters and this response publicly available in the NRC document management system (ADAMS).
If you have any further comments in this matter, please contact me. If you believe there was NRC employee misconduct involved in the handling of your concern, you may contact the OIG.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Cynthia A. Carpenter, Director Office of Enforcement Electronic Distribution, Page 4 X Publicly Available X Non-Sensitive ADAMS ML082350150 OFFICE OE RI OE OE:DD OE:D NAME D. Starkey D. Roberts N. Hilton C. Carpenter for S. Magruder C. Carpenter DATE 08/22/08 08/22 /08 08/29/08 08/29/08 08/29/08 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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Electronic DISTRIBUTION: Letter to David Lochbaum, Dated: September 2, 2008 ADAMS (PARS)
SECY CA OEMAIL BMallett, DEDR MVirgilio, DEDMRT CCarpenter, OE SMagruder, OE NHilton, OE DStarkey, OE CMarco, OGC GLongo, OGC ELeeds, NRR BBoger, NRR RNelson, NRR JBoska, PM, NRR MKowal, NRR MAshley, NRR RZimmerman, NSIR WDean, NSIR MLeach, NSIR DFurst, NSIR Enforcement Coordinators RII, RIII, RIV EHayden, OPA HBell, OIG GCaputo, OI DScrenci/NSheehan, RI ECobey, RI MCox, RI PCataldo, RI KFarrar, RI DHolody, RI RSummers, RI ADeFrancisco, RI CO=Daniell, RI SCollins, RI MDapas, RI MGamberoni, RI JTrapp, RI