ML073270111
| ML073270111 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/2007 |
| From: | NRC Region 4 |
| To: | |
| References | |
| RIV-2007-A-0028, RIV-2007-A-0048, FOIA/PA-2008-0011 | |
| Download: ML073270111 (13) | |
Text
'4.. . ,
.0 "B . -A-20048 A'.-
Facility Callaway Docket Number:
Name:
Functional Power Reactor Area:
Responsible Division: DRP ARB Date: 09/24/2007 Received Date 30 Days 150 Days Purpose of the ARB: Discuss the concerned individual's (CI) rebuttal letter for allegation files RIV-2007-A-0028 and RIV-2007-A-0048.
The Cl's rebuttal letter was addressed to a US Senator with a copy provided to the NRC SRI. Heller talked to the Cl on September 7, 2007 and was informed that the letter was been provided to a worker assigned to the Senator's Springfield office on or about August 15, 2007. As of this ARB, RIV has not received any indication that the letter has been forwarded from the Senator's office to the NRC.
A potential reason for the delay Is because the Cl addressed the rebuttal letter to a US Senator that does not represent the state where Callaway is located ARB:
Basis for Another Does Alleger Object to Referral r- Yes r- No f- N/A If any of the following factors apply, an allegation shall not be referred to the licensee.
- Information cannot be released in sufficient detail to the licensee without compromising the identity of the alleger of confidential source.
- The licensee could compromise an investigation or inspection because of knowledge gained from the referral.
r- The allegation is made against the licensee's management or those parties who would normally receive and address the allegation.
- The basis of the allegation is information received from a Federal or State agency that does not approve of the information being released in a referral.
- 1:, , .r WWWDONVU.
Chairman: " ~ ~ V .
AVegel RCaniano RDeese LSmith DWhite MVasquez KFuller JWalker JHeller
.Yt: Operations Operations Re~sponslble Branch:, Select.. OcseNmer:
Contention 1 is from Concern 1 of RIV-2007-A-0028. Basically the Cl contents that an operating crew (in 2003) lost control of core reactivity and left the control rods withdrawn for 90 minutes. The Cl believes the control rods were not inserted so the crew did not have to Information in this record was de-ete
- in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemption 9Ci
admit to upper management that the crew lost control of the reactor. The Cl has provided reasons why s/he believes that the crew's action should be the subject of an 01 investigation. However the Cl has not provided a reason why the crew's actions were unsafe or failed to comply with the licensee's procedures or NRC's requirements.
none - the results of the inspection for Concern 1 of RIV-2007-A-0028 demonstrated that the crew followed the licensee's procedures, there was not a violation of NRC regulations, and there was not a safety problem or a reactivity problem associated with leaving the control rods withdrawn for 90 minutes.
Safety Signlflcanfje - N/A see discussion in regulatory requirements Check if question Is applicable to the concern.
- Is it a declaration, statement, or assertion of impropriety or Inadequacy?
F Is the impropriety or inadequacy associated with NRC regulated activities?
F Is the validity of the issue unknown?
Cfall of the above statements are checked, the Issue Is an allegation.
fI items for the arb to consider
- 1. RPBB has performed an independent review of the Cl's rebuttal letter and the previous inspection results, is a second inspection necessary.
- 2. independence of the author preparing the response and the signature authority for the response to the concerned individual.
Act. n: 2'"- Bra ,D6--- finW~b~;~:D Other (Descr[b RPBI '09/24/2007 :09/27/2007 Comments;,, RPBB to review how we addressed all concerns in RIV-2007-A-0028
.and bring back to special ARB.
Additional Comments Concermý 2J Y ~. "' 4Alcýlnf tn-- Cd Y+ ?* *;!*i:g*;:*y*,:*Maintenance Modifications espo,,s.ble *B*ranb !*Select... OI,-Case Nu"*..
, er11'.,, ..
IL A Concern D esc tlptiq* ... ... ....... - .. .... . .- +> ........ A A Contention 2 is from Concern 1 of RIV-2007-A-0048. Basically the Cl contents that the licensee failed to implement timely corrective action for damage to the RHR suction relief valve following repeated opening of the pressurizer PORV. The Cl provided several reasons why s/he believes that the licensee's untimely corrective action demonstrated that the staff is understaffed and under funded. However the Cl has not provided any reasons why the delayed corrective action was unsafe or-failed to comply with the licensee's procedures or
UJ NRC requirements.
tnone - Basically the inspection for Concern 1 of RIV-2007-A-0048 determined that the-delay
- did not I increase the risk to the plant.
~N/A i see discussion in regulatory requirements Check if question is applicable to the concern.
F7 Is it a declaration, statement, or assertion of impropriety or inadequacy?
WOIs the impropriety or inadequacy associated with NRC regulated activities?
P_ Is the validity of the issue unknown?
If all of the above statements are checked, the Issue Is an allegation.
Contact lllMe= NACM iO9/24/2007 Cbmrints ' ACES/RPBB to contact alleger, to discuss previous NRC actions taken on this issue including basis for our conclusions and provide opportunity S for the Cl to provide additional information.
Additional Comments I
- Contention 3 was not previously captured in the allegation program or the subject of a written response to the Cl. The Cl is using a problem associated with a non-safety related system that was retired in place as an example that the licensee corrective action system is not functioning properly. Since the licensee implemented only one corrective action system,
.the problem was documented within the corrective action problem and apparently not
'fixed. The Cl contends that the failure of the corrective action program to fix a non-safety related system problem demonstrates the corrective action program is not functioning properly.
none - Basically when this issue was first discussed with the resident inspector, the Cl was informed that we do not use the failure of the corrective action program to fix a non-safety related system as demonstration that the corrective action program is not functioning see discussion in regulatory requirements Check if question is applicable to the concern.
f" Is it a declaration, statement, or assertion of impropriety or Inadequacy?
F" Is the impropriety or inadequacy associated with NRC regulated activities?
F Is the validity of the issue unknown?
If all of the above statements are checked, the issue Is an allegation.
I
-Wd'~~ d -A04661ate Cjo*mments:-,,:" ACES/RPBB to provide a written response that captures the information
.: verbally provided by the resident inspector and provide an overall summary of the NRC's assessment of the licensee's Corrective Action Program (PI&R crosscutting issue, PI&R inspection results).
. .Discuss this with Concern 2, when contacting the alleger.
11
.E/30/2007 1017 AM US NR4 - Cal -y Rssldan, Inapepsssr olf /S August 15, 2007 Richard J. Durbin, United States Senator 525 S. 81h S*teet Springlield, IL82703
Dear Senator Durbin:
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- . door C t7) hafb) flu I am sure you am aam tht although nuclear power is for the most patn a safe and relable way to enerte electrictly, toe sef staning nature of the nuclear reaction and fte radioactivity of the ftsion products ceme inherent risks. The sfe Operation of reactor plaftain to United Stan Isensured by a strono dmet to safety by the nu Industry Which rs Intur ensured by an agressive inspection program by the United Stats Nuclea Regulatory Cormisslon.
Callimay Plant has a culture which discourages with upper Inagement and which inhibi ft problem idenfcaon and resohution. TheMnrageznnt of Cafamy P t would prefer not to knw about probem and is relu to fully wnvesgt tIhem. I have brought Uhs Issue to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Comrnsi on tw separaft occaislons (Allegations RIV-2007-A-0028 and RIV-2007-A-0048). I am writing you because I amn with neither the thoroughnm of the I conducted by th United States Nuclmr RegWaftoy Cogrislon nor the perialte wmrde Cdoway Mart Although Calaway Plant is located inMhi #hi mft is OfConcer to YOU because:
- 1) Iam one of your consituen and Ido not know where Ingovernment toturn to with these Issues now gu the US NRC has not properly pursued them.
- 2) My concerns not only concern the pernorsnce of the mnusgment of Calaway Plant but also concern the peronnance, of the US NRC which is, of course, an agency of our federa go.rmer and theeby isa national concern.
- 3) The poor performe of a nuler plant anywhere Inthe county jeopardizs the public conklence Inour eleven reactor plaft InIl1nols.
I have enclaod a computer dsk with this kder On the enclosed disk ame e
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020034/2007 10,17 AN US RC - CalIl'mv Reelien% Inalse¶S?
§U~O.'SO710:UsA al S/S cmpomderie between me and the US NRC and copies of internal Caulaway Action Requests (the process for reporting concerns to anmpany leadership).
I have three concerns which are provided below.
I grey apprecit* your past conerinint to public safety concerns and to the safe generation of nucler power. Please let me know if you or your staff can provide me any assstance in resolvng ny concerns.
Very repctul, C-oncern I On October 21, 2003 the operating crew at Calawmy Plant lost control of madivity and th plant Inadvertently shut dowm. Ther appears to me to be strong evidence that the Shift Mmmr (in2003 the te Shift Supmvis used) left the control rods withdrawn for 90 rdnutms to avoid haIong to ad"*to upper mnagemen that his crew lost control of the reactor. I base this amcson ane folowing:
- 1) The crew did not document the inadvertent shutdown Inthe Operatom log.
- 2) The crew did not docwint the Inadvertbn shutdown In the Ca 'wayAction Requed Sy~mn
- 3) None of the five current Shift Managers with whom I discussed this issue can give me a mason why tem control rods would remain out for 90 minutes following the shut down.
- 4) The training superviesor who documented the pressuit levei transient ban earlier in the shift received negative fedbadc from the Shi Manager reg ing the need to documntd the transient In the CAR System.
The US NRC has refused to investiate whether or not the leaving of the control rods withdMm ws an intentional atemt to cover up a transient Their position is that since the Calhway P*nd pmcedue for conducting a reactor shutdown contains no trms requiremn, Otee was no nueconduct that would warrant an inwsgalon by the Office of Inve0gation I do not agree wth their position. I have nude an allegation mgadng .intgrity he of Individuals who hold US NRC issued Senior Rmctor Operator Icmnm. The Shif Manager involved In the inident was later Involved in an inadvertoant Safety Injecton (February 2004) which led to the flure of afty related relief valves on the Residual Heat Remnovel systernmnd a signilkat plart tasent while s r i the elecric grid (November 2005) which, althoug It was clearly caume by operator error,
1/5
~S~9/007 1:17 AN us HRC - Ca~ll.v Raa8dmfl% IDIPOS"TS 01f was Nlamed on newly Inslled equipment This sam Shift ManaW has since been prone to the Assitnt Operations ManaW for Peifornmnos Irnpoveunt. The other Senior Reactor Operators Involved In te October 21, 2003 cover up weas acthie wtWhtanders. My allegation regarding the intgrity of these Indviduas needs to eiter be substantiated or refued by the Office of lmnetldgsn; it cannro be ignored.
Although the US NRC plans on documenting a finding on the 3rd quarter inspection report for Calaway, this is slight punishment One's career should be not be forsmded by covering up mistmks; it should be jeopardized. To not propery Invesigate an allegation of covering up a tansient and I subtManta, to not properly punish such cover-up sends the wrong message to Senior Reactor Operators who are under pressure from fte company to operate eror fre. Error free operation should be accompled by earning from past mistakes and not by succesu y covering up errors Concern 2 On February 11, 2004 the perang crew at Callaway Plant drove te pla Into a Safety brVeion, causing the six safety related jecio pumps to star*t The resul*
Injection into the core caused the Reactor Coolant Systemn pressure to Increase above the lift selpoint of the Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS). The PORVs ifted and rmsealad about a domn times over the next quarter hour, until ie Soaft Injecdion aignai was reset and the injection pumps were soured.
Unbeknownst to the plant staff, the liftng of the PORVs dameged he twosucton relief valves of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system. These valves are both replaced during even nu refuheng outages (frequency of R2 - every oth refueng outage). Since the valves were last replaced duing RF12 (November 2002) they were not removed and inspected In the Spring 2004 refueln outage (RF13). The broke valves remained in the system until RF14 (F.Ml 2005).
In the summer of 2006, the valves were tested mid found to be brokerL The subsequent root cause i t o detemined t ft vavs were broken dung the February 11, 2004 Safety Injection due to an Inaequaly designed piping arangenent on te Primary Relief Tank (PRT).
The Inadequate piping design was first brought to the aftwenon of Callaway Plant mnaagemen t in Sepvtme of 2008. Despite uging from me, no eft was made to re-design the ppng untld December of 2006. Due to low staffing leves and oitier budgetary issues, adequate resources were not assigned during the winter monfs of eariy 2007 to re-design *th PRT piping prior to the first opportunity to fix th problem during the Spring 2007 refueling outage (RF15). When I becarme aware the mnodifcation to the PRT piping was removed fron RFI5, I submitted Allegaion RIV-2007-A-0048 to the US NRC.
The USNRC has detmmined that AmerenUE appropriately deferred the PRT re-design
11/15/0 7 07:41 FAX 81'78608i 211U NI(U \.
"based on the emergent design Issues and deferment risk." As a result, Callaway Plant was allowed to resume power operations following RF15 with a Primary Relief Tank piping arrangement which could cause unpredictable dainage to the RHR Suction Relief valves during a designed lifting of the Pressurizer PORVs.
I disagree with the assessment of the US NRC. The assessment of the US NR(3 Is based on Cailaway's claim that the design modification could not be ready in nr%for implementairon during RF15. Although this was brue, it was wholely due to the procrastination and short staffing of Callaway Plant A further issue is that Callaway Plant would prefer not to know about problems vith its safety related equipment. During thm investigation of the failure of the relief valves, it was suggested that the valves be replaced on a "staggered test basdes which wuld cause one to be replaced during odd numbered refueling outages and one to be repl*ced during even numbered refueling outages (currently both valves are replaced during even numbered refueling outages). The advantage of this is 1hat equipmmmt problemr could potentially be detected 18 months (one fuel cycle) earlier.
Although the detection of equipment problems 18 months sooner is an advantagtti to the public, Itis not necessarily an advantage to AmerenUE. If one vane is discovered broken, the other valve must be assumed to be broken - which could then neceedtata a mid cycle outage to replace the valve. Callaway rejected the suggeson of replacing the valves on a "staggered test basism because the Inservice Test Engineering group would prefer to not know about a felled valve when one potentially failed valve might still be Inthe system.
In performing its investigation of RIV-2007-A-0048 the US NRC gave a lot of credibility to the documentation of AmerenUE..Why an approprdately staffed and funded fa(ciity (which Callaway claims to be) cannot turn around a piping design modification In teven months was not addressed. The reasoning provided by the Inservice Test Engintiering group for not performing future tests of the failed valves on a "staggered test basit,%"
was also not challenged.
Concern 3 Callaway Action Request 200609298 documented how an acid system at the cooling tower was improperly retired-In-place with residual acid' still in the lines. Repeaetel documentation of problems related to add corrosion included the following:
- 1) Repeated leaks from retired-in-place components
- 2) Equipment Operators refusing to perform tagging operations because of the condition of the system
- 3) An incident of highly acidic (pH 1)water leaching into the lower levels of a builtng during hard rains because of extensive acid pollution in the surrounding soil
- 4) Above ground piping completely corroded away
- 5) An unisolable leak from the bottom of an acid tank.
09/30/ 2007 10:17 AIM - O.II.wa, R~a.Iiefl O:1AMUS OS/0/20?
NRC Insp~e~le Off 4/6 CaWlamy Adion Request 200809328 docum td a similar Issue with regard to an inpropesty retired-In-place md tank in the Red Waste building. The acd an was not properly neutraized until a leak developed which resulted In acid eating Its way through floor conduits and dripping from the ceiling qf the Rad Waste Control Room.
These Issues were brought to the attenton of one of the US NRC resident inspectors at Calawa. wacd pStem perifmed a safety relaed function, the resident neither inpector believed he wm unable to address the Issue. The fat that the Corrective Action Process (the eaine proce used for Saf Related and no-Safety Related Wsues) Miled t addrae the Issue was of no regulary concern to him my position is it should have been It should be noted that similar acid syst*emsdst at Ameren fostl plant. f Ameren does not properly retire equwpet at the Caaay Nuclear Plad (rguably the ew Inft reguled Misoud maret), it Is ke neglectng smilr equipment at f de-regulated Ilinois foss plants.
(End of Concern 3)
Please call me at Ifyou have any questions regarding these matters.
Thank you,
September 12, 2007 MEMORANDUM TO: Jim Heller, Senior Allegations Coordinator Judith Walker, Allegations Coordinator FROM: Vincent Gaddy, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch B
SUBJECT:
REVIEW OF ALLEGATION MATERIAL RIV-2007-A-0048 and RIV-2007-A-0028 In response to your memorandum of September 5, 2007, requesting review of its attached material, the following responses to your questions are provided below.
Since the letter disagrees with our previous resoonse and has the ootential to be a green ticket item. please address our review strateav (review by an individual indeoendent of the issue, etc.) so that it can be discussed at a followup ARB.
I assigned Rick Deese, a newly assigned Senior Project Engineer independent of the issue, to review the letter to figure out the differences in what was previously inspected and what the alleger is now asserting. His review is documented in Attachment 1.
Determine ifthe individual has raised new concerns and ifs/he has raised new concerns whether they are NRC reaulated activities or not. Provide a brief statement of the concern. It is not necessary to include all of the backaround information. List each concern on a cooy of the file "ARB Disiosition Record."
No new concerns were identified.
List possible reaulatory requirements (i.e. 10 CFR 26 etc.) that may aDply to concern if known, No new regulatory issues were identified.
Under significance, provide a followup priority (i.e. high - immediate action reouired, or normal - routine folIowu').
Not applicable since no new issues were identified.
Provide a recommendation for disposition (i.e. 01 investipation, insoection. refernal to licensee, or none'). List this under uaction."
Provide additional information pertaining to the depth and breadth of our inspection on the previously asserted claims and also the role of the NRC and the bounds of our enforcement.
List the branch you believe that should be responsible for the action.,
DRP Projects Branch B.
Provide a planned comoletion date. if known.
Will be determined following ARB discussions.
Should you have any questions, please call me.
ATTACHMENT 1 The alleger is not satisfied with the thoroughness or penalties imposed from previous inspections conducted by the NRC addressing his/her allegations. The alleger is concerned, in general, with the performance of the NRC in these inspections and states that we have not adequately pursued the issues. Specifically, the alleger breaks down his questions into three listed concerns. I have reviewed these "concerns" and their subparts and have summarized them, with my review, as follows:
1 Concern 1: The NRC has refused to investigate whether or not the leaving of control rods withdrawn during a plant eventin 2003 was an intentional attempt to cover up a transient. The alleger states that the integrity of the individuals needs to be investigated by our Office of Investigations.
Regl: Reactor Projects Branch B inspected this concern and determined that the 90 minute time delay the alleger refers to was not prudent and did suggest that the operators may not have exercised optimum reactivity management and may not have had adequate plant awareness. The whole event was a plant transient and was not covered up since all plant info (e.g., graphs) was available for management review. Any attempt to cover it up (by not logging it or entering it into the CAP) may suggest some intent of impropriety, but ultimately when faced with the responsibilities of their licenses, the on-shift operators followed their plant operating procedures to safely shutdown the plant.
Four bases of the intent to cover up the transient were given by the alleger. The first two (failure of the crew to enter the incident in the station log and failure of the crew to enter the conditon in the CAP) were cited in NRC Inspection Report 2007-03 as a licensee-identified violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action." The violation was not identified as potentially willful. I suggest discussion be held at the ARB to re-address this decision. The agency has already decided that the violation occurred and that it was more than minor. A second discussion to determine ifwillfulness was involved seems prudent.
A previous CAR was issued for the event which only addressed the training needed to upgrade operator knowledge deficiencies. CAR resolution does not address all of the issues brought up by the CAR (especially the concerns raised by the alleger). In my opinion, we may already have a case for at least an example of a minor corrective action violation. Also, the licensee typically enters violations into their corrective action program for resolution. I suggest Reactor Projects Branch B follow the entry and closure of the CAP document for the violation to see ifit addresses any potential willful aspects of the failures. Any reported- willfulness from this review should then be presented to the ARB.
To further reinforce the questionable integrity of the individuals in question, the alleger
cites two other instances. One of these incidents describes an operator involved in an indvertent safety injection and the other describes a significant plant transient while synchronizing to the grid. Neither of these descriptions contain information as to how the operators' integrity was questionable. After conducting an interview with the Callaway senior resident inspector and reviewing the alleger's letter, no information to support misconduct in these instances was evident that would further support the alleger's claims. The incidents appear to be caused by operator error and therefore do not implicate the integrity of the individuals involved.
I did note two possible issues which were indirectly brought up in the alleger's discussion. First, the alleger asserts that an individual received negative feedback for entering an issue into the CAP which, if substantiated could be a SCWE concern.
Second, the alleger states that Calllaway incorrectly determined the cause of an event to be equipment error, not human error, which could be an example of poor corrective actions by the CAP. These issues were not directly brought out as concerns by the Individual, therefore, I do not recommend inspecting them unless the ARB believes it would support the agency position.
- 2. Concern 2-a: In response to an event which brought to Callaway's attention of a design deficiency with the RHR suction relief valve, Callaway claimed they could not design and Implement in time a modification. The NRC Obought" this. The alleger questions why the NRC did not question how a modification would not be adequately scoped and done.
Bg& : Reactor Project Branch B inspected this concern and did question the licensee's timeline with respect to development and implementation of the modification. The inspectors concluded that the licensee did not properly develop the modification at first and therefore it was not available for implementation during the refueling outage. The inspectors did not intrusively question the cause of why the first development of the modification was faulty (like due to understaffing or ecomonic reasons as the alleger states). Instead the inspectors focused on the licensee's actions after failure to--
implement the modification. From this inspection, the licensee was tasked to prove the viability of the RHR suction relief discharge line to NRC Region IV staff members in a conference call. This discussion yielded the conclusion that the line would not unduly increase the risk of the plant if the line were left unmodified. As a result, the inspectors concluded that the subsequent revision of the modification will be implemented in a manner timely with its safety significance and that no regulations (e.g. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action,") were violated. My review concluded that the modification and Its timeliness were adequately reviewed and I recommend no further inspection action.
Concern 2.b: Also, the NRC did not challenge why Callway engineering did not adopt the new policy of staggered train RHR suction relief valve testing.
Re2ly: Reactor Project Branch B did inspect this concern. Inspection determined that the Callaway Plant's actions to maintain their inspection times of both valves simultaneously met the requirements of the ASME Code. Any inspection plan is at discretion of licensee and any suggestion by NRC to change the inspection plan without any other known deficiencies would be beyond the role of the NRC as long as the licensee was meeting their code requirements. The assertion that Callaway personnel scheduled the tests to avoid negative consequences may have been a contributor in the decision, but the inspectors lacked any additional information which suggests negative safety impact. As a result, the NRC is not in the position to challenge why Callaway did
not adopt the staggered train policy. Therefore, my review recommends no further inspection. Action to communicate our NRC limits of enforcement to the alleger may alleviate his concern.
- 3. Concern 3.a: The cooling tower acid system was improperly abondoned-in-place in the past. As a result, a leak developed damaging floor conduits and the Rad Waste Control Room ceiling. The alleger was unsatisified that we did not address this concern since the system did not perform a safety-related function. His main point of concern is that the Callaway Corrective Action Program failed in some manner and this was not addressed.
Rely: Reactor Project Branch B inspectors did not inspect this item. Upon receipt of the allegation, the inspector questioned the alleger as to the safety impact of the licensee failure. Since there was and still appears to be no safety significance to this assertion and the cooling tower acid system is not subject to NRC regulations, the inspectors concluded that entry of this issue into the allegation program was not required. Upon receipt of the concern, the inspector conferred with the Senior Allegations Coordinator who concurred with this decision. The inspector receiving the allegation also questioned the alleger whether this issue was an industrial safety concern warranting possible inspection of that sort; the alleger has never responded with any followup information.
SUMMARY
We need to communicate more information on what we have inspected and we also need to obtain more information from the alleger. The following actions are an assimilation of the ones detailed in the discussion above.
- Re-address our regional decision to pursue the willful aspects of the violation associated with the 2003 event.
- Continue tracking of resolution of the violation issued for the 2003 event.
- Thoroughly communicate with the alleger the inability of the NRC to enforce the regulations beyond what is written.
- Contact the alleger and seek any further information of the cooling tower acid leak allegation which would demonstrate its significance as an industrial safety concern (with the potential for forwarding to OSHA).