ML072690499

Encls 2 (Slides) for September 5, 2007, Meeting with Washington Tru Solutions on the Contents for Halfpact (Docket No. 71-9279, TAC No. L24111) and TRUPACT-III (Docket No. 71-9305, TAC No. L23827) Transportation Packages

ML072690499
Person / Time
Site:	07109279, 07109305
Issue date:	09/25/2007
From:	Meraj Rahimi NRC/NMSS/SFST
To:	Nader Mamish NRC/NMSS/SFST
Shared Package
ML072690157	List: ML072690098 ML072690499
References
TAC L24108, TAC L24111
Download: ML072690499 (61)

Text

Enclosure 2 Meeting Handouts

of Shielded Containers as an Authorized Payload Container for th~e HalfPA:T Steve Porter, Brad Day, and Todd Sellmer Washington TRU Solutions Carlsbad, New Mexico Presentation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 5, 2007 I

" Identify need for optional method for transporting RH-TRU waste

" Present the shielded containers as an engineered solution for shipping RH-TRU waste in a HalfPACT package

• Discuss proposed methodology to address regulatory and technical issues for an application

Recapture lost RH capacity at WIPP for the complex

• Three waste panels already filled without any RH waste emplacement in the walls

° More efficient method for emplacing RH waste at WIPP

• Overall reduction in the number of RH waste shipments required in a RH-TRU 72B by as much as 3:1

- Reduced number of shipments to WIPP equates to a reduced potential for shipping accidents

• Will allow for an accelerated clean up of generator sites

- Accelerated clean up provides for risk reduction at generator sites

° An authorized shielded payload container will allow generator sites to store and manage RH waste without a need to repackage prior to shipment

• It is anticipated that a large percentage of the lead used in the shielded containers will be Department of Energy recovered lead thus reducing orphaned lead from many sites

..WTS and DOE feel that the shielded container offers a significant benefit to the complex; the potential for increased efficiencies, gains in worker and public health and safety makes the shielded container an important initiative. to pursue for approval

• The following technical presentation will outline the intended approach for approval to be implemented

Transport a portion of the current RH inventory using shielded containers within the HalfPACT

• Stay within current HalfPACT design and licensing bases

- 7,600 lb payload, 30 watts decay heat, etc.

• Ship three shielded containers within a HalfPACT Each to contain a 440 Ib, vented, 30-gallon drum of RH Waste End and side shielding to be maximized while staying within payload weight limits Once assembled, 3-pack to remain intact all the way through disposal

• Shielded containers to be surrounded by energy absorbing dunnage to minimize changes in shielding characteristics during HAC events and to protect the ICV ICV void volume to be retained to the greatest extent possible

• Shielded containers and inner drum shall be vented and DOT Specification 7A certified iJ!

Grade 45, carbon steel shells

• 1" nominal lead and 5/16" nominal steel thickness in side; 3" steel lid and base

° 15, 1/2" Grade 8 closure bolts 0 Silicone rubber gasket

• Filtered vent port with lead shield plug o Lead gamma scanned, bottom and lid plates ultrasonically inspected, and welds visually inspected

• Empty weight 1,745 poes, nominal

A.

CARBON STEEL LEAD SHIELDED CONTAINER (2,260 LB MAX)

B B

3 1

30-GALLON PAYLOAD DRUM WITH INSIDE LEVER LOCK (440 LB MAX)

STEEL VIEW A-A SECTION B-B

FILTER PORT SILICONE GASKET 1/2-13UNC FLANGED HEAD, GRADE 8, CAP SCREW (15 TOTAL)

LID (CARBON STEEL)

,3 14*

BODY (CARBON STEEL) 530-GALLON PAYLOAD DRUM LEAD 18

• Both axial and radial dunnage assemblies are fabricated from aluminum and polyurethane foam to absorb and distribute end-and side-oriented drop energy thereby minimizing HAC drop induced changes to shielding and ensuring loads to the ICV are bounded by HalfPACT HAC certification test loads

• Aluminum guide tubes tie the upper and lower halves of the radial dunnage assembly and provide guides for payload assembly loading and unloading operations

" Axial dunnage assemblies distribute loads from the containers to the HalfPACT's aluminum honeycomb end spacers to absorb end-oriented drop energy

" Polyurethane foam stress-strain curves controlled in a manner identical to what's currently presented in the HalfPACT SAR

Shielded Containers Radial Dunnage Axial Dunnage Triangular Spaceframe Pallet /

Axial Dunnage (130 Ib)

Upper Slipsheet (10 Ib)

Radial Dunnage (430 Ib)

VShielded Container (2,260 lb max, gross)

Lower Slipsheet (10 Ib)

Triangular Spaceframe Pallet (110 Ib)

Axial Dunnage (130 Ib)

GENERAL PLASTICS FR-3700 RIGID POLYURETHANE FOAM 13 PCF, OR EOUIVALENT A -I til I ALUMINUM TUBE (TYP)-

I LW_

-V 36 iA ALUMINUM SHEET (TYP)

-t-SECTION B-B VIEW A-A

//

t GENERAL PLASTICS FR-3700 RIGID POLYURETHANE FOAM --

U IN M TU E (T P 6 PCF, OR EQUIVALENT ALUMINUM TUBE (TYP)

ALUMINUM SHEET (TYP),\\

-24 SECTION A-A

Purpose Compliance with WIPP requirements Four-foot drops of bare shielded containers onto an unyielding surface in four potentially worst-case orientations will be performed Demonstrate robustness for subsequent Regulatory Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) drop tests Acceptance Criteria No significant increase in the external radiation dose rate levels as established by pre-and post-test gamma scans No release of contents verified by scanning for the presence of fluorescein/flour on the container's external surfaces

TOP-DOWN C.G.-OVER-CORNER DROP BOTTOM-DOWN END DROP TOP-DOWN NEAR-VERTICAL END DROP SIDE DROP

• Develop a standalone addendum similar to the Pipe Overpack application

• Structural evaluation by a combination of analysis and HAC drop testing in an appropriately configured HalfPACT ICV

• Thermal, shielding, and criticality by analysis

• Document revisions:

HalfPACT SAR, Rev. 6 CH-TRAMPAC, Rev. 4 CH-TRU Payload Appendices, Rev. 3 TRUPACT-II SAR, Rev. 23 (header/reference change on!y)

• Submittal by end of November 2007

• .All requirements addressed via analysis, except for the HAC free drop test in a HalfPACT ICV

• HAC Free Drop Test

- Conservatively ignores the presence of the impact attenuating OCA and tests in a bare ICV (this is a test addressing performance of the shielded containers and dunnage, not a test of the ICV)

- Two drop tests, bottom end and side, with justification given for these bounding orientation's

HAC Free Drop Test (cont)

- Tested at ambient temperature, with. cold and hot temperature extremes addressed analytically

" Shielded container treated as a simply supported beam and ignoring lead strength will easily withstand maximum (cold) side drop gs

" Observed ambient temperature response of the dunnage foam and shielded container lead will be extrapolated to hot conditions

- Tested with a maximum weight, concrete-filled, 30-gallon payload drum in each shielded container (440 Ib)

0 HAC Free Drop Test (cont)

- Side drop configuration aligned with one shielded container vertically down (see figure):

• Maximizes load on the bottom shielded container

• Minimizes amount of foam available to absorb impact energy

• Maximizes foam crush and g-loads to containers End drop configuration has the ICV bottom stiffened to simulate the presence of the OCA and the maximum 385g bottom-end impact load measured during TRUPACT-Il testing i

UPPER ALUMINUM HONEYCOMB SPACER RADIAL DUNNAGE Ai AXIAL DUNNA LOWER ALUMINUM HONEYCOMB SPACER END DROP

Bottom end drop selected over top end drop

- Results in maximum end drop gs, maximum potential for lead slump, and maximum crush of aluminum honeycomb spacers and/or axial dunnage Flat bottom HalfPACT OCA vs. dished top makes bottom drop worse; accelerations in a top-down drop are approximately half the bottom-.down drop gs

- The ICV lift pockets are the only top-end feature significantly different than bottom end

• Prior top-down and top CG-over-corner testing of TRUPACT-Il with 7,000 lbs of concrete filled drums and no axial dunnage assembly in place demonstrates acceptability of ICV lift pockets Due to symmetry of shielded container design, observed lead slump in bottom-down drop will be identical to lead slump that could occur in the top-down drop

• Flat side drop testing used to:

Confirm expected lack of significance of the overall side drop bending response of shielded container Quantify any significant flattening or other redistribution of lead shielding Establish maximum radial dunnage deformation

• Since radial dunnage assemblies and axial dunnage assemblies (in conjunction with honeycomb end spacers) have been independently designed to absorb 100% of the payload energy associated with a 30 foot drop, testing can be limited to these two orientations Other orientations will partially crush both axial and radial energy absorbing components, but each to a lesser degree than seen in the end and side drop tests

Residual Axial Orientation Maximum End Minimum Side Maximum Side Engagement of Shielded (Horizontal = 00 End Structures Side Structures Crush Distance Length Available Crush Distance Containers with Upper Vertical = 900)

Energy Absorbed Energy Absorbed (in) for Crushing (in)

(in)

Radial Dunnage (in) 900 100%

0%

6.28 11.72 0.00 2.72 790 90%

10%

5.65 12.35 1.13 3.35 670 80%

20%

5.02 12.98 2.16 3.98 550 70%

30%

4.39 13.61 3.09 4.61 440 60%

40%

3.77 14.23 3.93 5.23 340 50%

50%

3.14 14.86 4.71 5.86 250 40%

60%

2.51 15.49 5.42 6.49 170 30%

70%

1.88 16.12 6.08 7.12 110 20%

80%

1.26 16.74 6.69 7.74 50 10%

90%

0.63 17.37 7.25 8.37 00 0%

100%

0.00 18.00 7.77 9.00 Note: Total side length, L = 18 inches, payload weight, W = 7,600 pounds, aluminum honeycomb spacer crush strength, Ucr-aium = 120 psi, the effective diameter for aluminum honeycomb spacer crush, Dhs = 68 inches, shielded container diameter, Dsc = 23 inches, radial dunnage crush strength (at 10% strain),

ct-foam = 850 psi, and the total drop energy, KE

= 2,736,000 in-lb.

Pre-test gamma scan of all shielded containers will be performed

• 30-foot bottom end drop will then be performed

• Following end drop, the ICV will be opened and shielded containers, dunnage, and aluminum honeycomb visually inspected and dimensionally checked

- Axial shift of shielded containers relative to radial dunnage will be noted and measured

• Reassembly for side drop will then occur Bottom end honeycomb and/or lower axial dunnage assembly will be replaced or the location of its upper surface restored (e.g., via wood blocking) such that shielded containers will be centered on top and bottom radial dunnage assemblies

30-foot side drop will be performed

• Following side drop, shielded containers, honeycomb visually checked the ICV will be opened and dunnage, and aluminum inspected and dimensionally

• Post-test gamma scans of all shielded containers will be performed Observed test results will be extrapolated to temperature extremes and resulting geometries discussed in HAC structural evaluations and addressed in HAC shielding analyses

• SAR will be completed and submitted 41jr

_ 3

• Perform an NCT thermal analysis using the same methodology as currently presented in the HalfPACT SAR

• Use existing HAC thermal analysis based on comparison of temperatures in the ICV from the NCT analyses

• The 30-watt maximum decay heat load is identical to previous HalfPACT analyses

• Shielding analysis will parallel the existing methodology used in the RH-TRU 72-B SAR

• NCT dose rates will be ensured by pre-shipment surveys under the basis that NCT will not damage the shielded container sufficiently to allow dose rate to increase significantly

° HAC dose rates will be ensured by a conservative analysis that establishes activity limits for radionuclides where sum-of-partial-fractions will be used to certify mixed payloads

(Dl AND D2 MEASURED FROM SHIELDED CONTAINER TESTING)

DROP DAMAGE METER

-RECEPTOR (MEASURED FROM HALFPACT TESTING)

• Criticality analysis will parallel the existing methodology in the TRUPACT-II/HalfPACT SAR Applicable to non-machine compacted waste with less than or equal to 1 % by weight special reflector materials (Be/BeO)

Fissile material from each of the three shielded containers will be assumed to reconfigure into an optimally moderated and reflected single source

° A 25/75 (by volume) poly/water mixture in the ICV will be used as a bounding moderator

• Additional steel and lead in the shielded container design will be evaluated as a reflector A 25/74/1 poly/water/Be mixture in the ICV will be used as a supplemental reflector to simulate water in-leakage

• Shielded containers are robust alternatives to shipping all RH-TRU waste in the 72-B cask

• Testing will demonstrate that the radial and axial dunnage assemblies protect and preserve the shielding capabilities of the shielded containers and protect the HalfPACT ICV

° SAR addendum submittal will occur on or before the end of November 2007

TRUPACT-Ill Payloads June 2007 Application Overview 9/5/07 Presentation to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Meeting Agenda

• Review of June 2007 application

- SAR

- TRAMPAC

- PREx

• Summary of prior TRUPACT-Ill flammable gas compliance payload meetings

- November 2005

- May 2006

• Detailed overview of proposed TRUPACT-IIl flammable gas compliance methodologies

- TRAMPAC

- PREx 2

2007 Application Review

• TRUPACT-Ill application consists of three documents Safety Analysis Report

• Presents safety basis for structural, thermal, containment, shielding, and criticality in addition to package operation and maintenance requirements TRAMPAC

• Presents baseline payload certification requirements PREx

• Presents alternative payload certification requirements and safety basis under the exemption request from 71.43(d)

• Application review will focus on unique attributes in comparison to previously approved methodologies utilized in other WIPP Type B packages (i.e., TRUPACT-II, RH-TRU 72-B) 3 2007 Application Review (cont.)

SAR

- Criticality Assumptions (Source Geometry)

" When packaged, the fissile material is distributed throughout the waste volume

" Under accident conditions, water in-leakage may cause some fissile material to migrate within the package interior

" It is unlikely that a distributed volume of fissile material could coalesce into a single fuel lump, but such a scenario is conservatively assumed

" It is postulated that if a package is tilted so that one corner is at the lowest elevation, all of the fissile material may collect in a corner of the package as the result of a gravity-driven process S

2007 Application Review (cont.)

SAR

- Criticality Assumptions (Source Geometry) (cont.)

" The fissile material is modeled as a pyramid with the inner walls of the package in close contact with three of the sides of the pyramid

• This fissile pyramid geometry is also likely incredible given the large volume of the package and the fissile material migration necessary for this geometry to be formed

• Therefore, this geometry bounds the true NCT and HAC geometry of the fissile material, which would likely be highly distributed

- Criticality Restrictions

• Materials are non-machine compacted with less than 1% by weight quantities of Be, BeO 2007 Application Review (cont.)

SAR

- Criticality Results Table 6.1 Summary of Criticalty Evatuation FOEL,,

i 0 I 0m 5t 53 555 Pu-240 Content (g)

I 0

5 15 25 Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) prckr cl cuL'm i

."l r~~

k t"JI

¢ JJ, U)7 lgt7 I

Am Hy, ot het Ic al 77 A

.cci e,

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'r.!,

NUi,II rf,irtmsmtd rraknmr [

f Thitnu e I.'u Iv M ~mx u k 0.'. I rr'r, i;,5C"(--'-0--------

t:j,.r, sS.,liuo..l Lou,! L'SL., I ____.'_________________2__

6

2007 Application Review (cont.)

SAR

- Criticality Assumptions (Source Geometry) (cont.)

" The fissile material is modeled as a pyramid with the inner walls of the package in close contact with three of the sides of the pyramid

• This fissile pyramid geometry is also likely incredible given the large volume of the package and the fissile material migration necessary for this geometry to be formed

" Therefore, this geometry bounds the true NCT and HAC geometry of the fissile material, which would likely be highly distributed

- Criticality Restrictions

- Materials are non-machine compacted with less than 1% by weight quantities of Be, BeO 2007 Application Review (cont.)

-SAR

- Criticality Results Table 6.1 Summary of Crltcai~ty Evaluation 4 7 FGE 1.1.1 5007 515 55 555 Pu-240 Ca.1tt 0

is1 25 Nn,, C..1110- of Transpofl INCT)

L.1-~ um Mx--. L 0

U)

I

~

U 0U's 0

Us4 1,

Hyp~t-.kl AcdmCodiftfns 4JAC)

'0--dPU T

h, U ~,

U'

_________0 6

2007 Application Review (cont.)

TRAMPAC (cont.)

- Requirements Specific to TRUPACT-Ill Payloads (cont.)

- Bounding dose-dependent Net Gas G value - 1.5

- Justification provided in Appendix 7.1.6 based on experimental data and review of literature (CH-TRAMPAC does not take credit for dose dependence of net gas G value)

- Used in evaluating compliance with design pressure and in the TRUPACT-III PREx 9

2007 Application Review (cont.)

• PREx

- Purpose Defines the technical safety basis for and conditions and controls under which payloads potentially exceeding TRUPACT-III TRAMPAC flammable gas limits and/or related restrictions on sealed containers or aerosol cans can be safely shipped in the TRUPACT-Ill

- Applicability to SAR

- The analyses presented in the TRUPACT-III SAR remain valid 10

2007 Application Review (cont.)

PREx (cont.)

- Applicability to TRAMPAC

- The TRUPACT-Ill TRAMPAC requirements and compliance methodologies are applicable except for the following (revised requirements and compliance methodologies for each of the following are included in the PREx):

- Prohibition on sealed containers >4 liters in size

- Prohibition on aerosol cans

- Gas generation properties requirements

- Payload assembly requirements, including the requirement to assign a TRUPACT-III Content Code

- Compliance methodologies associated with gas generation and payload assembly requirements Prior Flammable Gas Meetings Proposed initial flammable gas compliance initiative to USNRC in November 2005 Basic approach was to evacuate/backfill the TRUPACT-Ill containment vessel to render all vented layers of confinement non-flammable and limit the flammable gas source term to 5% H2 (on average) in the SLB2 payload container through process knowledge and assessment of sealed containers Meeting feedback

• Limiting of source term to 5% H2 (on average) provided no particular advantage because potential for flammable mixture in any confinement layer required an exemption from 71.43(d)

• Rigorous method for limiting flammable source term needed to be established through determination of the pressure capacity of sealed containers

• Oxygen generation in the waste matrix and the impact on the inerting process needed to be comprehensively addressed 12 S

Prior Flammable Gas Meetings (cont.)

Proposed revised flammable gas compliance initiative to USNRC in May 2006 Basic approach was to evacuate/backfill the TRUPACT-Ill containment vessel to render all vented layers of confinement non-flammable and limit the pressure contribution from potential deflagration events inside of unvented layers of confinement to ensure the maximum normal operating pressure (MNOP) of the containment vessel was not exceeded

- Testing was proposed to deflagrate a stoichiometric mixture of hydrogen and air in a surrogate sealed container sized to theoretically produce 25 psig in the TRUPACT-IlI containment vessel

- Testing was proposed to determine the source term potential of sealed containers by establishing the maximum burst pressure capacity of an initial inventory of sealed containers

- An analytical approach for correlating the pressure capacity of sealed containers with a contribution to MNOP resulting from a stochiometric deflagration inside the sealed container was proposed for validation by deflagration testing 13 2007 Application -

Flammable Gas Methodology TRUPACT-III Dual-Path Approach

- TRAMPAC - Path 1

" Less than or equal to 5% hydrogen in the innermost layer of confinement (same as TRUPACT-II)

" Primarily for newly generated waste (e.g., waste that is packaged to meet the requirements)

- PREx - Path 2

" Applies a "no consequence" methodology to ensure that any significant chemical reaction in the payload results in pressures which are below the maximum normal operating pressure (MNOP) of the containment vessel

" Primarily for previously generated waste containing sealed containers, unpunctured aerosol cans, and/or waste than cannot otherwise meet the TRAMPAC requirements

" PREx methodology consistent with May 2006 proposal 14

PREx Overview Definitions

- Sealed Container

" Any waste packaging boundary greater than 4 liters in size that is assumed to prohibit the release of gas across the boundary

" A waste packaging component meeting this definition does not have a known release rate of hydrogen gas out of its confined space

" Examples of sealed containers are rigid unfiltered containers with fully welded or gasketed lid closures Unsealed Layer of Confinement

" Any waste packaging boundary that restricts, but does not prohibit, the release of gas across the boundary

" A waste packaging component meeting this definition has a known release rate of hydrogen gas out of its confined space

" Examples of unsealed layers of confinement are twist-and-tape plastic bags, heat-sealed plastic bags, filtered plastic bags, and metal containers or drums fitted with filters 15 PREx Overview (cont.)

1st Principle

- All flammable gas within the TRUPACT-I11 void space, SLB2 void space, and unsealed layers of confinement are rendered non-flammable through the controlled removal of oxygen by an evacuation and backfill with inert gas process of the loaded package

" A "Model for Evacuation of the TRUPACT-III" analytically demonstrates that a minimum 6.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> evacuation to 36 torr is required to remove oxygen to below flammable limits in all unsealed layers of confinement

" An "Oxygen Generation During Transportation of TRUPACT-Ill Payloads" analysis demonstrates that potential oxygen generation during the shipping duration is insignificant and will have no impact on the evacuation/backfill methodology for reducing oxygen concentration in unsealed layers of confinement 16 I

PREx Overview (cont.)

2 nd Principle Sealed containers that potentially contain a flammable gas mixture are limited and controlled from both a size and pressure capacity perspective to ensure that any potential deflagration inside the sealed container does not impair the ability of the package to maintain containment

" Any sealed containers are accounted for in the MNOP determination by assuming that they undergo a stoichiometric hydrogen and air deflagration with an initial pressure equal to the burst/leakage pressure of the sealed container

" An "Adiabatic Constant Volume Deflagration Pressure Model" provides a conservative estimate of the percent contribution to MNOP resulting from a sealed container deflagration as a function of the size and burst/leakage pressure of the sealed container The deflagration is modeled as an adiabatic constant volume stoichiometric process, which is then adjusted to account for the void volume outside of the sealed container available within the SLB2 and TRUPACT-I1I using Boyle's Law 17 PREx Overview (cont.)

.2nd Principle (cont.)

" Stoichiometric deflagration testing was performed on a large sealed container within the SLB2 and a mock-up of the TRUPACT-IlI containment vessel to validate and demonstrate the analytical deflagration model as conservative

" An initial inventory of sealed containers potentially present in TRUPACT-III payloads was tested to establish the burst/leakage pressure capacities

- The burst/leakage pressure defines the maximum pressure inside the sealed container that could be present prior to initiation of a deflagration 18

PREx Overview (cont.)

3rd Principle Limits on the decay heat per SLB2, determined by accounting for all potential sources of pressure including the size and pressure capacity of sealed containers and the number of aerosol cans, ensure that the MNOP of the package is not exceeded over the shipping duration

• Potential gas release from aerosol cans is evaluated to establish the percent contribution to MNOP resulting from a potential release into the inerted void space of the SLB2 and/or TRUPACT-III

- The deflagration model conservatively accounts for the potential release of flammable aerosol can contents and potential subsequent deflagration inside a sealed container

• The MNOP compliance methodology accounts for total gas generation due to radiolysis, any pressure increase due to potential sealed container deflagration, and potential aerosol can contents release 19 Sealed Container Deflagration

• Adiabatic process with no heat loss to surrounding

• Stoichiometric hydrogen/air mixture in sealed container SEALED CONTAINER Start with stoich at hydrostatic burst pressure limit of container a-20 0

Sealed Container Deflagration (cont.)

CheetahTM Adiabatic Constant Volume Deflagration

- Thermochemical-kinetics code developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory o

• Pfactor

/21

/

E,,*

• • 21 Sealed Container Deflagration (cont.)

Void Volume Scaling (cont.)

- Pressure in sealed container P.def

[Pfactor X (Patm + Pscit )-

Patm Pressure in SLB2 Vsc-void Pslb2_defl

- Pscdefl x (Vcvoid + VsIb2_void)

- Pressure in TRUPACT-Ill ecv de ft sc delf

(

i V s 2 void (Vs~c void +

Vslb2 void + Vcv void) 22

Sealed Container Deflagration (cont.)

SEALED CONTAINER PRESSURE LIMIT IPSI)

%MNOP 114 112 1

2 3

4-5-

7 7 8

10 2

20 25 1

0 31 35 40 45 so 55 60 65 70 75 80 as 95 SEALED CONTAINER SIZE (GAL) 5 1

10 I

30 55 a5 0173 5.27 14.36 19.90 23.44 27.99 32.53 41.12 7 50.70 59.79

• 77.96 123.40

• 146.10

• 214.30 L

237.00 259.70 I 282.40 L

305.10 I

327.80 I

350+90 F 373.30 I

396.00 I 419.70 I

44 1.40 2.37 5.43 8.48 11.53 14.59 17.94 25.29 32.92 40.55 478.19 55.93 93.48

-71.10 79.74 9837 94.01 101.90 109.30 118.90 124.90 1 32.20 139.10 2.25 9.14 12.35 19.58 20.77 24.98 29.19 33.40 37.81 41.982 48.03 50.24 54.-45 59,68 62.87 67.09 71.29 T

0.89 3.85 6.40 9.19 1192 14.98 17.43 20.19 22.95 25.71 29.47 31.v22 3398 38.74 39,50 42.26 23 Deflagration Testing Stoichiometric hydrogen deflagration tests were performed at the Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center (EMRTC) at New Mexico Tech University in Socorro, NM utilizing

- Large surrogate sealed container (SSC) designed to initially contain the pressurized hydrogen/air mixture

- Prototypic payload container (SLB2)

- Rigid dunnage assembly (SLB2 dunnage) designed for testing to consume void space inside the SLB2

- Mock-up of the TRUPACT-111 containment vessel (Mock CV) designed as a vessel to contain and facilitate measurement of the deflagration pressure 24 S

S

Mock cv Deflagration Testing (cont.)

I Addtionl Port,:

Mook CV dyn-r,c preoore te 0n5 retaretogt tsreo)

Dynamic Pressure Transducer Locations:

P1 - Mock CV, Bottom 32 P2 - Mock CV. Side A P3 - Mock CV, Side B P4 - Mock CV, Side C PAP5

- Mock CV, Top P6 - Mock CV, Instrumentation Flange P7 - SLB2, Instrumentation Flange P8 - SSC, Instrumentation Flange Ports:

• hydrogo fill (t e.)

• Ilotrlc

-atch

(

Iee.)

S SSC stdtic pr-esure (1to.)

Seaed*

ssc dyostti poosot.(1 ee.)

• SLB2 dynatic pressute (1 ee.(

-r (SSC)

• M*. cv *,*

,=.o

)

k dy r p -r (tI25 25 Deflagration Testing (cont.)

Two variations on the test configuration were implemented Filter ports vented to obtain baseline response Filter ports open in the SLB2 to determine whether the measured Mock CV pressures were affected by the rate of combustion gas throttling through the vent port/filter openings Test Objectives Compare the pressure measured in the Mock CV void space to validate the pressure predicted by the adiabatic constant volume deflagration model Observe the structural response of the SLB2 and Mock CV to a deflagration test environment that was more severe than what would potentially exist in the actual TRUPACT-Ill payload 26

Deflagration Testing (cont.)

Test articles and initial conditions designed/sized to "theoretically" generate MNOP pressures (25 psig) in Mock CV SSC

• 33.5" ID x 53" IH carbon steel vessel with o-ring seal and closure bolts with a locally reduced cross-section designed to release lid at 10 psig internal pressure

• 766 liters internal volume filled with stoichiometric hydrogen/air to 6.174 psig SLB2

• Prototypic construction with 7,394 liters internal volume Rigid Dunnage

• Foam filled carbon steel L-shaped rigid structure

• 4950 liters external volume designed to fill 75% of.void space surrounding SSC in SLB2 Mock CV

• Structurally reinforced carbon steel structure with 10,019 liters internal volume (equivalent to TRUPACT-III containment vessel less pallets, roller floor, etc...)

5<-

27 Deflagration Testing (cont.) - Filtered Sm. A sm. 6

[2MWi am.

SLB2 -

SLB2 -Post Test Mock CV - Post Test 28 0

Deflagration Testing (cont.) - Filtered SLB2 Filter Ports - Post Test SLB2 Bumper Damage - Post Test 29 Deflagration Testing (cont.) - Filtered SLB2 Dunnage Deformation - Post Test SSC Lid Release - Post Test 30

Deflagration Testing (cont.) - Filtered

.Ports Filtered I4 k

1 31 i -

7,,

T *.

I

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....[ i....

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Deflagration Testing (cont.) - Open I L i

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Ports....

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[

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t'.

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32 S

Deflagration Test vs Model Comparison

" Ports Filtered

- Average pressure exerted on the Mock CV (reported by transducers P1, P3, and P6) from 25 to 100 msec ranges from 6.6 psig to 12.7 psig with a sustained average over the 75 msec time duration of 10.4 psig For specific ambient test conditions, void volumes, etc., the analytical model predicts a Mock CV deflagration pressure of 22 psig

" Ports Open Average pressure exerted on the Mock CV (reported by transducers P1, P3, and P6) from 25 to 100 msec ranges from 4.8 psig to 11.7 psig with a sustained average over the 75 msec time duration of 10.0 psig For specific ambient test conditions, void volumes, etc., the analytical model predicts a Mock CV deflagration pressure of 20 psig

• Test data demonstrates that the analytical model is appropriately conservative 33 Burst Pressure Testing

• Hydrostatic pressure tests were performed on an initial inventory of sealed containers to establish either the pressure at which the containers burst or the pressure that fails to increase further due to leakage from the container when subject to an input flow rate that is greater than or equal to 0.25% of the sealed container volume per minute

- Test articles were selected from a sampling of common container types utilized in waste packaging/preparation activities Ranged in size from 1-gal to 85-gal, in construction material from plastic to steel, and in lid closure types from small diameter screw-top lids to full container diameter friction-fit lids and lids with bolted closure rings

- Burst pressure was taken as the maximum response from 5 test articles

• It is proposed that additional sealed containers >4 liters can be inventoried and qualified by utilizing the test procedure outlined in the application to document the container type, volume capacity, materials of construction, and closure mechanism in addition to establishing its burst/leakage pressure 34

Burst Pressure Testing (cont.)

Test Objective

- To establish and associate each sealed container with a bounding pressure that could be achieved as an initial condition for a postulated stoichiometric hydrogen/air deflagration inside of the sealed container

• The bounding upper limit on the pressure at which a stoichiometric hydrogen/air deflagration could initiate is either the maximum pressure associated with burst (gross structural failure) of the container or a pressure that is limited by equilibrium between the internal gas generation rate and external leakage rate from the container

• The minimum flow rate utilized in the hydrostatic testing was selected to ensure that the test conditions for input flow rate exceeded the potential gas generation rate in the sealed container 35 Burst Pressure Testing (cont.)

• Test Inventory Test P

Nona.

te Qty Description Material Approximate Wall Closure Arile Tested Size (in.)

Thk.

Mechanism Number (in.)

TA-1 5

1 -gal Jug Plastic 06 x 12 H 0.038 Screw-top Lid TA-2 5

1-gal Can Steel 06-V x 7 H 0.016 Fricdion-fit Lid (Paint)

TA-3 5

5-gal Carboy Plastic 010-,. x 20-,' H 0.112 SCe-top Cap TA-4 5

5-gal Bucket Steel 0l-t-.x 13H 0018 Crimped Lid TA-5 5

5-gal Pail Plastic 0 11 x 14-1. H 0.007 Snap-fit Ud TA-B 5

30-gol Drum Steel 8-ls x 28-.!, H 0.047 Batd Closurn Ring TA-7 5

55-gal Drum Steel 022-.! x 33-% H 0.055 Boled Closure Ring TA-8 5

85-g.l D-ra Steel 026!. x 38-V, H 0.055 Bolted Closurn Ring 36 0

Burst Pressure Testing (cont.)

TA-2 l~

"fpki...S t)d-rr Testing Post-l*rst 38

S Burst Pressure Testing (cont.)

TA-3 O*gal Carboy s t

c. 0 fost.b*t 39 Burst Pressure Testing (cont.)

TA-4 T,_

Tot Failure TotI oo IIo Rate Bot Mod.

Flo 1n) Dur~tlon prto i*:.!.*

i il*i!:i!*

Numberrice Md Flym)

(d.. m,.n (i lmn (p-i9)

T A-4-01 Lid Leak 1.400 9.98 140 16.0 2

TA-4-02 Lid Leak 2,300 12.32 187 14.4 TA-4-03 Lid Leak 2.675 11.63 230 15.1 TA-4-04 ULd Leak 2.100 8.80 236 13.6

.1 TA-4-05 Lid Leok 1.575 728 216 13.3 W4 16.0 TA-4, 5-gal Bucket, St.1l. Crimped Lid m

u maimum 40 S

Burst Pressure Testing (cont.)

TA-5 5-9.1 P I

'-'u.n 41 Burst Pressure Testing (cont.)

TA-6 nI Vie co.-

Rin Tent Failure Total T

o R Article Duration PFessurr Number (dec min)

(mlnmin)

(peig)

TA-6-01 Lid Look 13,500 18.87 716 21.9 TA-6-02 Lid Leak 7,675 10.45 734 16.9 TA-6-03 Lid Leak 6.290 948 663 17.0 TA-6-04 Lid Leak 15.875 23.75 668 28.8 TA.6-05 Lid Loak 18.575 24.98 663 28.3 TA-6, 30-gal Drum, Steel, Bolted Closure Ring 3

ma28.8 mInium

-mauili 42

Burst Pressure Testing (cont.)

TA-7 t

Test Failure Total T

Flow Rate Article Mode Flow u,.)

Duration Pressure Number (dec min)

(lin)

(psig)

TA-7-01 Lrd Leak 26.980 38.20 706 27.1 TA-7-02 Lid Look 25.640 30.47 842 252 TA-7-03 Li ok 26,030 22.87 1.138 1

279 rl TA-7-04 Lid Leak 25.625 2388 1.073 26.5 TA-7-05 Lid Leak 27.050 25.38 1.066 28.2 S786 28.2 TA-7 e

55gal Dram, Steel, Bolted Closure Ring ini mum 43 43 Burst Pressure Testing (cont.)

TA-8 Tent Failure Tote Test FlwR Burst Article Duration Prenssor Number Mode Flow (mi)

(dec win)

(mllmin)

(psig)

TA-8-01 Lid Leak 33.650 25.75 1.307 18.2 TA-8-02 Lid Leak 41.050 30.27 1.356 25.5 TA-8-03 Lid Leak 41.275 2752 1.500 29.5 TA-8-04 Lid Look 21.050 17.17 1.226 15.8

7.

A-8-05 Lid Leak 38.550 28.17 1.298 24.1 1,226 2.

TA-8, 85-gal Drum, Steel, Bolted Closure Ring 1.226

.5 winiwuw weoiwuw 44 I

0

Aerosol Can Release

• The number of unpunctured aerosol cans must be known to ensure that a potential full release of the contents from the cans is accounted for in the MNOP determination for the package Due to the evacuation and backfill process that renders all unsealed layers of confinement non-flammable (and, therefore, any aerosol can content release into the vented void space of the package non-flammable), the presence of aerosol cans is controlled to determine a contribution to MNOP in the package

• An aerosol can potentially contributes to pressure in the TRUPACT-III CV via the mechanism of liquid-to-gas volume expansion of the released propellant 45 Aerosol Can Release (cont.)

The following equation conservatively accounts for aerosol can content release in the payload by assuming all aerosol cans are full, utilizing a propellant mixture consistent with the highest pressure capacity DOT spec container, assuming a 50% by volume propellant fill of the largest standard size aerosol can, and ignoring void space available for gas expansion inside the SLB2

=

xlx00 = 3.Ox Nac where Pac = 0.75 psia Nac = number of aerosol cans 46

4 MNOP Compliance

" The MNOP may be converted into an allowable total gas generation rate (ATGGR) that is used to determine a limit on the decay heat per SLB2

" The decay heat limit per SLB2 is calculated based on the remaining percentage of MNOP available over the shipping duration

" The MNOP is reduced to account for the pressure contributions from any sealed containers and/or aerosol cans that are present in the SLB2 The sealed container pressure contribution is based on a stoichiometric deflagration at a bounding initial pressure limit (i.e.,

hydrostatic burst pressure)

The aerosol can pressure contribution is based on the pressurized gas volume contained within an aerosol can of bounding size 47 MNOP Compliance (cont.)

A-48 48

MNOP Compliance (cont.)

Example

- Assumptions

- One 5-gallon crimped lid steel bucket (16.0 psig burst pressure from Table 2.1-6 of PREx) is present

- One 55-gallon bolted closure ring steel drum (28.2 psig burst pressure from Table 2.1-6 of PREx) is present

- Two aerosol cans are present

- SLB2 contains several unsealed layers of confinement (that do not restrict the free flow of gases) such that the sum of the void volumes across all unsealed layers of confinement is 567 liters

- Void volume within the SLB2 surrounding the inner containers/contents is 789 liters 49 MNOP Compliance (cont.)

Example (cont.)

" Using Table 2.1-1 of Section 2.1 of PREx

- The 5-gallon crimped lid steel bucket is assigned an MNOP fractional contribution of 0.04 (i.e., could contribute -4% to the 25 psig (172 kPa) MNOP)

- The 55-gallon bolted closure ring steel drum is assigned an MNOP fractional contribution of 0.50 (i.e., could contribute -50% to the MNOP)

• Using Table 2.2-1 of Section 2.2 of PREx

- The two aerosol cans are assigned an MNOP fractional contribution of 0.06 (i.e., could contribute 6% to the MNOP)

" Thus, the total pressure contribution of sealed containers and aerosol cans to the MNOP may be calculated as Pscac = 25 psig (0.04 + 0.50 + 0.06)

Pscac = 15 psig 50

.4 MNOP Compliance (cont.)

Example (cont.)

- The allowable decay heat is then calculated to limit the pressure contribution from radiolytic gas generation to be Prg = (MNOP + Patm) -

Pscac -

Phu - P.

or Prg = (2 5 + 14.7 ) Phu -- P, where Patm = atmospheric pressure Phu = pressure due to heat-up P=

pressure due to water vapor 51 0

Questions?

52