ML072110384

USNRC Presentation Titled SRA Update.

ML072110384
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	07/25/2007
From:	NRC/RGN-III
To:
References
FOIA/PA-2007-0180
Download: ML072110384 (7)

Text

SRA UDATE

" SDP Timeliness

" Phase 2 Pre-solved Tables

• Salem Gas Turbine

• Changing Missed TS Surveillance Requirements (TS SR 3.0.4)

" Knowledge Transfer 1

Process Map - Existing Process Per Manual Chapter 0609, The Agency's goal for SDP timeliness is that all final significance determinations be completed within 90 days from the issue date of the first official correspondence that described the finding and documented the need for further review to determine significa e.

To II cueI Approximated milestone Do STo + 30 DAYS - Choice letter for meeting 90 DAY issued based on the SERP goalperMC0609 To + 40 DAYS- Licensee

': responds to choice letter I I To + 70 DAYS - Regulatory Conference is held I I I

I I

I.

I I

To+90 FINAL ILETTER ISSUED To 30 40 70 90 2

The SDP Process Map - Existing Rt~les*

Per Manual Chapter 0609, The Agency's g all final significance determinations be completed within 90 days from the issue date of the first official correspondence that described the finding and documented the need for further review to determine significance. To maximize the available time the KEY is to get the SDP completed prior to issuance of the JR at To.

Cn To - Issue Documentedroximated milestone To + 30 DAYS - Choice letter

• r meeting 906DAY9 issued based on the SERP STo + 40 DAYS-Licensee

_____ responds to choice letter

_~__To + 70 DAYS - Regulatory Conference is held S" -- --- , .- LE-/T .ER ISSUED ordon! W illiams ,ik, ,, ,e....

To - 45 To 30 Sckt Sparks Wlat Rog9ers 3

The SDP Process Process Map - Existing Process Bas ic Flowchart of typical >GREEN SDP 4

item.

Salem Gas Turbine

• Credit given in PRA and SDP as an almost immediately available AC source.

" Actually could not be lined-up to safety busses for 2-4 hours.

• Team completed detailed procedure reviews, interviews and observed a timed plant walkdown.

• Good interaction between the team, the SRA, DRS staff, licensee.

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TS Risk Initiatives Eight initiatives for fundamental improvements to the STS are being developed by the industry and discussed with the NRC staff in public meetings:

" Initiative 1, TS Actions End States Modifications: This initiative would permit, for some systems, entry into hot shutdown rather than cold shutdown to repair equipment;

" Initiative 2, Missed Surveillances, Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.3:

This initiative permits the extension of up to one surveillance interval of an inadvertently missed surveillance, after assessing and managing the risk (approved September 2001);

" Initiative 3, Modification of Mode Restraint Requirements of Limiting.

Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4: This initiative permits, for most systems, transitioning up in mode with inoperable equipment, relying on compliance with the technical specification actions of the higher mode, after assessing and managing the risk (approved April 2003);

" Initiative 4b, Flexible Completion Times: This initiative would permit, contingent upon the results of a plant configuration risk assessment, temporary extension of the existing completion time within an LCO using a quantitative implementation of 50.65(a)(4);

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• Initiative 5b, Relocation of all SR Frequency Requirements out of TS:

This initiative would permit SR frequencies to be determined in and relocated to a licensee-controlled TS program;

" Initiative 6, Modification of LCO 3.0.3 Actions and Completion Times:

This initiative would convert default or explicit entry into the LCO 3.0.3 shutdown track into a completion time for corrective action before beginning shutdown;

" Initiative 7, Non-TS Support System Impact on TS Operability Determinations: This initiative would permit a risk-informed delay time before entering LCO actions for inoperability due to loss of support function provided by equipment outside of technical specifications;

• Initiative 8a and 8b, Remove/Relocate Non-safety and Non-risk Significant Systems from TS that do not meet the four criteria of 10 CFR 50.36: Initiative 8a would review technical specifications to remove systems that were included solely because they were judged risk significant at one time and have now been shown by analysis not to be. Initiative 8b would make the scope of technical specifications depend only on risk significance.

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