ML071570437
| ML071570437 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/2007 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 50-327/07-301, 50-328/07-301 | |
| Download: ML071570437 (219) | |
See also: IR 05000327/2007301
Text
Draft Submittal
.- (Pink paRer).~ -.....
SEQUOYAH APRIL/MAY 2007 EXAM
EXAM NOS. 05000327/2007301
AND 05000328/2007301
APRIL 9 -11 , 2007 AND
MAY 9,2007 (written)
Reactor Operator Operator Written Exam
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
4. 003 K4.04 001
( On a loss of CCS to an RCP thermal barrier heat exchanger, which ONE (1) of the
'.. following choices contains parameters that indicate adequate cooling to the RCP
seals?
Seal Injection Flow veT Outlet Temperature
A. 5GPM
B. 9GPM
12 GPM
D. 14GPM
A. Incorrect. Seal Injection flow too low
B. Incorrect. VCT temperature too high
C. Correct. 8-13 GPM flow to seals and less than 130 degrees F from VCT is the
requirement if TBHX cooling is lost
D. Incorrect. Seal Injection flow too low
Knowledge of Re p S design feature(s) and/or interlo ck(s) which provide for the following: Adequate cooling of Rep motor and
seals .
c. Question No. 1
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating : R02.8
Technical Reference: AOP-M.03
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-M.03 Objective 6
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.3
Comments:
Sour ce: NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:27 PM 6
SQN LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER
( Rev. 11
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.2 CCS Thermal Barrier Booster Pump Failure
1. IDENTIFY and LOCK OUT failed
Therma l Barrier Booster Pump.
2. CHECK Thermal Barrier isolation valves NOTIFY Chemistry to sample CCS for
OPEN: activity. and
GOTO Step 4.
- FCV-70-87
- FCV-70-90
- FCV-70-133
- FCV-70-134
3. ENSURE standby Thermal Barrier
Booster Pump starts.
4. ENSURE proper RCP seal injection:
- Flow betwee n 8 gpm and 13 gpm
- VCT outlet temperature less than or
equal to 130°F
l
Page 11 of 64
OPL271 AOP-M.03
Revision 0
Page 3 of 32
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRA INING
III. LESSON TITLE: AOp*M.03 "LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER"
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: - 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of License Tra ining, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios. the requirements of
AOP-M.03 , LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER.
B. Enabling Objectives
Objectives
O. Demons trate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge 's and abilities
associated with Loss of Component Cooling Water that are rated ~ 2.5 during Initial
License Tra ining and ~ 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Tra ining for the
appropriate position as identified in Appendi x A
1. State the purpose /goal of AOP-M .03.
2. Desc ribe the AOP-M .03 entry condit ions.
a. Describe the setpo ints, interlocks, and automa tic actions assoc iated with
AOP-M .03 entry conditions.
b. Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-M.03 entry conditions .
c. Interp ret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-
M.03 entry conditions .
d. Describe the Adm inistrative and Tech Spec conditions result ing from a Loss
of Component Cooling Water.
3. Describe the initial operato r response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-
M.03.
4. Upon entry into AOP-M.03, diagnose the applicab le condition and transition to the
appropriate procedural section for response.
5. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the condition that initiated entry into AOP-
M.03.
6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-M.03.
l
OPL271 AOP-M.03
Revision 0
Page 14 of 32
( X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
E. SECTION 2.2, CCS THERMAL BARRIER BOOSTER
PUMP FAILURE
1. Identify and Lock Out failed Thermal Barrier
Booster Pump
2. CHECK Therma l Barrier Isolation Valves
OPEN.
- FCV-70-87
- FCV-70-90
- FCV-70-133
- FCV-70-134
Valves could have auto
RNO directs Chemistry sampling of CCS for isolated due to leak in
ac tivity thermal barrier
3. ENSURE Standby Thermal Barrier Booster Auto start signal is return
Pump starts. flow dropping to 156 gpm
4. ENSURE proper seal injection:
- Flow between 8 gpm and 13 gpm
- vcr outlet temperature less than or
equal to 130°F
5. MONITOR RCP Sea l Return and lower bea ring
temperatures less than or equal to 225 °F.
RNO directs if in mode 1-3 to trip RX & RCPs,
then go to E-O; if in mode 4-6 trip RCPs &
Stabilize ReS temp. using RHR cooling.
6. MONITOR CCS radiation levels stable or
dropping:
RNO directs to appropriate plant procedu re
7. DETERMINE whether Thermal Barrier is to be
placed back in service .
RNO directs go to appropriate plant procedure
l
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on the unit and the action
required?
A. RCS leakage is from the charging line downstream of the regenerative heat
exchanger. Leakage is within technical specification limits. Make a containment
entry to determine if the leak is isolable. Prepare to begin a plant shutdown to
Mode 3.
B~ RCS leakaqeis from the charging line downstream of the regenerative heat
exchanger. Leakage is greater than technical specification limits. Isolate Charging
and Letdown .
( C. RCS leakage is from the charg ing line upstream of the regenerative heat
exchanger. Leakage is within technical specification limits. Initiate an investigation
to determine if the leak isi isolable. Prepare to begin a shutdown to Mode 3.
D. RCS leakage is from the charging line upstream of the regenerative heat
exchanger. Leakage is greater than technical specification limits. Trip the reactor
and enter E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection .
A. Incorrect. Leakage is not within TS limits
B. Correct .If RHX Oulet temperature is lowering, then more charging flow is going
through the RHX. This means the leak is downstream of the RHX in containment.
Since Charging flow increased from a normal value of 87 GPM to 101 GPM with no
other changes, leakage is greater thn TS limits.
C. Incorrect. Wrong location of leak, wrong action
D. Incorrect. Wrong location, correct action
(
Monday, March 12, 20072:35:27 PM 7
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operationson the eves; and (b) based on those predictions. use
procedures to correct. control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Boundary isolation valve leak.
(
Que stion No. 2
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.6
Technical Reference: R.05
Propos ed referen ces to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-R.05 Objective 4
Ques tion Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Conten t: 41.10
Comments:
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level: HIGH ER Di fficulty:
( Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOY AH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:27 PM 8
( SQN RCS LEAK AND LEAK SOURCE IDENTIFICATION
Rev. 11
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS
3. IF leak results in radiological hazard
or safety hazard ,
THEN
EVACUATE unnecessary personnel
from affected areas ,
4. DIAGNOSE the failure:
GOTO
IF... SECTION PAGE
Pressurizer level dropping
Charg ing flow rising with stable pressurizer level
VCT level dropping with Auxiliary Building or Containment 2.1 5
radiation rising
HELB recorders indicating increase tempera ture
other indications of RCS leak on Control Board indications
Unexpla ined rise in leak rate from 0-SI-OPS-068-137.0
2.2 21
AND leak search is required (leakage source unknown).
.. Page 4 of 58
OPL271AOP-R05
Revision 0
Page 3 of 26
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAIN ING
III. LESSON TITLE: AOP-R05 RCS LEAK AND LEAK SOURCE IDENTIFICATION
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />(s)
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Term inal Objec tive:
Upon completion of License Training , the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of
AOP -R05, RCS LEAK AND LEAK SOURCE IDENTIFICATION .
B. Enabling Objectives :
O. Demonst rate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge 's and Abilities
associated with Reactor Leak and Leak Source Identification that are rated ~
2.5 during Initial License Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator
Requalifi cation Training for the appropriate license position as identified in
Append ixA.
1. Explain the purpose/goal of AOP-R05.
2. Discuss the AOP-R05 entry conditions.
a. Describe the setpoints , interlocks, and automat ic actions associated with
AOP-R05 entry conditions .
b. Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-R05 entry conditions.
c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-
R05 entry conditions.
d. Describe the Administrative conditions that require Turbine Trip/ Reactor trip
due to RCS leakaoe .
3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-
R05.
4. Upon entry into AOP-R05 , diagnose the applicable condition and transition to
the appropriate procedural section for response.
5. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-
R05.
6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-R05.
( 7. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and
transitions to other procedu res.
OPL271 AOP-R.05
Revision 0
Page 9 of 26
( X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
C. Section 2.0. Operator Actions Objective 4 through 8
1. EVALUATE the following Tech Specs for Step performance should
appnca b ility: ensure that Tech Specs are
satisfied or that sufficient
3.2.5 DNB Parameters compensatory actions are
taken .
3.4 .3 .1 Safety and Relief Valves - Operating
3.4 .3.2 Relief Valves - Shutdown - Operating
3.4.6.2 RCS Leakage
3.4 .11 Reactor Coo lant System Head Vents
3.4.12 Low Temperature Over Pressure
Protection System
3.6.1.4 Containment Pressure
3.6.1.5 Containment Air Temperature
( 2. EVALUATE EPIP-1 , Emergency Plan Classification
Matrix .
An RCS leak could require
classification . depending on
the magnitude of the leak
Discuss EALs 2.5. 2.6. &
6 .3
3. IF leak results in radiolog ical hazard or safety hazard.
THEN EVACUATE unnecessary personnel from Protection of personnel
affected areas.
4. DIAGNOSE the failure Two choices one a leak is
occurring and the other is
The diagnosis of the event is assumed to be an unexplained rise in leak
completed by this step, based on PZR parameter rate from SI and leak
changes, Charging flow rising , VCT level dropping, search is required
HELB recorders and containment radiation monitor
responses.
D. Case 1 -Unit operating at 100% RTP and an RCS leak
develops which results in rapidly lowering PZR level
and pressure.
1. Diagnosis of leak
( a. Symptoms
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
8 . 005 Kl.Ol 002
( Given the following plant conditions :
- The Unit was in Mode 1, at 100% load.
- A LOCA is in progress.
- Actions of E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, are in progress.
RCS Pressure is 350 psig and dropping slowly.
Both RHR Pumps are running with no indicated flow.
Which ONE (1 ) of the following procedural actions is required?
A. Immediately stop both pumps and place handswitchs in pull-to-Iock to prevent
overheating the pumps.
B~ Open 1-FCV-70-153 and 156, CCS to the RHR Heat Exchangers , to assist in
removing pump heal.
C. Transition to ECA-1.1, "Loss of RHR Recirc" due to loss of ability to perform RHR
Sump Recirculation.
D. Reset the S~ety Injection Signal , stop both RHR Pumps, and place their
Handswitches in A-Auto because the RHR pumps are unnecessary for the event in
progress.
( A. Incorrect. With pressure dropping , pumps will not be stopped
B. Correct. Open valves to ensure a minimum flow for pumps
C. Incorrect. Would not go to ECA-1. 1 based upon indication s given. Credible
because loss of both RHR pumps is an entry to ECA-1.1
D. Incorrect. With pressure still dropping, pumps will remain running.
l
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:28 PM 13
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RHRS and the following systems: CCWS.
( Question No. 3
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: RO 3.2
Technical Reference: E-1
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200RHR.R2 Objective 4.d
Question Source : New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
Source: BANK Source If Bank: WBNBANK
( Cognitive Level : HIGH ER Difficulty:
Job Po sition: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 3 Last 2 NRC?: NO
Monday, March 12. 2007 2:35 :28 PM 14
SQN LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT E-1
Rev. 23
(
ISTEP : [ AC nON/EXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
11. DETERMINE if RHR pumps
should be stopped:
a. CHECK RCS pressure :
1) Greater than 300 psig 1) GO TO Step 13.
2) STABLE or RISING.
---
2) ENSURE CCS ALIGNED
to RHR heat exchanger:
- FCV-70-156 OPEN
- FCV-70-153 OPEN.
( GO TO Step 12.
- a-
b. CHECK RHR pump suction b. GO TO Step 12.
aligned from RWST .
c. ENSURE SI signal RESET.
=--
d. STOP RHR pumps and d. IF pump(s) CANNOT be stopped
PLACE in A-AU TO. inA-AUTO,
THEN
PLACE affected RHR pump(s)
in PUL L TO LOCK as necessary.
e. MONITOR RCS pressure e. IF RCS pressure dropping
greater than 300 psig. uncontrolled,
THEN
START RHR pumps .
Page 13 of 26
OPT200.RHR
Rev. 2
Page 3 of61
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAINING
III. TITLE: RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Presentation; I hour Simulator Demonstration;
I hour self-study/workshop
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of this lesson and others presented, the student should be able to
apply the knowledge to support satisfactory performance of the tasks associated with
the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) in the plant and on the simulator.
S. Enabling Objcctivcs:
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities
associated with the RHR System that are rated > 2.5 during Initial License
training for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A.
i. State the purpose/functions of the RHR System as described in the FSAR.
2. State thc design basis of the RHR System in accordance with the SQN FSAR.
c 3. Explain the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the
RHR System as illustrated on the simplified system drawing.
4. Describe the following items for each major component in the RHR System as
described in this lesson:
a. Location
b. Power supply (include control power as applicable)
c. Support equipment and systems
d. Normal operating parameters
e. Component operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
i. Protective features (including setpoints)
j. Failure modes
k. Unit differences
1. Types of accidents for which the RHR System components are designed
m. Location of controls and indications associated with the RHR System in the
control room and auxiliary control room
l
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
6 . 005 Al.OI 001
( Given the following plant conditions:
- Plant cooldown in progress using two trains of RHR.
- The flow is 2500 gpm per train.
- The RCS cooldown rate is 25°F per hour.
- RCS temperature is 250°F.
- The demand signal is RAISED on 1-FCV-74-32, RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass
Valve.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on RCS cooldown rate and on
total indicated RHR system flow?
RCS Cooldown Rate Indicated RHR Flow
A. INCREASES INCREASES
B. INCREASES REMAINS CONSTANT
C~ DECREASES INCREASES
D. DECREASES REMAINS CONSTANT
( A. Incorrect. Cooldown rate will be lower for this failure
B. Incorrect. Cooldown is lower, and flow changes. Raising demand on the bypass will
cause more flow aroung the HX. Flow is sensed downstream of where the bypass and
HX outlet come together
C. Correct. RHR outlet flow control valves are operated manually. Therefore more flow
bypasses the RHR HX. Since total flow is measured downstream of where the HX
Bypass connects to the HX discharge line, the indication will rise.
D. Incorrect. Flow does change. Cooldown rate is correct
Monday, March 12,20072:35:27 PM 9
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RHRS
controls includ ing: Heatup/cooldown rates.
(
Quest ion No. 4
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.5
Technical Reference: 0-50*74*1, 5.5.2 Placing RHR in Service for Normal Shutdown Cooling
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL200.RHR Objective 5.b
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments :
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
( Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday. March 12.20072 :35:27 PM 10
OPT200.RHR
Rev. 2
Page4of61
(
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):
B. Enabling Objectives (Conl'd):
5. Describe the operation of the RHR as it relates to the following:
a. Precautions and limitations
b. Major steps performed while placing the RHR in service
c. Alarms and alarm response
d. How a component failure will affect system operation
e. How a support system failure will affect RHR operation
f How a instrument failure will affect system operation
6. Describe the administrative controls and limits for the RHR as explained in this
lesson:
State Tech Specs/TRlvl LCOs that govern the RHR
State the TS /TRM LCOs that havc a.::: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action statement
Interpret applicable Tech Specs/TRM LCOs
Identify Limitations of the ODCM
Interpret applicable ODCM limitations
Given the conditions/status of the RHR components and the appropriate
sections of the Tech Spec, determine if operability requirements are met and
what actions are required
7. Discuss related Industry Events:
a. SQN LER 85-040-00
1. Loss 0f RHR During Pump Swapover
b. SOER 85-4
I. Loss or Degradation of RHR Capabilities in PWRs
c. NRC IE Notice #87-0 I
1. RHR Valve Misalignment Causes Degradation ofECCS in PWRs
d. SER 31-93
I. Unexpected Boron Concentration Reduction
VI. TRAINING AIDS:
A. Classroom Computer and Local Area Network (LAN) Access
B. Computer projector
C. Local Area Network (LAN) Access
D. Simulator (if available)
l
- - - - -- - - - - -
OPT200.RHR
Rev. 2
Page 45 of 6 1
(
RHR MODES (Cant.)
- -- Normal "Stage Two" Cooldown:
Suction comes off Loop 4 hot leg through FCV's-
74-1 (2) into the common suction header then
through the pump suction valves and pumps.
Prior to the HX the line splits , one path goes
through the HX and the HX outlet valve. The
other goes through HCV-74-36 (37) to the HX
by-pass valve FCV-74-32 then through FCV-74-
33 or FCV-74-35 back to the normal flow path.
c
SON RESIDUAL HEAT 0-SO-74-1
( REMOVAL SYSTEM Rev: 61
1,2 Page 76 of 204
Unit _ Date _
5.5.2 Placi ng RHR in service for normal shutdown cooling (Continued)
NOTE The next step applies to the train in service (N/A other valve).
[15] WHEN RHR injection flow is greater than 1250 gpm, THEN
ENSURE the miniflow valve for the RHR pump in service is
CLOSED:
PUMP VALVE NO. INITIALS
A-A FCV-74-12
B-B FCV-74-24
CAUTION - Flow through FCV-74-16, FCV-74-28, and FCV-74-32 should be
coord inated to achieve targ et RCS cooldown rate of 75'F per hour
(100'F per hour absolute maximum).
(
NOTE 1 The valve for the RHR train in service may be throttled to obtain desired
cooling rate.
NOTE 2 Steps [16] and [17] should be performed concurrently.
[16] SLOWLY THROTTLE [FCV-74-32] RHR Hx bypass
to avoid thermal shock.
[17] THROTTLE the RHR Hx valve for the RHR train being
placed in service. (N/A other valve)
VALVE NO. FUNCTION INITIALS
FCV-74-16 RHR Hx A Outlet
FCV-74-28 RHR Hx B Outlet
(
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
10. 006 K3.0 1 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
- A LOCA has occurred .
- RCS pressure is 100 psig.
- CETC's are reading 810°F and rising slowly
- Centrifugal Charging Pumps are running.
- Both SI pumps are tripped.
- RHR Pump 1B-B is running with flow indicating 600 gpm.
- RVLlS Lower Range Level is 60%.
If this condition cont inues, which ONE(1) of the following describes the effect on core
cooling and the reason why?
A. Adequate core cooling exists because minimum RHR flow requirements are met.
B. Adequate core cooling exists because SI Accumulator injection is suffic ient to
maintain core cooling .
C~ Core coolingJs degraded because minimum RHR flow requirements are NOT being
met.
D. Core cooling is degraded because RVLlS Lower Range level is too low to sustain
( core cooling.
A. Incorrect. Safety Function requires 1 full train of EGGS
B. Incorrect. SI Accumulator Injection design basis is for refill on a LBLOGA
with LOOP. For this event, they have already performed their design
function
C. Correct. Safety analysis assumes 1 CCP, 1 SI, 1 RHR, and 2 SI
D. Incorrect. Minimum SF are NOT met with less than 1 fuJI train of EGGS
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:28 PM 17
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowfedge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ECCS will have on the following: ReS.
( Question No. 5
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: RO 4.1
Technical Reference: . TS section 3.5 and basis
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL200.ECCS Objective 6
Question Source: Bank
Question History: WTSI (Various Exams)
Ques tion Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.8
Comments:
( Source: BANK Source If Bank: ROB INSON 2007 NRC
Cognitive Level : H IGHER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC? : NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:28 PM 18
OPT200,ECCS
Rev, 1
Page 4 of 120
(
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):
B. Enabl ing Objectives (Cont'd):
5. Describe the operation of the ECCS as it relates to the following:
a. Precautions and limitations
b. Major steps performed while placing the ECCS in service
c. Alarms and alarm response
d. How a component failure will affect system operation
e. How a support system failure will affect ECCS operation
f. How a instrument failure will affect system operation
6. Describe the administrative controls and limits for the ECCS as explained in this
lesson:
a. State Tech Specs/TRM LCOs that govern the ECCS
b. State the S I hour action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditions/status of the ECCS components and the appropriate
sections of the Tech Spec, determine if operability requirements are met and
what actions are required
7. Discuss related Industry Events:
a. PER 93856, Lessons Learned (operability impact of closing FCV-63-47 01'-
( 48)
b. Closure of Suction Valve for a Safety Injection Pump Places Unit 2 in
Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.3
c. PER 104032, Temperature Control Valve (TCV) stroke testing for ECCS
Pump Room Coolers.
VI. TRAINING AIDS:
A. Classroom Computer and Local Area Network (LAN) Access
B. Computer projector
OPT200.ECCS
Rev. 1
Page 98 of 120
(
TECH SPECS
3/4 .5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - Tavg Greater Than or Equal to 350'F
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsys tems shall be OPERABLE with each
subsystem comprised of:
a. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,
b. One OPERABLE safety injection pump ,
c. One OPERABLE residual hea t removal heat exchanger,
d. One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump , and
e. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the
refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal and
automatically transfe rring suction to the containme nt sump
during the recircuiation phase of operat ion.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.
c
(
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
(
BASES
3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS
The OPE RABILITY of each cold leg injection accumulator ensures that a sulf icient volume of
borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core in the event that the RCS pressure lalls
below the speci fied pressure of the accumulators. For the co ld leg injection accumulators, this condil ion
occurs in the event of a large or small rupture.
The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions
used lor accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met. The limits in the specification for
accumu lator nitrogen cover pressure and volume are ope rating limits and include instrument uncertainty.
The analysis limits bound the operational limits with instrument uncertainty applied. The minimum boron
concentration ensures that the reactor core will remain subcritical during the post*LOCA (loss of coolant
accide nt) recirculation phase based upon the cold leg accumulators' contribution to the post*LOCA sump
mixture concentration.
The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be "operating bypasses" in
the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that byp asses of a protective function be removed
automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these accumulator isolation
valves fail to meet si!:lgle failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.
The limits for ope ration with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except boron concentration
not within limits minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concur rent with
failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. Under
these conditions, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to
place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required. The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed to restore an
inoperab le accumula tor to OP ERABLE status is justified in Westinghou se Commercial Atomic Power
(WCAP)* 15049*A, Revision 1, dated April 1999. For an acc umulator inoperable due to boron
conce ntration not wilh in limits, the limits for ope ration allow 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to return boron conc entration to
within limits. This is based on the availability of ECCS wate r not being affected and an insi gnificant elfect
on core subcriticality during rellood because boiling of ECGS water in the core concentrates boron in the
saturated liquid.
3/4 .5.2 and :1/4 5:l ECCS SUBSYSTEMS
The OP ERABILITY of two independent ECGS subsystems ensures that sufficie nt emergency core
cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOGA assuming the loss 01one subsystem through
any single lailure consid eration . Eilher subsystem operating in conjuncfion with the accumulators is
capa ble of supplying sulficie nt core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits
lor all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break 01the largest RGS cold leg pipe
downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core cooling capability in the
recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.
. As indicated in the footnote for 3/4.5.2, operation in MODE 3 with EGGS trains made incapable of
injecting in order to facilitate entry into or exit from the Applicability of LCO 3.4.12, "Low Temperature
Overpressure Protection (LTO P) System," is necessary for plants with an LTOP arming temperature at or
near the MODE 3 boundary temperature of 350 o F. LGO 3.4.12 requires that certain pumps be rendered
incapabie of injecting at and below the LTOP arming temperature. When this temperature is at or near the
MODE 3 boundary temperature, lime is needed to make pumps incapable of injecting prior to entering the
LTOP Applicability, and provide time to restore the inope rable pumps to O PERABLE stat us on exiting the
LTOP Applicability.
March 9, 2005
SEQUOYAH* UNIT 1 B 3/4 5* 1 Amendment No. 155, 140, 192, 262, 291, 299
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
9 . 006 A3.0 1 001
Given the following plant conditions:
(
A LOCA has occurred .
RCS pressu re is 450 psig and lowering slowly.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the status operating ECCS equipment?
A. SI flow is rising; '
Cold Leg Accumulator level is stable ;
RHR flow is rising
B~ Sl flow is rising;
Cold Leg Accumulator level is lowering;
RHR flow is zero
C. SI flow is stab le;
Cold Leg Accumu lator level is stable;
RHR flow is zero
D. SI flow is stable ;
Cold Leg Accumulator level is lowering;
RHR flow is rising
A. Incorrect. Pressure is low enough that CLAs would be injecting
B. Correct. With RCS presure at 450 psig, SI flow has not reached its maximum, so it
will still be rising against lowering pressure . Cold Leg Accumulators will begin injecting
at about 600 psig, so level will be lowering as RCS pressure lowers . RHR flow will not
be indicated until RCS pressure drops to approximately 250 psig.
C. Incorrect. SI flow would be rising, and CLAs would be lowering
D. Incorrect. SI flow has not reached maximum yet, and RHR is not flowing yet.
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:28 PM 15
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to monitor automati c operation of the ECCS. including: Accumulators.
( Question No. 6
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R04.0
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.ECCS Objective 3
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.4
Comments:
So urce: NE W Source If Bank:
( Cognitive Leve l: HIGH ER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:28 PM 16
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
14. 007 K l.03 00 1
Given the following plant conditions:
(
A reactor trip has occurred .
RCS pressure is 1810 psig and lowering .
Containment Pressure is 1.5 psig and rising.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the flowpath of RCP #1 sealleakoff?
A. VCT
B:" PRT
C. RCDT
D. Isolated
A. Incorrect. Normal flowpath
B. Correct.
C. Incorrect. Flow path of #2 seal
D. Incorrect. The_sealleakoff is isolated, but seal flow still goes to PRT via a relief line
Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PRTS and the following systems: ReS.
( Question No. 7
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.0
Technical Reference: OPT200.CVCS, Slide 71
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200RCP Objective 3
Question Source: Bank
Question History: WTSI
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .7
Comments:
Monday, March 12.2007 2:35:28 PM 25
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: BANK Source If Bank:
Cognitive Leve l: HIGH ER Difficulty:
( Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date : 412007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:28 PM 26
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
1. 008 A4 .09 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
- Unit 1 is operating at 100% RTP
- 0-XA-55-27B-B, Window A-5 , "LETDOWN HX OUTLET FLOWITEMP
ABNORMAL" alarms.
- The RO determines that Letdown HX Outlet temperature is 132°F and rising slowly
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the event that has occurred, and the effect
on the unit prior to any action by the crew?
A. TCV-70-192 temperature input is failing high. Reactor power will rise slightly.
B. TCV-70-192 temperature input is failing high. Reactor power will drop slightly.
C. TCV-70-192 temperature input is failing low. Reactor power will rise slightly.
D~ TCV-70-192 temperature input is fail ing low. Reactor power will drop slightly.
A. Incorrect. Incorrect input failure , incorrect direction of power. If this was the failure ,
power would behave this way
B. Incorrect. Incorrect input failure , correct response of power
C. Incorrect. Correct input failure , incorrect response of power
D. Correct. If temperature input fails low, the rcv will close to raise temperature. If
temperature from the letdown HX rises , the mixed bed ion exchangers will have less
affinity for boron, resulting in a small boration due to temperature
Monday, March 12,20073:15 :22 PM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to manu ally operate and/ or monitor in the control room: CCW Temperature control valve.
Question No. 8
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.0
Techn ical Reference: OPT200
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective : OPT200.CVCS Objective 8
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.7
Comments:
( Source: NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
l
Monday, March 12,20073:15:22 PM 2
OPT200.CVCS
Revis ion 2
Page 3 of26
C' I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAINING
III. LESSON TITLE: CHEMICAL AND VO LUME CONTROL SYSTEM
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:
A. NSGPO: 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> lecture
B. Initial Licensing: 5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> lecture; 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> simulator demonstration; 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> self-study/workshop
C. NLOR: time required to Cover selected objectives to be recorded on the objective matrix form .
D. LOR: time required to cove r selected objectives to be recorded on the objective matrix form .
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Obj ective:
Upon completion of this lesson and others pres ented, the student sha ll demonstrate an
understanding of the Chemical & Volume Control system by successfully completing a written
examination as defined by program procedures. The "." objectives should be included, as
appl icable, in thc lecture.
B. Enabling Objectives
( * 1. State the purpose and functions of the evc system. (KIA 2.1.27)
- 2. Sta te the purpose and func tions of major evc system components. (KIA 2. I .28)
- 3. State the locations of components, switches, controls, and indications associated with the
CVC sys tem. (KIA 2.1.30 , 2.1.3 1)
- 4. Exp lain and apply all design limitations. (KIA 2. 1.32)
- 5. Identify and apply the CVC system Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements
Manual.
a. Stat e the eve system technical specifications w ith less than one hou r action
statements. (KIA 2 .1.1 I)
b. Explain the technical spec ifica tion bases for CVC system. (KIA 2.2.25)
c. Given a set of plant conditions, app ly the appropriate technical specifications and T RM
requi rements for the CVC system. (KIA 2.1.12, 2. I .33, 2.2 .22)
- 6. For the cve system, describe the differences between unit's design, control board layouts,
and instrumentation. (KIA 2.2.3, 2.2.4)
7. Explain and apply the CVC system precaut ions and limitations. (KIA 2.1.32)
8. Explain and app ly the Alarm Response Procedures associated with CVC system.
(KIA 2.4.46, 2.4.47, 2.4.48, 2.4.50)
- 9. Exp lain the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between CVC system
and the following plant systems: (KIA 004KI)
a. PZR Leve l Cont rol System
b. PZR and RCS temperature and pressure relationships
c. RCPS , including sea l injection flows
d. CROS operation in automatic mode control
( e. Makeup system to VCT
f. Interface of CVCS w ith PRT
g. Pneumatic valves and RHRS
OPT200.CVCS
Revision 2
Page 4 of26
h. Expected PRT response when opening PORV during bubble formation in PZR
I. Nitrogen systems
j. Hydrogen systems
k. Instrument Air System
I. ECCS
m. Boric acid storage tanks (BASTs)
n. .PZR
o. CCS
p. Primary grade water supply
q. Location of sample points for chemically sampled fluid systems
r. WGDS
s. RWST
t. RHRS
u. Interface between HPI flow path and excess letdown flow path
v. Flow path from CVCS to reactor coolant drain tank and holdup tank
w. Relationship between seal filter and letdown filter
x. Interface between high-activity waste tank and letdown filter drain
y. Effect and detection of leaking PORV or relief on PZR level and pressure, including
VCT makeup activity in automatic mode
z. Relationship between letdown flow and RCS pressure
-aa, Interface between CVCS and WDS.
bb. Minimum VCT pressure effect on RCP seals
cc . Interface between clean waste receiver tank and seal injection filters
( dd. Understanding of interface with LRS
- 10. State the electrical andlor control air supplies to CVC system's components. (KIA 004K2)
a. Boric acid makeup pumps
b, Makeup pumps
c. Charging pumps
d. BAST tank heaters
e. MOVs
f. Control instrumentation
g. Heat tracing
11. Given a CVC system/component malfunction, analyze its affect on the plant systems listed.
(KIA 004K3)
a, CROS (automatic)
b. CCS
c. RCPS
d. PZR LCS
e. RCS temperature and pressure
f. PZR level and pressure
g. RCP seal injection
- 12. Explain the following CVC system design features and or interlocks . (KIA 004K4)
c b. Control of pH, and range of acceptability
c. Protection of ion exchangers (high letdown temperature will isolate ion exchangers)
d. Manual/automatic transfers of control
5 (A-S)
Source Setpoint
(
SER 1190 (Unit 1 annunciator system)
LETDOWN HX
100 gpm decreasing
1-FS-70-190 OUTLET
SER1191 FLOWITEMP
1-TS-70-191 132'F increasing
ABNORMAL
Retransmitted to U-2
SER 2172 and 2173 (Unit 2 annunciator system )
Probable 1. CCS pump off.
Causes 2. Heat exchanger isolation valves closed or misaligned.
3. Low CCS water pressure .
4. 1-TCV-70-192 failed closed.
5. Pipe break.
Corrective [1] CHECK letdo wn heat exchanger outlet flow by observing
Actions [1-FI -70-190] and outlet temperature by observ ing [1-TI-70-191].
[2] MONITOR CVCS letdown temperature on [1-TI-62-78] .
NOTE Automatic positioning of 1-TCV-70-192 is control led by input from
HIC-62-78 (in Auto ) and TS-62-78 (In Auto or Manual at >124°F).
[3] IF [1-HIC-62-78] not operating properly in AUTO , THEN
PLACE in MANUAL, AND
ATTEMPT tem perature control.
( [4] VERIFY low pressure letdown valve mainta ining letdown pres sure
at - 340 psig .
[5] IF Letdown heat exchanger temperature cannot be controlled,
THEN
EVALUATE SWitching to excess letdown in accordance with
1-S0-62-6, Excess Letdo wn.
[6] VERIFY proper valve alignment in accordance with
1-S0-70-1, Component Cooling Water System Train A.
NOTE 1-TCV-70-192 fails open on loss of air , but could fail closed on a circuit
failur e of loop 1-T-62-78. 1-TIS-62-79 will faiI1-TCV-70-192 open on
high-high temperature of 124°F.
[7] IF this annunciator clears and re-alarrns, AND 1-TCV-62-79 has
diverted to the VCT, THEN
NOTIFY Instrument Maintenance to trouble shoot instrument loop
1-T-62-78.
[8] IF pipe break is suspected, THEN
GO TO AOP-M.03, Loss of Component Cooling Water.
[9] START additional CCS pumps in accordance with 1-S0-70-1 , as
nece ssary.
References 456655-2766-0, 476601 -70-49,47W859-2
SQN 0-AR-M27B-B
Page 7 of 39
( 0,1 Rev. 15
( KEY POINTS, AIDS,
INSTRUCTOR GUIDE QUESTIONS/ANSWERS
4. This reaction destroys all exchange
capacity of cation bed and produces
sulfuric acid
5. Boron affinity of resin bed is affected Objective 22
by temperature of coolant passed
through bed
a. At lower temperatures, borate ion
bonding to exchange site contains
three boron atoms
b. At higher temperatures, borate ion
contains only one boron atom
c. Result of this characteristic is that Objective 28
at lower temperatures resins are
more efficient at removing boron
from coolant than at higher
temperatures
d. A saturated resin bed will actually Objective 26 and 27
( release boron as temperature is
increased
6. In systems where it is possible to
subject demineralizer resin to high
temperatures, demineralizers have
automati c features to protect against
temperature damage
a. This is usually accomplished by
automatic closure of deminerali zer
inlet valves to isolate demineralizer
from high temperature liquid, when
high temperature at inlet to
demineralizer is sensed
(
PWR / COMPONENTS / CHAPTER 4 30 of 42 e 1999 GENERAL PHYSI CS CORPORATION
/ DEMINE RALIZERS AND ION EXCHANGERS REV 2
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
17.010 K2.03 001
( Which ONE (1) of the following describes the power supplies to the PZR PORVs and
their associated position indicating lights?
PORVs Indicating Lights
A. 120 VAC Vital Instrument Power 125 VDC Vital Battery Boards
B. 125 VDC Vital Battery Boards 120 VAC Vital Instrument Power
C~ 125 VDC Vital Battery Boards 125 VDC Vital Battery Boards
D. 120 VAC Vital Instrument Power 120 VAC Vital Instrument Power
A. Incorrect. Credible due to low voltage source, and partially correct.
B. Incorrect. Credible due to low voltage source, and partially correct.
C. Correct. Power to the PORVs and indication is DC
D. Incorrect. Credible due to low voltage source
Knowledge of bus powersupplies to thefollowing: Indicator forPORV position.
Question No. 9
c Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R02.8
Technical Reference: 45N601-4
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.MS Objective 4.b
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.7
Comments:
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
l Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC? : NO
Monday , March 12. 2007 2:35:28 PM 31
OPT200.M S
Rev. 3
Page 28 of 53
(
Enabling Objective 4
( X. LESSON BODY
- Can be kep t closed by pla cing hand sw itch on I- M-4 in closed position
Fails clo sed on loss of air. If DC control power is lost the valve will respond to the
output of the controlle r. DC control power to solenoids is 125V vital DC .
- Controller power suppl y is from 120 V ac plu g mold s. If power lost to plug mold
feedi ng a PORV, the valve can still open from the pressure switch @ 1140 psig.
- Loc al control
- S/G I and 4 - control station in th e 480v Shutdowon Board Rooms
- S/G 2 and 3 - control station in the annulus
with a manual valve
(
OPT200.MS
Rev. 3
Page 4 of 53
( 4. Describe the following features for each major component in the Main Steam
System as described in this lesson.
a. Location
b. Power supply (include control power as applicable)
c. Support equipment and systems
d. Normal operating parameters
e. Component operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
I. Protective features (including sctpoints)
J. Failure modes
k. Unit differences
1. Types of accidents for which the Main Steam components are designed
ID. Location of controls and indications associatcd with the Main Steam in
the control room and auxiliary control room.
(
c..
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
1. 0 12 K 2.0 1 00 1
I Given the following plant conditions:
\.
Unit 1 is at 100% power.
- A loss of 125 VDC Vital Battery Board I occurs.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on the associated Reactor Trip
Breaker?
A'! MCB indication is lost and RTA is NOT capable of tripping on a SHUNT trip.
B. MCB indication is lost and RTA trips OPEN due to loss of power to the
SHUNT coil
C. MCB indication remains lit; RTA trips OPEN due to loss of power to
the SHUNT coil.
D. MCB indication remains lit; RTA is NOT capable of tripping on a SHUNT trip.
A. Correct. 125 VDC supplies control power to RTB indication and also shunt trip
mechanism. Without this power, indication is lost and the shunt trip feature of the RTB
is disabled -
B. Incorrect. Correct indication, but loss of power to shunt coil will not cause a trip. UV
coil losing power will cause~
( C. Incorrect. Indication is not available on MCB
D. Incorrect. Indication is not available on MeB, and losing power to shunt coil will not
cause a trip
l
Monday, March 12, 2007 3:08:40 PM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: RPS channels. components, and interconnections.
( Question No. 10
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.3
Technical Reference: 0-45N706-3
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL 271AOP-P.02, Obj 2.d
Question Source: Bank
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .7
Comments:
Source: BANK Source If Bank: WTSI
Cognitive Level: LOWE R Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
( Dat e: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 3:08:40 PM 2
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
20. 012 K l.04 00 1
Given the following plant conditions:
(
A transient has occurred with Control Bank D initially at 220 steps .
Over the past 5 minutes , reactor power has been slowly rising, followed by a
sharp spike from 104% to approxima tely 109%.
All equipment has operated as designed in response to the transient
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the Control Bank D Rod Position and Group
Demand indications follow ing the termination of this event?
A. Rod Position Indication below 220 steps; Rod Bottom Lights extinguished ; Group
Demand indication at 220 steps.
B. Rod Position Indicat ion below 220 steps; Rod Bottom Lights extinguished; Group
Demand indication between 220 steps and 0 steps.
C!" Rod Bottom Lights illuminated; Group Demand indication between 220 steps and 0
steps .
D. Rod Bottom J:,ights illuminated; Group Demand indication at 220 steps.
A. Incorrect. Should have tripped, and rod bottom lights will be on
B. Incorrect. Should have tripped and rod bottom lights on
( C. Correct. Would have had an OPDT runback, causing group demand to be lower.
Spike to 109% would cause a reactor trip
D. Incorrect. Group demand will be below 220 steps because a runback should have
occurred prior to the trip
Monday, March 12, 20072:35:29 PM 36
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between theRPS and the following systems: RPIS.
( Question No . 11
T ier 2 Group 1
Importance Rati ng : R03.2
Technical Reference: . (TI-28)
Proposed references to be provided to applicants dur ing examination: None
Learning Objective : OPT200.RPS, 8 .3 & 4
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.6
Comments:
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
( Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
Monday, March 12,20072:35:29 PM 37
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
22. 013 K3 .03 001
Given the following plant cond itions:
(
A Loss of Off-Site Power has occurred .
A steam line break generated a safety injection signal but Engineered Safety
Featu re Actuation System (ESFAS) Train A failed to actuate.
Containment pressure indicates 2.9 psig and rising .
Assuming no manual actions have been initiated, which ONE (1) of the following
correctly describes a consequence of that failure?
A. 1A-A EDG will remain in standby.
B. Only the B Train load sequencer will be operating .
C. Only two Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) will be closed .
D!" Only one Phase A Containment Isolation Valve in each pen etrat ion wi ll be closed .
A. Incorrect. The EDG and sequencer will be running due to loss of power anyway
B. Incorrect. A train Sequencer will operate in blackout mode
C. Incorrect. MSIVs get signals from both trains, so only 2 closing is incorrect.
D. Correct. Failure of 1 train of ESFAS will result in 1 group of CIA valves closing.
(
Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ESFAS will have on the following: Containment.
Question No. 12
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R0 4.3
Technical Reference: 47W611-88-1,63-1
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Leaming Objective: OPT200.CtmtStructure
Question Source: Bank
Question History: Salem 2002
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .7
Comments:
Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:29 PM 40
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: BANK Source If Bank: SALEM 2002
c Cognitive Level: HIGHER
Job Position:
Da te:
412007
Difficulty:
Plant:
Last 2 NRC?:
SEQUOYAH
NO
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:29 PM 41
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
27 . 022 A4.01 001
Given the following plant conditions:
(
Reactor trip & Safety Injection occurred due to Large Break LOCA.
Containment Phase B isolation has occurred
All systems responded normally
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the response of the Lower
Compartment Coolers when Phase B is reset?
Fans in A-P AUTO Cooler ERCW Valves
A. remain off Cooler ERCW containment
isolation valves open.
B~ start Cooler ERCW containment
isolation valves remain closed .
C. remain off Cooler ERCW containment isolation
valves remain closed.
D. start Cooler ERCW containment isolation
valves open.
c A. Incorrect. Fans will start. Valves will remain closed
B. Correct.
C. Incorrect. Fans will start but valve position is correct.
D. Incorrect. Correct fan operation but valves will not open
ERCW does notrealign on Phase B reset. Fans in A-P AUTO will start as the Phase B
is cleared
Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:29 PM 50
QUESTIONS REPORT
for S EQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CCS fans,
( Question No. 13
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.6
Technical Reference: . 1-47W611-67-3, 1-47W611-30-4
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200 .CONTCOOLlNG , Obj . B.4
OPT 200.ERCW, Obj BA
Question Source: Bank
Question History: Sequoayah Bank
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.4
Comments :
( Source:
Cognitive Level :
BANK
LOWER
Source If Bank:
Difficulty:
SEQUOYAH BANK
Job Pos ition: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC ?: NO
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:29 PM 51
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
30. 025 A2 .06 001
Given the following plant conditions:
Unit 1 is at 100% power.
Ice Condenser Temperature Control Valve 1-TCV-61-71 setpoint fails.
Ice Condenser floor temperature is 12°F and lowering.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the potential effect of this failure, and the
action required? .
A. Excessive sublimation of the ice bed; throllle open 1-TCV-61-71 Bypass valve
B. Excessive sublimation of the ice bed; throttle closed 1-TCV-61-71 Bypass valve .
C. Ice Condenser door binding; throttle open 1-TCV-61-71 Bypass valve.
D~ Ice Condenser door binding; throttle closed 1-TCV-61-71 Bypass valve.
A. Incorrect. Wrong effect, wrong direction for the valve under the conditions
presented.
B. Incorrect. W1:Qng effect. Correcta ctions
C. Incorrect. Correct effect. Wrong direction for the valve under the conditions
presented
D. Correct. Temperature swings can cause buckling of the Ice Condenser wear slab,
( causing doors to jam. Sublimation happens when temperature is too high. High glycol
flow would cause temperature to be reduced. By throttling closed on the bypass valve
glycol flow is reduced, allowing the floor temperature to rise
(
Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:29 PM 56
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to (a) pred ict the impactsof th e following malfunctions or operations on the ice condenser system: correct. control. or
mitigate the consequencesof those malfunctions or operations: Decreasing ice condenser temperature.
( Question No. 14
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating : R02.5
Technical Referenc e: 80-61-1, AR-M6E-B7
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective : OPT200.ICE Objective 5
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .10
Comments :
( Source:
Cognitive Level: HIGHER
NEW Source If Bank:
Difficulty:
Job Pos ition: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC? : NO
Monday, March 12, 20072 :35:29 PM 57
SQN ICE CONDENSER COOLING 0-80-61-1
( 0 Rev. 28
Page 90 of 129
Unn Da~
8.9 Bypassing Floor Cooling TCV
NOTE 1 This section may be used to support maintenance
or if Glycol Floor Cooling Tempe rature Control Valve is not
operating properly.
NOTE 2 Floor cooling TCV-61-71 is set to maintain temp range of
13°F to 19°F.
[1] OBTAIN Unit 8RO approval to bypass TCV. 0
[2] THR OTT LE OPEN [VLV-61-751J, Temperature Control
Valve Bypass.
[3] IF Floor Cooling TCV requires isolation,
( THEN
CLOSE [VLV -61-750] Floor Cooling TCV Isolation.
[4] ADJUST [VLV-61 -751] Bypass valve as necessary
to mainta in temp range of 13°F to 19°F on TI-61-90. 0
[5] PLACE procedure in affected unit Configuration Log Book. 0
[6] WHEN desired to return bypass back to normal ,
THEN
PERFORM the foHowing:
[a] ENSUR E [VLV -61-750J, Floor Cooling TCV Isolation
is OPEN.
[b] CLOSE [VLV-61.751J, TCV Bypass.
[c] ENSURE [TCV*61-71] maintaining glycol temperature
as required . 0
End of Section 8.9
14 (B-7)
( Source Setpoint
SER 614 TS-61-99B/A
1-TIS-61-99B/A 7°F decreasing FLOOR COOLANT
TEMP LO
Probable 1. Failure of 1-TCY-61-71.
Cau ses 2. Bypass valve 1-61-751 opened too far.
Corrective [1] DISPATCH operator to old Reverse Osmosis room on elevation
Actions 734 in Auxiliary Building to perform the following:
[a] CHECK glycol floor coolant temperature by observing
[1-TI-61-90] in RO room on el 734.
( NOTE l-TCY-61-7 1 setpoint is 13°F.
[b]IF [1-TCV-61 -71] not operating properly, THEN
OPERATE manual bypass valve [1-61-751] as necessary
to bring temperature within limits (ref. 0-SO-6 1-1 section 8.9).
[2] INITIATE Work Order as necessary.
References 45B655-06E-0 , 47W600-87, 47W610-61-3
SQN 1-AR*M6-E
Page 16 of 40
1 Rev. 18
OPT200.ICE
Rev. 2
Page 10 of 56
( ENABLING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd)
5. Describe the normal, abnormal, and
emergency operation of the Ice Condenser
system as it relates to the following:
- . Precautions and limitations
- Major steps for placing Ice Condenser in
service
- Alarms and alarm response
- Howa component failure will affect system
operation
- How a support system failure will affect
system operat ion
- How a instrument failure will affect system
operation
IX. INTROD UCTION:
( L. The instructor will refer students to the applicable SO Precautions & Limitations,
Alarm Response Procedures, Emergency Operat ing Procedures, and the system
description to answer this objective.
M. There are some alarms which are directly generated by the Ice Condenser system.
These alarms (high ice bed temperature, ice condenser doors, etc.) will be discussed
in this lesson plan.
N. There are no direct control air or power connections to the Ice Condenser itself.
Power and air supplies to indirect mechanisms (Glycol chiller package, glycol eire
pumps, and air handling units, etc.) will be discussed in this lesson plan.
O. Inform students that simulator demon strations will show plant responses.
P. Students will refer to the Annunciator Response (AR-M) and the Emergency
Operating Instructions (EOIs) for response to alarms and accidents.
(
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
34. 026 K4.01 001
Which ONE (1) of the following states the interlocks that must be satisfied before
FCV-72-20 (Containment Spray Suction from Containment Sump) ("B" train) can be
opened?
A. FCV-63-73 (RHR Suction from Containment Sump) open, and FCV-72-21
(Containment Spray Suction from RWST) closed.
B. FCV-72-41 (RHR Discharge to RHR Spray) closed, and Safety Injection pump
miniflow valves 63-3 or 63-4 and 63-175 closed.
Cy FCV-72-21 (Containment Spray Suction from RWST) closed, and FCV-74-21 (RHR
Suction from RWST) closed.
D. FCV-74-21 (RHR Suction from RWST) closed, and FCV-63-73 (RHR Suction from
Containment Sump) open.
A. Incorrect. 63-73 is not required to be open, but 72-21 is required to be closed
B. Incorrect. 72-41 is not required to be closed
C. Correct. Interlock designed to ensure sump and RWST are not cross-tied
D. Incorrect. 63~73 is not required to be open
Knowledge of ess design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Source of water for ess. including
( recirculation phase after LO CA.
Question No. 15
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R04.2
Technical Reference: 0-45N779-25
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.CS, Obj 12.f
Question Source: Bank
Question History: SQN CSS B.12.F-2
Question Cognitive Levei: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .7
Comments:
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:30 PM 64
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: BANK Source (fB ank: SEQUOYAH BANK
Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:
( Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12,20072:35:30 PM 65
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
44. 039 A3.02 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
- A plant cooldown is in progress.
RCS pressure is 1850 psig.
RCS temperature is 505°F.
- All required actions have been taken for the cooldown in accordance with plant
procedures.
An event occurs:
RCS pressure is 1700 psig and lowering at 10 psi per second .
- SG pressu res are 700 psig and lowering at 25 psi per second .
Containment pressure is 1.2 psig and rising .
Assum ing all equipment operates as designed, which ONE (1) of the following
describes the ESF actuation status?
A. Safety Injection AND Main Steam Line Isolation have occurred.
B. Safety Inject!Qn has occurred ; Main Steam Line Isolation has NOT.
C:" Main Steam Line Isolation has occurred ; Safety Injection has NOT.
(
D. NEITHER Main Steam Isolation NOR Safety Injection have occurred.
A. Incorrect. SI is blocked and has not occurred
B. Incorrect. Actuations are reversed from actual
C. Correct.
D. Incorrect. MSLI would actuate on rate. Si is blocked
Below P-11, Low Steam pressure SI is blocked. High negative rate MSLI at 100 psi per
5 seconds is reinstated. CNMT pressure is not yet high enough to cause SI
Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:30 PM 83
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MRSS. including: Isolation of the MRSS.
( Question No. 16
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: RO 3.1
Technical Reference: ESFSD
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.RPS. B.4.g & h
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.7
Comments:
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
( Cognitive Level: HI GH ER D ifficu lty:
Job Position : RO Pla nt: SEQUOY AH
Dale: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC? :
(
Monday, March 12.20072:35:30 PM 84
OPT200.RPS
Rev. 2
Page 3 of 281
(" I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINI NG
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAIN ING
III. TITLE: REACTOR PROTECTIO N & ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES
ACTUATION SYSTEMS
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 9 hour1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> lecture; 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> simulator demonstration; 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> self-
study/workshop
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of this lesson and others presented, the student should be able to
apply the knowledge to support satisfacto ry performance of the tasks associated
with the Reactor Protection & Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems in the
plant and on the simulator.
B. Enabling Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an understanding ofNUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities
associated with the Reactor Protection & Engineered Safety Features Actuation
Systems as identified in Appendix A.
I . State the purpose/functions of the Reactor Protection & Engineered Safety
( Features Actuation Systems as described in the SQN FSAR.
2. State the design basis of the Reactor Protection & Engineered Safety Features
Actuation Systems in accordance with the SQN FSAR.
3. Explain the purposelfunction of each major component in the flow path of the
Reactor Protection & Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems as
illustrated on a simplified system drawing.
4. Describe the following characteristics of each major component in the Reactor
Protecti on & Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems:
a. Location
b. Power supply (include control power as applicable)
c. Support equipment and systems
d. Norm al operating parameters
e. Compon ent operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
I. Protective features (including setpoints)
J. Failure modes
k. Unit differences
( I. Types of accidents for which the components are designed
m. Location of controls and indications in the control room and auxiliary control
room
OPT200 .RPS
Rev. 2
Page 204 of 281
(
p." La
Pra Press
M-4 SIS Block
EO-S
, IND ~ .
( X. LESSON BODY:
E. System Operations
3. Emergency Operations
Instructor note: have students explain functions of switches
Main Steamline SI Block -Ifbelow P-Il , when both trains are blocked:
Steamline Low Press SI Blocked, alarms.
Steamline pressure high negative rate main steam line isolation is enabled
Rx Trip Train A & B - Either of two switches will initiate a Reactor Trip as
indicated by:
- RPI indication of rods at the bottom.
Reactor Trip and Bypass breakers open.
Manual Reactor Trip First Out alarm.
SI Actuate Train A & B Switches - Either of two switches will initiate SI
(another on M-6) as indicated by:
Manual SI Reactor First Out alarm
SI Actuation Permissive Light lights
ESF equipment will be actuated as indicated on monitor light boxes
(
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
43 . 039 A2.04 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
Unit 2 is at 15% power.
Steam Dumps are operating in the Steam Pressure mode.
Main Steam Header pressure instrument PT1-33 fails high.
Which ONE (1) of the followi ng describes the effect on the unit, and the action
required?
A . Steam Dumps are armed. No other effect until a modulation signal is received .
Place the Steam Dump mode selector in OFF/RESET and the controller to
MANUAL.
B. Steam Dumps receive a full open modulation signal. They will not operate because
they are not armed. Place the Steam Dump mode selector in OFF/RESET and the
controller to MANUAL.
C. Steam Dumps will fail closed due to the pressure input. RCS temperature will rise.
Place the steam dump controlle r in MANUAL and throttle open the steam dumps.
D~ Steam Dumps will fail open due to the pressure input. RCS temperature will drop.
Place the steam dump controller in MANUAL and throttle close the steam dumps.
( A. Incorrect. Dumps will open because they are already armed due to being in steam
pre sure mode. Credible because steam dump has arming and modulation signals in
Tave mode that could require this action
B. Incorrect. Dumps will open because they are armed from being in steam pressure
mode. Credible because steam dump has arming and modulation signals in Tave mode
that could require this action
C. Incorrect. Failure of dumps is opposite from what will actually occur
D. Correct.
/n Steam Pressure mode, the steam dumps have an arming signal already in.
Dumps must be placed in manual when the presure input fails, so they can be operated
Monday, March 12,20072:35:30 PM 81
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Abilityto (a) predict the impactsof the following mel-fu nctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) basedon predictions, use
procedures to correct. control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Malfunctioning steam dump.
(
Question No. 17
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating : RO 3.4
Technical Reference: OPT200.SDS
Proposed references to be provided to app licants during examination : None
Leaming Objective: OPT200.SDCS Objective 5.d
Question Source: New
Q uestion Histo ry :
Question Cognitive Level : Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 4 1.4
Comments:
( Sourc e: NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level : HIGH ER Di fficulty:
Job Position : RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC ?: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:30 PM 82
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
53. 059 Al. 07 00 1
(" Given the following plant conditions:
Unit is at 100% rated thermal power
Feedwater Master Controller and Feedwater Pump Speed Controllers are in
AUTOMATIC.
Main Feedwater Regula ting Valves are in AUTOMATIC.
All four main feedwater flows start increasing with level in all four steam
generators trending upwards .
For information:
PT-1-33 is a Main steam header pressure transmitter
PT-3-1 is a Main feedwater header pressure transmitter
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the two instrument failures that could have
caused this transient?
A . PT-1-33 has failed LOW or PT-3-1 has failed LOW.
B~ PT-1-33 has failed HIGH or PT-3-1 has failed LOW .
C. PT-1-33 has failed LOW or PT-3-1 has failed HIGH .
( D. PT-1-33 has failed HIGH or PT-3-1 has failed HIGH.
A. PT-1-33 failing low would cause a high delta-P and the MFPT control
system would reduce MFPT speed causing low feed flow and
decreasing SG levels . The results of PT-3-1 failing low are described
in "a" below.
a. Correct. Feedwater header pressure is normally higher than steam
header pressure by a programmed value of 80 psid at 0% totalized
steam flow and 195 psid at 100% totalized steam flow. PT-1-33 failing
high OR PT-3-1 failing low would indicate a lower than normal delta-P
between steam header pressure and FW header pressure . This
would cause the MFPT control system to increase speed in an attempt
to restore programmed delta-P. This increased delta-P would
increase FW flow and cause SG level to trend upward. The FW
regulating valves would be closing in an attemp t to reduce SG level
back to programmed value.
C. The results of PT-1 -33 failing high are described in "a" above. PT-3-1
failing high would cause a high delta-P and the MFPT control system
would reduce MFPT speed causing low feed flow and decreasing SG
levels.
D. PT-1-33 failing low would cause a high delta-P and the MFPT control system
would reduce MFPT speed causing low feed flow and decreasing SG levels.
PT-3-1 failing high would cause a high delta-P and the MFPT control system
would reduce MFPT speed causing low feed flow and decreasing SG levels.
Monday, March 12. 20072:35:32 PM 101
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to predict and/or monitorchanges in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MFW
controls ind uding: Feed Pump speed. including normalcontrol speed for leS .
(
Question No. 18
T ier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R02.5
Technical Reference: 47W611 -3-2
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.MFW, 8.5
Question Source: Bank
Question History: SQN FW-B.5-1
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.7,41 .4
Comments:
( Source: BANK Source IfBanle SEQUOY AH BANK
Cognitive Level; HIGHER Diffi culty;
Job Position; RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date; 4/2007 Last 2 NRC? ; NO
Monday , March 12, 200 72;35 ;32 PM 102
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
56 . 061 K6.02 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
Unit 2 is in Mode 1.
- The TDAFW Pump is tagged out of service.
- A Loss of Feedwate r causes a reactor trip.
- Coincident with the trip, Shutdown Board 2B-B de-energizes on fault.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the Auxiliary Feedwater alignment?
A':I 1 and 2 SGs being fed at 220 GPM each
B. 1 and 2 SGs being fed at 440 GPM each
C. ALL SGs being fed at 110 GPM each
D. ALL SGs being fed at 220 GPM each
A. Correct. Loss of 2B-B SO Board, Only A MOAFW Pump is available. Capacity is
440 GPM, and it is aligned to automatically feed 1 and 2 SGs. Oistractors are for
TOAFW capacitY...and flow alignments
B. Incorrect. Capacity of TOAFW aligned to 2 SGs
C. Incorrect. MOAFW would be aligned to 2 SGs, not all 4 SGs
c O. Incorrect. This would be the alignemnt if the TOAFW Pump was the only operating
pump
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:32 PM 107
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components: Pumps
( Question No. 19
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R02.6
Technical Reference: . AFWSD
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Object ive: OPT200.AFW, B.5.d
Question Source: Bank
Question History: WTSI Bank
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.7,41.8
Comments :
( Source: BANK
Cognitive Level: HIGHER
Source If Bank:
Difficulty:
WTSI
Job Position: RO Plant : SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?:
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:32 PM 108
OPT200.AFW
Rev. 3
Page 4 of 82
('
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):
B. Learning Objectives (Cont' d):
5. Describe the operation of the AFW system :
a. Precautions and limitation s
b. Major steps performed while placing the AFW system in service
c. Alarms and alarm response
d. How a component failure will affect system operati on
e. How a support system failure will affect AFW system operation
f. How a instrument failure will affect system operation
6. Describe the administrative controls and limits for the AFW system :
a. State Tech Specs/TRM LCOs that govern the AFW
b. State the :o;l hour action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditions/status of the AFW system components and the
appropriate sections of the Tech Spec, determine if operability requirements
are met and what actions are required
7. Discuss related Industry Events
( VI. TRAINING AIDS:
A. Classroom Computer and Local Area Network (LAN) Access
B. Computer projector
C. Simulator (if available)
OPT200 .AFW
Rev. 3
Page 29 of 82
(
- G ~ Auxiliary Feedwater Components
o Motor Driven AFW Pumps
. * Motor-driven pumps' capacity is 440 gpm
each at 2,900 ft. TDH.
- The MDAFWPs are powered from 6,900-
volt shutdown boards
SGs .
- A-A supplies 1 and 2 S/Gs; B-B supplies 3 and 4
S/Gs
E03
( x. LESSON BODY:
- Motor-driven pumps ' capacity is 440 gpm each at 2,900 ft. TDH.
- A-A supplies 1 and 2 S/Gs ; B-B supplies 3 and 4 S/Gs
- Pump-motor cooling is provided by area coolerlfa ns The cooler/fan operates
through local 'START'-'AUTO'-'STOP' switch controls.
- If selected to 'AUTO' , the unit starts at a predetermined area temperature.
- The following are fan and ERCW valve designations for the coole rs.
- Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) actuation will automatically start all 4 cooler/fans
regardless of the operating condition of either unit.
l
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
58. 062 G2.1.14 001
( Which ONE (1) of the following describes a requirement or cond ition for making a
Public Address (PA) announcement?
A. Planned starting of major electrical equipment; announcement required to be made
at least 3 times.
B:' Planned starting of major electrical equipment; no restriction on minimum number of
announcements.
C. Announcement of abnormal or emergency conditions; announcement required to
be made at least 3 times .
D. Announcement of abnormal or emergency conditions ; no restriction on minimum
number of announcements.
A. Incorrect. Not required 3 times
B. Correct. Planned starting or stopping of major equipment requires a PA
announcement, and emergency conditions require announcement to be repeated twice.
C. Incorrect. Announcements are required, but requirement is only twice
D. Incorrect. Restriction is make announcement twice
( Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of system status criteria which require the notification of plant personnel.
Question No. 20
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R02 .5
Technical Reference: OPDP-1
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271C209,8.6
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.1 0
Comments:
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level : LOW ER D ifficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date : 412007 Last 2 NRC ?: NO
Monday, March 12,20072:35:32 PM 111
OPL271C209
Revision 10
Page 3 of 53
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE: LICENSED TRAINING & NON LICENSED
III. LESSON TITLE: CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (OPDP-1, SPP-10.0, ODM)
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES :
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of this lesson, the student will have reviewed the "Conduct of
Operations" procedures and will demonstrate an understanding of these
procedures and other material presented by passing a written examination as
outlined by program procedure.
B. Enabling Objectives:
Each student will understand the following
1. Operations department specific duties, organization and administration
2. Operating policies including manipulation of controls that directly affect
reactor reactivity or power level.
3. The shift routines (rounds) and operating practices.
4. Control room activities including conduct, access, and control room
surveillance areas.
5. The requirements of pre-evolution briefings.
6. The requirements for proper communications including repeat back
communications utilizing radios, telephones, and the PA system.
7. Proper Operations notifications requirements.
8. The control of equipment and system status control requirements including
equipment status change authorization (maintenance, testing, return to
operability, etc.); equipment and system alignments and Technical
Specification compliance (Normal and 50.54X).
9. Log keeping requirements to include which records are QA and which are
not QA records.
10. The shift turnover requirements and processes.
( 11. Operations responsibilities relative to plant chemistry including
communications with plant chemistry personnel.
OPL271C209
Revision 10
Page 4 of 53
(' 12. The required reviews for Operations. Example: Procedure changes;
equipment design changes; license changes; industry experience
information.
13. Operating orders such as standing orders and shift orders.
14. Plant operating procedures relative to the conventions of use and procedure
compliance.
15. Requirements for Surveillance Testing by Operations department.
16. The requirements for operator aids including definitions, examples of
operator aids, posting requirements, responsibilities, documenting and
processing, and reviews.
17. The requirements for equipment labeling and method for requesting labels
be installed.
18. The requirements for Operations teamwork including responsibilities, on-
shift team members, response to events, training, and feedback.
19. _ The requirements for Self-Checking.
20. The requirements for active and inactive licenses (SRO and RO) including
( how to activate an inactive license to an active license.
21. The requirements for Operations key control.
22. Requirements for record keeping including ability to distinguishing between
23. The actions to be taken when an instrument failure is suspected.
24. The differences between the expected response to alarms during steady
state conditions and during transients.
25. The conditions resulting in an operator workaround.
TVAN Standard Conduct of Operations OPDP*1
( Department Rev. 0007
" Procedure Paqe 52 of 98
Appendix I
(Page 3 of 5)
Communications
b. Use equipment noun names and/or identification (10) numbers to describe a
componen t.
c. The use of sign language is undesired but maybe used when verbal
communications is not practical.
d. Take time when reporting abnormal conditions. Speak deliberately, distinctly
and calmly. Identify yourself and watch station or your location. Describe the
nature and severity of the problem. State the location of the problem if
appropriate. Keep the communication line open if possible or until directed
otherwise.
e. The completion of directed actions should be reported to the governing station,
normally the control room.
f. Require other plant personnel (including contractors) conducting operational
communication to do so in accordance with this procedure.
( g. If there is any doubt concerning any portion of the communication or task
assigned , resolve it before taking any action.
h. When making announcements for drills or exercises begin and end the
announ cement with "This is a Drill."
4. Emergency Communications Systems
When personnel are working in areas where the public address (PA) system or emergency
signals cannot be heard, alternate methods for alerting these persons should be devised .
Flashing lights, personal pagers that vibrate and can be felt, and persons dedicated to
notifications are examples of alternate methods.
5. PA System
a. Use of the plant PA system shall be limited to ensure it retains its effectiveness
in contacting plant personne l. Excessive use of the PA system should be
avoided . Plant telephones and other point-to-point communications channels
should be used in lieu of the PA system whenever practical.
b. The announcement of planned starting or stopping large equipment should be
made to alert personnel working in that area.
c. The plant PA system may be used in abnormal or emergency conditions . to
announce change of plant status , or give notification of major plant events either
( in progress or anticipated.
TVAN Standard Conduct of Operations OPDP-1
( Department Rev. 0007
Procedure Pace 53 of 98
Appendix I
(Page 4 of 5)
Communications
d. When using the plant PA system:
(1 ) Speak slowly and deliberately in a normal tone of voice.
(2) When announcements of abnormal or emergency conditions are made.
they shall be made at least twice.
(3) When making announcements for drills or exercises begin and end the
announcement with "This is a Drill."
6. Plant Telephones
When using Plant telephones:
a. Identify yourself and watch station.
b. When trying to make contact with the main Control Room , if the message is of a
( routine nature. the sender should hang up when the main Control Room fails to
answer after the fifth ring to avoid unnecessary Control Room noise. The
phone shall be allowed to ring until answered if the information is important to
Operations.
c. During times when the DO NOT DISTRUB (DND) function has been used by
MCR personnel. follow the directions on the recording as appropriate.
d. When making announcements for drills or exercises begin and end the
announcement with "This is a Drill."
7. Radio/phone Communication
Radio/phone usage shall not be allowed in areas where electronic interference with
plant equipment may result.
a. When making announcements for drills or exercises, begin and end the
announcement with "This is a Drill."
b. Sender should identify themselves by watch station.
c. Three way communications should be used.
d. Clear concise language should be used since radio/phone contact does not
have the advantage of face to face communication.
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
59 . 063 G2.2.22 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
- Unit 2 is ope rating steady-state at 100% power
- All systems are normally aligned
Which ONE (1) of the following would place the unit in the action of Tech Spec LCO
A. Battery Bank V is aligned to replace Vital Battery II.
By Electrical Maintenance determ ines that the terminal voltage on Vita l Battery I has
dec reased below the allowab le value for each connected cell.
C. The Spare Vital Battery Charger 1-S is aligned to 480V Shutdown Board 1B1-B
while supplying Vital Battery Board II.
D. The Spare Vital Battery Charger 2-S is aligned to 480V Shutdown Board 2A2-A
while supply ing Vital Battery Board III.
A. Incorrect. Battery Bank V may be substituted for any other bank
B. Correct. Requirement is > 129V.
( C. Incorrect. This is an acceptable TS configuration, does not violate any TS
requirements for alignmen t
D. Incorrect. This is an acceptable TS configuration, does not violate any TS
requirements for alignment
(
Monday. March 12. 2007 2:35:32 PM 112
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Equipment Control Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits..
( Question No. 21
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: RO 3.4
Technical Reference: TS 3.8.2.3
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.DC. B.6
Question Source: Bank
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 43.2
Comments:
( Source: BANK Source If Bank: SQNBANK
Cognitive Level: LOW ER Difficulty:
Job Pos ition: RO Plant: SEQUO YAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC ?: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:32 PM 113
OPT200.DC
Rev. 1
c
Page 3 of 186
I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAINING
III. TITLE: DC SYSTEMS
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 5 \12 hour lecture; 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> simulator demonstration; 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />
self-study/workshop
V. TRAI NING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of this lesson and others presented, the student should be able to
apply the knowledge to support satisfactory performance of the tasks associated
with the DC Electrical Syst ems in the plant and on the simulator.
B. Enabling Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an understanding ofNUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities
associated with the DC Electrical Systems as identified in Appe ndix A.
1. State the purpose/functions of the DC Electrical Systems as described in the
-8QNFSAR..
2. State the design basis of the DC Electrical Systems in accordance with the SQN
( FSAR.
3. Explain the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the
DC Electrical Systems as illustrated on a simplified system drawing.
4. Describe the following characteristics of each major component in the DC
Electrical Systems:
a. Location
b. Power supply (include control power as applicable)
c. Support equipment and systems
d. Normal operating parameters
e. Component operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
i. Protective features (including setpoints)
j. Failure modes
k. Unit differences
1. Types of accidents for which the components are designed
m. Location of controls and indications in the control room and auxiliary control
room
OPT200.DC
Rev. 1
Page 4 of 186
( V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):
B. Enabling Objectives (Cont'd):
5. Describe the operation of the DC Electrical Systems:
a. Precautions and limitations
b. Major steps performed while placing the system in service
c. Alarms and alarm response
d. How a component failure will affect system operation
e. How a support system failure will affect system operation
f. How a instrument failure will affect system operation
6. Describe the administrative control s and limits for the DC Electrical Systems:
a. State Tech SpecsffRM LCOs that govern the system
b. State the :sl hour action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditions/status of the system components and the appropriate
sections of the Tech Spec, determine if operability requirements are met and
what actions are required
7. -Discuss related Industry Events
VI. TRAINING AIDS:
( A. Classroom Computer and Local Area Network (LAN) Access
B. Computer projector
C. Simulator (if available)
ELECTRICAL POWE R SYSTEMS
( DC DISTRIBUTI ON - OPERATING
L1MITl NG CO NDITION FOR OPERATION
3.8.2.3 The following D.C. vital battery channels shall be energized and OPERABLE:
CHANNEL I Consisting of 125 - volt D.C. board No. I, 125 - volt D.C.
battery bank No. I" and a full capacity charger.
CHANNEL II Consisting of 125 - volt D.C. board No. II, 125 - volt D.C.
battery bank No. 11", and a full capacity charger.
CHANNEL III Consisting of 125 - volt D.C. board No. III, 125 - volt D.C.
battery bank No. III", and a full capa city cha rger.
CHANNEL IV Consisting of 125 - volt D.C. board No. IV, 125 - volt D.C.
battery bank No. IV", and a full capac ity charger.
APPLICABI LITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
a. ' _Wi th one 125-volt D,C. board inoperable. restore the inoperable board to OPERABLE status
Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD
SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
( b. With one 125-volt D.C. battery bank and/or its cha rger inoperable, restore the inoperable
battery bank and/or charger to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT
STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDO WN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
"D .C. Batte ry Bank V may be substituted for any othe r Battery Bank as needed .
January 24, 1985
SEQU OYAH - UNIT 1 3/48-11 Amendment No. 37
ELECTRICAL POWE R SYSTEMS
c .SURVEILLANCE REQUIR EMENTS
4.8.2.3.1 Each D.C. bus train shall be detenn ined OPERABLE and energized with tie breakers open
between redunda nt busses at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment, indicated
power availability from the charger and battery, and voltage on the bus of greater than or equal to
125 volts.
4.8.2.3.2' Each 125-volt battery bank and charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a. At least once per 7 days by:
1. Verifying that the parameters in Table 4.8-2 meet the Category A limits, and
2. V erifying total battery tenninal voltage is greater than or equa l to 129-volts on float
charge .
b. At least once per 92 days and within 7 days after a battery discharge (battery tenninal
voltage below 110-volts), or battery overcharge (battery tenninal voltage above 150-
vo lts), by:
1. V erifying that the'parameters in Table 4.8-2 meet the Category B limits,
2. Veri fying there is no visible corrosion at either terminais or connectors, or the
connection resistance of these items is less than 150 x 10" ohms, and
3. Veri fying that the average electrolyte temperature of 6 connected cells is above 60"F.
( c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that
1. The cells, cell plates and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage
or abnormal deterioration,
2. The cell-to-cell and tenninal connections are clean, tight and coated with anti-
corros ion material,
3. The resistance of each cell-to-terminal connection is less than or equal to 150 x 10"
ohms, and
4. The battery charger will supply at least 150 amperes at 125 volts for at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
'This surveillance includes Battery Bank V, but not charger V.
October 4, 1995
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/48-12 Amendment No. 37, 213
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
( SURVEILLA NCE REQU IREMENTS (Continued)
d. At least once per 18 months by verifying that the battery capacity is adequa te to supply and
maintain in OPERABLE status all of the actual or simulated emergency loads for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />
when the battery is subjected to a battery service test.
e. At least once per 60 months by verifying that the battery capacity is at least 82% of the
manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test. Once per 60 month
interval , this performance discharge test may be performed in lieu of the battery service test.
f. Annual performance discharge tests of battery capacity shall be given to any battery that
shows signs of degradation or has reached 85% of the service life expected for the
application. Degradation is indicated when the battery capacity drops more than 10% of
rated capacity from its average on previous performance tests, or is below 90% of the
manufacturer's ratin9.
(
(
October 4, 1995
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/48-13 Amendment No. 29, 213
TABLE 4.8 2
(
BATIERY SURVEILLANCE: REQUIREMENTS
CATEGOR Y A(1) CATEGORY B(2)
Limits for each Limits for each
Parameter Allowable(3) value for
des ignated pilot cell connected cell
each connected cell
>Minimum level >Minimum level Above top of plates, and
Electrolyte Level
indication mark. indication mark. and not overtlowing
and s 1/4' above s 1/4" above maximum
maximum level level indication mark
indication mark
" 2.13 volts " 2.13 volts Ie ) > 2.07 volts
Float Voltage
Not more than .020
below the average of all
" 1.195 connected cells
Specific Gravity\a) Average of all connected Average of all connected
" 1.200(b)
cells > 1.205 cells> 1.195("
( (a)
(b)
Corrected for elect rolyte temperature and level.
Or battery charging current is less than 2 amps.
(c) Corrected for average electrolyte temperature.
(1) For any Category A parameter(s) outside the limit(s) shown. the battery may be considered
OPERABLE provided that within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> all the Category B measurements are taken and found to
be within their allowable values, and provided all parameter(s) are restored to within limits within the
next 6 days.
(2) For any Category B parameter(s) outside the limit(s) shown, the battery may be considered
OPERABLE provided that they are within their allowable values and provided the parameter(s) are
restored to within limits within 7 days.
(3) Any Category B parameter not within its allowable value indicates an inoperable battery.
March 25, 1982
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/48-13a Amendment No, 12
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
1. 064 K4 .01 001
c Diesel Generator 1A-A has been started by the manual emergency start switch on the
M-1 panel.
Which ONE (1) of the follow ing conditions I actions will stop Diesel Generato r 1A-A?
A. Low lube oil pressure
B. High jacket water temperature
C. Actuation of the generator reverse power relay
D~ Actuation of the generator differential overcurrent relay
a. Incorrect because only the differential and overspeed protection is available
following manual emergency start from M-1 panels. Low lube Oil trip is disabled
b. Incorrect because only the differential and overspeed protection is available
following manual emergency start from M-1 panels. High Jacket Water temp trip
is disabled
c. Incorrect because only the differential and overspeed protection is available
following manual emergency start from M-1 panels. Reverse power trip is
( disabled
d. Correct because only the differential and overspeed protection is available
following manual emergen cy start from M-1 panels .
(,
Monday, March 12,2007 3:21:21 PM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of EDfG system design feature(s) andlor inter-lock(s) which provide for the following: Trips whil e loading the ED/G
(frequency, voltage. speed).
(
Question No. 22
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.8
Technical Reference . ' OPT200 .DG
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Leaming Objective: OPL200.DG Obj 4.i
Question Source: Bank
Question History: SQN Bank
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.7
Comments:
( Source: BANK Source (f Bank: SQN BANK
Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 412007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday. March 12. 2007 3:21:21 PM 2
OPTZOO.DG
Rev. 1
c I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
Page 3 of 83
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAINING
III. TITLE: DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> classroom, 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> simulator demonstration; 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> self-
study/workshop
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of this lesson and others presented, the student should be able to apply
the knowledge to support satisfactory performance of the tasks associated with the Diesel
Generator system in the plant and on the simulator.
B. Enabling Objectives:
O. Demon strate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities associated
with the Diesel Generator System that are rated > 2.5 during Initial License training for
the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A.
1. State the purpose/functions of the Diesel Generator System as described in the SQN
FSAR.
( 2. State the design basis of the Diesel Generator System in accordance with the SQN
FSAR .
3. Explain the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the Diesel
Generator System.
4. Describe the following items for each major component in the Diesel Generator
System:
a. Location
b. Power supply (include control power as applicable)
c. Support equipment and systems
d. Normal operating parameters
e. Component operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
1. Protecti ve features (including setpoints)
j . Failure modes
k. Unit differences
I. Types of accidents for which the Diesel Generator System components are designed
m. Location of controls and indications associated with the Diesel Generator System in
the control room and auxiliary control room
OPT200.DG
Rev. 1
Page 4 of 83
( V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):
B. Enabling Objectives (Cont 'd):
5. Describe the operation of the Diesel Generator (DG) system as it relates to the
following:
a. Precautions and limitations
b. Major steps performed wh ile placing the DG system in service
c. Alarms and alarm response
d. How a component failure will affect system operation
e. Howa support system failure will affect DG system operation
f. How an instrument failure will affect system operation
6. Describe the administrative controls and limits for the DG system:
a. State Tech SpecslTRM LCOs that govern the DG s
b. State the ::;l hour action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditions/status of the DG system components and the appropriate
- sections of the Tech Spec, determine if operability requirements are met and
what actions are required
( 7. Discuss related Industry Events:
a. OE20736 - Missed Acceptance Criteria
VI. TRAINING AIDS:
A. Classroom Computer and Local Area Network (LAN) Access
B. Computer projector
OPT200.DG
Rev. I
Page 57 of 83
( ObJ.5
DIG Protection
~ Engine Protection
- Low lube oil pressure
- High jacket water temperature
_____* Overs peed
- High crankcase pressure
~ Generator Protection
- Phase imba lance relay
- Reverse power relay
- Generator differential relay
- Loss of field relay
- Voltage Restraint overcurrent
(
x. LESSON BODY:
DIG Protection:
o Only the two relays (red arrows) marked in the slide above will be in service on an
emergency start.
o Parallel Operation: Ref:I ,2-45N767-4 & 5
o The 62X relay (located on DIG relay panel) is energized when either the normal or the
alternate feeder breaker to the shutdown board is closed (1 718 or 1716) and the DIG
breaker is closed (1 912).
o When 62X is energized, it opens a contact in series with 86LOR so it cannot be energized
from emergency start while DIG is in parallel to unit or offsite power.
o It also puts droop in the speed control of electric governor. (Under emergency start
conditions the electric governor operates in an isochronous mode.)
(
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
c 66. 073 K5 .01 001
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the type of radiation detector used by the
Condenser Vacuum Exhaust Radiation Monitor 1-RM-90-119, and the parameters that
affect the indication?
A. Scintillation detector; level of activity ONLY.
By Scintillation detector; level of activity AND flow rate of the sampled process.
C. Geiger-Mueller detector; level of activity ONLY.
D. Geiger-Mueller detector; level of activity AND flow rate of the sampled process.
A. Incorrect. Correct detector; incorrect in that it does not contain all of the variables.
flow rate is a concern.
B. Correct.
C. Incorrect. Wrong detector type, and also omits flow rate
D. Incorrect. Wrong detector type. Used for ARMs
Radiation monitor indication is a function of activity level and of flow past the detector.
If fiow is isoleied, detector indication will be low.
Area Rad monitors use G-M detectors
( Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the PRM system: Radiation theory, including
sources , types. units. and effects.
Question No. 23
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R02.5
Technical Reference: OPT200.RM, Slide 69 /70
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.RM,6.4
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.11
Comments:
c.
Monday, March 12,20072:35:33 PM 126
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007* NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
( Cogn itive Level: LOWER
Job Position: RO
Difficulty:
Plant: SEQUOY AH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
(,
Monday. March 12.2007 2:35:33 PM 127
OPT200.RM
Rev. 2
Page 3 of 166
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. CO URSE: SYSTEMS TRAINING
III. T ITL E: RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> lecture; I hour simulator demonstration; 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> self-
study/workshop
V. TRAINI NG OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon compl etion of this lesson and others presented, the student should be able to
apply the knowledge to support satisfactory performance of the tasks associated
with the Radiation Monitoring System in the plant and on the simulator.
B. Enabling Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities
associated with the Radiation Monitoring System as identified in Appendix A.
1. State the purpose/functions of the Radiation Monitoring System as described
2. State the design basis ofthe Radiation Monitoring System in accordance with
3. Explain the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the
Radiation Monitoring System as illustrated on a simplified system drawing.
4. Describe the following characteristics of each major component in the
Radiation Monitoring System:
a. Location
b. Power supply (include control power as applicable)
c. Supp ort equipment and systems
d. Norm al operating parameters
e. Component operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
i. Protective features (including setpoints)
j. Failure modes
k. Unit differences
l. Types of accidents for which the components are designed
m. Location of controls and indications in the control room and auxiliary
control room
(
OPT200.RM
Rev. 2
c V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):
Page 4 of 166
B. Enabling Objectives (Cont 'd):
5. Describe the operation ofthe Radiation Monitoring System :
a. Precautions and limitations
b. Major steps performed while placing the system in service
c. Alarms and alarm response
d. How a component failure will affect system operation
e. How a support system failure will affect system operation
f. How a instrument failure will affect system operation
6. Describe the administrative controls and limits for the Radiation Monitoring
System :
a. State Tech Specs/TRM LCOs that govern the system.
b. State the ::;1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditions/status of the Radiation Monitoring System components
and the appropriate sections of the Tech Spec, determine if operability
requirements are met and what actions are required
7. Discuss related Industry Events
( VI. TRAINING AIDS:
A. Classroom Computer and Local Area Network (LAN) Access
B, Computer projector
C. Simulator (if available)
OPT200.RM
Rev. 2
Page 69 of 166
(
Condenser Vacuum Pump Exhaust Monitors
1,2-RE-90-99 & 119, & 1,2-RE-90-255 & 256
- Continuously monitors mechanical vacuum
pump air exhaust for an indication of a
primary-to-secondary leak.
- Two low range monitors, 1,2-RE-90-99 &
119, & two accident monitors RE-90-255 &
256
- RE-90-99/119 alarm on detectable radiation
in the condenser exhaust - first indication of a
primary to secondary leak.
EO-4
( X. LESSON BODY
D. Major Components
4. Proces s and Effluent Gas Monitors
Condenser Vacuum Pump Exhaust Monitors 1, Z-RE-90-119, 1,Z-RE-90-99, 1,Z-
R E-90-Z55, 1,Z-RE-90-Z56
- Continuously monitor the mechanical vacuum pump air exhaust for an indication
of a primary-to-secondary leak.
Two low range monitors, 1,2-RE-90-99 and 1,2-RE-90-ll9, and two accident
monitors RE-90-255 & 256 (mid & high range) - overlapping ranges
RE-90-99 or 119 continu ously samples the condenser vacuum pump exhau st to
monitor noble gas concentrations for indications of primary to secondary leakage
and for evaluations of radioactivity released to the environment.
- Cover the same range of concentrations - both monitors should not be in
service at the same time due to flow limitations on the condenser vacuum
pump exhaust.
- alarm on any detectable reading of radiati on in the condenser exhaust -
first indication of a primary to secondary leak.
- RE-9 0-255 & 256 , provides detection of noble gases over the entire range of
concentrations from normal operations to accident conditi ons.
- 99 & 119 located on el. 732 of the turbine bldg.
- Power Supply:- 480 V C&A Vent Board
- Instrumentation : Radiation process & area monitor power dist panel
(
OPT200.RM
Rev. 2
Page 70 of 166
('"
Condenser Vacuum Pump Exhaust Monitors 1,2-
RE-90-99 & 119, & 1,2-RE-90-255 & 256
- RE-90-255 & 256, provides detection of noble
gases over the entire range of concentrations
from normal operations to accident
conditions.
- RE-90-99/119 utilizes a beta scintillation
detector
- RE-90-255 utilizes a G-M tube 10-1 - 10 4
mR/hr.
- RE-90-256 utilizes an ion chamber 10 3 - 10 7
mRlhr.
'----~ EO-4
c X. LESSON BODY
D. Major Components
4. Process and Effluent Gas Monitors
Condenser Va cu um Pum p Exhaust Monito rs 1, 2-RE-9 0-119, 1,2-RE-90-99, 1,2-
RE-90-255, 1,2-RE-90-256 - Cout'd
RE-90-99 & 119 Off-line gas type - 255 & 256 detect dose rates in the vicinity of
the condenser vacuum pump exhaust duct
RE -90-99 & 119 utilizes a single beta scintillation detector
- RE-90-255 utilized a G-M tube - range 10-1 - 104 mRlhr.
RE -90-256 utilizes an ion chamber - range 103 - 10' mRIhr.
Portable samplers can be utilized for laboratory analyses of particulate and iodine
radioactivity as required.
The setpoint for the low range monitor channels 99 & 119, is established in
accordance with the ODCM methodology.
(,
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
65. 073 A 2.0 1 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions :
- Unit 1 is at 100% RTP.
- Alarm "1-RA-120B/121B STM GEN BLDN L1Q SAMP MON INSTR MALFUNC"
annunciates.
Which ONE (1) of the follow ing describes the cause of the alarm and the mitigating
act ions that the cre'w should implement?
Cause Mitigating Action
A. Loss of power to the Manually terminate S /G blowdown .
radiation monitor
B:-' Loss of power to the Verify automatic termination of
radiat ion monitor S/G blowdown.
C. High flow through the radiation Verify automatic termination of
monitor S /G blowdown .
D. High flow through the Manually terminate S/G blowdown .
radiation monitor
( A. Incorrect. S/G blowdown should automatically isolate . If it fails to isolate the
operator would manually isolate .
B. Correct. High radiation or instrument malfunction would auto isolate S/G blowdown.
C. Incorrect. A low flow would cause the alarm; not high flow.
D. Incorrect. A low flow would cause the alarm; not high flow. SIG blowdown should
automatically isolate. If it fails to isolate the operator would manually isolate.
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:33 PM 124
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those
predictions. use procedures to correct. control. or mitigate theconsequencesof those malfunctionsor operations: Erratic or failed
( powersupply.
Question No. 24
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: RO 2.5
Te chnical Reference : O-AR-M12A
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during exam ination: None
Learn ing Objective : OPT200.RM , 8 .5
Questi on Sourc e: Bank
Question History: SQN Bank
Q uestion Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.11
Comments:
( Source: BANK Source If Bank: SQ N BANK
Cognitive Le vel: LOWER Difficu lty:
Job Position : RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NR C? : NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:33 PM 125
OPT200.RM
Rev. 2
Page 3 of 166
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAINING
Ill. TITLE: RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> lecture; I hour simulator demonstration; 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> self-
study/workshop
V. TRAINI NG OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of this lesson and others presented, the student should be able to
apply the knowledge to support satisfactory performance of the tasks associated
with the Radiation Monitoring System in the plant and on the simulator.
B. Enabling Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an understanding ofNUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities
associated with the Radiation Monitoring System as identified in Appendix A.
I. State the purpose/functions of the Radiation Monitoring System as described
2. State the design basis of the Radiation Monitoring System in accordance with
3. Explain the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the
Radiation Monitoring System as illustrated on a simplified system drawing .
4. Describe the following characteristics of each major component in the
Radiation Monitoring System:
a. Location
b. Power supply (include control power as applicable)
c. Support equipment and systems
d. Normal operating parameters
e. Component operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
I. Protective features (including setpoints)
j. Failure modes
k. Unit differences
I. Types of accidents for which the components are designed
m. Location of controls and indications in the control room and auxiliary
control room
(
OPT200.RM
Rev. 2
Page 4 of 166
(
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):
B. Enabling Objectives (Cont'd):
5. Describe the operation of the Radiation Monitoring System:
a. Precautions and limitations
b. Major steps performed while placing the system in service
c. Alarms and alarm response
d. How a component failure will affect system operation
e. How a support system failure will affect system operation
f. How a instrument failure will affect system operation
6. Describe the administrative controls and limits for the Radiation Monitoring
System:
a. State Tech Specs/TRM LCOs that govern the system.
b. State the ::;1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditions/status ofthe Radiation Monitoring System components
and the appropriate sections of the Tech Spec, determine if operability
requirements are met and what actions are required
7. Discuss related Industry Events
( VI. TRAINING AIDS:
A. Classroom Computer and Local Area Network (LAN) Access
B. Computer projector
C. Simulator (if available)
13 (B-6)
( Source Setpoint
1-RA-120B/121 B
SER 723 (Unit 1 annunciator STM GEN BLDN
system)
1-RM-90-120 Loss of Power on either man. L1Q SAMP MON
1-RM-90-121 FS-90-120 1 gpm decreasing INSTR MALFUNC
FS-90-121 1 gpm decreasing
Probable 1. Loss of power to monitor
Causes 2. Low flow through monitor
3. Instrument down scale failure or loss of signal.
4. Sample pump failure or breaker tripped
5. OPERATE/CALIBRATE switch set to CALIBRATE.
6. Adj ustments to either Units blowdown flow .
Corrective
Actions [1] DISPATCH operator to elevation 685 in Turbine Building to check
rad monitor for the following:
[a] Check for proper valve aiignment.
[b] Flow alarm - Make adjustments to position of FCV-15-43
and/or FCV-15-44. REFER to 1-8 0 -15-1.
( [c] Pump failure- Restart pump if pump was in service.
[2] IF releasing 8/G blowdown to the river and in-service
1-RM-90-120 or 1-RM-90-121 fails, THEN
ENSURE release terminated.
[3] IF Instrument Malfunction cannot be cleared and monitor is
determined to be inoperable, THEN
PLACE standby monitor in service per 1-80-15-1 ,S/G B/owdown
in Service Via the Heat Exchangers, as soon as practical.
[4] COMPLY with ODCM, Section 1.1.1 requirements.
[5] IF system recovery is required, THEN
GO TO 1-80-15-1.
References 45B655-12A-O, 47W610-90-2
SQN O-AR-M12-A
Page 19 of 43
0, 1 Rev. 49
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
69. 076 K1.I 6 001
C Given the following plant conditions:
A Safety Injection has occured on Unit 1.
After the SI, all four 6.9 KV shutdown boards were de-energized .
All equipment responded as designed.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the operation of the ERCW pumps?
A. The pumps that were NOT running prior to the SI would be running.
B. The pumps that were running prior to the blackout will be running.
C¥' Only 4 ERCW pumps would be running.
D. All of the pumps will be running after the blackout.
A. Incorrect. Credible because the applicant may misunderstand switches in A-P
AUTO and the trip of running pumps, and believe that the standby pumps would start
B. Incorrect. Credible because the applicant may believe that the pumps stay tied to
the bus, breakers remaining shut for loss of bus voltage
C. Correct. Four-pumps would be selected for auto start, and those that are selected
will start
( D. Incorrect. Credible because the applicant may believe that loss of header presure
would result in backup pumps starting. Have to consider that the sequence for
blackout will be controlling pumps
Knowledge of the physical connections and/orcause- effect relationships between the SWS and the following systems: ESF.
Question No. 25
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.6
Technical Reference: OPT200.ERCW, Slides 21 & 22, 47W611-67-6, ERCW SO
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.ERCW, B.4.g
Question Source: Bank
Question History: SQN Bank
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .8
Comments:
Monday, March 12,20072:35:34 PM 132
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: BANK Source If Bank: SQN BANK
( Cogni tive Level: HIGH ER
Job Positi on: RO
Difficulty:
Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date : 4/200 7 Last 2 NRC?: NO
c
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:34 PM 133
OPT2 00.ERCW
Rev. 2
Page 3 of 54
(-, I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAINING
III. TITLE: ESSENTI AL RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM (ERCW)
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> lecture; I hour simulator demonstration; I hou r self-
stud y/workshop
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A . TenninalObjective:
Upon completion of this less on and others presented, the student sho uld be abl e to
appl y the knowledge to suppo rt satisfactory performance of the tasks associated with
the ERCW system in the plant and on the simulator.
B. Learning Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an understanding ofNUREG 1122 knowledge 's and abilities
associated with the Essential Raw Cooling Water System that are rated > 2.5
during Initial License Training for the appropriate licen se position as identified in
~ppendi x A.
1. State the purpose/functions of the ERCW system as describ ed in the FSAR.
( 2. State the design basis of the ERCW system in accordance with the SQN FSAR.
3. Explain the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the
ERCW system as illustrated on a simplified system drawing.
4. Describe the followin g characteristics of each major co mponent in the ERCW
system:
a. Locati on
b. Power suppl y (include control power as appl icable)
c. Supp ort equipment and systems
d. No rmal operating parameters
e. Component op eration
f. Controls
g. Interl ocks (including setp oints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
i. Protective features (including setpoints)
j. Failure mod es
k. Unit differences
I. Types of accidents for wh ich the ERCW system co mpo nents are designed
m . Location of cont rols and indications associated with the ERCW system in the
control room and auxiliary control room
OPT200.ERCW
Rev. 2
Page 4 of 54
(
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):
B. Learning Objectives (Cont'd):
5. Describe the operation of the ERCW system:
a. Precautions and limitations
b. Major steps performed while placing the ERCW system in service
c. Alarms and alarm response
d. How a component failure will affect system operation
e. How a support system failure will affect ERCW system operation
f. How a instrument failure will affect system operation
6. Describe the administrative controls and limits for the ERCW system :
a. State Tech Specs/TRM LCOs that govern the ERCW
b. State the :':1 hour action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditions/status of the ERCW system components and the
appropriate sections of the Tech Spec, determine if operability requirements
are met and what actions are required
7. Discuss related Industry Events
b. INPO-SER 96-008
VI. TRAINING AIDS:
A. Classroom Computer and Local Area Network (LAN) Access
B. Computer projector
C. Simulator (if available)
OPT200.ERCW
Rev. 2
Page 2 1 of 54
(
Pumps ERCW
Dwg - 45N765-15 & 47W 611-67-6 Dwg * 47W845
Pumps Logic - Safety Injection Signal
o Only the four ERCW pumps selected for
operation (one per pair) will start, if not
already running.
o Any pumps already running will continue
to run.
X. LESSON BODY:
( M. ERCW pumps (cointuned)
- No notes for this slide.
(
OPT200.ERCW
Rev. 2
Page 22 of 54
(
Pumps ERCW
Dwg - 45N76 5-15 & 47W611-67-6 Dwg - 47W845
Pumps Logic - Blackout Condition
o Rurining ERCW pumps will trip because of the under
voltage condition .
o ERCW pumps selected for operation will start 15
seconds after shutdown board voltage is available.
o Pumps not selected for operation but were running
beforehand , will stay off.
o If one pump of a pair is running during a blackout
condition, the other pump (even if selected) cannot be
manually or automatically started.
o This is to prevent both pumps from being fed off the
same DIG and overloading it.
x, LESSON BODY:
M. ERCW pumps (cointuned)
( * No notes for this slide.
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
71 . 078 K J.04 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
- Both units at 100% RTP.
- Aux Air Compressor "A" is running.
- Annunciator window "LS-32-63 AUX AIR COMPR A LOW OIL LVL HI AIR TEMP"
is in ala rm.
- Auxiliary Bu ilding AUO reports a red indicating light for high discharge air
temperatu re for Au x Air Compressor "An.
Which ONE (1) of the following is the correct crew response?
A. Ensure Au x Air Compressor "A" is shutdown.
B. Verify that the intake air filter to Au x Air Compressor "A" is not clogged.
C~ Verify proper coo ling valve alignment from ERCW supply header 1A to the
compressor.
D. Verify proper cooling valve alignment from ERCW supply header 1A and 1B
cross-tie to th~ compressor.
A. Incorrect. High temperature is not an automatic trip. ARP only requires this action
( for low oil level which is an automatic trip.
B. Incorrect. This is not a requirement in the ARP.
C. Correct. Cooling of the Aux air compressors is trained.
D. Incorrect. This would be correct for the A, B, C, and 0 air compressors, not the Aux
Air compressors.
Monday. March 12. 2007 2:35:34 PM 136
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the lAS and the following systems: Cooling water
to compressor.
( Question No. 26
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R02 .6
Technical Reference: 1AR-M15-B, window C-6
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.CSA, Obj 9.d
Question Source : Bank
Question History: SQN Bank
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10 .
Comments:
Source : BANK Source If Bank: SQNBANK
c Cognitive Leve l: HIGHER
Job Position:
Date:
4/2007
Difficulty:
Plant:
Last 2 NRC?:
SEQUOYAH
NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35 :34 PM 137
OPT200.CSA
Rev . 2
Page 3 of 58
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAINING
III. TITLE: CONTROL AND SERVICE AIR SYSTEM
A. TV. LENGTH OF LESSON: Initial License Training: 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> lecture; I hour simulator
demonstration; I hour self-study/workshop
V. T RAINING OBJECTI VES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of this lesson and others presented, the student should be able to apply the
know ledge to support satisfactory performance of the tasks associated with the Control and
Service Air System (CSA) in the plant and on the simulator.
B. Enabling Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an understanding ofNUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities associated the
CSA that are rated ~ 2.5 during Initial License training for the appropriate license position
as identified in Appendix A.
I. State the purpose/functions of the CSA as described in the SQN FSAR.
2. State the design basis of the CSA in accordance with the SQN FSAR.
3. Explain the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the CSA.
( 4. Describe the following items for each major component in the CSA.
a. Location
b. Power supply (include control power as applicable)
c. Support equipment and systems
d. Normal operating parameters
e. Component operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
i. Protective features (including setpoints)
j . Failure modes
k. Unit differences
I. Types of accidents for which the CSA components are designed
m. Location of controls and indications associated with the CSA in the control room and
auxi liary control room
OPT200.CSA
Rev. 2
Page 4 of 58
(
V. TRAI NING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd) :
B. Ena bling Objectives (Cont' d):
5. Describe the operation of the CSA as it relates to the following:
a. Precaution s and limitations
b. Major steps performed while placing the CSA in service
c. Alarms and alann response
d. How a component failure will affect system operat ion
e. How a support system fai lure will affect the CSA operation
f. How a instrument failure will affect system operat ion
6. Describe the admi nistrative controls and limits for the CSA :
a. State Tech SpecsrrRM LCOs that govern the CSA
b. State the ::;1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditions/status of the CSA components and the appropri ate sections of the
Tech Spec, determine if operability requirements are met and what act ions are required
7. Discuss related Industry Events:
a . - Event Title: Reactor Coolant System Sample Line Leakage Not Identifi ed on Initial
Walk Down. INPO Event Number: 390-020713 -2
(
VI. TRAINING AIDS :
A. Comp uter.
B. Comp uter Display Proj ector & Controls.
C. Local Area Network (LAN) Access .
D. Simulator (if available)
20 (C-6)
(
Source Setpoint
lS-32-63
SER695
AUX AIR COMPR A
LS-32*63 Lowlevel in oil sump lOW Oil lVl
TS-32-64 430°F HI AIR TEMP
P robable 1. Compressor oil leak.
Causes 2. Loss of cooling wate r to the compressor.
3. rO*BCTD-32-60-Al (2A1-A C & A Vent 8d C/6C) racked out.
NO TE Compressor will trip on low oil level only.
Corrective [1] DISPATCH operator to auxiliary air compressor A to determine
Actions which alarm is present.
[2] IF low oil level is the problem, THEN
ENSURE air compressor shutdown.
( [3] ENSURE proper air supply to system.
[4] VERIFY proper valve alignment.
[5] IF auxiliary air is lost, THEN
GO TO AOP-M .02, Loss of Control Air.
Re ferences 45 8655*158*0,
4786 01-32*7,
47W611*32*2
( SQN 1-AR-M15*B
Page 22 of 38
1 Rev. 25
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
73. 103 A1.0 1 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
- The plant is in Mode 5.
Containment Purge is in operation.
- The Personnel Airlock and Equipment Hatch are closed.
- The Containment Purge Exhaust Isolation valve is inadvertently closed .
NO other components reposition.
Which ONE (1) of the follow ing describes the containment parameter MOST affected
by this failure?
A. Humid ity
By Pressure
C. Radiation
D. Temperature
B. Correct.
D. Incorrect. Temperature will remain constant since the Purge system does not
provide a cooling function
( C. Incorrect. Radiation levels would only rise to cause a purge isolation, they would not
rise because of an isolation
A. Incorrect. Humidity is a function of the containment temperature and dewpoint,
which are unaffected by purge control operation.
Monday, March 12,20072:35:34 PM 140
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to predict and/or monitor changesin parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the
containment system controls including: Containmentpressure, temperature, and humidity.
(
Question No. 27
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: RO 3.7
Technical Reference : OPT200CONTPURGE . Slide 17. 47W610-30-1
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective : OPT200.CONTPURGE . B.5.d
Question Source: Bank
Question History: Harris 2005 NRC Exam
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.5
Comments:
( Source: BANK Source If Bank: HARRIS 2005 NRC
Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:
Job Position : RO Plant: SEQUO YAH
Date: 412007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:34 PM 141
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
74. 103 K3 .03 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
Unit 2 is in Mode 6.
Core off-load is in progress.
Which ONE (1) of the following situations requires immediate suspension of irradiated
fuel movement? (Consider each individually)
A. One Train of ABGTS is declared inoperable.
B. Both Lower Containment Airlock doors are ope n.
C~ Equipment Hatch is closed with 2 bolls fastened.
D. Containment Purge Supply Fan is declared inoperable
A. Incorrect. One train of ABGTS is required operable if One Airlock door will be open .
Refue ling does not ha ve to stop if ABGTS inop
B. Incorrect. Both doors may be open as long as 1 is capable of being closed.
C.Correct. Equipment door is required to be fastened by 4 bolts.
D. Incorrect. Containment Purge inop does not require stopping refueling, only concern
is containment purge radiation monitors being operable for refueling
( Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the containment system willhave on the following: Loss of containment
integ rity under refueling operations.
Question No. 28
Tier 2 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.7
Technical Reference: TS 3.9.4
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.CntmtStructure, B.6.c
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .10/43.2
Comments:
Monday, March 12, 20072;35;35 PM 142
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source : NEW Source If Bank:
( Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:
'" Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:35 PM 143
OPT2 00.CntmIStruclure
Rev. 2
Page 3 of 54
(-, I. PROGRAM : OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAINING
III. TITLE: CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> lecture; I hour simulator demonstrati on;
I hou r self-study/wo rkshop
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A . TenninalObj ective:
Upon completion of this lesson and oth ers presented, the stud ent should be able to
appl y the knowledge to support satisfactory performance of the tasks associated with
the Containm ent Structure system in the plant and on the simulator.
S. Learninll Obj ectives:
O. Demonstrate an und erstanding of NU REG 11 22 know ledge' s and abilities
associated with the Cont ainment Structure system that are rated g 2.5 during
Initial License Training for the appropri ate license position as identifi ed in
Appendix A.
1. State the purpose/functions of the Containment Structure system as describ ed in
the FSAR.
( 2. State the design basis of the Containment Structure system in accordance with the
3. Explain the purpose/function of each maj or component in the flow path of the
Co ntainme nt Structure system as illustrated on a simplified system drawing.
4. Describe the follo wing characteristic s of each major component in the
Containm ent Structure system :
a. Location
b. Pow er supply (include control pow er as appl icabl e)
c. Support equipment and systems
d . No rmal operat ing param eters
e. Compon ent operation
f. Controls
g. Interlock s (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
i. Protecti ve features (including setpoints)
j. Failure modes
k. Unit differences
I. Types of accidents for which the Containm ent Structure system compo nents are
designed
m . Location of controls and indications associated with the Containment Structure
system in the control room and auxiliary control room
OPT200.CntmtS tructure
Rev. 2
Page 4 of 54
(
V. TRAI NING OBJECTI VES (Cont'd):
B. Learn ing Objectives (Co nt'd):
5. Describe th e operation of the Containment Structure system:
a. Precautions and limitations
b. Major steps performed whil e placing the Cont ainm ent Structure system in
service
c. Alarms and alarm response
d. How a compo nent failure will affect system ope ration
e. How a support system failure will affect Containment Structure system
operation
f. How a instrument failure will affect system operation
6. Describe the administrative controls and limits for the Containment Structure
system:
a. Stat e Tec h Specs/I'Rlvl LCOs that govern the Containment Structure
b. State the $ 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> actio n limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditions/status of the Containment Structure system compo nents
and the appropriate sections of the Tech Spec, determine if operability
requirements are met and what actions are required
( 7. Discuss related Industry Events
a. SQN ABSCE rendered inoperable, LER 96-009-00
b. SQN Containment leak rate exceeded TS limit , LER 94-005 -00
c. SQN AFW vent line valves not secured closed, LER 93-028-00
d. SQN personnel airloc k outer housing leaking, LER 93-004-01
e. Browns Ferry 3 MSIV leakage exceeded the TS limit, LER 94-008-01
f. North Anna Power Sta tion 2 breached fire barrier pene trations, LER 88-007-00
VI. TRAINING AID S:
A. Classroom Computer and Local Area Network (LAN) Access
B. Com puter projector
C. Sim ulator (if available)
REFUELING OPERATIONS
(
3/4.94 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATION S
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
3.94 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following status:
a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts,*
b. A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, and both doors of both oontainment personnel
airlocks may be open -if:
1. One personnel airlock door in each airlock is capable of closure, and
2. One train of the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System is OPERABLE in acoordance
with Technical Specification 3.9.12, and
c. Each penetration' providing direct acce ss from the oontainment atmosphere to the outside
atmosphere shall be either:
1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, manual valve, or equivalent, or
2. Be capable of being closed by an OPERAB LE automatic Containment Ve ntilation isolation
valve.
APPLICABILTY:
( 3.9.4.a. Containment Building Equipment Door - During movement of recently irradiated fuel within the
containment.
3.94 .b. and c. Containment Building Airlock Doors and Penetrations - During movement of irradiated fuel
within the containment.
ACTION:
1. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied for the containment building
equipment door, immediately suspend all operation s involving movement of rece ntly irradiated
fuel in the oonlainment building. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
2. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied for containment airlock doors or
penetrations, immediately suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel in the
oontainment building. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
4.94 Each of the above required containment building penetrations shall be determined to be either in its
required oondition or capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic Containment Ventilation
isolation valve once per 7 days during movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building by:
a. Verifying the penetrations are in thei r required condition, or
b. Testing the Containment Ventilation isolation valves per the applicable portions of Specification
4.6.3.2.
- Penetration flow path(s) providing direct access from the containment atmosphere thatlransverse and
terminate in the Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure may be unisolated under
administrative controls.
October 28, 2003
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/49-4 Am endment No. 12, 209,249,260,288
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
3. 001 K2.03 DOl
( Which ONE (1) of the following is the primary source of power to the Rod Control Logic
'" Cabinets?
A:" Rectified AC from the Rod Drive MG output.
B. Rectified AC from 120 VAC Instrument Bus
C. 125 VDC stepped down from station battery boards
D. 250 VDC stepped down from station battery boards
A. Correct.
B. Incorrect. Backup source is this supply
C. Incorrect. Correct that it DC; incorrect supply
D. Incorrect. Correect that it is DC; incorrect supply
Knowledge of bus power suppliesto thefollowing: One-lin e diagram of power supplies to logic circuits.
Question No. 29
Tier 2 Group 2
c Importance Rating:
Technical Reference :
R02.7
Rod Control SD, Pg 32
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL200RDCNT Objective 4
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.6
Comments:
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/200 7 Last 2 NRC?: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:27 PM 5
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
24. 015 Kl.08 001
C Given the following plant conditions:
Unit 1 is in Mode 5, preparing a plant heatup.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the MINIMUM requirement for monitoring
Source Range indication while starting RCPs in accordance with 1-S0-68-2, RCP
Operations?
A. Monitor indication during startup of the first RCP to monitor indications of a cold
water accident.
B~ Monitor indication during startup of the first RCP to monitor indications of a boron
dilution event.
C. Monitor indication during startup of all RCPs to monitor indications of a cold water
accident.
D. Monitor indication during startup of all RCPs to monitor indications of a boron
dilution event.
A. Incorrect. Correct action but reason is incorrect
B. Correct.
( C. Incorrect. Only performed for first RCP start; concern is dilution
D. Incorrect. Only performed for first RCP start
Knowledge of the physica l connec tions and/or cause-eff ect relationships between the NIS and the following systems: ReS (pump
start).
Question No. 30
Tier 2 Group 2
Importance Rating: R02.6
Technical Reference: 1-S0-68-2
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:
Learning Objective: OPT200.RCP Objective 5a
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.5
Comments:
Monda y, March 12,20072:35:29 PM 44
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
( Cognitive Level:
Job Position:
LOWER
Difficulty.
Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:29 PM 45
SQN REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS 1-80-68-2
( Rev: 30
1 Page 7 of 57
3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
L. The Source Range Monitor instrumentation must be monitored during
startup of the first RCP. This precaution is necessary in order to detect
rapid boron dilution from unborated water that could be flushed into the core.
M. If all RCP's are shutdown , do not start the first RCP if it is known that any volume
of dilute water has been introduced into any reactor coolant loop
until an action plan for recovery is developed as described in Appendi x F
Prevention of Rapid Boron Dilution. [C.S]
N. RCS pressure may increase when starting the first Rep.
(
(
OPT200 .RCP
Rev. 3
Page 3 of 56
(
I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAIN ING
III. TITLE: REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SYSTEM
IV. LE NGTH OF LESSON: 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> lecture; 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> simulator demonstration;
2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> self-study/workshop
V. TRAINIl'iG OBJECTIVES:
A. TenninalObj ective:
Upon completion of this lesson and others presented, the student should be able to
apply the knowledge to support satisfac tory performance of the tasks associated with
the Reactor Coolant Pump system in the plant and on the simulator.
B. Enablin g Object ives:
O. Demonstrate an und erstanding ofNUREG 1122 knowled ge' s and abilities
associated with the Reactor Coolant Pump System that are rated g 2.5 during
Initial License training for the appropriate license position as identified in
~ppendix A.
1. State the purpose/functions of the Reactor Coolant Pump System as described in
( 2. State the design basis of the Reactor Coolant Pump System in acco rdance with the
3. Expla in the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the
Reactor Coolant Pump System as illustrated on the simplifi ed system drawing.
4. Describe the following items for each major component in the Reactor Coolant
Pump System as described in this lesson:
a. Location
b. Power supply (include control power as applicable)
c. Support equipment and systems
d. Nonnal operating parameters
e. Component operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
i. Protect ive features (including setpoints)
j. Failure modes
k. Unit differences
1. Type s of accident s for which the Reactor Coolant Pump System components
are designed
m. Location of controls and indications associated with the Reacto r Coolant Pump
System in the control room and auxiliary control room
OPT200.RCP
Rev. 3
( Page 4 of 56
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):
B. Enablin l! Obj ectives (Cont'd):
5. Describe the operati on of the RCP system as it relates to the following:
a. Precautions and limitations
b. Major steps performed while placin g the RCP system in service
c. Alarms and alarm response
d. How a compone nt failure will affect system operation
e. How a support system failu re will affect RCP system operation
f. How a instrum ent failur e will affect system operation
6. Describ e the adm inistrative control s and limits for the RCP system as expla ined in
this lesson:
a. State Te ch Specs/TlcM LCOs that govern the RCPs
b. State the ~ l hour action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditions/status of th e RCP system comp onents and the appropriate
sections of the Tech Spec, determine if opera bility requirements are met and
_. what actions are required
7. Discuss related Industry Events:
( a. SQ961761PER; RCP#4 abov e 15mil vibration alarm
b. SOER-82-5; Reactor Coo lant Pump seal failure
c. SER 20-86; RCP shaft failure at Crystal River
VI. TRAINING AIDS:
A. Classroom Computer and Local Area Ne twork (LAN) Acce ss
B. Co mputer projector
C. Simulator (if available)
(
OPT200.RCP
Rev. 3
( Page 38 of 56
Normal Operation
);> Precautions and Limitations 80-68-2
- Prevent RHR ove r pressurization:
- Res is greater than or equal to 160°F
- 200°F and less than 300°F
- Greater than 300' F
- Less than 200 degrees
- Source Range Monitor instrumentation
- Prevention of Rapid Boro n Dilution [C.5]
- Starting the first Rep
E05
( X. LESSON BODY:
NOTE : Emph asize those P&L that reference a Source Note
o The following restriction s for RCP operation apply, when RHR is connected to
the RCS for shutdown cooling, to prevent RHR over pressurization: (FCV-74-1
and 2 open)
At least one RCP should remain in operation whenever RCS is greater than or
equal to 160°F.
When RCS temperature is greater than 20QoF and less than 300'F, and no RCPs
are running, a RCP can not be started unless pressurizer level is less than 65%.
When RCS temperature is greater than 300°F AND no RCPs are running, a RCP
can not be started regardless o f pressurizer level.
1st RCP start up must be limited to less than 200 degrees with steam bubble in
pressurizer with actua l level less than 85%
o The Source Range Monitor instrumentation must be monitored durin g startup of
the first RCP. Th is precaution is necessary in order to detect rapid boron dilution
from unborated water that could be flushed into the core.
o If all RCP' s are shutdown, do not start the first RCP if it is known that any
volume of dilute water has been introduced into any reactor coolant loop until an
action plan for recovery is developed as described in Appendix F Prevention o f
Rapid Boron Dilution. [C.5]
o [C.5] INPO SOER 94-002-01 (NER 94856001); Revised to establish procedural
( guidance for recover from a situation in which a pocket of low boron
concentration reactor coolant might have formed
oRCS pressure may increase when starting the first RCP. .
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
25. 017 A4 .02 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
- A LOCA has occurred.
Due to equipemnt failures, the crew has transitioned to FR-C.1, response to
Inadequate Core Cooling .
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the operation of RCPs for this event?
A. All available RCPs are run for the entire event.
B. All available RCPs are started prior to performing secondary depressurization.
Cl" One RCP at a time is started if it is available , only if secondary depressurization is
ineffective, as determined by Core Exit Thermocouple temperature.
D. One RCP is started as soon as its associated SG NR level is greater than 10%,
prior to perform ing secondary depressu rization.
A. Incorrect. RCPs will be shut down if they are running when in C.1
B. Incorrect. Wf)jJe forced cooling is desirable , the unit will be in condition that no
RCPs will be running when the action taken to depressurize is commenced
C. Correct. One RCP is run if CETs are >1200 degrees F following secondary
( depressurization. Only alternative after RCPs is head vents and SACRGs
D. Incorrect. Secondary side SG is >10% when RCP started, but this is performed later
after depre ssurization has been unsuccessful
Monday, March 12,20072:35:29 PM 46
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to manuallyoperate and/or monitor in the control room: Temperature values used to determine RCSfRCP operation during
( inad equat e core cooling (l.e ., if applicable. average of five highest values ).
Question No. 31
Tier 2 Group 2
Importance Rating : RO 3.8
Technical Reference: FR-C.1
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271FR-C.1 Objective 3
Question Source : New
Question History :
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
( Source: NEW Source If Bank:
Cogniti ve Level : LOWER Di fficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQ UOYAH
Date: 412007 Last 2 NR C? : NO
Monday, March 12, 20072:35:29 PM 47
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLI NG FR*C.1
Rev . 12
(
ISTEP II A CTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE IIRESPONSE NOT OBTA INED
14. b. DUMP steam to condenser b . DUMP steam at maximum rate
at maximum achievable rate: USING Intact S /G atmospheric
relief(s).
1) ENSURE steam dumps in steam
pressure mode. IF local control of atmospheric
relief(s) is necess ary,
2) ADJUST steam dump demand to TH EN
FULLY OPEN three cooldown DISPATCH personnel to dump steam
valves . USING EA-1-2, Local Control of
S/G PORVs.
3) WHEN T-avg is less than 540°F,
THEN
BYPASS steam dump interlock.
c. CHEC ~R C S pressure c . IF RCS pressure dropp ing,
less than 100 psig. T HEN
( GO TO Caution prior to Step 12.
IF RCS pressure stable or rising,
THEN
GO TO Note prior to Step 21 .
d . STOP S /G depressurization.
(
Page 14 of 22
SQN INADEQUATE CORE COOLING FR-C.1
Rev . 12
(
ISTEP II ACTIONIEXPECTED RESPONSE II RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
NOTE RCP damage due to absence or loss of normal support conditions is an
acceptable consequence in this procedure.
21. CHECK if RCPs should be started :
a. CHECK core exit TICs a. GO TO Step 22.
greater than 1200°F.
b . CHECK if idle RCS loop available: b. PERFORM the following:
- S /G narrow range level 1) OPEN all pressurizer PORVs
greaJer than 10% [25% AD Vj and block valves.
AND
( * RCP in associated loop
2) IF core exit TICs remain
greater than 1200°F,
AVAILAB LE and STOPPED. THEN
OPEN reactor vessel head vents:
- FSV-68-394
- FSV-68-395
- FSV-68-396
- FSV-68-397.
3) GO TO Step 22.
c . START RCP in one idle loop . .
---
d. GO TO Substep 21 .a.
( -------
Page 18 of 22
OPL271 FR-C.1
Revision 1
Page 3 of 16
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING
III. LESSON TITLE: FR-C.1, INADEQUATE CORE COOLING
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenario s, the requirements of
FR-C.l , INAD EQ UATE CORE COOLING.
B. Enabling Objectives
Obfectives
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities
associated with Inadequate Core Cooling that are rated ~ 2.5 during Initial License
Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the
appropriate position as identified in Appendix A
(
1. State the purpose/goal of this FR-C.1.
2. Describe the FR-C.1entrv conditions.
a. Describe the plant parameters and setpoints associated with FR-C.1
entrv conditions.
b. Demonstrate an understanding of the use of F-O, Status Trees to
indicate when FR-C.1 must be implemented.
3. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into FR-C.1 .
4. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of FR-C.1.
5. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and
transitions to other procedures.
6. Given a set of initial plant conditions use FR-C.1 to correctlv:
a. Recoanize entrv conditions.
b. Identifv reouired actions.
c. Resoond to Continaencies.
d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.
7. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior to,
durina and after the abnormal condition.
OPL27 1FR-C .1
Revision 1
Page 6 of 16
(' IX. INTRODUCTION:
This lesson is a review of Function Restoration Guideline FR-C.1, "Inadeq uate Core
Coolin g". Control room operators are required to have a thorough knowledge of this
procedu re, includ ing when and how to use it.
Overview
This guideline attempts to restore core cooling following events or malfunctions that
cause inade quate core cooling as defined in FR-O, Status Trees. T his response is
independent of the cause of the loss of core cooling.
This guideline attempts several different methods of establishing adequate core cooling.
After each attempt, RCS parameters are checked to determine the effectiveness of the
attem pt. If the attempt is unsuccessful, the next method is tried.
T he following sum marizes the different methods of establishing adequate core cooling:
a. Ensure a cool water supply to RHR pumps suction from RWS T or
Containment Sump.
b. Establish and maximize ECCS flow including opening the CLA isolation valve
if clos ed.
c. Depressurize the S /Gs to reduce RCS pressure to <100 psig and allow
increased ECCS flow .
( d. Start one RCP at a time to ge t CET <1200°F. This will force RCS 2 phase
mixture through the S /G and into the core. S /G water level must be
established for this method to be effective.
e. Open RCS inventory loss paths to lower RGS pressure to establish feed and
bleed of RCS. This reduces RGS pressure to reduce RCS pressure and allow
increas ed ECGS flow.
f. Depressurize S /G to atmospheric pressure and allow increa sed ECGS fiow.
g. If core cooling can be established then, verify core cooling and transition to
E-1 for restoring the unit to post accident conditions.
h. The above actions represent all the available means of re-establishing
adequate core cooling flow. If they are ineffective then conta inment of the
dama ged core and the release of fission products becomes the highest
priority action. Severe Accident Control Room Guideline, SAGRG-1 will
provide guidelines for response to the damaged core.
Fundamental Concepts
During review of this procedure , the instructor should emphasize the following
fundamental concepts as applicable steps are discussed.
- Monitoring plant cond itions and indications closely
- Controlling plant evolutions precisely
- Establishing a bias for conse rvative approach to plant operations
- Working effective ly as a team
- Having a solid understanding of plant design and system interrelatio nships.
OPL271FR-C.1
Revision 1
c x. LESSON BODY:
Page 10 of 16
INSTRUCTOR NOTES
NOTE: Refer to NOTE in AOP Use of steam dumps for
S/G depressurization is
will isolate on low steamline
pressure SI signal if NOT
blocked.
NOTE: Refer to NOTE in AOP IF low steamline pressure
can isolate on hi negative
steam pressure rate signal.
14. DEPRESSURIZE Intact S/Gs to reduce RCS Objective 5
pressure to less than 100 psig: S/Gs are depressurized in
a. Refer to FR-C.1 for Substeps an attempt to reduce RCS
b. Refer to FR-C.1 for RNO pressure to 100 psig so
c. Block low steamline pressure SI signal prior to CLA can be isolated and
initiating S/G depressurization when permitted prevent nitrogen from
d. RNg: If RCS pressure is dropping, S /G entering RCS which could
depressurization is effect, GO TO step 12 and stop secondary side heat
continue depressurization to 100 psig. removal
( e. RNO: If RCS pressure is NOT dropping,
depressurization is not effective, GO TO step
Depressurizing RCS should
allow an increase in ECCS
21 to start RCPs. flow to the RCS.
f. When S/G pressure is <100 psig stop
depressurization in preparation for closing CLA Objective 8
isolation valves. Review S/G saturation
pressure and RCS
temperature relationship
15. MONITOR if CLAs should be isolated: Objective 5
a. Refer to FR-C.1 for Substeps If RCS pressure <100 psig
b. Refer to FR-C.1 for RNO Reset SI and close CLA
isolation valves.
IF not GO TO step 21 for
starting RCPs.
Objective 8
Review natural circulation
and how nitrogen in the
RCS could interfere with it.
16. STOP all RCPs. RCP stopped prior to S/G
depressurization to
atmospheric pressure to
prevent seal damage.
OPL271FR-C.1
Revision 1
Page 11 of 16
( x. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
17. DEPRESSURIZE Intact S /G s to atmospheric Dump at maximum rate
pressure:
a. Refe r to FR-C.1 for Substeps
b. Refer to FR-C .1 for RNO
18. VERIFY ECCS flow: Obj ective 5
a. Refer to FR-C.1 for Substeps If S /G depressurization
b. Refer to FR-C.1 for RNO establishes effec tive
cooling then GO TO step
17 and continue. If NOT
effect ive, GO TO step 21
for RCP start.
19. CHECK core cooling: Objective 5
a. Refer to FR-C.1 for Substeps Check if core cooling has
b. Refer to FR-C.1 for RNO been re-established, IF so
continue unit specified
criteria is met and exit FRP.
IF core cooling not
established , then go to step
21 for RCP start.
( 20. GO TO E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Obj ective 5
Coolant, Step 14. Check if core cooling has
been re-established then
exit FRP
NOTE: Refer to NOTE in AOP RCP damage is acceptable
to prevent core damage
21. CHECK if RCPs should be started : Obj ective 5
a. Refe r to FR-C.1 for Substeps If TI Cs are > 12000F then
b. Refer to FR-C.1 for RNO start a RCP in a loop with
c. RNO : When all RCPs and available loops are S /G level and GO back to
run ning then attempt to establish core cooling step 21.a to see if
by feed and bleed of the RCS. additional RCPs should be
d. When TIC are <1200°Fthen continu e with Step started.
22.
22. DEPRESSURIZE Intact S /Gs to atmospheric Ensure intact S /G are at
pressure: atmospheric pressure and if
a. Refer to FR-C.1 for Substeps needed depressurized
b. Refer to FR-C.1 for RNO faulted or rupture d S /G in
an attempt to depressurize
flow.
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
38. 028 K 6.01 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
- Unit 1 is at 100% power
- A-A EDG is out of service for maintenance
- A design basis LOCA has occurred
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on Containment if B train
Hydrogen Recombiner is lost after 51 initiates?
Containment hydrogen concentration will _
A':" remain below 4%.
B. increase to greater than 4% but less than 8%.
C. increase to greater than 8% UNLESS Containment Purge is placed in service .
D. increase to greater than 8% UNLESS Hydrogen Igniters are placed in service.
A. Correct. A single recombiner is designed to maintain H2 < 4% during a design
basis LOCA. -
( B. Incorrect. 4% is as high as concentration will get with only 1 recombiner in service
C. Incorrect. Purge not required to maintain design basis
D. Incorrect. Igniters not required to maintain design basis
(
Monday, March 12. 2007 2:35:30 PM 72
QUESTIONS REPORT
fo r SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowfedge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the HRPS: Hydrogen recornblners.
( Question No. 32
Tier 2 Group 2
Importance Rating: R02.6
Technical Reference : Ctmt Combustible Gas Control Handout
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.CGCS, Obj. 5.d
Question Source: Bank
Question History: SQN CTMT COM GAS B.15.A-1
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.8
Comments:
( Source:
Cognitive Level :
BANK
LOWER
Source If Bank:
Difficulty:
SEQUOYAH BANK
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:30 PM 73
OPT 200.CGCS
Rev. 2
Page 4 o f 5 1
(
V. TRAINI NG OBJECTI VES (C ont' d):
B. Learn ing Ob jectives (Cont'd) :
5. Describe the operati on o f the Combustible Gas Control syst em as explained in
this lesson:
a. Precautions and limitatio ns
b. Major steps perform ed while placing the Comb ustible Gas Co ntrol system in
serv ice
c. Alarm s and alarm response
d. How a com ponent failure will affect system operation
e. How a support system failure will affecI Combustibl e Gas Control system
ope ratio n
f. How a instrument failure will affe ct system operation
6. Describe the adm inistrative controls and limits for the Co mbus tible Gas Control
system as explained in this lesson:
a. State Tech SpecsJTRM LCOs that govern the Comb ust ible Ga s Conlrol
Q. State the :'S I hour action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditions/status of the Combustible Gas Contro l system
compon ents and the appropriate sectio ns of the Tech Spec, determi ne if
( operability requirements are met and what actions are required
7. Discuss related Industry Events
a. Containm ent Hydrogen Analyze r Inoperable
b. Bo th Hydrogen Recombiners Inoperable, TS 3.0.3
c. Unlocked Manual Contain ment Isolation Valve Due To Equipment Interface
VI. TRAINIl'IG AIDS:
A. C lassroom Com puter and Loca l Area Network (LAN) Access
B. Computer proj ector
C. Sim ulator (if available)
(
Rev.O
Page 10 of 39
( Design Information
Design basis The design bases are tabulate d below.
The svstem is designed to *** Reason
meet the following General Design Single active or passive failure wiil not
Crite ria: prevent system function during a DBA.
- Redund ancy
- Allow for periodic inspection and
maintenan ce of major comp onents
- Allow for periodic testinq
be energ ized any tim e there is a hydroge n To reduce the hydrogen concen tration
concentration in containment that has not without causing general combu stion in
exceeded 6% bv volume . containment.
be capable of functioning even if wetted To function following a design base
with borated. hiqh-pH containment spray. LOCA.
funct ion adequately even if one unit is out The system provides 100% redundancy
of commission. since each recom biner is capable of
providing the required hydrogen removal
caoacitv.
susta in all normal loads as we ll as Reiiability and availability of the system
acc ident loads including seism ic loads during a LOCA
and pressure and tem perature transients
from a LOCA
maintain hydrogen in the containment Prevent a hydrogen burn that could
atmosphere < 4% volume following a threaten containm ent integrity
Design The design characteristics for both Normal and Post LOCA operations are tabulated
characteristics below.
Parameter Normal Conditions Post LOCA Conditions
Temper ature/Upper 85° - 105°F 250°F (max)
Lower 100° - 125°F
Pressure o psio 12 psid desion value
Relative humiditv 0-100% 100%
Spray solution: ",2000 ppm Boron
N/A
9-9.5 pH
Desiqn life 40 vrs N/A
Recom biner caoacitv N/A 100 scfm (minimum)
Continued on next page
(
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
39 . 029 A4.01 001
(..
'
Given the following plant conditions:
Unit 1 is in Mode 6.
A Containment Purge is planned.
Which ONE (1) of the following conditions requires a limit on the maximum flow for
Containment Purge, and what is the maximum flow for the condition?
A. Fuel Handling activities are in progress; 8,000 CFM
B~ Fuel Handling activities are in progress; 16,000 CFM.
C. SFP Fuel Transfer Tube is open; 8,000 CFM
D. SFP Fuel Transfer Tube is open ; 16,000 CFM .
A. Incorrect. Flow limit is too low by half
B. Correct. If Fuel Handling activities are in progress, 16,000 CFM is the limit.
C. Incorrect. SFP level may be affected on initial startup of Purge. Limit is too low
D. Incorrect. No limit on Purge flow based on Transfer Tube position . There are
concerns about/evel changes in the SFP, but no minimum or maximum purge flow
c Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room : Containment purge flow rate.
Question No. 33
Tier 2 Group 2
Importance Rating: R02.5
Technical Reference: 0-SO-30-3
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.CONTPURGE Objective 5
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .10
Comments:
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:30 PM 74
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: NEW Source I f Bank:
c Cognitive Level: LOWER
Job Position: RO
Difficulty:
Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 412007 Lasl2 NRC?: NO
(
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:30 PM 75
-
OPT200.CONTPURGE
Rev. 2
c Page 11 of76
ENABLING OBJECTIVES
5. Describe the operat ion of the containment purge
system:
- Precautions and limitations
- Major steps for placing the system in service
- Alarms and alarm response
- Howa component failure will affect system
operation
- How a support system failure will affect system
operation
- How a instrument failure will affect system operation
( IX. INTRODUCTION :
SQN CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM 0-50-30-3
( OPERATION Rev: 37
1,2 Page 8 of 182
3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (Continued)
K. In modes 1-4, only one set of purge supply and exhaust lines shall be used.
Each procedure for the area being purged (upper , lower, or incore) must be
followed . Vacuum in the annulus must be normal and steady (- 6" H20 ) and
containmenUannulus .ll.P less than or equal to 0.25 psid. 0-SO-30-8 provides
the steps to vent containment if containmenUannulus .ll.P greater than .25 psid.
L. Simultaneous purging of lower and upper containment using two-train operation
is only allowed in Mode 5, 6, or defueled without fuel handling in containment.
M. During fuel handling activities inside containment, purge flow shall not exceed
16,000 cfm. Containment purge flow may be monitored using FI-90-400 IM-9]
or using computer point Y2210A . (Reference: FSAR 15.5.6)
N. [UNIT 1 ONLY] Train A purge discharge damper 1-VLV-30-551 weights have
been adjusted to allow the damper to go full open when the 1A Containment
Purge Exhaust fan is started. This adjustment will allow more flow through the
( system and should stop the pressure surge , allowing the Containment Purge
ductwork to stabilize. When the 1A Containment Purge is in service extra
monitoring for flow swings, banging noises in the 690 Penetration Room, and
ductwork expansion and contraction is recommended.
O. When Incore Instrument Room Purge exhaust fan is placed in service for Unit 1
the discharge damper (1-VLV-30-551) for Containment Purge exhaust fan 1A
must be closed . This damper is located inside the purge housing in the 690
penetration room and can be viewed from the inspection ports. Radcon support
will be required if damper requires closing by hand.
P. Containment purge coils should not be used for cooling . Placing chilled water
on purge coils will result in moisture build-up, as there are no drains for
condensation.
SQN CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM 0-50-30-3
C' 1,2
OPERATION Rev: 37
Page 87 of 182
Unit. _ Date. _
8.0 INFREQUENT OPERATION
8.1 Upper Compartment Purge "A" Train in Modes 5, 6, or Defueled with Doors or
Hatches Open to the Aux Bldg.
CAUTION During fuel handling activities inside containment, purge flow
shall not exceed 16,000 cfm. Containment purge flow may be
monitored using FI-90-400 or using computer point Y2210A.
(Reference: FSAR 15.5.6)
NOTE 1 This section will open more exhaust paths than supply paths to ensure
Auxiliary BUilding does not go airborne during the purging procedure.
NOTE 2 A spent fuel exhaust fan should be operating during the performance
of this Instruction.
[1] NOTIFY US/SRO prior to performing this section.
(
[2] ENSURE Ice Condenser lower inlet door blocks are
installed.
[3] INITIATE 0-SI-CEM-30-41 0.2, and record release permit
number, unless not required during Mode 5, 6, or
defueled, as determined by the Unit SupervisorlSRO
and RCL Supervision.
Release Permit Number
[4] PERFORM 1(2)-SI-OPS-030-286.0.
CAUTION When air temperature entering the Auxiliary Building
heating/cooling coils ls s 35°F, ensure flow through
the coils unless coils are isolated and drained.
[5] VERIFY there is not a containment vent isolation signal.
[6] CHECK Containment Purge Train A filter assembly drain
loop seal sight glass level equal to or greater than 50%
(AB, EI 669, Penetration Room).
(
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
41. 035 K5.03 00 1
c Which ONE (1) of the following describes the basis for programm ed SG level
setpoints?
A. 33% level at low power is low enough to prevent flooding of the moisture separators
from a 10% step load increase.
B. 44% above 20% power is low enough to minimize water carryover from a
postulated steam line break.
C\" 44% above 20% power is high enough to minimize the probability of a reactor trip
caused by shrink due to a load rejection at high power.
D. 33% at low power is high enough to keep the SG feed ring covered in the event of
an inadvertent MSIV closu re.
C is correct.
A is incorrect because it is part the basis for 44% at higher power
B is incorrect because it is part of the basis for 33%
o is incorrect but credible because an MSIV closure will cause shrink. Just not part of
the consideration for programmed level
Knowledge of operatlonallm pftcanons of the following concepts as the applyto the 8/GS: Shrinkand swell concept.
Question No. 34
(
Tier 2 Group 2
Importance Rating: RO 2.8
Technical Reference: OPT200.SG Pg 77
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT 200.SG, Obj 13.c, 15.a
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.4
Comments:
Source: NEW Source If Ba nk
Cognitive Leve l: LOW ER Difficu lty:
Job Pos ition: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 412007 Last 2 NRC? : NO
Monday. March 12, 2007 2:35:30 PM 78
OPT200.SG
Rev. 2
c Page 77 of 113
Steam Generator Instrumentation
S/G Level
Control System 1.7 " " . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . ,
1.'
oD 1.S
Q
Level vs Mass b 1.4
- 1.3
- 1.2
~ 1.1
6 1.0
~ 0.9
~ 0 .8
C) 0.7 Constant Level Mass { and
~ 0.6 Progr ammed Level Man _ .. _ .. _ .. _. '_0,
en 0.5
0.' l- --'-- --'- --.Jl-_ _---'
o 25 50 7S 100
Percent ("10) of Rated Turbine Load
E03
X. LESSON BODY:
(
The S /G has more fluid mass at a level of 33 percent at no load than there is at a level of 44
percent with 20 percent or more load on the turbine. A diagram displaying this relationship is
shown
Stage Description
1 As power is raised, more and more of the S/G volume becomes steam
voids . Mass decreases for a given NR level.
2 As power is lowered , steam voids are reduced , and a pound mass of
steam occupies less volume than it does at high turbine loads . Mass
increases for a given NR level.
3 If liqUid level is not programmed to be reduced below 20 % load, the S /G
will contain too much mass for primary cooldown and containment
pressurization design concerns.
OPT200.SG
Rev. 2
Pag e 3 of 113
(, I. PROGRAM: OPERATO R TRAINING
II. COURSE : SYSTEMS TRAINING
III. TITL E: STEAM GENERATORS
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> lecture; 2.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> simul ator demon stration ;
2 hou r self-study/worksho p
v. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Ob jective:
Upon completion of this lesson and others presented, the student sho uld be able to
app ly the knowledge to support satisfactory perform ance of the tasks asso ciated
wi th the Ste am Gen erator (S/G) system in the plant and on the simulator.
B . Learn ing Ob jectives:
O. Demonstrate an understanding ofNUREG 1122 knowledge and abilities
associated with the S/G system that are rated 2: 2.5 during Initial License
Training for the ap propriate license posi tion as ident ified in Appendix A.
I . State the purpose/functions of the S/G system as described in the FSAR.
2. State the design basis of the S/G sys tem in acco rdance with the SQN FS AR.
( 3. Explain thc purpose/function of each major component in thc flow path of the
S/G system as illustrated on a simplified system drawing.
4. Describe the following characteristics of each major component in the S/G
sys tem :
a. Location
b. Power supp ly (include control power as applicable)
c. Support equipment and systems
d. Normal operati ng parameters
e. Component operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indication s
i. Protective features (incl uding setpoints)
j . Failure modes
k. Unit differences
I. Types of accidents for which the S/G system components are designed
m . Location of co ntrols and indications associated wi th the S/G system in the
control room and aux iliary co ntro l roo m
OPT200.SG
Rev. 2
Page 4 of 113
(
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):
B. Learning Objectives (Cont'd):
5. Describe the operation of the S/G system:
a. Precautions and limitations
b. Major steps performed while placing the S/G system in service
c. Alarms and alarm response
d. How a component failure will affect system operation
e. How a support system failure will affect S/G system operation
f. How a instrument failure will affect system operation
6. Describe the administrative controls and limits for the S/G system:
a. State Teeh Specs/I'Rvl LCOs that govern the SIG
b. State the :::l hour action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditionslstatus of the SIG system components and the
appropriate sections of the Tech Spee, determine if operability requirement s
are met and what actions are required
7. Discuss related Industry Events
( VI. TRAINING AIDS:
A. Classroom Computer and Local Area Network (LAN) Access
B. Computer projector
C. Simulator (if available)
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
63. 07 1 K 3.04 00 1
( Rad Waste AUO reports the Radiation Control Valve , 0-FCV-77-119 , has automatically
closed terminat ing a WGDT release.
Select from below the most likely cause of the termination.
A:" The running ABGTS Fan trips.
B. Waste Gas Decay Tank being released indicates 25 psig and stable.
C. Rad Monitor 90-400 module shows an amber warning light illuminated.
D. High hydrogen concentration alarm on the Waste Gas Analyzer Panel.
A. Correct; 0-SO-77-15, Section 6.0 NOTE ABGTS Fan operation and the interlock
between fan flow switches 1-FT-30-150/ 2-FT-30-165 and Rad Control Valve
0-RCV-77-119. Termination of the release will occur ifthe fan stops. Ref: logic
print.
B. Incorrect; WGDT pressure indicators/switches, by themselves, do not interface with
0-RCV-77-119.
C. Incorrect; RM 90-400, Shield Building Vent Radiation Monitor is not interlocked with
( 0-RCV-77-119.
D. Incorrect; Hydrogen Analyzer is indication and alarm only (cycles sample points),
no isolation features.
Monday. March 12, 20072:35:33 PM 120
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SE QUOYA H 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Waste Gas Disposal System willhave on thefollowing: Ventilation
system .
(
Question No. 35
Tier 2 Group 2
Importance Rating : R02.7
Technical Reference : 0-SO-77-15, Section6.0 Step 9 and NOTE; 47W611-77-4
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objecti ve: OPT200.GRW, Obj. 9d, ge, 9h
Question Source : Bank
Question History: SQN Bank
Question Cognitive Level : Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.7
Comments:
( Source: BANK Source If Baok:
Difficulty:
SQN BANK
Cognitive Level: LOWER
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC'?: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:33 PM 121
OPT200.GRW
Rev. 1
Page 3 of 98
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAINI NG
III. TITLE: GASEOUS RADWASTE
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> lecture; 0.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> simulator demonstration;
I hour self-study/workshop
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of this lesson and others presented, the student should be able to
apply the knowledge to support satisfactory performance of the tasks associated
with the Gaseous Radwaste (GRW) system in the plant and on the simulator.
B. Learning Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an understanding ofNUREG 11 22 knowledge and abilities
assoc iated with the GRW system that are rated 2: 2.5 during Initial License
Training for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A.
1. State the purpose/functions of the GRW system as described in the FSAR.
2. . State the design basis of the GRW system in accordance with the SQN FSAR .
( 3. Explain the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the
GRW system as illustrated on a simplified system drawing.
4. Describ e the following characteristics of each major component in the GRW
system:
a. Location
b. Power supply (include control power as applicable)
c. Support equipment and systems
d. Normal operating parameters
e. Component operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
i. Protective features (including setpo ints)
j . Failure modes
k. Unit difference s
l. Types of accidents for which the GRW system components are designed
m. Location of controls and indications associated with the GRW system in the
contro l room and auxiliary control room
OPT200 .GRW
Rev. 1
Page 4 of 98
( V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):
B. Learning Objectives (Cont'd):
5. Describe the operation of the GRW system:
a. Precautions and limitat ions
b. Major steps performed while placing the GRW system in service
c. Alarms and alarm respon se
d. How a component failure will affect system operation
e. How a support system failure will affect GRW system operation
f. How a instrument failure will affect system operation
6. Describe the administrative controls and limits for the GRW system:
a. State Tech Specs/Tkj-t LCOs that govern the GRW
b. State the s ! hour action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditi ons/status of the GRW system components and the
appropriate sections of the Tech Spec , determine if operability requirements
are met and what actions are required
7. Qiscuss related Industry Events
( VI. TRAINING AIDS:
A. Classroom Computer and Local Area Network (LAN) Access
B. Computer projector
C. Simulator (if available)
SQN WASTE GAS DECAY 0-SO-77-15
( TANK RELEASE Rev: 13
0 Page 8 of 16
Date _
6.0 NORMAL OPERATION (Continued)
NOTE Radiation Control Valve O-FCV-77-119 is interlocked
with 1-FT-30-150 and 2-FT-30-165, and will terminate
the release if the fan stops running.
[9] VERIFY the applicable ABGTS fan is running.
UO
[10] IF [0-RE-90-118] is operable, THEN
ENSURE 0-RM-90-118 is in service.
UO
[11] IF [O-RE-90-118] is INOPERABLE, THEN
ENSURE Compliance with actions of ODCM 1.1.2, AND
( WO initiated for corrective action.
UO
NOTE If the selected unit shield bldg. radiation monitor is inoperable, then
the following step may be N/A.
[12] VERIFY radiation monitor RM-90-400 is in service
and operable for the Shield Building vent
indicated in step [3].
UO
[13] IF the shield bldg vent release path selected in step [3] ,
radiation monitor RM-90-400 is inoperable , THEN
NOTIFY the U-1 SRO to take appropriate actions in
accordance with Section 1.1.2 of the ODCM, AND
WO initiated for correct ive action,
UO
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
1. 072 A2.0 1 00 1
c Given the following plant conditions:
1-RA-90-1C AUX BLDG AREA RAD MON INSTR MALFUNC alarm just
came in on 0-XA-55-12A panel
Which ONE (1) of the follow ing describes the failureslactions that could cause this
alarm, and what action is required?
Instrument power failure, or...
A. -MCR modu le placed in Source Check position OR
-Instrument down scale failure ; Notify Work Control and Radcon.
B. -MCR module placed in Source Check position OR
-MCR module placed in Trip Adjust position (non RM-1000S); Refer to AOP-R.06,
High RCS Activity.
C~ -MCR module placed in Trip Adjust position (non RM-1000S) or Calibrate
(RM-1000S) OR
-Instrument down scale failure ; Notify Work Control and Radcon .
D. -MCR module placed in Source Check position OR
-MCR module placed in Trip Adjust position (non RM-1000S ) or Calibrate
( (RM-1000S); Refer to AOP-R.06, High RCS Activity.
A. Incorrect part is Source Check position. This will cause rate meter to increase
and cause a high radiation alarm.
B. Incorrect part is Source Check position. This will cause rate meter to increase
and cause a high radiation alarm.
C. Correct. These three will cause instrument failure alarm.
D. Incorrect part is Source Check position. This will cause rate meter to increase
and cause a high radiation alarm.
Monday , March 12, 2007 3:23:20 PM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQ UOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
.Ability to (a ) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ARM system- and (b) based on those
( predictions, use procedures to correct, control , or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Erratic or failed
power supply.
Question No. 36
Tier 2 Group 2
Importance Rating: R02.7
Technical Reference: O-AR-M12-A
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.RM Obje ctive 5
Question Source: Bank
Question History: SQN Bank
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41 .11
Comments :
BANK
( Source :
Cognitive Level : L OWER
Source If Bank :
Difficulty:
SQNBANK
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Da te: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC ?: NO
Monday, March 12, 20073:23:20 PM 2
OPT200.RM
Rev. 2
Page 3 of 166
( 1. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAINING
III. TITLE : RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> lecture; I hour simulator demonstration; 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> self-
stud y/workshop
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objecti ve:
Upon compl etion of this lesson and others presented, the student should be able to
apply the knowledge to support satisfactory performance of the tasks assoc iated
with the Radiation Monitoring System in the plant and on the simulator.
B. Enab ling Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an und erstanding ofNUREG 1122 knowledge' s and abilities
associa ted with the Radiation Monitoring System as identified in Appendix A.
I. State the purpose/functions of the Radiation Monitoring System as described
2. State the design basis of the Radiation Monitoring System in accordance with
the SQ N FSAR.
(
3. Explain the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the
Radi ation Monitoring System as illustrated on a simplified system drawing.
4. Describe the following characteristics of each major component in the
Radiation Monitoring System:
a. Location
b. Power supply (include control power as applicable )
c. Suppo rt equipment and systems
d. Normal operating parameters
e. Comp onent operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
1. Protective features (including setpoints)
j. Failure modes
k. Unit differences
I. Types of accidents for which the components are desig ned
m. Location of controls and indications in the contro l room and auxiliary
control room
(
OPT200.RM
Rev. 2
Page 4 of 166
( V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):
B. Enabling Objectives (Cont'd):
5. Describ e the operation of the Radiation Monitoring System:
a. Precautions and limitations
b. Major steps performed while placing the system in service
c. Alarms and alarm response
d. How a component failure will affect system operation
e. How a support system failure will affect system operation
f. How a instrument failure will affect system operation
6. Describe the administrative controls and limits for the Radiation Monitoring
System:
a. State Tech SpecsfTRM LCOs that govern the system.
b. State the s ! hour action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditions/status of the Radiation Monitoring System components
and the appropriate sections of the Tech Spec, determine if operability
requirements are met and what actions are required
7. Discuss related Industry Events
( VI. TRAINING AIDS:
A. Classroom Computer and Local Area Network (LAN) Access
B. Computer projector
C. Simulator (if available)
14 (B-7)
(... Source Setpoint
SER 716 (Unit 1 annunciator system) N/A
1-RA-90-1C
1-RM-90-1 Spent Fuel Pit
AUX BLDG AREA
1-RM-90-6 Camp Clg Ht area
RAD MON
1-RM-90-7 Sample room
INSTR MALFUNC
1-RM-90-8 . Aux FW pumps area
1-RM-90-10 CVCS Bd Area
O-RM-90-S Spent fuel Pit pumps
O-RM-90-9 Waste Evap C area
O-RM-90-11 Contmt Spray- RHR
pump area
Probable 1. Instrument power failure.
Causes 2. Monitor power failure on anyone monitor.
3. Instrument in TRIP ADJUST position (Except for monitors
equipped with RM-1000S modules) .
4. Instrument down scale failure.
5. IF monitor Is equipped with RM-1000S modules , THEN
( Additional causes could be:
[a] Operate/Calibrate switch set to calibrate
[b] Loss of signal
[c] Safety loop open
[d] Loss of gain stabilization
Corrective
Actions [1] DISPATCH operator to various area radiation monitor stations
throughout Auxiliary Building to determine which radiation
monitor has instrument malfunction.
[2] CHECK following on each monitor to determine which
malfunctioned:
[a] Power on local ratemeter.
[b] Background reading appropriately.
[3] WHEN failed monitor determined, THEN
NOTIFY Work Control Group and RADCON
References 45B655-12A-0, 47W61 0-90-2
SQN 0-AR-M12-A
Page 20 of 43
0,1 Rev. 49
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
68. 075 G2.1.23 001
( Given the following plant conditions:
Unit 1 is in Mode 3.
Condenser vacuum is being established.
- The crew is starting up the CCW system in accordance with 0-SO-27-1,
Condenser Circulating Water System.
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the required sequence of actions to start the
FIRST CCW Pump?
A . 1-Verify Discharge valve 5% open
2-Place Control switch in START
3-Verify discharge valve travels full open
4-Adjust power factor
B:' 1-Place Control switch in START
2-STOP Discharge valve travel at 25% open
3-Adjust power factor
C. 1-Place Control switch in START
2-Verify Discharge valve travels to 5% open and stops
3-Adjust power factor
( D. 1-Verify discharge valve is closed
2-Place Control switch in START
3-Adjust power factor
4-STOP Discharge valve travel at 25% open
A. Incorrect. If discharge valve was allowed to travel full open, Pump runout may
occur.
B. Correct.
C. Incorrect. Pump will start and discharge valve will open . It will not stop at 5%. The
5% is credible because it is approximately how far the valve will open prior to pump
start
D. Incorrect. Power factor is adjusted after the discharge valve is stopped at 25%, and
the discharge valve will not be closed prior to pump starting
Procedure is directly from 0-80-27-1
(
Monday, March 12,20072:35:34 PM 130
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Conduct of Operations: Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures dUring all modes of plant operatlon..
( Question No. 37
Tier 2 Group 2
Importance Rating: R03 .9
Technical Reference: 0-SO-27-1
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.CCW, B.4.g
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
( Source:
Cognitive Level:
NEW
LOWER
Source If Bank:
Difficulty:
Job Position : RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date : 4/2007 Last 2 NRC? : NO
Monday, March 12, 20072 :35:34 PM 131
OPT200 .CCW
Rev. 2
c I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
Page 3 of 52
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAINING
III. TITLE: CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> lecture; 0.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> simulator demonstration;
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> self-study/workshop
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of this lesson, the student should be able to apply the knowledge to
support satisfactory performance of the tasks associated with the CCW in the plant
and on the simulator.
B. Learning Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge and abilities
associated with the CCW that are rated :::2.5 during Initial License Training for
the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A.
I. State the purpose/functions of the CCW as described in the FSAR.
2. State the design basis of the CCW in accordance with the SQN FSAR.
( 3. Explain the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the
CCW as illustrated on a simplified system drawing.
4. Describe the following characteristics of each major component in the CCW as
described in this lesson:
a. Location
b. Power supply (include control power as applicable)
c. Support equipment and systems
d. Normal operating parameters
e. Component operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
i. Protective features (including setpoints)
j. Failure modes
k. Un it differences
1. Types of accidents for which the CCW components are designed
m. Location of controls and indications associated with the CCW in the control
room and auxiliary control room
c.
OPT200.CCW
Rev. 2
c V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES (Cont'd):
Page 4 of 52
B. Learning Objectives (Cont'd):
5. Describe the operation of the CCW as explained in this lesson:
a. Precautions and limitations
b. Major steps performed while placing the CCW in service
c. Alarms and alarm response
d. How a component failure will affect system operation
e. How a support system failure will affect the CCW operation
f. How a instrument failure will affect system operation
6. Describe the administrative controls and limits for the CCW as explained in
this lesson:
a. State Tech Specs/TRM LCOs that govern the CCW
b. State the :O;l hour action limit TS LCOs
c. Given the conditions/status of the CCW components and the appropriate
sections of the Tech Spec, determine if operability requirements are met and
what actions are required
7. Discuss related Industry Events
( a. SOER 85-05, Internal Flooding of Power Plant Buildings
VI. TRAINING AIDS:
A. Classroom Computer and Local Area Network (LAN) Access
B. Computer projector
C. Simulator (if available)
SQN CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER 0-SO-27-1
( SYSTEM Rev: 63
1,2 Page 26 of 217
Unit. _ Date _
5.4 Startup of the CCW System (Continued)
CAUTION 1 . The Power Factor for each CCW Pump Motor must be
verified/adjusted within 20 seconds following the start of a
CCW Pump Motor to avoid a nuisance trip from the GE
Slipguard Relay. These motors are designed to run between
0.94 Lagging and 1.00 Power Factor.
CAUTION 2 Performance of step [10.b] without immediate completion of
steps [10.c] & [10.d] may result in RCW pump damage.
NOTE 1 The condenser isolation valves are interlocked such that no more
than one set of water boxes may be isolated at a time when starting
a CCWpump.
NOTE 2 CCW pump discharge valve may have been previously opened to supply
RCWpumps.
( [10j START the first CCW pump by performing the following:
[a] ENSURE CCW pump control power DC-AC switch
is in NORMAL position for CCW pump to be
started: (N/A pumps not to be started)
DESCRIPTION HANDSWITCH POSITION INITIALS
CCW Pump "A" control power
HS-27-9F NORMAL
DC-AC switch
CCW Pump "8" control power
HS-27-19F NORMAL
DC-AC switch
CCW Pump "C" control power
HS-27-29F NORMAL
DC-AC switch
[b) ENSURE all CCW pump discharge butterfly valves CLOSED.
DESCRIPTION VALVE NUMBER HANDSWITCH INITIALS
CCW Pump "A" Discharge Valve FCV-27-12 HS-27-12
CCW Pump "8" Discharge Valve FCV-27-22 HS-27-22
CCW Pump * C" Discharge Valve FCV-27-32 HS-27-32
SQN CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER 0-SO-27-1
( SYSTEM * Rev: 63
1,2 Page 27 of217
Unit. _ Date _
5.4 Startup of the CCW System (Continued)
CAUTION AUO should be stationed to perform substep [d) to limit
discharge valve opening to 25% when pump is started.
Exceeding 25% opening (with only one pump in service)
may result in damage to pump.
NOTE CCW pump will start when discharge valve is approximately 5% open.
[c) START desired CCW pump USING associated
handswitch: (NA pumps not started)
DESCRIPTION HANDSWITCH INITIALS
CCW Pump "A" HS-27-9A
CCWPump "B" HS-27-19A
CCW Pump "C" HS-27-29A
( [d) WHEN CCW pump discharge valve is approximately 25%
OPEN, THEN
STOP CCW pump discharge valve from further
opening USING associated pushbutton control.
(NA valves not operated)
DESCRIPTION HANDSWITCH INITIALS
CCW Pump "A" Discharge Vlv
HS-27-12
local control
CCW Pump "B" Discharge Vlv
HS-27-22
local control
CCW Pump "C" Discharge Vlv
HS-27-32
local control
SQN CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER 0-SO-27-1
( 1,2
SYSTEM Rev: 63
Page 28 of 217
Unit~ _ Date _
5.4 Startup of the CCW System (Continued)
NOTE The CCW Motor is starting as an induction motor with excitation being applied
as the motor approaches rated speed to bring the CCW Motor to synchronous
rated speed . The Power Factor meter read ing will stabilize as the CCW Motor
speed stabi lizes .
[e) MONITOR excitation panel Power Factor Meter:
- VERIFY Power Factor between 0.94 Lagging
and Unity (1.00) once stabilized
- ADJUST voltage regulator to achieve
Power Factor between 0.94 Lagging and Unity (1.00).
( [11) START second CCW pump (if desired ) by perfo rming the following:
[a) ENS URE CCW pump contro l power DC-AC switch
is in NORMAL position for CCW pump to be
started: (N/A pumps not to be started )
DESCRIPTION HANDSWITCH POSITION INITIALS
CCW Pump "A" control power
HS-27-9F NORMAL
DC-AC switch
CCW Pump "B" control power
HS-27-19F NORMAL
DC-AC switch
CCW Pump "C" contro l power
HS-27-29F NORMAL
DC-AC switch
[b) START second CCW pump USING associated
handswitch: (NA pumps not started )
DESCRIPTION HAN DSWITCH INITIALS
CCWPump "A" HS-27-9A
CCW Pump "B" HS-27-19A
CCWPump "CO HS-27-29A
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
72. 086 Al.Ol 001
( Given the following plant conditions:
- A fire has occurred on the Main Transformer.
- The Fire Brigade has extinguished the fire.
- The High Pressure Fire Protection System is being restored to normal in
accordance with 0-SO-26-1 and 0-SO-26-2 .
- An AUO is dispatched to the Fire Pump House to shut down Fire Pumps.
System Header pressure is 100 psig when the order to shut down Fire Pumps is
given .
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the impact of the Fire Pump shutdown?
A. HPFP tie to Potable Water will maintain system pressure at the normal standby
value .
B. Jockey Pumps will operate to maintain system pressure at the normal standby
value.
C~ The fire pump will restart. Determine where system flow demand is coming from ,
and once corrected, attempt to shut down the Fire Pump again.
D. The fire pump will restart. Ensure the HPFP header is repressurized to greater than
( 105 psig prior to attempting another shutdown of the pump .
A. Incorrect. System pressure normally maintained by a combination of Potable Water
and Jockey Pump operation. In this case, pressure is not high enough to prevent Fire
Pump restart
B. Incorrect. System pressure normally maintained by a combination of Potable Water
and Jockey Pump operation . In this case, pressure is not high enough to prevent Fire
Pump restart
C. Correct. If system pressure is not 110-112 psig, the Fire Pump will restart. Action is
to find out where system demand is comning from
D. Incorrect. Correct system response but incorrect HPFP pressure. Pump would
restart again if pressure was 105 when it was secured
Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:34 PM 138
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Fire Protection System ; and (b) basedon those
( predictions, use procedures to correct. control , or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Manual
shutdown of the FPS.
Question No. 38
Tier 2 Group 2
Importance Rating: R02.9
Technical Reference: 0-SO-26-1
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.HPFP, B.16.a
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
(
Source : NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level : HI GHER Difficult y:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQ UOYAH
Date: 4/200 7 Last 2 NRC?: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35 :34 PM 139
OPT200 .HPFP
Revision 0
Page 3 of 11
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: SYSTEM TRAINING
III. LESSON TITLE: HIGH PRESSURE FIRE PROTECTION
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE:
A. NSGPO: I hour lecture
B. Initial Licensing: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> lecture; I hour simulator demonstration; I hour self-
study/workshop
C . NLOR: time required to cover selected objectives to be recorded on the objective matrix
form.
D. LOR: time required to cover selected objectives to be recorded on the objective matrix form .
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of this lesson and others presented, the student shall demonstrate an
understanding of the reactor coolant pump system by successfully completing a written
examination as defined by program procedures. The "0" objectives should be included, as
applicable, in the lecture.
( B. Enabling Objectives
o I. State the purpose and functions of the high pressure fire protection system. (KIA 2.1.27)
- 2. State the purpose and functions of major high pressure fire protection system
components. (KIA 2.1.28)
o 3. State the locations of components, switches, controls, and indications associated with the
high pressure fire protection system. (KIA 2.1.30 , 2.1.31, 2.4.3)
o 4. Explain and apply all design bases /limitations. (KIA 2.1.32)
o 5. Identify and apply the high pressure fire protection system Technical Specifications and
Technical Requirements Manual.
a. State the high pressure fire protection system technical specifications with less than
one hour action statements. (KIA 2.1.11)
b. Explain the technical specification bases for high pressure fire protection system.
(KIA 2.2.25)
c. Given a set of plant conditions, apply the appropriate technical specifications and TRM
requirements for the high pressure fire protection system. (KIA 2.1.10, 2.1.12, 2.1.33 ,
2.2.22)
o 6. For the high pressure fire protection system, describe the differences between unit's
design, control board layouts, and instrumentation. (KIA 2.2.3, 2.2.4)
7. Explain and apply the high pressure fire protection system precautions and limitations.
(KIA 2.1.32)
8. Explain and apply the Alarm Response Procedures associated with high pressure fire
protection system. (KIA 2.4.46, 2.4.47, 2.4.48, 2.4.50)
o 9. Explain the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between high pressure
fire protection system and the following plant systems: (KIA 086KI)
OPT200.HPFP
Revision a
Page 4 of 11
( a. High pressure service water (086Kl.OI)
b. Raw service water (086K1.02)
c. AFW system (086Kl.03)
- 10 State the electrical and/or control air supplies to high pressure fire protection system's
components. (KJA 086K2)
II Given a high pressure fire protection system/component malfunction, analyze its affect
on the plant systems listed. (KJA 086K3)
a. Shutdown capability with redundant equipment (086K3.0 I)
- 12 Explain the following high pressure fire protection system design features and/or
interlocks. (KJA 086K4)
a. Adequate supply of water for FPS (086K4.0 I)
b. Maintenance of fire header pressure (086 K4.02)
c. Detection and location of tires (086K4.03)
d. Personnel safety (086K4.04)
e. CO, (086K4.06)
f. Main Turbine/Generator Protection (086K4.07)
13 Explain the following operational implications as they apply to high pressure fire
protection system. (KJA 086K5)
a. Effect of CO, on fire (078 K5.01)
b. Effect of water spray on electrical components (086K5.03)
- c. Hazards to personnel as a result of fire type and methods of protection (086K5.04)
14 Given a malfunction oflisted plant systems/components, analyze its effect on the high
pressure fire protection system. (KJA 086K6)
( a. Pumps (086K6.01)
b. Valves (086K6.02)
c. Motors (086K6.03)
d. Fire, smoke, and heat detectors (086K6.04)
15. Given a plant situation, prevent exceeding operational design limits by predicting and/or
monitoring, as applicable, changes in parameters that are associated with the operating
controls of the high pressure fire protection system. (KJA 086AI)
a. Fire header pressure (086.A1.01)
b. Fire water storage tank level (086.AI.02)
c. Fire doors (086.AI.03)
d. Fire dampers (086.A1.04)
e. FPS lineups (086.Al.05)
16. Given a plant situation for the high pressure fire protection system, (i) predict the impact
on plant operation, and (ii) based on the impact, apply procedural guidance to correct,
control, or mitigate the consequence of the situation. (KJA086A2)
a. Manual shutdown of the FPS (086.A2.01)
b. Low FPS header pressure (086.A2.02)
c. Inadvertent actuation of the FPS due to circuit failure or welding (086.A2.03)
d. Failure to actuate the FPS when required, resulting in fire damage (086.A2.04)
17. Given a plant situation, demonstrate the ability to monitor the automatic operation of the
high pressure fire protection system. (KJA 086A3)
a. Starting mechanisms of fire water pumps (086.A3.01)
b. Actuation of the FPS (086.A3.02)
c. Actuation of the fire detectors (086.A3.03)
18. Given a plant situation for the high pressure fire protection system, demonstrate the
ability to monitor and, as appropriate, perform manual operation of the system in the
control room. (KJA086A4)
OPT200 .HPFP
Revision 0
Page 5 of 11
( a. Fire water pumps (086.A4.01)
'"
b. Fire detection panels (086.A4.02)
c. Fire alarms switch (086.A4.03)
d. Fire water storage tank makeup pumps (086.A4.04)
e. Deluge valves (086.A4.05)
(
(
SQN HIGH PRESSURE FIRE 0-SO-26-1
( PROTECTION Rev: 47
0 Page 15 of 55
Date
7.0 SHUTDOWN
7.1 Securing the HPFP System After an Auto or Remote Initiation
[1] IF Fire Pump running due to Remote Start from 0-M-29 or Auto
Start from low pressure , THEN
ENSURE AUO or Fire Ops DISPATCHED to new fire pump
house to monitor Fire Pump operation and shutdown
pumps in accordance with 0-80-26-2. 0
[2] ENSURE no fire is present in any area that is covered by the
deluge valve before attempting to reset because some
valves cover multiple areas . 0
[3] IF Pre-Action Deluge valve actuated THEN
REFER TO Appendix A to restore system to normal. 0
(
[4] IF Flow Actuated Control Valve (FACV) actuated THEN
REFER TO Appendix B to restore system to normal. 0
[5] IF Turbine Building Maxitrol Deluge Valve actuated, THEN
REFER TO Appendix C to restore system to normal. 0
[6] IF Yard Maxitrol Deluge Valve actuated , THEN
REFER TO Appendix D to restore system to normal. 0
(
SQN HIGH PRESSURE FIRE 0-50-26-1
( PROTECTION Rev : 47
0 Page 16 of 55
Date _
7.1 Securing the HPFP System After an Auto or Remote Initiation
(Continued)
NOTE System pressure control is now from the new HPFP
system tie to potable water and/or Jockey Pump
operation; therefore , system flow demand must be
returned to normal standby values before pressure
control system has sufficient capacity to control pressure
without running a fire pump.
[7] WHEN all sprinkler or deluge systems are in process of return
to normal alignment, or otherwise isolated , and assurance
of NO fire is present, THEN
NOTiFY Operator at Fire Pump House to shutdown Fire
Pump(s) in accordance with 0-80-26-2. o
( [8] IF Pressure NOT maintained greater than 112-116 psig when
operating fire pump(s) is shutdown, THEN
[a] ENSURE Fire Pump automatically restarts to
recover pressure [Fire Pump Running ALARM
on 0-M-29] . o
[b] DETERMINE Source of excess system fiow demand
and take action to correct as required. o
[c] WHEN excess flow demand is reduced, THEN
REPERFORM Step [7]. o
END OF TEXT
l
QUESTIONS REPORT
for 5EQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
11. 007 EAl.08 001
( Given the following plant conditions:
Unit 2 was operating at 40% power.
- A reactor trip occurred.
- All equipment is operating as designed.
5G levels dropped to the following values:
5G 1 -10% NR
5G 2 -14% NR
5G 3 - 17% NR
5G 4 -12% NR
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the operation of the AFW pumps?
A. All AFW Pumps are off.
B~ All AFW Pumps are operating .
C. MDAFW Pumps are operating ONLY.
D. TDAFW Pump is operating ONLY.
( A. Incorrect.
start on FWI
Indications are that they may not have started on SG level, but they do
when the reactor is tripped and Tavg is less than 564
B. Correct.
C. Incorrect. If 1 SG was less than 10.7%, this could be true if the reactor was not
tripped
D. Incorrect. 2 SGs less than 10.7% without trip, would have TDAFW running
For level, 10.7% decreaing on 1 out of 4 SGs will initiate MDAFW
2 out of 4 SGs will initiate TDAFW
Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:28 PM 19
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
A bility to ope rate and monitor the following as they apply to a reactor trip: AFW System
( Question No. 39
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: R04.4
Technical Reference: TI-28 setpoints
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.AFW Objective 12.b
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.7
Comments :
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
( Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:
Job Position : RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC? : NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:28 PM 20
OPT200 .AFW
Revision 2
Page 4 of 14
(
g. Emergency water source
h. Chemical treatment
i. AJ'W turbine exhaust drains
- 10. Sta te the electrical andlor con trol ai r supplies to AF W system' s comp onen ts. (KIA
06 1K2)
b. * AJ'W electric drive pumps
c. AFW stea m-turbine d riven pump
II . G iven a AF W system/comp onent ma lfunction, analyze its affect on the plant systems
listed. (KIA 06 1K3)
a. Re S
b. S/G
- 12. Expla in the following AFW system design features and or interlocks. (KIA 06 1K4)
a. Water sources and priority of use
b. AJ'W automatic start upon loss of MFW pump, S/G level, blackout, or safety inj ection
c. Autom atic blowdown/sarnple iso lation
d. Prevention of AJ'W runout by limiting AJ'W flow
e. AF\V startup permissives
f. Turbine trip, including overspe ed
g. AF\V recircul ation
-.:...h. Cross-tics between multi-unit station
l. Reset of MFW reactor trip logic
J. Automatic level contro l
( k. Nat ural ci rculation flo w
1. Initiation of cooling water and lube oil
m. AFW automatic isolation
13. Explain the following operational implications as they apply to AFW system. (KIA
06 1K5 )
a. Relationship between AJ'W flow and RCS heat transfer
b. Decay heat so urces and magnitude
c. Pump head effects when control valve is shut
d. Feed line voiding and water hammer
14. Given a malfu nction o f listed plant systems/co mpo nents, analyze its e ffect on the AFW
sys tem. (KIA 06 I K6)
a. Controlle rs and positioners
b. Pumps
c. Motors
d. Breakers
e. Valves
f. Level detectors
I S. Given a plant situ ation, prevent exceeding operational design limits by predicting andlor
monitoring, as app licable, changes in parameters that are associated with the o perating
co ntrols of the AF W system. (KIA 06 1A I)
a . S/G level
b . S/G pressure
c. Interactions when multi unit syste ms are cross tied
d. AFW source tank level
e. AFW flow/motor amps
Student Handout
Revision 0
Page 7 of 43
(
Moto r-driven pumps' capacity is 440 gpm each at 2,900 ft. TDH . The MDAFWPs are powered from 6,900-volt
shutdown boards , I A-A from 1A-A, I B-B from I B-B. Each MDAFWP supplies feedwater flow to 2 SOs. A-A
supplies I and 2 S/Os; B-B supplies 3 and 4 S/Gs.
Pump-motor cooling is provided by area cooler/fans The cooler/fan operates through local ' START' -'AUTO' -' STOP'
switch controls. If selected to 'AUTO', the unit starts at a predetermined area temperature. The following are fan and
ERCW valve designation s for the coolers . Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI)actuation will automatically start all 4
cooler/fans regard less of the operating condition of either unit..
Unit Area Fan ERCW Headcr/Valve/Ternnerature Element
1 CCW & AFW Pump Clr Fan 1A-A CLR-30-190 A,I -FCY-67-182 TS-30-190
I CCW & AFW Pump Clr Fan I B-B C LR-30-191 B, I-FCY-67-184 TS-30- 191
2 AFW & BA XH.IR Space Clr 2A-A CLR-30-184 A,2-FCY-67-217 TS-30-1 84
Fan
2 AFW & BA XFMR Space Clr 2B-B CLR 30-185 B,2-FCY-67-219 TS-30-1 85
ran
MDAFW Pump runout protcction is provided by a cavitating venturi, which aids in runout prevention by establishing
backprcssure on the pump. As fluid velocity increases, the pressure drops. The fluid will approac h saturated
co nditions with high enough flow to choke off or slow down pump discharge due to decreased density and increased
( .olume. T his protects the pump from runout. MDAFWP runout is limited to 650 gpm by this design.
- vi DAFWPs Automa tic start signals are
1- Low-low level in any I SG (213 LTs);
2- Safety Injection Signal:
a- IA-A MDAFW P: Train A SI Signal
b- I B-B MDAFWP: Train B SI Signal
1- Blackout (20-second time delay);
2- Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigating System Actuation Circuitry (A..L'vISAC);
3- Trip of both ma in feed pumps
4- Trip of either main feed pump above 76 percent load; (77% U-2)
MDA FWP Recirculation Valves (FCY-3-400 & FCY-3-401)
!vIDAFW P Recirculation valves return to CSTs providing a flow path for testing and pump protection when running at
shutoff head conditions. The recirculation flow rate for each MDAFWP totals 165 gpm. This includes the original
recirc orifices, 30 gpm, and the 2 inch, 135 gpm recirc line paralle l to the existing recirc line on each pump. Non-
sa fety related control air system is utilized to provide air to open the recirc valves FCY-3-400, and FCY-3-401. Non-
safety air is accept able because these valves fail closed, and the solenoids and electrical control circuits are Class I E.
Therefore the air will bleed off resulting in recirc valve clo sure.
The air ope rated recirc valves may remain open during normal startup and shutdown sequencing . During an accident
-equiring full AFW flow to the steam generators, these valves were designed to close automatically. Procedural
directions require the valves to be placed in the P-T-L position when AFW is placed in the MOD E I Standby
Readiness condition. This will be discussed later.
MDAFWP SG l evel control valves (LCVs 3-148, 3-156, 3-164 & 3-171)
Stude nt Handout
Rev ision 0
Page 10 of 43
(
Turbine-driven pump
- TOAFW Automatic Start Signals
1- Low-low level in 2/4 steam generat ors (2/3 LTs);
2- Safety Injection Signal (1/2 SI train actuation signals);
3- Blackout (immediate start) Loss of either SO Bd. on applicable unit;
4- Anticipated Transi ent Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigating System Actuation Circuitry (AM SAC);
5- T rip o f both main feed pumps
6- T rip of either main feed pump above 76 percent load; (77% U-2)
- Pump
1- Type - horizontal centrifugal
2- Capacity - 880 gpm at 2600 ft. TOH
- T urbine
1- T ype - Terry turbine non-condensi ng impulse single stage turbine.
2- Steam pressure requirement - lOa psig
3- Time to reach full speed - 10 seconds (full rated speed is 3970 RPM)
- Trip and throttle valve (motor operated FCY-I-51 )
1- Purpose - Isolation valve which admits steam to governor assembly and closes rapidly upon trip
( 2- Thermal overload (bypassed on all starts except Loss of I MFPT)
3- Closes also on steam supply transfer, FCV-I -15 to FCY-1-16.
- Trips
1- Mech overspeed (4,900 rpm) 125%
Annunciator on M-3 alarms when device is in the tripped cond ition.
Must be manually reset locally at the turbine. (Refer to Figure 3-2 for desc ription ofT&T valve reset.)
2- Elec. Overspeed (4300 RPM) 11 0%.
Annunciator on M-3 alarms when device is actuated.
Ca n be manually actuated from PB on M-3
Automatically resets itself after condition clears. (Speed drops below S.P.)
- Governor valve (hydrauli cally operated) Speed control/Flow contro l
1- The Gove rnor speed control (gov. vlv) is controlling the Terry Tu rbine (TI) speed @ 3970 rpm, unless the
flow controlle r sees flow from Terry Turbine (TI) above automatic or manual flow controller S.P., at which
time the flow co ntroller (I-HC-46-57) will decrease TT speed by closing the governor valve to limit TI flow
equ al to controller S.P. In automatic, the flow controller S.P. is 880 gpm.
2- HC-46-57 (M -4) will swap from manual to auto if emergency start signal is rece ived on turbine. Must be
accident reset afte r emergency start to place in manual. Pull out for manual contro l. Automatically swap to
manual control will be allowed if total flow is less than 985 gpm.
3- A motor ope rated potentiometer on local panel is set to minimum speed and utilized for overspeed test
operation. Minimum speed setpoint = 2200 RPM.
4- Govern or valve fails open on loss of oil pressure. Full open with pump shutdown, closes down to control
speed as oil pressure increases.
5- The TOAFWP utilizes the turbine speed control system to control flow to 880 gpm.
6- Recircu lation valves returning to CSTs are provided for pump protecti on and on-line testin g.
- Level contr ol valves
1- No automatic level control. Contr ol board M-3 handswitches have PTL; Close (sprin g return to Normal
TI-2 8 Att . 9
SON UNIT 1 & 2 CYCLE DATA SHEET
c
Elf. Date: Q5/10/2006
(FOR INFORMA T/ON ONL Y)
Paoe 10 of 16
Signal Sel point Logic Permissive
MOTOR DR IV EN AUX ILIA RY FEEDW ATER PUM PS AUT O START SIGN ALS
SIG Le vel l. o-Lo 10.7% (Normal Cntmt .) 2/3 any S/G
15% (A dverse Cntmt.) 2/3 any S/G
Safety Inj ection Any signal Associated Train
6.9 kV Shut down Bd. < 80% for 1.25 seconds Starts 20 seconds after
Undervoltage associated SO Bd ener gized .
Trip of either M FPT 1/2 @ > 80% Turbine Load
Trip of bo th MFPTs 2/2
AMSA C Sign al - < 8% S/G Level 3/4 For > 22 seconds
- > 40% powe r ( as 2/2 360 second time delay dropout
. seen by mai n turbin e) for this interlock .
TURBI NE D RIVE N AU XILIAR Y FEEDWATE R PU MP AU T O STA RT SIGNALS
S/G Level Lo-Lo 10.7% (Normal Cntmt.) 2/3 on 214 S/G
15% (Adverse Cntmt.) 2/3 on 2/4 S/G
Safety Injection Any signal Either train on ass ociated unit.
6 9 kV Shut down ~ < 80% for 1.25 seconds Starts immediately on
Undervoltage undervoltage signal.
( Trip of eithe r MFPT
Trip of both MF PTs
1/2
2/2
@ > 80% Turbine Load
AMSAC Signal - < 8% SIG Level 4/4 For > 22 secon ds
- > 40% powe r ( as 1/2 360 second tim e delay dropout
seen by mai n turbi ne) for this interlock.
TURBINE DR IVEN AU XILIARY FEEDWATER PU MP TRIP & ISOLATION SIGNALS
-
Sional Setooint Action
1. Me chanical Overspeed 4900 RPM Closes FCV-1-51
2. Electrical O verspeed 430Q RP M (U-1) Closes 1-FCV-1-51
4380 RPM (U-2 ) Closes 2-FCV -1-51
3. High Room Temp erature 2/2 TSs ?: 148°F Closes FCV-1-17
2/2 TS s > 148° F Closes FCV-1-18
(,
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
1 9 . 0 11 EK3.11 00 1
( During a LOCA, as RCS pressure and inventory are reduced , wh ich ONE (1) of the
following correctly describes:
(1) the sequence that will occur for modes of core cooling and
(2) the reason that reflux boiling occurs?
A. (1) Natural Circulation, then Reflux Boiling.
(2) Reflux boiling occurs when Natural Circulation has ceased and steam from the
core migrates to the S /G tubes where it is condensed and returns to the core via the
COLD leg.
By (1) Natural Circulation, then Reflu x Boiling.
(2) Reflu x boiling occurs when Natural Circulation has ceased and steam frorn the
core migrates to the S/G tubes where it is condensed and returns to the core via the
HOT leg.
C. (1) Reflu x Boiling, then Natural Circulation.
(2) Reflux boiling occurs before Natural Circulation has had time to start. Steam
from the core migrates to the S/G tubes where it is condensed and returns to the
( core via the COLD leg.
D. (1) Reflux boiling, then Natural Circulation.
(2) Reflux boiling occurs before Natural Circulation has had time to start. Steam
from the core migrates to the S/G tubes where it is condensed and returns to the
core via the HOT leg.
A. Incorrect. Correct sequence, but definition is incorrect due to description of cold leg
uncovering
B. Correct. Natural Circulation exists after RCPs are tripped. When inventory is
reduced so that Hot Leg openings are uncovered, reflux takes place. When inventory
is further reduced due to the size of the opening, flow through the core is lost out of the
break
C. Incorrect. Incorrect sequence, and cold leg not correct.
D. Incorrect. Incorrect sequence of phenomena
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:28 PM 34
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the Large Break LOCA:NC and PC
( Question No. 40
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.3
Technical Reference: LOCA Analysis
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL273C0205 Objective 2
Question Source: Bank
Question History: Robinson 2007 NRC
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.5
Comments:
Source: BANK Source If Bank: ROBINSON 2007 NRC
( Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:
Job Position : RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:28 PM 35
OPL273C0205
Revision 0
Page 3 of 13
(-,
I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE : LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION
III. LESSO N TITLE: T & AA LOCA ANALYSIS REVIEW
IV. LENGTH OF LESSO N/COURSE: 2.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />(s)
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of this lesson. the trainee shall explain how various loss of coolant
accidents can affect core cooling mechanisms and reduce the margin to thermal
limits, and, in extreme cases, can result in the release of radioactivity to the
environment. The trainee shall be required to successfully (:0:: 80 percent grade)
pass a written examination on this objective.
B. Enabling Objectives:
1. State the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) acceptance criteria.
( 2. Describe the core cooling mechanisms associated with a LOCA in general
terms .
3. Describe the effect of noncondensable gases on large-break and small-break
LOCAs, including their sources.
4. Describe the dynamic behavior of the reactor, from a thermodynamic and
hydraulic point of view, following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) for the
following categories:
a. Break diameters less than or equal to 3/8 inch.
b. Break diameters between 3/8 and 1 inch, minimum safety injection.
c. Break diameters between 1 and 2 inches.
d. Break diameters between 2 and 13-1/2 inches (1 square foot).
e. Vapor space break.
f. Large-break LOCA areas, between 1 square foot and double ended.
5. State the design basis accident (DBA).
6. Describe the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) analysis of the DBA LOCA
with respect to core cooling, blowdown, reflood, and core damage .
( MODE 4 -- Decay Heat Removal by Core Boiling (Figures 9, 10, and 11)
1. The reactor vessel level continues to decrease due to fluid loss through the break.
2. Boiling takes place in the core. The boiling removes energ y from the core and
transports it to the steam bubble above the core.
3. Any liquid that is produced from condensation inside the S/G tubes returns to the
core via gravity counterflow along the bottom of each partially filled hot leg pipe.
This phenomenon is called reflux flow . The cold leg side of the U-tubes is draining
to the loop seal.
4. Eventually, the decay heat level drops to the point where the S /G safety valves are
no longer needed as a heat sink. The exact point in time at which this occurs is
depen dent upon the decay heat level and the break size. The larger the break, the
sooner this event will happen. As soon as the S /G saturation pressure drops below
the safety valve setpoint, the safet y valves shut. Decay heat is then removed only
by heat loss through the break and by heat loss to the environment.
5. Plant pressure is now controlled solely by the steam bubble above the core. As the
decay heat level drops without a corresponding drop in heat removal, the system
tempera ture decreases.
-
6. As system pressure drops , the driving force for flow out of the break decreases. At
the same time , the lower system pressure allows injection flow to increase. This
( occurs when decay heat level falls to within the capabilities of the ECCS.
By the end of MODE 4, decay heat is being removed by the break. The S /Gs have become a
heat source rather than a heat sink.
It should also be noted that the operator can cause system pressure to drop below S/G
safety valve lift pressure earlier in the transient by using the steam dump . This action is not
necessary to protect the core .
MODE 5 -- Deca y Heat Remo val During Tran sition from Core Boiling to Natural Circulation
Mode (Figures 12 and 13)
1. With injection flow exceeding break flow, reactor vessel level continues to increase
to the top of the hot leg nozzles .
2. Prior to this point, a steam vent path existed from the top of the reactor vessel to
the break, through the "loop seal." The venting provided efficient heat remo val and
at the same time prevented pressure build-up in the reactor vessel outlet plenum .
15
3730s:4
SQN-TAA-13 6/90
1990Westinghou se Electric Corp.
( 3. As vessel level increases toward the top of the hot leg nozzles, slugs of water begin
'. to flow down the hot legs to the S/Gs.
4. The S/G inlets become flooded by the slug flow, disrupting the flow of steam
through the S/G tubes to the break .
5. The disruption of steam flow to the break reduces heat removal capability. The
reactor core exit temperature and the corresponding reactor vessel steam bubble
pressure starts to increase in response to the disruption.
6. As steam pressure increases, the two-phase fluid in the core compresses, and the
reactor vessel mixture level drops .
7. When level drops to the tops of the hot leg nozzles, slug flow through the hot legs
stops.
8. The compression effect on the core level is transmitted to the down comer, back
through the cold leg, and up into the cold leg side of the U-tubes.
9. If sufficient water had been initially present in the vessel outlet and if the rate of
vapor condensation in the hot leg side of the U-tubes can keep up with the rate of
vapor introduction, the effect of no. 8 can lead to a refilling of the tubes. If this
occurs, th~ density gradients required for natural circulation will be established. If
large quantities of noncondensable gases, particularly dissolved hydrogen and
oxygen released during the depressurization, have accumulated in the S/G tubes,
( the re-establishment of natural circulation may be prevented.
10. If natural circulation is not reestablished (as a result of noncondensable gases),
coolant system pressure continues to increase. Eventually, the setpoints of the
reactor coolant PORVs are reached.
11. As water is expelled from the ReS by the PORVs (remember that at this high
system pressure, total break flow may be above the total discharge capacity of the
SI pumps), core level may drop to the point where the level is below the top of the
hot leg nozzles.
12. Once this happens, steam can flow from the vessel outlet plenum to the S/Gs where
it can be condensed. This reflux cooling adequately cools the core and once again
lowers core temperature and pressure.
16
3730s:4
SQN-TM-13 6/90
1990Westinghouse Electric Corp.
OPL273C0205
Revision 0
Page 10 of 13
(
6. Describe the general RCS pressure trend during a 2-inch diameter cold leg LOCA.
(T-13,1)
ANSWER: RCS pressure decreases rapidly until saturation; then more slowly until it
hangs at the setpoint pressure of the first SIG safety valve. Pressure
decreases below the pressure when more energy is removed by the break
than is being added to the RCS.
7. Describe the process by which natural circulation terminates in the 2-inch diameter
cold leg LOCA. (T-13.1)
ANSWER: Natural circuiation terminates at the point where the RCS and the SIGs are at
essentially the same temperature with significant voids existing in the SIG U-
tubes . At this point, reflux cooling predominates.
8. Describe reflux flow. (T-13.2)
ANSWER: _ Reflux flow is the mechanism of core cooling by which bidirectional fiow
occurs in each RCS hot leg. Steam exits the core, is condensed in the SIGs,
and is returned to the core via the hot legs.
(
9. What condition is necessary for steam to be vented out of a cold leg break? What
does this indicate about the water level in the core? (T-1 3.1)
ANSWER: The loop seal must be cleared. This indicates that the core has uncovered .
10. List five conservative assumptions used in accident analysis for the LOCA.
(T-13.4)
ANSWER: (Any five of the following)
1. All SI flow to broken loop is lost.
2. Minimum 51 (one train).
3. Protection signals include maximum tolerances.
4. SI and AFW flow delayed for 47 seconds.
5. Conservatively high decay beat.
6. Reactor power at 102 percent of RTP power.
7. No control systems function .
8. Offsite power lost at time of trip,
l
(
Reflux Flow (Reflux Boiling)
- * Boiling in the core takes place
II * Steam moves up and into the hot legs
II
II
- Condensed in the hot legs and flows , v ia
II
gravity, back down the hot leg into the core
II
D
(
36
- - -------
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
c 23. 01 5 AA2.10 001
Given the following plant conditions:
- A Loss of Component Cooling Water has occurred .
- The US has entered AOP -M.03, Loss of Component Cooling Water.
- Cu rrent RCP parameters are as follows:
RCP Lower Bearing temperature is 222 °F and rising at 5°F per
minute.
RCP Seal Water Outlet temperature is 228 °F and rising at 3°F per minute.
RCP Upper Motor Bearing temperature is 19rF and rising at 3°F
per minute.
RCP Lower Motor Bearing temperature is 192 °F and rising at 4°F
per minute .
Based on current conditions, which ONE (1) of the following describes the action
required in relation to the RCPs?
A. Initiate a plant shutdown to Mode 3 and trip RCPs based upon RCP Lower Bearing
temperature exceeding an operating limit.
B. Trip the reactor and enter E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and trip RCPs
based upon RCP Lower Bearing temperature exceeding an operating limit.
C. Initiate a plant shutdown to Mode 3 and trip RCPs based upon RCP Seal Water
Outlet temperature exceeding an operating limit.
D:-' Trip the reactor and enter E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and trip RCPs
based upon RCP Seal Water Outlet temperature exceeding an operating limit.
A. Incorrect. Bearing is not exceeding a limit
B. Incorrect. Wrong bearing exceeding limit, but correct actions
C. Incorrect. Correct limit, incorrect actions
D. Correct. Rep seal water outlet limit is 225 degrees
l
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:29 PM 42
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Ability to de term ine and interpret the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Ma lfunctions (Loss of RC Flow ): W hen
to secure Re ps on loss of cooling or seal Injection
(
Question No. 41
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03 .7
Technical Reference: ' AOP-M .03 R11
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination : None
Learning Objective: OPL271AOI-M.03 Objective 8
Question Source: Modified
Question History :
Question Cognitive Level : Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
{ modified this one some more , we need to keep as many high er cog questions in here as we
( can. This is much better
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
Cogni tive Level : HIGHER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 412007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
Monday , March 12, 2007 2:35:29 PM 43
( SO N LOSS OF COMPONE NT COOLING WATER
Rev. 11
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.1 CCS Pum
CAUTIONS: * Loss of component cooling water flow to the RCP motor, requ ires
RCP be stopped within two (2) minutes.
- Containment Spray Pumps may experience beari ng failure during
operation after 10 mi nutes of loss of CCS coo li ng .
NOTE 1: Wh en the associated TRAIN of CCS is out of service the CCPs, SI Pumps, and RHR
Pumps are INOPERABLE for ECCS purposes due to not being able to fulfill it's
design function for sump recirculation. LCOs 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.6.2.1, 3.7.3 should be
evaluated and appropriately entered by the SRO.
NOTE 2: When CCS is out of service to mechanical seal HXs ONLY, the affected CCPs, SI
Pumps , and RHR Pumps have been evaluated to be OPERABLE and AVAILABLE.
Tfiese pumps can run indefinitely without CCS cooling water to mechanical seal HXs
(Ref: PER 72528, DCN Q-11452-A, and RIMS B38 941123 802).
(
11 . ENSURE affected Unit's standby CCS PERFORM the following on the affected Unit:
Pump (aligned to Train A) RUNNING.
a. IF in Mode 1 or 2,
THEN
PERFORM the following:
1) TRIP reactor.
2) STOP RCPs.
3) GO TO E-O, Reactor Trip or
Safety Injection, WHILE continuing
--1111111!.--
in this procedure. [C.2]
c. STOP and LOCK OUT affected Unit's
Thermal Barrier Booster Pumps.
(Step continued on next page.)
Pag e 8 of 64
( SQN LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER
Rev. 11
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.2 CCS Thermal Barrier Booster Pum
5. MONITOR RCP Seal and Lower Bearing TRIP the affected Unit's reactor and RCP(s).
temperatures less than or equal to 225°F.
IF in Mode 1. 2, or 3,
THEN
GO TO E-O. Reactor Trip or Safety
Injection.
--~.--
IF in Mode 4, 5. or 6.
THEN
STABILIZE RCS temperature USING RHR
(
6. MONITOR CCS radiation levels STABLE
or DROPPiNG:
- RA-90-123A, CCS liquid Effluent
Monitor
---.--
GO TO appropriate plant procedure.
- Chemistry Sample
CAUTION: Automatic isolation of the thermal barrier can be caused by a heat exchanger
tube leak. Realignment of the thermal barrier may cause additional leakage.
7. DETERMINE whether Thermal Barrier is GO TO appropriate plant procedure.
--~.--
to be placed back IN SERVICE.
Page 12 of 64
QUESTIONS REPORT
for Draft RO-SRO Exam
1. 015 AA2.10 001IMODIF1ED //HIGH ERJiRO/SEQUOY AH/4/2007 /NO
( Given the following plant conditions:
A Loss of Component Cooling Water occurred 1 minute ago.
- The US has entered AOP-M .03, Loss of Component Cooling Water.
RCP parameters are as follows:
- RCP Lower Bearing temperature is 205 deg F and rising at 5 deg F per
minute . .
- RCP Upper Motor Bearing temperature is 191 deg F and rising at 3 deg F
per minute.
- RCP Lower Motor Bearing temperature is 192 deg F and rising at 4 deg F
per minute .
Assuming Component Cooling Water cannot be restored and current trends continue,
which ONE (1) of the following is the longest time available prior to requiring trip of
RCPs?
AY 1 minute
B. 2 minutes -
C. 3 minutes
(
D. 4 minutes
RCPs required to be tripped on loss of CCW to motor bearings for 2 minutes. Loss
occurred 1 minute ago. Distractors all add up to trip criteria
Saturday, March 03, 2007 3:32 :18 PM 1
QUESTIONS REPORT
for Draft RO-SRO Exam
Ability to detennine and interpret the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): When
( to secure Reps on loss of cooling or seal injection
Question No. 41
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: R03.7
Technical Reference: AOP-M.03 R11
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPL271AOI-M.03 Objective 8
Question Source: Modified
Question History: North Anna 2006
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
(
Saturday, March 03, 2007 3:32:18 PM 2
OP L271AOP -M.03
Revision 0
Page 3 of 32
(
I. PROGRAM: OPE RATO R TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICE NSE TRAI NING
III . LESSON TITLE: AOP-M.03 "LOSS OF CO MPONENT COOLING WA TER"
IV. LENGTH OF LE SSON/COUR SE: - 1.5 hou rs
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of License Training, the participa nt shall be able to demonstrate or
expla in, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios , the requirements of
AOP-M .03, LOSS OF COMPON ENT COOLING WATE R.
B. Ena bling Obj ectives
Objectives
O. Demon strate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abil ities
associated with Loss of Component Cooling W ater that are rated ? 2.5 during Initiai
License T raining and ? 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Tra ining for the
( app ropriate positi on as identified in Appendix A
1. State the purpose/goal of AOP-M.03.
2. Des cribe the AOP- M.03 entry cond itions .
a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with
AO P-M.03 entry conditions .
b. Describe the ARP requirements associated with AO P-M.03 entry conditions.
c . Inte rpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are co nsistent with AOP-
M.03 entry conditions.
d. Describe the Administrative and Tech Spec conditio ns result ing from a Loss
of Component Cooling W ater.
3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP -
M.03 .
4. Upon entry into AOP-M.03, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the
app rop riate procedural section for response.
5. Summarize the mitigat ing strategy for the condition that initiated entry into AOP-
M.03 .
6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions , and steps of AOP-M.03.
OPL271AOP-M.03
Revision 0
Page 12 of 32
( X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
6. ALIGN 2B-8 CCS Pump to 8 Train using 0-SO-70- This step would be skipped
1, Component Cooling Water System "B" Train if U1 was not supplying the
WHEN alignment complete, THEN continue with would still be on Train A
this procedure and suppiying the SFP.
If either case (whether 1B-B or 2B-B is aligned
to Train B), the procedure is continued after the
alignment is complete
7. CHECK 081/082 CCS Heat Exchanger inlet
pressure normal for present plant conditions (O-PI-
70-399):
- 8ETWEEN 90 psig AND 110 psig
RNO direct to section on loss of B train if
pressure NOT in the normal range
8. RESTORE 8 Train Containment Spray Pumps to If Train B pressure is
A-AUTO;: normal ti e Train Bees
restored) then the Spray
- 18-8 Containment Spray Pump pumps are returned to
( * 28-8 Containment Spray Pump normal
9. GO TO appropriate plant procedure. This would be applicable if
the B train had been lost &
restored.
10. IDENTIFY and Lockout failed CCS Pump. If get to this step, then
the pump failure would
have been a Train A
failure
2 Caution & 2 notes
precede next step
CAUTIONS: Loss of CCS to the RCP motor A Train CS supplies the Rx
requires RCP to be stopped within building header
two (2) minutes.
The Containment Spray Pumps may Same caution seen prior to
experience bearing faiiure after 10 first step in section.
minutes of loss of CCS cooling.
( SQN REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MALFUNCTIONS AOP*R.04
Rev . 22
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS
CAUTION: Exceeding the following limitations requires trip of the affe cted RCP,
unless RCP operation is required by FR-C.1 , Inadequate Core Coo ling
or FR-C.2, Degraded Core Cooling:
- RCP #1 Seal llP less than 220 psid
- RCP #1 Seal Temperature greater th an 225°F
- RCP Lower Bearing Tem peratu re greater than 225°F
- RCP Upper Motor Bearing Temperature greater than 200°F
- RCP Lower Motor Bearing Temperature greater than 200°F
- RCP Motor Voltage less t han 5940V or greater th an 7260V
- R§P Motor Amps greater than 608 amps
- Rep Vibratio n gr eater than 20 mils on any axis (x and /or y) [C.3)
(
NOTE1 : During plan t startup following seal maintenance, the seal packag e should seat and
operate norm ally following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of run time.
NOTE 2: RCP trip criteria is also located in App end ix B. This appen dix should be referred to
throughout the performance of thi s procedure.
1. DIAGNOSE th e failure:
IF.. . GOTO
SECTION PAGE
Reactor Coolant Pum p(s) tripped or shutdown requ ired 2.1 4
RCP #1 Seal Leakoff high now (high now Alarm) 2.2 7
RCP #1 Seal Leakoff low now (low now Alarm) 2.3 13
RCP #2 Seal Le akoff high flow (high RCP standpipe level) 2.4 17
RCP #3 Seal Leakoff high flow (low RCP standpipe level) 2.5 20
RCP Motor Stator Temperature High 2.6 23
(
Page 3 of 34
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
28 . 022 AK3.03 001
( Given the follo wing plant cond itions:
- Unit 1 is at 100% RTP when a small RCS leak develops.
- The operating crew takes the necessary actions to stabil ize PZR level.
- Subsequently, the crew attempts to determine the leakage source.
- After isolating charging and letdown, the crew observes the following
parameterslindications:
- Letdown flow 0 gpm ;
- Cntmt pressure approximately 0.3 and decreasing ;
- RCS pressure appro ximately 2235 psig and stable;
- Pzr level approximately 65% and increasing;
- Cha rging flow 40 gpm ;
- Cntmt rad iation monitors trend ing downward slowly.
Which ONE (1) of the following actions will the operating crew perform next?
A. Immediately trip the reactor and enter E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection because
PZR level exceeds the maximum limit.
By Place excess letdown in service and adjust seal injection flow to maintain PZR level
within limits; initiate maintenance.
( C. Initiate Emergency Shutdown per AOP-C.03, Emergency Shutdown due to RCS
leakage exceeding limits.
D. Isolate Charging unti l the leakage source can be identifi ed.
A. Incorrect . The initial conditions do not require an immediate reactor trip.
B. Correct. The RCS leak was determined to be on normal letdown based on
containment pressure decreasing and radiation monitor output has stabilized.
Therefore to maintain pressurizer level and RCS chemistry (chemical feed and
boration), excess letdown is required.
C. Incorrect. A OP-C. 03 Emergency Shutdown is entered for conditions that require a
rapid shutdown without a reactor trip. Since pressurizer level is stabilized and the
other initial conditions indicated the RCS leak has been isolated a rapid shutdown is
not required per AOP-R.05.
D. Incorrect. The leak has been isolated to the normal letdown line. Therefore, a leak
search team is unnecessary.
( The student must understand from the initial conditions the RCS leak was on the
letdown line and has been isolated. In order to maintain pressurizer level and
chemistry excess letdown is required.
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:29 PM 52
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Makeup: Performance of
lineup to establish excess letdown after determining need
(
Question No. 42
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating : R03.1
Technical Refe rence: ' AOP-R.OS
EA-62-3
Proposed references to be provided to app licants during exami nation: None
Learn ing Objective: OPL271 C367, Objectives Obj 2, 4
Question Source: Bank
Question History: AO P R.OS-B.2-6
Question Cognitive Level : Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
(
Source: BANK Source If Bank : SEQ UOYAH BANK
Cognitive Level: HI GHER Difficulty:
Job Position: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
Monday, March 12,2007 2:35:29 PM 53
OPL271AOP-R05
Revision 0
Page 3 of 26
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING
III. LESSON TITLE: AOP-R05 RCS LEAK AND LEAK SOURCE IDENTIFICATION
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />(s)
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective :
Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate or
explain , using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of
AOP -R05, RCS LEAK AND LEAK SOURCE IDENTIFICATION.
B. Enabling Objectives:
O. _Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 Knowledge's and Abilities
associated with Reactor Leak and Leak Source Identification that are rated ~
2.5 during Initial License Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator
( Requalification Training for the appropriate license position as identified in
Appendi x A.
1. Explain the purpose/goal of AOP-R05.
2. Discuss the AOP-R05 entry conditions.
a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks , and automatic actions associated with
AOP-R05 entry conditions.
b. Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-R.05 entry conditions .
c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-
R05 entry conditions.
d. Describe the Administrative conditions that require Turbine Trip/ Reactor trip
due to RCS leakaae .
3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-
R05.
4. Upon entry into AOP-R05, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to
the appropriate procedural section for response.
5. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-
R05.
6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-R05.
7. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and
transitions to other procedures .
OPL271AOP-R05
Revision 0
Page 4 of 26
( 8. Given a set of initial plant conditions use AOP-R05 to correctly:
a. Recognize entry condi tions
b. Identify required actions
c. Respond to Contingencies
d. Observe and Interp ret Cautions and Notes
9. Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the perform ance of
10. Apply GFE and system respo nse concepts to the abnorma l condition - prior to,
duri ng and after the abnormal condition
(
(
AOp*R.05
( SQ N RCS LEAK AND LEAK SOURCE IDENTIFICATION
Rev. 11
I STEP I ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
2.1 Small Reactor Coola nt System Leak (cont' d)
13. CHECK if charging and letdown
should be restored:
a. CHECK charging and letdown a. GO TO Step 14.
ISOLATED.
b. CHECK pressurizer level
greater than 20%.
c. CHECK charging and normal c. EVALUATE placing excess letdown
letdown-AVAILABLE. in service USING EA-62-3, Establishing
Excess Letdown.
GO TO Step 14.
(
d. RESTORE CVCS charging and
letdown USING EA-62-5,
Establishing Normal Charging and
Letdown.
14. CHECK if pressurizer heaters
should be restored:
a. CHECK pressurizer level a. GO TO Step 15.
greater than 20%.
b. ENSURE pressurizer heaters
in service as required.
c. ENSURE pressurizer liquid temperature
at saturation temperature.
Page 19 of 58
SQN EA-62-3
( ESTABLISHING EXCESS LETDOWN Rev. 3
1, 2 Page 3 of 5
4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS
4.1 Placing Excess Letdown in Service
NOTE If seal return valves FCV-62-61 or FCV-62-63 are closed, excess letdown
flow will be routed to PRT via relief valve 62-636. Reopening FCV-62-61
and FCV-62-63 following a Phase A Isolation is addressed in applicable
EOP steps.
1. IF excess letdown is only letdown flowpath,
THEN
CONTROL charging flow as necessary to prevent high pressurizer level. 0
2. IF high activity levels in RCS are suspected,
THEN
( NOTIFY Radiological Control (Radcon) section to monitor plant
radiological conditions as required. o
3. ENSURE CCS inlet to excess letdown heat exchanger [FCV-70-1431
OPEN. o
4. ENSURE CCS outlet to excess letdown heat exchanger [FCV-70-851
OPEN. o
5. VERIFY CCS flow to excess letdown heat exchanger
greater than 230 gpm, as indicated on.[FI-70-84J. o
6. ENSURE excess letdown divert valve [FCV-62-591 in NORMAL. o
(
SON EA-62-3
( ESTABLISHING EXCESS LETDOWN Rev. 3
1,2 Page 4 of 5
4.1 Placing Excess Letdown in Service (Continued)
7. OPEN excess letdown isolation valve [FCV-62-541 . o
8. OPEN excess letdown isolation valve [FCV-62-551. o
NOTE UNIT 1 ONLY Normally the temperature read on 1-TI-62-58 should be less
than 200°F. If operation requires temperatures greater than 200°F, the
pressure at 1-PI-62-64 (local indicator EI. 690 Pnl. L-46) should be less than
100 psig to protect the Grinnell valves .
9. ADJUST excess letdown flow control valve [FCV-62-561as necessary
to controi flow WHILE maintaining heal exchanger outlet temperature
less than 200°F (240°F on Unit 1), as indicated on [TI-62-581. o
(
10 . NOTIFY RADCON excess letdown has been placed in service. o
11 . RETURN TO procedure and step in effect. o
--~.--
END OF TEXT
(
-- -- . __ . - - ._--_.-
SQN EA*62*J
( ESTABLISHING EXCESS LETDOWN Rev. J
1,2 Page 5 of 5
5.0 REFERENCES
5.1 Drawings
A. 47W809-1, Chemical and Volume Control System.
B. 47W859*2 , Component Cooling Water System.
(
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
31 . 0 25 AKI.OI 001
( Given the following plant conditions:
- Unit 2 is in Mode 6.
- RCS drained to elevation 701 feet.
- RCS temperature is 110°F.
- Upper Internals are not installed.
- Core decay heat is approximately 5 MW.
- A total loss ofRHR cooling has occurred.
W hich ONE (1) of the following is correct concerning the amount of time it will take to
reach 200 °F in the RCS?
Reference Provided
A . 26 minutes
B. 32 minutes
C~ 43 minutes
D. 306 minutes
( A. Incorrect. Equation 1 was used to determine value .
B. Incorrect. Equation 2 was used to determine value.
C. Correct. Apply equation 3 of 0-GO-15, Appendix U.
Time =2390 [(200-110)/5000KW] =43 min
D. Incorrect. Equation 4 was used to determine value.
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:29 PM 58
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Residual Heat Removal System:
Loss of RHRS dUring all modes of operation
(
Question No. 43
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: RO 3.9
Technical Reference: O-GO-15, App. U
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: O*GO*15, App U
Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-R.03, Obj 1
OPL271 GO-1S, Obj 16
Question Source: Bank
Question History: AOP-R.03.B.1-6
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.5
Comments:
(
Source: BANK Source If Bank: SEQUOYAH BANK
Cognitive Level: HIGHER D ifficulty:
Job Posi tion: RO Plant: SEQUOYAH
Dale: 412007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
Monday, March 12, 20072:35:29 PM 59
SQN CONTAINMENT CLOSURE CONTROL 0-GO-15
Uni t 0 Rev. 0022
( Paae110of1 12
Appendix U
(Page 1 of 2)
TIME FOR RCS TO REACH 200°F (INFORMATION ONLY)
Unit _ -:-:---;-:-_
Unit _ Date _
NOTE
These equations can be used to calculate the time to reach 200°F based upon ReS
temperature (T) and Decay Heat (Power) in the reactor vessel. The decay heat values will
be provided from Nuclear Fuels calculations. These times should NOT to be used for
allowable closure times used in this procedure. It is intended to be INFORMATION ONLY
for defense in dept h.
Equation 1 Reactor Vessel Water Level at Elevation < 697.75 ' and the Upper
Internals Installed (midloop)
14b0[ 200 - T(dcg F)] = TIME(MIN.)
Power(KW )
( 1 460[200 - ~F) ] = MINUTES
~KW) - - -
Equation 2 Reactor Vessel Water Level at Elevation 697.75' and above With the
Upper Internals Installed.
1780[ 200 - T(dcg F)] = TIME(MIN.)
Power(KW)
1780[ 200 - ~ F)] = MINUTES
~ KW) --
SQN CONTAI NMENT CLOSURE CONTROL 0-GO-15
( UnitO Rev. 0022
Paqe 111 of 112
Appe ndix U
(Page 2 of 2)
Un it _ Date _
Unit _
Equa tion 3 React or Vessel Water Level at Elevation 701' and the
Upper Interna ls NOT Installed.
239 J 200 - T(deg Fl ] = TIME(MIN.l
'l Power(KW l
F
2390[200- L - l ] = MINUTES
L - KW) --
Equation 4 Reactor Vessel Head Off, Upper Internals NOT installed and
Refueling Canal Flooded to Elevation 716'
17000[ 200 - T(deg Fl ] = TIME(MIN.)
( Power(KW)
F
17000[200 - L - l ] = MINUTES
~KW ) - -
Equation 5 Reactor Vessel Head Off, Upper Internals NOT Installed and
Refue ling Canal Flooded to Elevation 726'
27000[ 200- T(deg Fl] = TIME(MIN.)
Power(KW)
27000[200 - L - F)] = MINUTES
L - KWl
(
OPL271 GO-15
Revision 0
( Page 4 of 13
12. Describe how Allowable Ciosure Time , Estimated Closure Time and Margin to
Closure Time are obtained.
13. Describe the requirements if the Margin to Closure Time is negative.
14. Describe the requirements for establishment of an Alternate Containment
Boundary .
15. Describe how the containment penetrations are organized for establishing and
verifying containment closure.
16. Describe how the time to reach 200QF in the RCS is calculated.
OPl271GO-1 5
Revision 0
Page 12 of 13
c X. LESSON BODY : INSTRUCTOR NOTES
7. The time for the RCS to heat-up to 200QF may be Objective 16
calculated for defense in depth purposes. This
calculation is for information only and should not be used Review Appendix U
for allowable c losure times in this procedure. Several
different equations may be used for the calculation
based on curr ent conditions of the RCS and core heat.
The following factors are used to calculate the time to
reach 200°F.
a. RCS temperature
b. Core decay heat (provided by Nuclear Fuels)
c. The limit for RCS temperature (200°F)
d. A conversion factor to give the results of the
calculation in minutes
OPL27 1AOP*R03
Revision 1
Page 3 of 37
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAIN ING
III. LESSON TITLE: AOP-R03 , RHR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Term inal Objective :
Upon completion of License Training, the participant shall be able to demonstrate
or explain, using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the
requirements of AOP-R03, RHR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.
B. Enabling Objectives
Objectives
O. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities associated
with Rf-4R SYST EM MALFUNCTIONs that are rated ~ 2.5 during Initial License
Training and z 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for the
appropriate position as identified in Append ix A.
(
1. State the purpose/goal of this AOP-R03 .
2. Describe the AOP-R03 entry conditions.
a. Describe the setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with
AOP -R03 entry conditions.
b. Describe the ARP requirements associated with AOP-R03 entry conditions.
c. Interpret, prioritize, and verify associated alarms are consistent with AOP-R03
entry conditions .
d. Describe the plant parameters that may indicate an RHR System Malfunction.
3. Describe the initial operator response to stabilize the plant upon entry into AOP-R.03.
4. Upon entry into AOP-R03, diagnose the applicable condition and transition to the
appropriate procedural section for response.
5. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into AOP-R03.
6. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of AOP-R03.
(
OPL271AOp*R03
Revision 1
Page 4 of 37
(-,
7. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and transitions
to other procedures.
8. Given a set of initial plant conditions use AOP-R03 to correctly:
a. Recoonlze entrv conditions.
b. Identify required actions.
c. Respond to Contingencies.
d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.
9. Describe the Tech Spec and TRM actions applicable during the performance of
10. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior to, during
and after the abnormal condition.
(
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
c 33. 026 G2.4.6 001
Given the following plant conditions:
- A loss of Component Cooling Water has occurred.
During performance of M.03, Loss of Component Cooling Water, the crew is
required to trip the reactor..
Which ONE (1) of the following describes the requ irement fo r concurrent use of the
AOP M.03 may...
A. only be used when the EOPs direct its use by terms such as 'use' or 'refer to'.
B. only be used upon transition from E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection , and only if
sufficient resources are available to support its use.
C~ be used concurrently with EOP usage in accordance with the requirements of
EPM-4.
D. be used concurrently with EOP usage only if enough resources above minimum
shift complement are available to allow the CRO to perform the AOP as a
'reader-doer' .
(
A incorrect. If conditions require, it may be used as necessary
B incorrect. May be used prior to transition.
C correct.
o incorrect. CRO is typically reader-doer, but not required. 8M decision
Monda y, March 12, 2007 2:35:30 PM 62
-----
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Emergency Procedures I Plan Knowledge symptom based EO? mitigation strategies.
( Question No. 44
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: RO 3.1
Techn ical Reference: .' EPM-4
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective : OPL271EPM-4 Objective 3
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments :
Source : NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:
( Job Posi tion :
Date :
412007
Plant:
Last 2 NRC?:
SEQUOYAH
NO
Monday, March 12,20072:35:30 PM 63
PROGRAM USER'S GUIDE Rev. 18
MANUAL Page 63 of 92
(
3.11.7 Use of AOPs Within the EO? Network
A. EOPs have priority over AOPs at all times , except when a reactor trip or
safety injection has occurred in conjunction with an App endix R fire (AOP-
N.08), Control Room abandonment (AOP-C .04), or Loss of all ERCW
capabil ity (AOP-M.01) .
B. AOP performance while in the EOP network is allowa ble under the following
two circumstances: [C .1]
1. AOP performance is directed by EOPs in effect.
2. AOP performance is deemed necessary by the SM or US to address
abnormal plant conditions NOT directly addressed by the EOPs but
which have a significant im pact on the ability of the EOPs to perform their
function (e.g., loss of ERCW, CCS, off-site power, vital instrument power
board, etc.) In this case, the following guidelines should be followed:
a. Concurrent performance of the EOPs and the AOP shouId enhance,
NOT degrad e, the performance of EOPs in progress.
b. Manpower resources are adequate to allow performing the EOPs
( and the AOP concurrently.
c. The AOP should be performed using the "reader-doer" method so
the procedure reader remains dedicated to the EOPs in progress,
which are mitigative in nature. Th e SM may elect to deviate from
this requirement whe n in ES-O.1.
d. Certain AOPs may be requ ired to be performed concurrently with the
EOPs in order for the EOPs to function as intend ed; for example.
loss of CCS, loss of ERCW, loss of air or vital power to equipment
importan t to safety-- any of these could have a significant impact on
the ability of the EOPs to achieve their goals.
e. Upon transition to ES-O.1. the 8 M will design ate the mitigating crew
responsibilities as appropriate, based on the events in progress.
Normally, the procedure reader and OATC will perform ES-O.1 while
the CRO performs the AOP as a reader-doer.
OPL271EPM-4
Revision 0
Page 3 of 26
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING
III. LESSON TITLE:
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 4-6 hour(s)
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of HLC Procedures training , the participant shall be able to explain ,
using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of EMP-4,
EOP-E-O, "User's Guide for Emergency Operating Instructions".
B. Enabling Objectives:
1. Determine/identify the correct procedural application(s) based on the operating procedures
network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions.
2. Analyze an EOP layout and determine (according to EPM-4):
a. correct procedural layout application ;
( b. if the use of terms is correct (e.g.: Faulted Steam Generator, Shall, Lowering , etc per
Appx. B);
c. correct use of symbols and icons.
3. Define EOP warnings , cautions, and notes and, given an EOP condition, determine
appropriate usage .
4. Compare and contrast event-based emergency/abnormal operating procedure s used in
parallel with the symptom-based EOPs.
5. Given an example, apply general guidelines , crew roles and responsibilities for EOP
procedural use and determine:
a. format and use of sequenced and non-sequenced sub steps;
b. transition between Action/Expected Response column and the Response Not Obtained
column;
c. requirements for task completion prior to proceeding to the next action (and how any
exceptions are identified);
d. requirements for task completion still in progress following transition to another procedure
or step;
e. actions based on fold-out page use;
f. actions based on hand-out page use;
g. if EOP termination is appropriate based on given conditions .
6. Identify post-acc ident instrumenta tion and determine if its use is required .
7. Given plant operating conditions , determine if EOP entry conditions have been met and state
the resultant appropriate immediate action steps for those conditions .
OPL271 EPM-4
Revision 0
Page 10 of 26
X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
2. Arc Flash protection requirements for operating EPM-4 Section 3.1
breaker or remo ving /installing fuses may be waived
when prompt action is necessary in an emergency.
3. Parameter approaching a protective action setpoint in Powerpoint Slides 24-25
an uncontrolled manner Reinforce the use of "trend"
in the evaluation of a
parameter.
3. Grew Briefs. PowerPoint Slide #26, 33
These guidelines promote belter communications.
See se ction 5.0 , definitions
for mitigating crew .
Review these guidelines
and rein force "SHALL" and
"SM."
4. Two or more procedures to be performed concurrently. PowerPoint Slide #34
This does hot appl y when the procedure reader hands
off one EAP to the UO. This applies when two or more Reinforce : the SM is the
c procedures (usually EAPs) must be performed and
resources are not available.
resource manager.
Example: While performing
EGA-O.O, the follo wing
EAPs need to be
performed: EA-3-4, EA-250-
1, and EA-250-2. When the
first AUO arrives in the
MGR which EAP does he
perform?
Answer: A judgment call by
the 8M based on plant
conditions and available
resources.
G. Prudent Operator Actions . PowerPoint Slide #35-52
Any action taken without explicit procedure guidance.
Objective 9
Q: When have prudent
actions been implemented
in the past? Under what
circumstances?
( The definition of prudent
action is in section 5.0.
OPL271 EPM-4
Revision °
Page 16 of 26
c X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
c. The mitigating crew is expected to be cognizant of Explain that continuous
all continuous actions that are currently applicable action verbs and event/
as procedures are performed. This includes any time-dependent verbs are
applicable continuous actions that were read in listed on the Handout page
previously performed procedures. for each procedure where
applicable.
d. Rules of usage for continuous action steps . Refer to the example in
Sect 3.9.8.
e. The scope of the continuous action step is See examples, Sect 3.9.8.,
determined by it's placement within the step the continuous action verb
structure. is in the sub step;
the continuous action verb
is in the high level step.
10. Transition step . PowerPoint Slide #76, 63
a. Transit ional verbs are GO TO and RETURN TO. See examples and arrows
These verbs will have a directional arrow to indicate if as shown in Sect 3.9.10,
( the transition is to a previous step, a step not yet
read in the same procedure, or to another procedure,
which becomes the controlling procedure .
b. Other verbs REFER TO and USING are transitional See examples in Sect 3.9.9.
in a limited sense in that another procedure is
specified for CONCURRENT performance. In this
case there is no directional arrow. These verbs may
also be used to refer to a document within the
controlling procedure such as a curve. The verb
USING may also specify a component or system to
complete the intent of a step such as "depressurize
USING auxiliary sprays."
c. Rules of usage for transition steps. PowerPoint Slide #77
Objective 5
Don't forget the crew brief.
1. Transitions from either column which refer to
another procedure will begin with step 1 unless
otherwise specified .
If there is a note or caution prior to step 1 or the
specified step then start with that note or
caution.
OPL271 EPM-4
Revision 0
Page 17 of 26
( X. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
2 . Transitions can be performed prior to
completion of a task in progress, provided tha t
completion of the task is verified at a later time .
3 . Transitions that depend on a parameter Example: A ruptured SIG
reaching a certain value or range of values may narrow range level is 40%
be performed prior to reaching the stated value increasing and all AFW flow
provided the SM or US concurs, and the is isolated. The AER states
parameter is approach ing the stated va lue , and to co ntrol between 10% and
its reaching that value is imminent. 50%.
Q : The RNO transitions to
E-3 . Does the level have to
rea ch 50% before
transitioning to E-3 ?
An swe r: NO
4. The procedure reader may assign appropriate Remember: If two or more
personnel to perform a concurrent procedure as concurrent procedures must
a "reader-doer." be performed , the SM is the
( resource manager and sets
the priority.
5. The procedure reader MUST kee p track of Meth ods for procedure
procedure transitions and w ho is perform ing place- keep ing are
concurrent procedures . discussed in Sect 3.11.1 .
See example in Sect 3.11 .
11. Foldout Page. PowerPoint Slide #78
Most ORPs (all Es , ESs , and some ECAs) have foldout Objective 5
pages (FOP) which present actions or transitions which
apply at all times during the procedure performance. Sect 3.9.10
FRPs, EAPs, and AOPs do not use FOPs. Q: Does the foldout pag e of
E-O apply while perform ing
T he FOP does no t fold ou t rather it is print ed on the E-1?
reverse side of the procedure step page. Th is
information must be frequently monitored. A: NO
(
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
36. 027 G2.4 .6 00 1
( Given the following plant conditions:
- A reactor trip has occurred on Low PZR pressure.
The crew is performing E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection .
- All Train A ECCS equipment is operating as required .
- Train B ECCS equipment has failed to start.
- Whi le checking RCS pressure control, the following conditions exist:
- All RCPs are running.
While performing E-O step 10, Check pressurizer PORVs, safeties and spray
valves, the following indications are observed by the OATC:
RCS pressure is 1200 psig.
PZR level is 100%.
PORV 68-340 red position indicator is lit.
Wh ich ONE (1) of the following describes all of the actions that are required in
accordance with E-O?
A. Attempt to close the PORV and/or block valve; if the PORV cannot be isolated ,
continue in E..:.O to the diagnostic steps to determine appropriate trans ition.
B. Attempt to close the PORV and/or block valve; if the PORV cannot be isolated ,
( transition directly to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
C~ Trip RCPs; attempt to close the PORV and/or block valve; if the PORV cannot be
isolated, transition directly to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
D. T rip RCPs ; attempt to close the PORV and/or block valve ; if the PORV cannot be
isolated, continue in E-O to the diagnostic steps to determine appropriate transition.
A. Incorrect. RCPs must be tripped, and E-O will not be continued if this condition
exists
B. Incorrect. Correct actions with exception of tripping RCPs
C. Correct. With RCS pressure <1250 psig and 1 SI or CCP running, trip RCPs.
E-O step 10 RNO directs other actions
D. Incorre ct. Correct actions with exception of continuing in E-O. Must go to E-1
Monday, March 12, 20072:35:30 PM 68
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Emergency Procedures I Plan Knowledge symptom based EOP mitigation strategies.
('" Que stion No. 45
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: RO 3.1
Technical Reference : E-O , step 10 RNO, E-O Continuous Action Page
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination : None
Learning Objective: OPL271 E-O Objective 5
Quest ion Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Higher
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.10
Comments:
Sourc e: NEW Source If Bank:
Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:
( Job Position:
Date:
4/2007
Plant:
Last 2 NRC?:
SEQUOYAH
NO
(
Monday, March 12, 20072:35:30 PM 69
OPL271E-0
Revision 0
Page 3 of 16
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING - LICENSED
II. COURSE: LICENSE TRAINING
III. LESSON TITLE: E-G, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection"
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON/COURSE: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Terminal Objective:
Upon completion of HLC Procedures training, the participant shall be able to explain,
using classroom evaluations and/or simulator scenarios, the requirements of E-G,
"Reactor Trip or Safety Injection".
B. Enabling Objectives
Obiectives
o. Demonstrate an understanding of NUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities
associated with Reactor Trip or Safety Injection that are rated ~ 2.5 during Initial
License Training and ~ 3.0 during License Operator Requalification Training for
the appropriate position as identified in Appendix A
( 1. State the purpose/goal of this E-O.
2. Describe the E-G entry conditions.
3. Summarize the mitigating strategy for the failure that initiated entry into E-G.
4. Describe the bases for all limits, notes, cautions, and steps of E-G.
5. Describe the conditions and reason for transitions within this procedure and
transitions to other procedures.
6. Given a set of initial plant conditions use E-G to correctly:
a. Recoqnize entry conditions.
b. Identify required actions.
c. Respond to Continaencies.
d. Observe and Interpret Cautions and Notes.
7. Apply GFE and system response concepts to the abnormal condition - prior to,
durinq and after the abnormal condition .
(
OPL271E-0
Revis ion 0
Page 9 of 16
( x. LESSON BODY: INSTRUCTOR NOTES
7. CHECK if main steamlines snould be Determines if MSIVs should
isolated : have auto isolated. If NOT
a. Refer to E-O for Substeps and cond ition are met, then
b. Refer to E-O for RNa manually isolate them .
Prevent RCS cooldown.
NOTE: Refer to NOTE in E-O Seal injection water should
be maintained even if RCPs
are tripped
8. Check RCPs trip criteria: Trip RCPs if criteria is met
a. Refer to E-O for Substeps
b. Refer to E-O for RNa
c. The following summary is provided from the Objective 7
RCP TRIP/RESTART document: If RCPs Discuss the thermodynamic
continue to operate during a small break effect of water flow vs
LOCA, the forced circulation provides core steam flow through a break
cooling, but also results in greater loss of and the effect if RCP trip is
coolant inventory due to continued discharge delayed after meeting RCP
of saturated liquid (rather than steam) from trip criteria .
the break. Continuous operation of the RCPs
( during a LOCA cannot be guaranteed since
tripping of the RCPs would occur upon a loss
of offsite power or other essential support
conditions which could occur at any time. The
reason for purposely tripping the RCPs during
an accident (when the RCP trip criterion is
met) is to prevent exces sive loss of RCS
water inventory through a small break which
might lead to severe core uncovery if the
RCPs were tripped for some reason later in
the accident.
9. MONITOR RCS temperatu res: Determines if a RCS cool
a. Refe r to E-O for Substeps down or heatup is in
b. Refer to E-O for RNa progress and provides
guidance to control either.
10. CHECK pressurizer PORVs, safeties, and spray Objective 5
valves: Checks for abnormal RCS
a. Refer to E-O for Substeps depressurization. If in
b. Refer to E-O for RNa progress then isolates the
c. Instructor NOTE: This is the diagnostic cause if possible or GO TO
section of this procedure to determine the E-1
cause and transition to the appropriate
( response procedure
TI-28 Atl. 9
SON UNIT 1 & 2 CYCLE DATA SHEET
Eff. Da te: 0511 0/2006
( {FOR /NFORMA T/ON ONL Y}
Pace 6 of 16
REAC TOR TRIP SIGNALS
Siqnal Selpoinl Logic Block/Permissive
1. Sour ce Range 10' cps t y, HS's Manual @ z P-6
2. Intermediate Ran ge 25% t 1/2 Manual @ ? P-10
I
3. Power Range (Lo) 25% r 214 Manual @ ? P-10
4. Power Range (Hi) 109% t 214 None
5. Power Range Rate 2: 5% with a 2-sec time 2/4 None
constant
I 6. OT6T Variable (nominal 115%) 2/4 None
I' 7. OP6T Variable (nominal 108.7%) 2/4 None
8. PZR Press . Hi 2385 psig i 214 None
9. PZR Press. Lo 1970 psig t Irate sensitive) 2/4 Auto Block @ .::: P-7
10. PZR Level Hi 92% t 2/3 Auto Block @ .::: P-7
11. RCS Flow Lo 90% t of loop design 213 in 2/4 loops Au to Block @ .::: P-7
flow 213 in 1/4 loops Auto Block @ .::: P-8
12. RCP-Bus UF 57 Hz t 2/4 loops Auto Block @ .::: P-7
13. RCP-B us UV- 73% (5022 volts) .j, 2/4 loops Auto Block @ .::: P-7
14. SIG Level Lo-Lo 10.7% .j, (Normal Cntmt.) 2/3 any S/G Time Delay. T M * Based
15% t (Adverse Cntmt.) 2/3 any S/G on Loop 6 T
15. Safety Injection 4 initiation signals Vari able None
16. Turbine Trip Auto Block @ .::: p- g
- Stop Valves Closed 4/4
- Auto Stop Oil 45 psig.j, 2/3
Press. Lo
17. Solid State Protective Tra in Trouble (any): 2/2 Train
Protectio n System a. Reac tor Trip Bypass Bkr Rack ed in and Closed
General Warning
b. PC Card Oul (any exce pt Isolator)
c. Power Supply Trouble:
I 1) Loss of Either 15 V DC
2) Loss of Either 4 8 V DC
3) Loss of Output Slav e Relay 120 V AC
d. Switc h Positions:
1) Inpul Error Inhibit - "Inhibit'"
2) Mult iplexe r Test - "Inhibit"
3) Logic Function - Out of "Normal"
4) Permissive Function - Out of "Normal"
5) Memories Function - Out of "Normel"
6) Output Relay Mode - "Test"
e. Ground Relay Fuse Blown
18. Manu al 1 1/2 HS 's I
E-O
SQN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION
Rev. 28
(
FOLDOUT PAGE
RCP TRIP CRITERIA
IF any of the following conditions occurs:
- Phase B isolation,
THEN
STOP all RCPs.
EVE NT DIAGNOSTICS
- IF any S /G press ure dropping in an uncontrolled manne r,
THEN
PERFORM tbe following:
a. CLOSE MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.
b. WHEN faulted S /G is identified,
THEN
PERFORM the followin g:
1) ISOLATE AFW flow to faulted S /G .
2) ENSURE one of the following :
- total AFW flow greater than 440 gpm
- narrow range level greater than 10% [25% ADV] in at least one intact S /G .
- IF both trains of shutdown boards de-energized,
THEN
GO TO ECA-O.O, Loss of All AC Power.
TAN K SWITCHOVER SETPOINTS
- IF CST level less than 5%,
THEN
- IF RWST level less than 27%,
THEN
GO TO ES-1.3, Tran sfer to RHR Conta inmen t Sump.
Page 1a of 21
E-O
SQN REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Rev. 28
( I STEP II ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE I I RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED
10. CHECK pressurizer PORVs, safeties,
and spray valves:
a. Pressurizer PORVs CLOSED . a. IF pressurizer pressure is
less than 2335 psig,
THEN
CLOSE pressurizer PORVs.
IF pressurizer PORV
CANNOT be closed ,
THEN
CLOSE its block valve.
IF any pressurizer PORV stuck open
AND block valve CANNOT be closed,
THEN
PERFORM the following:
( 1) MONITOR status trees.
2) GO TO E-1, Loss of Reactor or
b. Pressurizer safety valves CLOSED.
---.--
Secondary Coolant.
b. IF pressurizer pressure is
less than 2485 psig,
THEN
PERFORM the following:
1) MONITOR status trees .
2) GO TO E-1, Loss of Reactor or
(step conti nued on next page)
---.--
Secondary Coolant.
(
Page 10 0f 21
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
40. 029 G2.2.25 001
( Which ONE (1) of the following describes the basis for the capac ity of the Pressurizer
Code Safety Valves?
Maintain RCS pressure below the safety limit...
A. for all events including ATWS coincident with Loss of Feedwater.
B~ for a 100% load rejection with no steam dump or PZR PORV operation , and no
credit taken for direct reactor trip on loss of load.
C. for a 100% load reject ion assuming steam dump and PZR PORV operation, and
no cred it taken for direct reactor trip on loss of load .
D. for all events inc luding ATWS events , assuming the turbine is tripped within 30
seconds of the initiating event.
A. Incorrect. A TWS with loss of feed is beyond design basis
B. Correct. Direct from TS 3.4.3 basis
C. Incorrect. Steam Dump and PORVs are not considered
D. Incorrect. ATWS is beyond design basis, but criteria for turbine trip is related to
DNBR considerations for the A TWS event
( ATWS scenarios are design for EOPs.
Equipment Control Knowtedge of bases in technical specificationsfor limiting conditions for operations and safetylimits.
Question No. 46
Tier 1 Group 1
Importance Rating: RO 2.5
Technical Reference: TS 3.4.3
Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None
Learning Objective: OPT200.PZRPCS, B.2
Question Source: New
Question History:
Question Cognitive Level: Lower
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 43.2
Comments:
Monday, March 12,20072 :35:30 PM 76
QUESTIONS REPORT
for SEQUOYAH 2007 - NRC EXAM REV DRAFT
Source: NEW Source If Bank:
( Cognitive Level: LOWER
Job Position: RO
Difficulty:
Plant: SEQUOYAH
Date: 4/2007 Last 2 NRC?: NO
(
(
Monday, March 12, 2007 2:35:30 PM 77
OPT200.PZRPCS
Rev. 2
Page 3 of 109
( I. PROGRAM: OPERATOR TRAINING
II. COURSE: SYSTEMS TRAINING
III. TITLE: PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM & PRESSURIZER RELIEF
TANK
IV. LENGTH OF LESSON: 3.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> lecture; I hour simulator demonstration; I hour self-
study/workshop
V. TRAINING OBJECTIVES:
A. Tenninal Objective:
Upon completion ofthis lesson and others presented , the student should be able to apply the
knowledge to support satisfactory performance of the tasks associated with the Pressurizer
Pressure Control System & Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) in the plant and on the simulator.
B. Enabling Objectives:
O. Demonstrate an understanding ofNUREG 1122 knowledge's and abilities associated with the
Pressurizer Pressure Control System & Pressurizer Relief Tank that are rated > 2.5 during
Initial License training for the appropriate license position as identified in Appendix A.
I. State the purpose/functions of the Pressurizer Pressure Control System & Pressurizer Relief
Tank as described in the SQN FSAR.
( 2. State the design basis of the Pressurizer Pressure Control System & Pressurizer Relief Tank
in accordance with the SQN FSAR
3. Explain the purpose/function of each major component in the flow path of the Pressurizer
Pressure Control System & Pressurizer Relief Tank as illustrated on the simplified system
drawing.
4. Describe the following items for each major component in the Pressurizer Pressure Control
System & Pressurizer Relief Tank as described in this lesson:
a. Location
b. Power supply (include control power as applicable)
c. Support equipment and systems
d. Normal operating parameters
e. Component operation
f. Controls
g. Interlocks (including setpoints)
h. Instrumentation and Indications
I. Protective features (including setpoints)
j. Failure modes
k. Unit differences
1. Types of accidents for which the Pressurizer Pressure Control System & PRT components
are designed
m. Location of controls and indications associated with the Pressurizer Pressure Control
( System &PRT in the control room and auxiliary control room
REACTOR COOLANT SYS TEM
( BASES
safety valves are OPE RAB LE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability
and will pre vent RCS overpr essurization.
During ope ratio n, all pressurizer code safety valves mu st be OPE RABLE to prevent the RCS from being
pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig. The com bined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater th an the
maximum surge rate resulting fro m a com plete loss of load ass uming no reactor trip until the first Reac tor Protective
Syste m trip set point is reached (i.e ., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of load) and also ass uming no
operation of the powe r operated relief valves or steam dum p valves.
Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be
performed in accordance with the provisions of ASM E OM Code.
T he power oper ated relief valves (PORVs) and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design
trans ients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump . Operation of the PORVs minim izes the
undesirable open ing of the spring -loaded pressurizer code safety valves. Each PORV has a remo tely operated block
valve to provide positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable. The PORVs also func tion to remove
non-co ndensibles or steam from the pressurizer.
T he OPERABILITY of the power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and block valves is de termined on the basis of
their be ing capable of pe rforming the following functions:
a. Manual contro l of PORVs to co ntrol reacto r coolant system pressure. This is a function that is
used for a steam generator tube rupture accident.
( b. Maintaining the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. This is a function that is
related to controlling ident ified leakage and ensuring the ability to detect unidentified reactor
coolant pressure bou ndary leakage.
c. Manual control of the block valve to: (1) unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used for
manual control of reactor coolant syste m pressure (Item A) , and (2) isolate a PORV with
excessive seat leakage (Item B).
d. Manua l contro l of a block valve to isolate a stuck-open PORV.
Surveillance requirements (SR) provide assu rance that the PO RVs and block valves can perform
their fun ctions. The block valves are exemp t from the SR
June 16, 2006
SEQU O YAH - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-2 Amendment No. 12, 133, 157, 30 8