ML062540355

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Gil Johnson Notes/Comments on the Interview (10/09/2003)
ML062540355
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 10/09/2003
From: Johnson G
- No Known Affiliation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2005-0194
Download: ML062540355 (2)


Text

Gil Johnson notes/comments on th interview (10/00/2003)

The following are my observations/questions onth-interview (10/09/2003)

ASESMET QUESTION ES/NO

-AMLICTO(W-Y:

WHYNOT,-ETC.

Will raise concerns and has done so before?

YES I recessed SORC to find out what was going on

[reactivity issue]; I would have taken it up the chain or to the NRC (5)

Raises concerns for others?

N/A Not Discussed Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?

YES/NO I believe they will bring the nuclear safety issue to the table (1)

I don't know If it was a lack of recognition or unwillingness to acknowledge [reactivity issue],

vas involved and had full knowledge; AM~n' Nno[I there was inhibition] (2)

You do that once or twice [public inquisition] and they aren't going to speak up again; the whole SORC stalled out; This could be a chilling effect (6)

Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for YES Th at's probably why I don't have a job:

raising~~ cocrs elace hm bcause he's poison to the organization Technical Issues identified YES Stuck bypass valve; replacement gasket for EDG didn't fit(7)

Leak on a ASME service water valve (8)

Production over Safety?

YES.

There was a lot of challenging from senior management to do it with critical heat; says why can't you uqst start the unit back up; maybe. coming abovev schedule took

  • preceden~e over resolving the equipment Issue (3)

(1) Page 19; lines 9-15 (2).Page 20 line 25 and page'21 lines 1 & 2;Page 22 lines 18-22; Page 23, lines 1-6 S

0 (3) Page 28, lines 14-16; page 30 lines.21-25 & page 31; Pages 32-35; Page 88, lines 6,7 (4) Page 29, lines 11-25; Page 50 lines 5-25 (5) Page 20, lines 14-20; Page 36, lines 3-18; page 57 lines 24, 25 and page 58 lines 1-3 (6) Page 41, lines 7-22; pages 42 and 43; Page 48, lines 14-25 (7) Page 32, lines 1-3; page 63 lines 19-25 and page 64 lines 1-14 Pages 65-67 (8) Pages 80-83 ADDITIONAL INFO (Provided by Ted Wingifield):

(p. 29) When asked If he thought he had suffered any adverse consequences: "That's probably why I don't have a job

..that's one of [the reasons]... I'm sure that [refusing to perform a reactor hydro following an outage using 'critical heat', possibly the reactivity event I brought to light... Issue associated with restarting the unit [while a BPV was stuck open]

(p. 29 - 41) Discussed the push to start up Hope Creek following the stuck BPV Issue... "went beyond questioning and challenging. I was more like Interrogation... I was there when we were trying to close that valve... listened to it, and it was coming up against a hard mechanical stop, and they knew there was a problem... did considerable testing..

Monday... the valve did go closed... I was asked [b4J

'why we couldn't just restart the unit [because it was not a safety related valve and was working fine at the time]

. a lot of discussion, challenging, and consternation..

Informatioh in this record was deleted PagqTf in accordance with the Freedom of Information Pae1-.

Gil Johnson notes/comments on the~

neve 1/920) was challengi in] in intimidating manner... to me the questioning was out of line..you do that once or twice, and those 17ýind ;ýivds -aren't going to speak up again... a number of instances where... individuals basically clammed up"*

(p. 38) With respect to "production over safety" - "... if your looking at promoting conservative decision making..

operating these places safely, I would have expected senior management would have [embraced the concept of not restarting Hope Creek] until we completely understood what the problems and issues were"~

(p. 40) Indication of operational decision making power being subverted by senior management - he talks about being in the control room on several occasions to "mnake sure that the appropriate decisions were being made in those control rooms"~

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