ML062430025

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G20060754/LTR-06-0430/SECY-2006-0149 - David Lochbaum Ltr Re Security Sanction for Seabrook
ML062430025
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/21/2006
From: Lochbaum D
Union of Concerned Scientists
To: Jaczko G, Klein D, Peter B. Lyons, Mcgaffigan E, Merrifield J
NRC/Chairman, NRC/OCM
References
G20060754, LTR-06-0430, SECY-2006-0149
Download: ML062430025 (5)


Text

T EDO DUE:

Principal Correspondence Control

/

/

EDO CONTR(

FROM:

)L: G20060754 DOC DT: 08/21/06 FINAL REPLY:

OPA-3: -sc~k-Wo6LO(o-, I David Lochbaum Union of ConcernedScientist Commission FOR SIGNATURE OF :

GRN CRC NO: 06-0430 DESC:

ROUTING:

Security Sanction for Seabrook Reyes Virgilio Kane Silber Johnson Cyr/Burns

Luehman, OE Brenner, OPA DATE:.08/30/06 ASSIGNED TO:

NSIR CONTACT:-

Zimmerman SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

For Appropriate Action.

dlJ I

EDATS Number: SECY-2006-0149 SI o

I Initiating Office: SECY Assigned To: NSIR Other Assignees:

Subject:

Security Sanction for Seabrook

==

Description:==

QEDO Due Date: NONE SECY Due Date: NONE ADAMS Accession Numbers Incoming:

Response

Package:

Originating Organization: Union of Concerned Scientist Originator Name: David Lochbaum Incoming Task Received: Letter Date of Incoming Document: 8/21/2006 Document Received by OEDO Date: 8/29/2006 Date Response Requested by Originator: NONE Addressee: Chairman Klein Prcs Infomaio Action Type: Appropriate Action Priority: Medium Sensitivity: None Signature Level: No Signature Required Urgency: NO OEDO Concurrence: NO OCM Concurrence: NO Special Instructions:

OteI InfI Cross Reference Number: LTR-06-043 0,G20060754 Related Task:

File Routing: EDATS Agency Lesson Learned: NO Page 1 of l

4 F

OFFICE OF TIlE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET Date Printed: Aurg 29, 2006 15:28 PAPER NUMBER:

ACTION OFFICE:

LTR-06-0430 EDO LOGGING DATE: 08/28/2006 AUTHOR:

AFFILIATION:

ADDRESSEE:

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

DISTRIBUTION:

'David Lochbaum UCS CHRM Dale Klein For the record---security sanction for Seabrook Appropriate RF LETTER DATE:

ACKNOWLEDGED SPECIAL HANDLING:

08/21/2006 No EDO/OPA for Appropriate Action NOTES:

FILE LOCATION:

ADAMS DATE DUE:

DATE SIGNED:.

i EDO -- G20060754

Union of Concerned Scientists Citizens'and Scientists for Environmental Solutions August 21, 2006 Dr. Dale Klein, Chairman The Honorable Edward McGaffigan, Jr., Commissioner The Honorable Jeffrey S. Merrifield, Commissioner The Honorable Gregory B. Jaczko, Commissioner The Honorable Peter B. Lyons, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

'FOR THE RECORD - SECURITY SANCTION FOR SEABROOK

Dear Mr. Chairman and Commissioners:

Eliot Brefner'sl'ett6i-' dat~dAugisf 7,'2006, to'6th'e-ditor's '6fdihHri~ipltofi'Unibfi'*d*Srtshndbth Herald recently posted'to, the "F6fo.The RoErd fl..secti6_i of.fhe.NRC'sWibsite, ulediand cdnfuies.iusJWe assume you ~were'* cgiizanit *f th&`essence *fMryBrdnner'* qetti eforb~ff it as *mhiled.? :~ :

'` "

  • q I:

The sdcbfid paxagrah,'*fMW.Biennhr's §lter'cofitained'this'enfiterice (i0n:..

thileize'.ofthedvil penalty imposed on Seabrook's owner):

What's important is that the nuclear industry was sent a clear message that the NRC will not tolerate security deficienciei.

'I This statement puzzles us. We had been led to believe from NRC's testimonies -before various

  • Congressional 6cmmittees, NRC'security brochures (i.e., NUREG/BR-0314) and related paraphernalia, and from the ra're times that the NRC's Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR) has

___been permitted by you to meet with the public-that the frequent closed-door meetings between the NSIR staff and representatives of nuclear plant licensees and the non-licensee'Nuclear Energy Institute provided adequate communications. Mr. Brenner's statement strongly suggests that all these secret meetings went for naught in that the nuclear industry still needs a "clear message" that NRC was serious about security.

The Seabrook sanction, therefore, appears to be some bizarre sort of nuclear scarlet letter.

I The very next sentence in Mr. Brenner's letter confuses us. He wrote:

i ;

" t-, L V

,"3 Adverse publicity can act as a powerful deterrent.

a *.,,*-

.3....

We are not confuised'bý tihisc6ncdpt;(indeed,,i'e'doricede td'somr hopeo0fprbvoking if'*with this lett*r),i but are confused by Mr. Brenner's application of it to security matters. In August 2004, you established policy that delibtrately. -e6ved '6&urity iffoiiaaff6r 'fr&", th6 ea't't'oerv igjit-proddss and other public dren8, If Mr.. Bren

- is correct,-!it qppears'-6id'i d.cis

"'de;prived

.Aiie..c.ansrf.....is..6.e.fiilractfrlg deterrerit oVerrp tim i

to'so";tI&'e*iris fif6rninfib'to th'ROP.'

www.ucsusaorg BratileS mbrIeMA 2238-9105 TEL: 617.547.5552-FAX: 617.864.9405.

17o7 H Street NW. Suite 600- Washington, Dc 20006-3962. TEL: 202.223.6133 - FAX: 202.223.6162 2397 Shattuck Avenue. Suite 203. Berkeley, CA 94704-1567 - TEL: 510843.1872. FAX: 510.843.3785

-41 f

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August 21, 2006 Page 2 of 2 In addition, we struggle to comprehend the communication and deterrent values of a message delivered so late. The underlying problems at Seabrook were found and fixed in the late spring of 2005. The NRC did not dole out its associated communication and deterrent until nearly 15 months later. If you truly believe that the Seabrook sanction sent a "clear message" to the nuclear industry, you cannot justify waiting so long to deliver this important message. If you truly believe that the Seabrook sanction acts as a powerful deterrent, you cannot justify waiting so long to apply it.

The key part of Mr. Brenner's letter was not lost upon us. He wrote:

Because of the problem that we identified, Seabrook was subjected to far more scrutiny of its security so we could satisfy ourselves that it met our stringent requirements.

The NRC inspection effort that found the security problems at Seabrook and compelled them to be corrected is the "clear message" and "powerful deterrent" - not the subsequent NRC enforcement action.

The subsequent NRC enforcement action did not find any security problems, did notfix any security

-"7problems;nd for th reasons provided above, -did" not "deli'er-any "cle niessge"X-or'"powrful deterrent." The NRC enforcement effort was a complete and utter waste with no redeeming value.

This. Seabrook sanction, and all too many other examples, demonstrates that the NRC's enforcement program needs repairs. The frenetic pace at which you rotate people through as Director of the Office of Enforcement can only impede the pace of regulatory reforms needed in the NRC enforcement program.1 UCS is convinced the NRC's enforcement program needs reform and pledges to work with the Director of the Office of Enforcement, or the series of Directors of the Office of Enforcement, to right this wrong.

Sincerely, owl 4a I..

2j David Lochbaum Director, Nuclear Safety Project qi

, 1 'I'.

I II[I According to the US Department of Justice, the average sentence for persons convicted of felonies in Stal wavs 4 1/2" years (see http://wwwojp.usdoj. gov/bj s/sent. htm), a far longer stretch than the average residence' persons appointed to be NRC's Director of the Office of Enforcement

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