ML062220078
| ML062220078 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek |
| Issue date: | 10/15/2004 |
| From: | Blough A Division of Nuclear Materials Safety I |
| To: | Harrison L, Vito D Division of Nuclear Materials Safety I |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2005-0194 | |
| Download: ML062220078 (4) | |
Text
_-uqene 00b*-36YAHb torm tromlU/14/04 discussion re: mu 8sUWv= issues tollowing 10/10 event v-age 14*
From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
A. Randolph Blought,-
Harrison, Leanne; Vito, David Fri, Oct 15, 2004 11:22 AM ARB form froml0/14/04 discussion re: HC SCWE issues following 10/10 event SENSITIVE ALLEGATION INFORMATION -
PROTECT ACCORDINGLY -
I completed item #2, call to t 5:30 pm, 10/14/2004. Gene Cobey participated also.
I relayed the messages as r-ueted by the panel and stayed within the panel-specified limits of
- sn and detail.
ad just received a highly critical email di c from the alleger, so it took some time to set the
- ontext_ i had not yet seen the alleger's email c
but he may have initially thought I was calling solely in response to that email. Ultimately, we ha a pro ctIall that fully met the panel's intent.
Enclosed for the record are two email's from the alleger tcU
- - the one I mentioned above and one she sent later. last night - - I was cc'd on both
>>> David Vito 10/15/04 09:51 AM >>>
SENSITIVE ALLEGATION INFORMATION -
PROTECT ACCORDINGLY -
See attached final ARB sheet for RI-2003-A-01 10.
K
/
CC:
Cobey, Eugene; Farrar, Karl; Gsb; Holody, Daniel; Lorson, Raymond; Teator, Jeffrey Information in this record was deleted in accordance With the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions FOIA-
,7, -/9'/
7/V
tipg-m-\\G
)OOO1.TMP
- i L
Mail Envelope Properties (416FEB1C.87C: 9 :34932)
-rý9.9-11
Subject:
.Creation Date:
From:
Created By:
ARB form froml0/14/04 discussion re: HC SCWE issues following 10/10 event Fri, Oct 15, 2004 11:22 AM A. Randolph Blough ARB @nrc.gov Recipients kpl-po.KPDO DJV (David Vito) nrc.gov kpl-po.KP_DO DJi-CC (Daniel Holody)
GSB CC (Gsb)
JAT CC (Jeffrey Teator)
KLF CC (Karl Farrar)
LMH1 (Leanne Harrison)
RKL CC (Raymond Lorson)
Post Office kpl-po.KP_DO kpl-po.KP_-DO Route nrc.gov Files MESSAGE Mail Mail Options Expiration Date:
Priority:
Reply Requested:
Return Notification:
Concealed
Subject:
Security:
Size 1749 Date & Time Friday, October 15, 2004 11:22 AM None Standard No None No Standard
Eugene ob~iy-Nuclear Safety Issues at Hope Creek Page 1 From:I To:
Date:
Thu, Oct 14, 2004 2:39 PM
Subject:
Nuclear Safety Issues at Hope Creek I am contacting you despite ongoing litigation because I am gravely concerned about the nuclear safety issues at Hope Creek.
Although I am not your Organization Effectiveness Consultant or Coach, I am writing you to with my best counsel as if I were. I hope you will take this as intended: in support of you, the employees, the public, the industry, the country. The last thing we need right now is a nuclear event or fatalities at an American nuclear generating station.
This "Unusual Event" at Hope Creek provides a prime opportunity for you to model the "new culture" or reinforce the old one. So far, from what I have read and heard, the old one is being reinforced and ground is being lost, not taken.
If you think your 10/12/04 global email "Straight Talk from *llilii) built trust in you, especially from the operators at HC, you re sadly mistaken.
The perception is that you minimized the pipe break, subsequent errors and entire event. This further eroded trust in you and in PSEG leadership. I know you well enough (I think) to krnow that was not what you intended, but that was the consequence. Ask around at Hope Creek. Ask the engineers. Ask the training instructors. Ask practically anyone.
If ['10 61lr someone else wrote your message, calibrate him/her. These globale'ssages have become a trust-eroder, as opposed to a trust-builder.
If you fear putting what really happened in a global message, don't bother sending one out. "Sugar coated" messages from the CNO hurt the cause, not help it.
I implore you to go over to HC every day, both day and night shifts, to SEE and HEAR the people, especially the operators. If you haven't done this already, no matter what else is on your plate, you are missing a HUGE opportunity....both to learn and to show you care.
A notification was written in April, 2004, "foreshadowing" this very event--but nothing happened. How do you think that Control Room Operator feels?
Though you say "some steam escaped into the turbine building," that wasn't the experience of those on duty that night, who witnessed the turbine building nearly full of steam. How do you think the NEOs and contractors who could have been working in there feel?
Assembly nor Accountability was called....do you think caring for the workers was demonstrated?
People knew shortcuts had been taken to declare HPCI operable before the July 30 LCO expired...so was it really operable? Why were those short cuts tolerated? Why were the people raising objections not listened to?
You have NEOs, NCOs, SROs, and managers now believing the unit is not safe to restart, yet there's already talk of commencing start-up as early as Monday.
The Load Dispatcher can tell you what he has been told.
In addition to all this, you have a courageous manager willing to risk his standing in the organization to bring out the subtle and not-so-subtle nuclear safety concerns plaguing the site. Have you immediately contacted him, thanked him, and modeled the kind of reaction you want others to take? Or has this
been "buried" in the system such that you and/or your top team don't even know about it yet?
I know I am contacting you without having all the facts. But I have enough of them.
to be concerned and to bring this matter to your attention.
And I wil do Whatever I can to support safety as the TOP priority at the site.
As one person said yesterday, and I believe he speaks for many, "I just want to work in a safe plant. I don't want to see someone get killed. We got lucky."
"Luckm is not a nuclear safety strategy. I urge you to AcT NOW. Get the word out to everyone that Hope Creek will NOT restart (despite the problem of 10+ days of fuel needing to be burned before the refuel outage) until it is fully safe to do so...and until you have the support of the Ho ek Operations team, not just a handful of "yes men." Don't settle for less,4l There i s too much at stake....for all of us. Be a Leader Worth Following.
Kymn N. Kymn Harvin, Ph.D.
Leaders Worth Following:
People Who Move the World
- CC:
<ARB @ nrc.gov>, <ewc @ nrc.gov>, <jill.lipoti @ dep.state.nj.us>,
<kent.tosch @ dep.state.nj.us>, <mike.brothers @pseg.com>, <neil.bergh @ pseg.com>,
<lawrence.wagner@ pseg.com>, <dlochbaum @ ucsusa.org>