ML062220067

E-mail from Harrison to Wiggins, SRM-SECY-04-0111 Is Public

ML062220067
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	09/10/2004
From:	Harrison L NRC Region 1
To:	Wiggins J NRC Region 1
References
FOIA/PA-2005-0194, SRM-SECY-04-0111
Download: ML062220067 (11)

Text

Da~id Vito - Re: Fwd: SRM-SECY-04-0 ill is public vage 1 1 PaQe i I From:

To:

Date:

Subject:

Lean ne Harrison James Wiggins 9110104 8:50AM Re: Fwd: SRM-SECY-04-01 11 is public

Jim, Sorry to bother you about this again, but Dave is not here and "the Salem alleger" has contacted me via email requesting I fax her the Sec'y Paper (which is denoted as DRAFT yet portrayed as final by Lisa Jarriel) - for which I remain confused. So before I do anything I needed a little guidance. I'm only bothering you about this because you seem to be the most involved in this issue.

Thanks, Leanne

>>> James Wiggins 09/09/04 10:48AM>>>>

thx

>>> Leanne Harrison 09/09/04 10:04AM>>>>

Jim, Although I admit I am confused about this since the actual Sec~y paper has draft stamped on it (??,I am sending this SRM to you in case you wanted to inform the staff of SCWE inspection changes.

Thanks, Leanne PS: The ADAMS accession no. for the actual Sec'y paper is ML041750238 CC:

David Vito; Sharon Johnson K' A in accrdiance. I tl" iLurd Was deieted in acordnce ith the Freedom of no atn Act, exemptions Inorato FOIA.

F:wd-:

SRM and Sec'yý Paper P~oe 1.1 From:

Leanne HarrsnY To:

David Vito Date:

9/10/04 7:35AM

Subject:

Fwd: Re: SRM and Sec'y Paper Can I send her that with it being stamped draft?

CC:

Sharon Johnson

'Daliid ViiP - Re: SRM and Sec'y Paper

-____-Page 1

From:

To:

!LMH1 @nrc.gov>

Date:

9/9104 7:57PM

Subject:

Re: SRM and Sec'y Paper In a message dated 9/912004 10:06:40 AM Eastern Daylight Time, LMHl @nrc.gov writes:

Kim, The SRM for Sec'y Paper 04-0111 has been made available. Below is the accession numbers for the SRM and the actual Sec'y paper. You may retreive these documents through the NRC website (nrc.gov) via ADAMS using the below accession numbers (as I am having great difficulty trying to import them to a file that I could e-mail you with) or I can fax them to you if you wish. Let me know if you would desire this. Thanks.

Leanne for the SRM: ML042430661 for the Sec'y Paper ML041750238

Leanne, Thank you for sending this.

Please fax the Sec'y pap&

I ud fnd it with the number listed.

My private fax numbe Thank you very much.

Kymn

• NRC: Staff Requ~irements - SECY-04-01 11 - Recommended Statt Actions Regardilng Age... Page I ot 2 Ine Site Map I EAQ IHelPI Glossay I Contact Us 1 1 1 Sac SU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j Home Jj Who We Are fl What We Do lNuclearReactorllNuclear Materialsl Wast Cie II FaiitInder I

uvveen Home > Electronic Reading Room > Document Collections > Commission Documents > Staff Recluirements Memoranda (SRM SECY-04-0 111 August 30, 2004 MEMORANDUM TO: Luis A. Reyes Executive Director for Operations FROM:

Annette L Vietti-Cook, Secretary IRAI

SUBJECT:

STAFF REQUIREMENTS - SECY-04-01 11 - RECOMMENDED STAFF ACTIONS REGARDING A GUIDANCE IN THE AREAS OF SAFETY CONSCIOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY CU The Commission has approved Option 1A to engage stakeholders by noticing the draft document In the Federa a brief comment period, subject to the changes noted In the attachment. Options 1B and 1C are disapproved. A document Is being Issued for public comment, there should be no further discussion on whether to issue the do should be clear to stakeholders that the comments should address the content of the document only. The cont notice attached to the document should explicitly reflect the connection between a Safety Conscious Work Envi Safety Culture. At a minimum the staff should explain as It did In the paper that SCWE Is an attribute of Safety (EDO)

(SECY Suspense: 9/24/04)

The Commission has approved Option 2C to continue to monitor Industry efforts to assess Safety Culture and e Commission remains informed of Industry efforts and progress. Of particular note was the progress made by IN address recent Industry Issues In this area. As industry works to develop guidance In this area, the staff should resources to ensure that it has programs and procedures in place that encourage licensees to establish strong Culture programs. Options 2A and 2B are disapproved.

The Commission has approved Option 3B to enhance the Reactor Oversight Process CROP) treatment of cross-c to more fully address Safety Culture. The staff should not use surveys of licensee personnel, but rather should Inspector observations and other Indicators already available to the NRC. Consequently, the staff should develo allow Inspectors to rely on more objective findings. The staff should consider Including enhanced problem ident resolution Initiatives as part of this effort. Most Important, the staff should ensure that the Inspectors are prope the area of Safety Culture. The staff should consider developing an enhanced training program for Its Inspector resident inspectors on Safety Culture that uses both insights from INPO's work in this area and Insights from th international community. The staff should consider If the cross-cutting Issues In the enhanced ROP treatment m appropriately labeled Safety Management rather than Safety Culture. In making any changes, the staff should established processes for revising the ROP, In particular the process for involving stakeholders.

As a further enhancement to the ROP, the staff should include as part of its enhanced inspection activities for p Degraded Cornerstone Column (referred to as Column Three) of the ROP Action Matrix, a determination of the specific evaluation of the licensees Safety Culture. The staff should Interact with our stakeholders to develop a making the determination and conducting the evaluation. The staff's methodology for using the treatment of cr Issues to more fully address Safety Culture should require a specific determination for plants in the Degraded C Column.

With respect to Option 3C, the staff should continue to monitor developments by foreign regulators, as directed on SECY-02-0166, but should limit the expenditure of resources in this area to previously programmed levels.

3D, and 3E are disapproved.

The attachment contains recommended revisions to the draft document on "Establishing and Maintaining a Saf Work Environment", but the staff should feel free to continue to improve this document.,

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NRC: Staff Requirements -SE~CY

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Attachment:

Changes to the Federal Register notice In SECY-04-0111 cc:

Chairman Diaz Commissioner McGaffigan Commissioner Merrifield OGC CFO OCA DIG OPA Office Directors, Regions, ACRS, ACNW, ASLBP (via E-Mail)

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• .NRC:

SECY-04-01 11 - Recommended Staff Actions Regarding Agency (juidance in the..

Page I 01 c index~ I Site Map I EAQ I !Lelp IGlossar I Contact Us F Searchl

• %(:V CW S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Home JjWho We Are What We Do JjNuclear Reactors JjNuclear Materials JJRadioactive Waste flPublic Involvement Home > Electronic Reading Room > Document Collections > Commission Documents > Commission Papers (SECY) > 2004 >

0111 POLICY ISSUE NOTATION VOTE S

July 1, 2004 FOR:

The Commissioners FROM:

Luis A. Reyes Executive Director for Operations /RA/

SUBJECT:

RECOMMENDED STAFF ACTIONS REGARDING AGENCY GUIDANCE IN THE AREAS OF SAFETY CONS WORK ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY CULTURE

" PURPOSE

SUMMARY

• BACKGROUND

" DISCUSSION o Industry Guidance re: Safety Concious Work Environment o Industry Guidance re: Safety Culture o NRC Inspector Guidance re: SCWE and Safety Culture

" RECOMMENDATION

" COORDINATION PURPOSE:

To advise the Commission of the status of the staffs effort to develop a guidance document to encourage a Sa Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) and monitor efforts by foreign regulators to measure and regulate Safety and to seek Commission direction, prior to consideration of budgeting resources, with regard to the dlevelopme options for enhancing oversight of SCWE and Safety Culture.

SUMMARY

In Its March 26, 2003, Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM), the Commission directed the staff to take cert the areas of SCWE and Safety Culture. In response to the Commission's direction related to SCWE guidance, th consulted with Internal and external stakeholders and drafted the attached Industry guidance on establishing a maintaining a SCWE. Likewise, in response to the Commission's direction related to Safety Culture, the staff co monitor developments abroad within the international communities to regulate Safety Culture and develop obje Culture performance indicators. The staff will keep the Commission informed of these efforts through trip repor means as developments dictate.

Additionally, in response to lessons learned from the reactor vessel head degradation event at Davis-Besse, th discusses below options to develop additional SCWE and Safety Culture assessment tools for the industry and N inspectors.

BACKGROUND:

The Agency's expectations with regard to licensee's establishing and maintaining a SCWE are outlined in a May http://www.nrc.gov/reading-mildoc-collections/Commission/secys/2004/secy2004-0 111/2... 09/10/2004

• NRC: SECY-04-01 11 - Recommended Statt Actions Regarding Agency (ijuidlance in tre...

r-age L or o policy statement entitled, "Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fe Retaliation." A SCWE is defined by the NRC as an environment in which, "employees feel free to raise safety co to their management and to the NRC, without fear of retaliation." The NRC recognizes, however, that, aside fro retaliation, other matters can affect an employee's willingness to identify safety concerns, such as the effective licensee's processes for resolving concerns, and senior management's ability to detect and prevent retaliatory NRC policy statement, therefore, addresses these attributes of a SCWE, as well.

Regarding Safety Culture, there has been some confusion historically. Many use the terms "SCWE" and "Safety interchangeably. They are, in fact, two distinct, but related concepts. The Agency's expectations with regard to establishing and maintaining a strong Safety Culture are provided in a January 24, 1989, policy statement enti Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear Power Operations." Safety Culture in this document refers to, "the neces attention to safety matters," and, "the personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engaged in any has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power plants." A strong Safety Culture is also often described as having first focus." Attributes include concepts such as safety-over-production, procedural adherence, and conservativ making. The willingness of employees to identify safety concerns, L~e., SCWE, Is also an attribute of Safety Cult guidance provided by both of these Commission policies is very broad.

On March 26, 2003, the Commission Issued an SRM for SECY-02-0166, approving the recommendations of the Discrimination Task Group, as revised by the Senior Management Review Team. Although the Commission did rulemaking with regard to SCWE as recommended in the SECY, the Commission directed the staff to develop fu guidance, in consultation with stakeholders, that would identify "best practices" to encourage a SCWE. The Corn indicated that the proposed guidance should emphasize training of management as to Its obligation under the protection regulations and should provide information as to the recommended content of the training in this im Within this SRM, the Commission also provided direction in the broader area of Safety Culture. Specifically, the stated that, "[iun light of efforts by foreign regulators to measure and regulate safety culture, the staff should m developments abroad so as to ensure that the Commission remains informed about these efforts and their effe particular, because subjectivity is a principal objection to the direct regulation of safety culture, the staff should monitor efforts to develop objective measures that serve as indicators of possible problems with safety culture Finally, a weak Safety Culture was Identified as a root cause of the reactor vessel head degradation at the Day nuclear power plant. The NRC's Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force report recommended that the staff re inspections and plant assessment processes to determine whether sufficient processes are in place to identify a appropriately disposition the types of problems experienced at Davis-Besse. The report also recommended mo and focused inspections to assess a licensees' SCWE.

Both in response to the Commission's direction and lessons learned from the reactor vessel head degradation e Davis-Besse, the staff discusses below actions taken and recommended in the areas of SCWE and Safety Cultu DISCUSSION:

Industry Guidance re: Safety Conscious Work Environment In response to the Commission's March 26, 2003 SRM, the staff formed a working group that developed an out SCWE guidance document regarding "best practices" to encourage a SCWE. The outline was based on the cont 1996 Policy Statement and the experience and knowledge of the working group's members. The outline was pu on the NRC's public web site and in the Federal Register for comment and was used to facilitate discussion during a Fe 2004, public meeting with various stakeholders. Although most stakeholders, including representatives from bo industry and whistleblower advocates, were in general agreement concerning the content of the outline, some improvements were suggested and many have been incorporated into the attached draft document. The most comment, however, addressed whether the Agency should be producing such a document at all. Industry repre commented that the industry, rather than the NRC, should develop the guidance. The following specific comme to this topic were received:

The May 1996 Policy Statement clearly set the NRC staff's expectations for development of a SCWE and responsibility for establishing and maintaining a SCWE on the licensees. Therefore, it is not appropriate staff to assume responsibility for development of a "best practices" document in the area of SCWE.

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" Some "best practices" in the NRC's document may be impractical or inappropriate for some organization the 1996 policy.

" "Best practices" are not enforceable nor useful for NRC inspectors.

" The industry has developed and is using guidance from Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 97-051; therefore guidance from the NRC is not necessary.

" Any guidance developed by the NRC would be defacto regulatory requirements in this area.

In addition, during the February 2004 meeting and in the public comments that followed, the industry requeste should the NRC proceed In developing such guidance, it provide another opportunity for supplemental commen final issuance of the document.

The staff has reviewed the above general comments which suggested that the Industry, rather than the NRC st responsible for developing guidance related to "best practices" for establishing and maintaining a SCWE. Regar comment that the 1996 Policy Statement clearly set the NRC's expectations for development of a SCWE and pl responsibility for establishing and maintaining a SCWE on the licensees, the staff notes that, in response to the the Discrimination Task Force, the Commission more recently (March 26, 2003) Issued a staff requirements me that specifically requested that the staff develop more guidance regarding "best practices" to encourage a SCW agrees with the comment that some practices in the proposed document may not be appropriate for every NRC contractor, and has clarified this point in the attached document's title and content. Nonetheless, the staff cont believe that the guidance can be helpful to licensees and their contractors developing or trying to enhance a SC Regarding the comment that "best practices" are not enforceable, the NRC staff plans to issue the attached gu form of a Regulatory Issue Summary (R15), which does not create a regulatory requirement but is an establish providing guidance to the Industry. Regarding the comment that additional guidance beyond NEI 97-05 is not n the staff has reviewed NEI 97-05, Revision 1 and a draft of Revision 2, and concurs that both revisions contain that are important to establishing and maintaining a SCWE. However, the staff noted the following important d comparing the NEI document to the proposed NRC guidance on establishing and maintaining a SCWE:

" NEI 97-05 provides tools for use in the establishment of an Employee Concerns Program (ECP), an alter process for reporting safety concerns, and resolving those concerns brought to Its attention. As such, th the NEI document Is on the effectiveness of the ECP Program. While the NEI document includes informa of the same topics as the NRC's guidance document on SCWE, the NRC's document more broadly addres of SCWE as it applies to all problem identification and resolution processes. For example, while both doc discuss the need for accessibility to problem identification and resolution processes, the NEI document e accessibility of the ECP Program, while the NRC document emphasizes accessibility of all site-wide probi identification and resolution processes.

" The NRC guidance document contains more detail than the NEI document on several practices which ma SCWE, including how to conduct exit interviews with Individuals who raise concerns, management behav contribute to a SCWE, feedback to individuals who raise safety concerns, techniques for conducting surv oversight of contractor activities which may impact the SCWE at licensed facilities.

" The NRC guidance document provides more detail than the NEI document on the content of SCWE traini Commission specifically directed in the March 26, 2003, SRM that the proposed guidance emphasize trai management as to its obligations under the employee protection regulations and provide information as recommended content of the training.

" The NRC guidance document includes information on several important and complex issues that may aff which are not included in the NEI document. These issues include: the effect of incentive programs on th 360 degree appraisal programs, and balancing personal accountability with maintaining a SCWE.

• NEI 97-05 does not provide guidance with respect to processes to help detect and prevent discrimination perceptions of discrimination. Such processes have been valuable both in preventing discriminatory acts providing continuous training to licensee management when used at licensed facilities, such as the Milist Davis-Besse nuclear power plants.

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NRC: SECY-04-01 11 - Recommended Ntatt Actions Regarding Agency Uuiciance in tne...

rage 4 or o Option 1A - Continue to engage stakeholders by noticing the attached draft document in the Federa for a brief comment period. The outline previously noticed in the Federal Register and commented on by va stakeholders was fairly detailed and comments received indicated that most were in general agreement concer content of the document. Nonetheless, this option allows for public comment on the complete document, is res industry's request for further comment, and reflects the staffs expectations to provide for further comment as during the February 2004 public meeting.

Option 116 - Issue the attached document as a RIS without further public comment. This option reflec that most stakeholders that provided comments on the detailed outline of the document published earlier this y general agreement with its contents. Published as a RIS, it does not impose regulatory requirements, but mere guidance for use by licensees hoping to improve their SCWE. The RIS process can take anywhere from one to f however, this option is expected to be the most timely. It is not, however, responsive to the industry's request Involvement and is contrary to the staffs stated expectations during the February 2004 public meeting.

Option 1C - Notice in the Federal Register the NRC's decision not to pursue further development of guidance. This option is response to the above industry comments. However, as detailed above, the NRC staff believe the existing industry guidance is comprehensive enough to provide sufficient direction in this important Industry Guidance re: Safety Culture:

The Commission stated in its 1989 Policy Statement that it was issued to, "foster the development and mainte safety culture at every facility licensed by the NRC." It notes that, "management has the duty and obligation to development of a 'safety culture' at each facility and to provide a professional working environment, In the con throughout the facility, that assures safe operations. Management must provide the leadership that nurtures an perpetuates the safety culture." The proposed options In this area focus on enhancing NRC guidance to encour assist the Industry in taking the initiative to monitor and maintain a strong Safety Culture.

Option 2A - Revise the 1989 Policy Statement, "Policy Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear Power 0 to: a) broaden its focus beyond the control room and licensed operators to encompass all areas of p operations and; b) update the definition and attributes of Safety Culture referenced to improve alig current international standards. Option 2A would broaden the scope of the policy statement to Increase its to all aspects of plant operations. In addition, the reference to the document International Nuclear Safety Advi (INSAG)-3, Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants, would be updated to reflect the current guidance d used Internationally. Updating the policy statement would also provide the Commission the opportunity to clani expectations in the area of Safety Culture and to provide guidance and encouragement for the industry to prog preferred direction. The disadvantage to implementing this option is that resource expenditures would be requi the practical effect on the industry being determinable, since it would not be a regulatory requirement.

Option 213 - Emphasize the 1989 Policy Statement, "Policy Statement on Conduct of Nuclear Power Operations," by encouraging licensee self-assessment of Safety Culture through the development o document on Safety Culture similar to that being developed for SCWE. Option 2B would provide the Ind practical methods for implementing the 198 Policy Statement. Providing explicit and detailed guidance would likelihood of licensees taking the initiative to Implement the suggested practices and to do so successfully. The disadvantage to this option is similar to that of the previous option: resources would be required to develop the but its actual effects on industry practices would not be known.

Option 2C - Monitor developments by the industry to assess Safety Culture to ensure the Commissio Informed on such efforts, but without providing additional guidance. Under this option the Commission able to fully express its views or make explicit its expectations for the area of Safety Culture. Without such gui encouragement from the Commission, industry initiatives and progress may be limited or move in directions th accordance with Commission preference and/or internationally accepted standards.

NRC Inspector Guidance re: SCWE and Safety Culture:

A weak Safety Culture was identified as a root cause of the reactor head degradation at the Davis-Besse nuclea plant. Because the NRC staff Was limited in its ability to find this problem prior to the incident, the staff believe implementation of assessment processes which facilitate identification of negative trends in the area of Safety should be explored. Item 3.3.4(5) of the Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force states that the staff will "rev range of NRC baseline inspections and plant assessment processes, as well as other NRC programs, to determi http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rmldoc-collections/commission/secys/2004/secy2004-0 111/2... 09/10/2004

• NC: S ECY-04-01 I I - Recommended Staff Actions Regarding Agency (Juidance in tne...

r'age :ýor 0 sufficient programs and processes are in place to identify and appropriately disposition the types of problems e at DBNPS (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station). Additionally, the NRC should provide more structured and focu inspections to assess licensee employee concern programs and safety conscious work environment."

The staff is developing a response to a General Accounting Office (GAO) Report entitled, "Nuclear Regulation -

to More Aggressively and Comprehensively Resolve Issues Related to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant's Sh May 2004. Among the responses the NRC staff is considering is enhancing its oversight of Safety Culture over years by increasing its focus on SCWE inspection and assessment efforts.

Regarding NRC assessment of the broader area of Safety Culture, a subset of underlying elements of Safety Cu as identification and resolution of problems, currently is assessed to some extent by elements of the Reactor 0 Process (ROP). However, there has been no attemrpt to move beyond the current implementation philosophy w emphasis on objectivity and predictability by supplementing these elements with the subjective aspects inhere assessment of Safety Culture.

Option 3A - Develop an inspection process that would provide Instruction on systematically assessin Culture and result in additional agency actions if Safety Culture Issues were Identified. Develop trai Inspectors on this methodology. This option would allow the staff to assess the willingness of the licensee t document safety issues, adhere to written procedures, make conservative decisions, and conduct probing self-The present inspection program and its associated action matrix would not support this approach, because the on assessing performance deficiencies In an objective manner through the significance determination process.

agency action under the ROP is driven by the Action Matrix, which integrates inspection findings after their sign determined. The nature of assessing Safety Culture by direct inspection requires some measure of subjective j Under this option, the staff would develop an Inspection process and an assessment tool to drive additional age that would be separate from the existing ROP Action Matrix, and unique to the area of Safety Culture. Presenti the ROP are to be objective, risk-informed, and predictable. The subjective nature of assessing Safety Culture inspection may detract from meeting these goals.

Option 313 - Enhance the ROP treatment of cross-cutting issues to more fully address Safety Culture allow for more agency action as the result of the identification of a cross-cutting issue. Develop trai inspectors on this methodology. Again, this option would allow the staff to assess the willingness of the lice and document safety issues, adhere to written procedures, make conservative decisions, and conduct probing assessments. Presently cross-cutting Issues can be identified as the result of Inspection findings of sufficient nu multiple areas, although the individual findings may be of low safety significance. Agency action in response to issues is presently generally limited to requested oral or written responses from licensees as part of the annua process. Under this option, the staff would develop a Safety Culture cross-cutting issue, and define specific age as a result of the identification of a Safety Culture cross-cutting issue. To support this, the inspection program to be modified to allow for observation and documentation of Safety Culture issues. The staff would develop gu inspectors to use in making observations, such as a survey tool, and documenting such observations in a form for trending. The documentation of these observations are expected to be a challenge in terms of their risk per use for trending. Negative survey results would be followed up by NRC staff and additional agency actions wou determined by NRC senior management on a case by case basis. This option provides an avenue for the NRC s actively assess Safety Culture within a framework which provides for some subjective assessment.

Option 3C - Whi le continuing to monitor efforts by foreign regulators on Safety Culture, pro-actively the international communities to develop objective performance indicators of possible problems wi safety cultures of our licensees. This option would help to assure consistency among the international comm applicability to US facilities.

Option 3D - Engage the industry to develop an industry process to assess the Safety Culture at indiv facilities, with NRC oversight of this process. This option would be along the lines of the industry efforts in area, where the INPO has set up standards for training, and there is an industry process to periodically assess each facility and to react to weak performance in this area. This option would allow the industry the flexibility t the most efficient manner to achieve the goal, yet provide the NRC with some oversight capability. The NRC wo the option of directly intervening at a facility if circumstances warrant. Under this option, public access to spec Safety Culture assessments would be limited, and therefore public confidence could be negatively impacted. In without direct involvement of the NRC there is a higher probability that the industry's actions in this area may NRC expectations.

Option 3E - Develop criteria for and possible intervention strategies for the NRC to take when down http://www.nrc.gov/reading-n-n/doc-collections/commission/secys/2004/secy2OO4-0 111/2... 09/10/2004

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rageu Vl UL trends in the area of SCWE and/or Safety Culture already exist and the licensee has failed to take a action. This option is different from all of the other options In that it is re-active rather than pro-active. This w situation as at Davis-Besse where the licensee identified Safety Culture as a root cause and the NRC had to rel expertise and documents from the IAEA to develop an ad hoc inspection protocol.

RECOMMENDATION:

The staff recommends approval of Options 113 and 2B, and authorization to explore the feasibility of Options 3B and 3E.

COORDINATION:

The development of this paper has been coordinated with the Offices of Nuclear Regulatory Research and Nudle Regulation. The Office of General Counsel advises that actions to address Safety Culture are limited in the abse regulation. Without such regulation, the NRC cannot require licensees to meet an agency standard for Safety C most, the NRC may suggest that licensees take actions to improve Safety Culture even if serious shortcomings through inspection. The development of an NRC standard for Safety Culture which can be assessed and addres substantive NRC action would require the development of a Safety Culture regulation. Developing this type of r would pose the same difficulties as a regulation on SCWE, which the Commission previously decided not to pur Therefore, the adoption of the options discussed earlier, to the extent that they call for more active NRC oversi Culture, may require reconsideration of the Commission's determination not to Initiate rulemaking in this subje

/RA/

Luis A. Reyes Executive Director for Operations

Attachment:

Guidance Document, "Establishing and Maintaining a Safety Conscious Work Environment",

CONTACT:

Usamarie Jarriel, OE 301-415-8529

1. NEI 97-05, "Nuclear Power Plant Personnel-Employee Concerns Program-Process Tools In A Safety Consciou Environment," Rev. 1, January 2002.

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