ML062210080
| ML062210080 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 01/16/2004 |
| From: | Johnson G - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2005-0194 | |
| Download: ML062210080 (2) | |
Text
Gil Johnson notes/comments on the interview (01-16-04)
The following are my observations/questions of the M
interview held on 01-16-04. This transcript review was completed on 03-12-04.
SESMENT QUSTON.<I,-ZA-MPLIFESIOI~~nr-r-Will raise concerns and has done so before?
YES I've never had an issue with personally raising a safety concern (p 8)
Raises concerns for others?
N/A Not discussed Believes others raise concerns without hesitation?
YES I dont know of any individuals myself that had issues or concerns like that (p 9)
Knows of someone who has experienced retaliation for NO Absolutely not (p 10) raising concerns?
Bins for Issues:
- 1 - PERCEIVED LACK OF FREEDOM TO RAISE SAFETY CONCERNS TO PSEG MANAGEMENT We always start off our shift meeting with a safety message.. It's always open for discussion (p 9)
The Industrial (safety) does weigh more heavily (than Nuclear safety) (p10)
Well try to minimize the people in the diesel room during a run (because of past CO problems) (P 13)
Equipment Operators raised the safety Issue associated with CO in the diesel room (p 16)
- 2 - PRODUCTION OVER SAFETY ISSUES It's obvious to me that with these forced outages...is really upper management saying "Hey, let's get this stuff fixed.
We're not going to settle for this stuff anymore" (p 19)
.We're fixing other things too... going to cold shutdown... going into the drywell (p 20)
In the past you would fix something and It would show up a month or two later (p 28)
Now the root causes... fix It... so it's not going to happen again ( p 28)
We're fixing stuff and we are fixing it right (p 30).
Note: The following four items are discussions on shift related to backing down power due to some Indications being lost They ROs) wanted to come down and I was with them...talked about it wit decided not to do it (p 112)
- Mfelt we should have come back down power a little bit There Is potential issues associated with moving the plant (down 2%)... may sound like a minor adjustment (p 11)
Slsaid "Hold off on that" (p 116)
Note: From my own personal BWR experience there is little impact from 'backlng down" a few percent. Did it weekly at VY.
You're right it Is a double standard (procedure compliance) "now you're telling us not to comply..." (P 122)
We approached or exceeded a limit on vibration (feed pump) and it didn't come out right away (p 127)
- 3 - SCHEDULE PRESSURE ISSUES Back in 2000 the work groups were jam packed with work...almost impossible to execute (p 24)
Now the message is "If you can't do a procedure as written, then stop" (p 24)
Reducing power to 60% was the right thing to do..that's where management was willing to go for safety (p 26)
In the past we talked the talk but didnt walk the walk... so much emphasis on production (p 28)
When we went through it (stuck B/P valve problem) I was very uncomfortable with It (p 42)
Information in this record was deleted Page 1 of 2 in accordance with the Freedom of Informationr Act, exemptions.117C_
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I I Gil Johnson notes/comments on th
- nterview (01-16-04) 7 Note the following comments relate to the forced outage In March 2003 requiring a IPTE to shutdown with stuck B/P valve Had not been done at Hope Creek before (reduce pressure while critical) (p 48)
There was a lot of frustration in that training..n those couple of hours Saturday night (p 52)
So there was a certain amount of time pressure to achieve this thing (fix B/P valve problem) Sunday night (p 55)
It wasn't a validation and it should have been...still hashing things out...weren't sure which way we were to go (p 56)
So the time pressure...was that we had to get through it...relieve the other crew at midnight (p 57)
I said "Unless we can come to some consensus as to what we are doing...find someone else to take the watch" (p 60)
I don't think that thing would happen again...had a plan not fully baked (p 64)
We felt we had responded the way we were trained and we did a good job (p 79)
I'm sur felt the same...this thing was scheduled for Sunday...we needed to do what we could (p 84)
I don't think It had anything to do with production, absolutely not (p 86)
- 4 - LABOR - MANAGEMENT ISSUES It's easy for the union guys to say "Shut it down..this isn't right" without any thought on other impacts (p 33)
They (union) may not have the full picture or be totally grounded in fact (p 135)
I think everyone to a man (in the union) feels empowered to raise those type of (safety) issues (p 136)
- 5 - INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ISSUES Safety is the number one priority in the plant. I believe that (p 18)
A building operator got hurt two years ago and the other operators said "We're not going to put up with this stuff" Since that time It has become a more safety conscious work environment (p22)
OTHER-THINGS NOT GETI-NG FIXED QUICKLY EHC filters frustrate us. Frequent changeout... not fixing the reason for the filter dogging (P 38)
The reliability of our boilers has been substandard...That has not been addressed adequately (p 38)
It's not in-plant equipment...in the boiler house and It doesn't get the attention it needs (p 39)
I don't know how you can expect a guy from Hope Creek to work on Salem when he never set foot in there (p 40)
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