ML062210060
| ML062210060 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/2004 |
| From: | Barber S NRC Region 1 |
| To: | Robert Fretz, Vito D NRC Region 1 |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2005-0194 | |
| Download: ML062210060 (7) | |
Text
Glnh Moypr - Routine u pdatefor S alem/HC SCWE)(RI-2O0-3-A-01 10) Page 1 ]
,f A A' From: Scott Barber To: David Vito; Robert Fretz Date: 1/8104 9:43AM
Subject:
Routine update for Salerr/HC SCWE)(RI-2003-A-01 10)
Appended is some useful reference material for today's discussion (10:00a.m.). I will bring hard copies to the meeting.
Please treat this as predecisional information. It should not be shared with personnel outside NRC.
MCI Conference Number 1-877-917-2512 Problems ...... call 1-877-855-4797 and refer to confirmatiorAMMM CC: A. Randolph Blough; Brian Holian; Daniel Holody; Daniel Orr; Eileen Neff; Ernest Wilson; Glenn Meyer; Karl Farrar, Leanne Harrison; Sharon Johnson; Theodore Wingfield Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions 2-' X(-.
FOIA- "
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- SALEM/HC SCWE HIGH LEVEL
SUMMARY
Unsafe Operations To date, there has been no contemporary information that has been conveyed through interviews or through inspection that would rise to the level of unsafe acts on the part of licensee management or operations that would warrant prompt and immediate action by the NRC. This aspect is evaluated in an ongoing and continuous manner.
There have bee ssues w duction over safe r ssures have been evident. In one Sa I was alleged to have taken an action to 1-- Ue steam supply to a main feedwater without approval of the operating shift. This was done to avoid taking the unit off line to effect repairs. A December 31, 2003 interview with the responsible Salem Shift Manager confirmed that th-11j did not have (C permission to operate the valve. Thus, this is gnpp*arent violation of the PSEG Conduct of Operatin poedure. DPrecommends th-In a recent HC interview, a HC reactor operator related a situation where he wanted to take a conservative action because he had lost reactor power indication (from a computerized calorimetric calculation) and wanted to lower power to a known state (approximately a 1% power reduction) and was prohibited from doing so by the operating supervisor (OS). More interviews are needed to review this matter.
The PSEG Work Environment To date there has been no information conveyed through interviews or through inspection that indicates that personnel would not raise safety issues to management. Thus, PSEG meets minimum standards for implementing a Safety Conscious Work Environment at Salem/HC.
Although the Salem interviewees to date have all indicated that interviewees would not hesitate to raise safety issues to management, they have indicated that senior management's response is often one to directly challenge the issue as being a safety issue or to recharacterize it as minor or to take action to minimize the importance of the concern. In a HC case, there appeared
. obe a desire to maximize neration in the face of uncertain reactor power conditions. Some
_alem Shift Maners (SM dicated that there had been a paradigm shift under th-
, . 1 n which they were being asked why they couldn't take an action to eo uction rather-than being asked if itwas a proposed action was safe or not. ThesEM rovided examples of situation in which they were asked to either delay a shutdown or to proc&.d wi startup or power ascension even when they were reluctant to do so. According to thd M none of these examples constituted a violation of the license or technical specifications, but management's approach was diametrically opposed to past practice in these instances. Cost pressures appeared to have been a contributor to the paradigm shift.
1
PSEG Industrial Safety Issues Many Nuclear Equipment Operators (NEOs) interviewed raised a number of industrial safety issues that have not been adequately addressed. They indicated that they had wrote notifications but that they either were never addressed or addressed in an inadequate manner.
In some instances, they indicated that management did not want to hear about there problems and considered it "whining" on their part.
PSEG Labor-Management Issues ne it.ervi e W . - . .. , ,. ' . .,
During the interview, he stated that he had been on days off and had traveled to the.!site on hiý own time to resolve other labor management issues. He was requested to take a en ough he . was off which he discussed with operations management at that time. The .. g)d him to go- home and to not worry about it which he did. He subs eqe ot a call from a-was told to come in for the test which he subsequently did. Later, he was told he was being fired for FFD rule violations. When asked why this occurred during the interview, he indica ed that 4IN* ad told another manager that "We're going to make an example out ofLm nd we're going to show the union that management is running the station and not the union."
There were other examples where union members indicated that management was generally . .
unresponsive to industrial safety issues rased by the union. One union member4&6fiiJ.a1'= 7.
1i.indicated that he and others had to protect the plant from management' 0ood ideas." 7;
By anecdote, he also commented that "PSEG has the right management team in place for the sixth time".
PSEG's Corrective Action Process(CAP)
Some interviewees indicated that the CAP provides a shield or a convenient excuse for why action has not been taken to address equipment problems or personnel safety issues. On occasion, NEOs have been told to reenter thier concerns in the system. When they have done so nothing changes.
NRC Considerations During interviews, we listen very carefully to issues that may be safety significant and try to develop questions that sufficently probe the issue so that it's significance is fully understood.
WE use this approach as part of our ongoing litmus test to determine if any unsafe acts have been idnetified.
Recent interviews have applauded th egime as being effective at -7
,ddressing emergi g concerns (both safety and otherwise) from all levels of the organization.
he retirement d and the removal Wrfroo positions of powe -
nas been viewed as b.nnging rel ief tthe previously unhealthy work -rivironment. However, one potential contributo - this environment still wields significant management influence power on-'e. We plan to continue to understand both his positive and negative "
contribution to the SCWE at Salem/HC.
Salem-HC SCWE Summary.wpd August 6, 2004 (1:27PM)
It,
§19 I March 17, 2003 at Ho e Creek -
- no n c confide that STATUS: ACTIVE INVESTIGATION INTERVIEWS:
No N/A 700 a*n' pressured for resta withou forced outage - bypass Interviews to date have suggested that the concern here was betwee nd his valve incident; Forced outage & turbine dep ent heads. He apparently "harassed" (From interviews wit t ed bypass valve (TBV) repair occurred. them for four hours on why a shutdown to repair a TBV was necessary when ar of th-epartment heads believe the decision to shutdown was a "no brainer".
Although non-conservative decision making is a possible root cause, there was no TS violation.
2 March 17, 2003 at Hope Creek J STATUS: ACTIVE INVESTIGATION No N/A 0 told alleger he did INTERVIEWS:
not have the authority to stop the evolution (reactivity excursion during Not yet developed - More to follow the bypass valve shutdown?) even though he knew It was Ill-conceived.
3 June 17, 2003 at Hope Creek - EDG STATUS: ACTIVE INVESTIGATION No N/A leakage exceeds LCO time;iressure to INTERVIEWS:
avoid shutdown; irected operator to not shu down; Interviews to date have suggested that there was time pressure to delay the shutdown as shutdo ncom enced within acceptable long as possible to allow engineering time to come up with an adequate operability time frame and met regulations. justification. Although non-conservative decision making was a possible root cause, there was no TS violation. The HC RIs were fully engaged with the Issue as It unfolded.
4 1 .t.m. 20T2atVS
.. mn- ,24,r STATUS: ACTIVE INVESTIGATION INTERVIEWS:
Yes TBD
- *ECP Interviews to date hay~ sgested that this Issue yay have bs stan11aed. !y-confidential report substantiates NEOs noted that to an NEO th or'e yM went and the the valve, wearing thý necessary personaal safety gear, and allegation, Third Step Grievance. without:
without following the work control process. Non-conservative decision making was viewed as a possible root cause for U*,sactlon. After coor~dination With OE and comparison to another recent Issue ?"gr operating Ginna SW valves) , this will be arima=
considered as a violation of PSEG's Conduct of Operations procedure because the/ z did not have appro Ifo hjpl-onlt prte the valve. The technical staffis recommending thai '-WI I I Rev. Date: 118104 Attachment A Page I of 4 Pre-declsional Information - Not for Release to the Public
5 Eahl 20I02 at Salem- Manager STATUS: ACTIVE INVESTIGATION No N/A directed SRO INTERVIEWS:
op. to NjA*a startup che.cklist s fep.led to havey ý W New information received on November 6, indicates this alleged activity may have fired but was unsuccessful. actually occurred whe to "irecte NA* a surveillance step for the Reactor Vessel Vent valves when a sing eývalve indicated dual Indication during this routine stroking evolution. s was allegedly told by the Operation Crew that they would not "NA" the step. Earlier information from Interviews suggested that the concern involved "NA-Ing" a second verification containment walkdown to be done by a VP-OPS level person step. This step was added to the SU. rocedure as a lessons leamed from the Davis-Bpes issue. According t ý this walkdown was actually done by himself an and startup was bieayed b-a day because of leaks that they found from some SG wet-ayup level indication valves. So, the step was actually completed contrary to the alleger's assertion.
STATUS: COMPLETE (Licensee actions appropriate) ; . ,
INTERVIEWS: COMPLETE -
he'wastlie duty manager dudng grassing season and woudnot havefd
- supportddaydeffodds'to station additional'operators Ithe Intake to clean the screens',
dudring' eavy,grassing penods.;His apprdacliwould have been to tak e theunit ofine6-He' i indlcated that hemayv hav'told the alleaer that dhe Was concerned that some'of the" ,
lindlcatea 'uring tfe Interview Utat ne was not lelng deve!oped but he.'did recall hi eon howto ha'ndleheissue:' He said he may' IIR IGhei.s~Ag ,rbat"deal obf nform~atl'oh ianthislss
-Au mtinagers an8a sfan.A~:'...- :~
8 Excessive use of temporary logs STATUS: ACTIVE INVESTIGATION TBD TBD INTERVIEWS:
Not yet developed - More to follow Rev. Date: 118104 Attachment A Page 2 of 4 Pre-decislonal Information - Not for Release to the Public
9 Salem 2 ISI relief request re: piping UT STATUS: ACTIVE INVESTIGATION TBD TBD (coverup?) INTERVIEWS:
Not yet developed - More to follow 10 HC offgas Issue a ok STATUS: ACTIVE INVESTIGATION No N/A over. Rad safety concerns expressed INTERVIEWS:
butRnot resolved ndicated some knowledge of this issue since he believe it pertained to elevated "C o gas flow rates due to excessive air in-leakage Into the condenser. He indicated that SME wrote a somewhat Inflammatory notification because the NEOs had to try to Identify the location of the leak In higher than normal radiation fields. The location of the leak eventually was discovered and the offgas leakage reverted to its pre-in-leakage levels.
11 HC employee allegedly asked to STATUS: ACTIVE INVESTIGATION No NIA modify a Notification re: "in-leakage" INTERVIEWS:
@*indlcated some knowledge of this Issue since he believe Itpertained to elevated 2!C o*f as flow rates due to excessive air in-leakage into the condenser. He indicated that detýrote a somewhat Inflammatory notification because the NEOs had to try to ldeenti* the location of the leak Inhigher than normal radiation fields. The location of the leak eventually was discovered and the offgas leakage reverted to its pre-in-leakage levels.
Rev. Date: 118104 Attachment A Page 3 of 4 Pre-decisional Information - Not for Release to the Public
I 4
1 PSEG non-conservative decision STATUS: ACTIVE INVESTIGATION making relative to #14 Steam Generator INTERVIEWS:
(SG) Feed Regulating Valve (FRV) believed to be stuck at 74% open Interviews to date have suggested that this concern related primarily to the timing of a decision to enter TS 3.0.3. An NEO and RO have asserted that it should not have taken 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to enter 3.0.3. However, once the licensee's troubleshooting plan showed that FRV was stuck they immediately entered the LCO and followed the SD requirements.
Although non-conservative decision making was a possible root cause, there was no TS violation.
~1~ t 1~ I.
2 In the Spring 2001 outage, a'Salem STAT"US: ACTIVE INVESTIGATION Unit 1 reactor trip was caused by a INTERVIEWS:
main generator current tro f rmer failure. Th tld Not yet developed - More to follow operations aptthey needed to get the reactor started up by particular date or their NRC performance Indicator was going to "go white.". Ilegedly harassed operations ally y asking day "when are you going to start the plant". Operations then toldaf they would start up when they thought they were within a day of putting steam into the main turbine. Although sotruinsisted that operations should start up the reactor with the MSIVs shut, operations refused to do so because it I
was contrary to their safety analysis.
C:\TEMP\GWViewer\Salem-HC-AttA-SCWE-Table.wpd Rev. Date: 118/04 Attachment A Page 4 of 4 Pre-decisional Information - Not for Release to the Public