ML062160268
| ML062160268 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/2005 |
| From: | Joel Wiebe Division of Nuclear Materials Safety I |
| To: | NRC Region 1 |
| References | |
| 1-2003-A-0110, FOIA/PA-2005-0194 | |
| Download: ML062160268 (2) | |
Text
iVito-Talking Points for ARB RI-2003-A-0110 Discussion aru From:
To:
Date:
Subject:
Place:
Joel Wiebe 16 R1Allegation 3/9/05 10:58AM Talking Points for ARB RI-2003-A-0110 Discussion R1Allegation Since the ARB form is lengthy and doesn't lend itself to be read from the projector display, I have made up a one page talking points document to facilitate the discussion.
CC:
Daniel Holody; Eugene Cobey; Leigh Trocine; Russell Arrighi Information in twlis recora was ae.ý..eo in accordance with the Freedom of InformatioR Act, exemptions '?2 OIA-.
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Oa*vjd*jt:- Talking Points for ARB R1.2.0.03A0110.wpd page Talking Points for ARB RI-2003-A-0110 Discussion Summary Draft violation is no longer sustainable because of information obtained during the 01 investigation. However, there is a violation of the Technical Specification required management directive NC.NA-ME.ZZ-0015(Z), dated February 9, 2002.
Details S
The s
di r
e eoeed about whether or not
- However, the 01 investigation revealed th; t the Unit 2 Reactor peralor'(RO), the Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor(CRS), and the Operations Superinten 0
eac some knowledge and some with extensive discussion about th In addition, they agreed that was in compliance with the procedure and was the preferred action if it would isolate the steam leak.
The requirements in 10 CFR 50.54 (j) and PSEG procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0005(Q) state that equipment, affecting reactivity or power level of the reactor, shall be manipulated only with the consent of a licensed operator or
's erato.
The extensive discussions and varying knowledge about th L
leads to the conclusion that at least tacit consent was given t1I The consent of the Unit 2 Rea erator (who states that h s p told him he was going tol is all that is needed to fulfill the reqsuireme t.
I The 01 investigation indicates there was confusion, a lack of understanding, and inadequate communications. We agree with this analysis.
Confusion, lack of understanding, and inadequate communications are inconsistent with proper command and control.
The Salem Unit 2 Technical Specifications, paragraph 661.2 requires that a designated individual be responsible for the Control Room command function and further requires a management directive to that effect be issued annually. PSEG Management Directive NC.NA-ME.ZZ-O01 5(Z), Shift Management Responsibility for Station Operation (Technical Specification 6. 1.2) dated February 9, 2002, was in effect on September 21, 2002 during the steam leak event.
The management directive states in the first paragraph that the OS is responsible for ensuring proper command and control during all planned evolution and upset conditions. Contrary to this requirement, the on-duty OS on September 21, 2002, did not ensure proper command and control during the Salem Unit 2 steam leak event, as evidenced by the confusion, lack of understanding, and inadequate com rrn!ations that occurred during the event.
fTh = contributed to the OS' failure to ensure proper command and control.
7 C..
e-an gement directive states in the third paragraph that all personnel should have a clear understanding of the chain of command. Contrary to this, th did not exhibit a clear understanding of the chain of command when heat a.
management level above the OS, made a decision that thý,
performed inadequate communications with several levels of personnel in the conirniand structure, and then performed the action of 1
The violation is minor because it was not willful, had no impact onsafety equipment, and caused no safety consequences.