ML062160266

Allegation Review Board Disposition Record

ML062160266
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	03/09/2005
From:	NRC Region 1
To:
References
1-2003-A-0110, FOIA/PA-2005-0194
Download: ML062160266 (3)

Text

g:\\ora\\a1leg\\panel\\20030110arb23.wpd ALLEGATION REVIEW BOARD DISPOSITION RECORD Allegation No.: RI-2003-A-01 10 Branch Chief (AOC): Cobev Site/Facility: Salem/Hope Creek Acknowledged: Yes ARB Date:

3/9/2005 Confidentiality Granted:

No Issue discussed: Review of completed 01 Repo.

.Branch 3 review determined the draft violation, upon which the 01 investigation was based, is no longer applicable due to the information obtained during the investigation. There is, however; a violation of the Technical Specification required management directive NC.NA-ME.ZZ-0015(Z) dated February 9, 2002.

The original draft violation (upon which the 01 investigation was based) cited Salem Generating Station Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1, Regulatory Guide 1.33 "Quality Assurance Program Requirements," 10 CFR 50.54 (j), and PSEG procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0005(Q), "Station Operating Practices." The draft violation concluded thq} contrary to the guidance delineated in these documents, "... on September 21, 2002, thegbn duty shift manager, following identificationof a steam leak on a main feedwater pump turbine steam admission valve during a planned power reduction, commenced a briefing of the operations staff to discuss plans to increase the rate or ower reduction to nimize adverse affects of the steam leak, however, about the same time, While there is some disagreement by personnel in the interviews about whether or not th It! OS,. the CRS and the Unit 2 Operator stated that they eithekwas going to r recall thorough] discu*in-the extent t at they could understand ho 4

_ould have thought he had their approval. In addition, neither 10 CFR 50.54(j) nor NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0005(Q) use the word "authorized." Instead, CFR and the procedure require that manipulation of equipment must be done with the knowledge and consent of the on-duty licensed operator. We come to the conclusion that ontacted the CRS and OS prior tc T

nd cated by information contained in the 01 report... "three comments liste i, t e ECP documeint indicate that p~ed the on-duty licensed operators, including..

that was going to notes of his Octo er 2002 interview of the [OS]... tol

'conducting b ief in CR contr I room, while this going ona me to me and said oin t the time of the incident] was "positive that o d-him he as going to

[Plant Operator on Unit I at the time of the incident] indicated in his 01 interview hat "later in the s f alked to [the OS] who initially indicated that he understood what was doing when

)left the control room" and indicated that during his ECP interview "he--

may have toldIlthat [the OS] told him he knew what was going to happen"...1.

alem Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor at the time of the incident] indicated that "he and observed the steam leak and agreed that if conditions changed it would be desirable to although he did not specifically give he direction to close the valve, based on their earlier discussion... it is his opinion th ~

thought he had his go ahead/approval tootI

1. IM IM... [the OS'] second interview indicated that he "admitted that what he told

- back in October 2002... may have been more accurate than the information he provided to 01 during his December 31, 2003 interview... [and he then recalled that]

whispered in his ear during the control room briefing that he was either going t r look to see if it could be closed."

As noted above, there is evidence that control room personnel to one extent or another were aware thatl iýas going tIM.an at least tacitly gave their. consent by not responding

.and nrt directing that the I

However, it is clear as detailed in the 01 report that rn acc erne Yi M'*t.

6ry,6 IT of complete understanding, and inadequate communications. To tin e tio

,a 6nfor--tio Act, exemptions,1

2 minimize confusion and misunderstanding during complex evolutions and events, it is important for all personnel involved to know who is in charge and what the plan is for proceeding. The Salem Unit 2 Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.1.2 requires that a designated individual be responsible for the Control Room command function and further requires a management directive to that effect be issued annually. PSEG Management Directive NC.NA-ME.ZZ-0015(Z), Shift Management Responsibility for Station Operation (Technical Specification 6.1.2) dated February 9, 2002, was in effect on September 21, 2002 during the steam leak event.

The management directive states in the first paragraph that the OS is responsible for ensuring proper command and control during all planned evolution and upset conditions. Contrary to this requirement, the on-duty OS 0s g _ber 21, 2002, did not ensure proper command and control during the Salem Unit s evidenced by the confusion, lack of understanding, and inadequate communications that 0ccured during the event. Confusion, lack of understanding, and inadequate communicatibns are inconsistent with proper commandja control. The OS provided conflicting statements concerning whether or not he knew tha'.

as going tcoW

') During his I st interview with 01, the OS maintained that it was unclear to him whether ot

). as going to or further assess the situation. As the individual with the control room command function, the S must ensure that the plan for proceeding is clear to him and the other personnel involved.

ll ontributed to the OS' failure to ensure proper command and control. At a management level above the OS,4 T111iiade a decision that th

-hat decision should normally be provided to the OS as the person in charge (per the Technical Specifications and NC.NA-ME.ZZ-0015(Z)) to determine if that is the correct and safe decision. The OS would then direct personnel to carry out the decision. However l

also decided that he was the best person to carry out the action.. In such a situation, to ensure proper command and control is exercised as required, clear communications with all involved must take place. The management directive states in the third paragraph that all personnel should have a clear understanding of the chain of command. Contrary to this,A*

id not exhibit a clear understanding of the chain of command when he made a decision thatm-

_a, performed inadequate communications wi several levels of personnel in the command structure, and then performed the action o,Uiillm The above are two examples of a violation of the Technical Specification required management directive, NC.NA-ME.ZZ-0015(Z). The violation is minor because it was not willful (as determined

byOQ, ad no impact on safety equipment, and caused no safety consequences. Thel tltamillwas in compliance with S2.OP-AB.STM-0001 (Q), Excessive Steam Flow, which was being im blemented in response to the steam leak.

ALLEGATION REVIEW BOARD DECISIONS Attendees: Chair - Uhle Branch Chief (AOC) - Cobey SAC - Vito, Harrison

01. Rep. - Teator RI Counsel - Farrar Others - Wiebe, Arriphi, S Lewis, Jackson, Quichocho, J White, Urban, Holody DISPOSITION ACTIONS:

1)

Prepare letters to licensee and alleger providing NRC conclusion of the 01 investigation and that a minor violation of a Technical Specification required management directive was determined to have occurred. (This issue will be addressed in the letters previously drafted to the licensee and the individual concerning the individual's discrimination complaint)

Before issuance of the letters, they will be sent to OE to obtain HQ concurrence (in lieu of the 3 week e-mail process) given the sensitivity of these issues. Obtain all regional

3 concurrences and send to HQ.

Responsible Person:

Urban ECD: 3/16/05 (to concur by 3/111/05)

Closure Documentation:

Completed:

2)

Issue after HQ concurs, OE briefs the EDO, DEDO, Commissioners Assistants and Commissioner Merrifield. DRP to carry out comm plan.

Responsible Person:

Cobey ECD:

3/30/05 Closure Documentation:

Completed:

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE ASSESSMENT:

PRIORITY OF 01 INVESTIGATION:

If potential discrimination or wrongdoing and 01 is not opening a case, provide rationale here (e.g.,

no prima facie, lack of specific indication of wrongdoing):

Rationale used to defer 01 discrimination case (DOL case in progress):

ENFORCEMENT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CONSIDERATION (only applies to wrongdoing matters (including discrimination issues) that are under investigation by 01, DOL, or DOJ):

What is the potential violation and regulatory requirement?

When did the potential violation occur?

(Assign action to determine date, if unknown)

Once date of potential violation is.established, SAC will assign AMS action to have another ARB at four (4) years from that date, to discuss enforcement statute of limitations issues.

NOTES: (Include other pertinent comments. Also include considerations related to licensee referral, if appropriate. Identify any potential generic issues)

Distribution: Panel Attendees, Regional Counsel, 0I, Responsible Individuals (original to SAC)

ARB MINUTES ARE REVIEWED AND APPROVED AT THE ARB