ML062160263
| ML062160263 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 01/19/2005 |
| From: | Vito D NRC Region 1 |
| To: | Lisamarie Jarriel NRC/OE |
| References | |
| 1-2003-045, FOIA/PA-2005-0194, RI-2003-A-0110 | |
| Download: ML062160263 (5) | |
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David Vito I-\\
Lisamarie Jarriel 1/19/05 9:06AM Fwd: ***_*.SENSITVE.ALLEG MATERIAL**
- Lisa, I spoke w/you earliler about our current efforts toward closing the Salem/HC SCWE alleger's H&I issue, but forgot to mention that we are having an ARB discussion on this today. The Bridge # info is attached.
There are limited lines, so if you are intersted, if you would, please find the folks in NRR and OE who will be listening in and go to one of those offices.
y primary concern is t-UIA. blie -UIA'd right after the SGWE review was do nd weto er w5e could not give her anything at the time because the H&I case and 1*ve ere in process. If we put out the H&I conclusion separately, she will F immediately, a again.we will have to tell her that we can't give her anything. If we wait until the is's done (it is relatively close), we can give her everything upon the FOIA request, which is obviousl y y preference.
I/-
CC:
Andrea Kock; Carl Mohrwinkel Information in this record was deleted in accordance With the Freedom of Information Act, exemptions C
o FOIA/
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- .*.~ *~*
.n~rayttI From:
Sharon Johnson To:
A. Randolph Blough; Cynthia O'Daniell; Daniel Holody; David Vito; Ernest Wilson; Eugene Cobey; James Luehman; Jeffrey Teator; Jennifer Uhle; Joel Wiebe; John Lubinski; Karl Farrar; Kay Gallagher; Leanne Harrison; Rani Franovich; _Russqell A righi;. Theodore Wingfield; Wayne_
Lanning Date:
1/18/05 10:45AM
Subject:
- SENSITIVE ALLEG MATERIAL****
I am supplying the bridge number and pass code for the January 19, 2005 ARB meeting regarding the Salem/Hope Creek H&I case discussion.
The ARB is scheduled for 1:30 p.m.
I have obtained 4 lines - (1) for RI (1) for NRR (1) for OE (1) free Call:
301-231-5539 or 1-800-638-8081 Pass Code llw
O r*.
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[iLisamnarie Jarriel - 2003011 Oarb22011 905.wpd Page 1 g:\\ora\\alleg\\panell20030110arb22.wpdALLEGATION REVIEW BOARD DISPOSITION RECORD Allegation No.: RI-2003-A-0110 Branch Chief (AOC): Cobey Site/Facility: Salem/Hope Creek Acknowledged: Yes ARB Date:
1/19/2005 Confidentiality Granted: No Issue discussed:
01 report for Case No. 1-2003-045 transmitted by RI 01 letter dated December 28, 2004.
01 Conclusion There is insufficient evidence to prove that the employment actions taken against the Cl was in violation of the employee protection regulation.
Summary of Information from Report
- 1. There is substantial evidence to indicate that the employment actions were the result of other factors.
l sked the CI to transfer to Nuclear in late 2001. This was after a spring 2001 sta mm eting in which the Cl said the leadership at the site was a nuclear safety issue.
.0 s treated more favorably than others with regard to temporary living expenses irst considered eliminating the Cl's position in the middle of 2002 based on pus Inets reasons.
made the decision to eliminate the Cl's position in early 2003 based to a large extent on feedback from his staff that the Cl was no longer effective.
Note that his staff's feedback could be based, in part, on the Cl's statement in the spring 2001 staff meeting.
Not withstanding the above, there is a plethora of other reasons why his staff would give negative feedback. The CI was a change facilitator. In general, change is perceived as negative to individuals. Individuals are more comfortable in a static environment. A group of individuals perceiving change as negative results in an or nizational resistance to change. Other reasons are: the Cl was considerecum m spy, the Cl did not produce observable results, the Cl's effectiveness appeared to be w ning was retiring and the Cl was closely tied to him.
ema
- 2. Management communications and inaction significantly contributed to the Cl's perception that the employment actions were the result of raising safety issues.
Perception is reality to the perceiver unless direct and consistent action is taken to change the perception. As time goes by, the required action to change the perception takes more effort until the perception can no Ion hanged.
The Cl's role in the organization was not clear t staff.
The Cl's status in the organization was not clear - permanent, consultant, rotational, t ean rary.
I
'procrastinated in making the decision as to when the Cl's separation would be e*f-cte. He had never downsized anyone before.
The VP of HR made the decision to move up the Cl's last work day without ensuring the reasons were adequately communicated.
I Lisarnarie Jarriel - 2003011 0arb220111905.wpd Page 2 1 The HR individual, assigned responsibility to inform the Cl that the separation date was to be moved up, delayed the discussion. When it occurred he was nervous and admittedly stumbled in his discussion. The separation date move was inconsistent with K-the information the Cl received from The HR indjal left the incorrect impression that the direction for the date change came from
- 3. Are management's inadequate communication and inaction subject to NRC enforcement or regulatory action?
"The failures that led to the perception of a violation of the employee protection act were not willful. Perception is reality to the individual doing the perceiving. This perception is not limited to the Cl and adversely affects the SCWE. Enforcement or regulatory action is not withheld for equipment issues just because it is not willful.
A SCWE is defined by the NRC as an environment in which, "employees feel free to raise safety concerns, both to their management and to the NRC, without fear of retaliation." The willingness of employees to identify safety concerns, i.e., SCWE, is an attribute of Safety Culture. Safety Culture in SECY 04-0111 refers to, "the necessary full attention to safety matters," and, "the personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engaged in any activity which has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power plants."
Using the above connection to the safety of nuclear power plants, in the case covered by the 01 report, management failures had a negative effect on the SCWE, which has a potentia negative effect on the safety/risk of nuclear power plants. In fact, because of the difficulty of causing a change in perception, this negative effect is ongoing until the perception change is successful.
This increase in risk resulting from the management failures is not quantifiable, but there is sufficient risk and basis for our concern or we would not be concerned about SCWE.
Enforcement/Regulatory Action Options Order? - Not appropriate.
Violation? - Not appropriate, because there are no requirements.
CAL? - Not appropriate, because the damage to SCWE as a result of this issue is done.
What is left is actions to improve SCWE and that is already occurring by licensee commitments under NRC scrutiny.
Inspection Report? - Probably the best vehicle. This could be covered under the SCWE crosscutting issue. Possibly, this could be a finding concerning management inadequate communication and inaction that resulted in a negative effect on SCWE.
This will be sensitive since we need to tell PSEG enough so that they understand our rational and can take actions to prevent recurrence, but we need to be concerned about keeping personal and proprietary information out of the public.
Alleger contacted prior to referral to licensee (if applicable)?
ALLEGATION REVIEW BOARD DECISIONS Attendees: Chair -
Uhle Branch Chief (AOC) - Cobey SAC - Vito, Harrison 01 Rep. - Mullen, Teator RI Counsel - Farrar Others - Wiebe
C I Lisamrnarie Jarriel - 20030110arb22011905.wpd Page 3 I
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DISPOSITION ACTIONS:
- 1)
ARB to determine if PSEG should be subject to additional NRC regulatory action.
Responsible Person: _
Closure Documentation:
ECD:
Completed:_
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE ASSESSMENT: Safety significance is low because no direct link to plant safety can be established.
PRIORITY OF 01 INVESTIGATION:
If potential discrimination or wrongdoing and 01 is not opening a case, provide rationale here (e.g., no prima facie, lack of specific indication of wrongdoing): NA Rationale used to defer 01 discrimination case (DOL case in progress): NA ENFORCEMENT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CONSIDERATION (only applies to wrongdoing matters (including discrimination issues) that are under investiciation by 01, DOL, or DOJ):
What is the potential violation and regulatory requirement?
When did the potential violation occur?
(Assign action to determine date, if unknown)
Once date of potential violation is established, SAC will assign AMS action to have another ARB at four (4) years from that date, to discuss enforcement statute of limitations issues.
Distribution: Panel Attendees, Regional Counsel, 01, Responsible Individuals (original to SAC)
ARB MINUTES ARE REVIEWED AND APPROVED AT THE ARB ARB MINUTES ARE REVIEWED AND APPROVED AT THE ARB