ML060750143
| ML060750143 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/2006 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2006-0095 | |
| Download: ML060750143 (1) | |
Text
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-encecmg- WY Continual Learning Through Knowledge Sharing S~ea!rh I !tow to ,SulbscriIW I login February 22, 2006 OE Home > Forum > 0 Fire Protection Page: 1 Carla Roquecruz-Di Laudo (2/22/2006 9:00:26 am)
Revisea' on 2/22/2006 9:02:45 am Potential Vulnerabilities Discovered During Design Basis Fire Review at Wolf Creek Unit 1 On September 29, 2005, conditions were discovered where a postulated design basis fire could cause the loss of a safe shutdown success path. During reviews associated with post fire safe shutdown work, the licensee discovered that the ability to perform diverse means required to mitigate spurious actuations came into questions for Fire Area A-8.
Some of the spurious actuations that could occur:
1.Pressurizer PORV BBPCV0455A opens and block valve BBHV8000A falls to close (Train A).
- 2. Steam Generator A ARV ABPV0001 spuriously opens and cannot be controlled from the control room (Train A). 3. Steam Generator C ARV ABPV0003 spuriously opens and cannot be closed from the control room (Train A).
- 4. Both VCT outlet valves BGLCV0112B and BGLCV0112C fail to close and normal letdown Isolates, causing a reducing inventory in the VCT and possible hydrogen intrusion into the charging pump suction (Trains A & B).
- 5. Normal charging pump power cables pass through this fire area and may be damaged, causing the NCP to trip. 6. RHR suction valve from the RWST, BNHV8812A, loses power and containment sump valve EJHV8811A opens, causing the RWST to drain to the containment sump (Train A),
- 7. BIT inlet valve EMHV8803B fails to open from the control room hand switch (Train B).
At the time of disovery the following actions took place:
- 1) Detection / Suppression systems available in area A-8 were functional.
- 2) Hourly fire watch established 1AW AP 10-104, Breech procedure.
IOEB has opened Issue for Resolution 2005-091 to further evaluate this issue.
For more information go to the following documents:
EN 42Q2%, Potential Vulnerabilitles Discovered During Design Basis Fire Review J.lER 4822005005, Validation of Post Fire Safe Shutdown (PFSSD) Capabilities of Fire Area A-8 Page: 1 AkI/
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