ML060240587

Comment (31) Submitted by Pilgrim Security Watch, M. Lampert, Et Al. E. J. Epstein, N. Cohen, S. J. Goodman, R. Becker, D. Katz and H. Moyer on Proposed Rule PR-73 Regarding Design Basis Threat

ML060240587
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim (DPR-035)
Issue date:	01/20/2006
From:	Becker R, Cohen N, Epstein E, Goodman S, Katz D, Lampert M, Moyer H Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility, Citizens Awareness Network, Coalition for Peace & Justice, Pilgrim Security Watch, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, Three Mile Island Alert, UNPLUG Salem Campaign
To:	NRC/SECY/RAS
Ngbea E S
References
70FR67380 00031, PR-73, RIN 3150-AH60
Download: ML060240587 (20)

Text

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Pilgrim Security Watch DOCKETED USNRC January 23, 2006 (2:25pm)

OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND 148 Washington St., Duxbury MA 02332 ADJUDICATIONS STAFF Tel 781-934-0389 Fax 781-934-5579 E-mail Lampert@adelphia.net

Subject:

Comments Nuclear Regulatory Commission Proposed Rule 10 CFR Part 73: Design Basis Threat [RIN 3150-AH60]

Date: January 20, 2006 To: SECYbnrc.Qov./(301) 415-1966.

Although the proposed rule addresses some important issues such as requiring protection against suicide attackers, insiders, and multiple attacking teams; it fails to include important measures necessary to ensure public health and safety in the event of an attack of the kind that we now can expect post 9/11.

1. Federalizing Security at Nuclear Reactors should be required to ensure protection of the public.

The principal objective of the proposed rule is "... to define in NRC regulations the level of security necessary to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense and security." However this is not possible because the NRC limits requirements to measures that a private security force can provide. (See text, "The NRC's DBT takes into consideration... a determination as to those characteristics against which a private security force could reasonably be expected to provide protection.")

A. The principal reasons to federalize security are that the Federal Government can provide types of securities that the industry or local/state government cannot. For example only the Federal Government can provide real on-site security against an attack by air - on site missiles such as those used in Washington DC and at the Olympic Games. And federalizing security will ensure that the decision as to how much security is required will be independent of the licensee's desires to save money.

B. Federalizing security had support in Congress, too. Senator Harry Reid introduced his "Nuclear Security Act" in November 2001, its main feature federalized nuclear power plants in the same way that government screeners are being installed at airports. However, Reid and his allies, including Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton failed to overcome resistance from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission among others and ended up abandoning the idea, Senate and industry officials said at that time. Again it was industry's fear that to federalize security would tell the public that nuclear reactors presented a potential danger that over-rode the public's right to real protection.

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2. Modes of Attack A. Water The proposed rule acknowledges an attack by water but does not require steps to prevent an attack by water.

Problem with current water defense:

Exclusion zones alone inadequate: At Pilgrim, for example, there is a 500 yard "exclusion zone", marked by buoys or floating "no-trespassing" signs. It is not impenetrable, and is not patrolled most of the time. The zones do not provide adequate protection since there are no watercraft barriers in place to prevent intrusion of a boat or floating explosive device. Trespassers have been on the beach.

Solutions:

1. Require water craft barriers: Barriers are manufactured, for example, by Wave Dispersion Technologies Inc. They make a Vessel Exclusion Barrier rises above the water a couple of feet with a fence on top. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have installed these barriers as part of Homeland Security programs to protect dams.

They are also used to protect U.S. Naval ports and nuclear subs in Connecticut.

Additionally, chain nets could be dropped from the floating barriers to ocean floor to prevent submerged explosives or divers.

See htto2://www.whisprwave.com/ for more information.

2. Require grates at mouth of intake canal: In 2005 the Department of Homeland Security offered to install a grate at the mouth of the intake canal at the Millstones to prevent an explosive from going up the canal and destroying the reactor's water-intake cooling systems. The licensee refused the offer; although in an August 12, 2005 news interview a Millstone spokesman acknowledged there could be a risk to public health and safety if a terrorist explosion destroyed one of the plant's water-intake cooling systems. He stated that short of a meltdown, disruption of the cooling system at the Waterford plant could result in releases of hazardous radioactive steam.

3. Require 24 -hour, armed surveillance and radar-on shore to detect any boat attempting to breach the zone.

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B. Air

1. Problem with current air defense:

Pilgrim NPS, an example: Since September 11, 2001, a "no fly" zone was put into effect for a short period, and was then eliminated. Because of the proximity of Boston and other airports, a "no fly" zone can not be large enough to permit effective response by Air Force or National Guard fighter aircraft. Even at the relatively slow speed of 300 miles per hour, a ten-mile "no fly" zone would provide only 2 minutes advance warning. The time for the two interceptor jets on "high alert" at Otis to be airborne is ten minutes. To be effective a no-fly zone would have to be 100 miles - crippling US air industry.

March 25, 2002, it was announced that Coast Guard helicopters would fly over the reactor site. Again, what is the probability that they would be flying overhead exactly when an attack was happening? Also Coast Guard resources are severely limited so that they fly over infrequently.

There is no capability of immediate armed response. Current NRC regulations do not require security from an air attack. However even an explosive laden helicopter could take out the control room, the brain of the reactor; or a explosive laden small plane could take out the spent fuel pool, especially in a BWR Mark I or II where the pool is located in the attic of the reactor with a thin roof overhead.

2. Solutions Require ground based air defense systems at reactors such as Raytheon Phalanx Close-In Weapon System Ground based air defense makes sense if one looks at the options.

A. Strengthening commercial airport security Good idea to deal with terrorism in general but will not solve our problem - will not prevent attacks using smaller, explosive laden aircraft; nor prevent attacks from small private air fields; nor attacks from planes departing from fields outside our country; nor attacks from the 70 plus planes missing, identified by the GAO.

B. Harden the reactor building, support structures and spent fuel storage systems:

Hardening everything is too expensive. Clearly moving most of the spent fuel out of the pool to secured dry cask storage - casks reinforced with earth and gravel, spaced 60 feet (not 6 feet) apart and bringing the pool back to the original low-density design would both decrease the attractiveness of the target and reduce the consequence if attacked. But we need more.

C. No-fly zones can not be wide enough. An airplane traveling at 300 miles per hour would penetrate a 10 mile keep-out zone in two minutes, far too little time for fighter aircraft on strip alert to respond. Moreover, according to the NRC data, 21 reactors are located within five miles of an airport. In order to be effective, keep-out zones would have to have radii of order of 100 miles or larger and such keep-out zones would cripple U.S. aviation. Small keep-out zones within a few miles of reactors might be useful for preventing pilots of small aircraft from making practice flights to scout out the approaches to power plants.

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Keep-out zones could be effective (and would be needed) in combination with air defense weapons.

D. Fighter aircraft on continuous patrol is impractical. There are 63 active reactor sites would put a huge burden on the U.S. military. For each aircraft on patrol, several others would need to be in various stages preparation and maintenance.

Thus it is likely that something of the order of 300 aircraft or more would have to be dedicated to this mission, and a much larger number of pilots, technicians, and support personnel.

E. "Beamhenge" shields as recommended by the Committee to Bridge the Gap. We are not opposed to this as one option to decrease vulnerability; however, we are advocating on-site missile systems operated by the US military, similar to those used in the summer and winter Olympics in the United States. The 'Beamhenge" shield system would not protect against use of an aircraft or helicopter from dropping explosives on the reactor or necessary support structures; and it is apt not to be practical or possible to surround all potential targets - main reactor building, support structures, and spent fuel storage areas.

F. Ground-based air defense systems are therefore a better way of enforcing a keep-out zone around nuclear power 1lants - recommended specifically Raytheon's Phalanx Close-In Weapon System.

Se,,.o r.u itaJr Ihj~ip AnA Low WARk The Raytheon Phalanx Close-In Weapon System is appropriate for a wide range of threats and avoids problems associated with surface to air missiles. It is a rapid fire, computer-controlled, radar-guided gun system designed to defeat air threats. The Phalanx system use 20 mm bullets and is currently used on U.S. Navy vessels. It offers around the clock protection and is cheaper, safer and more reliable than other means of protection.

The computerized radar system can determine if an aircraft's flight path termination point is at the reactor site. If such a determination is made, operating personnel can verify the approaching threat and destroy it shortly before it strikes the reactor. The 4

system is ideal to use when the reactor is close to an airport or busy traffic lines, like Pilgrim NPS, because of its advanced analysis capabilities.

It is ideally suited to protect nuclear reactors because it is short range, which reduces the probability of killing innocent aircraft (missiles do not have this advantage); Phalanx's field of fire is programmable; it is available 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day; and it is able to differentiate between a real threat and a passing or lost aircraft.

What are the drawbacks to putting missiles in or near nuclear reactor sites? Establishing a no-fly zone might also require closing some small airports -

perhaps procedures might be put in place to permit some to continue. However comparing risks against the benefits - choice is easy.

Placing them on site reduces the potential of an attack that government studies show will contaminate 500 miles if the spent fuel is hit, or if the core is hit, a 20-mile peak fatal radius the first year and a 65 mile peak injury radius.

We are at risk. Nuclear plants are targets and vulnerable to aircraft attacks -

especially small, explosive-laden planes.

There does not seem to be another viable response to this threat - doing nothing is not an option.

• These short-range anti-aircraft systems exist and could be rapidly deployed to greatly reduce the danger of an aircraft causing a radiological disaster.

See: J. P. Hinton et al, Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, SAND97-8203 (Albuquerque, New Mexico: Sandia National Laboratories, October 1996).

C. Land On site security is inadequate - under-manned, under-equipped, under-trained, under-paid, unsure; help from outside will arrive too late and are not trained either.

This will remain so unless the NRC specifically requires otherwise. See www.POGO.org

1. outside resDonders:

a. Problem - takes too long to arrive and mobilize; not trained adequately; under-equipped In the event of a terrorist attack, the NRC does not require a facility to be able to defeat the attack without help from the outside - SWAT units from the local sheriff, State Police or the FBI. The NRC only requires that the security guards are capable of delaying the attack long enough for outside help to arrive.

However, nuclear reactors can not depend on outside help to defeat a terrorist attack. The Project on Government Accountability (POGO) consulted security experts.

They agreed that a suicidal attack aimed at the reactor or spent fuel pool would be over, one way or the other, in 3-10 minutes. In fact, people familiar with NRC OSRE's tell POGO the mock attacks are usually lost in three minutes. Top NRC officials acknowledged to POGO, that tabletop security exercises show that it would take one-two hours for outside responders to arrive on the scene and get organized.

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The delay results from the actions that must take place if Pilgrim makes an emergency call that it is under attack and needs outside help. These actions are:

Assemble SWAT unit; Transport SWAT unit to the site; Conduct security briefing to inform the SWAT unit about where the terrorists are located and how they are armed; and Coordinate the actions of the SWAT unit with those of the guard force.

Apparently licensees have never actually tested the length of time it would actually take for an outside responder SWAT team to arrive. The NRC has recently begun a pilot program to test these timelines, but only with tabletop exercises - not actual drills.

Even if some local and State Police or local sheriffs' deputies could respond in 10-20 minutes, they do not constitute a combat force. They do not carry automatic weapons; are not familiar with the reactor layout or target sets to be protected; and have not had extensive coordinated on-site training.

NRC officials currently regard the two-hour delay in response time acceptable. They believe it would take at least an hour or two after an attack before irreversible core meltdown would occur. But the NRC has performed no analysis to support this assumption. NRC admits that if the terrorists or an "active insider" disables the reactor controls and their back-up, there would be nothing outsider responders could do.

Pilgrim, example: After 9/11, a few National Guardsmen were assigned to patrol outside Pilgrim's property - not on site. Their purpose is essentially to serve as the canary in the coal mines - if shot, a warning to on-site guards. They are basically referred to as "eye candy." They have not trained on site with on site security; nor toured the site - according to a report by the former security guard trainer, summer 2005. The State Police supposedly arrive by helicopter. The landing pad is directly adjacent to the hydrogen storage tank on Route 3A. This is dangerous because in a moist salt air environment the whirling copter blades create sparks - they risk blowing up. Also the State Police require transport from the helicopter landing pad on Route 3A to the reactor site - adding delay.

b. Solution The real solution is to federalize security - so properly trained and equipped personnel with prior authority can immediately and appropriately respond. A half measure would be to require an increase in the number of National Guard around the perimeter; have actual on site, mock attack training drills with on site security on the premises; supply the Guard with appropriate weapons.

2. On-site security at nuclear reactors:

a. Problems

1. Under-manned: Prior to 9/11, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) required only five to ten security guards on duty per nuclear reactor. Since then, the NRC has ordered the utilities to minimally increase the guard force. But more than half the 6

guards the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) interviewed say their plants are relying on increased overtime of the existing guard force -- up to six consecutive days of 12-hour shifts -- rather than hiring more guards. Guards raised serious concerns about fatigue. While a few guards said their plants have increased the guard force -- one plant has tripled the number of guards -- most interviewed believe that they are still below adequate levels to defeat a real terrorist attack. In fact at Pilgrim a security trainer stated summer 2005 that there are not enough guards to man all the checkpoints-the first line of defense. Pilgrim's security workers went on strike during the summer, 2003 protesting 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shifts for 4 days without 3 consecutive days off. Pilgrim has a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> work limit per week. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is too many hours week-after-week - especially when many guard jobs are boring (example sitting in a tower) but require being alert. Overtime is expected. Security workers stated that overtime at Pilgrim made some work weeks extend to 104 - 108 hours0.00125 days <br />0.03 hours <br />1.785714e-4 weeks <br />4.1094e-5 months <br />. If overtime is refused, they know that the worker is let go.

2. Rotating shifts: At Pilgrim workers complained that they work one week days and the next week nights resulting in an inability to establish a sleep pattern and exhaustion. This should not be allowed.

3. Under-trained: Nuclear industry executives have repeatedly claimed that guards receive 270 hours0.00313 days <br />0.075 hours <br />4.464286e-4 weeks <br />1.02735e-4 months <br /> of training before being posted; 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> per year to re-qualify with their weapons; and 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> per year in antiterrorist tactical exercises. None of these claims appear to be true. Most guards interviewed train with their weapons only once per year (Pilgrim included) for two to three hours during their annual weapons qualification. Most also have had no training or practice in shooting at a moving target. "Tabletop" exercises are rudimentary.

For example: According to two former Seabrook nuclear power plant guards who were hired post-9/11, they were only given four days of tactical training and three days of weapons training before being posted. Neither they, nor any of the other 14 recruits in their training class, had military or law enforcement experience. The majority of those recruits had never even fired a weapon before. Yet during their training they were limited to firing 96 rounds with their handguns and fewer rounds with their shotguns, and were told they "would not be firing our service weapons again until the annual qualifications." The guards said they informed the trainers more training was necessary, but were told that if they wanted more practice with the weapons, it would have to be on their own time and at their own expense.

Also there are too few security guard trainers. At Pilgrim [summer 2005], for example, there were 2 security guard trainers - one had left June 3, 2003 leaving only two people to do training, revamp department and carry out the NRC October 2003 order.

4. Under-equipped: Many of the guards believe they are not equipped with adequate weaponry. The power and range of weapons provided to many of the guards is vastly inferior to the weapons known to be used by terrorists, due in part to restrictive state laws. According to one guard, terrorists will come armed with automatic weapons, sniper rifles, and grenades and the guard force "would be seriously outgunned, and won't have a chance." Federal law prohibits security guards from using automatic weapons, even though they are expected to face them in an attack.

Pilgrim guards stated they now have 9 millimeter guns and need 45 millimeter; bullet proof vests are only in sizes large and extra large -unsuited for many workers 7

- and only have 12 vests, summer 2005. Does that mean only 12 guards? Do they have Kelvar helmets? At Pilgrim they have night vision for weapons but no mount for it on the rifles.

According to a US Army demolition manual (FM 5-25/May 1967), just two 75 pound backpacks of high explosive (PETN) will blow a twelve foot diameter crater six feet deep at its center in heavily reinforced concrete. This is for untamped explosive, (i.e., just laid on the surface).

5. Underpaid: Low wages and inadequate health, disability and other benefits are causing turnover in the guard force at some plants as high as 70-100% over the 31/2year life of a labor contract. At six nuclear facilities identified by POGO, security guards were being paid $1 to $4 less per hour than custodians or janitors. Guards also often earn less than workers in their area who face substantially less risk such as funeral attendants, manicurists, and aerobic instructors.

6. Unsure: Nearly all of the guards interviewed by POGO raised concerns about the lack of guidance on the use of deadly force. Guards are currently restricted from using deadly force unless an intruder is wielding a weapon or threatening the life of an individual. If a suicidal terrorist with a backpack (possibly containing explosives) jumped the fence and headed straight for a spent fuel pool or reactor, the guard could only observe and report the event. One guard summed up the problem stating:

"If you pull the trigger, you're on your own and you'll need a good lawyer."

7. Background checks are made in the U.S. but not out-of-the-country.

8. Guard Towers serve no purpose other than PR. They are simply sitting ducks -

targets. Towers are not constructed to keep out the caliber ammunition likely to be used by terrorists. If fired upon, the guard unless suicidal, would not open the portal to shoot back. The long hours and boredom make it unlikely that the guard in the.

tower will remain alert to even notice a problem.

9. Control Room requires ventilation; they take in some outside air. However what is to prevent crop duster or trucks releasing chlorine gas to kill operators? What is the capability to close off outside air and use supplemental air systems and for what duration?

b. Solution Appropriate solutions are, in part, mentioned throughout the "land-problem" discussion above.

The real solution is to federalize security.

1. Short of that, it is obvious that the NRC must require and enforce regulations so that security workers are not fatigued.

A. Shorter work schedules. We understand that the NRC directed that security guards on average work no more than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> a week at any plant and plant operators had a transition period to put the order into effect - some cases until October 2004. What does "on average" mean? It should mean 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, period -

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including overtime. We are told security workers worked more than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> a week at Pilgrim NPS.

B. Non-standard work schedules are discussed on the following website.

http //www.wws.orinceton.edu/ota/d iskl/1991/9108/9 10803. PDF. Work schedules outside the standard daytime hours can disrupt the biological rhythms of the body.

This disturbance can continue unabated while other factors, such as sleep loss and social disruption, compound the deleterious effects. The results can be detrimental to some workers' health and ability to perform their jobs, which in turn can adversely affect their safety and that of society as a whole." The practice of switching a worker's work schedule from day to night from one week to the next is especially dangerous and should be prohibited - a sleep pattern can never be established. A separate staffing crew should be assigned permanently to work the night shift.

2. Staffing must be increased to match the number of attackers on 9/11; they must be properly trained and equipped; and regulations requiring that only workers with complete background checks can be hired.

3. TESTS OF SECURITY - ignored in proposed rule Security inspections and force-on-force Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) program exercises must be upgraded to conform to the proposed DBT regulations - they must demonstrate high confidence to be able to repel a September 11, 2001, level assault.

The following flaws identified by Riverkeeper concerning the OSRE security test performed at Indian Point are discussed below and we concur with their recommendations (1-10) to improve the tests.

A) There is too much advance notice. Indian Point has had months to prepare for their OSRE drill, summer 2003. Entergy knew the exact date of the test. They could make sure all equipment was in top working order and that all security officers were fully trained on their response duties. In reality, the attackers are unlikely to provide early warning. Thus, intrusion equipment may be out of service for repairs and security officers may be new to the job without fully understanding their duties.

REQUEST: The right way to perform the OSRE drills is with short notice - about two or three weeks. That would provide enough time to arrange "cover" security (during the OSRE, real security officers with real guns must be present but not involved in the exercise in case a real attack were to occur) but not enough time to correct problems. When notified, plant operators should be required to "freeze in place" the security force to be tested, rather than calling in their most capable security officers.

When notification occurs months in advance companies have time to hire security-training consultants and additional guards to improve their security posture and chances of success in deterring a mock attack. A nuclear industry representative acknowledged that utilities spend 'millions of dollars' getting ready for the tests. The security officers said that for months prior to a test, they repeatedly practice for the two or three scenarios on which they will be tested, often with the help of the consultants. The problem, according to the guards, is that they train only on the particular attacks that will be used in the test rather than on many different types of attacks. Once the tests are completed, the security consultants are let go and the guard force reduced until the next test.

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B) The OSRE drills set a low bar to hurdle by using a low passing grade. The OSRE drill typically features four force-on-force exercises. Each exercise features the mock intruders attempting to destroy every piece of equipment on a "target set" and the armed security officers trying to prevent it. The plant security defense team has to win at least three of the four exercises for the plant to get a bad grade. In real life, there would be no second chances.

REQUEST: Good security should be scoring 100 rather than 75 on the OSRE drill.

C) The OSRE drills are almost always performed with the plant at full power during evening or midnight shifts. i.e. during a time when the number of workers at the plant is minimal. The armed responders, knowing that an OSRE drill is in progress, can literally shoot at anything that moves and be assured it's an attacker. In reality, the armed responders would have to spend a few seconds distinguishing between friend and foe. Having no "innocent" workers around makes it easier for the defenders and harder for the attackers. In addition, the OSRE drills are never run during outages. During outages, the equipment to be protected is different and the containment barriers may already be breached (opened for refueling).

REQUEST: OSRE drills should be performed during outages and security officers must be trained and tested to differentiate between plant workers and attackers.

D) The OSRE drills limit the insider role to that of a passive participant. The security regulations have long specified that the attackers can be aided by one insider acting in either a passive or active role. The OSRE drills to date and as planned have limited the insider role to that of a passive participant. In other words, the insider provides information to the attackers so they can plan their assault. But the insider does not take an active role (i.e., creating a distraction, damaging target set equipment or security equipment, etc.)

REQUEST: OSRE drill should involve active participant(s).

E) The OSRE drills to date and as planned have only involved attackers originating from one direction as one team. The September 11th attack and subsequent attacks abroad in Saudi Arabia and Casablanca have involved multiple teams and attacked from multiple directions. A successful terrorist attack on a reactor or spent fuel pool could result in tens of thousands of casualties.

REQUEST: OSRE drills should assess the ability of plant security to defend against teams of 4 or 5 attackers originating from multiple directions.

F) The OSRE drills to date and as planned only require plant security to defend against a small number of attackers. The attacks of September 11th on U.S. soil and more recent attacks abroad involved 19 or more terrorist attackers.

RECOMMENDATION: At a minimum, the OSRE drills should assess the ability of plant security to defend against twenty or more attackers, in teams of 4 or 5, and attacking from multiple directions.

G) The OSRE drills do not assess plant security's ability to defend against an attack on the spent fuel pool. More than 300 OSRE exercises have been conducted since 1991. A grand total of zero (0) of these exercises has been run with the spent fuel as 10

the target.

REQUEST: OSRE drills should include the spent fuel storage pool as the target of at least one exercise during the OSRE drills.

H) NRC. after intensive consultation with the nuclear industry, did not seek public input while revamping the OSRE exercises.

REQUEST: The NRC should receive input from representatives of public interest groups on security policy issues.

I) a plant owner which performs poorly on an OSRE drill is not subject to enforcement actions.

REQUEST: A plant owner that performs poorly during an OSRE drill should be subject to an enforcement action. If a plant owner repeatedly performs poorly, the NRC should order the closure of the plant, until the plant owner improves its performance during the OSRE drill.

J) No independent observers, those without a vested interest, are present to monitor and evaluate the drills.

REQUEST: The NRC should allow independent observers, i.e. congressional staff with security clearance, to observe and evaluate the OSRE drills to ensure that the drills are not staged and provide an accurate assessment of plant defenses.

K) Results on Tests not publicly available (beginning 8.04.)

REQUEST: Certainly, some security information is best kept behind locked doors. But this blanket directive includes anything and everything, and will inevitably restrict the release of potentially embarrassing, but not necessarily dangerous, information.

Communities around nuclear plants have an inherent right to know what is going on next door.

L) Wachenhut. the foreign -owned company that provides security for half the nation's reactors. will also test reactor's security.

This is a conflict of interest and provides no incentive to seriously challenge the guards; the company is foreign owned and this raises questions in that airport security by foreign owned companies is not allowed; and Wachenhut has a poor track record. POGO, for example, explained in a July 30, 2004 letter to NRC Chairman Nils Diaz that, "As recently as last January, DOE inspector general reported that Wackenhut personnel had cheated during a force-on-force exercise of June 2003 at the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge, Tenn. This facility houses hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium. The inspector general, Greg Friedman, said the test results were "tainted and unreliable." Moreover, Friedman gleaned from more than 30 testimonies that this was part of "a pattern of actions" dating back almost two decades."

REQUEST: The NRC should return to the previous practice of security testing to the U.S. federal government-design, performing the attacks, evaluation of the exercises

- so that tests are credible.

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4. Targets - Spent Fuel Spent fuel storage on site deserves special attention. The National Academy of Science was mandated by Congress to analyze the vulnerability of spent fuel storage on site. They concluded terrorist attacks on spent fuel pools are possible ---a credible threat; and if a terrorist attack on the spent fuel pool lead to a zirconium cladding fire, it could result in large amounts of radioactive material spreading perhaps 500 miles downwind. All spent fuel pools were vulnerable; however 32 reactors, Boiling Water reactors with Mark I and II Containments were identified as especially vulnerable to attack - reactors such as Pilgrim NPS and Vermont Yankee. An August 10, 2004 Petition was submitted to the NRC by the Nuclear Security Coalition and we support its contentions and recommendations.

El.kd Imdi. Fel#1M Find A. Spent Fuel Pools

1. Problem SDent Fuel Pools - as described by the National Academy of Sciences.

Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear fuel Storage Public Report, April 2005. To access the report www.nap.edu/books/0309096472/html "Finding 2A: Spent fuel storage facilities cannot be dismissed as targets for such attacks because it is not possible to predict the behavior and motivations of terrorists, and because of the attractiveness of spent fuel as a terrorist target given the well known public dread of radiation... The committee judges that attacks by knowledgeable terrorists with access to appropriate technical means are possible. "p.4 12

"The potential vulnerabilities of spent fuel pools to terrorist attack are plant specific... there are substantial differences in the designs of spent fuel pool that make them more or less vulnerable to certain types of attackop.6 "The vulnerability of a spent fuel pool to terrorist attack depends in part on its location with respect to ground level as well as its construction. Pools are potentially susceptible to attacks from above or the sides depending on their elevation with respect to grade and the presence of surrounding shielding structures. "p.43 "The spent fuel pool, (GE Mark I BWR reactors) is located in the reactor building well above ground level. Most designs have thin steel superstructures. The superstructures and pools were not, however, specifically designed to resist terrorist attacks. "p.41 A loss-of-pool-coolant event resulting from damage or collapse of the pool could have severe consequences. Severe damage of the pool wall could potentially result from several types of terrorist attacks, for instance: (1)

Attacks with large civilian aircraft; (2) Attacks with high-energy weapon; Attacks with explosive charges (NAS, p. 49)

Finding 3B -... a terrorist attack that partially or completely drained a spent fuel pool could lead to a propagating zirconium cladding fire and the release of large quantities of radioactive materials to the environment. Details are provided in the committee's classified report (NAS, p 6)

Such (zirconium cladding) fires would create thermal plumes that could potentially transport radioactive aerosols hundreds of miles downwind under appropriate atmospheric conditions( NAS, p. 50)

The excess cancer estimates...to between 2,000 and 6,000 cancer deaths (NAS, p. 45)

2. Solutions

a. The real solution is low-density, open frame racking in the pool and hardened, dispersed, on-site dry cask storage as an interim measure until all spent fuel can be moved off-site.

b. NAS recommended immediate steDs to prevent a fuel fire - reconfiguring or checker-boarding the fuel in the pool; putting in a spray water system; and limiting the frequency of off-loads of full reactor cores. It is important that these steps are viewed as only immediate steps; that they are limited in their effectiveness; and long term measures are required.

1) Reconfiguring the Spent Fuel Pool To reduce spent fuel pool vulnerability, the National Academy of Sciences recommended that the fuel pool be rearranged so that the recently unloaded, very hot fuel is dispersed in the pool among the older and cooler fuel. The analysis of the effectiveness of this is plant specific. It appears that even if the recently discharged spent fuel is mixed with the older, cooler fuel, there is still a high likelihood of a zircaloy fire for a period of time after discharge from the reactor. There are many 13

variables such as burnup, age, type of fuel, density and temperature that will need to be analyzed for each plant and fuel configuration.

However, shifting the fuel around will yield only a small reduction in risk. It will be useless if there is partial drainage of water or if debris blocks air flow in a drained pool.

Specifically:

(1) Checker boarding with full pool and tight racks -- small risk reduction.

(2) Checker boarding with 5-year fuel only and tight racks -- better risk reduction.

(3) 5-year fuel only and open-frame racks -- best risk reduction.

2) Spray Cooling System Installed in Pool To reduce spent fuel pool vulnerability, the National Academy of Sciences recommended that a spray cooling system be installed and specified that the system must be capable of operation even when the pool is drained (which would result in high radiation fields and limit worker access to the pool) and stay in tact even when the pool or overlying building, including equipment attached to the roof or walls, are severely damaged. These requirements are unlikely to be met.

Pilgrim spokesmen have stated publicly that hoses could be brought to prevent or put out any fire. This is not so.

If water is lost from a spent fuel pool recently discharged fuel can ignite in a period as short as 1-2 hours. Actual period depends on the time since the reactor shutdown for refueling. There is at present no pre-engineered means of spraying water into a drained pool to keep the fuel temperature below the ignition point. Human access with hoses could be precluded by fire or high radiation fields generated as part of the attack, or by other disabling mechanisms such as chemical weapons. Sophisticated attackers might attack the reactor and the pool, using the radiation field from the damaged reactor to preclude access to the pool. Once ignition had occurred, spraying water into the pool would feed the fire through the exothermic steam-zirconium reaction. A massive and probably impractical flow of water would be needed to overcome the effect.

Following an event at the Connecticut Yankee nuclear plant on August 21, 1984, the NRC issued Bulletin 84-03 requiring licensees of operating nuclear plants to among other things calculate the radiation doses in the vicinity of the spent fuel pools should the water level drop. By letter dated November 29, 1984, the licensee of the Connecticut Yankee and Millstone nuclear plants provided the NRC with its response to Bulletin 84-03. The licensee informed the NRC that the calculated radiation dose rate near the edge of a drained spent fuel pool was 40,000 Rem/hr. The dose rate for Millstone Unit 3 was 19,000 Rem/hr. These calculations are representative of the replies received by the NRC from other plant owners. Workers would receive a lethal dose of radiation in 40 to 85 seconds if exposed to such high levels. Twenty years have passed since those calculations and the tons of additional spent fuel crammed into the Millstone pools have only increased the potential radiation hazards. Given the 25 Rem emergency worker dose limit articulated by the NRC in Information Notice No. 84-40, workers could only visit the area of the spent fuel pool railing for 2-5 seconds, scarcely enough time to position a fire hose and lash it in place.

14

3) NAS also recommended as an immediate step to limit the frequency of offloads of full reactor cores into the spent fuel pools, require longer shut downs of the reactor before any fuel is offloaded, and provide enhanced security when such offloads must be made.

B. Dry Cask On-Site Storage

1. Problem NAS stated that dry casks were less vulnerable to attack because casks are passive; casks are located at or below ground level making attack more difficult; the fuel is more spread out. However, the Academy cautioned that casks are still vulnerable to attack. They are vulnerable to attack especially the way industry has chosen to store casks - place them on a concrete pad, not unlike a basketball court, and line them up about 6 feet apart like bowling pins.

2. Solution NAS suggested, ".simple steps that could be taken to reduce the likelihood of releases of radioactive material from dry casks in the event of a terrorist attack -

such as spreading the casks further apart, constructing mounds around the casks.

a IS

=.

j i

=

..~i

( t'JUNO Dry Casks Typically when industry moves to dry cask storage, they place the casks on a concrete pad - like bowling pins waiting for a strike. However, it is not September 10th; therefore it is necessary to place them in a less vulnerable position. The schematic below by Dr. Gordon Thompson makes sense.

a. Dry Casks Need to Be Secured or Hardened - two proposals PROPOSAL #1 Dispersed Hardened Cask Storage Proposal 15

SCHEMATIC VIEW OF PROPOSED DESIGN FOR HARDENED, DRY STORAGE Disperse casks so that they are a more difficult target. Pilgrim has plenty of room; it sits on 1600 acres.

Overhead View

/

Spacing must be suffcient to

<~presnt destruction of omumpleCasks t

flEk berms wound cask would timt off"ecs VI wpcosiun or flr

b. PROPOSAL#2 Holtec Underground Storage Proposal Holtec International, a major cask design and manufacturing company, stated that they would ask the NRC to approve an underground design for a dry storage cask facility (NuclearFuel, Vol. 29, Number 9, April 26, 2004). According to Holtec's President/CEO the design is a low-profile system - all but two feet of which would be below ground - offers "the next level of protection against terrorist attacks." The new system uses the same inner canister and ancillary equipment NRC has already approved as part of their Hi-Storm 100 cask system. The new system known as Hi-Storm 100U, uses a large concrete block with metal-lined cavities to hold spent fuel storage canisters. Once the canisters are in place, a lid is secured to each cavity.

Canisters are passively cooled and can hold the same heat load as the existing system. Holtec says that the system can be used at any site, even on a coastal plain or site with a high water table, because the metal canisters are welded and completely sealed off from the surrounding substrate. Preservatives will be applied to protect the concrete from groundwater. A surveillance program would monitor for 16

groundwater. At issue is will being out of sight be out of mind; and how effective will the monitoring be to assure no leakage?

Because with either proposal risk is reduced and not eliminated, it is important that full security and emergency planning be maintained until operations cease and all waste is removed from the site.

5. Comments Section-by-Section Analysis (part IV proposed rule)

The proposed rule included a table to provide a comparison between the proposed rule text and the current rule text. My comments are inserted in bold italics.

New Change (l)i Radiological sabotage: The rule change should specifically cover attack by more than one team, attacking from multiple entry points, at the same time same time.

(1)(i)(D) The rule should include response to weapons capable of penetrating reinforced concrete and incapacitating agents entering control room from outside.

(1) i)(E) 'Water vehicles should include unmanned floating devices loaded with explosives and grates to prevent explosives being sent up the intake canal.

(1)(ii) An internal threat of an insider: The rule change must be clear an active insider.

(l)(iii) A four-wheel drive land vehicle bomb must be clarified to read adversaries may coordinate a vehicle bomb assault with another external and/or internal assault.

(C)Civ) A waterborne vehicle bomb change to include unmanned raft or debris loaded with explosives.

(2) The proposed paragraph would add new adversary capabilities to the DBT including operation as one or more teams and attack from multiple entry points. Specify 'simultaneously (2)(i)CC) Suitable weapons, range of weapons licensees must be able to defend against requires providing night vision mounts.

Comments submitted on behalf of, Mary Lampert, Pilgrim Watch 148 Washington Street Duxbury, MA 02332 781-934-0389 ph/781-934-5579 fax Email Lampert@adelphia.net 17

Eric Joseph Epstein Chairman, TMI-Alert 4100 Hillsdale Road Harrisburg, PA 17112 (717)-541-1101 Phone (717)-541-5487 Fax tmia.com Norm Cohen Executive Director Coalition for Peace and Justice; UNPLUG Salem Campaign, 321 Barr Ave, Linwood; N308221; 609-601-8583 Sidney 3. Goodman 158 Grandview Lane Mahwah, N. 07430 Rochelle Becker, Executive Director Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility www.a4nr.ora (858) 337 2703 PO 1328 San Luis Obispo, Ca 93406 Deb Katz Citizens Awareness Network Box 83 Shelburne falls, MA 01370 Herb Moyer, President Seacoast Anti-Pollution League PO Box 1136 Portsmouth, NH 03802 Email: info@saplorg 18

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