ML053640128

Draft - RO & SRO Written Exam First Submittal (Folder 2B)

ML053640128
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	10/03/2005
From:	Balian H Operations Branch I
To:	Todd Fish Operations Branch I
Conte R
References
Download: ML053640128 (74)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:From 100% power and 100% flow, what individual jet pump flow indications would you see on flow transmitters FT-B21-1N034A through W (at Panel 1C619902-38 in the Upper Relay Room) if the "B" reactor recirculation pump (RRP) inadvertently trips? Flow indications for the "A" loop jet pumps will initially increase, then return to their original values. Flow indication for the "B" jet pumps will decrease to zero as the pump coasts down, then increase to a positive value as flow reverses in the "B" loop jet pumps. A Flow indications for the "A" loop jet pumps decrease, then increase to their original values as flow through the "B" loop jet pumps slows, then reverses. Flow indication for the "B" jet pumps will immediately read zero. B Flow indications for the "A" loop jet pumps will increase during the transient. Flow indication for the "B" loop jet pumps will decrease to zero as the "B" RRP coasts down, then remain at zero. C Flow indications for the "A" loop jet pumps will increase during the transient. Flow indications for the "B" loop jet pumps will decrease to zero as the "B" RRP coasts down, then increase to a positive value as flow reverses in the "B" loop jet pumps. D 2950 01 Partial or Complete Loss of Forced Core Flow Circ AK2.07 3.4 3.4 AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION and the following: AK2.07 Core flow indication NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the Applicant does not understand that the operating loop system characteristic changes when in single RRP operation. The operating RRP will have a lower flow resistance because it can now discharge into the ten idle jet pumps in addition to the core inlet plenum. CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the Applicant does not fully understand how the core flow signal is developed. The individual jet pump flow transmitters produce signals before they are summed to determine total core flow. FY-1K607 is substituted for FY-1K606 if a RRP generator exciter breaker is open or discharge valve is less than 90% open. FY-1K607 subtracts the idle loop jet pump flow from operating loop jet pump flow to determine actual core flow (operating loop flow less backflow through the idle loop). CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the Applicant does not understand that the idle loop jet pumps have no method of backflow prevention or if the Applicant misunderstands signal development. CHOICE (D) - Yes References (CFR: 41.7 / 45.8) CFR Link 1 28345 SRO RO Question ID: Bank Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. (HB 09/08/05) Mod from INPO Bank QuestionID 20448 (Quad Cities exam in August 2001)

2. (THF 09/08/05) - no comment

3. Gil 09/09/05 - no comment.

4. Gil 09/26/05 - Should be HCL R: o.k. - classified Higher Cognitive Level.

Todd 09/30/05 - OK. SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO

Given the following conditions:

- SSES Unit 1 recently entered Mode 4 to start a refueling outage following a 500 day run.
- SSES Unit 2 is in mode 1 at full power and flow.
- The station experiences a loss of Startup Transformer T-20.
- the Shift Manager has just declared an UNUSUAL EVENT.

Why has Shift Manager declared an UNUSUAL EVENT? CU1: Loss of All Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater than 15 Minutes. A CU2: UNPLANNED Loss of Reqired DC Power for Greater than 15 Minutes. B CU3: UNPLANNED Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability with Irradiated Fuel in the RPV. C MU1: Loss of all Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater than 15 Minutes. D 2950 03 Partial or Complete Loss of A.C. Power AK3.06 3.7 NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: requires loss of both T-10 AND T-20. VALID DISTRACTOR: Loss of power c/b reasonable cause for entering the EAL. CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: requires loss of ALL vital DC power for >15 minutes. VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may believe loss of T-20 causes loss of DC power. CHOICE (C) - YES Applicant must recognize that loss of T-20 causes RPS Bus "B" to deenergize on SSES Unit 1. This causes PCIS initiation which, subsequently, isolates the RHR SDC drop line. Finally, Applicant should recognize that decay heat load is high and an uncontrolled heat up could cause RCS temperature to rise above 200 degrees Fahrenheit. This is the entry condition for EAL CU3 per EP-TP-001 CHOICE (D) - NO WRONG: requires loss of both T-10 AND T-20. VALID DISTRACTOR: Loss of power c/b reasonable cause for entering the EAL. References CFR Link 2 29662 SRO RO Question ID: Mod Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. (HB 09/08/05) Modified from SSES Bank.

24 month 700 days or 18 month 500 days for SQ to answer

2. THF 09/08/05 - clarified stem.

3. Gil 09/09/05 - concerned about K/A match.

4. Gil 09/26/05 - K/A mismatch. Relationship between containment isolation and EAL?

R: on a loss of T-20, RPS buss "B" is deenergized. This causes Primary CTMT isolation including isolation of RHR in SDC mode. The successful Applicant must recognize the reason PCIS isolated is the loss of RPS buss "B" and that the isolation interupted SDC which must be restored to prevent entry into an EAL. If SDC not restored, the threshhold for an EAL will be crossed.

5. Todd 09/30/05 - OK.

6. Rich 10/03/05 - odd way to ask response question?

R: change to "why did the SM declare the event". Saved original question as number 21. SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF A.C. POWER : AK3.06 Containment isolation NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO

While operating at full power on Unit 2, control power to the operating control rod drive (CRD) pump is lost. What effect will this have on the CRD pumps? The operating CRD pump will continue to run. Automatic protective trips for both pumps are functional. A The operating CRD pump will trip. Automatic protective trips for both pumps are disabled. B The operating CRD pump will continue to run. Automatic protective trips for both pumps are disabled. C The operating CRD pump will trip. Automatic protective trips for both pumps are functional. D 2950 04 Partial or Complete Loss of D.C. Power AK1.05 3.4 3.3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF D.C. POWER : Loss of breaker protection NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: Automatic protective trips are disabled VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because the pump will continue to run. CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: the operating pump will not trip VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because RRPs will automatically trip on loss of 125 VDC control power, not CRDs. Auto trips are disabled. CHOICE (C) - YES CHOICE (D) - NO WRONG: Operating CRD Pump will not trip and auto trips are not functional. VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if Applicant considers this a fail safe mechanism. References (CFR: 41.8 to 41.10) CFR Link 3 28347 SRO RO Question ID: Bank Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. (HB 09/08/05) Modified from INPO Bank 23832 which was used on SSES August 2002 exam.

2. THF 09/08/05 - changed format to T-T / T-F / F-T / F-F with reasons.

3. Gil 09/09/05 - question ok but - in ATWS and directed to start both CRD pumps. Concurrent loss of DC power. Now what?

4. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate with enclosed references.

R: need SSES to validate answer and distractors. Low risk of error because this is a bank question. Gil thinks it's reasonable from memory. Todd 09/30/05 - OK. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

SSES Unit 1 is refueling. Source Range Monitor (SRM) "A" is inoperable because its detector is being replaced. Fuel shuffles are in progress and a bundle is ready to be lowered into the reactor vessel when the Control Room receives the following indications:

- IRM CHAN B/D/F/H UPSCALE TRIP OR INOP (AR-104-001/A06)
- SRM UPSCALE OR INOP (AR-104-001/B06)
- 24V DC PANEL 1L680 SYSTEM TROUBLE (AR-106-001/B13)
- REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL 1C201 INSTR PWR FAILURE (AR-106-001/H16)

Which of the following is the correct response for the Control Room operating crew? Stop all fuel movement and enter ON-175-001, LOSS OF 24 VDC BUS. A Continue fuel movement and enter ON-175-001, LOSS OF 24 VDC BUS. B Stop all fuel movement and enter ON-081-002, REFUELING PLATFORM OPERATION ANOMALY. C Continue fuel movement and enter ON-081-002, REFUELING PLATFORM OPERATION ANOMALY. D NRC K/A System/E/A Justification CHOICE (A) - YES TS 3.3.1.2 refers to Table 3.3.1.2-1 for minimum SRM operability. Two SRMs are required when in mode 5. However, the loss of Division II 24 VDC power disables both SRM channels "B" and "C". Given that SRM channel "A" is already inoperable, the TS requirement can not be met because three out of four SRMs are now disabled. Note that this is NOT a spiral offload or reload because the stem specifies that a core "shuffle" is in progress and because SSES Training Dept indicates that spiral off/on-loads are not typical for SSES. CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the Applicant fails to recognize that TS 3.3.1.2 can not be met following loss of one Division of 24 VDC power because the affected SRMs are in opposite quadrants. CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the applicant believes that stopping fuel movement is an entry condition for the Off-Normal procedure. CHOICE (D) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the applicant believes that stopping fuel movement is an entry condition for the Off-Normal procedure and fails to recognize that TS 3.3.1.2 can not be met following loss of one Division of 24 VDC power because the affected SRMs are in opposite quadrants. References 4 28348 SRO RO Question ID: New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. (HB 09/08/05) New question. Question for SSES: will SRM UPSCALE OR INOP (AR-104-001/B06) reflash? Can we delete that initial condition? Should others be added?

2. THF 09/08/05 - changes to stem and answers to simplify and clarify

3. Gil 09/09/05 - no comment

4. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate with enclosed references. Shortest answer is correct. Should balance with other distractors.

R: Revised distractors "B" and "D" to address length of choices. Todd 09/30/05 - OK. Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

2950 04 System Number RO CFR Link SRO 2.2 Equipment Control 2.2.30 3.5 3.3 "Knowledge of RO duties in the control room during fuel handling such as alarms from fuel handling area, communication with fuel storage facility, systems operated from the control room in support of fueling operations, and supporting instrumentation." NRC K/A Generic System Number RO (CFR: 45.12) CFR Link SRO

Given the following Control Room indications, - AR-106-001 (A08) GEN LOCKOUT RELAYS TRIP - AR-106-001 (C04) STATOR COOLING WATER PUMP 1A-1B TRIP - Generator Stator Cooling Water Pumps 1A and 1B are NOT running (both AMBER lights energized) - Generator Stator Cooling Water control switch is selected to "1A-START 1B-RESERVE" what AUTOMATIC action will occur and why? Main TURBINE trip due to Generator negative phase sequence. A Main TURBINE trip due to Generator Stator Cooling Water high conductivity. B Main GENERATOR trip due to Generator Stator Cooling Water low pressure. C Main GENERATOR trip due to Generator Neutral Overvoltage (59GN) fault. D 2950 05 Main Turbine Generator Trip AK2.04 3.3 3.3 Knowledge of the interrelations between MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP and the following: Main generator protection NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: This will cause Generator trip but not the Stator Cooling water pump trips. VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because a Negative Phase Sequence will cause GENERATOR trip. CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: No automatic turbine trip on high conductivity. VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because Operators are expected to perform reactor scram / turbine trip if conductivity can not be maintained below 9.9. However, there is no automatic stator cooling or turbine trip on stator water conductivity. Moreover, the question calls for what would cause a GENERATOR trip v. TURBINE trip. CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: This is a TURBINE, not GENERATOR trip. VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because low stator cooling water pressure (< 44 psig) will cause a TURBINE trip after a 70 second time delay (normal pressure is 50 to 65 psig). However, a simple pump trip is not expected to cause this condition because the reserve pump should start if low discharge pressure (first signal at < 102 psig, second signal at < 92 psig) is sensed at the discharge of the running pump. The stem indicates that the reserve pump would have started. Moreover, the question calls for what would cause a GENERATOR trip v. TURBINE trip. CHOICE (D) - YES References (CFR: 41.7 / 45.8) CFR Link 5 29658 SRO RO Question ID: New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. (HB 09/08/05) Question for SSES: how to describe Pp 1B status?

2. Gil 09/09/05 - no comments

3. Gil 09/26/05 - OK

4. Todd 09/30/05 - OK.

5. Rich 10/03/05 - Backward logic at memory level. Can we increase cognitive level?

R: revised question and answer choice to be forward looking. Saved original question as number 51. Still considered on the high side of memory level. SRO NRC K/A Generic Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

System Number RO CFR Link SRO

Ten minutes after a reactor scram late in core life, the Shift Technical Advisor reports that steady state Reactor Pressure has risen from about 955 psig to almost 960 psig. Which of the following caused this? A Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) tripped. A Steam Pressure Transmitter PT10101A failed low. B Steam Pressure Transmitter PT10101A failed high. C Steam Pressure Transmitter PT10101B failed high. D 2950 06 SCRAM AA2.04 4.1 4.1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SCRAM : Reactor Pressure NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because a high failure will cause a plant depressurization because the HVG will pass the full OPEN signal to the TBVs. CHOICE (B) - YES This failure will cause EHC to maintain a new steady state pressure 3 psig GREATER THAN the pre-failure steady state pressure. CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the Applicant believes that reactor coolant throughput is reduced; thereby causing a slight pressure drop. Alternatively, the Applicant may conclude that the tripped RFP reduces steam flow such that pressure goes down. In fact, should a RFP trip, the EHC system will respond to maintain steady state pressure per program. CHOICE (D) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because this is redundant to PT10101A and an Applicant may incorrectly conclude that the signal will bias the output of the HVG somehow. However, this failure will cause a plant depressurization because the HVG will pass the full OPEN signal to the TBVs. References (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) CFR Link 6 29587 SRO RO Question ID: New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. (HB 09/08/05) New.

Need reasonable pressure drop from SQ

2. THF 09/08/05 - changes to stem and answer.

3. Gil 09/08/05 - not realistic. Suggests scram condition but Rx Press stays at full power value - then ask what procedure to enter.

4. Gil 09/26/05 - Distractor "A" not plausible with electric feed pumps.

R: SSES has steam driven feed pumps. This is the result of comments to date. We need to reconsider "A" in light of making it mirror image of B-C-D. Todd 09/30/05 - OK. SRO NRC K/A Generic Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

System Number RO CFR Link SRO

What is the DESIGN BASIS for disabling control room controls when control is transferred from the Control Room to the Remote Shutdown Panel per ON-100-009, PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THE CONTROL ROOM? To prevent unauthorized component operation from the Control Room. A To prevent spurious component operation caused by hot shorts. B To simplify design and construction of the Remote Shutdown system. C To minimize time to evacuate the Control Room once deciding to evacuate. D 2950 16 Control Room Abandonment AK3.03 3.5 3.7 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to CONTROL ROOM ABANDONMENT : Disabling control room controls NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (B) - YES CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because it does fulfill the purpose proposed by this distracter. However, the design reason is to prevent spurious hot short operation. CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because it may simplify design and construction of the RSD system. However, the design reason is to prevent hot short operation. CHOICE (D) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because it may minimize evacuation time. However, the design reason is to prevent hot short operation. References (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) CFR Link 7 28352 SRO RO Question ID: Bank Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. (HB 09/08/05) Bank - minor revisions

2. THF 09/08/05 - editorial and deleted window dressing in stem.

3. PAP 9/9/05 - too easy, consider asking what the CR indication would be when the instrument were swapped to RSD.

4. Gil 09/26/05 - Revise first sentence of stem: "What is design basis for disabling control room controls..."

R: done. Todd 09/30/05 - OK. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

The plant is at 100% power when a loss of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) occurs. With NO Operator action, which of ONE of the following will occur and why? Inboard MSIVs will close because Containment Instrument Gas is lost when RBCCW is lost. A Outboard MSIVs will close because Instrument Air is lost when RBCCW is lost. B Inboard MSIVs will close due to Main Steam Tunnel High Temperature when RBCCW is lost. C Outboard MSIVs will close due to Main Steam Tunnel High Differential Temperature when RBCCW is lost. D 2950 18 Partial or Complete Loss of Component Cooling Wtr AK1.01 3.5 3.6 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER : Effects on component/system operations NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - YES CTMT Inst Gas compressors cooled by RBCCW. CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: IA compressors are cooled by TBCCW. VALID DISTRACTOR: CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: Tunnel coolers cooled by SW (Secondary CTMT). Moreover, Hi Tunn Temp closes ALL MSIVs. VALID DISTRACTOR: CHOICE (D) - NO WRONG: Tunnel coolers cooled by SW (Secondary CTMT). Moreover, Hi Tunn Diff Temp closes ALL MSIVs. VALID DISTRACTOR: References (CFR: 41.8 to 41.10) CFR Link 8 29586 SRO RO Question ID: Bank Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. (HB 09/06/05) Bank question.

2. THF 09/08/05 - editorial changes. changed choics to just INBD/OUTBD

3. Gil 09/09/05 - added stem conditions to improve operational orientation.

4. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate with enclosed references.

R: Risk of error is low because this is a BANK question. Also noted that RBCCW cools the steam tunnel HVAC during exam development.

5. Rich 10/03/05 - Backward logic at memory level. Can we increase cognitive level?

R: revised wording to forward looking. Still lower level cause BANK and it is memory. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

SSES Units 1 and 2 are operating at full power. For both units:

- "A" Containment Instrument Gas compressors (1K205A and 2K205A) are in LEAD
- "B" Containment Instrument Gas compressors (1K205B and 2K205B) are in STANDBY
- "A" Instrument Air compressors (1K107A and 2K107A) are in LEAD
- "B" Instrument Air compressors (1K107B and 2K107B) are in STANDBY
- "A" Service Air compressors (1K108A and 2K108A) are in LEAD
- "B" Service Air compressors (1K108B and 2K108B) are in STANDBY The plant suffers a loss of Bus 2A201. Which of the following correctly describes the plant response:

PCV-22560 will open, allowing the Service Air system to supply Instrument Air system loads. A Service Air compressor 2K108B will start and cycle between 118 psig and 127 psig. B Instrument Air compressor 2K107B will start and cycle between 87 psig and 102 psig. C Containment Instrument Gas compressor 2K205B will start and cycle between 152 psig and 170 psig. D 2950 19 Partial or Complete Loss of Instrument Air AA1.03 3.0 3.0 NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (D) - YES CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because a unit 2 bus was lost and the STBY IA compressor does cycle between 87 and 102. Incorrect because the power supply to lead IA compressor 2K107A (2A204) remains energized. CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because a unit 2 bus was lost and the STBY SA compressor does cycle between 118 and 127. Incorrect because the power supply to lead SA compressor 2K108A (1B130) remains energized. CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because PCV-12560 will open as described on a loss of IA. However, no loss of IA occurred as described in Distractor 1. References (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) CFR Link 9 28355 SRO RO Question ID: New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. (HB 09/08/05) New. Check cycle pressures with SSES.

2. THF 09/08/05 - formatting

3. Gil 09/09/05 - no comment

4. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate with enclosed references.

R: will reverify if time permits. Did reverify once during development of subsequent question and am confident in question.

5. Todd 09/30/05 - OK.

6. Rich 10/03/05 - are we sure it is Memory Level?

R: yes - really only need to know the power supplies for each of the compressors. Once loss of power to 2K205A is recognized, the question is straightforward memory. SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR : Instrument air compressor power supplies NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO

Reactor Vessel Water Level must be above a MINIMUM water level before starting Residual Heat Removal (RHR) in Shutdown Cooling (SDC) mode. The minimum water level is ___(1)___ and the reason(s) for this minimum level are ___(2)___. (1) 45 inches. (2) to ensure natural circulation flow for core cooling and to prevent thermal stratification if Shutdown Cooling is lost. A (1) 90 inches. (2) to ensure natural circulation flow for core cooling and to provide adequate NPSH to the Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) pumps. B (1) 45 inches (2) to prevent thermal stratification and to provide adequate NPSH to the Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) pumps. C (1) 90 inches. (2) to provide adequate NPSH to the Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) pumps and to the RHR pumps. D 2950 21 Loss of Shutdown Cooling AA2.07 2.9 3.1 NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - YES CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: NPSH to FPC pumps is NOT the reason. VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because 90 inches is the administrative limit per OP-149-002 and because NC flow is partially correct. Static head is a common issue wrt NPSH. CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: NPSH to FPC pumps is NOT the reason. VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because 45 inches is correct and thermal stratification is part of the reason. Static head is a common issue wrt NPSH. CHOICE (D) - NO WRONG: NPSH to pumps is NOT the reason. VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because 90 inches is the administrative limit per OP-149-002. Static head is a common issue wrt NPSH. References (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) CFR Link

1. 10 29649 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. (HB 09/08/05) New.

2. Gil 09/09/05 - no changes.

3. PAP 9/9/05 comment - Applicant could argue that "C" is a second correct answer. Changed RFR to Fuel Pool Cleanup pumps.

!!! ASK SSES IF "C" IS POTENTIALLY CORRECT !!!!

4. Gil 09/26/05 - K/A mismatch.

R: possibly but on a loss of SDC, unlikely to see any recirc flow changes. Todd - unable to agree. SSES input seems to support my view but I asked for further clarification. 09/28/05 Phone Conversation with SSES - they agree that the original question as written did not appear to match the K/A. However, they recommended changes to the entire question to better align it to the K/A. These changes were incorporated into the question. Todd 09/30/05 - OK. SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING : Reactor recirculation flow NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO

Which one of the following is the Safety Related Basis for maintaining Fuel Pool level 22 feet above the top of fuel? To provide a floodable volume for RHRFPC following a postulated seismic event. A To limit Iodine release during a fuel handling accident to 25% or less of 10 CFR 100 limits. B To minimize localized boiling within individual fuel assemblies following a loss of fuel pool cooling. C To properly seat the Fuel Pool Gate Inflatable Seals with a static head of water in the fuel pool D 2950 23 Refueling Accidents AK1.01 3.6 4.1 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to REFUELING ACCIDENTS : Radiation exposure hazards NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (B) - YES CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: SQ has committed to to providing RHRFPC to maintain temperatures below 125 degrees farenheit following a seismic event. However, this is not the safety related basis. CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: This is the basis for maintaining fuel pool temperature below 125 degrees farehheit. However, it is not the safety related basis for maintaining 22 feet of water above the fuel. CHOICE (D) - NO WRONG: This is not the stated reason. VALID DISTRACTOR: Higher head of water could be expected to better seat the gates.. References (CFR: 41.8 to 41.10) CFR Link

1. 11 29585 SRO RO Question ID:

Bank Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. (HB 09/08/05) Bank - INPO 24493 (River Bend ILO in 2003)

Need to verify BASIS against SQ TS

2. THF 09/08/05

3. Gil 09/09/05: added operational orientational and raised LOD by adding conditions to the stem.

4. Gil 09/26/05: Distractor "D" not plausible if FPC pumps are non-safety related.

R: Replaced "To ensure net positive suction head to the Fuel Pool Cooling Cleanup Pumps during routine operation." with new distractor. Todd 09/30/05 - deleted "Refueling operations are about to start. There are no known fuel failures in the core. The Shift Manager directs you to ensure the level in the Fuel Pool and Reactor Cavity are greater than 22 feet." from the stem. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

SSES Unit 2 Operators are responding to a High Drywell Pressure condition by venting the drywell per OP-273-003, Primary Containment Nitrogen Makeup and Venting. There is no failed fuel and the Containment atmosphere is below minimum detectable activity (MDA). How does the method of Drywell venting per Section 2.3 of OP-273-003, Venting Drywell, prevent an UNMONITORED and UNCONTROLLED release to assure radiation exposures remain as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)? The Drywell is vented to the Standby Gas Treatment Exhaust Vent via the Standby Gas Treatment system. A The Drywell is vented back through the Air Purge lines because the potential release is below MDA. B The Drywell is vented to the Nitrogen Makeup system via the Containment Instrument Gas system. C The Drywell is vented to the Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust Stack via the Ambient Offgas Charcoal system. D 2950 24 NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - YES CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: This is not the vent path VALID DISTRACTOR: From the Training diagram, this appears to be a possible flow path. CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible to believe that the Nitrogen gas could be compressed and reused. However, it's not done this way. CHOICE (D) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible method of venting the Drywell. However, it's not done this way. References CFR Link

1. 12 28357 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. (HB 09/08/05) New by Gil. Check TRM 3.6.1.

2. THF 09/08/05 - no comment

3. Gil 09/09/05 - no comment

4. Gil 09/26/05 - Is the flowpath in distractor "B" possible?

R: No. none of the distractor flowpaths are possible. Replaced "The Drywell is vented to the Offgas Recombiner via the Main Condenser." with new distractor. SRO 2.3 Radiation Control 2.3.2 2.5 2.9 Knowledge of facility ALARA program. NRC K/A Generic System Number RO (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4. 45.9 / 45.10) CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

- Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure is steady at 1,050 psig
- One Main Turbine Bypass Valve is approximately 50% open
- The Pressure Regulator setpoints are set per GO-100-002 (GO-200-002), PLANT STARTUP, HEATUP AND POWER OPERATION
- Leading Edge Flow Meters (LEFM) are NOT in service.

Based on these conditions, what procedure MUST the Control Room Operators enter? ON-100-004, Reactor Power Greater than License Limit. A ON-158-001, Loss of RPS. B ON-243-001, Main Condenser Vacuum and Off Gas System Off Normal Operation. C ON-247-002, Loss of Feedwater Heater String. D 2950 25 High Reactor Pressure EA2.02 4.2 4.2 Ability to determine and/or interpret the Reactor power as it applies to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - YES CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the Applicant believes that an automatic reactor scram should have occurred for these conditions. CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the Applicant believes that Main Condenser backpressure is causing the high RPV pressure. CHOICE (D) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible if the Applicant believes that reduced FW heating (more FW subcooling) is causing a high reactor power condition. References (CFR 41.10, 43.5, 45.13) CFR Link

1. 13 28358 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. 09/08/05 New. Check numbers with SQ staff.

2. 09/08/05 THF: added "Based on these conditions... "

3. Gil 09/09/05 - add Pressure Regulator setpoint to the stem

4. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate with enclosed references.

R: we need to run this past SSES and, if possible, on the simulator to determine credibility of the question. Can we add first stage turbine pressure to the list of conditions? 100% first stage pressure. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loop "B" is running in the Suppression Pool Cooling mode of operation per EO-100-103, PC CONTROL. The Reactor Operator notices significant fluctuations in flowrate and motor amps on both RHR Pumps "B" and "D". Which ONE of the following caused this? Minimum flow valve HV-151F0007B failed open. A Safety Relief Valve (SRV) "S" stuck open. B RHR Pump "B" discharge flow orifice FO-15100B is blocked. C Clogged RHR Loop "B" suction strainer.. D 2950 26 Suppression Pool High Water Temperature EK1.01 3.0 3.4 Knowledge of the operational implications of the Pump NPSH as it applies to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification Surveillance Requirement SR 3.5.1.7 Need to verify the procedure - done 09/07/05 by email DISTRACTOR (A): Plausible because a failed open min flow valve will affect the pump by increasing flowrate and NPSH requirements. The pumps are rated at 3175 gpm @ at 290 psig. The min flow line is designed to pass the full rated flow of two pumps (6350 gpm). Therefore, opening the min flow line during a test could cause pump RUNOUT. However, the stem conditions describe CAVITATION. DISTRACTOR (C): Plausible because blocking the discharge path will affect the pump by increasing discharge pressure and reducing flowrate. However, this effect is inconsistent with indications of cavitation. DISTRACTOR (D): Plausible because this was a recent industry event. However, each pump has its own suction strainer. Therefore, two clogged strainers are required to make this true. References (CFR 41.8 to 41.10) CFR Link

1. 14 29584 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/09/05 - need to amend distractors and determine best SRV to finish revision. 09/09/05: amended distractors. 09/12/05: amended distractor D 09/15/05: amended answer to "S" SRV because OP-183-001, Attachment A, shows this to be the closest to the RHR Pp suction. Gil 09/26/05 - Revise last sentence of stem "Which one of the following is the most likely cause of this?" R: Per Chief Examiner's direction, avoiding use of phrases like "most likely", "most probable", "could have". Revised stem to read "Which ONE of the following caused this?" Todd 09/30/05 - added "significant" to stem and amended grammar accordingly. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

SSES Unit 2 has a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and the following plant conditions exist: - RPV Pressure........................... 25 psig - RPV Level............................. +40 inches and rising slowly - Torus Level............................ +1.5 inches - Torus Temperature....................... 102 degrees Farenheit - Drywell Pressure........................ 21 psig - Drywell Temperature..................... 296 degrees Farenheit - Division I RHR........................... Injecting into the RPV - Division II RHR........................... Operating in Suppression Pool Cooling/Spray mode - Both Divsions of Core Spray................ Injecting into the RPV - Instrument Run Temperature (UR 25701A&B).. 276 degrees Farenheit Given the above conditions, which of the following actions is required by the operating crew per EO-200-103, PC CONTROL? Go To EO-200-112, Rapid Depressurization. A Initiate Drywell Spray per OP-249-004, RHR Containment Cooling. B Go To EO-200-114, RPV Flooding. C Shutdown All Drywell Coolers and Fans per OP-273-001, Containment Atmosphere Control System. D 2950 28 High Drywell Temperature EK3.02 3.5 3.8 Knowledge of the reasons for the RPV flooding as it applies to HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification Bank - Fermi 2 2 exam of March 2003 (Question ID = 23721) Applicants may want the EOPs to refer to Figure 1 of EO-100-103, PC Control. However, they should be able to determine that RPV level instruments are unreliable due to reference leg flashing by using ordinary steam tables. The given RPV Pressure of 25 psig or 40 psia yields a saturation Temperature of 267.25 deg F. The given Instrument Run Temperature is almost 9 deg F above saturation. DISTRACTOR (A): Plausible because the Drywell Temperature Control procedure requires Rapid Depressurization if DW temps can not be restored/maintained below 340 deg F at step DW/T-6. However, in this question, the operator should have gone to RPV flooding earlier at step DW/T-3. DISTRACTOR (B): Plausible because Drywell Spray is required when Drywell Temps exceed 340 deg F. DISTRACTOR (D): Shutdown All Drywell Coolers and Fans per OP-273-001, Containment Atmosphere Control System. References (CFR 41.5, 45.6) CFR Link

1. 15 29576 SRO RO Question ID:

Bank Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/09/05 - editorial change to stem Gil 09/26/05 - OK SRO NRC K/A Generic Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

System Number RO CFR Link SRO

Which of the following describes the method that provides the highest flowrate of makeup to the Suppression Pool per OP-159-001, Suppression Pool Cleanup System? Pump the Condensate Storage Tank with the Core Spray Line Fill Pump to the CORE SPRAY CONDENSATE TRANSFER ISOLATION TO LOOP "B" MINIMUM FLOW LINE 152028. A Gravity drain the Condensate Storage Tank through the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Pump Casing to the RCIC MIN FLOW TEST LINE 149F019. B Pump the Condensate Storage Tank with the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Pump to the HPCI MIN FLOW LINE 155F012. C Gravity drain the Condensate Storage Tank through CORE SPRAY CST SUPPLY ISOLATION 152021 and CORE SPRAY PUMP B&D CST SUCTION SUPPLY 152F002B to the Core Spray suction strainers. D 2950 30 Low Suppression Pool Water Level EA1.06 3.4 3.4 Ability to operate and/or monitor the Condensate storage and transfer (make up to the suppression pool) (Plant-Specific) as it applies to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: lower flowrate than the correct response. VALID DISTRACTOR: normal method of makeup. CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: Not procedurally authorized. VALID DISTRACTOR: would work. CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: Not procedurally authorized. VALID DISTRACTOR: Would work CHOICE (D) - YES References (CFR 41.7, 45.6) CFR Link

1. 16 29577 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Inspired by Peach Bottom 2 September 2002 exam (Question ID 24782) Gil 09/09/05 - editorial change to stem CONSIDER CHANGING ALL DISTRACTORS TO: Gravity drain CST through RHR, HPCI, RCIC suction strainers. ????????? Gil 09/26/05 - Correct answer is longest. Should balance with other distractors. R: added full noun name descriptions to "B" and "C" for HPCI and RCIC. However, unable to perfect length of selections without degrading operational validity of the distractors or creating new psychometric clues. Todd 09/30/05 - deleted "SSES Unit 1 is operating at full power. A failure of PSV152-F032B, the "B" Core Spray loop pump suction relief valve has lowered Suppression Pool water level. PSV152-F032B has been gagged shut. However, Suppression Pool water level has been below 22 feet for one hour. Per Emergency Operating Procedure EO-100-103, step SP/L-1, the Unit Supervisor has directed you to raise Suppression Pool water level to 23 feet." from stem. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

SSES Unit 1 lost all Feedwater flow. Reactor Pressure Vessel level quickly lowered to approximately - 40 inches at which point all control rods inserted and both Reactor Recirculation Pumps (RRP) tripped. What FSAR described event occurred and what caused the plant response? Feedwater Line Break - Outside Containment Backup Scram Valve (SV 147110 A & B) actuation A Feedwater Controller Failure - Maximum Demand ATWS-RPT actuation B Feedwater Line Break - Outside Containment ATWS-RPT actuation C Feedwater Controller Failure - Maximum Demand Backup Scram Valve (SV 147110 A & B) actuation D 2950 31 Reactor Low Water Level EK2.13 4.1 4.2 Knowledge of the interrelations between REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL and ARI/RPT/ATWS (Plant-Specific) NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification New Note: The ATWS-ARI and ATWS-RPT use the same circuitry per TM-OP-058, page 46. RPS should have scrammed the plant at L3 (+13 inches). In this case, the rods inserted and RPT occurred just below L2 (-38 inches). DISTRACTOR (A): Plausible because FW Line Break is correct and the Backup Scram Valves are a redundant means of inserting control rods. However, per OP-TM-058, page 35, the Backup Scram Valves will not actuate unless both both RPS A and B Trip Systems trip (de-energize) to energize the Backup Scram Valve Solenoid on each valve. In this case, the RPS system failed to operate at L3. DISTRACTOR (B): Plausible because the FW failure to max demand would eventually cause a loss of both FW-Ps on high RPV level. However, the question stem does not support this conclusion because there is no statement indicating a rise in RPV level and the RPV level decrease to below L2 requires the main turbine to be in operation. DISTRACTOR (D): Plausible because Backup Scram valves are a redundant means of inserting control rods. However, per OP-TM-058, page 35, the Backup Scram Valves will not actuate unless both both RPS A and B Trip Systems trip (de-energize) to energize the Backup Scram Valve Solenoid on each valve. In this case, the RPS system failed to operate at L3. References (CFR 41.7, 45.8) CFR Link

1. 17 29578 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/09/05 - No comment Gil 09/26/05 - OK Todd 09/30/05 - change insert and trip to inserted and tripped. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

SSES Unit 1 has an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS). The control room operating crew initiate Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) per LQ/Q-3. You observe the following: - 1P208A SBLC Pump RED indicating light ILLUMINATES, - 1P208B SBLC Pump RED indicating light does NOT illuminate, - ONE SBLC SQUIB READY A-B White indicating light extinguishes, - ONE SBLC SQUIB READY A-B White indicating light remains energized, - SBLC SQUIB VALVES LOSS OF CKT CONTINUITY (A03) Energizes. What OPERATOR action, if any, is necessary to establish REQUIRED flow (86 gpm)? OPEN the second SBLC SQUIB Valve to establish sufficient flow path for full flow. A START the second SBLC Pump (1P208B) to establish full pumping capacity. B INJECT Boron with RCIC IAW ES-150-002 to establish full flow. C No action is necessary because a single pump and valve will provide rated flow. D 2950 37 NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification New - inspired by Browns Ferry 2 exam of September 2001 (Question ID 21039) SSES requires both SBLC pumps to start to ensure reactor safety following an ATWS. The expected flowrate is approximately 86 gpm. In this case, the flowrate is one-half of expected (43 gpm) because one SBLC pump failed to start. The alarm will energize when 4742 less 4587 (155) gallons have been injected. This will occur in 155 divided by 43 or 3.6 minutes. The failure of one SQUIB Valve to fire has no effect on the solution because the pumps discharge to a common header. The common header then flows through two parallel SQUIB valves. A - Only one valve opened. Plausible if the Applicant believes that the failed SQUIB valve blocks SBLC flow to the RPV and that opening the valve will restore full flow. C - LQ/Q-4 requires this if Boron can NOT be injected with SBLC. Here, SBLC is injecting, albeit at half the required rate. D - SSES requires both SBLC pumps to start to ensure reactor safety following an ATWS References CFR Link

1. 18 29660 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/09/05 - editorial change to stem Gil 09/26/05 - Distractor "A" not plausible with one pump running and one squibb fired; should have some flow. R: revised "Never" to "16 minutes". Applicant may misapply pump laws. Todd 09/30/05 - why give setpoint? R: w/o setpoint, it may become LOD=5 because not expected to know this. Rich 10/03/05 - K/A mismatch. CE view? R: agreed. Changed stem and distractors to require Applicant to demonstrate ability to manipulate controls. Saved original question as 181.

• *
• Ask SSES to evaluate distractor "C" as a potentially second correct answer.

SRO 2.2 Equipment Control 2 2 2 4 0 3 5 NRC K/A Generic System Number RO (CFR: 45 2) CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

2.2.2 4.0 3.5 Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels. Number RO (CFR: 45.2) CFR Link SRO

Following an accident at the Chlorine Building, a significant release of Chlorine gas occurs. How will the Control Structure HVAC system protect control room operators from toxic gas? The system will automatically shift to the RECIRULATION MODE. Correct configuration and operation is then verified per ON-159-001 (ON-259-002), Containment Isolation. A The system can be manually started in the RECIRCULATION MODE per OP-030-002, Control Structure HVAC, by placing Control Stucture Manual Isolation switches HS-07802A1 and HS-07802B1 to "ISO" and then starting CREOASS Fan OV101A or OV101B. B The system can be manually started in the PRESSURIZATION/FILTRATION MODE per OP-030-002, Control Structure HVAC, by placing Emergency Outside Air Intake Radiation Monitor mode switches RISHH-D12-0K618A and RISHH-D12-0K618B to "TRIP TEST". C The system will automatically shift to the PRESSURIZATION/FILTRATION MODE. Correct configuration and operation is then verified per ON-159-001 (ON-259-002), Containment Isolation. D 2950 38 High Off Site Release Rate EA1.07 3.6 3.8 Ability to operate and/or monitor the Control room ventilation (Plant-Specific) as it applies to HIGH OFF SITE RELEASE RATE NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification New Per TM-OP-079E, the system originally built to automatically do this on high Chlorine. DISTRACTOR (A): Plausible because ON-1/2 59-002 does verify configuration and operation in response to a CTMT ISO. Automatic initiatio of RECIRCULATION was part of the original design basis. DISTRACTOR (C): Plausible because this is one of three distinct operating modes for the system. However, per the TM-OP-079E, the correct response is RECIRC mode. DISTRACTOR (D): Plausible because this is one of three distinct operating modes for the system. However, the system will not automatically align itself to this mode and ON-1/2 59-002 does not address this mode. References (CFR 41.7, 45.6) CFR Link

1. 19 29580 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/09/05 - No comment Gil 09/26/05 - K/A mismatch. Suggests throwing the K/A out. R: disagree. While the question does not directly ask what happens on a RADIOACTIVE release, the successful Applicant must understand operation of the Control Structure venilation system to answer this question. The applicant must know the difference between the two suggested operating modes (Recirc and Press/Filt) and what situations cause automatic reconfigurations. Therefore, the question does discriminate between Applicants who understand the Control Structure HVAC from those who do not. Gil: suggests new stem: "Following a significant release of Chlorine from the Chlorine building". Accepted. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

The BACKUP DIESEL FIRE PUMP starts in response to a fire in the ACCESS PROCESSING FACILITY. Which one of the following locations will receive an alarm indicating actuation of the BACKUP FIRE SUPPRESSION system? PP&L Energy Dispatch A SSES Central Alarm Station B PP&L Corporate Security C SSES Control Room D 6000 00 Plant fire on site AA1.06 3.0 3.0 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: Fire alarm NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification New GET CORRECT TITLE FOR DISTRACTOR - for all of them. Per TM-OP-013-ST, page 20, the Backup Fire Suppression system does not energize an alarm in the control room. Plausible because the actual alarm goes to Security Plausible because the actual alarm goes to Security Plausible because generally all alarms alert the control room staff of off-normal conditions either directly or through a satellite alarm. Per TM-OP-013-ST, page 20, this is not true for the Backup Fire Suppression system. References CFR Link

1. 20 29581 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/09/05 - No comment Gil 09/26/05 - Does "C" have the correct title. R: Yes but will confirm with SSES. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

SSES Unit 1 is at full power when a Feedwater Level Control System malfunction causes RPV Water Level to stabilize at approximately 47.5 inches. Per ON-145-001, RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, the Operating Crew is able to restore Feedwater Level Control to Automatic, 3-element control on LEVEL A. The Operating Crew then completes ON-145-004, RPV WATER LEVEL ANOMALY and has NOT determined the cause of the malfunction. (1) What malfunction caused RPV Water Level to stabilize at approximately 47.5 inches? (2) What procedure must the Operating Crew enter next? (1) A single feed flow instrument failed downscale while in THREE ELEMENT (2) GO-000-001, REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL CONTROL DURING MAINTENANCE A (1) A single feed flow instrument failed upscale while in THREE ELEMENT (2) OI-AD-509, TROUBLESHOOTING B (1) A single level instrument input failed upscale while in AVERAGE. (2) GO-000-001, REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL CONTROL DURING MAINTENANCE C (1) A single level instrument input failed downscale while in AVERAGE. (2) OI-AD-509, TROUBLESHOOTING D 2950 08 NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: This procedure only applies when the mode switch is in SHUTDOWN or REFUEL. VALID DISTRACTOR: The failure causes stable level at ~48 inches. CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: Need to determine what this causes. VALID DISTRACTOR: This is the correct procedure. CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: This procedure only applies when the mode switch is in SHUTDOWN or REFUEL. VALID DISTRACTOR: This is the correct mode but the failure will give stable level of ~22.5 inches. CHOICE (D) - YES Stable level of ~47.5 inches Correct Procedure. References CFR Link

1. 21 29589 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Ask SSES what Distractor B will cause. Tough one - 6 hours to develop.

1. PAP 9/9/05 comments to balance choices.

2. Gil 09/26/05 - does not see connection of OI-AD-509 in references.

R: added OI-AD-509 to list of references. Applicants expected to answer this question without use of references. Suggestion if Question rejected: put Applicant in T/S activity and ask how is problem prevented. SRO 2.2 Equipment Control 2.2.20 2.2 3.3 Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities. NRC K/A Generic System Number RO (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

SSES Unit 1 is at full power when a Feedwater Level Control System malfunction causes RPV Water Level to stabilize at approximately 47.5 inches. Per ON-145-001, RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, the Operating Crew is able to restore Feedwater Level Control to Automatic, 3-element control on LEVEL A. The Operating Crew then completes ON-145-004, RPV WATER LEVEL ANOMALY and has NOT determined the cause of the malfunction. (1) What malfunction caused RPV Water Level to stabilize at approximately 47.5 inches? (2) What procedure must the Operating Crew enter next? (1) A single feed flow instrument failed downscale while in THREE ELEMENT (2) GO-000-001, REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL CONTROL DURING MAINTENANCE A (1) A single feed flow instrument failed upscale while in THREE ELEMENT (2) OI-AD-509, TROUBLESHOOTING B (1) A single level instrument input failed upscale while in AVERAGE. (2) GO-000-001, REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL CONTROL DURING MAINTENANCE C (1) A single level instrument input failed downscale while in AVERAGE. (2) OI-AD-509, TROUBLESHOOTING D 2950 08 NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: This procedure only applies when the mode switch is in SHUTDOWN or REFUEL. VALID DISTRACTOR: The failure causes stable level at ~48 inches. CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: Need to determine what this causes. VALID DISTRACTOR: This is the correct procedure. CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: This procedure only applies when the mode switch is in SHUTDOWN or REFUEL. VALID DISTRACTOR: This is the correct mode but the failure will give stable level of ~22.5 inches. CHOICE (D) - YES Stable level of ~47.5 inches Correct Procedure. References CFR Link

1. 21 29659 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Ask SSES what Distractor B will cause. Tough one - 6 hours to develop.

1. PAP 9/9/05 comments to balance choices.

2. Gil 09/26/05 - does not see connection of OI-AD-509 in references.

R: added OI-AD-509 to list of references. Applicants expected to answer this question without use of references. Suggestion if Question rejected: put Applicant in T/S activity and ask how is problem prevented. SRO 2.2 Equipment Control 2.2.20 2.2 3.3 Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities. NRC K/A Generic System Number RO (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

Which of the following conditions will prevent CAVITATION? Reactor Lower Water at +11 inches and Reactor Feedwater Pump "A" flow of 26% and Reactor Feedwater Pump "B" flow of 27%. A Reactor Lower Water at +32 inches and Reactor Feedwater Pump "A" flow of 18% and Reactor Feedwater Pump "B" flow of 18%. B Reactor Lower Water at +28 inches and Reactor Feedwater Pump "A" flow of 20% and Reactor Feedwater Pump "B" flow of 18%. C Reactor Lower Water at +12 inches and Reactor Feedwater Pump "A" flow of 16% and Reactor Feedwater Pump "B" flow of 17%. D 2950 09 Low Reactor Water Level AK1.02 3.0 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL: Recirculation pump net positive suction head: Plant specific. NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification 30% limiter if below L3 and TOTAL FW less than 20% CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: greater than 20% FW VALID DISTRACTOR: below L3 is correct CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: above L3 VALID DISTRACTOR: Total FW < 20% is correct CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: Below L4 but above L3 VALID DISTRACTOR: This combination will actuate the 45% limit (Speed Limiter #2) CHOICE (D) - YES References CFR Link

1. 22 29592 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - No K/A statement with question. Did validate correct answer. R: added K/A to K/A table. Gil is OK. Todd 09/30/05 - removed references to L3, L4 and Total v. RFP flows. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

A steam line break occurred in the Primary Containment of SSES Unit 2. The following conditions exist:

- Several control rods failed to insert.
- RPV Water Level is 167 inches and steady.
- RPV Pressure is 520 psig and steady.
- Drywell Pressure is 7.0 psig and steady.
- Drywell Temperature is 180 degrees Farenheit and steady.
- Suppression Chamber Pressure is 2.0 psig and rising slowly.
- Suppression Chamber Temperature is 86 degrees Farenheit and steady.

According to EO-200-103, PC CONTROL, which ONE of the following Residual Heat Removal (RHR) configurations is required? RHR Loop "A" in Suppression Pool Cooling and RHR Loop "B" in Suppression Chamber Spray A RHR Loop "A" in Suppression Pool Cooling and RHR Loop "B" in Suppression Pool Cooling B RHR Loop "A" in Drywell Spray and RHR Loop "B" in Suppression Chamber Spray C RHR Loop "A" in Drywell Spray and RHR Loop "B" in Suppression Pool Cooling D 2950 13 High Suppression Pool Temperature AK2.01 3.6 3.7 Knowledge of the interrelations between HIGH SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE and the following: Suppression pool cooling NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - YES SP Cooling required per SP/T-1 SP Spray required per PC/P-4 CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: SP/T-2 does NOT require maximum SP cooling until SC temp can NOT be maintained below 90 deg F. VALID DISTRACTOR: Some SP cooling will be required to maintain SP below 90 deg F CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: Drywell Spray is NOT required until DW pressure exceeds 13 psig in the SC per PC/P-5 VALID DISTRACTOR: SC Spray required per PC/P-4 CHOICE (D) - NO WRONG: Drywell Spray is NOT required until DW pressure exceeds 13 psig in the SC per PC/P-5 VALID DISTRACTOR: Some SP cooling will be required to maintain SP below 90 deg F References (CFR: 41.7 / 45.8) CFR Link

1. 23 29593 SRO RO Question ID:

Mod Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate with enclosed references. Appears correct.

R: Self validated. Will ask Chief Examiner to validate. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

SSES Unit 1 was operating at full power when the Main Turbine tripped. However, the Reactor did NOT scram. You are inserting control rod 22-27 per EO-100-113, Control Rod Insertion. The following plant conditions exist:

- all Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs) indicate approximately 24% Reactor Power.
- the RSCS ROD INS BLK BYPASS HS-55601 is in NORMAL (WHITE light illuminated)

On the Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) Operator Display Unit (ODU), you observe the following:

- AMBER DISPLAY UNIT pushbutton lower light (FREE ROD) illuminated.
- Control Rod 22-27 AMBER light emitting diode (LED) is illuminated.
- RED DISPLAY UNIT pushbutton lower light (BYPASS) illuminated.
- Control Rod 22-27 RED light emitting diode (LED) is illuminated.

Which one of the following describes the status of control rod 22-27? Control Rod 22-27 can be INSERTED because power is above the Low Power Setpoint (LPSP). A Control Rod 22-27 can be INSERTED because it is BYPASSED. B Control Rod 22-27 can NOT be INSERTED because the RSCS ROD INS BLK BYPASS HS-55601 is in NORMAL. C Control Rod 22-27 can NOT be INSERTED because power is below the Low Power Setpoint (LPSP). D 2950 15 Incomplete SCRAM AK2.06 2.6 2.8 NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: RPS does not bypass RSCS blocks. VALID DISTRACTOR: LPSP is 22%. APRMs > 22% may be mistaken for the actual LPSP parameter (1st stage pressure). CHOICE (B) - YES Turbine 1st stage pressure is the parameter measured to determine whether the plant is above or below LPSP and LPAP. The stem establishes that the Main Turbine is tripped. Therefore, 1st stage pressure is below the LPSP setpoint and is probably at a vacuum. In addition, the ODU conditions in the stem establish that the rod is bypassed (RED LED) and free to move (AMBER LED). CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: The rod can be inserted because RSCS does not have a Rod Block on this rod VALID DISTRACTOR: EO-100-113 directs the user to bypass RSCS. Applicant may believe the rod could be blocked if the switch is still in normal. CHOICE (D) - NO WRONG: The rod can be inserted because RSCS does not have a Rod Block on this rod. VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may recognize that with no 1st stage pressure, RSCS receives a <LPSP signal and blocks rod motion. References (CFR: 41.7 / 45.8) CFR Link

1. 24 29594 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - OK Todd 09/30/05 - replaced colon with question mark at end of stem. SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

Both units are at full power. SSES Unit 1 has isolated and is draining Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loop "B" for planned maintenance. SSES Unit 1 RHR loop "B" is draining to the floor drain to the Reactor Building Sump via 161121 (RHR Pump B & D Room Drain Iso Vlv.). SSES Unit 2 Receives the following alarms and indications:

- RHR LOOP B PUMP ROOM FLOODED (AR-213-001, H08).
- SUPPRESSION POOL DIV 1 LO LEVEL (AR-211-001, E02).
- SUPP POOL LEVEL LI-25755A indicates 22.4 feet and slowly lowering.
- SUPPRESSION POOL DIV 2 LO LEVEL (AR-212-001, E02).
- SUPP POOL LEVEL LI-25755B indicates 22.3 feet and slowly lowering.
- REACTOR BLDG SUMP LEVEL HI-HI (AR-225-001, B01)

(1) How will Suppression Pool level respond? (2) What Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) entry conditions are CURRENTLY met? (1) The Suppression Pool will continue to drain until 161121 (RHR Pump B & D Room Drain Iso Vlv.) is closed. (2) EO-200-104, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL. A (1) The Suppression Pool will continue to drain until 161121 (RHR Pump B & D Room Drain Iso Vlv.) is closed. (2) EO-200-103, PC CONTROL. B (1) Suppression Pool level will lower to 17 feet and stabilize. (2) EO-200-104, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL. C (1) Suppression Pool level will lower to 17 feet and stabilize. (2) EO-200-103, PC CONTROL. D Justification CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: SP will not continue to drain because the Unit 1 and 2 floor drains are not cross-connected. VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct EOP and each unit's ECCS room floor drains are cross-connected to other ECCS room of the same unit. CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: PC CONTROL requires SP level below 22 feet. However, the SP will not continue to drain because the Unit 1 and 2 floor drains are not cross-connected. VALID DISTRACTOR: The stem conditions give sufficient information to correctly conclude that the Suppression Pool will stabilize at 17 feet (Table 18 of EO-100-103). Therefore, Applicant may reasonably select this. CHOICE (C) - YES Table 18 of EO-100-103 tells us that SP will stabilize at 17 feet. EO-100-104 requires entry on RB Water Level above high alarm. CHOICE (D) - NO WRONG: PC CONTROL requires SP level below 22 feet. VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct SP level. The stem conditions give sufficient information to correctly conclude that the Suppression Pool will stabilize at 17 feet (Table 18 of EO-100-103). Therefore, Applicant may reasonably select this. References

1. 26 29596 SRO RO Question ID:

Mod Origin: Comments and Question Modification History NM2 August 2002 (Question ID 22279)

1. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate the 17 feet because EO-100-103 not included in workpapers R: it is 17 feet. Ask Chief Examiner to independently validate.

2. Todd 09/30/05 - changed "(1) What level will SSES Unit 2 Suppression Pool stabilize at?" to "(1) How will Suppression Pool level respond?".

changed part (1) of distractors "C" and "D" from "(1) 17 feet" to "(1) Suppression Pool level will lower to 17 feet and stabilize." Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

2950 36 Secondary Containment High Sump/Area Water Level EA1.01 3.2 3.3 Ability to operate and/or monitor the Secondary containment equipment and floor drain systems as it applies to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH SUMP/AREA WATER LEVEL NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO (CFR 41.7, 45.6) CFR Link SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO

Following a loss of coolant accident, the Primary Containment Hydrogen and Oxygen (H2O2) Analyzers are placed in service per OP-173-001, Section 2.8, H2O2 ANALYZER OPERATION DURING EMERGENCY. The following conditions exist:

- Analyzer "A" is aligned to the SUPPRESSION POOL.
- Analyzer "A" O2 reads 2%.
- Analyzer "A" H2 reads 9%
- Analyzer "B" is aligned to the DRYWELL.
- Analyzer "B" O2 reads 6%
- Analyzer "B" H2 reads less than 1%
- Sample flow to both analyzers was restored 35 minutes ago.
- Both analyzers are on the 10% range.

Which ONE of the following statements is correct? All Hydrogen Recombiners, Drywell Fans and Drywell Coolers MUST be Operated to adequately mix the Primary Containment atmosphere. A All Hydrogen Recombiners, Drywell Fans and Drywell Coolers MUST be Operated to adequately recombine Hydrogen in the Primary Containment atmosphere. B All Hydrogen Recombiners, Drywell Fans and Drywell Coolers MUST be Shutdown because Hydrogen and Oxygen concentrations are above combustible limits. C All Hydrogen Recombiners, Drywell Fans and Drywell Coolers MUST be Shutdown because Hydrogen and Oxygen concentrations can NOT be determined. D 5000 00 High Containment Hydrogen Concentration EA2.04 3.3 3.3 NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: EO-100-103 requires that Recombiners, Fans and Coolers be secured when H2>6% AND O2>5% whether the gases are in the same CTMT section or not because migration is possible. VALID DISTRACTOR: EO-103-113 calls for mixing and recombining for the individual CTMT sections (SP or DW) given the individual conditions. CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: EO-100-103 requires that Recombiners, Fans and Coolers be secured when H2>6% AND O2>5% whether the gases are in the same CTMT section or not because migration is possible. VALID DISTRACTOR: EO-103-113 calls for mixing and recombining for the individual CTMT sections (SP or DW) given the individual conditions. CHOICE (C) - YES Analyzers have been in-service for >30 minutes. H2 and O2 conditions exceed combustible limits. CHOICE (D) - NO WRONG: The Analyzers require 30 minutes to stabilize. They've had 35 minutes. VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may consider the Analyzers inoperable due to the disparate SP and DW readings or because Analyzers have been in service for a short time period. (Note: 1 hour at PB) References (CFR 41.10, 43.5, 45.13) CFR Link

1. 27 29597 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - OK Todd 09/30/05 - OK SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

Ability to determine and / or interpret Combustible limits for wetwell as it applies to HIGH PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN CONCENTRATIONS NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO

Given that the following conditions occur in the specified sequence:

1. All required conditions for Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) actuation are met.

2. Automatic depressurization is in progress.

3. All low pressure ECCS pumps trip.

4. A single Core Spray (CS) pump is restarted.

Which ONE of the following describes how the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) is affected? ADS depressurization STOPED when low pressure ECCS pumps tripped; then AUTOMATICALLY reinitiated after the CS pump restarted. A ADS depressurization CONTINUES until the LOGIC TIMER RESET pushbutton is depressed. B ADS depressurization CONTINUES until both MANUAL INHIBIT (S34A & S34B) switchs are rotated to INHIBIT. C ADS depressurization STOPPED when low pressure ECCS pumps tripped; then can be MANUALLY reinitiated after the CS pump restarted. D 2030 00 RHR/LPCI: Injection Mode (Plant Specific) K3.03 4.2 4.3 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RHR/LPCI: INJECTION MODE (PLANT SPECIFIC) will have on Automatic depressurization logic NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: K4A seals in the actuation signal. VALID DISTRACTOR: ADS will not actuate without low pressure ECCS pumps running CHOICE (B) - YES Signal seals in until broken by the ADS LOGIC/TIMER RESET PB CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: Manual Inhibit PBs are effective before ADS actuation only. VALID DISTRACTOR: They are effective before actuation at stopping actuation. CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: K4A seals in the actuation signal and Manual Initiation does NOT bypass the LP ECCS Pumps relay K9A and K10A VALID DISTRACTOR: Reasonable belief that Manual Initiation would bypass all interlocks. References (CFR 41.7 / 45.4) CFR Link

1. 28 29598 SRO RO Question ID:

Bank Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Drawn from Clinton 1 June 2000 exam (Question ID 18937) Gil 09/26/05 - Add to first sentence in stem "... conditions occur in sequence". Can you shorten distractor "D" a bit? R: accepted both comments. Todd 09/30/05 - Revised "A" and "D" to be past tense and added auto restart to "A". SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

Both units are at full power. 480 VAC Bus 2B226 is deenergized for planned electrical maintenance. All systems were in their normal configuration when Operations de-energized 2B226. Which ONE of the following correctly describes the status of SSES Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Loop "B" with NO Local/Manual component manipulation? Drywell Spray Mode - NOT Available Suppression Pool Spray - NOT Available Suppression Pool Cooling - NOT Available RHR Pump "B" and "D" Minimum Flow Isolation - Available A Drywell Spray Mode - Available Suppression Pool Spray - Available Suppression Pool Cooling - Available RHR Pump "B" and "D" Minimum Flow Isolation - NOT Available B Drywell Spray Mode - Available Suppression Pool Spray - NOT Available Suppression Pool Cooling - NOT Available RHR Pump "B" and "D" Minimum Flow Isolation - NOT Available C Drywell Spray Mode - NOT Available Suppression Pool Spray - Available Suppression Pool Cooling - Available RHR Pump "B" and "D" Minimum Flow Isolation - Available D Justification De-energizing 2B226 removes power from the following:

- HV251F016B - Drywell Spray (Normally Shut)
- HV251F017B - Injection (Normally Open)
- HV251F028B - SP Spray & Cooling (Normally Shut)
- HV251F010B - Cross-connect to "A" loop (Normally Shut)
- HV251F004B - "B" Pump suction from SP (Normally Open)
- HV251F006B - "B" Pump suction from SDC dropline (Normally Open)
- HV251F003B - "B" HX Outlet (Normally Open)
- HV251F047B - "B" HX Inlet (Normally Open)

Therefore, the following applies"

- Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) - Operable because de-energized valves in the flowpath are normally open (HV251F015B is on swing buss 2B229)
- Drywell Spray Mode - NOT Available because normally closed valve F016B is de-energized
- Suppression Pool Spray - NOT Available because normally closed valve F028B is de-energized
- Suppression Pool Cooling - NOT Available because normally closed valve F028B is de-energized
- RHR Pump "B" and "D" Minimum Flow - Available because normally closed valve F007B is energized from 2B229 CHOICE (A) - YES CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: DW Spray NOT avail because F016B deenergized. SP Spray NOT avail because F028B deenergized.

VALID DISTRACTOR: LPCI is Operable, Min Flow is available and SP Cooling NOT Avail. CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: LPCI is Operable. Remainder of distractor mirrors Distractor B VALID DISTRACTOR: Remainder of distractor mirrors Distractor B CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: LPCI is Operable. Remainder of distractor mirrors Distractor D VALID DISTRACTOR: Remainder of distractor mirrors Distractor B References

1. 29 29599 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - Suggest use "Available" (or not available) rather than "Operable". Not sure what impact the bus loss will have on Operability, however availability is assured in A. R: accepted. Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

2050 00 Shutdown Cooling System (RHR Shutdown Cooling Mode K2.02 2.5 2.7 Knowledge of electrical power supplies to Motor operated valves NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO (CFR 41.7) CFR Link Todd 09/30/05 - deleted LPCI mode to limit variables to four. modified distractors accordingly. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO

SSES Unit 1 is at full power when 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) inadvertently initiates and injects to the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV). Assuming no Operator action, which ONE of the following correctly describes the INITIAL change from steady state? Thermal Power will RISE RPV Water Level will LOWER Total Steam Flow will LOWER Total Indicated Feedwater Flow will LOWER A Thermal Power will RISE RPV Water Level will LOWER Total Steam Flow will RISE Total Indicated Feedwater Flow will LOWER B Thermal Power will RISE RPV Water Level will RISE Total Steam Flow will LOWER Total Indicated Feedwater Flow will RISE C Thermal Power will RISE RPV Water Level will RISE Total Steam Flow will RISE Total Indicated Feedwater Flow will LOWER D 2060 00 High Pressure Coolant Injection System A1.01 4.3 4.4 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM controls including Reactor water level (BWR-2,3,4) NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: Wrong Level, ST & FW changes VALID DISTRACTOR: correct power changes. CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: Wrong RPV Water Level Effect. VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct Power, ST and FW changes CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: Reverses the actual FW and ST changes - both affect Level Error. VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct Power and Level change CHOICE (D) - YES Steam Flow RISES cause HPCI Turbine Operating. Therefore, RPV pressure drops cause ST rises and Power rises due to colder FW. RPV Water Level will rise because FW now > ST. Stable when Level Error offsets Flow Error Total Steam Flow will rise because now have additional steam flowpath Indicated FW Flow lowers to create the Flow Error that offsets Level Error. References (CFR 41.5 / 45.5) CFR Link

1. 30 29600 SRO RO Question ID:

Bank Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. Gil 09/26/05 - could not validate with enclosed references. Note for justification "A" Power increases due to lowering feedwater temperature with HPCI injection.

R: Low risk of error because it is drawn from SSES Exam Bank and is theoretical rather than plant specific.

2. Todd 09/30/05 - changed "INITIAL to FINAL" to "INITIAL change from SS" SRO NRC K/A Generic Memory Level Answers:

A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

System Number RO CFR Link SRO

During quarterly surveillance testing of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system per SO-152-002, the system is __(1)__ and the liquid flowpath is __(2)__. (1) NOT OPERABLE because injection valve HV155F006 is deenergized in the closed position. (2) From the Suppression Pool to the Pumps and return to the Suppression Pool. A (1) NOT OPERABLE because injection valve HV155F006 is deenergized in the closed position. (2) From the Condensate Storage Tank to the Pumps and return to the Condensate Storage Tank. B (1) OPERABLE because HPCI will automatically realign to the injection mode upon receipt of an initiation signal. (2) From the Suppression Pool to the Pumps and return to the Suppression Pool. C (1) OPERABLE because HPCI will automatically realign to the injection mode upon receipt of an initiation signal. (2) From the Condensate Storage Tank to the Pumps and return to the Condensate Storage Tank. D 2060 00 NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: Path is CST to Pps to CST VALID DISTRACTOR: system is Inoperable. CHOICE (A) - YES CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: Path is CST to Pps to CST. System is NOT operable (no auto realign) VALID DISTRACTOR: mirror imaging distractors. CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: System is NOT operable (no auto realign) VALID DISTRACTOR: correct flowpath References CFR Link

1. 31 29601 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Get the correct surveillance (I've got the 24 month one) Gil 09/26/05 - OK Todd 09/30/05 - ask SSES if initial power level changes the answer. SRO 2.2 Equipment Control 2.2.12 3.0 3.4 Knowledge of surveillance procedures. NRC K/A Generic System Number RO (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

Both SSES units were at full power and SSES Unit 1 was running Core Spray pumps 1P206A and 1P206C for surveillance testing when the site experienced a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP).

- Both units are now maintaining Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure and inventory with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system. 
- All engineered safeguards (ES) buses are powered from their associated emergency diesel generators (EDG).

Subsequently, a transient affects SSES Unit 2 and results in the following conditions:

- SSES Unit 2 RPV Water Level is -60 inches.
- SSES Unit RPV Pressure is 350 psig.
- SSES Unit Drywell Pressure is 1.8 psig.

Which ONE of the following describes the AUTOMATIC actions of the SSES Unit 2 Core Spray system? Core Spray pumps 2P206A, 2P206B, 2P206C and 2P206D start after a 15 second time delay. A Core Spray pumps 2P206A, 2P206B, 2P206C and 2P206D start after a 10.5 second time delay. B Core Spray pumps 2P206B and 2P206D start after a 10.5 second time delay. Core Spray pumps 2P206A and 2P206C do NOT start. C Core Spray pumps 2P206B and 2P206D start after a 15 second time delay. Core Spray pumps 2P206A and 2P206C do NOT start. D 2090 01 Low Pressure Core Spray System K4.08 3.8 4.0 NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: the 15 sec TD occurs if ES busses are energized from normal/off-site power. VALID DISTRACTOR: all four pumps do start after a TD CHOICE (B) - YES the 15 sec does time out. However, its start signal comes AFTER the 10.5 sec TD sends its signal. LOOP: K3A opens, EDGs start and energize ES busses, K3A closes and the EDG breaker 52 contacts swap (a closes & b opens) LOCA: K10A closes on DW Hi pressure and RPV Low pressure, K116A energizes 10.5 sec TD concurrently with K16A's 15 sec TD. K116A closes before K16A closes, K12A energizes. CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: CS pumps A & C will also start. VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct TD and pumps B & D are "Preferred" unit 2 pumps for concurrent CS initiation signals (electrical load considerations). CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: Wrong TD and CS pumps A& C will also start. VALID DISTRACTOR: CS pumps B & D are "Preferred" unit 2 pumps for concurrent CS initiation signals (electrical load considerations). References (CFR 41.7) CFR Link

1. 32 29602 SRO RO Question ID:

Mod Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - OK Todd 09/30/05 - changed "plant" to "site" in the stem. SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

Knowledge of LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the Automatic system initiation NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO

Both SSES units are at full power. During shift turnover, you notice that the:

- white indicating light for Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) squib valve 148F004A is EXTINGUISHED
- white indicating light for Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) squib valve 148F004B is ILLUMINATED Before accepting the shift, you go to the Relay Room and determine that the Unit 1 SBLC squib valve CONTINUITY METERS read 5 milliamps (ma) for BOTH squib valves.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes the status of the SBLC squib valves? 148F004A is Operable 148F004B is Operable A 148F004A is NOT Operable 148F004B is Operable B 148F004A is Operable 148F004B is NOT Operable C 148F004A is NOT Operable 148F004B is NOT Operable D 2110 00 Standby Liquid Control System K4.04 3.8 3.9 Knowledge of STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for Indication of fault in explosive valve firing circuits NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - YES The stem establishes conditions indicative of a burned out light bulb. CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: Neither valve is inoperable. VALID DISTRACTOR: White light out is the first indication of an inoperable squib valve. CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: Neither valve is inoperable VALID DISTRACTOR: Tests Applicants' understanding of the normal/expected condition. CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: Neither valve is inoperable VALID DISTRACTOR: Mirror imaging and tests Applicants' understanding of normal/expected condition. References (CFR 41.7) CFR Link

1. 33 29603 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - suggest using 5 milliamps in stem if this is technically correct, albeit a little higher than normal. 4 milliamps is too easily recognizable. R: accepted. Changed from 4 to 5 and deleted sentence saying "These are the NORMAL values". Recategorized to Higher Cognitive Level. Todd 09/30/05 - added "Unit 1" before SBLC in the stem. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

SSES Unit 1 is operating at full power. The following Standby Liquid Control System (SBLC) conditions exist following SBLC tank filling:

- SLC tank temperature is 70 F
- AR 107 B03, STANDBY LIQUID TANK HI/LO TEMP is in alarm
- SLC tank level is 5100 gallons
- AR 107 C03, STANDBY LIQUID TANK HI/LO LEVEL is in alarm
- Chemistry sample results after filling indicate that the concentration of the sodium pentaborate solution in the SLC tank is 15.4% by weight Which ONE of the following identifies the status of the SLC system according to Technical Specifications?

The LCO is satisfied. A Tank temperature does not meet the LCO conditions. B Tank available volume does not meet the LCO conditions. C Sodium pentaborate concentration does not meet the LCO conditions. D 2110 00 NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification

! ! T H I S Q U E S T I O N A P P E A R E D O N T H E A U G U S T 2 0 0 2 S U S Q U E H A N N A E X A M ! !

CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: The temperature-concentration combination is in the UNACCEPTABLE range. VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant must determine this from Firgure 3.1.7-2 CHOICE (B) - YES CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: Volume falls in the acceptable region of Figure 3.1.7-2 VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant determine this from Figure 3.1.7-2 CHOICE (D) - WRONG: Concentration falls in the acceptable region of Figure 3.1.7-2 VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant determine this from Figure 3.1.7-2 References CFR Link

1. 34 29655 SRO RO Question ID:

Bank Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

! ! T H I S Q U E S T I O N A P P E A R E D O N T H E A U G U S T 2 0 0 2 S U S Q U E H A N N A E X A M ! !

Gil 09/26/05 - Not sure it is plausible for an operator to NOT acknowledge any annunciator. How about "acknowledge but do not reset" for "A". R: accepted. Changed distractors "A" and "B" ?? Does SSES have the RESET function ??

• *
• R E J E C T E D K / A C A U S E L O D U N R E A C H A B L E * *
• Reselected 2.1.33 and found this in an SSES old exam.

SRO NRC K/A Generic Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

2.1 Conduct of Operations 2.1.2 3.0 4.0 Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation. System Number RO (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) CFR Link SRO

SSES Unit 2 scrams from full power. All systems, structures and components operated as expected EXCEPT the Scram Pilot Solenoid Valves for all twenty (20) Group 2 Hydraulic Control Units (HCU) on Reactor Side 2 failed to vent their associated HCUs. Which ONE of the following is TRUE concerning the 20 associated control rods? All 20 Control Rods will insert in less than 10 seconds. A All 20 Control Rods will NOT insert but can be inserted by venting the Scram Air Header. B All 20 Control Rods will insert in greater than 10 seconds. C All 20 Control Rods will NOT insert but can be inserted using Reactor Manual Control (RMC). D 2120 00 Reactor Protection System K4.09 3.8 3.9 Knowledge of REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the Control rod insertion following RPS system electricalfailure NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: The rods will INSERT at a slower rate as ARI and Backup Scram valves act to depressurize the air header VALID DISTRACTOR: The rod still inserts CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: The rods will insert without Operator action VALID DISTRACTOR: valid method directed by EO-100-113, Control Rod Insertion CHOICE (C) - YES CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: The rods will insert without Operator action VALID DISTRACTOR: using RMC may be plausible once the Scram and ARI are reset. References (CFR 41.7) CFR Link

1. 35 29605 SRO RO Question ID:

Bank Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - Once a rod is scrammed (from any means) it will insert at the same rate (about 4 seconds). Recommends: A - All control rods will atuomatically insert in < 10 seconds. C - All control rods will automatically insert in > 10 seconds. R: no known basis for the 10 second threshhold. Will request SSES input. Not sure I accept the proposition that all rods will insert at the same rate. Seems reasonable to believe that the rods for which the Scram Pilot Solenoid Valves did NOT open would move a bit slower because their air is vented through a smaller area. 09/27/05: Now understand the issue. All rods insert at the same rate once the scram valves open. However, for the affected 20 HCUs, the scram valves take longer to open. Must have SSES verify/evaluate the 10 second threshhold. Todd 09/30/05 - replaced "Both units are at full power when one unit scrams for unknown reasons." with "SSES Unit 2 scrams from full power." SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

A reactor STARTUP is in progress. All Intermediate Range Neutron Monitors (IRM) are on Range 4. Which ONE of the following IRM readings will cause a HALF SCRAM? Note: INOP = Inoperable and NOT bypassed. A B C D E F G H INOP 109 108 106 110 INOP 107 107 A 124 124 108 106 110 103 107 108 B 110 107 INOP 123 112 118 109 111 C INOP 105 108 110 124 112 116 109 D 2120 00 Reactor Protection System A3.01 4.4 4.4 Ability to monitor automatic operations of the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM including Reactor Power NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification IRMs are assigned to RPS as follows: RPS "A": IRM channels "A", "C", "E", "G" RPS "A": IRM channels "B", "D", "F", "H" To yield a half scram, one or more APRMs in a SINGLE and only a SINGLE RPS channel must either trip on high flux (>122 / 125 scale) or INOP CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: INOP IRM channels "A" and "F" yield a FULL scram. VALID DISTRACTOR: Two inoperable channels. CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: IRM channels "A" and "B" yield a FULL scram. VALID DISTRACTOR: Two channels > high flux setpoint CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: IRM channels "D" and "E" yield a FULL scram VALID DISTRACTOR: Two channels above high flux setpoint. CHOICE (D) - YES IRM channel "A" trips RPS "A" IRM channel "E" trips RPS "A" References (CFR 41.7 / 45.7) CFR Link

1. 36 29606 SRO RO Question ID:

Mod Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. Gil 09/26/05 - explanation talks about APRMs rather than IRMs.

R: corrected explanation to IRMs. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

SSES Unit 1 shutdown in Mode 5 for a scheduled refueling outage. The Division I 24 VDC distribution system is in the following configuration:

- Battery 1D670 is DISCONNECTED from the 1D672 24-VDC Bus to support emergent corrective maintenance.
- BOTH Battery Chargers 1D673 and 1D674 are powered from the 1Y216 Instrument AC Distribution Panel to support planned maintenance on 1Y236.

For unknown reasons, the 1B216 ESS 480-VAC MCC is DEENERGIZED. Which ONE of the following correctly describes the status of Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM)? IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" are deenergized and failed DOWNSCALE IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" are energized and OPERABLE IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" CAN be inserted or withdrawn IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" CAN be inserted or withdrawn A IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" are deenergized and failed DOWNSCALE IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" are energized and OPERABLE IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" CAN be inserted or withdrawn IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" can NOT be inserted or withdrawn B IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" are deenergized and failed UPSCALE IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" are energized and OPERABLE IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" can NOT be inserted or withdrawn IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" CAN be inserted or withdrawn C IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" are deenergized and failed DOWNSCALE IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" are energized and OPERABLE IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" can NOT be inserted or withdrawn IRMs "B", "D", "F", and "H" can NOT be inserted or withdrawn D Justification IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" are powered from 1D672. The stem establishes that the associated battery is not available to provide backup power to 1D672 and that both battery chargers are abnormally configured to be powered from the same buss (1Y216). 1Y216 is powered from 1B216 which, according to the stem, is lost. Therefore, 24-VDC to 1D672 is also lost. The IRM Detector Drive motors for all 8 IRMs are powered from 1Y218. Although the normal power to 1Y218 is lost, the Non-class 1E Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) 1D240 keeps 1Y218 powered from a 250-VDC battery and ES Buss 1B236. Therefore all 8 detectors can be moved. CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: IRM Detectors "B", "D", "F", and "H" can be moved. IRMs "A", "C", "E", and "G" are deenergized and fail downscale VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may erroneously associate drive motors with associated detectors. Applicant may believe detectors fail upscale. CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: All IRMs are movable. VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may understand that 1Y218 is affected by the loss of 1B216 but forget that 1Y218 is protected by an UPS. CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: IRMs fail down, not up VALID DISTRACTOR: everything else is correct. References

1. 37 29607 SRO RO Question ID:

Mod Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - Please confirm that there is at least one indicator in the plant (not necessarily IRMs) that will fail upscale on loss of power; otherwise C and D are not plausible. I can't think of any at the plants I worked. R: will ask. Easy fix by also varying the status of Div II IRMs or Div I IRMs. Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

2150 03 Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) System K2.01 2.5 2.7 Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the IRM channels/detectors NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO (CFR 41.7) CFR Link Changed Distractor "D" to fail DOWNSCALE and IRMs B, D, F, H can NOT be withdrawn. Request sent to SSES to determine if any meters fail high. If so, may return to UPSCALE. 09/28/05 Phone conversation with SSES: they agree it is implausible for an IRM to fail UPSCALE and indicated that this could happen on plants with DC powered IRMs. They did not consider an UPSCALE failure credible. Therefore, changes indicated above should alleviate this concern because now only one distractor contains the UPSCALE failure. Adjusted the ability to withdraw IRMs to make distractor "C" more enticing. Todd 09/30/05 - changed "fail" to "failed" in all four choices. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO

SSES Unit 2 is in Mode 2, conducting a normal reactor startup per GO-200-102, PLANT STARTUP, HEATUP AND POWER OPERATION. The following conditions exist:

- the reactor is CRITICAL.
- RPV Pressure is 0 psig.
- All Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM) are on Range 3
- Source Range Monitor (SRM) detectors are being withdrawn intermittently, TWO AT A TIME.
- SRM level is being maintained between 5E3 (5,000) and 5E4 (50,000) counts per second (CPS).
- SRM Channel "A" reads 6.1E3 (6,100) CPS and slowly rising.
- SRM Channel "B" reads 7.2E4 (72,000) CPS and slowly rising.
- SRM Channel "C" reads 6.0E3 (6,000) CPS and slowly rising.
- SRM Channel "D" reads 6.1E3 (6,100) CPS and slowly rising.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes: (1) a cause of these conditions and (2) actions, if any, necessary to permit the Reactor Startup? (1) SRM Detector "B" is stuck & located LOWER in the core than SRM Detectors "A", "C", & "D". (2) None. The SRM Upscale Block is AUTOMATICALLY bypassed when all IRMs are on Range 3 or above. A (1) SRM Detector "B" is stuck & located LOWER in the core than SRM Detectors "A", "C", & "D". (2) MANUALLY bypass SRM "B" to prevent a Rod Withdrawal BLOCK at 2E5 (20,000) CPS. B (1) SRM Detector "B" is stuck & located HIGHER in the core than SRM Detectors "A", "C", & "D". (2) MANUALLY bypass SRM "B" to prevent a Rod Withdrawal BLOCK at 2E5 (20,000) CPS. C (1) SRM Detector "B" is stuck & located HIGHER in the core than SRM Detectors "A", "C", & "D". (2) None. The SRM Upscale Block is AUTOMATICALLY bypassed when all IRMs are on Range 3 or above. D NRC K/A System/E/A Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: The detector is stuck HIGHER in the core and AUTO bypass occurs on Range 8 or higher. VALID DISTRACTOR: Mirror imaging. CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: The detector is stuck HIGHER. VALID DISTRACTOR: Manual bypass is required. CHOICE (C) - YES Detector is stuck HIGHER. MANUAL bypass is required to continue. CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: Auto bypass occurs on Range 8 or higher. VALID DISTRACTOR: SRM is stuck HIGHER. References

1. 38 29608 SRO RO Question ID:

Mod Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - OK Todd 09/30/05 - grammatical corrections to stem. Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

2150 04 Source Range Monitor (SRM) System K5.03 2.8 2.8 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as it applies to SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) SYSTEM : Changing detector position System Number RO (CFR 41.5 / 45.3) CFR Link SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO

SSES Unit 1 is at full power. You observe the following neutron monitoring system status:

- APRM "E" is BYPASSED
- APRM "F" is BYPASSED
- IRM "A" is BYPASSED
- IRM "H" is BYPASSED Which ONE of the following correctly describes the Reactor Protection System (RPS) status?

All scram functions of RPS "A" (Division I) are AVAILABLE All scram functions of RPS "B" (Division II) are AVAILABLE A All scram functions of RPS "A" (Division I) are NOT Available All scram functions of RPS "B" (Division II) are AVAILABLE B All scram functions of RPS "A" (Division I) are AVAILABLE All scram functions of RPS "B" (Division II) are NOT Available C All scram functions of RPS "A" (Division I) are NOT Available All scram functions of RPS "B" (Division II) are NOT Available D 2150 05 Average Power Range Monitor/Local Power Range Moni A1.02 3.9 4.0 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM controls including RPS status NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: Div I is not operable. VALID DISTRACTOR: Div II is operable. CHOICE (B) - YES

- T.S. 3.3.1.1 requires the RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 to be OPERABLE.
- Table 3.3.1.1-1, Line 2.d, requires that the APRM INOP function be operable in Modes 1 & 2 with a minimum of 2 channels per trip system.
- The INOP function requires a RPS deenergization if the APRM is DNSCL while the IRM is UPSCL.
- According to SSES Training Materials and Plant Dwgs M1-C72-22 (Sheets 6, 7, 8, 9), the APRM-to-IRM association is:
- Division I: A-A, C-C, E-E, E-G and this Div is INOPERABLE because only one APRM INOP function is functional (A-A, E-E, E-G are bypassed)
- Division II: B-B, D-D, F-F, F-H and this Div is OPERABLE because two APRM INOP functions are functional (F-F, F-H are bypassed)

CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: Div I and Div II are reversed. VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may mistake two bypassed channels for taking two out of three functions away. CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: Div II is OPERABLE. VALID DISTRACTOR: Mirror Image References (CFR 41.5 / 45.5) CFR Link

1. 39 29661 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - OK but we should revalidate this one. Todd 09/30/05 - designated a unit in the stem and deleted window dressing concerning shift turnover. Rich 10/03/05 - replaced OPERABLE with AVAILABLE to get away from SRO level. SRO NRC K/A Generic Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

System Number RO CFR Link SRO

How is the integrity of Primary Containment protected if one of the RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Instrument Sensing Lines break? The Instrument Sensing Lines are Normally Open and are AUTOMATICALLY isolated in response to a line break. A The Instrument Sensing Lines are equipped with a Flow Orifice, a MANUALLY Operated Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) and an Excess Flow Check Valve. B The Instrument Sensing Lines are equipped with a Flow Orifice, an AUTOMATICALLY Operated Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) and an Excess Flow Check Valve. C The Instrument Sensing Lines are Normally Isolated and are AUTOMATICALLY placed in service when RCIC actuates. D 2170 00 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) K1.02 3.5 3.5 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC) and the Nuclear boiler system NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: they do penetrate CTMT VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may believe that the sensors are EQ. CHOICE (B) - YES CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: The PCIV is Manual. VALID DISTRACTOR: everything else is correct. CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: References (CFR 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) CFR Link

1. 40 29610 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

• * * * *
• N O T E: SSES rejected this K/A in 2002 because it was too difficult to write a LOD>1 question. * * * * *
• Gil 09/26/05 -... penetrate the RCIC Turbine...... these RCIC INSTRUMENT....

R: issue is unclear. Clarified by phone - revisions made by inserting "RCIC" Todd 09/30/05 - deleted long winded explanation of the line from stem and replaced "A" with distractor better balanced with "D" and more enticing. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

With SSES Unit 2 at full power, a Safety Relieve Valve (SRV) inadvertently opened and is now indicating CLOSED. What is the expected tailpipe temperature 45 minutes later if the SRV is leaking? Assume Suppression Pool Pressure is 14.7 psig. Select the closest answer. 551 degrees Farenheit. A 545 degrees Farenheit. B 296 degrees Farenheit. C 252 degrees Farenheit. D 2180 00 Automatic Depressurization System A3.01 4.2 4.3 Ability to monitor automatic operations of the AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM including: ADS valve operation NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: this is Tsat for normal RPV pressure of 1040 psig. VALID DISTRACTOR: TMI lesson learned. CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: this is Tsat for normal MS Header pressure of 985 psig. VALID DISTRACTOR: TMI lesson learned. CHOICE (C): YES At 1040 psig (1055 psia), the steam vapor enthalpy is 1190.8 BTU/lbm. Throttling is an isenthalpic process. From the Mollier diagram, we see that the expected tailpipe temprature is in the vicinity of 280 deg F. From the tables, we can interpolate to 296 deg F. CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: this is 2 deg F above the alarm setpoint. VALID DISTRACTOR: the alarm setpoint is 250 deg F References (CFR 41.7 / 45.7) CFR Link

1. 41 29611 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - K/A mismatch. R: will reconsider. Agree that this does not DIRECTLY test automatic ADS valve operation. But Applicant should understand whether tailpipe temperatures are trending to ambient or not following an open SRV. Todd 09/30/05 - verify with SSES that 45 minutes eliminates "D" as potentially correct. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

A loss of 250-VDC Load Center 1D662 would affect the __(1)__ system PUMP by preventing the __(2)__ Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIV) from closing. (1) High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) (2) Outboard A (1) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) (2) Outboard B (1) High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) (2) Inboard C (1) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) (2) Inboard D 2230 02 Primary Containment Isolation System/Nuclear Steam K6.02 3.0 3.2 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of D.C. electrical distribution will have on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUT-OFF NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification From TM-OP-088, the 1D264 and 1D274 busses are powered from 1D662. 1D662 is powered from the 1D663 Battery Charger or the 1D660 Battery. The stem specifies a loss of 1D662. Therefore, the cause of this loss is irrelevant. However, the successful Applicant must recognize that loss of 1D662 will also cause a loss of 1D274 and 1D264. Alternatively, the successful Applicant may know that RCIC DC-powered MOVs are powered from Div I and HPCI DC-powered MOVs are powered from Div II of the 250-VDC system. CHOICE (A) - YES 1D264 and 1D274 provide power to the HPCI outboard PCIVs. CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: It's HPCI, not RCIC VALID DISTRACTOR: correct valves. CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: Wrong Valves VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct system CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: Wrong valves and system. VALID DISTRACTOR: Mirror image. References (CFR 41.7 / 45.7) CFR Link

1. 42 29612 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History

1. Gil 09/26/05 - can't see connection between 1D662 and Outboard MOV.

R: INBD Vvs AC pwrd to prevent sparking inside PC that could ignite H2 if present. OTBD Vvs are DC powered for reliability & diversity. Added text to justification section explaining 250-VDC distribution. Also added word "PUMP" to stem to preclude "B" from being a potentially correct second answer. HV-149F084, RCIC TURB EXH VAC BKR OB VLV, is powered from 1D264 and is an Outboard PCIV.

2. Todd 09/30/05 - OK.

SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

SSES lost all offsite power (LOOP). During the transient, a Main Steam (MS) line on SSES Unit 2 broke and caused Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) to CLOSE. Subsequently, the control room is EVACUATED and you go to the SSES Unit 2 Remote Shutdown Panel (1C201). The following conditions now exist:

- BOTH the Upper and Lower Relay rooms are inaccessible.
- Drywell Pressure is 1.9 psig.
- Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Pressure is cycling between 1,180 psig and 1,150 psig.
- Safety Relief Valve (SRV) control has been transferred to the Remote Shutdown Panel.

What functional mode, if any, are the Safety Relief Valves (SRV) operating in? Overpressure SAFETY operation A Overpressure RELIEF operation B Low pressure ECCS (ADS) C None, RCIC is controlling RPV Pressure. D Justification Complete rewrite of original question. Old question saved as Order 431. CHOICE (A) - YES There are 16 SRVs. In the SAFETY mode, two SRVs open at 1175, six SRVs open at 1195 and eight SRVs open at 1205 psig. In the SAFETY mode, the SRVs close at 97% of set pressure. 97% of 1175 is 1140. 97% of 1195 is 1160. Therefore, 1180 to 1150 is a reasonable expectation for RPV pressure in this condition. CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: RELIEF mode is incorrect - pressures too high VALID DISTRACTOR: This is one mode of SRV operation CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: Pressure is not steadily lowering. VALID DISTRACTOR: This is one mode of SRV operation. CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: RCIC would not cause pressure to cycle. VALID DISTRACTOR: RCIC is one method of controlling RPV pressure if MSIVs close. References

1. 43 29646 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History NOTE: per ON-100-009, ADS valves can be operated from the Relay Rooms. Revised correct answer to "A" after telephone discussion with SSES. Accumulators will provide some operation of SRVs A, B, C from the RSD in this condition. Operation in SAFETY mode will not deplete the accumulator. ? ? ? ? ? QUESTION: would the accumulators have depeleted in RELIEF mode by now? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

1. Gil 09/26/05 - believes SRVs always operate in Overpresssure Relief mode before safety relief mode. This will deplete the air supply. Question may have NO correct answer if this is true.

R: The stem conditions state that pressure is cycling between 1180 and 1150. At these higher values, the SRVs have to be in the Safety mode because RPV pressures would be lower in the Relief mode. Applicant should be sufficiently familiar with the setpoints to recognize this. May need to delete second half of question regarding which SRVs have controls at the RSD to make the entire question plausible. Distractors c/b RELIEF, ADS, RCIC/HPCI. Agree to toss second half out and make corrections to remaining distractors. Essentially rewrote the question. Saved old one as 431. NOTE: from ON-100-009, learned that Automatic RELIEF mode operation is NOT possible when control transferred to RSD panel. May be able to use this if further revision required. Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

2390 02 Relief/Safety Valves K5.02 3.7 3.8 Knowledge of the operational implications of the Safety function of SRV operation as it applies to RELIEF/SAFETY VALVES NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO (CFR 41.5 / 45.3) CFR Link Todd 09/30/05 - grammatical correction to accommodate distractor "D". SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO

Reactor power is 27% and rising pursuant to a normal reactor startup. Which ONE of the following would cause a ROD BLOCK? Intermediate Range Monitor Detector is FULLY INSERTED. A Main Turbine FIRST-STAGE Pressure instrument fails HIGH. B WIDE RANGE RPV Water Level REFERENCE leg ruptures. C One Main Steam Flow instrument fails DOWNSCALE. D 2590 02 Reactor Water Level Control System K3.03 2.7 2.9 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM will have on Rod worth minimizer (Plant-Specific) NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: At 50% power, the MODE switch is in RUN - that bypasses the IRM UPSCALE Scram and Block. VALID DISTRACTOR: Fully inserted would yield a Block if not bypassed because the IRM would read >108% CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: This would not cause a rod block VALID DISTRACTOR: First Stage pressure is an input to RSCS which would cause a rod block if it failed low. CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: RPV Water Level has no Rod Block function and this failure would cause a HIGH condition. VALID DISTRACTOR: The Narrow Range instrument is an input to FWLCS but is not sent onto to RWM from there. Moreover, the Ref leg rupture would cause a HIGH level indication that would NOT actuate any other protective features that could cause an RPS Scram which would block rods. CHOICE (D) - YES References (CFR 41.7 / 45.4) CFR Link

1. 44 29614 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - K/A mismatch. R: Disagree. MS flow does affect RWM. FWLCS uses Steam Flow as an input. FWLCS also sends TOTAL Steam Flow to the RWM to determine if the plant is above/below LPSP or LPAP. At 50%, each steam line is inputting 12.5%. If one goes to zero, the TOTAL steam flow goes to 37.5%. This is the ONLY relationship between the Reactor Water Level Control System and the Rod Worth Minimizer. The following is copied from TM-OP-031D Main Steam Line (MSL) flow is measured by the Feed Water Level Control (FWLC) System to determine when the plant is operating at 22 percent of Rated Thermal Power (RTP). This monitored parameter is inputted to the RDCS and PICSY to activate the LPSP. The setpoint can be adjusted by varying the trip value in the MSL flow sensor. Noted computational and typographical errors: Changed 50% power to 27% to ensure loss of one MS flow instrument puts total steam flow below LPSP of 22%. Corrected reference to TM-OP-031D from TM-OP-078K. Gil is now OK. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

Following a Reactor Feed Pump Turbine (RFPT) trip, in addition to the automatic interlocks, what Operator actions must be MANUALLY satisfied before resetting the RFPT trip? RFP Suction (HV-10616) NOT Full Closed RFP Disch (HV-10603) CLOSED RFP Min Flow (FV-10604) in AUTO Min Flow (FIC-10604) set for 2,000 gpm A RFPT Stop Valves (SV) are RESET Trip Conditions CLEARED or BYPASSED RFPT Exhaust (HV-12731) 100% OPEN RFP Disch (HV-10603) NOT 100% CLOSED B RFPT Exhaust (HV-12731) 100% OPEN RFPT Control Valves 100% CLOSED RFPT LP Isol (HV-12709) 100% CLOSED RFPT HP Isol (HV12710) 100% CLOSED C RFP Min Flow (FV-10604) in MAN Min Flow (FIC-10604) set for 2,000 gpm RFP Disch (HV-10603) CLOSED EAP Control (SIC-C32-1R601) at 0 D 2590 02 Reactor Water Level Control System A4.09 3.4 3.1 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor TDRFP lockout reset: TDRFP in the control room NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: Mix of Automatic and Manual requirements on the pump side. AUTO is incorrect. VALID DISTRACTOR: Mix of AUTO and MAN requirements. CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: SVs s/b NOT RESET. Trip conditions is AUTO. Disch Vv s/b full closed VALID DISTRACTOR: Mix of AUTO and Manua. CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: These are all automatic interlocks in their correct state - turbine side. VALID DISTRACTOR: they are interlocks that would prevent RFPT Reset. CHOICE (D) - YES References (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) CFR Link

1. 45 29615 SRO RO Question ID:

Mod Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Modified from SSES Exam Bank essay question. 09/19/2005: Per SSES staff, MSC must be on LSS per simulator attempt to reset RFPT Trip during previous weekend. Changed answer "D" to reflect MSC on LSS as an Automatic Interlock. Gil 09/26/05 - Change justification for "D" (correct answer). R: corrected justification. Todd 09/30/05 - too busy. reduced to four Manual actions. original saved as 451. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

The following conditions exist on SSES Unit1:

- Recently entered Mode 4 in preparation for a planned refueling outage.
- Primary Containment is PURGING.

SSES Unit 2 has a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and DRYWELL PRESSURE quickly rises above 1.72 psig. Which ONE of the following describes the correct ventilation system response? All three Reactor Building Zones (1, 2 and 3) Isolate and automatically reconfigure to RECIRCULATION. Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS)automatically takes suction on the Reactor Building Exhaust ventilation stack. SSES Unit 1 PURGE automatically ISOLATES. A Reactor Building Zones 2 and 3 Isolate and automatically reconfigure to RECIRCULATION. Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) automatically takes suction on the Reactor Building Exhaust ventilation stack. SSES Unit 1 PURGE automatically ISOLATES. B Reactor Building Zones 2 and 3 Isolate and automatically reconfigure to RECIRCULATION. Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) automatically takes suction on the Reactor Building Recirculation plenum. SSES Unit 1 PURGE Continues. C All three Reactor Building Zones (1, 2 and 3) Isolate and automatically reconfigure to RECIRCULATION. Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) automatically takes suction on the Reactor Building Recirculation plenum. SSES Unit 1 PURGE Continues. D Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: Only Zones 2 and 3 Isolate. SGTS does not take suction on the Exhaust Vent VALID DISTRACTOR: CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: SGTS does NOT take suction on the Exhaust Vent VALID DISTRACTOR: reasonable misconception to believe SGTS would draw suction on the normal exhaust path. CHOICE (C) - YES Zones 2 (Unit 2) and 3 (Common) Isolate and reconfigure to Recirc SGTS automatically takes suction on RB Recirc plenum Unaffected unit does not isolate. Therefore, purge continues. CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: Only Zones 2 and 3 isolate

1. 46 29616 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

2610 00 Standby Gas Treatment System K1.01 3.4 3.6 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM and the following: Reactor building ventilation system NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO VALID DISTRACTOR: Purge continues and SGTS suction is correct. References (CFR 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) CFR Link Comments and Question Modification History Confirm with SSES that unaffected unit's purge will continue. Gil 09/26/05 - OK Todd 09/30/05 - OK SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO

SSES has a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) "A" fails to start. Within 10 minutes, Operators start EDG "E" and energize 1A201 and 2A201. Both VITAL AC UPS (1D666 & 2D666) are energized from their __(1)__ source. All four NON-CLASS 1E INSTRUMENT AC UPS (1D240, 1D130, 2D240, 2D130) are energized from their __(2)__ source. Note: UPS = UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLIES 250-VDC ALTERNATE source (1D662, 2D142). 250-VDC ALTERNATE source (1D652, 1D662, 2D652, 2D662) A 250-VDC PREFERRED source (1D662, 2D142). 480-VAC PREFERRED source (1B236, 1B246, 2B236, 2B246) B 480-VAC PREFERRED source (1B246, 2B246). 480-VAC BACKUP source (1B216, 1B226, 2B216, 2B226) C 480-VAC ALTERNATE source (1B246, 2B246). 250-VDC ALTERNATE source (1D243, 1D133, 2D243, 2D133). D Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: Vital: Pfd v. Alt. Inst: wrong source of 250-VDC & would not be on 250-VDC CHOICE (B) - YES CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: Vital: 480-VAC is not Pfd. Inst: would not swing to B/U cause EDG "E" brought on in under 20 minutes. CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: Vital: no reason to shift to 480-VAC alt Inst: would have shifted back to Pfd 480-VAC source HOD because Applicant must distinguish LOOP from Blackout. Here, following a LOOP, the EDGs respond to power the ES busses. References

1. 48 29657 SRO RO Question ID:

New Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - "A" and "C" not plausible with "all...components operate as designed". That is, everyone should know 1E equipment will be energized. Use a different term (RPS MG Set or Instrument AC Distribution Panel 1Y216, etc) rather than "CLASS 1E". Answer B does not appear correct. The way I read the references the preferred will be lost for about 10 seconds and the UPS will run on DC. Then when the EDG energizes the bus the UPS will automatically shift back to preferred. R: will revisit this question. Added "one minute after" to expressly show question is asking for conditions after the transient. Suggestion: don't say "Class 1E" and just identify the buss itself.

• C O M P L E T E R E W R I T E 2 7 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 5
• Todd 09/30/05 - same question with substantial revisions. Saved old one as 481.

Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

2620 02 Uninterruptable Power Supply (A.C./D.C.) K6.01 2.7 2.9 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of A.C. electrical power will have on the UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (A.C./D.C.) NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO (CFR 41.7 / 45.7) CFR Link SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO

250 VDC Battery Charger 2D663 has the following front panel indications:

- Battery Charger Float-Equalize switch is in FLOAT.
- Battery Charger Interval Timer set to FIVE HOURS.

Which ONE of the following is correct concerning charger operation? Output voltage will be between 279 and 287 VDC for five hours, then lower to between 265 and 271 VDC thereafter. A Output voltage will be between 265 and 271 VDC for five hours, then lower to between 279 and 287 VDC thereafter. B Output voltage will be between 279 and 287 VDC for five hours and will remain between 279 and 287 VDC thereafter. C Output voltage will be between 265 and 271 VDC for five hours and will remain between 265 and 287 VDC thereafter. D 2630 00 D.C. Electrical Distribution K1.02 3.2 3.3 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between D.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION and Battery charger and battery NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - YES Per TM-OP-088 and OP-1(2)88-001, this provides Equalizing Charge for five hours, then automatically reconfigures to the FLOAT mode. CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: Reverse of correct answer VALID DISTRACTOR: First FLOAT, then EQUALIZE CHOICE (C) - No WRONG: Stay on EQUALIZE VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct if Float-Equalize switch in EQUALIZE CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: Stay on Float VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant my believe that the Float-Equalize switch must be in EQUALIZE to conduct charge. References (CFR 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) CFR Link

1. 49 29618 SRO RO Question ID:

Bank Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - add to stem:...switch has just been placed in FLOAT. This ensures the full five hours at 279-287 will occur; making A correct R: added "up to" in each answer choice. Pfd concept of Operator on tour discovering these conditions. deleted "up to" and added "is" to the stem. Todd 09/30/05 - OK SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

Why and how does the Operator reduce and stabilize Diesel Generator load at 300 - 500 KW before opening the EDG-to-Bus breaker? To prevent an ENGINE Trip on Reverse Power, by adjusting the Diesel Generator Voltage Adjust (HS-00053). A To prevent a STARTUP TRANSFORMER TAP Change which can cause a Diesel Generator Trip, by adjusting the Diesel Generator Voltage Adjust (HS-00053). B To prevent an ENGINE Trip on Reverse Power, by adjusting the Diesel Generator Speed Governor (HS-00054). C To prevent a STARTUP TRANSFORMER TAP Change which can cause a Diesel Generator Trip, by adjusting the Diesel Generator Speed Governor (HS-00054). D 2640 00 Emergency Generators (Diesel/Jet) A1.09 3.0 3.1 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) controls including Maintaining minimum load on emergency generator (to prevent reverse power) NRC K/A System/E/A System Number RO Justification CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: adjusting voltage changes reactive load (KVAR not KW). VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct Engine trip CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: adjusting voltage changes reactive load (KVAR not KW). VALID DISTRACTOR: S/U XFMR TAP Changer adjustments can cause EDG trips but this is not why REAL load is reduced. Reactive load is minimized (kept close to zero) to prevent TAP changes. CHOICE (C) - YES CHOICE (D) - No WRONG: S/U XFMR TAP Changer adjustments can cause EDG trips but this is not why REAL load is reduced. Reactive load is minimized (kept close to zero) to prevent TAP changes. VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct DG control scheme. References (CFR 41.5 / 45.5) CFR Link

1. 50 29619 SRO RO Question ID:

Mod Origin: Comments and Question Modification History Gil 09/26/05 - OK Todd 09/30/05 - revised from (1) (2) format to simple sentence structure. SRO NRC K/A Generic System Number RO CFR Link SRO Memory Level Answers: A B C D References Provided to Applicant:

/ then increase to a positive value as flow reverses in the "6' b p jet pumps. 'A" loop jet pump decrease, then increase to their original values as V f h m reverses. Flow indication for the '6' jet pumps will immediately read zero. It Increase during the translent. Flow indication o as the 'B' RRP coasts down, then remain at jet p u ~ increase during the transient. Flow indications Tease to zero as the "B" RRP coasts down, then increase to a positive value as flow reverses In the "B" loop jet pumps. Justlflcatlon WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: PLauslble If the Appllcant does not understand that the operathg loop system oheuactenstle changes when In single RRP opwatlon. The operatlng RRP will have a lower flow resistance because It can now discharge into the ten Idle jet pumps h addltlon to the core inlel plenum. WAONCI: VALID MSTRACTOR: Plausible if the Applicant does not fully understand how the core flow slgnal is developed. The indhrldual jet pump low tranemb produce slgnels before they are summed to detennlne total core flow. FY-1 KBo7 Is substituted for PI-1 K608 If a RRP generator exclbr breaker Is open or dbcharge valve Is less then 90% open. FY-1 K607 subtracts the Idle loop jet pump flow from operatlng loop jet pump flow to detemlne actual core flow (opsrating loop tlow less backflow through the idle bop). WRONG: VAUD DISTRACTOR. Plauslble If the Appllcmt does not udorstand that the Idle l00p)et pump have no method of backflow prevention or lf the Appllcant mlswwlerstands signal devebpment CHOICE (0) - Yes .y- " L .~., ~-, A CHOICE (A) - NO CHOICE (6) - NO CHOICE (C) - NO 1 Comments and Question YodlflaaUon Hlstory

1. (HB 09/ae/o5) Mod from INPO 6adc QuesbnlO 20448 (Quad C i

exam h, August 201)

2. WF oS/OW05) - no comment

3. Gn 09/09/05 - no comment.

4. GU 09/26/05 - Shwld be HCL R: 0. k. - dasslfied Higher Cognltlve Level, Todd OW30105 - OK.

NRC K/A SystemlEIA Sylern Number AK2.07 RO 3 4 SRO 3.4 CFR Unk (CFR: 41.7 1 6. 8 ) AK2. Knowledge of the Interrelations between PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS of FORCE0 CORE FLOW CIRCULATION and the followlnp: AK2.07 Core flow indtcatlon 29500 Partial or Complete Losa of Forced Core Row Ciffi 1

,#,g-l MRO MSRO OusrtbnID: 28682 ol(dra: Uad 0 mnorybvd Given the following conditions: - SSES Unit 1 recently entered Mode 4 to start a refueling outage following a 500 day run. - SSES Unit 2 is In mode 1 at full power and ftow. - The station experiences a loss of Startup Transformer T-20. - the Shift Manager has just declared an UNUSUAL EVENT. Why has Shift Manager declared an UNUSUAL EVENT? A CU1: Loss of All Offslte Power to Essential Busses for Greater than 15 Minutes. B CU2: UNPLANNED Loss of Reqired DC Power for Greater than 15 Minutes. C CU3: UNPLANNED Loss of Decay Heat RenrovaJ Capebllity with Irradiated Fuel in the RPV. D MU1: Loss of all Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater than 15 Mlnutes. Jurtlflcatlon CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: W+~lm INS Of both T-10 AND T-20. VALID MSTAACTOR: h e of power wb reaaonetde cmme for mnterlng Ihe EAL. CHOICE (8) - NO WRONG: requlres loss of ALL vttal DC power for >16 minutes. VALID DISTRACTOR: Applff~nnt may believe loss of T-20 causes loss of DC power. Appllcant muat recognize thal loss of T.20 came9 RP6 Bus "a" lo des-on SSES Unlt 1. Thls causea PClS Initlatian whlch, subeequedy, Isolates the RHR SDC drop line. Flnauy, Appliosnt should rewgnlze that decay heat load Is high and an unconhdled heat up owfd cause ACS tempenrtura to rise above 200 degeea Fahrmheit. This (s the entry condttkm for EAL CU3 per EP-TP-OOl WRONG requlres loss of buth T-10 AND T-20. VALID DISTRACTOR: Losa of power c/b reasonable cause for mterlnp !he EAL. CHOICE (C) - YES CHOICE (D) - NO e kd &.de Ftefemnces 24 month 700 days Of 18 month 600 daya for SQ to answer

2. THF 09/0BH)5 - clarified slem.

3. (311 OQ/O9K)5 - conoemed about KIA match.

4. Gflo9/2&rO5 - WA mismatch. Relationship between containment bolation dnd AI.?

R: on B loss of 7-20, RPS buss "6' is deenerghsd. This causes Prlmary CTMT isolation lncludlng lsdatlon of RHR h SDC mode. The successful AppucSnt mwt recognize the reason PClS isohted is the loss d RPS bum "B' and that the lsolaNon interupted SDC whlch must be restored to prewr entry hto M EAL If SDC rut restored, the threshhold for an EAC wlll be crossed. @ l e c h f i i t a l ( J r V c 7 Cc;)rraT

5. TOW ODDO/OS - OK.

6. Rich 1W305 - odd way to esk response question?

R change to 'why dld the SM declare me event'. Saved al~Inal question as number 21. NRC WA SystemNA System NumW AK306 RO 3.7 SRO CFR Unk 29600 Partlal or Complete Loss of A.C. Power 3

&1RO @SRO QuertknID 28947Wgh: B#rk @ 3 I n q b l While operating ai full power on Unit 2, control power to the operating control rod drive (CRD) pump is lost. What effect will this have on the CRD pumps? \\ A\\The omaiing CRO Dump wil$ontinue to run. Automatic protective trips for pumps are functional. rating CRD pump rip. Automatic protective trips forpqfh,pumps are disabled. ntinue to run. Automatic protective trips for - both pumps are trip. Automatic protective trlps for both pumps are functional. .irz JurttNcatlon WRONG: Autornetlc proteotlve trlps are dlsabled VAUD DISTRACTOR: Plausible becaw the pump wlll wntlnue to run. WRONG. the operating pump wlll not Mp VALID DISTRACTOR: Plaustble because RRPs will autornathAy trlp M loss of 125 VDC Control power, not CRDs Auto trlps are Ulsabled. CHOICE (A) - NO CHOlCE (8) - NO CHOICE (C) - YES CHOICE (0) - NO WRONG: Operatlng CRD Pump dll not trlp and auto Mps 8173 no1 fwtcnonal. VAUD DISTRACTOR: Plausible If Applicant consldem hls a fan aafe rneohanlsm. References C ~ m m t s an-d Questlon Modlflcatl 1 (H6 09/08/05) ModlRed fro

2. THf 09/08105 - changed format to T-7 / T-F I F-T I F-F wlth reasons.

3. Gll09/09105 - questlon ok buf - In ATWS and directed to start both CRD pumps. Concurrent loss of DC power. Now what7

4. Q1109/26/05 - could not valldate with enclosed references.

R. need SSES to valldate answer and dlstrectors. Low risk of enor because thts Is a bank question. GR thlnks its reasonable from memory. wan used on SSES August xx12 exam. Todd 08/30/05 - OK. NRC K/A SystemNA System Number AK1.05 RO 3.4 SRO 3.3 CFR Llnk (CFFI: 41.8t041.10) 29500 Parliil or Complete Loss of D.C. Power 4 Knowledge of the operaUonal Implications of the following concepts as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF D.C. POWER : LOSS of breaker protection NRC KIA Generlc System Nurnbsr A0 SRO CFR Llnk

ACP A @RO ESRO OwstJmID: 28S48 O m : New UMM#yLeMl __I-_..-c - -- --IcL___ Ranqe Monltor [SRM] A is inoperable because i t . bein 2 , N, b: re in progress and a bundle is ready to be lowered into the reactor vessel eives the following indications: - IRM CHAN BIDEM UPSCALE TRIP OR INOP (AR-104-001/A06) - SRM UPSCALE OR INOP (AR-104601/806) - 24V DC PANEL 1 L680 SYSTEM TROUBLE (AR-106-001/613) - REMOTE SHUTDOWN PAPEL IC201 INSTR PWR FAILURE (AR-106-001/H16} S E W 3 5 D c / - Zkh4 4 Which of the following is the correct response for the Control Room operating crew? 5 A B C D l-3i.4+mJ Stop all fuel movement and enter ON-175001, LOSS OF 24 VDC BUS. p[/ke $-j Continue fuel movement and enter ON-175-001, LOSS OF 24 VDC BUS. h Stop all fuel movement and enter ON-081 -002, REFUELING PLATFORM OPERATION ANOMALY. Continue fuel movement and enter ON-081-002, REFUELING PLATFORM OPERATION ANOMALY. Justlllcatlon TS 3.3.1.2 refers IoTable 3.3.1.2-1 loc rninlmun SRM operability. Two SRMs are required when in mode 5. However, the loss of Division II 24 VDC power dlsables bath SRM channels 6 and C. W e n that SRM ch8nnel A Is already hopemtie, the TS requirement can not be met because three out of four SRMs are now disabled. Note that this Is NOT a splral offload or rebed beoause the stem specifies mat a core shuffle Is In progress and because SSS Trainlng Dept fndkales that spiral off/mloads are not tVplcal for SSES, WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible If the Applicant fak to reoognlze that TS 3.3.1.2 can not bs met foilowing lass of one Ohrlslon of 24 VDC power became the affected SRMs are in opposlte quadrants CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: VALlD DISTAACTOR: PIauslMe If the applicant belleves that sfopphg hwl movement is an entry condition for the Off-Normal procedure. WRONG: VALfD DISTRACTOR: Plausible If the applicant believes that stopplng fuel movement is an entry mndrtlon for the Off-Normal procedure and faits to recognize that TS 3.3.1.2 can not be met fdlowlng loss d one Divsion of 24 VDC power because the affected SRMs are In opposlre quadrants. CHO(CE (A) - YES CHOICE (e) - NO CHOICE (D) - NO Comments and Question Mod@aUon History w l k m Question for SSES: MI SRM UPSCALE OR lNOP fAR-104-0011808\\ rdlash? Can we delete that Inillat oMK11Uon? Should others be added?

2. THF 08/08/05 - changes to stem and answers to slmpllfy and clarify

3. Gil OWOW05 - no comment fvZA j&

4. (3R 09/26/05 - oouM not validate with enclosed references. Shortest answer ts correct. Should balance wlth Other distractors.

R: Revlsed dlslractors 6 and 0 to address length of choices. Todd 08/30105 - OK. U NRC KIA SystemlUA

Ro SRO CFR Llnk NRC KIA Generlc System 2.2 Equipmenthntrol Number 22.30 RO 3.5 SRO 3.3 CFA Llnk (CFA: 45.12) "KnowledQe of RO duties in the control room durlng fuel handlhg suoh as alarms from fuel handlhg area, comrnunicatlon wlth fuel storage faclltty, aysteme operated hwn the control room In support af fueling operations, and supporting Instrumentatbn.'

1. 5 1 BFIO @SI30 Quo8ibnID 29858 OrloL.1: New EMmalr1.HI Given the following Control Room indications,

- AR-106-001 (A081 GEN LOCKOUT RELAYS TRIP - AR-106-001 (C04) STATOR COOLING WATER PUMP 1A-18 TRIP - Generator Stator Cooling Water Pumps 1A and 1 B are NOT running (both AMEER lights energized) - Generator Stator Cooling Water control switch is selected to "1 A-START I B-RESERVE" (y/? AUTOMATIC action will occur and why? - 7 A Main TURBINE trip due to Generator negative phase sequence. Main TURBINE trip due to Generator Stator Cooling Water high conductivity. - I' C Main GENERATOR trlp due to Generator Stator Cooling Water low pressure. Main GENERATOR trip due to Generator Neutral Overvoltage (59GN) fault. w JurtMcaUon WRONG: +his wlll cause Generator Vlp but not the Stator Coollng water pump trlps. VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because a Negathre Phase Sequence wlll cause GENERATOR blp. WRONQ: No automatic turbine trlp on high canductlvtty. VALID DISTRACTOR: PIeuslbJe because Operaton ere emted to perform reactor scram I turblne trip If conductlvlty can not be malntahed below 9.9. However, there Is no aubmatlc stator cwllng or turblne trlp on stetor water conductlvtty. Moreover, the question cells for what would cause E GENERATOR trip v. TURBtNE trlp. WRONG: Th16 Is a TURBINE, not QENERATOA Mp. VAUD DISf#ACTOR: Plauslble because low stator cadlng water pressure (< 44 psig) will mu8e a TURBINE Wp after a 70 semnd Ume dday (normal pressure Is 50 to 66 pig). However, a simple pump trip is not eqmted to causa thls condltlon beceuse the reserve pump should start If low dlscharge pressure (fkst signal at c 102 pslg, second slgnal at c 92 psi@ Is sensed at the dlscharge of the mnmg pump. The stem Indicates that the reserve pump would have Started. Moreover, me question calls for what wwkl cause e GENERATOR trlp v. TURBINE trip. CHOICE (A) - NO CHOICE (B) - NO CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (0) - YES Comments and QuarUon Modincotion Hlstory YjHB ODmWS) Ouestlon for SSES: how to descrd Pp 1 B status?

2. Oil 06108/D5 - no comments

3. Gill ow26105 - OK fl P

Q c

4. Todd 09(30/05 - OK.

5. Rich 10103106 - W w a r d logic at memory level. Can we Increase cognitive level?

on the high side of memory level. Fk revleed qvastlon and answer &&e to be forward Iookhg. Saved arl~inal questloo as number 51. SHU cmsldered NRC KIA SystemNA 8-Number AK2.04 RO 3.3 SRO 3.3 CFR Link (CFR: 41.7 / 45.8) Knowledge of the intenelations between MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP and the fdl&whg: Main generator protection NRC K/A Generic 29500 Maln Tutt~ine Generator Trlp 5

RO SRO CFR Llnk

1. 6 1 Z R O QSRO QuMtbnID 29581 OmlW NOW Memayhml Ten minutes after a reactor scram late in core life, the Shift Technical Advisor reports that steady state Reactor Pressure has risen from about 955 psig to almost 960 pslg.

Which of the following caused thls? A A Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) tripped. &WJL /---/- Steam Pressure Transmitter PTSG101A C Steam Pressure Transmitter PT10101A failed hig D Steam Pressure Transmitter PT101 OtB failed h JustMcaUon WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plauslble because a hlgh tallure wlfl cause a @ant depressurlzetlan because the HVG wlll pass the full OPEN slanal to tJw T8Vs. Thk faUure wlll cause W C to m a i ~ h a new steady state pressure 3 pslg GREATER THAN the prefallure steady state pressure. WRONG: VAUD DISTRACTOR: Plauslble tf the Applicant belleves that reactor coolant throughput i8 reduced; thereby causing a sllght prwure drop. Alternathrety, ihe Applioant may conclude that the tripped RFP r e d m atearn Row such that pressure we8 down. In fact, should a RFP Mp, the EHC system MI respond to melntaln steady state pressure per Progtm. CHOICE (D) - NO I CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (6) - YES CHOlCE (A) - NO WRONQ: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plau6Me because thle 16 redundant to PTIOlOlA and an Applicant may Incorrectly conclude that the slgnal will blas the output of the HVG somehow. However, thls failure will cause a plant dqressurlzatlon because the HVG will pass the full OPEN signal to the TBVs. References r - Jl Need reasonable pressure drop from SQ

2. THF 08/08105 - changes to stem and answer,

3. GfI 09/o&r05 - not realistic. Suggests acrarn oondltlon but Rw Press slays at lull power value - then ask what procedure to enter.

4. GI1 09/26/05 - Distractor A not plauslble wlth electric teed pumps.

meklng 11 mirror image of B-C-D. Todd 09130/05

• OK.

A: SSES has steam drlven feed pumps. thls is the result of comments to date. We need to remnaider A h llght of NRC K/A System/UA Syrm 29500 SCRAM Number AA2.04 RO 4.1 SRO 4.1 CFR Unk (CFR: 41.10 149.5 145.13) AblNty to determlne andlor Interpret the following es they apply to SCRAM : Reactor Pressure NRC KIA Generlc 0

Changed Dlstractor "D" ta fall DOWNSCALE and IRMs 6, D, F, H can NOT be wlthdmm. Request sent to SSES to determine I any meters fall hlgh. If 60, may return to UPSCALE. OW2BK16 Phone mversatlon wllh SSES: they agree It Is impleuslble lor an IRM to fail UPSCALE and indicated that thls cwld happen on plants wlth DC powered IRMs. They dM not conslder an UPSCALE faYure credible. Therefore, changes lndlcated above should alleulate this c m r n because now only one dlstractor mntalns the UPSCALE failure. Adjusted the ebllity to wfthdraw IRMs to make dlsfractor "C" more entlclng. Todd 09/30/05 - changed "fall' to Yslled" In all four choims. NRC KIA SystemlEIA $yetem Number K2.01 RO 2.6 SRO 2.7 CFR Llnk (CFR 41.7) Knowledge of eleotrioal power supplles to the IRM channelddeteclors NRC WA Generlc -tern Number Ro SUO CFR Llnk 21500 lnlennedlate Range Monitor (IRM) System 3

What is the DESIGN BASIS for dlsabling control room controls when control is transferred from the Control Room to the Remote Shutdown Panel per ON-1 00-009, PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM OUTSIDE THE CONTROL ROOM? A To prevent unauthorized component operation from the Control Room. 5 To prevent spurious component operation caused by hot shorts. C To simplify design and construction of the Remote Shutdown system. 7 f?U= D To minimize time to evacuate the Control Room once deciding to evacuate. Juotlflcatlon 1 CHOICE (8) - YES CHOICE (A) - NO WRONQ: VALID DISTRACTOR: PlauslMe because It does Wll the purpose proposed by thls dl6tracter. However, the design reason 1s to prevent spurlow hot short operation. WRONG: VAUO DISTRACTOR: PlauslMe because It may simplify des@ and corrstructlan of the RSO system. However, ltre design reason is to prevent hot short aperatlon. WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because it m y mhlmlre evecuatlan Ume. However, the design reason is to prevent hot short operatlon. CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (0) - NO cilflca~on ~ l a t a ~ 1 1. (H8 09/08/05) Bank - minor revlsbns

2. THF Osbr08/05 - editorial and deleled wlndow dresslng In stem.

3. PAP 9/9/05 - too easy, mslder asklng what the CR krdloah would be when the Instrument were swapped to RSD.

4. QII 09/26/05 - Revise first sentence ot stem: "Whet fa design bads for disabling control rm controls..."

R: dona. Todd 09/30/05 - OK. NRC K/A SystemNA System 2950t Conbd Room Abandonment Number AK3.03 RO 3.5 SRO 3.7 CFR Unk (CFR: 41.5 145.6) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to CONTROL ROOM ABANDONMENT : Dlsabllng control room oonrrds 6 NRC K/A Generic s m Number RO BRO CFR Link

L a - - + ] &1RO -10: 2S86 O m : bnk @M-bWI The plant Is at 100% p e r when a loss of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) occurs. With NO Operator action, which of ONE of the following will occur and why? A Inboard MStVs will close because Containment Instrument Gas is lost when RBCCW is lost. B Outboard MSlVs will close because Instrument Air is lost when RBCCW Is lost. C Inboard MSlVs wilt close due to Maln Steam Tunnel High Temperature when RBCCW is lost. D Outboard MSlVs will close due to Main Steam Tunnel High Differential Temperature when RBCCW is lost. JurMcaUon CTMT lnst Gas compressore coded by RBCCW. WRONa: IA oompreasors are W e d by TBCCW. VALID DISTRACTOR: WRONG: Tunnel coders cooled by SW (Secondary CTMT). Moreover, HI Tunn Temp doses ALL MSIVs. VALID DISTRACTOR WRONG: Tunnel coolers cooled by SW (Seomdary CTMT). Moreover, Hi Tum Diff Temp doses ALL MSIVs. VAUD DISTRACTOR: 1 CHOICE (A) - YES CHOICE (8) - NO CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (0) - NO il Comnynti and Ouestlon Modlfimmn Hlstory

1. (HBOWOW) Bankquestion.

2. THF 09/08/05 - edbrlal changes changed chdcs to just INBDlOUTBD

3. QU oe/o9/05 - added stsm condltlons to improve aperatlonal orlentation.

4. G109/26/05 - could not valldate WHh enclosed referenuss.

exam development

5. RIch 1 OM305 - Beokward 1-at memory level. Can we Increase m g n M level?

R: RIsk of enor Is bow because thts is a BANK questhn. Also noted that RBCCW caols the steam tunnel HVAC during R: revfaad wordlnp to forward loddng. Stlll lower level ~8468 BANK end It Is memory. NRC WA SystemlUA System 29601 Partial or Complete Loss of Component Cooling Wlr Number AK1.01 RO 3.5 SRO 3.8 CFR Llnk (CFR: 41.8 to 41.10) Knowledge of the operetianel implhtiow d the fdlouhg concepts as they appJy to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOUNG WATER : Effects on wrnponent/systwn operatkns 8 NRC KIA Qeneric syrm Number RO SRO CFR Llnk

/);, g9. 1 BRO OBRO Qr#rtbnID 28355 Od~br: New BM.rn0y-I $d LQLbVlL.ut* 1- $ p' 2\\jzdQ f I fh SSES Units 1 and 2 are operating at full power. For both units: - "A" Containment Instrument Gas compressors (1 K205A and 2K205A) are in LEAD - '6" Containment lnstrument Gas compressors (1 K205B and 2K205B) are In STANDBY - "A" Instrument Alr compressors (1K107A and 2K107A) are in LEAD - "8" Instrument Air compressors (1 K107B and 2K107B) are in STANDBY - "A" Service Air compressors (1 K108A and 2LKlWA) are In LEAD (9 suffers a loss of Bus 2A201. Which of the following correctly describes the plant response: #& - "8" Service Alr compressors (1 K108B and 2K1 OBB) are In STANOBY dz. A B C D PCV-22560 will open, allowing the Service Air compressor 2K108B Instrument Air compressor 2K1078 wtl\\ Containment Instrument Gas compressor Instrument Air system loads. psig and 127 psig. 87 p i g and 102 psig. cycle between 152 psig and JusUHcatlon CHOICE (D) -YES CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible becawe a unll2 bus was lost and the STBY IA compressor does cyole between 87 and 102 Incorrect because the power supply to lead IA compressor 2K107A (2A204) remains energized. WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Ptawlble beoause a unlt 2 bus wa6 lost and the STBY SA compressor does cycle between 118 and 127. Incorrect because the power supply to lead SA compressor 2K108A (16130) remalns energlred. WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plauslble because PCV-12580 WHI open as described on a loss of IA. However, no loss of IA occurred as daacrlbed In Distractor 1, CHOtCE (B) - NO CHOICE (A) - NO Ref-Commtytr 8nd_0uwtlon Modlfloatlo_n HlStQ2

1. (HB Oe/oWoS) New. Cheok cycle pressures with SSES.

2. THF 09/08/05 - formetling

3. GII 0 8 M - no comment

_t

4. Gil09/28/05 - could not vatklate wlth endosed ref8rences.

questlon.

5. Todd 09/30/05 - OK.

R: wlW revem I! tlrne permits. Did reverlfy ance during development of subsequent questlon and am confident m

6. Rlch 10/03/05 - are w sure li Is Memory Level?

recognized. the questton Is straightforward memory. R yes - really only need to know the power supplies for each of the mpressors. Once lass of power lo 2K205A is NRC WA SystemNA Syatwn 29501 Parttat or Gomplete Loss of lnstrwneni Air Number AA1.03 RO 3.0 SRO 3.0 CFR Unlr (CFR: 41.7 145.8) B

Ablllty to operate and/or monitor the followlng as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR : Instrument alr compressor power supplies NRC KIA Generlc Systnrn Number Ro SRO CFR Lln k

1. 10 1 QRO BSRO QumtbnID:

29649 Odgln: New &IMemarybwI Reactor Vessel Water Level must be above a MINIMUM water level before starting Residual Heat Removal (RHR) in Shutdown Cooling (SDC) mode. The minimum water level Is -(1)- and the reason(s) for this minimum level are -(2)-. A (1) 45 inches. (2) to ensure natural circulation flow for core cooling and to prevent thermal stratification if Shutdown Cooling Is lost. (2) to ensure natural circulation flow for core cooling and to provide adequate NPSH to the B (1) 90 Inches. (2) to prevent thennal slratlflcatlon and to provide adequate NPSH to the Fuel Pool Cooling O p u m p s. D (1) 90 inches. Juatlflcatlon ._j._ll' CHOICE (A) - YES CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: NPSH Io FPC pumps k NOT Ihe reason. VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible because 90 lnchea Is the admhistratlve limR per OP-149.002 and because NC flow k partlally correct. Static head is u m m n Issue wrt NPSH. WRONG: NPSH to FPC pump le NOT the reason. VALID DISTAACTOR: Pleuslble because 46 inches Is coneat end themal stratiflcatlon I6 part of the reason. Static head is a common issue wfl NPSH. WRONG: NPSH lo pumps Is NOT the reason. VALID DISTRACTOR: Plaudble because 80 lnohes Is the athtnklrative limlt per OP-148-002. Static head is a m m o n Issue wrt NPSH. CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (D) - NO Cbrn.?sn,ts and Question Modlficatlon History

1. (HE WOW5l New.

2. GI1 09K)9/05 - no changes.

3. PAP 9/9/05 Oamrnent - Applicant could argue that "CY Is a secand correct answer. Chanped RFA to Fuel Pool Cleanup pumps.

!!I ASK SSES IF "C' IS POTENTIALLY CORRECT 11!1

4. Gfl09/26/05 - WA mlsmatoh.

R: possibly bul on a loss of SDC, urdlkely Io see any reclrc flow changes. Todd - unable to agree. SSES Input seems tD support my vlew but I asked for further clarlfikath. 09/28/05 Phone Conversatlon w(th SSES - they agree that the original questh as wrlttan did not eppear to match the WA. However, they recommended changes to the entire qusstlwl to better align It to the KIA. These changes were Incorporated Into the question. Todd 09/30/05 - OK. NRC K/A System/OA System Number W. 0 7 RO 2.9 SRO 3.1 CFR Llnk (CFR:41.10143.5/45.13) 29502 Loes d Shutdown Cooltng 1

Ability to determine andlor interpret the Wb as they apply to LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING : Reactor reclroulatbn fbw NRC KIA Generic ewm N u m b Ro SRO CFR Llnk

@I30 DSRO QusabnID 29686 Orlgh: Bank @luemaryLaVsl Which one of the following is the Safety Related Basis for maintaining Fuel Pool level 22 feet above the top of fuel? A To provide a floodable volume for RH B To limit Iodine release during a fuel handling accident to 25% or less of 10 CFR 100 limits. PC following a postulated seismic event. sl C To minimize localked boiling wfthln indivldual fuel assemblies following a loss of fuel pool D To properly seat the Fuel Pool Gate Inflatable Seals with a static head of water in the fuel pool. cooling. Jurtlflcatton CHOICE (6, -YES CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: SQ has committed to to provldlng RHRFPC to rnakrtaln temperatures below 125 degrees farenhelt Idlowing a selsmlc event. However, thls is no) the safety related basls. WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Thls is the basla for malntaining fuel poor temperature bslow 125 degrees farehhelt However, It Is not the sefety related basls for malntalnlng 22 feet of water above the fual. WRONG: Thls Is not the stated reason. VALID DISTRACTOR: Hlgher head of water could be expeded to better seat the gates.. Rdarences CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (D) - NO Need to verlfy BASIS agalnst SQ TS

2. THF 09108105

3. QII 09/08/05: added opemtkmal orlentatJonel and ralsed LOD by addlng condjtloT(s to the Stern

4. GI1 09/26/05: Olstractof fy not plausible If FPC pumps are noksefety related.

R: Replaced To ensure net posltlve suction head to lhe Fuel Pool Coollng Cleanup Pwnps during rwUne operation. wlth new dimtractor. Todd 09/30105 - deleted Refuellng operatlons are about to start. There are no known fuel failures In the Core. The Shift Manager dlrects y w to ensure lhe level h the Fuef Pod and Reactor cavity are greater than 22 feet. IrOm the stem. NRC KIA SystemlElA SyPrem 29502 RdueIlngAccldents 3 Number AK1.01 Ro 3.6 SRO 4.1 CFR Unk (CFR:41.6to41.10) Knowledge of the operatianal lmplloatlons of the Mowing concepts as they apply to REFUELING ACCIDENTS : Radlatlon exposure hazards NRC K/A Generic syrmm Number Ro SRO CFR Lln k

~ 1 2 I &IRO MSRO Q&ID 263570rlgln: k w a m - 1 SSES Unit 2 Operators are responding to a High Drywell Pressure condition by venting the drywell per OP-273-003, Primary Containment Nltrogen Makeup and Venting. There Is no failed fuel and the Containment atmosphere is below minimum detectable activity (MDA). How does the method of Drywell venting per Section 2.3 of OP-273-003, Venting Drywell, prevent an UNMONITORED and UNCONTROLLED release to assure radiation exposures remain as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)?

• G D W o the Standby Gas Treatment Exhaust Vent via the Standby Gas Treatmmtzq@tm.

_15\\ n B %rywell is v e n g back through the Air Purge lines because the potential release is below C The Drywell is ve o the Nitrogen Makeup system via the Containment Instrument Gas w the Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust Stack via the Ambient Offgas Charcoal system. Jwtlflcatlon CHOICE (A) - YES CHOICE (B) - NO WRONG: This is not the vent path VAUD DISTRACTOR: From the Tralnlng diagram, this appears to be a passlble flow path WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plaudble to belleve that the Nltmgm gas COUM be oornpreesed and reused. However, Its not done thls way. WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible method of ventlng the Drywell. However, its not &ne thls way. Retorencos Comments ond QusrUon Modification Hl~tory

1. (HB 09/08/05} New by Qn. Check TRM 3.6.1.

2. M F 0910BK)5 - no comment

3. QII Os/os/w - no comment

4. Gill 08/28/05 - IS ths flowpath In distractof 8 poselble?

R: No. none of the dlstractor flowpatha am possible. Replaced The Drywell Is vented to the Offgas RecomMner vla the Maln Condenser. with new dlstrector. CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (D) - NO L NRC IUA SystedElA System 29502 Number NRC WA Genwlc System 2.3 Radiation Control Number 2.3.2 RO 2.5 SRO 2.9 CFR Llnk (CFR: 41 -12 143.4. 45.9 l45.10) Knodedge of faculty ALAFIA program. 4 RO SRO CFR Llnk

RO EXAM SSES Unit 2 Operators are responding to a High Drywell Pressure condition by venting the drywell per OP-273-003, Primary Containment Nitrogen Makeup and Venting. There is no failed fuel and the Containment radiation exposures asonably achievable ( A U R A. 2.3 of OP-273-003, Venting D atmosphere is below activity (MDA). How does the method of Drywell venting per Section an UNMONITORED and UNCONTROLLED release to assure o the Standby Gas Treatment Exhaust Vent via the Standby Gas Treatment system through the Y A Zme 3 FIIIPTCC! c.&J~+ 746. Pc31'w &*\\ 0 via the Ambient Offgas Charcoal

@RO QSRO QuwtbnID: 289511 Now Momofy ~ W B I - Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure is steady at 1,050 pig - One Main Turbine Bypass Valve is approximately 50% open - The Pressure Regulator setpoints are set per GO-100-002 (GO-200402). PLANT STARTUP, HEATUP AND POWER OPERATION - Leading Edge Flow Meters (LEFM) are NOT in service. Based on these condltlons, what procedure MUST the Control Room Operators enter7 A ON-1 00-004, Reactor Power Greater than License Limit. B ON-158-001, LOSS of RPS. C 0&40l, Maln Condenser Vacuum and Off Gas System Off Normal Operation. D ON@7-002, Loss of Feedwater Heater String. Jurtlrlcation I ) CHOICE (A) - YES p:vf!ct & 3 / + CHOICE (e) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plausible tf the Applicant believes that an automatic reactor scram ehould have occurred for these condltlons. CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Phuslble If the Applicant bellevas that Maln Condenser backpressure is causing the high RPV pressure. WRONG: VALID DISTRACTOR: Plauslble If the Applicant believes that reduced FW heating (more RN subcodlng) Is causing B high reaclor power condltlon. CHOJCE (D) - NO I Roterepom Comments and Oumtlon Modlfkation Hlrtory

1. 09/08/05 % Check numbere wRh SQ staff.

A 2.09/08105 THF added "Based on these coodltlons... '

3. G i l O W 0 5 - add Pressure Regulator setpolnt lo the stem

4. Oil 09126105 - could not validate with enclosed r e b r a s,

R: we need to run thls past SSES and, If posslble, on the simulator fo determine crediblllty of the question. Can we add flrsi stage turbine pressure to the llst of condltbns? 100% first stage gressure. NRC WA SystwnlWA System 29602 Hllgh Reactor Pressure Number EA2.02 RO 4 2 SRO 4.2 CFR Llnk (CFR 41.10,43.5,45.13) Ablllty to determine and/or interpret the Reactor power as It appfles to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE NRC KIA Generic syatm Number 5 RO SRO CFR Llnk

OR0 @SRO QwtbnID: 29504 O m : Nsw OH#noryLevsl Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loop ' B is running in the Suppression Pool Coaling mode of operation per EO-100-109, PC CONTROL. The Reador and motor amps on both RHR Pumps "6" and - Which ONE of the following caused Ais? A Minimum flow valve HV-151F00078 failed open, 8 Safety Relief Valve (SRV) "Sa stuck open. C RHR Pump "8" discharge flow orifice FO-151006 is blocked. I rr Clogged RHR Loop "B" suction strainer.. Surveillance Requirement SR 3.6.1.7 Need to verlfy the procedure - done OgK17M5 by emall DISTRACTOR (A): Plauslble because a faNed open rnh flow vahm WI affect the pump by imreaalng Itowrate and NPSH requirements. The pumps are rated at 3175 gpm @ at 290 pslg. The mh flow line is desrspled to pass the full rated now of two punps (6360 gpm). Therefore, openlng the m h flow line dwlng a test could cause pump RUNOUT. However. the stern condltbne dascrlbe CAVITATION, DISTRACTOR (C): Plausible because blocking the dlscharge path will affect the pump by Increasing dlscharge pressure and reducing flowrate. However, thls effeci k inconsistent with lndlcations ot cavttetfon. DISTRACTOR (D): Plaudble because thla was a recent industry event However, each pump has Its own suction strainer. Therefwe, huo clogged strehers era required to make thls true. Retercnces Cynents and Ountlon Modllloatlon History Oil 09/09/05 - need to amend dlstractors and determine best SRV to flnish revision. ocM)9/05: amended dtstractors. OW1 2K)5: emended dlstractor 0 09/15/05: amended answer to "6' SRV because OP-183-001, Attachment A, shows lhls to be the chest to the RHR Pp suction. Gi109/26/05 - Revise lest sentance of stem "Nhkh one of the following is the most llkely cause of thls?' R. Per chief Exmlner's direction, a W h g USB of phrases like "most Ilkely", 'most probable", "could haw". Revlsed stem ta read 'Whkh ONE of the foflowlng caused this?' Todd 09/30106 - added "algnflcant" to stem and amended grammar accordingly. J NRC KIA SYstem(E/A Sy#tbm Number EK1.01 RO 3.0 SRO 3.4 CFRLfnk (CFR41.8to41.10) Knowledge of the Operatbnal impllcetlons of the Pump NPSH as It applles to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERANRE 29502 Suppmasbn Pool HI@ Water Temperature 6 NRC KIA Generlc Systsm Number Ro SRO CFR Llnk

SSES Unit 2 has a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and the following plant condfibs exist: RPV Pressure...........................25 psis . RP Level............................. +40 inches and rising slowly - om 'Temperature....................... 102 degrees FarenheA u>j:& -&Level m e s 2 3. 54 54P foi I/. Drywell Pressure........................ 21 Pig Drywell Temperature..................... 296 degrees Farenheit . Division 1 RHR........................... lnjectlng into the RPV Division II RHR........................... Operating in Suppression Pool CoolinglSpray mode . Both Divsione of Core Spray................ Injecting into the RPV - Instrument Run Temperature (UR 25701 A&B).. 276 degrees Farenheit Given the above conditions, whlch of the following actions is required by the operating crew per EO-200-103, PC CONTROL? A Go To EO-;k)O-l12, Rapid Depressurization, C Go To EO-$bO-l14, RPV Flooding. D Shutdown All Drywell Coolers and -273-001, Containment Atmosphere Cot$rok ' System. Jurtlfloatfon Bank - Fermi 2 2 exam of March 2003 (Question ID = 23721) Applicants m y want the EOPs to refer to FlQure 1 of EO-100-103, PC Control. However, they should be able to determlne that RW level inslrurnents are unrellable due to reference leg flashing by using ordinary stearn tables. The ghm RPV Pressure of 25 pslg or 40 psla yields a serumtion Temperature of 267.26 de0 F. l'he given Instrument Rwr Temperature Is almost 9 deg F above saturation. DISTRACTOR (A): Plausible because the DrywsJl Temperature Control procedure requires Rapid DepressLlrizatlw, ff DW temps can not be restoredlmalntalned below 340 deg F at slep DWfl-8. However, In thls questlon, the operator should have gone to RPV flooding earlier at step MN/T-3. DISTRACTOR (e): Plausible because Dlyweil Sprey is required when Drywell Temps exceed 340 deg F. DISTRACTOR (D): Shutdown All Ofywell Coolers and Fans per OP-273-001, Containment AWnosphere Control System. FkteTUflCWl Commentv and Queslbn Wlodtttcatton yatary (311 09/09K)5 - edltarlalohsngito stem - GU 08/28/05 - OK NRC KIA SystemNA Sysbm 29502 High Drywall Temperature Number EK3.02 RO 3.5 SRO 3.8 CFR Unk (CFR 41.5,45.6) Know)edge Of the reaMulS for the RPV floodkrg a8 it appliea to HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE 8 NRC KIA Generlc syrtam Number RO SRO CFR llnk

1. 16 I QRO

@SRO QubrtbnID: 29577 O m : h W @I Msmorybl Which of the following describes the method that provides the highest flowrate of makeup to the Suppression Pool per OP-l59-0Ol, Suppression fool Cleanup System? A Pump the Condensate Storage Tank with the Core Spray Line Fill Pump to the CORE SPRAY CONDENSATE TRANSFER ISOLATION TO LOOP "3" MINIMUM FLOW LINE 152028. B Gravity drain the Condensate Storage Tank through the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling C Pump the Condensate Storage Tank with the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Pump (RCIC) Pump Casing to the RCIC MIN FLOW TEST LINE 149F019. to the HPCl MIN FLOW LINE 155F012. D Gravity drain the Condensate Storage Tank through CORE SPRAY CST SUPPLY ISOLATION 152021 and CORE SPRAY PUMP B&D CST SUCTION SUPPLY 152FOO28 to the Core Spray suction strainers. Jurtlflcatlon WRONG: lower Rowrale than the correct response. VALID DISTRACTOR: normal method ol makeup. WAONQ: Not procedurally autharlzed. VALID DISTRACTOR: WUM work. WRONQ: Nd procedurally a W i VAUD DISTRACTOR: Would work CHOICE (A) - NO CHOICE (6) - NO CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (0) -YES Comments and Question Modlflcatlon Inspired by Peach Bottom 2 September 2002 exam (Question ID 24782) Gil OQ/os/os - edltorlal change to stem CONSIDER CHANGING ALL DISTRACTORS TO: Qlavlty drain CST through RHR, HPCI, RCIC suction strainers, ??7717?7? GilOW26K.E - Correct answff Is longest Should balance wllh other dktractors. R: added full noun name descriptlons to 73" and 'C" for HPCl and RCIC. However, unable to perfect length of ~el~~tlOn6 wlthout degrading operational valkllty of tha dlstractonr or oreatlng new psychomeMc clues. Todd 09/30)05 - deleted "SSES Unit 1 is cperatlng at lull power. A failure of PSVlS-FO32B. the "B" Core Spray loop pump suckion relief valve has lowered Suppressbn Pad wtw bvel. PSVi52-FO328 he5 been gagged shut. However, Suppressbn Pool Water level has been below 22 feet tor one hour. Per Emergency Operating Procedure EO-100-103, step SPIL-1, the Unit Supervisor has dlrected you to nlse Suppreselon Po01 water level to 23 feet." from stern. NRC KIA System/E/A System Number EA1.06 RO 3.4 8RO 3.4 CFR Unk (CFR 41.7, 45.6) AbUrty to operate andlor rnonltor the Condensate storage and transfer (make up to the suppreselon pool) (Plant-SpeclRc) a8 It applies to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL 29503 Low Suppresslm Pool Water Level 0 NRC WA Genetic Sysbm Number RO SRO CFR Unk

SSES Unit 1 lost all Feedwater flow. 40 inches at level quickly bwered to approximately - A Feedwater Line Break - Outside Containment Backup Scram Valve (SV 1471 10 A & 6) actuation B Feedwater Controller Failure - Maximum Demand C Feedwater Line Break - Outside Containment D Feedwater Controller Failure - Maximum Demand Backup Scram Valve (SV 1471 10 A & e) actuation ,$I& f ATWS-RPT actuation AD f ATWS-RPT actuation New Note: The ATWS-ARI and ATWS-RPT use the same clrcultry per W P - 0 5 8, page 46. RPS should have scrammed the plant at 13 (+13 Inches). In Ihk case. the rpds inserted and RPT occurred just below L2 (-38 Inches). DISTRACTOR (A): Plausible because FW Line Break ts mect and the Backup Scram Valve8 are a redundant means of insertlng control rods. However, per OP-TM-058, page 35, We Beckup Scram Valves wlll not actuate unless both both RPS A and 6 Trip Systems lrlp (de-energize) to energhe the Backup Scram Vahre Sdanold on each valve. In this case, the RPS 6ysim falled to operate at L3. DISTRACTOR (e): Plausible because the FW failure to m a demand would eventually cause a loss d both FW-Ps on high APV level. However, the queslion stem does not support this conclusion because there I8 no statemem lndlaatlng a rise in RW level and the RPV level decrease to below L2 requlres the main turblne to be in aperatlon. DISTRACTOR (D): PlewLble because Backup Scram valves are a redundant means of insertrng control rods. However, per OP-TMOSE, pegs 36, the Backup Scram Valves wlll not actuate unless both both RPS A and E Trip Systems trlp (de-energize) to energlze the Backup Scram Valve Sdenokl on each valve. In lhk oase, Ihe RPS system falled to operate at L3. RsfOlW-Commen_t.and Qucrtlon Modlllcatlon Hl6tory GllO9/09/05 - No comment Todd 09/30/05 - c h a w Insert and tdp ta h80fled and trlpped. I- "" an ow2w05 - OK NRC WA SystemlUA Systom Number EK2.13 RO 4.1 8RO 4 2 CFR Unk (CFR dl.7,46.8) 28503 Reactor Low Water Level 1 Knowledge of the 1nterrelat)ons be-REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL end ARI/RPT/ATWS (Plant-Speclflc) NRC KIA Generlc Symtsrn Number RO SRO CFR Link

SSES Unit 1 has an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS). The control room operating crew initiate Standby liquid Control (SBLC) per LQ/Q-3. You observe the following: - ##6A SBLC Pump RED indicating light ILLUMINATES, -4P2086 SBLC Pump RED indicating light does NOT Illuminate, - ONE SBLC SQUIB READY A-8 White indicating light extinguishes, - ONE SBLC SQUIB READY A-6 White indlcatlng light remains energized, - SBLC SQUIB VALVES LOSS OF CKT CONTINUITY (A03) Energizes. What action$f any, i necessary to establish REQUIRED flow (66 gprn)? A OPEN the second SBLC SQUIB Valve to establish sufflcient flow path for full flow. B START the second SBLC P u m m o establish full pumping capacity. 4/12 e P trdlr C INJECT Boron with RClC IAW ES-150-002 to establish full flow. D No action is necessary because a single pump and valve will provide rated flow. Jumflcabn New - lnsplred by Browns Ferry 2 exam of September 2001 (Ouestlon ID 21 039) SSES requires both SBLC pumps to start to ensure reaob safety fdlowlng an ATWS. The expected flowrate Is approxlmatdy 8s gprn. In thls case. the Aowtate Is onehalf ot expected (43 gpm) because one SBLC pump failed to stark The alarm wlll energlza when 4742 less 4587 (156) gallons have been Injected. This will occur In 155 dlvlded by 43 or 3.8 mlnutes. The fallUte of one SQUIB Valve to Hre has no effect on the 8oluUon because the pumps dlschaJQa to a mrnmon header. The common header then flaws through two parallel SQUIB valves. A - Only one valve opened. Phuslble ti the Appllcant believes that faaued SQUIB valve block8 SBLC flow to the RPV and that openhg the valve will restore full How. C - LWQ-4 requlres thls fl Boron can NOT be Injected Wrlh SMC. Here, SBLC is Injecllng, elbelt at half the required rate. 0 - SSES requlres both SBLC pumps to start to ensure reeotor safety lollowing an ATWS P cpm.meats and Qurrtkn ModMcatlon Hlatary GilOWOQN5 - edltorlal change to stem GY 08/26/05 - Distrador "A" not plausble with one pump runnlng End one squlbb fired; should have soma flow Todd 09/30/05 - why give setpoint? Rich lOh3lO5 - WA rnlematch. CE vtew? origlnat quesUon as 181, Ask SSES to eveluate distractor "C" ea a potentially second correct answer. R: revised "Never" to "16 rnlnutes". Appllcant may rnlsapply pump laws. R: Wo setpoint, It may become L O M because not expected to know thls. R: agreed. Changed stem and dlstractm to require Applicant to demonstrate ability to manipulate controls. Saved NRC KIA SyotemlVA SYSWIII 29503 7 N u m b RO SRO CFA Llnk NRC WA Generic 2.2 Equipment Control

Ablllty to manlpulata the cansale controls ea required to operate the faclllty between shutdown and desigwtacl power levels.

QRO WSRO 0'"HHMID: 29680 OrlgK Ekw OMemofyLmvel 'w, a significant release of Chlorine gas occurs. How will &h IC y L Following an accident the Control Structure HVAC system protect control room operators from toxic gas? A The system will automatically shift to the RECIRULATION MODE. Correct configuration and operation is then verified per ON-1 59-001 (ON-259-002), Containment Isolation. The system can be manually started in the RECIRCULATION MODE per Of-030-002, Control Structure HVAC, by placing Control Stucture Manual Isolation switches HS-07802A1 and HS-0780281 to "ISO" and then starting CREOASS Fan OV1 OlA or OV101 B. 030-002, Control Structure HVAC, by placing Emergency Outside Alr Intake Radiation Monitor mode switches RISHH-DI2-OK618A and RISHH-012-0K6188 to TRIP TEST". C The system can be manually started In the PRESSURlZATION/FILTRATlON MODE per OP-D The system will automatlcaily shift to the PRESSURIZATION/FILTRATlON MODE. Correct configuration and operation is then verified per ON-1 58001 (ON-259-002), Containment Isolation. JustifbatJon I Per TM-OP-O79E, the system orlglnally burn to aubmatlcally do this on high Chlorine. DISTRACTOR (A): PlauslMe because ON-lE 59.002 does verlfy ConflgutaUon and operatfon in response lo a CTMT 1%. Autornatlc inhiatlo d RECIRCULATION was part of the or(gW design beeis. DISTRACTOR (C). Plausible because thls is one of three dkiistinct operating modes for the system Howaver, per the TUl-OP-O79E, the come13 response Is RECIRC mode. DISTRACTOR (D): PlauslMe because lhis is one of three distinct operating modes for the system. However, the system wllf not autornatlcally allgn itself to thls mode and ON-14 58002 does not address thls mode. I Comments2nd Ousstlon k&dlflcrtfon Hlstoly GI1 09/26/05 - WA mlsmatch. Suggests throwlng the KIA cut. A: dlsagree. While the questlon does not dkectly ask what happens on a RADIOACTIVE release, the successful Apprlcant musl understand operatlon of the control Structure venilatim system to a n s w thls questkn. The eppllcant must know the difference between the twa suggested operating modes (Reclrc and Press/Fllt) and what SRuatlons cause automatlc rBconfislllltlons. Therefore, the question does discriminate betwm Appllcants who understand the Conlrol Structure HVAC frorn those who do not. Qll: suggesla new stern: "Following a significant release of Chlorine from the Chlorine bulldlng". Accepted. ( j i u s - No-&ment I NRC KIA System/EIA Byatem Nmbsr EA1.07 RO 3.6 SRO 3.8 CFR Llnk (CFR 41.7, 46.6) Ablilty to operate and/or monitor Me Conhpl room ventllatlon (Plant-Speaflc) as It appllea to HIGH OFF SITE RELEASE RATE 29503 High Off ate Release Rate 8 NRC K/A Generic syr-Number RO SRO CFR Llnk

3 ~ f i ~ 9 3 k i S r v z k / s i

• w Q 1

. How will the Control Structure HVAC system protect control room operators frorn4eAegtH RO EXAM A B C D The system will automatically shift to the RECIRUIATION MODE. Correct configuration and operation is then verified per ON-159-001 (ON-259-002), Containment Isolation. The system can be manually started in the RECIRCULATION MODE per OP-030-002, Control Structure HVAC, by placing Control Stucture Manual Isolation switches HS-07802A1 and HS-07802B1 to "ISO" and J then starting CREOASS Fan OV101A or OVlO1 B. The system can be manually started in the PRESSURlZATlONFlLTRATlON MODE per OP-030-002, Control Structure HVAC, by placing Emergency Outside Air Intake Radiation Monitor mode switches RlSHH 012-OK61 8A and RISHH-Dl2-OK6186 to 'TRIP TEST". The system will automatically shift to the PRESSURIZATION/FILTRATlON MODE. Correct configuration and operation is then verified per ON-I 59-001 (ON-259-002), Containment Isolation. A k

1. 201 8 R O @SRO QumhID:

29681 wh: Naw 6ab#yb~l The BACKUP DIESEL FIRE PUMP starts In response to a fire in the ACCESS PROCESSING FACILITY. Which one of the following locations wilt receive an alarm indicating actuation of the BACKUP FIRE SUPPRESSION system? A PP&L Energy Dispatch B SSES Central Alarm Station C PP&L Corporate Security D SSES Control Room New O f f CORRECT TITLE FOR DISTRACTOR - for all ol them. Per TM-OP-OlsST, page 20, the Beakup Fke Suppreeslon system dDes not energlze an alarm In the control foam. Plauslbte because the actual aiarm goes to Security Flausible because the actual alarm goes to Gecurlty Plaueible because generally all alarms alert the mtrd mom staff d off-normal ccmdlbns elther dlrectly or through a wtelllte alarm. Per TM-OP-013ST. page 20, thls la not true for the Baokup Flre Suppression system. Rdcmnoem _ _. Corn-y ~ p auwtlon Modlllcatlon HI GI1 09lOWX - No comment Qi109/26/05 - Does 'C* ham the correct title. R: Yea but will conRrm with S E S.

1. 21 1 QRO MSRO QurrdknID 29589 Odgln: New nmemotyIrsw SSES Unit 1 is at full power when a Feedwater Level Control System maifunction causes RPV Water Level to stabilize at approximately 47.5 Inches. Per ON-145-001, RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, the Operating Crew is able to restore Feedwater Level Control to Automatic, 3-element control on LEVEL A. The Operating Crew then completes ON-145004, RPV WATER LEVEL ANOMALY and has NOT determined the cause of the malfunction.

(1) What malfunction caused RPV Water Level to stabilize at approximately 47.5 inches? (2) What procedure musi the Operating Crew enter next? A (1) A single feed flow instrument failed downscale while in THREE ELEMENT (2) GO-000-001, REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL CONTROL DURING MAINTENANCE B (1) A single feed flow Instrument failed upscale whlle In THREE ELEMENT C (1) A single level instrument Input failed upscale while in AVERAGE. (2) 01-AD-509, TROUBLESHOOTING (2) GO-000401, REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL CONTROL DURING MAINTENANCE D (1) A single level instrument input failed downscale while in AVERAGE. (2) 01-AD-509, TROUBLESHOOTING Justlllcatlon I CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: Thls procedure only applles when the made swltch Is In SHUTDOWN or REFUEL. VALID DISTRACTOR: The failure muse8 stable level ai -48 Ilwhes. CHOICE (6) - NO M,++bLh K/d -pjJS 1 D C l @ S fid- +;c '-i ; p j 13 {'dq VALID DISTRACTOR: This Is the correct procedure. k c 4 pC?Ab1 S l rl WRONG: Need to determine what thls causes. dTdiJ b-@ 7 L 5 &<- ca.WJ'&f CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: This procedure Only epplleil when the mode swltch Is In SHUTDOWN or REFUEL. P(/o C,cCta&!J VALID DISTRACtOR: This is the correct mode but the faflure wlll give srable level of -22.5 Inches. Stable level of -47.5 utches Correct Procedure. CHOICE (D) - YES Ask SSES what Distractor B Wnl came. Tough one - 6 hours to develap.

1. PAP 8/9/05 comments to balam chaices.

2. QIlO9/26/05 - does not see connectton of 01-AD-508 in references.

R: added 01-AD508 to list of references. Appllcants expeated Lo answer this questIan wlthwt use of references. Sugeesh H Puestlon rejected put Applicant In TIS acthrtly and ask how IS problem prevented. NRC KIA S~stemlVA S-29500 Number A 0 SRO CFR Llnk NRC KIA Generic Syatsm 2.2 Equipment Control Number 2.2.20 RO 2.2 8RO 3.3 CFR Link (CFR: 433145.13) Knonledw of the process for rnsnaglng truuMeshmtkrg actkrltles. B

1. 21 I

@I210 IQSRO QudonID: 29659 Orbln: New O ~ m o y h I SSES Unit 1 is at full power when a Feedwater Level Control System malfunction causes RPV Water Level to stabilize at approximately 47.5 inches. Per ON-145-001, RPV LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, the Operating Crew is able to restore Feedwater Level Control to Automatic, 3-element control on LEVEL A. The Operating Crew then completes ON-145004, RPV WATER LEVEL ANOMALY and has NOT determined the cause of the malfunction. (1) What malfunction caused RPV Water Levei to stabllize at approximately 47.5 inches? (2) What procedure must the Operating Crew enter next? A (1) A single feed flow instrument failed downscale while in THREE ELEMENT (2) 60-000-001, REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL CONTROL DURING MAINTENANCE B (1) A single feed flow instrument failed upscale while in THREE ELEMENT C (1) A single level Instrument input falled upscale while in AVERAGE. (2) 01-AD-509, TROUBLESHOOTING (2) 60-000-001.) REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL CONTROL DURING MAINTENANCE D (1) A single level instrument input failed dournscale while in AVERAGE. (2) 01-AD-509, TROUBLESHOOTING Justlflcatlon WRONG: This procedure only applies when the mode swltoh Is h SHUTDOWN or REFUEL. VALID DISTRACTOR: The failure causes atabte level at -48 Inches. WRONG: Need to determine whet this causes. VALID DISTRACTOR: Thfs le the correct procedure WRONG: This procedure on!y applles when the mode switch Is In SHUTDOWN of REFUEL VAUD DISTRACTOR: This is the cwrect mode but the failure wlll Qlve stable level of -22.5 inches. Stable level of -47.5 inches Correct Prwedute. _1 -. CHOICE (A) - NO CHOICE (e) - NO CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (0) - YES Ask SSES what Distractor B WYI cause. Tough one - 6 hours to de~&p.

1. PAP e/8/05 oomments to balance cholces

2. G I 09/28/05 - does not see cannech of 01-AD-609 in references.

R: added 01-AD-509 to list of references. Applicants expected to answer this questlon wlthout use of references. Suggestion if Questlon rejected: put Appllcant In T/S acUvlly and aak how Is problem prevented. NRC WA SystemlVA Swm 29500 Number RO SRO CFR tlnk 8 NRC WA Generlc sy6t6m 2.2 EqulpmmtContrd Number 2.2.20 RO 2.2 SRO 3.3 CFR Unk (CFR: 43.6 I 45.13) Knowledge of the process for rnanaglng troubleshaorhg actlvltlee.

a 5 R 0 @SRO QuertknID: 28592 O m : New 0 Memory hml 0 c qlr ; (4 iC, r~ & k.l;) J. 2 Which of the following conditions will prevent CAVITATION? A B C D LI.'A)-rys C&'& Reactor Lower Water at +11 inches and mactar Feawater pump "A" flow of 26% and Reactor Feedwater Pump 5" flow of 27%. Reactor Lower Water at +32 inches and Reactor Feedwater Pump "6" flow of 18%. Reactor Lower Water at +28 inches and Reactor Feedwater Pump "6" flow of 18%. Reactor Lower Water at +12 inches and Reactor Feedwater Pump "A" flow of 16% and Reactor Feedwater Pump W flow of 17%. d d, " ; &cfl*/ c't CI e & @ I r3& pf!M &r f+&* @ D:& f \\ d w && u.urk? u5 (j-"+i, &&L p i q 6 5 7 4 Reactor Feedwater Pump 'A' flow of 1 Bo% and Reactor Feedwater Pump A" flow of 20% and CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: greater than 20% FW VALID DISTRACTOR: belaw L3 Is coneot CHOICE (E) -NO WRONG: above0 VAL10 DISTRACTOR: Total Fw 20% is O O R ~ WRONG: Below L4 but above L3 VALID DISTRACTOR: Thls mblnatlon will actuate the 45% h i t (Speed Umlter #2) CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (D) - YES Relereyw 1 idate correct answer R: added WA to WA table. Gil Is OK. Todd 09/30/05 - removed reference8 to L3, L4 and Tofal v. RFP flows NRC K/A System/E(A Symm Number AK1.02 RO 3.0 SRO CFR Unk Knowledge of the operatland impllcaUons of the kllowlng concepts as they apply to LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL: Recirculation pwnp net poslHve suction head: Plant speclk. NRC WA Generic s-Number 29500 Low Reactor Water Level 9 CPR Llnk RO SRO

1. 23 1

~ MRO mRo QUOBUO~~ID: 2 9 5 ~ 3 M O ~ o m b s l $Qitt4( Pd4! dr ? A steam line break occurred in the Primary Containment of SSES Unit The following conditions exist: - Several control rods failed to insert. -.,,yr-t\\ fiL p t w t ! ~ fd % / f3 G',#J LLQS - RPV Water Lev I is Winches and steady. - Drywell Pressure is 7.0 p i g and steady. - Drywell Temperature Is 180 degrees Farenheit and steady. - Suppression Chamber Pressure is 2.0 psig and rising slowly. - RPV Pressure i s p 0 7 pslg and steady. l-f"j Temperature i 6' grees Farenheit and stear)g: PC CONTROL, which ONE of the following Residual Heat Removal (RHR) U 1 J L ILL+ A RHR Loop 'AA" in Suppresslon Pool Cooling and RHR Loop "B" in Suppression Chamber Spray B RHR Loop "A" in Suppression Pool Cooling and RHR Loop "B" in Suppression Pool Cooling C RHR Loop 'A" in Drywell Spray and RHR Loop "8" in Suppression Chamber Spray D RHR Loop 'A" in Drywell Spray and RHR Loop "B" in Suppression Pool Cooling Justlllcatlon SP Cooling requtred per SPm-1 SP Spray requlred per Pap-4 WRONG. SPR-2 does NOT requlre maxknun SP cwllng unHl SC temp can NOT be rnalntalned bebw 90 deg F. VALID DISTflACTOR: Some SP coollng will be requked to malntaln SP below 90 deg F WRONQ: Drywell Spray Is NOT required untll DW pressur8 exceeds 13 pslg in the SC per PWP-6 VAUD DISTRACTOR: SC Spray required per PCIP-4 WRONQ: Drywell Spray Is NOT required mlil DW pressure exceeds 13 pslg In the SC per PCIP-5 VALID DISTRACTOR: Some SP coollng wlll be requlred to matntaln SP below 90 deg F Reterenccn Compents and Oumtlon Modmcat(on Htstory 1

1. GI1 09/26/05 - could not valldate with enclosed references. Appears correct.

R: Self validated Wilt ask Chief Exernher to valldate. a CHOICE (A) - YES CHOICE (8) - NO CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (D) - NO L. NRC KIA SystemlUA Syrtem Number AK2.01 RO 3.6 SRO 3.7 CFR Llnk (CFR: 41.7 146.8) KnmMedge of the lnterrelatlons between HIGH SUPPRESSION P o o l TEMPERATURE and the following: Suppresston pool coollng NRC K/A Generic 29501 High Suppresslon Pool Temperature 3 System Number RO SA0 CFR Llnk

9 4, QRO @I SRO QUOatbnID: 29584 O m : Now DrnmOfyLnnl SSES Unit 1 was operating at full power when the Main Turbine tripgedJh@vef,$e NOT scram, -setting control rod 22-27 per to-100-1 13, Control R o f i e r t i The followlng plant conditions exist: - all Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs) Indicate approximately 24% Reactor Power. - the RSCS ROD INS ELK BYPASS HS-55601 is in NORMAL (WHITE light Illuminated) On the Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) Operator Display Unit (ODU), you observe the following: - AMBER DISPLAY UNIT pushbutton lower light (FREE ROD) illuminated. - Control Rod 22-27 AMBER light emitting diode (LED) is Illuminated. - RED DISPLAY UNIT pushbutton lower llght (BYPASS) illuminated. - Control Rod 22-27 RED light emitting dlode (LED) is illuminated. Which one of the following describes the status of control rod 22-27? 7-f i a ontrol Rod 22-2 can be INSERTED because power is above the Low Power Setpdnt A T d be INSERTED because It is BYPASSED. NOT be INSERTED because the RSCS ROD INS BLK BYPASS HS-D-cm N Y be INSERTED because power is below the Low Power Setpoint / CHOICE (A) - NO WRONQ: RPS does not bypass RSCS blocks. VALID DISTRACTOR: LPSP Ls 22%. APRMs 5 22% may be mlstaken for the actual LPSP parameter (1st stage pressure) Turbine 1st atage pressure la the parameter measured to detenlne whether the plant Is above or below LPSP and LPAP The stem eatablkihea that the Main Turbhe I8 trlpped. Therefore, 1st stage pressure le below the LPSP setpoht and Is probably at a vacuw. In addltlon, the ODU condRlons In the stem sstabllsh that the rud 1s bypaseed (RED LED) and free to move (AMBER LED), WRONG: The rod can be Inserted because FISC6 does not have a Rod Black on this rod VALID DISTRACTOR: EO-100-1 13 dlrects the user to bypass RSCS. Appllcant may belleve the rod colld be blocked If the switch is still In normal. WRONG: The rod can be Inserted because RSCS does not have a Rod Block on this rod. VALID DISTRACTOR: Applkant my recognize that wlth no 1st stage pressure, RSCS r d v e s a <LPSP slgnal and Mocks rod motlan. CHOICE (B) - YES CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (0) - NO Todd 09/30/05 - replaced cdon wtth queatlon mark at en4 at stem. NRC KIA SystemlEIA SyStMn 29601 Incomplete SCRAM NumW AK2.06 RO 2.6 SRO 2.8 CFR Unk (CFR: 41.71 45.8) 5

Knowtedge of the Interrelations between INCOMPLETE SCRAM and the following: RSC8: Plant-Speclflc NRC WA Generlc S@em Numtmr FK) SRO CFR Link

1. 26 1 MRO MSRO QlYdhnIO:

2Bwl6 0-Mod 0 Memorybl Both units are at full power. SSES Unit 1 has isolated and is draining Reslduat Heat Removal (RHR) loop "W for planned maintenance. SSES Unit 1 RHR loop "B' is draining to the floor drain to the Reactor Building Sump via 161 121 (RHR Pump B & D Room Drain Is0 Vlv.). SSES Unit 2 Recelves the following alarms and indications: & JLtI - RHR LOOP 6 PUMP ROOM FLOODED (AR-213-001 HOB). - SUPPRESSION POOL DIV 1 LO LEVEL (AR-211-001, E02). - SUPP POOL LEVEL LI-25755A indicates 22.4 feet and slowly lowerlng. - SUPPRESSION POOL DIV 2 LO LEVEL (AR-212-001, EOZ), - REACTOR BLDG SUMP LEVEL HI-HI (AR-225-001 801) L M J d LL - SUPP POOL LEVEL Ll-257558 indicates 22.3 feet and slowly lowering. (1) How will Suppression Pool level respond? (2) What Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) entry conditions are CURRENTLY met? A (1) The Suppression Pool wlll continue to drain untlt 161 121 (RHO Pump B & D Room Drain Is0 Vlv.) is closed. (2) EO-200-1 04, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL. B (1) The Suppression Pool will continue to drain until 161 121 (RHR Pump B & D Room Drain tso Vlv.) is closed. (2) EO-200-1 03, PC CONTROL. C (1) Suppression Pool level will lower to 17 feet and stabilize. D (1) Suppression Pool level will lower to 17 feet and stabilize, (2) EO-ZOO-lM, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL. (2) EO-200-103, PC CONTROL. JustMcaUon CHOCE (A) - NO WRONQ: SP will not cantinue to draln because the Unlt 1 and 2 floor dralns am not cross-connected. VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct EOP and woh mft's ECCS r ~ ~ m flaM dmlns are crose-oonnecled to olher EGCS room of the same unit. CHOICE (B) - NO WRONQ: PC CONTROL requlres SP level below 22 feet. However, the SP will not contlnue to drain because the Unh 1 and 2 floor dmlns are not cms-connected. VALID DISTRACTOR: The stem condltlons &e sufflclent lnforrnatlon to oorrectly conclude that the Suppresslon Pool will siaMlize at 17 feet (Ta!Ae 18 of EO-100-103). Therefore, Appllcant may reasonably select thle. Table 18 of EO-1DO-103 tells un that SP will stabilke at 17 feet. EO-100-104 require8 entry On RB Water Level above high alarm. WRONG: PC CONTROL requires SP level below 22 feet. VALID DISTRACTOR: COnect SP level. The stem candltions give sufficient lnfomratlon b correctty conclude that the Stppreselon Pool wfll stabUize at 17 feet (Table la of EO-100-103). Therefore, Applicant may reasonably select the. Refaencer CHOICE (C) - YES CHOICE (0) - NO 1 Conrrn8-h and Qumstlon Modltledtlon Hlstory

1. GU 08/26/05 - oouM not validate the 17 ket because 6100-103 not Included in workpapers R: It Is 17 feet. Ask Chlef Examiner to Independently valklate.

2. ?'odd 02v30/06 - ohenged "(1 1 What level will SSES Unlt 2 Suppcesslon Pool stablllze at?" to "(I)

Now will Suppression Pool level respond?'. changed part (1) of disbactors "C" and "D" from '(1) 17 feer to '(1) Suppreeslon Pod level wlll lomr to 17 feet and stablllze:

NRC WA SystemlUA System Number EA1.01 RO 3.2 8RO 3.3 CFR Llnk (CFA 41.7,46.6) AbUlty to operate andlor monitor the Secondaty containment equipment and floor drain systems as It applies to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH SUMP/AAEA WATER LEVEL 29503 Secondary Contalnment Hlgh Sump/Area Water Level 6 NRC WA Generlc svl-Number RO SRO CFRUnk I

2 7 1 QRO SaSRO Q~eatbnID: 29597 -: NOW o m - Following a loss of coolant accldent, the Primary Containment Hydrogen and Oxygen (H202) Analyzers are placed in service per OP-173601, Section 2.8, H202 ANALYZER OPERATION DURING EMERGENCY. The following conditions exist: - Analyzer "A" is aligned to the SUPPRESSION POOL. - Analyzer "A" 02 reads 2%. - Analyzer "A" H2 reads 9% - Analyzer "81' is aligned to the DRYWELL. - Analyzer '8' 02 reads 6% - Analyzer " 6 H2 reads less than 1% - Sample flow to both analyzers was restored 35 minutes ago. - Both analyzers are on the looh range. Whbh ONE of the following statements is correct? f --9 biners, Drywell Fans and Drywell Coolers MUS* Operated to r i m a r y m -. Operated to

e.

B C e Shutdown because e Shutdown because D Justlficatlon WRONG: 0-100-103 requires that AecomMnem, Fans and Coolers be secured when H2>6% AND 0%5% whether the gases are in the same CTMT sectlon or not because mlgratlon Is posslble. VALID DISTRACTOR: EO-103-113 calls for mlxlng and recombining for the Individual CTMT sectmns (SP or DW) given the IndMdual conditions. WRONG: EO-100-103 requires that RWmblnerS, Fans and Coolers be Becured when -6% AND 0 2 ~ 5 % wtwrher the gases am In the same CTMT sectbn or not because mimlwl le posslble. VALID DISTRACTOR: EO-103-1 13 all6 for mklng and recomblnhg for the Mlvidual CTMT secttons (SP or DW) given the Individual conditions. CHOICE {A) - NO CHOICE (6) - NO CHOICE (C) - YES Analyzers have been In-6ecvice for mhutes. H2 and 02 conditions exceed combuetible l i i. WRONG: The Analyzers require 30 mhutee ta stablllze. They've hed 35 minutes. VALID DISTRACTOR: Applbant may conskler the Analyzers inoperable due to the disparate SP and DW readlngs or beause Analyzers have been In servlce for a short blme period. (Note: 1 hour at PB) CHOICE (0) - NO (311 Oe/26/05 - OK Todd OW3Of05 - OK NRC WA SystemlWA System Number EA2.04 RO 3.3 SRO 3.3 CFR llnk (CFA 41.10,43.5,46.13) 60000 Hiah Contalnment Hydrngen Cancentration 0

AMIIty to detemlne and I or interpret Combustible llrnlts for wetvvell as It applies to HIGH PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN CONCENTRATIONS NRC WA Generlc sycm Number RO SRO CFRUnk

d/*e Given that the following conditions occur In the speclfied sequence:

1. All required conditions for Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) actuationfmet.

2. Automatic depressurization is in progress.

3. AH low pressure ECCS pumps trip.

4. A single Core Spray ((23) pump is restarted.

how the Automatlc Depressurization System (ADS) is affected? A low pressure ECCS pumps tripped; then AUTOMATICALkY reinitiated after the CS pump restarted. 8 ADS depressurization CONTINUES until the LOGIC TIMER RESET pushbutton is depressed. C ADS depressurization CONTINUES until both MANUAL INHlBlT (S34A & S34B) switchs are rotated to INHIBIT. D ADS depressurization STOPPED when low pressure ECCS pumps tripped; then can be MANUALLY reinitiated after the CS pump restarted. Jurtiflcalon WRONG: K4A seals In the actuation dgnal. VALID DISTRACTOR: ADS wllt not actuate without low pressure ECCS pumps running Slgnai seals In untll broken by the ADS LOGIQTIMER RESET PB WRONG. Manual Inhibit PBs are effecthre bebm ADS actuatbn only. VALID DISTRACTOR: They are effectlve before actuation at stopplng actuetron. WRONG: K4A seats In the actuetlon slgnal and Manual Initlatlon does NOT bypass the LP ECCS Pumps relay K9A and KlOA VALID DISTRACTOR; Reasonable bellel that Manual Inltiatlon would bypass all Interlocks. Raterances I CHOICE (A) - NO CHOICE (e) - YES CmllCE (C) - No CHOICE (D) - NO -~ 4 Comments and Chsctlon Irllodiflcatlon Hlstory Draw from Cllntan 1 June 2000 exam (Question ID 18937) QilOW26/06 - Add to first sentence in stem "... condtlfons occur In mquflnce". Can you shorten dlstractor "D" a b117 Todd 09/30/05 - Revlsed "A' and 'D" to be past tense and added auto reetati to 'A". R: accepted both comments. NRC KIA SyetemNA System Numbar K3.03 RO 4.2 SRO 4.3 CFR Llnk (CFR 41.7 f45.4) Knodedge of the effect that a lose or malfunction of the R H W C I : INJECTION MODE (PLANT SPECIFIC) wlll have on Automatlo depreasurfzatlon logic NRC WA Qenerlc 20300 RHRILPCI: Injeccbn Mode (Plant Specific) 0 RO SRO CFR Llnk

1. 29 J 5 R O @SRO QusrtbnIP:

2sssSOd&: NOW O h m b ~ I Both unb are at full power. 480 VAC Bus 28226 is deenergized for planned electrical maintenance. All systemxere in their n m a l configuration when Operations de-energlzed 28226. ~ @ 8 # rf Which ONE of the following correctly describes the status of SSES Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal C' (RHR) Loop "6" with NO LocaVManual component manipulation? flQ Guu,"F& 4 3 ;s7 A B C D Drywell Spray Mode - NOT Available Suppression Pool Spray - NOT Avallable Suppression Pool Cooling - NOT Available RHR Pump 'B" and "0" Minimum Flow Isolation - Avallable Orywell Spray Mode - Available Suppression Pool Spray - Available Suppresslon Pool Cooling - Available RHR Pump "B' and "0' Minimum Flow lsolatjon - NOT Avallable Drywelt Spray Mode - Available Suppression Pool Spray - NOT Available Suppression Pool Cooling - NOT Available RHR Pump "El" and P" Minimum Flow Isolation - NOT Avallable Drywell Spray Mode - NOT Available Suppression Pool Spray - Avallable Suppression Pool Cooling - Avaifable RHR Pump "B" and 'ID" Mintmum Flow isolation - Avallable Jurtiff catlon De-energhlng 28226 remove6 power from the following. - HV251M1BS - Drywell Spray (Normally Shut) - W251 FO178 - lnjectlon (Normally Open) - HV251 F0106 - Crorrs-aanned to "A' loop (Normally Shut) - tiV251 FOWB - '6" Pump suctlon from SP (Normally Open) - W251 Foo68 - "B' Pump wcHon from SDC dtDpline (Normally Open) - HV261 FW3B - "8" HX Outlel (Normally Open) - HV251M478 - "8" HX Inlet (Normally Open) Therefore, the follawhg applies' - Low Pressure Coolant Inj8ctlon (LPCI) - Operable because de-energized velvea h the flowpath are normally open (HV251 F0166 la on swlng buss 28228) - Chyvdl Spray Mode - NOT Avallable because normally closed valve FO16B I6 de-energlzed Suppresslon Pool Sprey - NOT Avallable bemuse normally closed mlve F02W Is de-energlzed - Suppression Pod Coollng - NOT Avallable bemuse normally dosed valve FOPBB Is de-energized - RHR Pump "8' and '0' Mlnlmum Row - Available because normally closed valve F007B Is energized from 28229 - HV251M28B - SP Spray & Cwllng (Normally Shut) CHOICE (A) - YES CHOICE (B) - No WRONG: DW Spray NOT avalt because F016B deenergized SP Spray NOT evell because FO288 deenergbed. VALID DISTRACTOR: LPCl (s Operable, Min Flow is available and SP Cooling NOT AvaY. WRONG: LPCl la Operable. RemaInder of distractor mirrors Dlstractor B VALID DISTRACTOR: Remalnder of dit3tfacm m l m Distractor B CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (0) - NO WRONG: LPCl Is Operebte. Remainder of dlstrac&r rntrrors Dlstractor D VAUD DtSTRACTOR: Remalnder d distractor mlrrors Distrsctor B 3 rather than 'Operable'. Not sure what Impact the bus loss wlll haw an Operabili, ho\\rvever avalteMlRy I6 assured In A. R: aooepted.

Todd 09/30/05 - deleted LPCl mode to llmk variables to four. tnodlfled dlstrecton accordingly. NRC KIA SystemNA System 2O500 Shutdown Coollng System (RHR Shutdown Cooling Mode 0 Number K2.02 RO 2.6 8RO 2.7 CFR Unk (CFR 41.7) W e d g e of etectrhl power suppiles b Motor operated valves NRC KIA Generlc System Number Ro SRO CFR Llnk

BRO @SRO QueatbnID: 2seooOr1oh: Bank U M e m o r y h d wm SSES Unit 1 is at full power when 1 High Pressure Coolant fn)ection (HPCI) inadvertently initiates and injects to the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV).&suming no Operator action, which ONE of the following correctly describes the INITIAL A Thermal Power will RISE RPV Water Level will LOWER Total Steam Flow will LOWER Total Indicated Feedwater Flow will LOWER B Thermal Power will RISE RPV Water Level will LOWER Total Steam Flow will RISE Total Indicated Feedwater Flow will LOWER C Thermal Power will RISE RPV Water Level will RISE Total Steam Flow will LOWER Total Indicated Feedwater Flow will RISE D Thermal Power will RISE RPV Water Level will RISE Total Steam Flow will RISE Total Indicated Feedwater Flow will LOWER Jurtlfk&tlon WRONG: Wrong Level, ST & FW changes VALID DISTRACTOR: corred pwver changes. WRONG: Wrong RPV Water Level Effect. VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct Power, ST and FW changes WRONG: Reverses the actual FW and ST ahanges - both affect Level Enor. VALID DISTRACTOR: Con& Poww and Level change Steam Flow RISES c a w HPCl Turbine Operatlng. Therefore, RPV pressure drops cause ST rlses and Power dses due to Colder FW. RPV Water Level wlu rlse because RN now z ST. Stable when Level Error offsets Flow Error Total Steam Flow wlll dse because now have addltlonal steam flowpath lndlcated Fw Flow lower6 to create the flow Enorlhat offsets Level Error. I_ 1 CHOICE (A) - No CHOICE (6) - NO CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (D) - YES Rdsmnces Cornmen5 and Questbn Mod1

1. QII 00/28/05 - could not valldate wlth enclosed r e f a r m e. Note for jusWcaUof~ 'A" Power increases due to lawerlng feedwater temperature wlth J

HPCI Injection. R: LMN nsk of error because tt ie drawn from SSES Exam Bank and Is theoretloal rather than plant specific.

2. Todd W30/05 - changed "INITIAL to FINAL" to "INITIAL change from SS' NRC KIA System/E/A Sydmn Number Al.01 RO 4.3 SRO 4.4 CFR Llnk (CFR 41.5 / 45.5)

Ability to predlct and/or monltor ohanqes h parameters assocktad with operatlng the HlQH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM contm(a Including Reactor water level (BWR-2,3,4) NRC K/A Generic 206oO Hlgh Pressure Coolant Inlection System 0

System Number RO SRO CFR Llnk

MRO @SRO OudonID: 29601 O M : Nwu &j*mary-l f31 During quarterly SUW~IIIMM testing of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system per SO-152-002@he system is J1)- and the liquid flowpath Is -(2)-. HF? A 0 C D (I) NOT OPERABLE because injectlon valve HV155F006 Is &energized In the closed posltlon. (2) From the Suppression Pool to the Pumps and return to the Suppression Pool. (1) NOT OPERABLE because injection valve HV155F006 is deenerglzed in the closed position. (2) From the Condensate Storage Tank to the Pumps and return to the Condensate Storage Tank. (1) OPERABLE because HPCl will automatically realign to the injectlon mode upon receipt of an initlation signal. (2) From the Suppression Pool to the Pumps and return to the Suppression Pool. (1) OPERABLE because HPCl will automatically realign to the injection mode upon receipt of an initlation signal. (2) From the Condensate Storage Tank to the Pumps and return to the Condensate Storage Tank. JurPCfcatlon I CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: Path IS CST to P ~ S to CST VALID DfSTfWCTOR: system Is Inoperable. CHOICE (A) - YES CHOICE (C) - NO WRONQ: Path Is CST to Pps to CST. system le NOT operable (no auto rsallgn) VALID DISTRACTOR: mirror lmaglng distractom. CHOICE (C) - NO WRONQ: System IS NOT operable (no auto realign) VALID DISTRACTOR: correct flowpath RefersmBs 1 Cammenta and Qu#tlon Modlfloatlon HImlory Get the correct surveillance (I've got the 24 month me) Gll OWWO5 - OK Todd 09/30/05 - a& SSES if lnltlal power level changes the answer. NRC KIA SystemlWA syam 20800 Number RO SRO CFR Llnk NRC WA Generic System 2.2 EquipmentConlrol Number 2.2.12 RO 3.0 SRO 3.4 CFR Llnk (CFR: 41.10 145.13) Knowledge af aurveULsnce procedures. 0

1. 32,.1 @RO MSRO Q W ~ I D : m02 o m : MOC~

OMMnoyWl Both SSES units were at full power and SSES Unit 1 was running Core Spray pumps ?P206A and 1 P206C for surveillance testing when the site experienced a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). - Both units are now maintalning Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure and inventory with the Reactor Core Isolation Coollng (RCIC) system. - All engineered safeguards (ES) buses are powered from their assoclated emergency diesel generators (EDG). Subsequently, a transient affects SSES Unit 2 and resutts In the following conditions: - SSES Unit 2 RPV Water Level is -60 inches. - SSES Unit RPV Pressure is 350 pig. - SSES Un',Drywell Pressure is I .8 pig. >

• i n Which ON of the following describes the AUTOMATIC actions of the SSES Unit 2 Core Spray pLLdj e I

A Core Spray pumps 2P206A, 2P206B, 2P206C and 2P206D start after a 15 second time delay. B Core Spray pumps 2P2WA. 2P2068.2P206C and 2P206D start after a 10.5 second time delay. C Core Spray pumps 2P206B and 2P 206D start after a 10.5 second time delay, Core Spray D Core Spray pumps 2P2068 and 2P206D start after a 15 second time delay. Core Spray pumps 2P206A and 2P206C do NOT start. pumps 2P206A and 2P206C do NOT start. 3wuncation WRONG: the 15 8ec TD occurs if ES busses are energhed from normal/off-slte power. VALID DISTRACTOR: all fwr pumps do start after a TD the 15 BBC does tlrne out However, Its start slgnal m e 6 AFTER the 10.5 sec TD sends its signal. LOOP: M A opens, U M s start and energize ES busses, K3A doses and the EDQ breaker 52 contaota swap (a cloees 8 b opens) LOCA K1OA closes on OW Hi pressure and RPV Low pressure, KllW energlzes 10.5 soc TD concurrently wlth K16A's 16 secTD. K 1 1 6 A c b s e s before K18A closes, K12Aenerglres. WRONQ: CS pumps A a C will also stan. VAUD DISTRACTOR: Correct TD and pumps B & 0 are 'Preferred" unlt 2 pumps for concurrent CS hitiation signals (electrioal load nonsldemths). WRONQ: Wrong TD and CS pumps A& C w l also start. VALID DISTRACTOR: CS pumps B & 0 are "Preferred" unit 2 p u n ~ s for concurrent CS fnltiallon signals (electrical load consideratbns). CHOICE (A) - No CHOICE (8) -YES CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (D) - NO R8lW6flW 1 (31 09/26/05 - OK Todd 09/30M5 - changed 'plant" to "site" In the stem. NRC WA svrtem/UA syrtem 20800 Low Pressure Core Spray System 1 NumbW K4.08 RO 3.8 SRO 4.0 CFR Llnk (CFR 49.7)

Knowledge d LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM deslgn feature@) andlor lnterlacks whlch provide tor the Automatic system infUatJon NRC K/A Generic Syrlem Number RO SRO CFR Link

B R O DSRO QuWonfD: 29608 O m : Now 0 MemaryLsVsl Both SSES units are at full power. During shift turnover, you notice that the: - white indicating light for Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) squib valve 148F004A is EXTINGUISHED - white Indicating light for Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) squib valve 148FOO48 is ILLUMINATED Before accepting the shift, you go to the Relay Room and determine that the Unit 1 SBLC squib valve CONTINUITY METERS read 5 milliamps (ma) for BOTH squib valves. Whkh ONE of the following correctly descrlbes the status of the SBLC squib valves? I A 148FWA is Operable 148FOO4B is Operable B 148F004A is NOT Operable 148FOO48 is Operable C 148F004A is Operable 148FOO4B is NOT Operable D 148F004A is NOT Operable 148F0048 is NOT Operable I JUltlllC8tkm CHOICE (A) - YES .. r l. The atem establlshes condltlons indicative of a burned out llght bulb. WRONQ: Nelther valve k hoperable. VALID DISTRACTOR: Whfte llght out is the flrst indlcatlon of an Inoperable squlb valve. WRONQ: Nelther valve IS Inopecable VAUD DISTRACTOR: Tests Applicants' understanding of the m l l e x p e c t e d condltlon. WRONO. Nelther valve Is InopereMe VALID DISTRACTOR: Mtrm lmaglng and tests Ap@lcants' understanding of normallexpected mndttion. CHOICE (e) - NO CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (0) - NO QII 0912WO5 - suggest using 6 rnllliamps In stem H this le technlcally correct, albelt a little higher than normal. 4 mUllamps is too eeslly recognizable. Higher Cbgnitlve Level. Todd 09/30/05 - added 'Unlt 1" before SBLC In the stem, R: Bccepted. Changed frwn 4 to 5 and deleted sentence saylng 'These are the NORMAL values". Recetegorited to NRC KIA SystemtEIA System 21 lo0 Stendby Liquid Control System 0 Numbor K4.04 A 0 3.8 SRO 3.9 CFR Llnk (CFR 41.7) Knowledge of STANDBY LtclUID CONTROL SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or Interlocks whlch provide for Indication of faun In explosive velve firing circuks NRC WA Genwlc Number systein Ro SRO W R Link

~ 3 4 I @RO MSRO Ousrtbnlo: 2ses;tiOdgln: b n k OMmotyLevel SSES Unit 1 is operating at ful power. The following Standby Liquid Control System (SBLC) conditions exist following SBLC tank filling: - SLC tank temperature is 70 F - AR 107 803, STANDBY LIQUID TANK HI/LO TEMP is in alarm - SLC tank level Is 5100 gallons - AR 107 CO3, STANDBY LIQUID TANK HVLO LEVEL is in alarm - Chemistry sample results after filling indicate that the concentration of the sodium pentaborate Whlch ONE of the followingidmWs t&kWus-&the SLC systemacax&@e Technical Specifications? ~ d d A T pd r 3 - c ; l ~ u d Q+ed C Tank available volume does not meet the LCO conditions. 0 Sodium pentaborate concentration does not meet the LCO conditions. /2rwix. &&L dw+/-t?kukJ JurtificaUon I ! T H I S Q U E S T l O N A P P E A R E D O N T H E A U G U S T 2 0 0 2 S U S Q U E H A N N A E X A M I ! CHOtCE (A) - NO + 4 WRONC3: The iemperature.ooncentratlon oornbinatbn is In he UNACCEPTABLE range. VALID DISTRACTOR Appllcant must determine thls from Argure 3.1 2 CHOICE (B) - YES CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: Volume fells in the acceptable @on of Figure 3.1.7-2 VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant determlna lhl6 from Flgure 3.1.7-2 WRONG: Concentration falls In the acceptable regbn of Figure 3.1.7-2 VALID DISTRACTOR: Apptkant determine thb from Figure 3.1 2 C W C E (D) - B Cocment8 and Qusstlan Modlflcetlon Hl8tory I I T H I S QUESTION A P P E A R E D ON T H E A U G U S T 2 0 0 2 S U S Q U E H A N N A EXA M I ! Gil08/26/05 - Not sure It is plawlble for an operator to NOT acknowledge any annunciator. How about "acknowledge but do M t reset" lor 'A". R: accepted. Changed dlstractors 'A" and '8' ?7 Doea SSES have the RESET Iuncffon 77 ..* R E J E C T E D K / A C A U S E L O D U N R E A C H A B L E * *

• Reselected 2.1.33 and found thls h an SSES old axam.

NRC WA Sy6tedEfA sVobm 21 100 Nu mbsr NAC K/A Generic RO SRO CFR Llnk

6ydsm 2.j Conductof Operations Number 2-12 RO 3.0 9RO 4.0 CFR Link (CFR: 41.10 f 6.13) Knowledge of operator responsjblllbs durlng an modes of plant oparatlon.

1. 35 1 ORO Q sRo QIMWUCH~ID: 29605 o m n Hemtytawl SSES Unit 2 scrams from full power. All systems, structures and components operated as expected EXCEPT the Scram Pilot Solenoid Valves for all twenty (20) Group 2 Hydraulic Control Units (HCU) on Reactor Side 2 failed to vent their associated HCUs.

Which ONE of the following is TRUE concerning the 20 associated control rods? A All 20 Control Rods will insert in less than 10 seconds. B All 20 Control Rods will NOT insert but can be inserted by venting the Scram Air Header. C All 20 Control Rods will insert in greater than 10 seconds. D All 20 Control Rods will NOT insert but can be inserted using Reactor Manual Control (RMC). 3ustmcatlon WRONQ: The rods will INSERT at a slower rate as ARI and Backup Scram valves act to deptWSUriZt3 the air header VALID DISTRACTOR: The rod still Inserts WRONG: The rods will insert without Operator action VALtD DISTRACTOR: valid method dlrected by EO-100-113, Control Rod Insertion CHOICE (A) - NO CHOICE (e) - No CHOICE (C) - YES CHOICE (0) - hb WRONG: The rods Hllll Insert without Operator action VALID DISTRACTOR: using RMC may be plauslble once the Scram and AAI are reset. Gn 09/P6/05 - Once a rod is scrammed (from anv meens) It wlll Insert at the same tab (about 4 seconds\\. Recommends: A - All contrd rode wNl st&rna#oak, Insect h e 10 seconds. C - All control rods wll autometically lnsen h > 10 seconds. R no known basis for the 10 second threshhold. WU request SSES input. Not sure I accept the proposltlon that all rods Will h a r t at the same rata. Seems rmsonable to belleve that the rods lor whlch the Scram PYot Solenoid Valves did NOT open would move a bit slower because their alr Is vented through a smaller area. 09/27/06: Now understand the Issue. All rods Insert at the seme rate onm the scram valves open. However. for the affected 20 HCUs. the scram valves take longer to open. Must hem SSES verlfy/evaluaie the I O second threshhold. Todd 09/30/05 - replaced Both unlta are at full power when one unit scmma for unknown reasons wlth SSES Unit 2 scram from full power. NRC K/A SystemlEIA System Number K4.09 RO 3.8 SRO 3.9 CFR Llnk (CFR 41.7) KnavAedge of REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM deelgn feature@) and/or Interlocks which provlde for the Control rod lnsertlon fdlowing RPS system electricalfailure NRC K/A Generic s V r m 21 200 Reactor Proteatton System 0 Number RO SRO CFA Llnk

RO EXAM B SSES Unit 2 scrams from full power. All systems, structures and components operated as expected EXCEPT the Scram Pilot Solenoid Valves for all twenty (20) Group 2 Hydraulic Control Units (HCU) on Reactor Side 2 'AR 20 Control Rods will r O T insert but can be inserted by venting the Scram Air Header.

_# 36_1 &)RO USRO QuedknID: 29608 0-2 Mod 0 Memoyb\\rsl A reactor STARTUP Is in progress. All Intermediate Range Neutron Monlto E. Which ONE of the following IRM readings will cause a HALF SCRAM? b CJ Note: INOP = Inoperable and NOT bypassed. A B C D E F G H A INOP io9 loa io6 110 INOP io7 io7 B 124 124 108 106 I10 103 107 108 C 110 107 INOP 123 112 118 109 111 D INOP 105 108 110 . 124 112 116 109 Jurtftkatlon IRMs are ass-to RPS 89 follows: RPS *A": IRM ohannets " A, 'C", 'E', 'W RPS "A? IRM channels '6'. ' 0, "F", "H" To yield a half soram, one or mom APRMs In a SINGLE and only a SINQLE RPS oh& must dlher trip on hlgh flux ( ~ 1 2 2 I 125 scale) or INOP WRONG: INOP IRM channels 'AD and 'F yield a F U U scram. VALID DISTRACTOR: Two Inoperable channels. WRONQ: IRM channels "A" and 'B" yleld a FULL scram. VALID DISTRACTOR Two ohannels > hl& flux setpoint WRONG: IRM channels "D' and "E" yield a W U aoram VALID DISTRACTOR: Two channels above high flux setpolnt. IRM channel "A" trips RPS "A' IRM channel 'E" Mps RPS "A" C W C E (A) - No CHOICE (E) - NO CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (D) - YES Rermcer 1 I (311 OW2605 - explanation talks about APRMs rather man IAMs R: corrected explanelkm lo IRMa. NRC KIA SystemNA System 21200 Reactor Pratectlon System Number A3.01 RO 4.4 SA0 4.4 CFR Link (CFR41.7145.7) Ablwty to monitor automatic operatlorn of the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM including Reectw P o w 0 NRC KIA Generlc Syatam Number RO SRO CFR Llnk

381 a30 QSRO QMrtknID: 20608 O & h W OWm#ybval SSES Unit 2 Is In Mode 2, conducting a normal reactor startup per GO-200-1 02, PLANT STARTUP, HEATUP AND POWER OPERATION. The following wndltions exist: -the reactor is CRITICAL. - RPV Pressure is 0 pig. - All Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM) are on Range 3 - Source Range Monitor (SRM) detectors are being withdrawn intermittently, TWO AT A TIME. - SRM level is being maintained between 5E3 (5,000) and 5E4 (50,000) counts per second (CPS). - SRM Channel "A" reads 6.1 E3 (61 00) CPS and slowly rising. - SRM Channel '8" reads 7.2E4 (72,000) CPS and slowly rising. - SRM Channel 'CY reads 6.OE3 (6,000) CPS and slowly king. - SRM Channel "D" reads 6.1 E3 (6,100) CPS and slowly rlslng. Which ONE of the following correctly describes: (1) a cause of these conditions and (2) actions, if any, necessary to permit the Reactor Startup? A (1) SRM Detector ' 9 Is stuck & located LOWER in the core than SRM Detectors "A", 'C", & I'D". (2) None. The SRM Upscale Block is AUTOMATICALLY bypassed when all IRMs are on Range 3 or above. B (1) SRM Detector "8" Is stuck & located LOWER in the core than SRM Detectors "A', "C", "D". (2) MANUALLY bypass SRM 'B* to prevent a Rod Withdrawal BLOCK at 2E5 (20.000) CPS, C (1) SRM Detector '6" is stuck & located HIGHER in the core than SRM Detectors "A", "C', & 'DN. (2) MANUALLY bypass SRM "B" to prevent a Rod Withdrawal BLOCK at 2E5 (20,000) CPS. D (1) SRM Detector '8" is stuck & located HiGHER in the core than SRM Detectors "A", "C', & "0". (2) None. The SRM Upscab Block is AUTOMATICALLY bypassed when all lRMs are on Range 3 or above. Jwtlkatlon WRONG: The detector Is stuck HIGHER In the core and AUTO bypare occurs on Range 6 or hlgher. VALID DISTRACTOR: Minor Imaging. WRONQ: The detector is stuck HIGHER. VALtD DISTRACTOR: Manual bypass is requlred. Detector Is stuck HIQHER. MANUAL bypass is requfred to continue. CHOICE (0) - Na WRONG: Auto bypass occurs on Aanae 8 or higher. VAUO DISTRACTOR: SRM is atuok HIQHER. CHOICE (A) - NO CHOICE (8) - NO CHOICE (C) - YES Todd OBMO/05 - grammatlcal corrections to stem. NRC WA S y s t d U A

RO EXAM

1. 1. 39 J SSES Unit 2 is in Mode 2, conducting a normal reactor startup per GO-200-102, PLANT STARTUP, HEATUP AND POWER OPERATION. The following conditions exist:

-the reactor is CRITICAL. - RPV Pressure is 0 psig. -All Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM) are on R a n g e 0 - Source Range Monitor (SRM) detectors are being withdrawn intermittently, TWO AT A TIME. - SRM level is being maintained between 5E3 (5,000) and 5E4 (50,000) counts per second (CPS). - SRM Channel "A" reads 6.1 E3 - SRM Channel "B" reads - SRM Channel "C" reads - SRM Channel " D reads 6.1E3 (6,100) CPS and slowly rising. Which ONE of the following correctly describes: (1) a cause of these conditions and (2) actions, if any, necessary to permit the Reactor Startup? in the core than SRM Detectors "A", "C", & "0'. ICALLY bypassed when all IRMs are on Range 3 or abovex 6 (1)) n I1 ' @in the core than SRM Detectors "A', 'IC", & "0". od Withdrawal BLOCK at 2E5 (20,000) CPS. c (v-- I 11. e in the core than SRM Detectors "A", "C", & "D"/ od Wdhdrawal BLOCK at 2E5 (20,000) CPS, D (1) (2) MANUALLY bypass SRM 'W' to preve (2) MANUALLY bypass SRM "8" to preve (2) None. The SRM Upscale Block is in the core than SRM Detectors "A", "C", & "0". CALLY bypassed when all IRMs are on Range 3 or above

System Number K6.03 RO 2.8 SRO 2.8 CFR Llnk (CFR 41 -5 146.3) Knowledge of the operational Irnpllcatlons of the fallowing ooncepte as It appllee to SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) SYSTEM : Changing detector posrtion 21 500 Source Range Monitor (SRM) System 4 NRC WA Generlc swan Number RQ SRO CFR Llnk

1. 37 I

@RO &1WO QueslkmID: 29607 Ott@h: Mod 0 Memory Lswl SSES Unit 1 shutdown in Mode 5 far a scheduled refueling outage. The Division I 24 VDC disirlbutlon system is in the following configuration: - Battery 1 D870 is DISCONNECTED from the 15372 24-VOC Bus to support emergent corrective maintenance. - BOTH Battery Chargers 1D673 and 1 D674 are powered from the 1Y216 Instrument AC Distribution For unknown reasons, the 18216 ESS 480-VAC MCC is DEENERGIZED. Panel to support planned maintenance on 1 Y236. 4&t c2 4Vw-y Which ONE of the following correctly describes the status of lniermedlate Range Monitors (IRM)? A IRMs "PA", "C", "E", and "G' are deenergized and failed DOWNSCALE I&, B1.MG, t u w d 4 4 IRMs "EP, "D', 'IF, and "H" are energized and OPERABLE lRMs "A', "C", "E", and "G" CAN be inserted or withdrawn lRMs " 8, "D", "F". and 'H" CAN be inserted or withdrawn IRMs "E", 'ID", 'F", and "H" are energized and OPERABLE IRMs "A', "C", "E', and "G" CAN be inserted or withdrawn \\RMs "B", "D", "F", and "H' can NOT be Inserted or withdrawn C IRMs "A', "C", "E", and "G" are deenerglzed and failed UPSCALE lRMs W, "D', 'F", and "H' are energlzed and OPERABLE IRMs 'A", "C", "E', and "G" can NOT be inserted or withdrawn IRMs "8", "D", 'IF', and 'Hn CAN be inserted or withdrawn IRMs 'lBul "O", "F", and "H" are 8nergked and OPERABLE IRMs "B", 'D", 'IF", and "H" can NOT be inserted or withdrawn IRMs 'A", "C", "E", and "G" are deenergized and failed DOWNSCALE & r * &."o /%&z AtW D IRMs 'A", "C", "E", and "G" are deenergized and failed DOWNSCALE b+J+&& IRMs "A", "C", "E', and "G' can NOT be inserted or withdrawn z b l d w ; lRM6 'K, 'C", "E', and 'G" are powered ~K&I Tb672. The stem establishes that the assoclated battery is not 8WYable io provlde backup power to 1Df372 and that both battery chargers are abnomrally configured to be powered from the mme buss (1Y216). 1Y216 is powered from 18216 whlch, according to the stem, Is lost. Therelore. 24-VDC to 1D672 Is also lost The IRM Detector Ortve motors lor ell 8 IRW are powered hwn 1Y218. Although the normal power to 1Y218 I6 lost, the Nan-das6 1E Unlnterruptible Power Suppry (UPS) 10240 keepe lY218 powered from a 250-VDC battery and ES Buss 10236. Themfore all B detecbn can be moved. WRONG: IRM Deteaton 'B", " 0, "F", and "H' can be moved. IRMs "A", 'C", "E", and "(3' are deenerglzed and fall downscale VALfD DISTRACTOR: Aqplbant may eIToneouGy essoclate cMve motors with assoclated detectors. Apptlcant may believe detectos fall upscale. WRONQ: All lRMs are movable. VALID DISTRACTOR: Applicant may understand that lY218 is affected by the lass of 182i6 but forget that 1 ~ 2 1 8 is protested by an UPS. CHOICE (6) - NO CHOICE (C) - NO CHolCE (0) - NO WRONG: lRMs fall down, not up VALID DISTRACTOR. everyttrhg else IS correct. IWmncm 3 Comments and Question Modlflcatlon H m r y G109/28/05 - Please oonflrm that there la at least one lndloatnr In the plant (not neaessarily IRM) that wlll fall upscale an &as Of pow& otherwiee c and D ale not plausible. I can't think of any at the planla 1 worked. A: wlll ask. Easy flx by a160 varying Ihe status of Dk ll IRMs or DIU 1 IRMs. 1

BRO MSRO Q w d k n l D : 29861 OtWn: New 0hWmaY-l SSES Unit 1 is at full power. - APRM "E" is BYPASSED - APRM "F" is BYPASSED iFz the following neutron monitoring system status: ( 5 - IRM "A" is BYPASSED - fRM "H" is BYPASSED iL \\ &\\ describes the Reactor Protection System (RPS) status? (Divislon I) are AVAILABLE (Division II) are AVAILABLE (Division 11) are NOT Avallable (Division I) are NOT Available (Divislon II) are AVAILABLE (Dfvlslon 1) are AVAILABLE (Dlvlsion 11) are NOT Available (Division I) are NOT Avallable J urtlncati on CHOICE (A) - No WRONQ: Dlv I is not operable. .Iv ChJbt ' \\y 5") b \\$ d-=- -- 7-1 3 v\\> \\l.nc VALID DETRACTOR: Div II Is operabk. - T.S. 3.3.1.1 requlres ltre RPS Instrumentation for each Fumtkm In Table 3.3.1.I-1 to be OPERABLE - Table 3.3.1.1 -1 I Une 2.d, require8 that ttm APRM INOP funcUon be operable In Modes 1 6 2 wlth channels per trip system. ~ The INOP lunctbn requlm a RPS deenergjzatlon If the APRM Is DEdSCL whlle the IRM is UP - According to SSES TrainM Materlafs and Rant Dwgs Ml-C72-22 (Sheets 6, 7, 8,9), the APRM-blRM assoclatlon Is. - Division I: A-A, C-C, E-E, E43 and thls Diu le INOPERABLE because only one APRM INOP functlon Is funaHonal (A-A, E-E. E-G are bypaased) - Divlsion It: B-B, D-D, F-F, F-H and thls Dlv le OPERABLE because two APRM INOP functlons arefunc#ortal (F-F, F-H are bypassed) WRONQ: Div 1 and Dlv II are reversed. VAUD DISTRACTOR: Appllcant may ml8takR two bypaased channel8 for taklng two out of three h t l o n s away. WRONG: Dlv II is OPERABLE. VALID DISTRACTOR: Mlrror Image )urd+ CHOICE (B) - YES mimum of 2 CHOfCE (C) - NO CHOICE (D) -NO Todd 09/3wO5 - designated a untl In Ihe stem and deleted window dresslng concernlng shlR turnover Rich 1 O / O W - replaced OPERABLE wlth AVAILABLE to gat away f r m SRO level. NRC WA System/UA Sy.tun Number A1.02 RO 3.9 8FK) 4,O CFR Llnk (CFR 41.6 /45.6) Ablllty to predict andlor monltor changes In parameters aaaoclated wIth operating me AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITORILOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM controls lncludlng RPS status NRC KIA Generic 21 500 Average Power Range hltor/Locaf Power Flange Moni 5

. RO SRO CFR Unk

1. -40 I B R O RSRO QrwrtbnID 29610 Ollgh: Now lid Memory Lswl How Is the integrity of Primary Containment protected if one of the RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Instrument Sensing Lines break'?

Normally Open and are AUTOMATICALLY isolated in uipped with a Flow Oriiice, a MANUALLY Operated (PCW) and an Excess Flow Check Valve. ipped with a Flow Orifice, an AUTOMATCALLY ion Valve (PCIV) and an Excess Flow Check Valve. Isolated and are AUTOMATICALLY placed in JU8tlflCllhl CHOICE (A) - No y l WRONG: they do penetrate CTMT VAUD DISTRACTOR: Applicant may belleve that the seneom are EQ. CHOICE (8) -YES CHOICE (A) - NO WRONG: The PCIV Is Manual. VALID DISTRACTOR: everything else le correct. CHOICE (A) - No W R W : VALID DETRACTOR: GilOBMBH)6 -... penetrate the ACIC TWne.,.... these RCIC tNSTRUMENT. R. iSSeU0 b U d B l l l. Clarlfled by phone - revlslons made by Inserting RCIC' Todd W 3 0 K ) S - deleted long wlnded explanation of the llne from stem and replaced 'A' vvltb dlstractor better balanced Wlth "0" and more entlclng. NRC WA SystedEIA System Number K1.02 RO 3.5 SRO 3.5 CFR Link (CFR 41.2 to 41.9 I45.7 to 45.8) Knowledge d the physloal mneotions and/or museeffect reiatlonshlps between REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC) and the Nuclear bailer system 21700 Reactor Core tsoletlon Coollng System (RCIC) 0 NRC KIA Generk Sy.tem Number Ro SRO CFR Llnk

_# 41 1 Q R O USRO QwrtbnID: 29611 0-New ClMemaryW With SSES Unit 2 at full power, a Safety Relleve Valve (SRV) inadvertently opened and is now indicating CLOSED. What is the expected tailpipe temperature 45 minutes later if the SRV is leaking? Assume Suppression Pool Pressure is Select the closest answer. A 551 degrees Farenheit. 545 degrees Farenheit. C 296 degrees Farenheit. D 252 degrees Farenheit. JustlflcaUon I CHOICE (A) - No WRONQ: this Is Tsat far normal R W pressure of 1040 pig. VALID DISTRACTOR: TMI lesson learned. WRONG: this Is Tsat lor normal MS Header pressure of Be5 pdg. VALID DISTRACTOR: TMt lesson learned. CHOICE (C): YES At 1040 psig (1065 psla), the steam vapor enthalpy is 11 80 8 BTUllbm. Throttling Is an Isenthalpf process. Frm the WLer dlagram, we see that the expected tailplpe tempraturn Is In the violnlty of 280 deg F. From the tables, we can Interpolate to 288 deg F. WRONQ. thls le 2 deg F above the alarm setpolnt. VALID DISTRACTOR: the alarm setpoint is 250 deg F Referanc~ Commqnt. and Oucntlon Modtflcatlon Hlrtory GI1 09126/06 - KIA mlmtoh. R: will rtxmslder. Agree that thle doea nol DIRECTLY test automatic ADS valve operatlon. But Applloant should understand INhether tallplpe temperatures are trendlng to amblent or not following an open SRV. Todd 08/30105 - verify dth SSES that 45 minutes ellrnlnales ' D as po(entlally correct. CHOICE (B) - NO CHOICE (0) - No I NRC WA SystemlUA System Number A3.01 RO 4.2 SRO 4.3 CFR Link (CFR 41.7146.7) Abllky to monltor automatic operatbns of the AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM including: ADS valve opwaUon 2 1 BOO Automatic Depressudzalion System 0 NRC WA Generlc system Number RO SRO CFfl Link

1. ,42A @RO

@SRO QusrtknID: 29812 Origh: clkw 0 Mmnrory Law1 A loss of 250-VDC Load Center 1 D662 would affect the J2)- Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIV) A (1) High Pressure Cdant Injection (HPCI) .$ 5 c n B (1) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) C (1) High Pressure W a n t Injection (HPCI) D (4) Reactor Core lsolatlon Cooling (RCIC) (2) Outboard (2) Outboard f (2) Jnboard 5 (/&dd (2) Inboard Justlf lostlon From TM-OP-OBB, the 10264 end 10274 busses are poMlredfrom 1D662. 1D6N is powered from the 1D663 Battery Charger or the 1 DBBO Battery. The stem specilks a loss uf 1 De82. Therefore, h e cause of this lass fs Irrelevant. However, the succeesful Applicant must recognhs that loss of 1 D682 wlll also c a w a loss of 1 D274 and 1 D264. Alternatively, the soccessful Appllcant may know that RClC DC-powered MOVs 818 powered horn Dhr 1 and HPCl DC-powered MOVs are powered from Dhr II of the 250-VDC system. 10284 and 10274 provkle power to the HPCI outboard PCNs. WRONG: It's HPCI, not RClC VALID DISTRACTOR: correct valves. WRONG: W rang Valves VALID DISTRACTOR: Cwrect system WRONG: Wrong vahms and system. VALID DISTRACTOR: Mfmr Image. CHOICE (A) - YES CHOICE (6) - No CHOICE (C) - No CmllGE (D) - No and Outboard MOV. R: INBD Vvs AC pwrd to prevent eparklng Inside PC lha! oould lgnlte H2 I present. OTBD Vva are DC powwed for relWlity & diversity. Added text to jualitlcatbn section e@aIn\\ng 25GVDC dlstrlbution. Also added word "PUMP' to stem to preclude "B' fmm belng a potentially correct second answer. HV-149F084, RClC TURB EXH VAC BKR OB VLV, is powered from 1 D264 and Is m Outboard PCIV.

2. ~

~ d d ogimrn5 - OK. NRC KJA SystemlEIA System Number K6.02 RO 3.0 SRO 3.2 CFR Unk (CFR 41.7 145.7) Knowledge of the effect that a loss ot rnaltunctlon of D.C. dectrloal dlstrlbutlon wlll have on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUT-OFF 22300 Prlrnary Containment Isolation Systemn\\luciear Steam 2 NRC KIA Generlc Syatem NUInber R a SRO CFR Llnk

SSES lost all offsite power (LOOP), During the tfansient, a Main Steam (MS) line on SSES Unit 2 broke and caused Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) to CLOSE. Subsequently, the control mom is EVACUATED and you go to the SSES Unit 2 Remote Shutdown Panel (1C201). The following condltions now exist: - BOTH the Upper and Lower Relay rooms are inaccessible. - Drywell Pressure is 1.9 psig. - Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Pressure is cycling belween 1,180 psig and 1,150 psQ. - Safety Relief Vatve (SRV) control has been transferred to the Remote Shutdown Panel. What functional mode, if any, are the Safety flellef Valves (SRV) operating in7 A B C D (&/ jh'J Overpressure RELIEF operation Low pressure ECCS (ADS} Jumtlncatkn Complete rewrlte of orlglnal questlon. Old question saved as Order 431 CHOICE (A) - YES There are 18 SRVs. In the SAFETY mode, two SRVs open at 1176, elx SRVs open at 11 95 and etght SRVs open at 1205 pslg. In the SAFETY mode, the SRVs close at Q7% of set pressure. 97% of 1176 IS 1140. 97% of 11 &5 Is 1160. Iherefore, 11 80 to ? 150 Is a reasonable expectation for RPV pressure in thls condition. WRONQ: RELIEF mode Is incorrect - pressures tao hi#^ VAUD DISTRACTOR: Thls I8 one mode of SRV opsratlon WRONG: Pressure Is not steedily lowering, VALID DISTRACTOR: Thh ie one mode of SRV operatlon. CHOICE (0) - NO WRONQ: R C C would not cause prmsure to cycle. VAUD DISTRACTOR: RClC is one method of conbollhg RPV pressure If MSlVs dose. ~, CHOICE (B) - NO CHOICE (C) - NO Comments and QuesUon Modlflcatlon Hlitory NOTE: per ON-100409, ADS valvee can be operated from the Relay Rooms. Re-correct answer to 'A' after telephone dlscussbn wlth SSES. Accumulators will provlde 601118 operatlon d SRVs A, 6. C from the RSD h., thls mndltlon. Operation In S A F m mode wlll not deplete Vle eccumulator. 3 ? 7 7 ? QUESTION: woLl(d me accumulators have depdeted In REUEF mode by now7 ? ? 7 7 7 7 7

1. GI1 09/26/06 - believes SRVs always operate In Overpresssure Rdlel mode before safety relief mode. Thls Will deplets the air supply. Questlon may have NO correct answer If mhls Is true.

R: The stem condltlons State that pressure Is cydlng bmveen 11 80 and 1150. At these hlgher vaIue5, the SRVs have to be In the Safety mode because RPV pressures would be lower In the Rellef mode. Applkant should be sUmciently famlliar wlth the setpdnts to recognize thls. m y need to delete second half of question regarding whlch SRVe have controls at the RSD to make the entire question plaualble. Dlstractors cib RELIEF, ADS, RCICIHPCI. AQree to toss second half out and make correotlons to remalnlng dlstractors. Essentlatly remDte the questlon. Saved old one as 431, NOTE: from ON-100-009, learned that Automatic AEUEF mode operatbn Is NOT poaslMe when m t r d hafI8ferred to RSD panel. May be able to we this I f further twtelan required. ~

Todd 09/30/05 - grammatical correction to accommodate dlstractor ID'. NRC WA s y S t 0 m A Syatem 23900 RelieVSafetyVelw Number K5.02 RO 3.7 8RO 3.8 CFR Llnk (CFR 41.5 145.3) Knowledge Df the operational lrnplicaliona of the Safely funclbn of SRV operation as It applk to RUJEWSAFETY VALVES 2 NRC WA Generic SY-m Number RO SRO CFR Llnk

Reactor power is 27% and rising pursuant to a normal reactor would cause a ROD BLOCK? A Intermediate Range Monitor Detector is FULLY INSERTED. B Main Turbine FIRST-STAGE Pressure instrument fails HIGH. (4j) K/# *i$&,&CCh C WIDE RANGE RPV Water Level REFERENCE leg ruptures. D One Main Steam Flow instrument fails DOWNSCALE. ~ ~ ~~ JtmtMccltlon WRONG: At 50% power, the MOOE swltch Is in RUN - that bypasses the IRM UPSCALE Sarem and Block VALID DISTRACTOR: Fully lnserted would yiekl a Blook If not bypassed because the IRM would read >108% WRONG: Thls would not cause a rod block VALID DETRACTOR: First Stage pressure is an lnput to RSCS whlch would cause a rod blmk tf R faded low. WRONG: RW Water Level has IX) Rod Block functlon and tMs fallure would cause a HIGH condlblon. VALID D(S7RACTOR: The Narrow Range Instrument Is an Input to RNLCS but Is not sent onto to RWM lrom there. Moreover, the Ref leg rupture would cause a HIGH level lndlcatlon that w f d NOT actuate any other prolectlve features that could oame an RPS Scram whlch would block rods. 1 CHOICE (A) - NO CHOICE (e) - No CHOICE (C) - No CHOICE (D) - YES -yY 8 Commonts and Ouestlon Modmcstlon Hlstory Gfl W26/06 - K/A mlsmatch. R: Disagree. MS flow does affeot RWM. FWLCS uses Steam Row a8 an Input. FWLCS also sends TOTAL Steam Aow to the RWM to detetmlne If the plant Is abovelbelow LPSP or LPAP. At 60%, each steam line Is inputthg 12.5%. If one goes to zero, the TOTAL steam flow pea m 37.5%, Thls Is the ONLY relatlonshlp between the Reactor Water Level Control System and the Rod Worth Mlnlmlrer. The followlng Is oopled from TM-OP-0310 Main Steam Line (MSL) flow I6 measured by the Feed Water Level Control (FWLC) System to determine when the plant Is operatha at 22 percent of Rated Thermal Power (ATP). This manltored parameter Is Inputted to the Rocs and PlCSY to actlvate the LPSP. The setpolnt can be adjusted by varying the Mp value in the MSL flow sensor. Noted oomputatlanal and typogmphkal errm: Changed 50% power to 27% to ensum loss of one M6 flow Instrument puts total steam flow below LPSP of 22%. GI1 is now OK. Conected ~ ~ I W I C B to TM-OP-031 D from TM-OP-078K. NRC IVA SystenWA Syatsm Number K3.03 RO 2.7 SRO 2.8 CFR Llnk (CFR 41.7 J45.4) Knowledged the effect that a loss or malfumtion of the REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM will have on Rod worth minimizer (Plant-Speclflc) NRC KIA Generk Swtem N u m b RO SRO CFR Llnk 25900 Reaclor Water Level Control System 2

A B C D

1. 1. 45A B R O 2lSRO QuertknID:

29815 O M : Mod Q Memory Level Folowing a Reactor Feed Pump Turbine (RFPT) trip, in addition to the autornatlc interlocks, what Operator actions must be MANUALLY satisfied before RFP Suction (HV-10616) NOT Full Closed RFP Disch (HV-10603) CLOSED Mln Flow (FIC-10604) set for 2,000 gpm RFPT Stop Valves (SV) are RESET Trip Conditions CLEARED or BYPASSED RFPT Exhaust (HV-12731) 100% OPEN RFP Min Flow (FV-10604) (tl AUTO RFP DSCh (HV-10603) NOT 100% CLOSED RFPT Exhaust (HV-12731) 100% OPEN RFPT Control Valves 100% CLOSED RFPT LP Is01 (HV-12709) 100% CLOSED RFPT HP ISOI (HV12710) iOO% CLOSED RFP Min Flow (FV-10604) in MAN Mln Flow (FIC-10604) set for 2,000 gpm RFP Disch (HV-10603) CLOSED EAP Control (SGC32-1 R601) at 0 Justlflcrtlon WRONQ: MIX of Autnmatlc and Manual requlrements on the punp side. AUTO Is Incorrect. VALID DISTRACTOR: Mix of AUTO and MAN requlrements. WRONG: SVs s/b NOT RESET. Trip condltlons Is AUTO. Dlsch Vv s/b full closed VALID DISTRACTOR Mix of AUTO and Menua. WRONG: These are all autornatlc interlocks In thelr correct state - turbine slde. VAUD DISTRACTOR: they are Interlocks that would prevent RFPT Rem. CHOICE (A) - No CHOICE (B) - NO CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (D) - YES References Modlfled from SSES Exam Bank essay question. OW 912005: Per SSES staff, MSC must be on LSS par slmulatw attempt to reset RFFT Trip dwlng prevlous weekend. Changed answer "D" to reflect MSC on LSS as an Automatic Interlock. GI1 09/26M5 - Change justtlicallan for "D' (correct answer). Todd 09/30/05 - too busy. reduced lo four Manual actlons. origlnal saved as 451. R corrected )ustmcatlon. NRC WA SystemlUA syatm 26900 Reactor Water Level Contml System Number A4.08 RO 3.4 SA0 3.1 CFR Llnk (CFR 41.7 145.5 b 45.8) Abillty to manually aperate and/or rnonltor TDRFP lockout met: TDRFP In the mM laom NRC KIA Generic srptem Number Ro SRO CFR Unk

5 4 6 1 @RO BSRO QusrtknID: 29616 orlpln: NOW 0 Memorybvel The following conditions exist on SSES Unit1 : - Recently entered Mode 4 in preparation for a planned refueling outage. - Primary Containment is PURGING. SSES Unit 2 has a Loss of Coobnt Accident (LOCA) and DRYWELL PRESSURE quickly dsas above 1.72 pslg. Which ONE of the following describes the correct ventilation system response? A All three Reactor Building Zones (1, 2 and 3) Isolate and autmatblly reconfigure to L RECIRCULATION. Standby Gas Treatment (SG'TS)automatically takes suction on the Reactor Building Exhaust ventilation stack. SSES Unit 7 PURGE autmatlcally ISOLATES. B Reactor Bullding Zones 2 and 3 Isolate and automatically reconfigure to RECIRCULATION. Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) automatically takes s u c h on the Reactor Butktlng Exhaust ventilation stack. SSES Unit 1 PURGE automatically ISOLATES. C Reactor Building Zones 2 and 3 lsolate and automatically reconfigure to RECIRCULATION. \\ Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) automatically takes suction on the Reactor Building Recirculation plenum. SSES Unn 1 PURGE Continues. D All three Reactor Building Zones (1,2 and 3) Isolate and automatically reconfigure to RECIRCULATION. Standby Gas Treatment (SGTS) automatically takes suction on the Reactor Building Reclrculatlon plenum. SSES Unit 1 PURGE Continues. JurtHlcation CHOICE (A) - NO WRONa Only Zones 2 and 3 Isdate. SGTS does not take suction on the Exhaust Vent VALID DISTRACTOR: CHOICE (B) - NO I WRONQ: SQTS does NOT take suction on the Exhaust Vent VAUD DISTRACTOR: reasonable m b m m to believe SQTS would draw sucUon m the nortnaJ exhaust path. ZHOICE (C) -YES - Zonea 2 (Unit 2) and 3 (Common) lsolate and reoonflgure lo Redrc SQTS automatlcalty takes suction on RB Reclrc plenum Unaffeoted unit dom not isolate. Therefore, purge oontlnues. WRONG: Only Zones 2 end 3 isolate CHOICE (D) - NO

VALID DISTRACTOR: Purge continues and SCiTS suctlon Is correct. I_._- B Comments and Q u a s h Modltloatlon HMory Confirm with SSES that unaffacted unit's purge wlII continue. Gll O B M W - OK Todd OaMoros - OK NRC WA System/uA Sptem Number K1.O1 RO 3.4 SRO 3.6 CFR Link (CFR 41.2 to 41.9 146.7 to 45.8) Knowledge of the physlcal connectlone and/or cawe4ect reletlonshlps between STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM and the following Reector building ventllatbn system 28100 Stmdby Gee Treabnent System 0 NRC WA Generlc SyItsm Flumbsr RO SRO CFR Llnk

RO EXAM SSES experienced a seismic event. Consequently, a loss of offsite power (LOOP) occurred. Both units have establish Reactor Pressure and Inventory control using Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC). All 4.16 kVAC and 480 VAC ESS buses are energized. One hour later, the Control Room Operators are investigating a slow rise in Drywell Pressure on SSES Unit 1. Conditions rapidly deteriorate and the following conditions develop: On SSES Unit 1: - Drywell Pressure is 2.1 psig. - Reactor Pressure Vessel pressure is 395 psig. - Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps lP202 B, C, D are running. - Core Spray (CS) pumps 1 P206 B, C, D are running. - Emergency Service Water (ESW) pumps OP504 B, C, D are running. On SSES Unit 2: - Control Rod Drive (CRD) pump 2P132A is running. - Reactor Building Chiller 2K206A is running. Which ONE of the following describes the cause of these conditions and the required actions? A B C D Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) "A' failed to start. Perform ON-104-201, LOSS OF 4KV BUS 1A (1A201) or ON-204-201, LOSS OF 4KV BUS 2A (2A201) to start the EDG. Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) "A" is running but not powering 1A201 or 2A201. Perform ON-1 04-201 LOSS OF 4KV BUS 1A (1A201) and ON-204-201, LOSS OF 4KV BUS 2A (2A201). ESS bus 114201 8 2A201 deenergized because Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) " A TRIPPED. Perform ON-1 04-201 I LOSS OF 4KV BUS 1A (1A201) or ON-204-201, LOSS OF 4KV BUS 2A (2A201) to restart the EDG. ESS bus 1A201 deenergized because breaker 1A20104 (EDG Supply) tripped OPEN. Perform ON-1 04-20?, LOSS OF 4KV BUS 1A (1A201).

1. 48A a30 EISSRO QusrrtknID:

28667 O m. New a MOW LM SSES has a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) "A" fails to start. Within Jifminutes, Operators start EDG "E" and energize 1A201 and 2A201. Both VITAL AC UPS (1 0666 & 20666) are energked from their -(l)- source. +# qw All four NON-CLASS I E INSTRUMENT AC UPS (1 D240,1D130,20240,2D130) are energired from their -{2)- source. Note: UPS = UNINTERRUPTIBCE POWER SUPPLIES A 250-VDC ALTERNATE source (1 D662,2D142). B 250-VDC PREFERRED source (1D662,2D142). C 48PVAC PREFERRED source (18248,28246). D 480-VAC ALTERNATE source (1 8246,2B246). 250-VDC ALTERNATE source (1 D652,10662,20652,2D662) 480-VAC PREFERRED source (1 6236,16246,26236,26246) 480-VAC BACKUP source (16216,1B226,28216,26226) 250-VDC ALTERNATE source (1 D243,l D133,2D243,2D133). &j k , Jualncallon CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: Vital: Pfd v. Alt. Y lnst wrong source of 250-VDC & wodd not be on 250-VDC C W C E (B) -YES CHOICE (C) - NO WRONG: under 20 minutes. Vltal: 4WVAC is not PM. Inst: woukl not swing to BN cause EDG "F brought on in CHOICE (D) - NO WRONQ: HOD because Appllcant must distinguish LOOP from Blackout. Here, fowoWlng B LOOP, the EDGs respond to power the ES busses. Vbl: M reason to shlft to 4BO-VAC alt lnst would have ahlfted back to Pfd W V A C source RI~WUWM Commenta M d OUwtbn Modlflcitlon Hl8tOQf GllO8/26/05 - "A" and "C-wlkh "all..components operate as designed'. That is, everyone should know 1E equlpment will be energized. Use a different term (RPS MG Set or Instrument AC Dlstrjbutlon Panel 1Y216, etc) rather than "CLASS 1E". Answer B does not appear mrrect. The way I read the references the preferred will be lost for about 10 seconds and the UPS wIII Nn on DC. Then when the EDG energizes the bus the UPS wlll automatlcaUy shift back to preferred. B I R: WOI revlsit this question Added 'one rnhute after to expressly show questton Is esking for condttbns after the translent. Suggestion: don't say "Class 7 E' and lust Identify the buss Itsslf. O b ~ ~ t ? ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ b ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ b ~ ~ ~ O O ~ ~ b ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ' C O M P L E T E R E W R I T E 2 7 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 6 b Todd 09/30/06 - 681118 question with substantlal revklans. Saved old one as 481.

NRC KIA SysteWA System 26200 Uninterruptable Power Supply (A.C.D.C.) 2 Number K6.01 RO 2.7 SA0 2 CFR Llr (CFR 41.7 I45.7) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or mehnction of A.C. eleatrid pourer wlll have on the UNINERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (A.CJ0.C.) NRC WA Generlc syrtrm Number RO SRO CFR Llnk

QRO MSRO QuwUonID: 29616 Omh: 250 VDC Battery Charger 2D683 has the following front panel indications: - Battery Charger Float-Equalize switch is in FLOAT. - Battery Charger Interval Timer set to FIVE HOURS. Which ONE of the following is correct concerning charger operation? A Output voltage will be between 279 and 287 VDC for five hours, then lower to between 265 B Output voltage will be between 265 and 271 VDC for five hours, then bwer to between 279 ? A and 271 VDC thereafter. and 267 VDC thereafter. a p ? ~ c Output voltage will be between 279 and 287 VDC for five hours and will remain betweem 279 and 287 VDC thereafter. D Output voltage wilt be between 265 and 271 VDC for flve harts and will remain between 265 and W D C thereafter. Justlf laation Per TM-OP-OBB and OP-l(2)8&001, thls provides Equallrlng Charge for five hours, then automatloally reconflgures to the FLOAT mode. WRONG: Reverse of conect mswr VALID DISTRACTOR: First FLOAT, then EQUALIZE WRONQ: Stay on EQUALIZE VALID DISTRACTOR: Correot If FlOnPEquallze swltch in EQUALIZE W RONQ: Stay on Float VALID DISTRACTOR: Applbant my believe thet the Float-Equalize swltch must be in EQUALIZE to conduct charge. CHOICE (A) - YES CHOICE (B) - NO CHOICE (C) - NO CHOICE (D) - NO CommOnto and Quutton Modlflcatlon - Hktary 011 09/28/05 - add to stem:... swltch has just been da!d In FLOAT. This ensures the full five hours at 279-287Wrll occur; makIw 'A" correct R: added 'up to" in each R ~ W choloe. Pfd concept of Operator on tour discoverhg these oondlllons. deleted "up to" and added 'is" Lo the stern. Todd 09/30/05 - OK NRC KIA SystemlEIA system 28300 D.C. Electrkel Dlstrlbutlon Number K1.02 RO 3.2 SRO 3.3 CFR Link (CFR 41.2 to 41.91 45.7 to 45.8) Knowledge of the physical Wnneotlons and/or cause-effect relaUonshlps between D.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION and Battery ch8wr and battery 0 NRC WA Generic syl-Number RO SRO CFR Unk

OuoauontD: 291119 orlgtn: Mod B ylemayh\\nl and stabilize Diesel Generator load at 300 - 500 KW before I A To prevent an ENGtNE Trip on Reverse Power, by adjusting the Olesel Generator V o b w B To prevent a STARTUP TRANSFORMER TAP Change which can cause a Diesel Generator c To prevent an ENGtNE Trip on Reverse Power. by adjusting the Diesel Gen6rator Speed D To prevent a STARTUP TRANSFORMER TAP Change which can cause a Diesel Generator Adjust (HS-00053). Trip, by adjusting the Diesel Generator Voltage Adjust (HS-00053). Governor (HS-00054). Trip, by adJusting ttre Diesel Generator Speed Governor (HS-00054). Jurtlflcmtlon B CHOICE (A) - No WRONG: adjusthe voltage ohangea reaotlve load (WAR not Kw). VALKI DISTAACTOR: Coneat Engine trlp CHOICE (e) - No WRONG: arqwtiw changes reaotive bed (WAR nd KW). VALID DISTRACTOR: WU WMR TAP Changer adjustments oan c~uee Effi tdps but thls is not why REAL load reduced. RmCttVe h d Is mlnknlzed (kept close b ~8m) to p e n t TAP changes. CHOICE (C) - YES CHOICE (0) - NO WRONG: S/U XFMR TAP Changer adjuabnents can muse EDG trtps but this is not why REAL load Is redwed. Reactive load is minknlzed (kept close to zero) to prevent TAP ahanges. VALID DISTRACTOR: Correct DG control scheme. C o m r n e E d Owmtion kiadlllcrUon H M O ~ ~ 9 Todd 00/30/05 - revlaed from (1) (2) format to slmpte sentence structure. 011 09/28/06 - OK NRC KIA SystemlUA System 26400 Emergency Generatars (DleseVJst) Number A1.aQ RO 3.0 SRO 3.1 CFR tlnk (CFR 41.5 i 45.5) Abillty to predlct ador m&or changes In parameters assodated Mth operatln~ the EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEUJET) controls including Matntalnlng rnlnlrnum load on emeraency generator (to prevent reverse power) 0 NRC K/A Generlc SWtbm Numb# RO SRO CFR Lhk}}