ML053400205

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Letter to Jim Riccio Re Proposal by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to a Install Waterborne Barrier Device at Millstone
ML053400205
Person / Time
Site: Millstone  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 12/02/2005
From: Tracy G
NRC/NSIR/DNS
To: Riccio J
Greenpeace
References
Download: ML053400205 (3)


Text

December 2, 2005 Mr. Jim Riccio Greenpeace 702 H Street, NW Suite 300 Washington, DC 20001

Dear Mr. Riccio:

During the September 1, 2005, public security meeting, you expressed a concern regarding a proposal by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to install a waterborne barrier device at the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant.

As you know, the NRCs mission is to protect public health and safety and the environment, and to ensure that licensee activities are not inimical to the common defense and security. As an independent regulatory authority, we do not provide our licensees with physical protection equipment. Rather, we establish the requirements licensees must meet as they develop security plans and implementing measures. To ensure compliance, we provide oversight of licensee security measures through inspections and force-on-force testing to verify that requirements have been met.

In August 2003, DHS proposed (and proposed funding for) a waterborne barrier project at Millstone. NRC facilitated DHS interactions with appropriate members of the licensee staff and advised DHS on NRC security requirements. It is our understanding that Dominion Nuclear ultimately declined the DHS offer to install a waterborne barrier. It should be noted that Dominion has used other means to achieve compliance with NRC physical security requirements to protect against waterborne attacks. Subsequently, on October 29, 2004, the NRC staff completed a comprehensive review of the Millstone physical security plan and determined that it meets applicable regulatory requirements.

NRC regulations require licensees to protect against radiological sabotage, including waterborne threats, in a manner that provides high assurance that licensed activities do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. This includes either prevention or mitigation of the waterborne attack on the intake structures.

Should you have any questions, please call me at (301) 415-6828.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Glenn M. Tracy, Director Division of Nuclear Security Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

Mr. Jim Riccio Greenpeace 702 H Street, NW Suite 300 Washington, DC 20001

Dear Mr. Riccio:

During the September 1, 2005, public security meeting, you expressed a concern regarding a proposal by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to install a waterborne barrier device at the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant.

As you know, the NRCs mission is to protect public health and safety and the environment, and to ensure that licensee activities are not inimical to the common defense and security. As an independent regulatory authority, we do not provide our licensees with physical protection equipment. Rather, we establish the requirements licensees must meet as they develop security plans and implementing measures. To ensure compliance, we provide oversight of licensee security measures through inspections and force-on-force testing to verify that requirements have been met.

In August 2003, DHS proposed (and proposed funding for) a waterborne barrier project at Millstone. NRC facilitated DHS interactions with appropriate members of the licensee staff and advised DHS on NRC security requirements. It is our understanding that Dominion Nuclear ultimately declined the DHS offer to install a waterborne barrier. It should be noted that Dominion has used other means to achieve compliance with NRC physical security requirements to protect against waterborne attacks. Subsequently, on October 29, 2004, the NRC staff completed a comprehensive review of the Millstone physical security plan and determined that it meets applicable regulatory requirements.

NRC regulations require licensees to protect against radiological sabotage, including waterborne threats, in a manner that provides high assurance that licensed activities do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. This includes either prevention or mitigation of the waterborne attack on the intake structures.

Should you have any questions, please call me at (301) 415-6828.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Glenn M. Tracy, Director Division of Nuclear Security Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response ADAMS PACKAGE: ML053400205 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\Riccio-Millstone letter.wpd To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy OFFICE DNS RI DHS USCG DNS NAME J Marshall GSmith (via phone)

LStanton (verbal)

ADahl (via email)

GTracy DATE 11/17/05 11/30/05 (w/comment) 12/1/05 11/30/05 12/02/05 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY