ML052780336
| ML052780336 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/2005 |
| From: | Archie J South Carolina Electric & Gas Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 05-S01-01 | |
| Download: ML052780336 (4) | |
Text
Jeffrey B. Archie Vice President, Nuclear Operations 803.345.4214 A SCANA COMPANY September 28, 2005 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir / Madam:
Subject:
VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER 2005-S01-01)
ENTRY OF UNAUTHORIZED EMPLOYEE INTO THE PROTECTED AREA
Reference:
Jeffrey B. Archie (SCE&G) Letter to Document Control Desk (NRC), RC-05-0095 Licensee Event Report (LER 2005-S01-00), Entry of Unauthorized Employee into the Protected Area, June 22, 2005 Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2005-S01-01, for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS). This report identifies the entry of an improperly badged South Carolina Electric & Gas Company employee into the VCSNS Protected Area and is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 73, Appendix G, I(b). Supplemental information is denoted by a vertical revision bar in the right side margin.
Should you have any questions, please call Mr. Ronald B. Clary at (803) 345-47--.
Very truly yours, B. rc JT/JBA/dr Attachment c: N. 0. Lorick M. P. Findlay S. A. Byrne T. P. O'Kelley N. S. Carns K. M. Sutton T. G. Eppink (w/o attachment) EPIX Coordinator R. J. White INPO Records Center W. D. Travers J&H Marsh & McLennan R. E. Martin NSRC NRC Resident Inspector RTS (C-05-1434)
P. Ledbetter File (818.07)
D. L. Abstance DMS (RC-05-0155)
SCE&G I Virgil (. Summer Nuclear Stalion . P.O.Box 88J.enkinsville, South Carolina 29065. T(803)345.5209 .wwwscana.com
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004 (7.2001) COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to Industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Management Branch (17-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, DC 20555-0001. or by Intemet e-mail to bjsl@nrc.gov. and to the Desk Officer. Office of (See reverse for required number of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104). Office of Management digits/characters for each block) and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.
- 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station 05000395 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Entry of Unauthorized Employee into the Protected Area
- 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL REV M FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MO DAY YEAR YEAR NO
.NUMBER MO DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 04 25 2005 2005 - S01 - 01 09 28 2005
- 9. OPERATING 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMIT1rED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
MODE 6 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) l 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER _202201 - 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(aY2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL 0% _20.2203(a)(1) l 50.36(c)(1)(iXA) l 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 73.71 (a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) _ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) _ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) _ 73.71 (a)(5)
-_ 20.2203(a)(2)(i) _ 50.36(c)(2) _ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) X OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)iii) _ 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) Specify In Abstract below or In 20.2203(a)(2)(Ov) _ 50.73(a)(2)(i)A) __ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) NRC orm366A
,;' >- 20.2203(a)(2)(v) _ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) _ 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OCFR3Ap.
'i 73 i(b)l 20.2203(a)(2)(vt) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vifl)(A) -
- X '
-_ 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) -
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
R. B. Clary, Mgr., Nuclear Licensing 1(803) 345-4757
- 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT CAUSE CASSYSTEM YTM OPNN ANU- REPORTABLE TO EPIX TCOPONENT .~CMOET CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FAMANU-CTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX A J
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR l___YES_____(If____yes,______complete_________EXPECTED_______ SUBMISSION IYES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X NO DATE_____
- 16. ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, I.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
At approximately 0745 hours0.00862 days <br />0.207 hours <br />0.00123 weeks <br />2.834725e-4 months <br /> on April 25, 2005, a non-nuclear South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) employee, without a V. C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) issued security/door key card badge, was allowed access to the VCSNS Protected Area (PA). This employee was wearing a company ID badge which is almost identical to the VCSNS badge with the exception of a small colored stripe located at the bottom of the badge.
The employee was accompanied by an authorized VCSNS employee all the time he was performing work in the PA except for a few minutes while he was in the restroom and approximately three minutes when he was en route to exit the PA. Upon his attempt to exit at 1422 hours0.0165 days <br />0.395 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.41071e-4 months <br />, it was discovered by a security officer that he had entered the PA without the correct badge.
Interviews with the non-nuclear SCE&G employee and the VCSNS employee accompanying him determined that the non-nuclear SCE&G employee did process through all search equipment on entry to the PA. No vital areas were entered by the non-nuclear SCE&G employee during his time in the PA.
The cause of this event is determined to result from a) Standards, Policies, and Administrative Controls not being effectively communicated to plant and security personnel, b) security access training emphasized personnel identification, not authenticating the badge, and c) there is no equipment to alarm, detect, or prevent this type of event in processing personnel into the PA.
Corrective actions are to provide necessary emphasis and communication on proper authentication of security badges and to install turnstiles with key card readers and biometric scanners for access to the PA.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
- 1. FACILITY NAME I 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE lA SEQUENTIAL REVISION V.C. Summer Nuclear Station 05000395 NUMBER - NUMBER 2 OF 3
-2005 -0 So _ 01 17'. NAI'K1AI IVt (IT more space is required, use acicionat copies or ivKic t-orm JIDDA).
PLANT IDENT CATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor EOUIPMENT IDENTICATION N/A IDENTIFICATION OF EVENT A VCSNS security officer observed an individual at the access portal exit door AP01 having difficulty while attempting to exit the PA of the VCSNS. The officer discovered that the individual did not have a VCSNS security badge but did have a SCE&G company identification badge. The two badges are similar with the exception of a small colored stripe located at the bottom of the badge. The officer notified the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and then escorted the individual out of the PA where the non-nuclear SCE&G employee was detained for questioning and verification of his identification.
EVENT DATE April 25, 2005 Condition Evaluation Report CER 05-1434 was generated to address investigation, cause, and corrective actions associated with this event.
REPORT DATE Supplemental Report: September 28, 2005 Initial Report: June 22, 2005 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT I Mode 6, 0% Power- Refueling Outage 15 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT At approximately 0745 hours0.00862 days <br />0.207 hours <br />0.00123 weeks <br />2.834725e-4 months <br /> on April 25, 2005, a non-nuclear SCE&G employee, without a VCSNS issued security/door key card badge, was allowed access to the VCSNS PA. This employee was wearing a Company ID badge which is almost identical to the VCSNS badge with the exception of a small colored stripe located at the bottom of the badge. The employee was accompanied by an authorized VCSNS employee all the time he was performing work in the PA except for a few minutes while he was in the restroom and approximately three minutes when he was en route to exit the PA. Upon his attempt to exit at 1422 hours0.0165 days <br />0.395 hours <br />0.00235 weeks <br />5.41071e-4 months <br />, it was discovered by a security officer that he had entered the PA without the correct badge.
NRC -Form 366A
(7-2001)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
- 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE SEQUENTIAL REVISION V.C. Summer Nuclear Station 05000395 YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 3 OF 3 2005 - Sol - 01
- 17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
CAUSE OF EVENT The cause of this event is determined to result from a) Standards, Policies, and Administrative Controls not being effectively communicated to plant and security personnel, b) security access training emphasized personnel identification, not authenticating the badge, and c) there is no equipment to alarm, detect, or prevent this type of event in processing personnel into the PA. This cause was determined through the VCSNS Corrective Action Program by Root Cause Analysis Report RCA 05-1434.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT The improperly badged individual, that accessed the VCSNS PA, is an employee at an SCE&G non-nuclear plant who was "on loan" to VCSNS for the refueling outage (RF-15). The VCSNS employee that escorted this non-nuclear SCE&G employee into the PA indicated that he was expecting this employee to call him upon arrival at the Access Portal. Following receipt of a call from the Access Portal, the VCSNS employee exited the PA and met the non-nuclear SCE&G employee near the entrance to the security search area. The VCSNS employee noticed the non-nuclear SCE&G employee wore a SCE&G ID badge, but failed to realize that a visitor badge was also required for entrance into the PA. The two badges are almost identical with the exception of a small colored stripe located at the bottom of the badge.
Both employees processed through the security search area. The VCSNS employee allowed the non-nuclear SCE&G employee to tailgate through the PA entrance door. The security officer, on duty at the Access Portal, also failed to recognize the difference in the badges between the nuclear and non-nuclear employees. According to the security computer system, this entrance occurred at 0743 hours0.0086 days <br />0.206 hours <br />0.00123 weeks <br />2.827115e-4 months <br />.
Both employees proceeded to the electrical shop where the non-nuclear SCE&G employee was assigned to work with another VCSNS employee. During the time of the unauthorized entry, the non-nuclear SCE&G employee work location was at the 412' elevation of the Turbine Building, and was in the company of VCSNS employees continuously with the exception of a few minutes in a restroom, and again when he was en route to exit the PA at the Access Portal. There was no adverse impact from this unauthorized entry. The non-nuclear SCE&G employee never entered any vital areas.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS This event was reported under Event Notification #41634 at 1521 hours0.0176 days <br />0.423 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.787405e-4 months <br /> on April 25, 2005 in accordance with 10CFR73, Appendix G, Reportable Safeguards Events. Corrective actions are to provide necessary emphasis and communication on proper authentication of security badges through training and administrative controls to VCSNS Security personnel. A plant modification has been initiated to install turnstiles with key card readers and biometric scanners for access to the PA.
PRIOR OCCURENCES None.
NRC Form 366A (7-2001)