ML052030479
| ML052030479 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 06/07/2004 |
| From: | Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0282 | |
| Download: ML052030479 (2) | |
Text
NMi Commined to Nuceba Ezcetlenc,;
Point Beach Refuelin'g Outage, Edition'
.i U h
-DAY rlI~fli' UF65 KrLLEME flT BEACH
- 1t June 7,L2004
(:.;,
I I-. I i I I
I CONTACT INFORMATION Control Room x291 Work Control Center - x6703-OCC -.x 7190 --Option 1 Lessons Learned - x719p - Option 2 Plant Status - x7190 - Option 3 OPutage to, Date-Acmomplishments.
,,,1-Perso r Safety
- OSHA
- -. -i.-:..
inel
' iast 24 Hours.
Ro hI
.1: -.
II I
Rertrdahle - 1 I
wi I
.'. I RecordablE Disabling -O
. Disabling - 0
- Back strain.
Last 24 Hours Outage to Date Schedule Focus AreaslPrlorities Coitroi Rod Bank Worth Meas'iremnts -
Warm' Steam Lines
- Trbin plandTrip Test.,,.
- .
- Unit online I
.L Itl ALARA 0.433
' I -
86.800R Dose as of the end of Day 62
..
".I.. -,-. I --, -I .
Or
: 77 fn;atlmkftil60w I....
' I...
.. vm d*W -
in bf hbrma6on Act
- 649a
.V-`)1
.4'
- y..iune 7, 2004' 74 O~UTAGE'GOALS
+/-
- NUCLEAR SAFETY
'bA ACUI IPERFORMANCE C
Unplanned orange/red paths None i' None'N-Reactor trips (either Unit) -
- ' None-1 Safeguards actuation (either unit). -
Loss of shutdown cooling None -
None I Loss of Rx vessel level control aI l--
None -
None INDUSTRIAL SAFETY '
PERFORMANCE.x. -
- r Lbst time accideit
- ~-
n
.I.
I.
-~
ytj i
- i. HUMAN PERFORMANCE -
GOAL",-'
ACTUbAL Security Violations fr t-f
. 12 loggable events 4
- Station human performance clock resets j Rework 1%
On Goal-.
\\ SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE Outage Duration.
~~'
~
~
(excludes extensions Iueto d
-30 'ays' Off Goalt extended hed or BMI inspctions) l t
,i; Mod Irmplementation 100% Of Rev 0 On Goal.
85% schedule;.
Schedule Compliance.
-.-- compliance with
'-Off Goal outage milestone Emergent work (during
-s 2% late additions
-On Goal implementation)
-5% Emergenti.
Goal Sop
-"~
Complete
>95
%of'of cope I
d.*
t::lRev0-cope
' OnGoalc, Oet s
100% of Scheduled lOperator Burdens
- Operator Burdens i
On Goal
.r
,: ;~~t=' ! '.corplfeXe=
,,¢*ira>
Post Outage availability 50 days of Avalablea a.ailability c.ontin66us operation, a later date;.
- BUDGET PERFORMANCE Wi'2%to2'dV o5riouly I.-,
, - -.outage budget
.,-Challenged Personnel injuries (OSHA recordable) *
'i e
Ij &
1:
. RADIOLOGiCALLERFORMANCE t
C.
s Radiation exposure (Excludes additional;:-
.8 r
A
- c
.dose from any head or BMl repalr.
92.R..,86.800R.W
. contingencies)'
Personnel contaminations -
.18 5f5K'CPM ;_____
l Radiological events (defined as unplanned uptake w/assigned dose >10 mrem or a'*
.ent 1-
- dose event based on ED alarms
3 Radmaterial event (defined as any rad j
1 1
-riajerialo ItsldeRCA2 100 CPM)
-1evet, 0
8 q..
'..--**.......-*,i.
Operating Experience QE12624 - Unit 1 Heater Drain Tank Pump Loss itX
.'On March 27, 2001, a scaffold worker inadvertently "bumped" the Unit 1 Heater Drain Tank level indicator while 'altering the position
'of a mid-rail. This action sent a disturbance to a level switch which shares a common standpipe with the indicator and tripped the operating Heater Drain Tank Pumps. As a result of the loss of preheated Feed Water, a greater volumetric tl6owf cooler'-'
condensate was directed to the suction of the Main Feed Pumps. Reactor power increased in response to the cooler feed water,--'
reaching greater than 1600 megawatt indicated Reactor Thermal Power with power Increasing to a Delta T Power peak indication of 101;96 percent.-ow Main Feed Pump suction pressure alarms were also received.--A-rapid load reduction was commenced.--4-'--K Shortly thereafter, Operations successfully started two Heater Drain Tank pumps:- Tiis allowed the Secondary system to be
.stabilized after approximately7-8 minutes after the initiation of the event. The level indicator was found indicating off-scale high due to a sticking 'magnet dmring a post'transient 'ygstnii Walk-'d&wn.
An Enigineer and Mdchanic:Eie1ctriciif-d6cided that light mr6hAical agitation of the level indicator could dislodge the stuck magnet without causing 'additional ertthbation..This determination was4 based 66r1'an ini-orrec tuhndeii'tanding Ihaftthe iheater Drain Tank pumpn trip had b'egn initiated by a diikct impact on the level sWitch. !
Light mechanical agitation of the level indicatorwas applied. The mechanical agitatio'n disturbed the level switch and gave alarniist6 the control room.' Operations responded and stopped the activity withbut further impact.
Lessons Learned: The option to erect or m6difyfthe scaffold when the unit was shutdown to eliminate the rlsk of workingi niext to highly sensitive equipment w'as' not cornsidered. The scaffold request form does not 'prompt'.this consideration.
A review of a sampling of completed scaffold request forms Identified that some initIators had made that consideration and stated to wait until unit shutdown to erect the scaffold. The scaffold that was being modified was erected to support a U1R26 work'evolutlon and could have been erected/modifled foll6wing U" lishutdowns S ~ ~ ~
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I
- ~-
.au^si-od
.A ig*-
,,I Human Performance..
Stop versus STAR, know where you are:
A Difference between STAR and Stop When Unsure:
STAR (selfbchecking) ito66l to'increase !atttnti66f'foi -porta'nt'pi'ojits' inWa'na'ctivity'b6f16e, duri ngrdifter a spe'cif i'isk' is performed. STAR is about paying attention to detail when the person doing the task is qualified, experienced and knows hoW.thb task should be done. This tool helps the person avoid unintentional slips and lapses.
Stop When Unsure is a tool to be used when a person is uncertain about how to proceed. With STAR a person pauses, focuses their attention, decides what to do next and then moves ahead with the task because they are confident about how to move ahead. STOP when Unsure is used when the person Is not certain about how to proceed (scope has changed) and heeds to stop and find out. Do not proceed in the face of uncertainty and be deliberate about your actions.