ML052030223
| ML052030223 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/2004 |
| From: | Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0282 | |
| Download: ML052030223 (2) | |
Text
or NMC %
Comanmed to Nuclear Excxnciloo Point Beach Refueling Outage Edition TODAY
-v June 2, 2004 CONTACT INFORMATION Control Room Emergency - x2911 Work Control Center - x6703 OCC - x 7190 - Option I Lessons Learned - x7190 - Option 2 Plant Status - x7190 - Option 3 Oc rE ?
Vc 7 0, be of Accomplishments TS-30 High & Low Head SI Check Valve Test JD Installed Blank Flange on Purge Supply chop.
Purge Exhaust Valve Unbolted
- TS-10 Upper Containment Hatch Pressure Test IT-530E LRPM Test of RHR System Completed Containment Purge Valve Work
- Heatup RCS to 190OF Cold Rod Functional Testing kC$'
a./, Joac 44 Personnel Last 24 Hours Outage to Safety Rcdbe-0Date Reodabe -
Recordable -1^
Disabling - 0 Disabling - 0
- OSHA Recordable - Back strain.
Last 24 Hours Outage to Date ALARA
-- l' 0.111 85.451 R Dose as of the end of Day 58 Inrdmbin t Maord ws deled in arcoww* Fr im Of Irtomab Act oxem z~ot@
Co a m2 Schedule Focus Areas/Priorities Continue Containment Purge Testing IT-01 SI Pump & Valve Test -
J*
Joe on Establish Containment Integrity Enter Mode 4 RCS Heatup to 250-2700F Establish Pzr Bubble Start RHR Common Work V
43 rs t ene AA*J a/
AJAR/*
June 2, 2004 I
.. I OUTAGE GOALS NUCLEAR SAFETY G
ACUA PERFORMANCE..__'.A C
Unplanned orangelred paths None None Reactor trips (either unit)
None I
Safeguards actuation (either unit)
None None Loss of shutdown cooling None None Loss of Rx vessel level control None None INDUSTRIAL SAFETY PERFORMANCE Lost time accidents None None Personnel injuries (OSHA recordable)
None 1
RADIOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE Radiation exposure (Excludes additional dose from any head or BMI repair s 92 R 85.451 R contingencies)
< 18wI Personnel contaminations
>5K CPM1 Radiological events (defined as unplanned uptake w/assigned dose >10 mrem or s1 event 1
dose event based on ED alarms Radmaterial event (defined as any rad
- 1 event J
material outside RCA 2 100 CPM)
I event_0 HUMAN PERFORMANCE GOAL ACTUAL Security Violations 12 loggable events 3
Station human performance clock None 4
resets Rework s 1%
On Goal
.SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE Outage Duration (excludes extensions due to -
30 days Off Goal extended head or BMI Inspections)
Mod Implementation 100% of Rev 0 On Goal
> 85% schedule Schedule Compliance compliance with Off Goal outage milestone Emergent work (during s 2% late additions On Goal implementation) 5% Emergent OnGoal
.Scope Complete Z 95% of On Goal 100% of Scheduled Operator Burdens Operator Burdens On Goal complete Post Outage availability 2 150 days of Available at continuous operation a later date BUDGET PERFORMANCE Wihin -2% to 0% of Seriously outage budget Challenged Operating Experience OE8638 - Rod Testing Near Miss On January 30, 1997, contrary to procedural direction, the Unit i Control Operator was beginning to insert a group of rods before withdrawing the previously inserted group, the results would have been two sets of rods inserted at the smne time.
This event occurred during Bi Weekly rod exercise testing, when procedure Step 4.7 was not fully completed before commencing step 4.8. The incident is termed a near miss, in that the Control Operator stopped before the rods were moved, when an observer, (NRC resident), noted the error and questioned the Control Operator.
Lessons Learned: The root cause of this event was an Inadequate procedure. The procedure contained multiple evolution's In one step, lack of positive self-verification and lack of a place holder. Performing a rod exercise test in an environment where the Control Operator was required to frequently stop and restart the test with a procedure that lacked separate steps, positive self-verification or place holding, for each rod manipulation resulted in the Control ODerator failina to comDlete a stev In the test Procedure.
Human Performance Ever get that queasy uneasy feeling?
An Appendix R engineer was asked by a Design Engineer to review an ECR related to an Appendix R modification. The Appendix R Engineer reviewed the ECR and returned it to the Design Engineer. When he was questioned as to whether or not he was qualified, he was not sure. He had performed a few reviews in the past and did not realize there was a qualification requirement. When he checked the qualification matrix he realized a qualification existed. He had reviewed another ECR earlier that month that had since been approved for work.
Safety Snippet It's too late for learning when your skin is already burning There have been 3 incidents'in'the past month where individuals contacted hot equipment and minor burns resulted. Two in maintenance - one was during welding activity, the second was when an employee came in contact with a hot muffler on a pump. The third was when one of the M&M Lunch employees placed her hand on a hot grill. What human performance barriers are we missing here?