ML051670184
| ML051670184 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 06/09/2005 |
| From: | Jordan T South Texas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| BL-04-001, NOC-AE-05001890, STI: 31886206 | |
| Download: ML051670184 (3) | |
Text
Nuclear Operating Company E N -
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ZZA June 9, 2005 NOC-AE-05001890 1 OCFR5O.54(f)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 SouthTexasProject_
Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01, "Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at Pressurized-Water Reactors"
Reference:
Letter, Thomas J. Jordan to NRC Document Control Desk, "Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01,"Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Pipilig Connections at Pressurized-Water Reactors," dated July 27, 2004 (NOC-AE-04001762)
In accordance with IOCFR50.54(f), STP Nuclear Operating Company submits the following response to Requested Information Item No. 2 in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)Bulletin 2004-01, "Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Material used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at Pressurized-Water Reactors," dated May 28, 2004.
NRC Bulletin 2004-01 Requested Information Item No. 2 requests the results of inspections be provided to the NRC within 60 days of a plant restart following the inspection of the Alloy 82/182 pressurizer penetrations and steam space piping connections for STPEGS Units 1 and 2. The requested information
-is-provided-as-an -attachment-to this letter-for-STPEGS Unit 1, wvhich completed the 12th Refueling--
Outage on April 16, 2005.
If there are any questions regarding this additional information, please contact Mr. Scott Head at (361) 972-7136 or me at (361) 972-7902.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and corr9t.
Executedon June Jr an Vice President of Engineering jcy/jal
Attachment:
Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01 Requested Information Item No. 2 STI: 31886206 a6l4tz
NOC-AE-05001890 Page 2 of 2 cc:
(paper copy)
(electronic copy)
Bruce S. Mallett Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, Texas 76011-8064 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk One White Flint North
-11555-Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Richard A. Ratliff Bureau of Radiation Control Texas Department of State Health Services 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756-3189 Jeffrey Cruz U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 289, Mail Code: MNI16 Wadsworth, TX 77483 A. H. Gutternan, Esquire Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP David H. Jaffe U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jack A. Fusco Michael A. Reed Texas Genco, LP C. Kirksey City of Austin Jon C. Wood Cox Smith Matthews J. J. Nesrsta R. K. Temple E. Alarcon City Public Service C. M. Canady City of Austin Electric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704
NOC-AE-05001890 Attachment Page I of I Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01 Requested Information Item No. 2, "Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections At Pressurized-Water Reactors" NRC Request:
Within 60 days ofplant restart following the next inspection of the Alloy 82/182/600 pressurizer penetrations and steam space piping connections, tile subject PJIR licensees should either:
(a) submit to the NRC a statement indicating that the inspections described in the licensee 's response to item (1)(c) of this bulletin wvere completed and a description of the as-found condition of the pressurizer shell, any findings of relevant indications of through-wall leakage, followvup NDE performed to characterize flaws in leaking penetrations or steam space piping connections, a stunmnar' of all relevant indicationsfound by NDE, a sumnmnzay of the disposition of anyfindings of boric acid, and an' corrective actions taken and/or repairs made as a result of the indications
- found, or (b) if the licensee was unable to complete the inspections described in response to item (I)(c) of this bulletin, submit to the NRC a sunmmary of the inspections performed, the extent of the inspections, the methods used, a description of the as-found condition of the pressurizer shell, any findings of relevant indications of through-wall leakage, followuzp NDE performed to characterizeflaws in leaking penetrations or steam space piping connections, a sunimnaty of all relevant indications found by NDE, a sunmmary of the disposition of any findings of boric acid, and any corrective actions takeml and/or repairs made as a result of the indications found. In addition, supplement the answver which you provided to item (J)(d) above to explain wh)y the inspections that you completed were adequatefor the purpose of maintaining the integrity of yourfacility's RCPB and for meeting all applicable regulatory requirements wt'hich pertain to yourfacility.
For lines attached directly to the pressurizer, with the exception of the surge line, the information requested in (1) and (2) above should be provided for any locations, including those remote froln the pressurizer shell, which contain Alloy 82/182/600 materials which are exposed to conditions similar to those of thepressurizer environment.
STPNOC Response:
-- STPNOC completed the Unit 1 12th Refueling Outage (1RE12) on April 16, 2005 and submits the information below describing the results of the Alloy 82/182 pressurizer penetration and steam space piping connection inspections.
STPNOC performed "Bare Metal Visual" (BMV) inspections on all steam space nozzles during the Unit I refueling outage (IRE12) in the Spring of 2005. There was no evidence indicating any pressure boundary leakage from these nozzle safe ends of the pressurizer, nor was there any evidence of corrosion or wastage. A complete BMV examination was achieved at each of the nozzle safe ends. A VT-i visual examination method was performed by a certified Level II visual examiner using a flashlight and an 18%
neutral gray card with 1/32" width black line for assuring adequate lighting for resolution of any indications. A nondestructive examination report was written to document these examinations. Similar inspections are scheduled for subsequent refueling outages.