ML051520256

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Outage Stand Down Observations
ML051520256
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/24/2005
From:
- No Known Affiliation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2004-0282
Download: ML051520256 (1)


Text

Outage Stand Down Observations Following notification by the NRC residents of the events that were observed during the steam generator nozzle dam installation as noted in the 'Nozzle Dam Observations" document, Point Beach management began an outage stand down. At 1100 on Friday 4/9/04, the plant manger requested the OCC manager to begin the stand down of work that was in progress on Unit 1.

At 1400 the plant manger noted that work was still being performed and again requested the OCC manager to stand down work on Unit 1. At 1600 the plant manager told the OCC manager to announce a stop work over the plant Gai-Tronic system. Plant management informed the resident inspectors that they were developing a communications plan and a strategy to exit the 'Orange Path' risk because the reactor water level was at mid-loop.

At 1600 the first of the licensee's Train-The-Trainer sessions to begin the communications with the site personnel about the reasons for the stand down and what had to be accomplished to re-start the outage. The training sessions were held several times on Friday evening, Saturday, and Sunday. These sessions were to remind the plant personnel of the picture of excellence, requirements for safety, and individual accountability. All personnel on site, licensee and contractor, are to be trained prior to returning to work. Inaddition to these sessions plant management required that all supervisors and above that would be involved in work were required to attend a senior manager interview about the specific job that was to be performed.

On Sunday morning after attending the 0600 OCC turnover meeting the Resident Inspector learned that the craft briefing for the vessel head detentioning team was in progress and attended the second part of the meeting. At the conclusion of the meeting the inspector questioned the supervisor of the job about training he had received prior to giving the briefing.

The supervisor had attended the training sessions and had verified that the personnel inthe work group had also attended the training. When questioned about the job specific manager interview, the supervisor indicated that the interview had been done on the previous shift and the job had been released to be performed. After further questioning the supervisor indicated that he was unsure of the requirements and would verify with the OCC manager prior to starting work.

The inspector contacted the senior manager onsite and informed him the a job was about to begin and no senior management interview had been conducted. When the inspector returned to the OCC to question the senior management and the OCC management staff the inspector noted that the senior manager did not clearly understand the concern. The inspector indicated that the understanding was that the supervisors would be briefed prior to the crew briefs for each job. Upon questioning other members of the management onsite the inspector discovered that there was confusion about the requirements for performing work under the rules established by senior management.