ML051510069
| ML051510069 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 04/25/2005 |
| From: | Lambert M Pilgrim Watch |
| To: | Diaz N NRC/Chairman |
| References | |
| LTR-05-0233 | |
| Download: ML051510069 (12) | |
Text
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET Date Printed; May 27,2005 15.34 PAPER NUMBER:
ACTION OFFICE:
LTR-05-0233 OGC LOGGING DATE: 04/26/2005 AUTHOR:
AFFILIATION:
ADDRESSEE:
SUBJECT:
Mary Lampert MA Nils Diaz Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station's Emergency Planning Zone..urges the Comm to overturn the denial of the 2.206 petition ACTION:
DISTRIBUTION:
LETTER DATE:
ACKNOWLEDGED SPECIAL HANDLING:
Signature of Secretary Chairman, Comrs, EDO 04/25/2005 No OGC...coordinate response with EDO 2.206 petition NOTES:
Made publicly available in ADAMS via SECY/DPC ADAMS FILE LOCATION:
DATE DUE:
06/21/2005 DATE SIGNED:
I 7i 934 5579; APR-25-05 4:05PM; PAGE 2
_ bLNI by: ;
I 78i 934 5579; APR 25-05 4:06PM; PAGE 2 PETITION TO U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPEAL TO COMMISSIONERS TO OVERTURN DECISION E PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB)
Submitted by Mary Elizabeth Lampert; on April, 2005; regarding issues enclosed herein concerning Pilgrim N Plymouth, Massachusetts.
Mary Elizabeth Lampert 148 Washington Street Duxbury, Massachusetts 02332 Tel 781-934-0389 Fax 781-934-5579 Email LamrperttadelDhia.net K-Y iI t
Ps, i
i Vie email, original text by fax & mall.
II 1
si BY:
I 781 934 5579; APR-25.05 4:06PM; PAGE 3 6tu 1 8y: ;
i 78i 934 5579; APA-25-05 4:06PM; PAGE 3 April 25, 2005 Commissioner Nils J. Diaz U.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Fac 301-415-1757 Eniail vmb@nrc.gov
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Asyou know Duxbury, Massachusetts is within the Pilgrim Nuclear Poyver Station's Emergency.Planning Zone. My residence is approximately 6 miles across open water from the reactor. Theref 'e, safety at Pilgrim NPS is a primary concern due to its potential dire t impact upon my family's health, property and community.
I rbquest that this correspondence be regarded as a formal appeal! to the Commissioners to overturn the April 1, 2005 decision by the N:C staff, Petition Review Board, to d~by-my 2.206 petition.
Basis Appeal - Summary The original 2.206 petition asked NRC to require Pilgrim NPS to ce se op rations until proper notification equipment is installed throughoUt the Emergency Planning Zone to enable residents and transients to be notified in an emergency within the required approximate 15 minutes.
The appeal states that the NRC did not enforce its own regulations.
- 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(5), the emergency response plan must establish "means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure path ay Emergency Planning Zone" (i.e., 10-mile EPZ).
Section IV.D.3 of Appendix E provides a design objective pf.
having "The capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway iEPZ within about 15 minutes."
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Appendix 3, Section C.3, (c) L provides standards for siren systems "" Where special individ jal 2
- =cl1 I Ot5; i3 1 781 934 5579; APR-25-05 4
- 06PM; PAGE 4 cases require a higher alerting signal, it should be provided V other means than a generally distributed acoustic signal."
The petitioner explains that the sirens could not be heard (1) insid' sohne houses and commercial buildings above normal ambient ind or nojse under specified conditions (i.e., for example: when the wind ws ark closed; air conditioners are on; dwelling are set back, insulate landscaped; strong winds); and (2) inside vehicles under specified conditions. Therefore notification "should be required by other me ns th~n a generally distributed acoustic signal." Rapid dialing telepho 'e systems and electronic message boards would satisfy the require bent.
Thy petitioner also explains that NRC staff's petition denial failed t provide data/factual basis to substantiate their statements.
Thy original petition is followed by the petitioners response to poi ts mrde in the PRB.
Original Petition - January 18, 2005 Summary Roactor: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Plymouth, Massachusetts Rdquest for Enforcement Action: Require Pilgrim NPS to cease operations until proper notification equipment is installed through ut thi Emergency Planning Zone to enable residents and transients t be ncitified within the required approximate 15 minutes.
F !cts that constitute the basis for taking this action: discus ed he'rein.
Discussion
- 1. I am filing a 2.206 petition as the only means available to me o address safety concerns at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. The pubkc warning system now does not provide reasonable assurance that n the event of an accident resulting in a large release of radiation the residents and transients within the EPZ will receive timely warnin.
Therefore Pilgrim Station is operating without a functional emerge cy response plan.
2.1 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station public warning system cannot p ss minimum standards of operability under 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, !(D),
(E), and other applicable regulation. 10 CFR 50, Appendix E (D) s ates, 3
- StNI BY: ;
i 781 934 5579; APR-25-05 4:06PM; PAGE 5 The design objective of the prompt public notification system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of this notification capabiliWy will range from immediate notification (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials are notified that a situatio exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where a more substantial amount of time.
- 3. XPilgrim Station has installed sirens in many areas in the Emerg ncy Plnning Zone. However, these are simply outdoor warning syster5.
This is because If they were loud enough to be heard Indoors over normal ambient noise they would damage the hearing of those cloe to the sirens. I can attest to the fact that they can not be heard in d 6rs frc'm my own experience and from informally polling citizens in m community.
- 4. It is important to have an outdoor warning system; however it is equally important to have an indoor warning system for those wh work, sleep and are inside residences or work places for all or any portion of the day. Additionally, Pilgrim's EPZ is located in a clima that is not conducive to having windows open all, or even most, of the yebr; and when It is warm enough to have a window ajar, many pebple and businesses now have air conditioners - meaning that windows are generally closed the entire year.
- 5. j Also, Pilgrim's sirens have been unreliable. They failed 12 time;a from January 2000 to January 2004. For example, In January 2004.
nearly 80 percent of the newly installed emergency sirens used to warn about 100,000 residents in five towns about a disaster at th Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station failed to operate. The latest siren fa lure cahne after a brand-new siren system was installed. Redundancy i an iniportant component of safety; hence a combination of warning syptems is required - and Importantly, the systems must be audible both inside and outside - now they are not. Notification means th t thy intended recipient hears, receives, the message.
6., The present back-up system, known as route notification, calls for Ioqal police to drive up and down streets where sirens fail to warn residents over their PA system. Route notification takes considers ly loAger than 15 minutes. Route notification Is a waste of now scard himan resources and will not accomplish the task - at best some folks who happen to be outside on streets that the local police happen o drive may receive notice. The towns within the Emergency Planni r 4
- SEN1T BY:
1 781 934 5579; APR-25-05 4:07PM; PAGE 6 Zohe have large wooded areas; and areas with houses on large lot sited and landscaped to provide privacy and quiet - away from the strieet and traffic noise. Also the EPZ towns each have many miles of ro~ds - Duxbury, for example, has 127.54 miles of roads1. Plymo th, the host community, and largest town in the Commonwealth, has 521 miles of roads2.. It is clear that:
- 1Local police and emergency personnel are not capable of coveripg roads in approximately 15 minutes - too many miles of roads, Oo
'few personnel;
- 'The PA systems or bullhorns on those vehicles are unlikely to b 1heard inside due to how property is sited, landscaped, Insulate {and Ithe real uncertainty of whether windows will be open.
- 7. !Technology exists today that would fill the current void and brl9 licensees into compliance - that is notify residents and transients inSide houses or buildings. The system is generally known as rapi dialing systems and has been in use In many communities for many yebrs. It is tested. Rapid dialing systems have the capability to no fy workers and every household and business within the EPZ in a 'proximate 15 minutes. For example, one company's (Dialogic Cqmmunications -DCC) phone bank has 500 phones capable of m king 1,QOQ calls a minute, based on a 30 second transaction. Simply contracting to use two of their phone banks would permit contacti ig 30,000 households. More phone banks could be added, as require Sigma Reverse 911 is another such system, many exist.
8 Another notification deficiency concerns notifying those in cars and trycks. We cannot assume that the driver has a radio on tuned to an Epergency Alert System. Sirens are not placed along our major hi hways, Route 3, for example; and even if they were so placed :hey could not be heard in a car above ambient sound.
9.- Technology exists today to solve the problem - NRC requiring he installation of reader boards along the major routes within the Erhergency Planning Zone. As an aside, reader or message board :are multi-purpose and can serve many purposes in an emergency.
1q. Request for action: I request for the above stated reasons th until such time as Entergy, the licensee, has provided a workable
' 4assachusetts Highway Road Census, 2001: Town of DuxbuyyRoads - 99.96 milck; Mass High iy Roads 18.39 mikes; Private Roads = 9.19 miles lTon ofrPlymouth Engineering Dept 01/18105: total town, state, private wads = 521 miles S
SENIT BY: ;
l 78i 934 5579; APR-25-05 4:07PM; PAGE 7/12 emergency warning or alert system and NRC has verified its r opprability, NRC order cold shutdown of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Sta: on ano/or take other such action as is within NRC's discretion to restcr e
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety.
I am aware that there is a four month period allowed for correctio of emergency planning deficiencies in 10 CFR 50.54 (s) (2); however redjuest that this matter be given Immediate attention because of :he faqts that nuclear reactors are terrorist targets; Pilgrim is located 6 "Atnerica's Hometown" perhaps making it an especially attractive target due to its symbolic value; Pilgrim is a BWR with a Mark I containment meaning that its spent fuel is stored high up in the rnin reactor building, outside primary containment, vulnerable from thee sides; and Southeastern Massachusetts is now highly congested.
Response PRB, April 1, 2005 (Docket No. 50-293)
- 1. Petitioner statement:
"warning sirens cannot be heard indoors and cannot be heard b.
citizens traveling in cars in the EPZ."
N4kC respgrise:.
A.NRC: "design objective of having the 'capability to essentially comnplete the initial notification...'
Petitioner: The sirens can make the sound but the issue is that it cannot be heard inside. I am reminded of the question, "if a tree brbnch falls in the woods and no one is there to hear it, did it ma e a stund?" The issue in emergency planning, and intent of regulatio is that the public hears the sound so that they know that there is an erpergency and how to respond.
l.
B.' NRC: "the Commission recognized that not every individual wOuld necessarily be reached by the actual operation of such a system Wider all conditions of system use, but that the provision of such a syst(Mn wvuld significantly improve the capability of taking protective actions...'
Petitioner: How many individuals have to not hear the sirens to c unt; and in what geographic area and density? NRC does not explain.
id the Commission define, "under all conditions" mean to exclude th se 6
StrJi by:;
1 781 934 5579; APR-25-05 4:09PM; PAGE a/12 indoors or in their vehicles? How does the Commission define "significantly improve" and more to the point on what basis?
The Petitioner states that, based on community knowledge the sirehs are not heard inside by those who should be alerted in a disaster.
Evbry person counts.
C. NRC; "An acceptable criteria at most locations would be a soun lelel from the siren system of 10 decibels above average daytime ardbient background."
Pefitioner: How are "most locations" defined and on what basis? M ny va iables effect whether a noise can be heard --- and the prtsence/absence and combination of those variables varies from bu lding-to-building and section-to section. For example: distance f bu~lding from siren; presence of water bodies and wind; constructi n of building - Insulation; noise from heating and air-conditioning system; vegetation; set back; air and street traffic noise.
How is "average daytime ambient background" ascertained? It m t
bellsite specific - because it varies In each site. How did NRC determine what Is average throughout Pilgrim's EPZ, how and wh ri?
Nid, facts are provided. How was 10 decibels picked as the "magic number" - why not 9 or 15, for example?
Pilbrim's Public Relations representative stated publicly that the d cibel leVel chosen was limited in volume to one that would not injure th hebring of those outside when the siren is sounded. However, tha mikes it too soft to be heard inside under some conditions stated.
D.;'NRC: "The 10db differential above daytime ambient is meant tc previde a distinguishable signal inside of average residential construction under average conditions.
Petitioner; The petition states unequivocally that it does not -bas d on personal and local community experience. How is "average reside tial coistruction" determined? What about people inside commercial buildings --- do those people not count? Average implies a normal cu[ve. Is NRC saying that those on either end of the curve do not deserve notification? They do not count.
Wbat are "average conditions?" I had understood that planning pli ed for the best and the worst case scenarios. Is this not true? If for examiple there is a station blackout during a bad winter storm and a disaster results; because the wind and severe weather were not 7
SErJI BY:;
1 781 934 5579; APR-25-05 4:08PM; PAGE 9/12 "average conditions" then it is not necessary for the population to be notified. Hence the fact that they could not hear the sirens was inconsequential.
E. NRC: "c) Where special individual cases require a higher alerIng sihnal, it should be provided by other means than a general ry di4tributed acoustic signal."
Petitioner: Your own regulations make the petitioner's case, "Whe 6 special individual cases require a higher alerting signal, it should by provided by other means than a generally distributed acbustic signal." This does not say, nor was the regulation intended, to 1refer simply to those who are disabled -deaf. The petitioner is simply asking you to enforce your own regulations.
Individuals inside homes, businesses, buildings, vehicles require a hither alerting signal (they can not hear the sirens inside) it shoul be provided by other means than a generally distributed acoustic sig 61."
Th~bse means are available - rapid telephone dialing systems and electronic message boards.
Hdnce, the PRB Incorrectly stated that "Your petition did not idently any special individual cases that require a higher alerting signal."
Inolviduals were named individually and as a class.
2.iThe Petitioner stated that, "Pilgrim's sirens have been unreliabl, failing 12 times from January 2000 to January 2004."
Petitioner: The NRC's response missed the point. The point was tht redundancy Is a key element in planning. Therefore technology th t can contact the public, who are inside buildings, rapid telephone dialing systems or reverse 911, would be important if some or all f the sirens failed.
3,1Petitioner stated that route notification may not accomplish the task inla timely manner."
NRKC response, "Your assessment of the deficiencies of the route alerting process assumed failure of most, if not all, of the 112 sire ns in the EPZ. The NRC and FEMA consider this to be an unlikely assumption."
Petitioner: It is as unlikely for the NRC to assume that many if no all WEII not fail." In fact, they have.
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181 9J4 5579; APR-25-05 4:08PM; PAGE 0M12 As'pointed out in the original petition, In January 2004, nearly 80 percent of the newly installed emergency sirens used to warn aboet 10tJ,000 residents in five towns about a disaster at the Pilgrim Nuxlear Pofver Station failed to operate. Plymouth, as an example, has 52V mles of roads. In that instance, which may or may not be repeated, roighly 400 miles of roads might have to be covered by route aler ing.
Bottom line, NRC has to plan for both the best and worst case scenarios. Responsibility can not again be brushed aside by the N t bylsimply describing an event that NRC does not want to deal wit ias "unlikely."
La~t route alerting Is a "fool's errand." This is because:.
- iThere are too many miles of roads, too few personnel;
- The PA systems or bullhorns on those vehicles are unlikely to b I heard inside due to how property is sited, landscaped, insulate and the real uncertainty of whether windows will be open.
Let's allow 2005 technology, rapid telephone systems (reverse 91 ) do what it can do best and free up actual emergency personnel to do what only they can do.
4.iThe PRB does not refute the petitioner's charge that sirens can ot b heard by motorists traveling within the EPZ because of the absence ofisirens in areas along major routes; and because they could not be h~ard inside vehicles above ambient background sound even if sir ns ware there. Because this contention is not disputed, please descri e thp agency's plan for mitigation. I would expect that it would InCL hC reuiring additional message boards on major evacuation routes nd providing portable electronic message boards to EPZ communities.'
Conclusion Ydur own regulations make the petitioner's case, "Where special inijividual cases require a higher alerting signal, it should b provided by other means than a generally distributed acou tic sional." The petitioner simply asks NRC to enforce your own regulations.
The NRC has a very serious credibility problem -of your own mak 6.
The most recent, and very public, example was your response to he 9
.. Li4l DI
- 1 /B1 934 5579; Or-11 I D l
- 1 181 934 5579; APR225-05 4:09PM; PAGE ll/12 National Academy of Science Safety and Security of Commercial S 'ent Nuplear Fuel Storage Report.
Thy PRB's rebuttal of this petition is foolish on its face and further i ha ms the agency and industry.
It i's abundantly clear that rapid notification of the public is one of he keg elements In emergency planning ---any emergency. This is especially true for a nuclear disaster because of the publics' real fer of radiation ---thereby increasing the chance of a panic response. Also there is an increased probability of an accident due to the very reaI threat of a terrorist attack --- an accident that is both fast breakin ani of considerable consequence. Pilgrim is a GE Mark I Boiling WC ter Reactor making Its spent fuel pool more vulnerable. We know that NRC acqepts responsibility for dealing with the consequences of an atta k -
th t would include emergency planning under such circumstances.
If there is a disaster, the public must be able to hear the warning.
Sirens are outdoor warning systems -perhaps the best we had in t Ie past. But technology today allows us to do better -rapid dialing systems are available and tested.
Homeland Security monies are being distributed and, although financing an alert system that really works Is not our responsibility :it is Worth considering asking Homeland Security to enter into a paritnership - so that all or some of the cost of a rapid dialing syste and electronic message boards for the EPZ could be covered under:
that umbrella. Both of those alert systems are multi-purpose.
NRC, your agency, is the problem -the roadblock to protecting pub Ic safbty. NRC denies the problem; does not require sirens to be supplemented by rapid dialing systems and message boards for roadways; and is so doing abdicates its responsibility to protect th pubiic and increases the public's disrespect for the agency.
I look forward to your response; and thank you for your considerat On.
Sinrerely, Mar,,y Lampertl.
Pilgrim Watch 148 Washington Street, Duxbury, MA 02332 Tel j781-934-0389 10 I
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- X 1 781 934 5579:
APR-e25.05 4:nqPM,:
PA=1 4.I14 Joining the Petitioner Je4 Thorp, Energy Campaign Organizer Clean Water Action 36 BromField St., Suite 204 Boston, MA 02108 Tel 617-338-8131 Sahdra Gavutis C-l0 Research and Education Foundation 44: Merrimac St., Newburyport, MA 01950 Tel 978-465-6646 Deborah Katz, signed in recognition that the same notification issL discussed herein, also apply to Vermont Yankee and other reactor communities Citizens Awareness Network Bdx 83 Shelburne Falls, MA 01379 Tel 413-339-5781 Rclchelle Becker AlMiance for Nuclear Responsibility.
sdn Luls Obispo Mothers for Peace P.O. Box 164 Piimo Beach, CA 93448 Tel 805 773-3881
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