ML051250342

Reply to a Notice of Violation, EA-04-214

ML051250342
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	04/28/2005
From:	Richard Anderson FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, NRC/RGN-III
References
EA-04-214, IR-04-016, PY-CEI/NRR-2882L
Download: ML051250342 (4)

Text

FENOC Perry Nuclear Power Plant 10 Center Road FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Comnpany Perry Ohio 44081 Richard Anderson 440-280-5579 Vice President-Nuclear Fax: 440-280-8029 April 28, 2005 PY-CEI/NRR-2882L

-United States Nuclear-Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket Number 50-440 License Number NPF-58

Subject:

Reply to a Noiice'of Violation; EA'04-214 Ladies and Gentlemen:

Enclosed is the response to Notice of Violation, EA-04-214, issued to the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on March 29, 2005. The details of the violation were documented in NRC Inspection Report Number 05000440/2004016 dated December 23, 2004. The violation was for failure to follow .the requirements of the Perry Emergency Plan during an Alert level event declared on July 20, 2004: During this event, the licensee staff failed to' peform' a Computer Aided Dose Assessment Program (CADAP)'analysis within 15 minutes of the-Alert declaration' required by the licensee's Emergency Plan. The violation is associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding.

The enclosed response is based-on a root cause investigation. This investigation will be revieWed by the Corrective Action Review Board and -is pending executive approvalY.- -

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal. Any actions discussed in this document that represent intended or planned actions, are described for the NRC's information, and are not regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Jeffrey Lausberg, Manager-'Reguiatdry Compliance at (440)280'5940.-

Very truly your , ' ' i -  :.

Enclosure cc: NRC Region IlIlAdministrator NRC Senior Resident Inspector - PNPP NRR Project Manager- PNPP

.,6b1

PY-CEI/NRR-2882L Enclosure Page 1 of 3 REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION: EA-04-020 RESTATEMENT OF THE VIOLATION Title 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires, in part, that a licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in Section 50.47(b). Title 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) requires, in part, that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme be in use by the nuclear facility licensee.

The Perry Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan, Section 4.0, provided an emergency classification system which includes Emergency Action Levels. Emergency Action Level (EAL) HA1 required, in part, that when entered, an emergency dose assessment run using the appropriate source term, determined at the time of the event, must be performed within 15 minutes concurrently with Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) calculations to determine if Site Area Emergency entry criteria have been met.

Contrary to the above, on July 20, 2004, the First Energy Nuclear Operating Company, a licensee authorized to operate the Perry Nuclear Plant, failed to implement the emergency classification system and emergency action levels described in Section 4.0 of the Perry Power Plant Emergency Plan. Specifically, the licensee did not conduct the emergency dose assessment required by EAL HA1 within 15 minutes of its classification of the event as an Alert at 3:44 a.m., on July 20, 2004. The licensee completed the emergency dose assessment at 6:24 a.m., 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 40 minutes after the Alert declaration. As a result, the licensee failed to meet the requirements of their emergency plan during a declared Alert.

This violation is associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding.

REASON FOR THE VIOLATION Emergency Plan Implementing Instruction (EPI) Emergency Action Level (EAL) HA1 corntirined an action emb~ded in a note. EALH-K1 is thentycndition for an unplanned release of gaseous radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 200 times the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) control limit for 15 minutes or greater. The placement of the action in the note was contrary to FENOC procedure expectations and created confusion concerning whether the note was a clarification or an action. It is widely understood by plant personnel that notes are for clarification only and not for required action. The procedure writers' guide directs that action steps will not be included in notes.

Emergency response personnel were not effectively trained in the intended execution of EAL HA1, resulting in an Emergency Coordinator rationalizing that the action in the note was discretionary. This was further compounded by the fifteen-minute time critical execution of a Computer Aided Dose Assessment Program (CADAP) analysis and the Emergency Coordinator's uncertainty from being in the Alert without a uvalid" instrument reading.

PY-CEI/NRR-2882L Enclosure Page 2 of 3 While the note for EAL HA1 was explicit in its direction to perform a CADAP analysis in 15 minutes, the Emergency Coordinator's knowledge of the step's intent and the actual CADAP process led him to conclude that he could decide by evaluation of the next higher emergency classification entry conditions (EAL HS1) that entry into a Site Area Emergency was not required. Furthermore, in this specific situation, the Emergency Coordinator was knowledgeable in CADAP performance and performed a mental assessment in which he determined that a CADAP analysis would provide a resultant value which was less than the entry levels for a Site Area Emergency.

When the Offgas Vent Pipe Radiation effluent monitor went off-scale high, EPI-Al f

-EAtLHAI the Chemitchnician Tretatedactions'for

- one to conduct a grab sample and the second to conduct a CADAP analysis. This required that the Emergency Coordinator make a value decision, to either proceed with the grab sample to attempt to avoid having to unnecessarily declare an Alert or redirect the Chemistry Technician to run CADAP. The Emergency Coordinator should have diverted the Chemistry Technician from obtaining the grab sample to perform an emergency plan instruction required CADAP run.

CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND THE RESULTS ACHIEVED A second Chemistry Technician was added to the shift complement to be available to perform a CADAP analysis. This is a compensatory measure until the Plant Manager determines the permanent method of obtaining the required CADAP analysis.

Training was provided to emergency response personnel who classify or recommend emergency classifications to ensure they are aware of the HA1 requirements, including the lessons learned from the July 20, 2004 Alert declaration. This training was deemed as marginally effective, but is compensated for by having the second Chemistry Technician on shift. Additional training is scheduled to improve this training deficiency.

The note associated with EAL HA1 was clarified to emphasize that assessment of an event must continue following the declaration of an Alert to verify if the entry criteria for a Site Area Emergency have been met. This action was deemed as marginally effective

-since the-action.is .still contained in.the-note.-An additional corrective-action was written to address this issue. This change is being reviewed to determine if it will require prior NRC approval. Additionally, in order to eliminate conflicting priorities, EAL HA1 was revised to remove the 15-minute Alert entry level confirmatory sampling requirement.

CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT WILL BE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATIONS The note in EAL HA1 will be revised to conform to the FENOC procedures writers' guide that states, "notes shall not contain action steps for procedure performance'.

PY-CEI/NRR-2882L Enclosure Page 3 of 3 Emergency Coordinators, including Senior Reactor Operators, will be trained on the below items. This training will be integrated into initial training programs per the Systematic Approach to Training.

• An overview of the 7/20/04 Alert initial classification and implementation of EAL HA1

• Perry response to the NRC White Finding letter

• The NRC NOV, including the relationship to risk significant planning standards

• All EAL HA1 Entry Criteria

• EAL HA1 Bases EJAL N te-and Ihe-Note'.sBases,-including the relationship to-EAL-HS1----

• Indications available to determine if clad damage is suspected or has occurred

• Requirements for procedure use and adherence with respect to the Emergency Plan The compensatory measure that requires a second chemistry technician on shift will be maintained until the Plant Manager determines the permanent method of obtaining the required CADAP analysis.

DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED Full compliance was achieved on July 20, 2004, at 0624 hours0.00722 days <br />0.173 hours <br />0.00103 weeks <br />2.37432e-4 months <br />, with the completion of the CADAP analysis with no detectable release.