ML050770471

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G20050009 - Samuel J. Collins Ltr. Re Expressing Appreciation for Participating in the Government to Government Meeting on 12/16/2004
ML050770471
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 03/17/2005
From: Collins S
NRC Region 1
To: Abinanti T, Alagno L, Bass S, Bernard T, Bianco N, Blau M, Bondi R, Borgia C, Brower D, Buckley J, Chervokas J, Corcoran F, Dulgerian K, Faiella J, Feeney A, Feroe P, Fienemann B, Galef S, Greeley D, Gross R, Herbert J, Kaplowitz M, Kopenhaver D, Koury W, Lemie J, Levine R, Maurer D, Mcmahon R, Meehan R, Menzel C, Morahan T, Murphy M, Paschkes D, Rashford J, Rush S, Seimarco J, Shapiro G, Sloan J, Stiebeling A, Sutton A, Sweeting N, Tkacs J, Tosch K, Tuffey J, Walsh G, Warshauer G, Weitz B, Wells J
Orange County, NY, Putnam County, NY, Putnam County, NY, Emergency Management, Rockland County, NY, State of NJ, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering, State of NY, Emergency Management Office, State of NY, Senate, State of NY, State Assembly, Town of Bedford, NY, Town of Cortlandt, NY, Town of Mt. Pleasant, NY, Town of New Castle, NY, Town of North Castle, NY, Town of Ossining, NY, Town of Patterson, NY, Town of Philipstown, NY, Town of Pound Ridge, NY, Town of Somers, NY, Town of Yorktown, NY, US HR (House of Representatives), US SEN (Senate), Village of Briarcliff Manor, NY, Westchester County, NY, Westchester County, NY, Board of Legislators
McDermott, B J, Reg.I/610-337-5233
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G20050009
Download: ML050770471 (144)


Text

March 17, 2005 The Honorable Thomas Abinanti Westchester County Board of Legislators 800 Michaelin Office Building 148 Martine Avenue White Plains, NY 10601

Dear Mr. Abinanti:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Abinanti 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Louis Alagno, Chief Town of Mt. Pleasent One Town Hall Plaza Valhalla, NY 10595

Dear Chief Alagno:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Chief Alagno 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Tara Bernard Office of Legislator Kaplowitz Westchester County 800 Michaelin Office Building 148 Martine Avenue White Plains, NY 10601

Dear Ms. Bernard:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency

Ms. Bernard 2

preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Nick Bianco Town of Yorktown 363 Underhill Avenue Yorktown Heights, NY 10598

Dear Mr. Bianco:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Bianco 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Michael Blau Village of Briarcliff Manor 111 Pleasantville Road Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510

Dear Mr. Blau:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Blau 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Robert Bondi County Executive, Putnam County Putnam County Office Building 40 Gleneida Avenue, 3rd floor Carmel, NY 10512

Dear Mr. Bondi:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Bondi 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Catherine Borgia, Chief of Staff Office of Assemblywoman Sandra R. Galef State of New York 2 Church Street Ossining, NY 10562

Dear Ms. Borgia:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Ms. Borgia 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Steve Bass Office of Legislator Kaplowitz Westchester County 800 Michaelin Office Building 148 Martine Avenue White Plains, NY 10601

Dear Mr. Bass:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency

Mr. Bass 2

preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 David Brower Town of Phillipstown 238 Main Street Cold Spring, NY 10516

Dear Mr. Brower:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Brower 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 John Buckley Town of New Castle 200 South Greeley Avenue Chappaqua, NY 10514

Dear Mr. Buckley:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Buckley 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 John V. Chervokas Supervisor, Town of Ossining 16 Croton Avenue Ossining, NY 10562

Dear Mr. Chervokas:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Chervokas 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Francis Corcoran Councilman, Town of Bedford 321 Bedford Road Bedford Hills, NY 10507

Dear Mr. Corcoran:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Corcoran 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Korky Dulgerian Orange County Government Center 255 Main Street Goshen, NY 10924

Dear Mr. Dulgerian:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Dulgerian 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Jerry Faiella New Castle Town Administrator 200 South Greeley Avenue Chappaqua, NY 10514

Dear Mr. Faiella:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Faiella 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Andrew Feeney 1st Deputy Director, Emergency Management Office Bldg. 22, suite 101, State of New York, 1220 Washington Avenue Albany, NY 12226-2251

Dear Mr. Feeney:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Feeney 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Peter Feroe Office of Congresswoman Lowey United States House of Representatives 2327 Rayburn House Office Bldg.

Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Feroe:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Feroe 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Bill Fienemann Office of Assemblywoman Sandra R. Galef New York State Assembly 2 Church Street Ossining, NY 10562

Dear Mr. Fienemann:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Fienemann 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 The Honorable Sandra R. Galef New York Stae Assembly 2 Church Street Ossining, NY 10562

Dear Mrs. Galef:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mrs. Galef 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Dan Greeley Assistant Commissioner of Emergency Services Rockland County 16 East Lake Drive Thiells, NY 10984

Dear Mr. Greeley:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Greeley 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Roger Gross Special Assistant to State Senator Leibell State of New York 1441 Route 22, Suite 205 Brewster, NY 10509

Dear Mr. Gross:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Gross 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Jerry Herbert Patterson Town Hall 1142 Route 311 Patterson, NY 12563

Dear Mr. Herbert:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Herbert 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 The Honorable Michael B. Kaplowitz Westchester County Board of Legislators 800 Michaelin Office Building 148 Martine Avenue White Plains, NY 10601

Dear Mr. Kaplowitz:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Kaplowitz 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Diane Kopenhaver Town of North Castle 15 Bedford Road Armonk, NY 10504

Dear Ms. Kopenhaver:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Ms. Kopenhaver 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Walter Koury Commissioner, Department of Emergency Services Orange County Government Center 255 Main Street Goshen, NY 10924

Dear Mr. Koury:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Koury 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Jon Lemie, Chief of Staff State of New York 4 New King Street North Castle, NY 10604

Dear Mr. Lemie:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Lemie 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Ron Levine State of New York 158 Airport Executive Park Nauet, NY 10954

Dear Mr. Levine:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Levine 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Don Maurer New York State Emergency Management Office 1220 Washington Avenue, Bldg 22, suite 101 Albany, NY 12226-2251

Dear Mr. Maurer:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Maurer 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Robert McMahon Commissioner, P utnam County Emergency Services Putnam County Office Building, 3rd floor 40 Gleneida Avenue Camel, NY 10512

Dear Mr. McMahon:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. McMahon 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Robert F. Meehan Supervisor, Town of Pleasant One Town Hall Plaza Valhalla, NY 10595

Dear Mr. Meehan:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Meehan 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Chris Menzel, Police Chief Town of Bedford 321 Bedford Road Bedford Hills, NY 10507

Dear Chief Menzel:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Chief Menzel 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 The Homorable Thomas P. Morahan New York State Senate 158 Airport Executive Park Nanuet, NY 10954

Dear Mr. Morahan:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Morahan 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Mary Beth Murphy Town of Sommers 335 Route 202 Somers, NY 10589

Dear Ms. Murphy:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Ms. Murphy 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Daniel Paschkes Councilman, Town of Pound Ridge 179 Westchester Avenue Pound Ridge, NY 10576

Dear Mr. Paschkes:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Paschkes 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Jason Rashford Office of Congresswoman Sue Kelley United States House of Representatives 1127 Longworth House Office Building Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Rashford:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Rashford 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Susie Rush State of New York 700 White Plains Road, suite 252 Scarsdale, NY 10583

Dear Ms. Rush:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Ms. Rush 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 James Seimarco Liaison to Indian Point Town of Buchanan 236 Tate Avenue Buchanan, NY 10511

Dear Mr. Seimarco:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Seimarco 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Geri Shapiro Office of Senator Clinton United States Senate 476 Russell Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510

Dear Ms. Shapiro:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Ms. Shapiro 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 John Sloan Town of Cortlandt 1 Heady Street Cortlandt Manor, NY 10567

Dear Mr. Sloan:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Sloan 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Adam Stiebeling Deputy Commissioner, Putnam County Emergency Services Putnam County Office Building, 3rd floor 40 Gleneida Avenue Camel, NY 10512

Dear Mr. Stiebeling:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Stiebeling 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Anthony Sutton Commissioner of Westchester County Emergency Services 800 Michaelin Office Building 148 Martine Avenue White Plains, NY 10601

Dear Mr. Sutton:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Sutton 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Neil Sweeting Westchester County Emergency Services 800 Michaelin Office Building 148 Martine Avenue White Plains, NY 10601

Dear Mr. Sweeting:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Sweeting 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Jeff Tkacs Homeland Safety Coordinator Town of Cortlandt 1 Heady Street Cortlandt Manor, NY 10567

Dear Mr. Tkacs:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Tkacs 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Kent Tosch Bureau of Nuclear Engineering State of New Jersey P.O. Box 402 Trenton, NJ 08625-0402

Dear Mr. Tosch:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Tosch 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 James W. Tuffey Director, Emergency Management Office State of New York 1220 Washington Avenue, Bldg. 22, suite 101 Albany, NY 12226-2251

Dear Mr. Tuffey:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Tuffey 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Gerry Walsh County Executive Office Rockland County 16 East Lake Drive Thiells, NY 10984

Dear Mr. Walsh:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Walsh 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Gary D. Warshauer Supervisor, Town of Pound Ridge 179 Westchester Avenue Pound Ridge, NY 10576

Dear Mr. Warshauer:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Mr. Warshauer 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Bill Weitz Office of Congressman Engel United States House of Representatives 2228 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20518

Dear Mr. Weitz:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC

Mr. Weitz 2

recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2

March 17, 2005 Janet L. Wells Supervisor, Town of New Castle 200 South Greeley Avenue Chappaqua, NY 10514

Dear Ms. Wells:

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I would like to thank you for participating in the government-to-government meeting on December 16, 2004, in Briarcliff Manor, New York. I appreciated the opportunity to discuss important issues regarding safety, security, and emergency preparedness for Indian Point. One of the NRCs goals is to ensure openness in our regulatory process, and I believe this meeting supported that goal by keeping local officials informed regarding NRC actions in these areas.

The NRC recognizes that many things have changed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We appreciate the concerns of the public about the ability of nuclear power plants to mitigate the effects of deliberate attacks involving large commercial aircraft.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed the potential consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant for aircraft attack. As a result of those assessments, the NRC required all nuclear power plant licensees to implement enhancements to mitigate the potential consequences of a terrorist attack. The NRC conducted detailed engineering studies related to this matter, drawing on national experts from several Department of Energy laboratories and using state-of-the-art structural and fire analyses. These studies confirmed the low likelihood of damaging the fuel in reactor cores or spent fuel pools and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety. The assessments show that even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist attack, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigating actions and off-site emergency plans. Based on our assessments, we believe that nuclear power plant safety, security, and emergency planning programs continue to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Nonetheless, as part of our continuing emphasis on security, additional studies for the Nations nuclear power plants are underway or being planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capabilities on a site-specific basis. The NRC will not hesitate to take action if the need for additional capabilities is identified.

Additionally, actions taken by Federal aviation safety and security agencies -- Federal Air Marshals, reinforced cockpit doors, airport passenger and baggage screening, improved ability to detect deviation from planned flight paths, and greater military aircraft intercept capability --

have reduced the likelihood that large commercial aircraft could be used to attack critical infrastructure, including a nuclear facility. Other actions, such as improved communication between military surveillance authorities, the NRC, and NRC licensees, would allow plant operators to prepare the plant for safe shutdown should it be necessary.

The NRC has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of emergency response activities to protect the public in case of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant. As we discussed at the meeting, the NRC believes that the emergency preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid. However, the NRC recognizes that there are enhancements that can be made to emergency plans to incorporate

Ms. Wells 2

unique considerations associated with terrorism. We have also gained new insights from two recent studies on evacuations and are conducting a study to examine innovative protective action guidance for terrorism events. The results of the completed evacuation studies are enclosed for your information. In addition, the NRC is considering enhancements to the emergency preparedness notification process that will enable licensees to inform off-site response organizations, including State and local officials, of a security threat more quickly.

The NRC continues to work closely with the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal Emergency Management Agency on issues of concern, such as the effectiveness of sirens and route alerting for emergency notification. If you have any questions regarding the evacuation studies or other emergency preparedness issues, please feel free to contact Patricia Milligan of the NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate at (301) 415-2223.

We also appreciated the opportunity to discuss NRC oversight of activities at Indian Point. The NRC will maintain close oversight at Indian Point and will continue to monitor Entergys efforts to improve performance and integrate the two units. We will also perform on-site inspections as Entergy proceeds with its plans for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).

These inspections will look at construction, operations, and security of the planned ISFSI.

The NRC will hold an annual assessment meeting for Indian Point on May 10, 2005. This meeting will be open to the public and will provide an opportunity for local officials and members of the public to learn more about the NRC oversight process and our assessment of performance at the site. Additionally, in response to requests from local officials, we plan to discuss the license renewal process. We will also be prepared to talk about other topics, including security and emergency preparedness, and respond to questions from interested stakeholders.

Thank you again for attending the government-to-government meeting and for your interest in the safety and security of nuclear power. You can find the meeting summary, presentation slides, and attendance list in NRCs document system (ADAMS) under accession number ML043230617. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

1.

NUREG/CR-6863, Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies for Nuclear Power Plants

2.

NUREG/CR-6864, Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations, Volumes 1 and 2