ML050630425
| ML050630425 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/17/2005 |
| From: | Berg W Dairyland Power Cooperative |
| To: | Document Control Desk, NRC/FSME |
| References | |
| LAC-13863 | |
| Download: ML050630425 (12) | |
Text
DAIRYLAND PVSO.P.O. BOX 817
- LA CROSSE, WISCONSIN 54602-0817 OFFICE (608) 787-1258 WILLIAM L. BERG FAX (608) 787-1469 President and CEO WEB SITE: www.dairynet.com February 17, 2005 In reply, please refer to LAC-13863 DOCKET NO. 50-409 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
Dairyland Power Cooperative La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR)
Possession-Only License No. DPR-45 Annual Report for 2004 - Report of Changes. Tests and Experiments
REFERENCES:
(1) LACBWR Technical Specification, Section 6.5.1.1 (2) 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2)
In accordance with Reference 1, we are submitting the Annual Report covering the radiological exposure summary.
Also included are brief descriptions of facility changes, including summaries of evaluations, as required by Reference 2. No tests or experiments were conducted during 2004.
If there are any questions concerning this report, please contact us.
Sincerely, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE William L. Berg, President & CEO WLB:JBM:dh Enclosures cc/enc: Kristina Banovac, NRC Project Manager Peter Lee, Decommissioning Branch, NRC Region III K\Cff):IsU I A Touchstone Energy Cooperative
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR)
ANNUAL REPORT - 2004 Prepared by Jeff Mc Rill Technical Support Engineer POSSESSION-ONLY LICENSE NO. DPR-45 Dairyland Power Cooperative 3200 East Avenue South La Crosse, WI 54602-0817
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS 2004 FACILITY CHANGES The following facility changes were physically completed in 2004. A summary of the evaluation of each, performed according to 10 CFR 50.59, is included. A determination was made that prior NRC approval was not required for these facility changes.
37-03-27 Remove Containment Isolation Functions-Various Containment isolation relays acted to operate various ancillary valves, dedicate water supplies for core cooling, and close certain isolation valves during maximum credible accident (MCA) conditions. There is no longer an accident scenario that requires core cooling or results in pressurization of the Reactor Building. These functions were defeated, electrically removed, or verified as removed, under previous approved facility changes. This work was performed in preparation for the ultimate removal of the containment isolation relays and de-energization of the Reactor Safety System. The 50.59 screen, prepared under the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure, concluded that implementation of this facility change did not require prior NRC approval, that there was no need for any change to Technical Specifications, and that a 50.59 evaluation per the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure was not required.
37-03-28 Remove Containment Isolation Relays Nine relays received signals from the Reactor Safety System, the Reactor Building air monitoring system, and Reactor Building internal pressure transmitters. These relays acted to establish containment isolation, dedicate water supplies for core cooling, and ensure emergency power available during maximum credible accident (MCA) conditions. There is no longer an accident scenario that requires core cooling or results in pressurization of the Reactor Building. Containment integrity is no longer required by Appendix A Technical Specifications. Following final disposition of all containment isolation relay outputs, the relays were de-energized and removed. This work was the final step in preparation for de-energization of the Reactor Safety System. The 50.59 screen, prepared under the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure, concluded that implementation of this facility change did not require prior NRC approval, that there was no need for any change to Technical Specifications, and that a 50.59 evaluation per the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure was not required.
41-97-08 Remove Equipment from Control Room Panel "D-2" Following removal of containment isolation functions and relays, the Reactor Safety System was de-energized and equipment mounted in Control Room Panel D-2 was removed. This equipment included two reactor water level drawers, two reactor pressure drawers, two reactor power/flow comparator drawers, an auxiliary relay drawer, and a test power supply drawer. During operation, the Safety System acted to provide safe shutdown of the reactor. The aging energized equipment presented a fire hazard. The 50.59 screen, prepared under the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure, concluded that implementation of this facility change did not require prior NRC approval, that there was no need for any change to Technical Specifications, and that a 50.59 evaluation per the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure was not required.
47-03-09 Remove RLI and RL2 Buses RL1 and RL2 were 120-V AC, fused branch circuits that provided power to Control Room instruments directly or through numerous plug molds. A very small number of items remained energized from the two circuits. These instruments were attached to alternate power supplies. RL1 and RL2 were de-energized; associated wiring and plug molds were removed. The 50.59 screen, prepared under the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure, concluded that implementation of this facility change did not require prior NRC approval, that there was no need for any change to Technical Specifications, and that a 50.59 evaluation per the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure was not required.
55-03-24 Vent and Off-Gas System Modification Reactor vent header flow was routed through off-gas system piping and valves directly to the ventilation stack or to HEPA filters of the Reactor Building ventilation system.
Routing valves were controlled by containment isolation relays. Off-gas system valves were removed or disabled, and the reactor vent header was permanently attached to the inlet of the Reactor Building ventilation system HEPA filters. This work was performed in preparation for the ultimate removal of the containment isolation relays and de-energization of the Reactor Safety System. The 50.59 screen, prepared under the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure, concluded that implementation of this facility change did not require prior NRC approval, that there was no need for any change to Technical Specifications, and that a 50.59 evaluation per the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure was not required.
64-04-12 Remove Reactor Pressure Gauge and Piping A Heise gauge mounted on the Reactor Building biological shield provided local monitoring of reactor pressure. Piping to this gauge obstructed access to the upper cavity where shield block removal is in progress. The gauge and piping were removed to clear this obstruction. The 50.59 screen, prepared under the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure, concluded that implementation of this facility change did not require prior NRC approval, that there was no need for any change to Technical Specifications, and that a 50.59 evaluation per the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure was not required.
74-02-69 Remove Unused Control Room Benchboard Wiring This change removed abandoned wiring that terminated under the Control Room benchboard. This change is part of a continuing effort to remove unused and unnecessary wiring plant-wide. The 50.59 screen, prepared under the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure, concluded that implementation of this facility change did not require prior NRC approval, that there was no need for any change to Technical Specifications, and that a 50.59 evaluation per the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure was not required.
74-03-72 LACBWR Switchyard Upgrade The small LACBWR switchyard contained one remaining oil-filled 69-kV breaker. This breaker supplied power to the facility through the 5,000-kVA reserve auxiliary transformer. Due to the age of this breaker (1960's vintage) it was decided to replace the unit with a simplified arrangement using economical fuse links. Dairyland Power Cooperative's Electrical Engineering designed the project, with Transmission Maintenance and Construction personnel completing the installation. The 50.59 screen, prepared under the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure, concluded that implementation of this facility change did not require prior NRC approval, that there was no need for any change to Technical Specifications, and that a 50.59 evaluation per the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure was not required.
75-02.16 Modification to HPSW Diesel Fuel Oil Tanks Fill and Vent Connections High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) diesel-driven pumps are installed in the Cribhouse located on the shore of the Mississippi River. Each pump has a 300-gallon aboveground fuel tank also installed within the Cribhouse. The fuel tanks are equipped with containment dike structures of steel construction. The fuel tanks had fill and vent connections located outside the building. These connections were not equipped with catch basins and were identified as possible fuel spill paths to the near waterway. The fill and vent connections were moved inside the dike boundaries in accordance with applicable NFPA guidelines. The 50.59 screen, prepared under the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure, concluded that implementation of this facility change did not require prior NRC approval, that there was no need for any change to Technical Specifications, and that a 50.59 evaluation per the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure was not required.
78-02-22 Consolidate LACBWR 125-V DC Buses During operation, the 125-V DC system consisted of three separate station batteries, battery chargers, and buses. The Reactor Plant battery and charger were the first to be removed in 1999 due to age. In2004, the Diesel Building battery and charger were likewise removed and changes were made to consolidate the three separate DC systems to a single system supplied by the remaining Generator Plant battery and charger. The 50.59 screen, prepared under the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure, concluded that implementation of this facility change did not require prior NRC approval, that there was no need for any change to Technical Specifications, and that a 50.59 evaluation per the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure was not required.
87-04-25 Install New Security Camera at Front Gate An additional camera was installed to provide improved monitoring. This additional camera was recommended by the NRC during scheduled Security inspections. The 50.59 screen, prepared under the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure, concluded that implementation of this facility change did not require prior NRC approval, that there was no need for any change to Technical Specifications, and that a 50.59 evaluation per the 10 CFR 50.59 review procedure was not required.
TESTS There were no tests conducted during 2004.
EXPERIMENTS There were no experiments conducted during 2004.
2004 Dose Distribution Date: 01/20/05 License No. DPR-45 Licensee: DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE Affiliated Lic. No.:
Primary & Affiliated All Records for Licensee Records Monitoring Year Number of TEDE Dose Number of TEDE Dose Dose Range (rem) Individuals (person-rem) Individuals (person-rem)
No Meas. Exposure 12 12 Meas. <.100 56 0.918 56 0.918
.100 - .250
.250 - .500
.500 - .750
.750 - 1.000 1.000 - 2.000 2.000 - 3.000 3.000 - 4.000 4.000 - 5.000
> 5.000 Number with Meas. 56 56 TEDE Total Monitored 68 68 Total Collective TEDE 0.918 0.918 Total Collective CEDE APPENDIX A STANDARD FORMAT FOR REPORTING NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AND MAN-REM BY WORK AND JOB FUNCTION 2004 Number ofPersonnel(>100 mRem) Total Man-Rem Contract Contract Work & Job Function Station Utility Workers and Station Utility Workers and Employees Employees Others Employees Employees Others REACTOR SURVEILLANCE Maintenance Personnel 0 0 0 0.128 0.000 0.000 Operating Personnel 0 0 0 0.222 0.000 0.000 Health Physics Personnel 0 0 0 0.174 0.000 0.000 Supervisory Personnel 0 0 0 0.038 0.000 0.000 Engineering Personnel 0 0 0 0.038 0.000 0.116 ROUTINE MAINTENANCE Maintenance Personnel 0 0 0 0.020 0.000 0.000 Operating Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Health Physics Personnel 0 0 0 0.006 0.000 0.000 Supervisory Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Engineering Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 INSERVICE INSPECTION Maintenance Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Operating Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Health Physics Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Supervisory Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Engineering Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 SPECIAL MAINTENANCE Maintenance Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Operating Personnel 0 0 0 0.002 0.000 0.000 Health Physics Personnel 0 0 0 0.012 0.000 0.000 Supervisory Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Engineering Personnel 0 0 0 0.036 0.000 0.000 APPENDIX A - (cont'd) 2004 Number ofPersonnel (>100 mRem) Total Man-Rem Contract Contract Work & Job Function Station Utility Workers and Station Utility Workers and Employees Employees Others Employees Employees Others WASTE PROCESSING Maintenance Personnel 0 0 0 0.076 0.000 0.005 Operating Personnel 0 0 0 0.023 0.000 0.000 Health Physics Personnel 0 0 0 0.022 0.000 0.000 Supervisory Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Engineering Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 DEFUELING Maintenance Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Operating Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Health Physics Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Supervisory Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 Engineering Personnel 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 TOTAL Maintenance Personnel 0 0 0 0.224 0.000 0.005 Operating Personnel 0 0 0 0.247 0.000 0.000 Health Physics Personnel 0 0 0 0.214 0.000 0.000 Supervisory Personnel 0 0 0 0.038 0.000 0.000 Engineering Personnel 0 0 0 0.074 0.000 0.116 GRAND TOTAL 0 0 0 0.797 0.000 0.121 MAXIMUM INDIVIDUAL DOSE DURING CALENDAR YEAR: 0.084 Rem (HP Technician)