ML043480208
| ML043480208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
| Issue date: | 12/08/2004 |
| From: | Blanch P, Gundersen A - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Diaz N NRC/Chairman |
| References | |
| G20040836, IR-04-008, LTR-04-0744 | |
| Download: ML043480208 (11) | |
Text
EDO Principal Correspondence Control FROM: DUE: 12/15/04 EDO CONTROL: G20040836 DOC DT: 12/08/04 FINAL REPLY:
Paul M. Blanch West Hartford, Connecticut Arnold Gundersen Burlington, Vermont TO:
Chairman Diaz FOR SIGNATURE OF : ** GRN ** CRC NO: 04-0744 Dyer, NRR DESC: ROUTING:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Reyes Virgilio Kane Merschoff Norry Dean DATE: 12/10/04 Burns Collins, RI ASSIGNED TO: CONTACT: Cyr, OGC Kim, OEDO NRR Dyer SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:
Prepare short reply fm J. Dyer, NRR addressing receipt of letter and that we will be considering it as a supplement to their open 2.206 Petition as he has requested. Coordinate with T. J. Kim, OEDO and Region I as appropriate.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET Date Pinted:Dec 09, 2004 17:11 PAPER NUMBER: LTR-04-0744 LOGGING DATE: 12/09/2004 ACTION OFFICE: EDO AUTHOR: Paul Blanch AFFILIATION: CT ADDRESSEE:
SUBJECT:
Vermont Yankee nuclear power station (VYNPS)
ACTION: Signature of Chairman DISTRIBUTION: RF I LETTER DATE: 12/08/2004 ACKNOWLEDGED No SPECIAL HANDLING: Made publicly available in ADAMS via SECYIEDO/DPC NOTES: Commission Correspondence FILE LOCATION: ADAMS DATE DUE: 01/03/2005. DATE SIGNED:
EDO - -G20040836
Nuclear Safety Advisors Paul M. Blanch Arnold Gundersen Energy Consultant Nuclear Safety Consultant 135 Hyde Road 139 Killarney Drive West Hartford, CT 06117 Burlington, VT 05401 860-236-0326 802-865-9955 pmblanch(c'comcast.net arnieaundersen(isailchamplain.net December 8, 2004 Chairman Nils Diaz USNRC Washington DC 20005-0001 Via E-Mail
SUBJECT:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (N7Y'NPS)
Dear Chairman Diaz:
Chairman Diaz, we respectfully request that you personally intervene in Entergy's application to increase Vermont Yankec's power to 120 perccnt of its original design.
We are asking for your intervention to assure that by proper reconciliation of Vermont Yankee's design bases and applicable NRC regulation, your agency fulfills its Congressional mandate to protect public health and safety.
We note that in the recent report issued by the NRC' delineating its inspection of Vermont Yankee, the NRC fails to provide any assurance of regulatory compliance either now or when the plant operates at its proposed 120% power increase. Given the significant safety issues involved, this is a considerable risk and safety concern to all New Englanders, not just those residing within 50 miles of this aged nuclear power plant.
After completely reviewing the results of the final inspection report wve conclude that the NRC has not and is not willing to address Vermont Yankee's regulatory compliance. Furthermore, the NRC's continued refusal to address Vermont Yankee's ILetter from Wayne Lanming to Jay Thaycr dated, December 2, 2004 "Vermont Yankec Nuclcar Power Station NRC Inspcction Report 05000271/2004008"
Chairman Diaz - re: NRC oversight VY 12-04 Page 2 of 9 regulatory compliance leads uis to believe that the agency is simply unable to do so.
Thcrefore, we believe that the NRC is not even fully aware of the design and licensing bases of the plant, and furthermore, this fact is confirmed by recent communications as wvell as by your agency's lack of response to our July 2004 petition and the pertinent questions wc raised therein.
We are not simply idle bystanders who have decided to take issue with nuclear safety.
We are two of the foremost nuclear safety experts in the country who for the last 18-months have been reviewing in detail the technical and engineering aspects of Vermont Yankee's application to increase its power output. The more technical specifications and safety criteria we study, the more concerned we become about the safety of Vermont Yankee. Yet, the NRC continues headlong toward licensing this 33-year-old nuclear reactor for the largest percentage powver increase ever proposed at any nuclear facility in the United States and quite possibly in the world.
For your information, we have spent FOUR times as many hours as has the NRC's entire inspection team spent on its alleged special Engincering Inspection, yet the NRC continues to turn a dear car toward our concerns. As you wvell know, each of us has been involved in the nuclear industry for more than 30 years, first as engineers and later as independent consultants and expert wvitnesses. What you may not know, is that together we have spent more than 2800 hours0.0324 days <br />0.778 hours <br />0.00463 weeks <br />0.00107 months <br /> reviewing the technical, engineering, and safety analyses prepared for Vermont Yankee's application to increase (uprate) the power its reactor may produce.
On March 17, 2004, the Vermont Secretary of the Senate wrote to you forwarding a resolution unanimously passed by the entire Venrnolt Senate. This resolution requested the NRC conduct an inspection that:
- 1) Assesses the conformance of thefacility to its design and licensing bases,for operatingat both 100 percent and 120 percent of its originally intendedpoler production level;
- 2) Identifies all deviations, exnemptions and/or waivers from (a) regulatol)'
requirements applicable to Ver-mont Yankee and (b) regulatoin3 requirements
Chainiian Diaz- re: NRC oversight VY 12-04 Pagc 3 org a])plicablC to a newt nuclear reactoor (i.e. today's safety regulations) and verifies that adequate safety margins are r-etained clespite the cuiuiiilatii'eejffect ofslch deviations, excmiptiois, andor waivers for both the present licensedpowler level and under thee proposed ertendedpoiteriuprate."
On May 24, 2004, when James Dyer responded for you to the Secretary of tile Vermont Senate, lie stated:
"The Senate r equested that anj, assessment of J~erminont Yankee assess the conformance of thefacility to its design and licensing bases,for operatingat both 100 percent and 120 percent of its originally intendedpowerproductionlevel. We continually assess whetheer Entei-g operates 'el711011t Yankee in conformance i 'ith Vlermnont Y ankee's designi and licensing bases. One of thefinctions of oulr Reactor Oveisight Process is to assess wthether Entergy operates Vrerminont Yankee in accordance with the appropriatenuclear safety requirenments and standards.
The most recent annual assessmnent of Ven711011t Y'ank-ee concluded that the plant has been operatingin a manner thatpreservedpublic health andsafet). We have also conducted inspections beyond our nol7Znal inspections that ar-e specificall) focused on contfolmance writh design and licensing bases."
Chairman Diaz, please note that the clever wording of this NRC response to the Vermont State Senate provides no assurance of regulatory compliance, either now or when the plant operates at its proposed 20 percent power increase.
According to its own report, the NRC inspection team reviewed only 45 specific items and yet it still identified 8 clear violations of NRC regulation. Individually, while some of these violations may not be of high safety significance, taken collectively, they indicate a severe breakdown of Vermont Yankee's Quality Assurance (QA) program.
These findings add significant concern to an already problematic application since Venmont Yankee's QA program is the very program that was implemented to assure regulatory compliance.
In reviewing the inspection report issued by the NRC, we note that the condition of Vermont Yankee was reviewed against its design drawings and specifications (USFAR),
operating procedures, calculations, Information Notices, Generic Letters, and Regulatory Guides, and it was not reviewed for compliance with NRC regulation including the
Chairmian Diaz- re: NRC oversight VY 12-04 Page4 of 9 General Design Criteria2 . As noted in the inspection report written and issued by the NRC, the NRC conducted this inspection as a "pilot program" for the industry.
"The inspection wtas thefirst offourplannedpilotinspections to be conducted thrloughout the countiy, to assist the ARC in deter-milling whether changes should be made to its Reactor O'ei-sight Process (ROP) to imnprov'e the etfectiveness of its inspections and oversight in the design/engineering area."
Wiat a twist of words this "pilot program" has been passed off as the independent engineering assessment originally requested unanimously by the Vermont State Senate.
For instead of being the unique safety-sensitive examination Vennont's Congressional Delegation, the State of Vermont, the Public Service Board and its vetted experts, and the Vermont State Senate all requested, this inspection was a one-size fits-all program designed instead to assess the performance of the NRC Reactor Oversight Process (ROP).
By our reckoning, the NRC's performance is sadly lacking when it conducts an inspection against generic communications while ignoring the very inspection criteria it is statutorily obligated to evaluate. Except for brief discussions in this NRC issued report regarding 10 CFR Appendix B and 10 CFR 50.63, the NRC remains eerily silent about hundreds of other critical NRC safety regulations.
An inspection like the one NRC just concluded at Vermont Yankee, and thus summarized in its report, would be similar to one of us developing a maintenance program for our car (USFAR) by stating wev would change the oil every 50,000 miles, but simultaneously, we would never reference the owner's manual (NRC regulation). Therefore, by following NRC logic, as long as wvc changed the oil at this 50,000-mile interval, we wovuld comply vith our "design bases" and our car would operate safely. Let us take this analogy one step further and point out that if we inspect our car the way the NRC continues to inspect Vermont Yankee, we will never detect the underlying problem with our car's 2The design bases includes such items as the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR),
Technical Specifications, Orders, etc. We have previously pointed out to the NRC that the UFSAR does not reflect the design or the plant and that it fails to even attcrnpt to address the most basic General Design Criteria (GDC). The use of the UFSAR as the bases for the inspection is thcrefore inadequate. The bases for the inspection needs to be the NRC regulations.
Chainnan Diaz- re: NRC oversight VY 12-04 Pave s or9 maintenance program.
During this most recent inspection, the NRC-assembled inspection team really looked at Vermont Yankee's design control process and plant procedures and did not assess applicable NRC safety regulation, even though it is statutorily obligated to do so.
Therefore, our single biggest concern remains that any inspection conducted at Vermont Yankee must use the applicable NRC regulation including the General Design Criteria (GDC) as the inspection norm. We notified the NRC of this critical nuclear safety concern in our 2.206 petition dated July 29, 2004. Four and one-half months later, the NRC still has not responded to this very real nuclear safety issue.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, fonmulated at the inception of the nuclear powver industry, established "adequate protection" as a sound methodology and rule of law by which to ascertain the safety of an industry that relies upon atomic energy as its energy source. The "adequate protection" methodology wvas designed to protect the public from the inherent safety risk involved in using such a lethal technology to generate power in close proximity to cities and towns. It is the standard of safety upon which NRC regulation is based. "Adequate protection" means, "if the NRC review determines that the proposed changes would be in compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements, there is reasonable assurance that the proposed change is safe."
Certainly, we need not remind you and the other Commissioners that the NRC granted Vermont Yankee's operating license on March 21, 1972 with the following provision.
"The Boardhas concluded that the facility lwil operate in conformility with the application,as amended, the provisionsof the Act, and time miides and regulationsof the Connnission and will not be inimicalto the conunon defense andsecurit' or to the health andsafety of the public and that Velrmollnt Yankee is technically andfinanciallyqualifiedto engage in the activities authorized by the operating license. The Board hasfirther concluded that the activities authorized by the license will not have a significant, adverse impact oln the quality of the environnment and that the requirements of 10 CER 50.57 (c) have been satisfied."
According to this statement, NRC provided the public with the assurance that the
Chairnman Diaz- re: NRC oversight VY 12-04 Page 6 of 9 underpinning of"adcequatc protection" would be provided as long as the plant is in conformance with "the riules and-regulationsof the Commimissioll ".
The most recent inspection and our extensive revicw of Vermont Yankee and NRC documentation affirm our contention that the plant is definitely not in compliance with NRC regulation.
Moreover, it is also very clear that the NRC seems to be wholly unable to determine Vermont Yankee's compliance with NRC regulation. The entire so-called independent inspection was compromised as:
- The "independent" team was not independent, but was handpicked by the NRC.
- Qualified individuals were eliminated from consideration after the NRC "developed" arbitrary criteria for team members in order to solidify a team specific to NRC needs.
c It is clear that although the alleged "independent" team completed its inspection in five weeks, the report itself has been groomed wvithin the NRC for almost three months3 . Clearly any illusion of independence has been removed from what is really a Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) "pilot program" and industry prototype engineering assessment.
- Even wvith its total lack of independence, this team still identified eight areas of regulatory non-compliance, while reviewing less than one percent of the plant's systems. Therefore the "cockroach theory" would suggest that there must then be at least 800 more problems that the NRC failed to discover.
- Additionally, the inspection stated that 91 "samples" were selected and that 45 of the original 91 samples were selected for a more detailed review. From these 45 narrowly selected samples favored for detailed review, eight violations of NRC regulation were identified.
- These 91 samples represent significantly less than 1% of the areas impacting nuclear safety.
- Even assuming that 1% is an accurate estimate, this means that by statistical assessment approximately 800 areas of regulatory non-compliance currently exist at Vermont Yankee.
The fact that statistically there arc more than 800 undetected violations of NRC regulation is of great concern to all New England residents.
3Thc final report was not signed by the team members until Dcceniber 2, 2003
Chainnan Diaz- re: NRC oversight VY 12-04 Page 7 of 9 Unless Vermont Yankee can demonstrate compliance with thlc NRC regulation, there is no assurance of the "adequate protection" uinder which the NRC has its statutory authority. Every plant in the country must comply with somnc type of General Design Criteria, just as wlien buildingz a house one must comply with the building codes in effect when construction was bcgun. We arc in agreement with the NRC that Vermont Yankee should comply with the 70 Draft GDC that were in effect when its construction began.
However, we have found absolittely no reference to Vermont Yankee's actual compliance with those 70 Draft General Design Criteria" anywhere in the of hundreds of thousands of pages of Vermont Yankee licensing information we have reviewed.
Vermont Yankee's NRC Project Manager informed us that Vermont Yankee's written commitment to the GDC was in the USFAR. This is an NRC claim that we believe to be patently false. Without a clear statement under oath from Entergy that Vermont Yankee meets those critcria and all other NRC applicable regulation, "adequate protection" to the general public cannot be assured.
Most importantly, since there is no assurance and no record that Vermont Yankee has demonstrated it is presently in compliance with the NRC regulation. there is no assurance of "adequate protection" at the present power level and most certainly not at the proposed uprated power increase.
To meet the requirements of The Atomic Energy Act 5 and provide assurance of "adequate protection" to the general public as mandated by law, the NRC must demonstrate that Vermont Yankee is in compliance wvith its General Design Criteria (GDC) and other applicable regulations which arc the v'ery foundation by which Vermont Yankee received its license to operate and generate electricity within the State 4 Our review of revision I S to VY's UFSAR only discusscs compliance with two of the GDC's, both of thcse being the final GDC's rather than the draft GDC's. There arc no discussions within tcic UFSAR addressing any of the known deviations from the GDC's.
S The Atomic Energy Act clarified that "adequate protection is presumptively assured by compliance with NRC requirements". Furthermore, according to thc NRC the August 27, 1997 NRC Staff Requirements Mcmorandum (SPRM) stated that "compliance simply means meeting applicable regulatory requirements".
The August 27, 1997 SRM qualified its position, by stating that in "the case for any proposed license amendment, the NRC staff review determines if the proposed changes would be in compliance wvitli the applicable regulatory requirements"
Clhaimiani Diaz- re: NRC ovcrsighit VY 12-04 Page 8 of 9 of Vermont. Further, the NRC must provide assurance that the plant xvill remain in compliance with all NRC regulation should the 20% tiprate be approved.
Over and over again, we have requested that the NRC demonstrate to the general public that Vermont Yankee is in compliance with NRC regulation, thereby guaranteeing to the citizens of Vermont and its neighboring states that "adequate protection" is assured as is mandated by law. We have filed a 10 CFR 2.206 petition Nvith the NRC requesting that Vermont Yankee identify its design bases. While this petition xvas filed in July 2004, we have yet to receive a final response from the NRC.
Short of a new and completely independent inspection that verifies that Vermont Yankee is in compliance with all NRC regulation, there is no assurance that the public is adequately protected. We urge the Commission, and particularly you Chairman Diaz. to direct the NRC Staff to issue a Demand For Infornation (DFI) letter to Vermont Yankee in order to clarify its design bases and identify all deviations from any and all applicable regulation. If the Commission is unwilling to take this action, we request that the NRC Staff provide us with al I information identifying Vermont Yankee Design Bases and all applicable NRC regulation includint! all areas in which Vermont Yankee deviates from NRC regulation.
Consequcntly, we expect that NRC will provide answers to the significant safety issues we have identified. Additionally, we also expect answers to these issues at the VSNAP/NRC meeting December 16, 2004 in Brattleboro, Vermont.
Furthermore, so there is no misinterpretation on anyone's part, wve are nuclear safety advocates who have worked unceasingly for more than 15 years on critical nuclear safety issues in the public arena both here and abroad. Least we remind you, that we are two of only several expert witnesses w;'ho were vetted to testify regarding the accident at Three Mile Island. Subsequently, each one of us has testified before establishments as diverse as the United States Senate, the Senate of the Czech Republic, and the Vermont Public Service Board as wvell as numerous other state and federal quasi-judicial hearings.
9
Ciairmnan Diaz- re: NRC oversight VY 12-04 Page 9 of 9 Finally, Chairman Diaz, once again, we respcctftilly request that you personally intervene in order to assure that by proper reconciliation of Vermont Yankee's design bases and applicable NRC regulation, your agency fulfills its Congressional mandate to protect public health and safety. Moreover, by doing so, wve are certain that you wvill also advance your agency's goals, not only those of adequately maintaining sarety, but more importantly at this critical juncture, the goal of increasing public confidence in the NRC's ability to create a safe nuclear power environment. This is an area now sorely tried by the perception that the NRC only gives lip service to enforcing regulation.
Sincerely, Paul M. Blanch for Arnie Gundersen Cc: Senator Jeffords Senator Leahy Congressman Saunders