ML042660384

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Reports Detailing Structural Analysis of Corrosion Wastage at Davis Besse
ML042660384
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 09/17/2004
From: Matthew Kirk
Division of Engineering Technology
To: Nilesh Chokshi
Division of Engineering Technology
References
Download: ML042660384 (3)


Text

September 17, 2004 MEMORANDUM TO: Nilesh Chokshi, Chief Materials Engineering Branch Division of Engineering Technology FROM: Mark T Kirk /RA/

Component Integrity Section Division of Engineering Technology THRU: Allen L. Hiser, Chief /RA/

Component Integrity Section Division of Engineering Technology

SUBJECT:

REPORTS DETAILING STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF CORROSION WASTAGE AT DAVIS BESSE The purpose of this memorandum is to transmit to you final reports detailing the results of our analysis and testing program aimed at investigating the structural significance of the corrosion wastage discovered in the upper head of the Davis Besse nuclear reactor vessel in February of 2002. Attached to this memorandum please find four letter reports from ORNL:

1. Bass, B,R., et al., Experimental Program for Investigating the Influence of Cladding Defects on Burst Pressure, Oak Ridge National Laboratory Report Number ORNL/NRC/LTR-04/13, September 2004.
2. Williams, P.T., Yin, S., and Bass, B.R., Probabilistic Structural Mechanics Analysis of the Degraded Davis-Besse RPV Head, Oak Ridge National Laboratory Report Number ORNL/NRC/LTR-04/15, September 2004.
3. Williams, P.T. and Bass, B.R., Analysis of the Davis-Besse RPV Head Wastage Area and Cavity, Oak Ridge National Laboratory Report Number ORNL/NRC/LTR-02/09, September 2004.
4. Williams, P.T. and Bass, B.R., Stochastic Failure Model of the Davis-Besse RPV Head, Oak Ridge National Laboratory Report Number ORNL/NRC/LTR-02/10, September 2004.

The first report concerns our probabilistic structural analysis and provides details of our forensic examinations of samples removed from the Davis Besse cladding. The second report details results of our mock-up burst tests. The results of these tests were used to develop and validate the structural model described in the first report. The third and fourth reports describe our preliminary modeling efforts. The models described in the first report evolved out of insights gained from reports three and four.

Please note that I have reviewed all of these reports for technical accuracy and to ensure that any proprietary information has been removed.

Key conclusions from these studies can be summarized as follows:

 Our forensic examination of the cracks in the stainless steel cladding removed from Davis Besse reveals no evidence of tearing at the reactors operating pressure, something that would have to occur prior to any cladding failure. This finding suggests strongly that no near-term failure was likely when the plant was shut down.

 Our structural analyses showed that the exposed cladding that existed on February 16, 2002, would have held until pressures reached about one and a quarter to one and a half times the normal operating pressure of 2200 psi, i.e. between 2700 and 3300 psi (5th and 95th percentile), with a median pressure estimate of 3000 psi. Uncertainties regarding the cladding material properties and the irregularity of the crack network are responsible for the range in these predicted pressure margins. It is important to note that all of these pressures exceed the safety relief valve setpoint pressure of 2500 psi.

 To accurately estimate how long after February 16, 2002, the stainless steel cladding could have held would require more information on the rate at which the cavity behind the cladding was expanding and the rate at which the existing cladding cracks were growing, among other variables. Significant uncertainties remain regarding these variables, and regarding the mechanism responsible for cavity growth. By using a simplified model we have determined that Davis Besse could have continued to operate between 2 to 22 months after February 16, 2002 without failure of the RPV head.

This information has previously been reported to the EDO (see Adams ML041250112) and has been provided to Mr. Gary DeMoss of the Risk Analysis Branch to support his Accident Sequence Precursor calculations. Mr. DeMoss has reported the results of his calculations separately.

Should you have any questions or concerns please do not hesitate to contact me.

DISTRIBUTION MEB r/f DET r/f DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML042660384.wpd OAR in ADAMS? (Y or N) Y ADAMS ACCESSION NO.:ML042600455 TEMPLATE NO. RES-Publicly Available? (Y or N) Y DATE OF RELEASE TO PUBLIC 9-21-04 SENSITIVE?

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy OFFICE RES/MEB RES/MEB RES/MEB NAME M. Kirk /RA/ A. Hiser /RA/ N. Chokshi /RA/

DATE 09/17/04 09/17/04 09/17/04 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY