Text

Final Section C Operating
	ML042190312
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	07/19/2004
From:	Wilson M; Dominion Nuclear Connecticut
To:	Conte R; NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
	Conte R
References
	50-423/04-301
	Download: ML042190312 (206)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Form ES-D-1 Facility: Millstone, Unit 3 Scenario No.: One Op-Test No.: One Examiners: Operators: SRO Surroaate Harrv Balian /John Caruso RO Applicants 4 to 6 Gill Johnson RO Applicants 7 to 9 Initial Conditions: 81% Power. Steadv State Turnover: The plant is at 81% power and returnina to full Dower followina a refuelinq outaae. However. CONVEX has directed the crew is to rapidly reduce power.

Motor drive auxiliarv feedwater pump, 3AFW*PIA is out of service for emeraent maintenance. 3AFW*PlA was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months aao and expected return to operabilitv is 32 hours3.703704e-4 days 0.00889 hours 5.291005e-5 weeks 1.2176e-5 months from now. Limitina condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.1 2, action a. has been entered.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Outline\MS3 ES-D-1 Scenario 1.wpd NUREG-1021, Revision 9

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE APPROVAL SHEET 1.

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: 0 II. Initiated:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 17 May 2004 Developer Date III. Reviewed:

Reviewer Date IV. Approved:

Operations Manager Date Operator Training Supervisor Date

AI 99-6848 G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenano 1 .doc Page 1 of 54

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTIONS LISTED IN ORDER

1. Exam Overview

2. Instructor Guide

3. Sequence of Events Summary

4. Validation Checklist

5. Reference and Critical Task Tracking Form

6. Scenario Initial Conditions Sheet G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 2 of 54

SECTION 1 EXAM OVERVIEW

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: 0

1. Exam Brief:

The plant is at 81% power and returning to full power following a refueling outage.

However, CONVEX (IS0 New England), has ordered a rapid down power to 65%. The specific order is Reduce output to 650 MW-net, push 150 MVARS. The crew should recognize the need to reduce turbine-generator output to 700 MW and 150 MVARs out to comply with the order. Event 2 begins when the plant is stable at -65%.

Event 2 is pressurizer pressure transmitter, 3RCS*PT455, failure low. This causes all PZR heaters to energize. However, a significant RCS pressure rise is not expected before the crew recognizes the failure and responds per AOP 3571; including selection of an alternate control instrument. This event causes the RO to take manual control of normally automatic functions and the SRO to make Technical Specification action statement entries.

Event 3 is turbine impulse pressure transmitter, 3MSS-PT505, failure low. The indicated power mismatch will cause control rods to insert. The RO will have to take rod control to manual. The crew may have to maneuver the plant to bring Tave and Tref within 1%OF. The alternate instrument, 3MSS-PT506, will have to be selected and compensatory measures dictated by AOP 3571 carried out. The SRO will have to refer to Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements. However, entry into action statements is not expected.

Event 4 is pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV), 3RCS*PCV456, leakage.

Ostensibly, the preceding transients cause the leak. The crew responds per OP 3353.MB4A 3-5 or AOP 3555 and blocks the affected PORV. The SRO refers to Technical Specifications and Technical Requirementsand enters Tech Spec action statement 3.4.4.a. The event ends at the Examiners discretion.

Event 5 is main steam header pressure transmitter, 3MSS-PT507, failure low. The indicated differential pressure between main steam and main feed causes both turbine driven feedwater pumps to reduce speed. As the feedwater pumps slow down, steam generator water levels will lower. The steam generator water level control system will open the feedwater flow control valves in an attempt to raise levels to the programmed level. Operators should take feedwater pump speed control to manual before significant transients occur.

Event 6 is B feedwater flow control valve, 3FWC-FCV520, to failing open. Steam generator B water level will rise uncontrollably and the crew should trip the plant to prevent carryover to the turbine. Otherwise, an automatic turbine trip will occur on high steam generator water level.

Events 6 is five control rods failing to drop. The crew will perform the first four steps of E-0 and transition to ES-0.1. ES-0.1 will direct the crew to Immediate Borate per G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 3 of 54

operating procedure 3566.

Event 7 is a failure of the available auxiliary feedwater pumps, 3FWA*P1B and 3FWA*P2, to start. ES-0.1 also directs the crew to start AFW pumps. The crew may enter FR-H.l or FR-H.2 if the heat sink critical safety function becomes red or orange.

Events 9 and 10 are a 340-gallon per minute steam generator tube rupture and failure of the standby-charging pump to start. Alternatively, if the standby charging pump was previously started, the pump will trip when SI initiates. At least four authorized procedure paths exist from this point. They are to respond to the radiation monitor alarms (AOP 3573), respond to the RCS leak (AOP 3555), respond to the steam generator tube leak (AOP 3576) or respond to the lowering pressurizer level (ES-0.1 Foldout Page). Nevertheless, all four paths inevitably require the Crew to trip the reactor, initiate SI and go to E-0. As the crew progresses through E-0, they should recognize the one of the charging pumps is not running and start or restart the offending pump. Step 25 of E-0 sends the crew to E-3, based on either abnormal radiation or uncontrollable level increase. The operators should isolate feed flow to the ruptured Steam Generator when the level increases to >8% NR or 65% WR. The crew should progress through E-3 to cooldown and depressurize the RCS; then to terminate SI and stop primary to secondary leakage. The scenario terminates when the second charging pump is secured or at the Chief Examiner's discretion.

Event I 1 is a scripted question for the SRO applicant to determine the appropriate emergency action level (EAL) - ALERT Charlie One based on leakage [RCB4].

During pre-validation,this scenario ran close to two hours. Reactor Coolant Pumps ran the entire scenario and RC-P trip criteria were never reached. The scenario kept the RO and BOPvery busy and is good for testing Applicants on the consoles.

2. Plant/Simulatordifferences that may affect the scenario are: None.

3. Duration of Session: 1% hour G:VIRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 4 of 54

SECTION 2 INSTRUCTOR GUIDE

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number I ID Number: NRC Scenario I Revision: 0 All Control Room Conduct, Operations and Communicationsshall be in accordance COP 200.1,Conduct of Operations, and OP 3260,Unit 3 Conduct of Operations.

"Review the Simulator Operating Limits(design limits of plant) and the Simulator Modeling Limitations and Anomalous Response List prior to performing this training scenario on the simulator. The instructor should be aware if any of these limitations may be exceeded." (NSEM 6.02)

G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 5 of 54

SIMULATOR PROBLEMS DURING EXAMS It is the responsibilityof the Instructors in the simulator to insure that exam interruptions have a minimum negative impact on the Crew and the examinations we provide. ,

Be aware that at all times the Operators should treat the simulator as if it were the plant and you too should treat it as much like the plant as possible when they are in the simulator.

As soon as the Instructors are aware of a simulator problem that will adversely affect the exam in progress (computer fault, etc.) the Instructor should:

1. Place the simulator in FREEZE if possible.

2. Announce to the Crew that there is a simulator problem.

3. Request that the Crew leave the simulator control room. (The Crew should leave the simulator for problems which involve major switch alignments).

4. Deal with the problem (reboot, call STSB, etc.)

5. After the Instructors believe the simulator is restored to service, the Crew should be told how the exam will continue. If it is possible and felt to be acceptable to the evaluators, the examination can begin where it left off with an update on plant parameters and each Crew member is prepared to restart. If the examination will not begin where it left off, the crew should be told how and where the exam will begin again.

6. Once the Crew has been told how and where the exam will begin, have the crew conduct a brief so that the Instructor and evaluators can insure that the crew has all the necessary information to continue with the scenario.

7. Once all Crew members, Instructors and evaluators are satisfied that they have the necessary information to continue the scenario, place the simulator in RUN and announce to the Crew that you have continued the evaluation session.

G:\DRS\Osb\BalianMillstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 6 of 54

-~

EVENT #O TITLE: INITIAL SETUP Setup Instructions:

Enter IDT as follows :

At any XTERM window, type 4dt>

When the SUN asks for an executive type: UEXEC or RTEXEC? enter cr>: this will bring up a blank idt page.

To go to a previously saved idt file type <read> at the prompt When the SUN asks for a file name of the file you wish to view type in the appropriate file name:

The old "Landon" files are as follows:

Old ISD pages 1-8 are idt file OPS Old ISD pages 9-16 are idt file OPSl Old ISD pages 17-19 are idt file OPS2 IF the step counters are athear 000, THEN REMOVE the STEP COUNTER OVERRIDE, allow the counters to step out during the IC reset, Reset to IC-I2 REINSTATE the step counter OVERRIDE Adjust the various pot settings to the valued specified by the chart located in the sim booth for the selected IC.

Place Simulator to RUN Set the STEP COUNTERS PLACE the Main Turbine on the LOAD LIMITER Verify annunciator, "COMPUTER FAILURE" (MB4C, 1-1 I), is NOT LIT.

Place MOL Curve Book in Shelf for Operator use. Remove other Curve Books from the floor.

Clear the DCS Alarms PLACE THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT IN PTL or align as needed:

Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump 3FWA*PlA Equipment 0 0 s : O 3FWA*PlA 0

Synchronize the MONITOR Time Display with digital time display on MB4.

G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 7 of 54

Initial Malfunctions

/IOs/lDAs:

,T=O RD16 Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert,.

FW20A Failure of Auto Start on MDAFW " A FW20B Failure of Auto Start on MDAFW "B" FW2OC Failure of Auto Start on TDAFW Pump S107B Failure of Auto Start on SI Pump.

I/Os RXOSA Severity = 0% 3RCS*PT455 fails low RX16A Severity = 0% 3MSS-PT505 fails low RC07B Severity 1% 3RCS*PCV456 leakage RXI5 Severity = 0% 3MSS-PT507 fails low FW08B Severity = 100% 3FWC-FCV520 fails open SGOIB Severity = 38% SGTR of 340 gpm (ramp from 100 to 340 over 2 minutes).

Post Exam Data Collection Reactor Power trend data Turbine Generator Load trend data Pressurizer Pressure trend data (PT455 & PT456)

SG Levels (all SGs, both NR & WR)

Rod Positions Auxiliary Feedwater Flowrate trend data (all SGs)

All console and panel strip charts or recorded digital data (may be collected at end of day for all crews.

G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 8 of 54

NOTE: Do not end this event until C-7 is reset at OP 3575, Step 21.e below. Otherwise a reactor trip will occur when Event 3 is initiated.

A CONVEX requested emergency generation reduction should be completed within 15 minutes of

. notification.

If a unit shutdown is required, the final desired power level should be between 20% and 25% reactor 3575, NOTE

. power.

If at any time ROD CONTROL BANKS LIMIT LO-LO (MB4C 4-9) preceding Step I.

annunciator is received, DO NOT go to AOP 3566, Immediate Boration. Immediately perform step 9.

Determine Power Reduction Rate us (%/mid 3575, Step Check desired power reduction rate - 3575, Step EQUAL TO OR LESS THAN 5%/min 1.a Check power reduction - CONVEX 3575, Step REQUESTED 1 .b Perform load reduction at 3575, Step us 5%/min and Proceed to step 2. 1 .c RO -

Check Rod Control IN AUTO 3575. Stet, 2 BOP Align EHC Panel 3575, Step 3 Check turbine OPERATING MODE - 3575, Step BOP MANUAL us Proceed to NOTE prior to step 4 3575, Step 3.a, RNO If at any time the power reduction NOTE rate or final desired power level must preceding be changed, Return to step 1. 3575, Step 4 Verify Power Reduction Rate 3575, Step 4 Check power reduction rate - 3575, Step 5%/MIN 4.a Check turbine load reduction - 3575, Step us

- REQUIRED TO STABILIZE PLANT 4.b G:DRS\Osb\Balian~illstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 9 of 54

3575, Step us Proceed to step 5.

4.b, RNO RO Initiate Ratid Boration 3575. SteP 5 RO Verify RCS makeup system in -

AUTO I 3575, Step 5.a RO START one boric acid transfer pump 1 3575, Step 5.b RO OPEN emergency boration valve (3CHS*MV8104\ I 3575, Step 5.c Verify direct boric acid flow (3CHS-FI 3575, Step RO 183A) - INDICATED l5.c

e. OPEN charging line flow control 3575, step RO valve, to match boric acid flow 5.d (SCHS-FI 183A)

Record time boration started 3575, Step Record the time. RO 5.e

- Time RO Energize all PZR heaters 3575, Step 5.f Using formula, Determine boration 3575, step RO time (If gravity borating, use net charging flow for BA flow rate): 54 Check the Calculation Boration Time (minutes) = (Total Forumula of (16 + 85)

15 = 2.8 minutes RO Power Change) + (BA Flow Rate) X 3575, Step BA Flow Rate = 85 gpm 15 54 based on pre-validation During power decrease, Modify boration time as necessary to RO ..

maintain:

Rods above the Rod Insertion Limit 3575, Step 5.i Tavg within f 5-F of Tref AFD within COLR limits Check turbine load decrease - IN us PROGRESS OR COMPLETED 3575, Step 5.j Proceed to NOTE prior to step 7. 3575, Step us 5.j, RNO G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 10 of 54

c CRS Direction to BOP:

If a unit shutdown is being "Decrease Turbine Load Set to BOP Initiate Load Reduction NOTE performed, the final Mwe load should preceding be amroximatelv 230 Mwe. 3575. SteD 6

~~

3575, Step 7 700 M W .

I BOP MANUAL I Check turbine OPERATING MODE - 3575, Step 7.a Check power reduction - CONVEX 3575, Step REQUESTED I7.e Maintain initial MVAR loading during Remember, CONVEX ordered BOP power reduction, unless directed 3575, Step 7.f 150 MVAR out.

otherwise I I US Check boration - IN PROGRESS I 3575, Step 7.a The following step places one TD FW NOTE Reduction to 65% Power pump in manual while allowing the should not prompt US to us other TD FW pump to automatically preceding secure Feedwater Pump 3575, Step unload during the downpower.

Align One Feedwater Pump For us Automatic Unloading 3575, Step Verify removing a feedwater pump 3575, Step from service during the downpower -

8.a DESIRED 3575, Step US Proceed to step 9.

8.a, RNO If RIL Lo-Lo or Lo is RO Verify Rod Position 3575, Step 9 received, the procedure Check ROD CONTROL BANKS directs Crew to raise 3575, Step RO LIMIT LO-LO (MB4C 4-9)

Boration flow rate. If 9.a annunciator - LIT required flow rate can NOT be established, procedure Proceed to step 9.e. and, IF at any directs Crew to trip and go to time, the annunciator is received, 3575, Step E-O.

us THEN Perform steps 9.b., 9.c. and 9.a, RNO 9.d.

G:U)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 11 of 54

3575, Step 9.e, RNO Perform step 9.f. and 9.q.

Restore From Rapid Or Gravity RO 3575, Step 10 Boration Check rapid OR gravity boration - IN 3575, Step PROGRESS 1O.a Ro I Check boration performed for the time determined in steps 5.h. and 5.i.

Check rapid boration - IN 3575, Step 10.b 3575, Step Ro 1o.c PROGRESS CLOSE emergency boration valve 3575, Step Ro 10.d (3CHS*MV8104) 3575, Step RO STOP boric acid transfer pump 1O.e Restore PZR level to program value 3575, Step RO and Place charging line flow control 10.f valve in AUTO Using normal makeup, Adjust RCS boron concentration as necessary to RO ..

maintain:

Rods above the RIL Tavg within f 5-F of Tref 3575, Step lo.g AFD within COLR limits Reduce Steam Supply To The BOP 3575, Step 11 MSRs Check reheat steam flow controllers 3575, Step BOP

- IN AUTOMATIC 11-a Using the MSR Startup Pressure Display on the Foxboro DCS, Verify 3575, Step BOP symmetrical operation of the MSR 1l.b reheaters durina Dower decrease Z C h e c k IfRCS SamDle Reauired 3575. Step 12 us Verify change in Reactor Power - 3575, Step GREATER THAN 15% 12.a G:\DRS\OsbUBalian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 12 of 54

Verify change in Reactor Power - 3575, Step us GREATER THAN 15% IN ONE 12.b HOUR Request Chemistry sample the RCS 3575, Step us for iodine (between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 12.c after the power change)

Request Chemistry Department Booth Operator perform gaseous effluent samples When CRS requests chemistry and analysis (between 24 and 72 samples, merely acknowledge the hours after the power change) for the 3575, Step request. us following process monitors:

12.d 3HVR-REIOB Continue power reduction to the final desired power level and, WHEN Final 3575, Step us desired power level is reached, 13,a, RNO THEN Proceed to step 21.

us Check Plant Status Verify - AT FINAL DESIRED POWER 3575, Step us LEVEL

~

I 21.a Borate or Dilute as necessary to maintain AFD as close to the target 3575, Step RO value as possible while maintaining 21 .b rods above the Rod Insertion Limit Request Chemistry obtain RCS 3575, Step us boron samples 21.c 3575, Step RO Using GA-9, Align for auto makeup 21.d Select RESET on the steam dump 3575, Step BOP mode selector switch (If required) 21.e Report Unit Status And Power Reduction 3575, Step US Notify CONVEX 22.a G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 13 of 54

Check power reduction - GREATER 3575, Step THAN OR EQUAL TO 100 Mwe 22.b Using MP-01-SM-GDLOI. O l , Power I'

Change and Outage Notifications," 3575, Step Update the Millstone Electronic 22.c Bulletin Board (EBB) 3575, Step I I I us Notify the U3 Duty Officer 22.d Check If Plant Should Be 3575, Step 23 Shutdown Shutdown NOT desired.

Therefore, follow Step 23.a.,

Verify plant shutdown - DESIRED I 3575, Step 23.a Response Not Obtained. 3575, Step Proceed to step 24.

23.a, RNO Continue With Normal Plant us Operations Using Applicable Plant 3575, Step 24 Procedures NOTE: Do not end this event until C-7 is reset at OP 3575, Step 21.e below. Otherwise a G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 14 of 54

During pre-validation, it took about Iminute after inserting the failure to receive MB4A 4-4 and 5-3.

411 instruments and controls are on the left side of the MB4 console and panel.

RO Determines that PT-455 Determine The Initiating Parameter has failed low (Low Pressure us And Place The Affected Controller In 3571,l.

RO MANUAL Stabilize The Plant Parameters 3571,2.

It is desired that I&C personnel trip the bistables specified in this procedure. If, during off-hours, I&C personnel are not able to trip the NOTE necessary bistables within the time preceding limitations required by the Technical AOP 3571, Specifications, Operations Step 3.

Department personnel may trip the bistables using the guidance provided within this procedure.

Perform Corrective Actions Using Appropriate

Attachment:

US goes to Attachment B. us Attachment B - Pressurizer Pressure 3571,3 Channel Failure The following annunciators are symptoms of a PZR pressure instrument failure:

9larms received during validation

. PRESSURIZER PRESSURE HI MB4A 3-4 PRESSURIZER PORV CHANNEL PRESSURE HI PRESSURIZER PRESSURE DEVIATION MB4A 4-4

. MB4A 4-3 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE DEVIATION MB4A 4-4 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LO MB4A 5-4 NOTE

, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LO MB4A 5-4

. PZR RELIEF VALVE DIS TEMP HI MB4A 3-5 PRESSURIZER SI CHANNEL PRESSURE LO MB4A 5-3 xeceding 4OP 3571,

, PRESSURIZER SI CHANNEL PZR REL TK TEMP HI MB4A 2-2 PZR REL TK LEVEL HI-HIIHIILO MB4A 2-3 4ttachment B, PRESSURE LO MB4A 5-3 PZR REL TK PRESSURE HI MB4A 2-4 Step 1.

PZR PRES LO MB4F 1,2,3,4 3 -

PZR PRES HI MB4F 1,2,3,4 4-PZR PORV PRESS HI MB4F 1,2,3,4 13 LOOP 1,2,3,4 OVR TEMPeT MB4F 1,2,3,4 5 LOOP 1,2,3,4 OVR TEMPbT MB4F 1,2,3,4 7 PZR PRES LO MB2D 1,2,3,4 5 -

PZR PRES HI MB2D 1,2,3 6-G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 15 of 54

Defeat the failed channel input.

Pressurizer Press Select - Control RO, AT us DIRECTION, ROTATES THE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE us . 3RCS-PS455F Pressurizer Press Select - Record AOP 3571, Attachment B, CONTROL SELECTOR SWITCH TO POSITION 3-4 RO

. 3RCS-PS455G OT/OP AT Record Select RCS-TS41IE Step 1 Restore RCS pressure to normal, AOP 3571, RO RETURNS PZR HEATERS TO RO then Place PZR pressure control in Attachment B, AUTOMATIC.

automatic. Ster, 2 When conditions have stabilized, Observe MB annunciators and AOP 3571, parameters. Immediately report any Attachment B, unexpected or unexplained Step 3 conditions to the Shift Manager.

Trip the associated Reactor Protection System bistable(s):

Place a check mark in the box above US CHECKS PT 455 AOP 3571, the appropriate channel that requires PRoTECTloN SET I ON PAGE 3 OF US Attachment B, tripping on pages 3 or 4 of this 4 OFATT. B. Step 4.a Attachment .

3.3.1, Action 6 - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to trip, Refer to Technical Specification 3.3.1, AOP 3571, 3.3.2, Action 20 - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to 3.3.2, and 3.3.3.5.

trip, us Attachment B, 3.3.3.5 - No. of OD. Chnls met. I Refer to Technical Requirement I Step4-b AOP 3571, 3.3.2.1 - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to trip. *US 3.3.2.1. Attachment B, SteP 4.c NOTE: Do not initiate event 3 until C-7 is reset at OP 3575, Step 21.e above in Event 1.

Look for MB4D 6-6.

Otherwise a reactor trip will occur when Event 3 is initiated.

G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 16 of 54

G:\DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 17 of 54 RO-ATC Examiner: If possible, discretely record initial Rod Index and Tave Deviation:

Rod Index: Tave Deviation:

I NOTE: C-7 must be reset before initiatina this event (MB4D . 6-61

~ - - I RO places Rod Control in Respond to the failed instrument by AOP 3571 Manual. placing rod control in manual. ster, 1 Caution The US may direct the BOPto take Train A TBVs to OFF I Rod Control is the affected us Determine the initiating parameter AOP 3571 and place the affected controller in parameter. RO MANUAL. step 1 Reduce Turbine load to bring AOP 3571 Stabilize the plant parameters.

Tref and Tave within I%O step 2 Perform Corrective Actions Using Appropriate Attachment AOP 3571 US Goes to Attachment G us step 3 G - Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel Failure Places the First Stage Steam Defeat the failed channel by selecting Pressure Channel Selector the alternate channel on first stage AOP 3571 Switch (3MSS-PS505Z) to steam pressure channel selector Att. G step 1 PT506 - MB7 switch (3MSS-PS505Z).

If C-7 is actuated, select RESET on AOP 3571 C-7 should NOT be actuated the steam dump mode selector. Att. G step 2 Set steam generator pressure AOP 3571 Should already be set at 1092. BOP controller (3MSS-PK507) to 1092 Att. G step 3 mia.

US may have already directed Place one condenser interlock AOP 3571 this in resoonse to the failure. selector switch to OFF. Att. G step 4 Place the steam dump mode selector AOP 3571 in the STEAM PRESSURE mode. Att. G step 5 G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 18 of 54

Skill of the Craft / Good Prax BOPshould check steam dump Place both condenser interlock AOP 3571 demand before placing the selector switches to ON. Att. G step 6 condenser interlock selector switches to ON.

Continued Operation

$ g= Refer to 3TRM-7.2 Additional AOP3571 Att.

.S% permissiblewith best efforts US Requirements, AMSAC.

6 G step 9 to reDair. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~

When conditions have stabilized, observe ME! annunciators and AOP 3571 parameters. Immediately report any Att. G step unexpected or unexplained conditions 10 to the SM.

If the interlock (permission annunciator window) is in the AOP 3571 Att.

US required state for the existing plant G NOTE prior conditions), no further actions are to step 11 required (e.g., tripping of bistables).

Within one hour, perform the AOP 3571 us followina: Att. G stet, 1 I G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 19 of 54

Determine if the interlock is in the required state for the existing plant Should be in the required conditions.

Rx or turb not at power P-7 AOP 3571 Att.

G step 1l.a state, otherwise TS 3.0.3 applies. . (MB4D 5-3)

Turbine not at power P-13 (MB4D 6-31 AOP 3571 Refer to Technical Specification us 3.3.1, Action 8.

Att. G, step 11.b Request I&C Department perform AOP 3571 us corrective maintenance on failed Att. G step instrument. 12 Event 4 when' US Requests Cc - 5 Maintenance by I&C G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 20 of 54

There is a time delay between IF PORV OPEN (MB4B 4-9) is lit, 3353.MB4 3-malfunction insertion and first GOto OP 3353.MB4B 4-9, PORV 5 alarms. OPEN. SteD 1 IF PRESSURIZER PRESSURE HI 3353.MB4 3-(MB4A 3-4) is lit, Go To MB4A 3-4, 5 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE HI. Step 2 CONFIRM high PORV outlet 3353.MB4 3-IF 3RCS*PCV455A or 3353.MB4 3-RO 3RCS*PCV456, PORV, (MB4), is not 5 fully closed, CLOSE PORVs. Step 4 IF 3RCS*PCV455A or RCS*PCV456, 3353.MB4 3-RO PORV, (MB4), fail to close, CLOSE 5 associated PORV block (MB4): SteD 5 IF pressurizer pressure is not high 3353.MB4 3-AND both pressurizer power relief 5 valves are closed, PERFORM the following to determine leaking PORV: Step 6 MONITOR PORV outlet PRT Temp = 70°F Tailpipe Temp = 208°F G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 21 of 54

3353.MB4 3-MONITOR 3RCS-TI 463, "PORV" 5 "OUTLET TEMPS" (MB4).

Step 6.3.2 IF 3RCS-TI 463, "PORV" "OUTLET TEMPS" (MB4), decreases, Refer To the following Technical

..US Enters:

3.4.4, Action A SpecificationslTRMsand DETERMINE Limiting Condition for 3.4.6.2 - leakage Blocked &

us ..

Operation:

TIS 3.4.4, "Relief Valves" 3353.MB4 3-

.. identified.

3.4.9.3 - Applies to Mode 4 3.4.1 1, Action C defers to .

T/S 3.4.6.2, "Operational Leakage" T/S 3.4.9.3, "Overpressure 5

Step 6.3.3 TS 3.4.4.

. Protection Systems" TRM 3.4.1 1, "Reactor Coolant System Vents" Event 5 when Examiners are d with US'S Tech Spec calls. -'*

G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 22 of 54

BOPDeterminesthat PT-507 DetermineThe Initiating Parameter failed low. Probable alarm: us And Place The Affected Controller In MBSA, B, C light up 3571, 1.

BOP MANUAL Take Feedwater Pump Master Speed Controller to HAND.

Alternatively, takes individual BOP Stabilize The Plant Parameters 3571,Z.

wmDs to HAND.

I.VERIFY 3FWS-PI , "MD FW PP,"

running (MB5).

2. THROTTLE open 3FWS-PV590, "MDFW START-UP W CNTL MAIN," to maintain 40 to 140 psid 3353.MB5C on program (3FWS-PI 508 - 3MSS- 4-1 PI 507).

If Crew goes to MB5C 4-1 3. IF a TDFW pump is operating FEEDWATE Alarm Response erratically in "AUTO," PLACE R DIS affected pump in "MANUAL." MFLD

4. IF a TDFW pump is operating PRESSURE erratically in "MANUAL," LO EVALUATE the need to reduce plant power and remove affected

. When BOPExaminer is satisfied, initiate Malfunction FW08B (100%)

TDFW pump from service.

It is desired that I&C personnel trip the bistables specified in this procedure. If, causing 3FWC-FCV520 to fail full open. during off-hours, I&C personnel are not NOTE

. Steam Generator "B" water level will rise uncontrollably. Crew should trip able to trip the necessary bistables within the time limitations required by the Technical Specifications, preceding AOP 3571,

. the reactor.

Note, delay between malfunction Operations Department personnel may Step 3.

trip the bistables using the guidance insertion and first alarm was 6 minutes provided within this procedure.

during pre-validation. Perform Corrective Actions Using 4ppropriate

Attachment:

Attachment J - Main Steam Header 3571,3 Pressure Channel Failure G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 23 of 54

The following annunciators are NOTE symptoms of a failed main steam preceding header pressure instrument (3MSS- AOP 3571, PT507): None Attachment J, Step I Verify feedwater pump A and B master speed control (3FWS-SK509A) in MANUAL and Restore feed pump AOP 3571, differential pressure to normal Attachment operating band (Program: 40 to 140 J, Step 1 mid). I Place steam generator pressure I controller (3MSS-PK507) in MANUAL and reduce the output to minimum. AOP 3571, (The steam dump STEAM PRESSURE Attachment mode is inoperable until the channel is J, Step 2 restored.)

When conditions have stabilized, Observe MB annunciators and parameters and immediately report any AOP 3571, unexpected or unexplained conditions Attachment to the Shift Manager. J, Step 3 There are no Technical Specifications NOTE:

3r bistables associated with 3MSS- preceding

>T507. AOP 3571, Attachment J, Step 4 3equest I&C Department perform

orrective maintenance on failed AOP 3571, nstrument . Attachment J, Step 4 G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 24 of 54

..Foldout page must be open.

ADVERSE CTMT is defined as BOPOperator should start non- .GREATER THAN 180-F or GREATER THAN 105 Whr in NOTE running AFW pumps BEFORE the US reaches the appropriate step in E-0.

us

. containment.

The reactor can be interpreted as "tripped" when any two of the three preceding E-0, Step 1 bulleted substeps of step I. are satisfied.

Verify Reactor Trip Check reactor trip and bypass breakers - OPEN RO Check rod bottom lights - LIT E-0, Step 1 Check neutron flux -

DECREASING I I BOP 1 Check all turbine stop valves -

BOP CLOSED E-0, Step 2.a.

I I Verify Power To AC Emergency BOP Busses Check AC emergency busses 34C and E-0, Step 3 E-0, Step BOP 34D - BOTH ENERGIZED 3.a I I RO Check If SI Is Actuated E-0, Step 4 RO MB2B 5-9) - LIT During Validation, Heat Sink RED came in for a few moments. Crew may go to FR-H.1. IF SI is NOT required, THEN Initiate E-0, Step Should move quickly through first 3 steps to monitoring of CSF Status Trees and Go 4.a, RNO restore AFW flow and return to procedure in to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. Column effect.

If SI actuation occurs during this CAUTION procedure, immediately Go to E-0, preceding Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. ES-0.1, Step 1 NOTE Crew will set 15 minute timer to preceding remind them to check status us Foldout page must be open.

ES-0.1, trees every 15 minutes.

Step 1 G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 1\Scenario 1.doc Page 25 of 54

Check RCS Temperature ES-0.I, c Verify RCS cold leg WR temperature -

Ro BETWEEN 550-F AND 560-F Proceed to step 2.

Step 1 ES-0.1, Step 1.a.

ES-0.1, Step 1.b.

Check FW Status ES-0.1, SteD 2 Check reactor trip and bypass breakers ES-0.1,

- OPEN SteD 2.a.

Verify annunciator FW ISOLATION BY ES-0.I, RX TRIP AND LO T AVG (MBSC 2-1) -

LIT Step 2.b.

Verify FW isolation Check SG feed regulating valves -

. CLOSED Check SG feed regulating bypass

. valves - CLOSED Check FW isolation trip valves -

ES-0.1,

. CLOSED Check SG chemical feed isolation valves CLOSED Step 2.c.

Verify total AFW flow to SGs - ES-0.1, GREATER THAN 530 gpm Step 2.d.

d. Perform the following:

1) START MD AFW pumps.

2) START TD AFW pump by opening steam supply valves, if necessary. ES-0.1,

3) Verify proper emergency AFW valve Step 2.d.

alignment.

RNO

4) Maintain AFW flow Column GREATER-THAN 530 gpm until NR level is GREATER THAN 8% in at least one SG.

RO will have to close these valves. Same signal that starts .

Check SG blowdown isolation Verify SG blowdown isolation valves AFW closes these valves.

That signal is failed in the scenario.

RO

. - CLOSED Verify SG blowdown sample isolation valves - CLOSED ES-0.1I Step 2.e.

G:VIRS\Osb\BalianMillstone 3\Scenario 1\Scenario 1.doc Page 26 of 54

ES-0.1, BOP Check Status Of AC Busses SteP 3.

us Verify AC emergency busses -BOTH ES-0.I, BOP ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER SteP 3.a.

Proceed to step 3.j. ES-0.1, us Step 3.b.

Check-busses 34A AND 34B BOTH BOP ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER

- ES-0.1, Step 3.j.

ES-0.1, us Proceed to step 4.

Step 3.k.

Check PZR Level Control ES-0.1, RO Step 4.

Verify charging pump operation -

ES-0.I, RO AT LEAST ONE RUNNING Step 4.a.

Verify PZR level - GREATER THAN ES-0.1, RO 22%

Step 4.b.

Verify charging and letdown flow - ES-0.1, RO ESTABLISHED Step 4.c.

ES-0.1, RO Verify PZR level - TRENDING TO 28%

Step 4.d.

Check PZR Pressure Control ES-0.1, us Step 5.

Verify PZR pressure - GREATER ES-0.1, RO THAN 1890 psia Step 5.a.

Verify PZR pressure - STABLE AT OR ES-0.1, RO TRENDING TO 2250 psia Step 5.b.

Proceed to step 6. ES-0. I, us Step 5.c.

Verify All Control Rods - FULLY RO Reports that NOT all 3-0.1, Control Rods Inserted.

us INSERTED Step 6.

G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 27 of 54

Booth Operator Cue:

If requested, tell Control Room that IF two or more control rods are the latest Boron sample was 1549 NOT fully inserted, THEN Using AOP pprn. 3566, Immediate Boration, Immediate borate until one of the following ES-0.1, Crew recognizes need to .

conditions is met:

Increase of 200 ppm for each control Step 6.

Immediately Borate. Refers to AOP 3566. US may delegate AOP 3566 . rod NOT verified fully inserted OR Increase of 1200 ppm in RCS boron RNO Column to RO and continue ES-0.1 actions.

. concentration OR Increase of RCS boron concentration to 2600 ppm FULLY INSERTED

[B] rise of 1,000 ppm requires

-12,000 gallons.

If SI actuation occurs during this CAUTION Important CAUTION in view of procedure, Go to E-0, Reactor Trip or preceding next event (SGTR). Safety Infection, and restore from AOP 3566, immediate boration lineup. Step 1.

During Validation, the US Initiate Immediate Boration Of RCS AOP 3566, handed AOP 3566 off to the Step I.

RO and continued with ES-0.1 AOP 3566, RO Check one charging pump - RUNNING Step 1.a.

AOP 3566, Align boration path:

Step 1.b.

START at least one boric acid transfer AOP 3566, RO Dump Step l.b.1)

OPEN emergency boration valve AOP 3566, RO (3CHS*MVS104) Step 1.b.2)

Check normal charging flow path aligned Charging flow control valve -

RO

. CAPABLE OF BEING THROTTLED Charging header loop isolation salve (3CHS*AV8146 or 3CHS*AV8147) -

4OP 3566, Step 1.c.

. OPEN Charging header isolation valves (3CHS*MV810b and CHS*MV$105)

- OPEN Proceed to step 3.

40P 3566, Ster, 1.d.

G:U>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 28 of 54

Step 3.

Check PZR pressure -

RO II I

LESS THAN 2350 psia Check normal charging flow AOP 3566, Step 3.a.

RO Ipath-ALIGNED AOP 3566, Step 3.b.

AOP 3566, Step 3.c.

Adjust boration flow to the RCS -- EQUAL TO OR AOP 3566, RO GREATER THAN 33 gpm Step 3.d.

Restore From Immediate Boration

a. Align systems for normal operation After SGTR is initiated, the b. Request Chemistry sample the RCS crew may perform this step for boron concentration pursuant to the CAUTION c. Adjust boric acid makeup flow AOP 3566, preceding step 1. However, controller pot setpoint for current Step 7 limited staff resources may RCS boron concentration cause US to direct RO d. Check boration flow accomplished activities elsewhere. through - A N SI COLD LEG INJECTION PATH G:U>RS\Osb\BalianWillstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 29 of 54

Probable RMS ALERTS on

.MB2B MSS76-1, SG "B" Stm Relief

. Line MSS79-I, 3FWA*P2 Turbine

. Exahust (TDAFW Pump)

SSR08-1, B/D Eff from any

. S/G.

ARC21-1, Condenser Air Ejector Disch to Rad

. Gaseous Waste.

MSS80B, N16 Monitors.

Crew may enter:

AOP 3573, Rad Mon 3555, Step 1

.. Response AOP 3555, RCS Leak E-0 (required if PZR Level RO Check PZR Level - DECREASING 3576, Step 1.a.

<9%

NOTE: Proceduralflow path is 3555, not predictable. ES-0.1 Increase charging Flow Step 2 Foldout Page requires SI RO and actuation and return to E-0 if Minimize Letdown 3576, PZR level .c 9%. Step I 3555, Step 2.a RO START a second Charging Pump 3576, Step 1.e.

3555, Verify PZR level - STABLE OR Step 2.d RO INCREASING 3576, step 6

RO Trip the Reactor RNO Cols:

RO Initiate SI 3555, Step 6 GO TO E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety us Injection 3576, Step 1.f Reactor is already TRIPPED Verify Reactor Trip E-0, Step G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 30 of 54

'with 5 rods stuck out.

Immediate Boration in

. Check reactor trip and bypass progress. US may direct RO to terminate Immediate Boration once SI is initiated.

.. breakers - OPEN Check rod bottom lights - LIT Check neutron flux -DECREASING E-0, Step BOP Verify Turbine Trip 2

E-0, Step Check all turbine stop valves - CLOSED 2.a Verify Power to AC Emergency E-0, Step BOP Busses 3 Check busses 34C and 34D BOTH - E-0, Step ENERGIZED 3. b E-0, Step Crew manually actuated SI us Check If SI Is Actuated 4

Verify Safety InjectionActuation E-0, Step RO annunciator - LIT 4.a By observation of ESF Group 2 Status E-0, Step RO Panel lights, Verify both trains of SI -

4.b ACTUATED Check reactor trip and bypass breakers - E-0, Step RO OPEN 4.c RO Verify Service Water Pumps AT - E-0, Step LEAST ONE PER TRAIN RUNNING 5 Crew should perform-a short brief and come out of Master Verify Two RPCCW Pumps -ONE PER E-0, Step RO Silence at the completion of TRAIN RUNNING 6 step 6.

E-0, Step RO Verify ECCS Pumps Running 7

Check SI pumps - RUNNING Check RHR pumps - RUNNING Check two charging pumps - RUNNING G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 31 of 54

CRITICALSTEP. PERE-0, STEP7 THE -

SECOND S I PUMP IS TO BE STARTED W/O QUESTION.

E-0, Step CREW MUST START THIS PUMP BEFORE RO START second SI Pump 7 RNO PROCEEDING TO STEP 8.

OPERATORATC SHOULD HAVE STARTED 3SIH*P1B BEFORE THIS.

E-0, Step BOP Verify AFW Pumps Running 8

Should still be running after E-0, Step Manual Start following the trip BOP Check MD pumps - RUNNING 8.a above.

BOP Check turbine - driven pump - E-0, Step RUNNING, IF NECESSARY 8.b BOP Verify FW Isolation Check SG feed regulating valves -

CLOSED

~_______

Check SG feed regulating bypass valves

- CLOSED Check FW isolation trip valves -

CLOSED E-0, Step Check MD FW pump - STOPPED 9

Check TD FW pumps - TRIPPED Check SG blowdown isolation valves -

Valves closed on Hi Radiation RO CLOSED Check SG blowdown sample isolation valves - CLOSED Check SG chemical feed isolation valves

- CLOSED Check If Main Steam Lines Should Be E-0, Step BOP Isolated 10 Check Ctmt pressure GREATER THAN E-0, Step 18 psia 1O.a any SG pressure LESS THAN 660 psig E-0, Step Proceed to step 11 10.a, RNO G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 1\Scenario 1.doc Page 32 of 54

Check if CDA Required Check Ctmt pressure is GREATER E-0, Step THAN 23 psia Ctmt spray is initiated I E-0, Proceed to step 12. Step11.a, RNO Verify CAR Fans Operating In Emergency Mode c Stops the C CAR fan.

Check CAR fan status:

CAR fans A and B - RUNNING CAR fan C - STOPPED START/STOP CAR fans as necessary E-0, Step 12.a.

E-0, Step 12.a. RNO Column Verify RPCCW Ctmt supply and return header isolations - OPEN I E-0, Step 12.b Verify Train A and B RPCCW supply and E-0, Step return to chili water valves - OPEN I12.c Verify CIA Check ESF Group 2 status columns 2 I2 Step E-0, Step through 10 - LIT 13.a Verify Proper ESF Status Panel Indication E-0, Step RO Verify ESF Group 1 lights - OFF 14 Verify ESF Group 2 lights - LIT 4lign component(s) as necessary for E-0, Step minimum safety function. 14. RNO Determine If ADVERSE CTMT Conditions Exist

. Ctmt temperature GREATER THAN E-0, Step

. 180°F Ctmt radiation GREATER THAN I O 5 R

/hr 15 G:U>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3Ecenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 33 of 54

DO NOT use ADVERSE CTMT E-0, Step parameters. 15, RNO Crew may perform short brief E-0, Step and come out of Master RO Verify ECCS Flow 16 Silence.

E-0, RO Check charging pump flow indicator - Step 16.

FLOW INDICATED a

Check RCS pressure GREATER E-0, RO THAN 1650 psia (1950 psia ADVERSE Step 16.

CTMT) b E-0, RO Check PORV block valves - OPEN Step 16.

C E-0, Step RO Open energized block valves 16c, RNO E-0, us Proceed to Step 17: Step 16.

d NOTE:

BOPmust get US direction prior to us Verify Adequate Heat Sink I :Yep isolating flow to the ruptured SG per OP 3272,Attachment 3.

If the BOPthrottles flow to 0 gpm BOP Check NR level in at least one SG -

GREATER THAN 8%. I E-0, Step i7.a Control feed flow to maintain NR level when SG NR level is >8% and <20% E-O, step BOP between 8% and 50%. (42% and 50%

but w/o US direction, then critique 17.b this item during the debrief.

adverse).E-0, Step 17.a, RNO 7 us Proceed to Step 18 1 E-0, Step 17.c BOP Verify AFW Valve Alignment PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT I E-oy 18 Step RO Verify ECCSValve Alignment PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT I E-o, I 9 Step E-0, Step us Check Plant Status I20 Verify SLCRS doors - CLOSED I E-0, Step 20.a G:V)RS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 34 of 54

SGOI Report SLCRS doors closed E-0, Step Check if CBI actuated when US calls SSS. 120.b E-0, Step Verify ESF Group 2 CBI lights LIT- l20.c Control Building purge supply fan and E-0, Step purge exhaust fan NOT RUNNING [ 20.d Control building air bank isolation valves

- OPEN (after 60 seconds)

E-0, Step STOP kitchen exhaust fan 120.f Booth Operator 5 minutes after request to "Close Close and Dog (as applicable) Control E-0, Step and Dog .....m'REPORT

, action Building pressure boundary doors. 20.g completed.

Check RCS Temperature Verify RCS cold leg WR temperature -

I E? Step BETWEEN 550°F and 560°F.

Perform the applicable action:

8 -IF temperature is GREATER THAN 560°F THEN dump steam to E-0, Step atmosphere. Proceed to step 21.c 21.a, RNO 8 -IF the temperature is LESS THAN 550" Temp was between 550°F THEN Proceed to step 21.e and 560°F during pre-validation. E-0, Step Proceed to step 22..

121.b I Ro Check PZR Valves I 2" Step E-0, Step Verify PORVs CLOSED 122.a Verify normal PZR spray valves - E-0, Step CLOSED I22.b E-0, Step Verify PZR safety valves CLOSED I22.c To prevent damage to the RCP seal(s), E-0, Step seal injection flow should be maintained 23, to all RCPs. CAUTION 1 NOTE I Ro Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped I23 E-0, Step G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 35 of 54

SGOI Leads to Step 24 even if RCP Trip Criteria is reached. RO Verify RCPs -ANY RUNNING Verify RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1500 E-0, Step psia (1800 psia ADVERSE CTMT) I23.b E-0, Step Proceed to step 24 23.b, RNO.

BOP Check If SG Secondary Boundaries

/ RO Are Intact I Step NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN E-0, Step

. AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NO SG COMPLETELY 24.a E-0, Step RO Check If SG Tubes Are Intact 25 Sampe all SGs for activity RESET SG blowdown sample isolation OPEN SG blowdown sample isolation E-0, Step valves(s) 25.a.

If samples are requested, ensure they request HP Request Chemistry obtain activity coverage samples using HP coverage.

Check steam generator levels - NO SG E-0, Step LEVEL INCREASING IN AN

25. b UNCONTROLLED MANNER Initiate monitoring of CSF Status Trees E-O, Step NOTE: and Go to E-3, Steam Generator Tube 25mb,RNO Crew should transition to E- Rupture.

3 based on Rad Monitor Verify trend history and alarm status of trend histories NOT normal OR level increasing uncontrollably in the radiation monitors Main steam line - NORMAL E-0, Step 25.c.

ruptured SG.

. Condenser air ejector - NORMAL SG blowdown - NORMAL Initiate monitoring of CSF Status Trees E-O Step and Go to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

25,-i, RNO To prevent damage to the RCP seal(s), E-3, Step seal injection flow should be 1, maintained to all RCPs. CAUTION G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 36 of 54

The US should direct the Board Operator to open and E-3, Step Foldout page must be open review their Fold Out Page I,NOTE Books E-3, step US Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped I

NOTE:

Four alternative paths all Ro Verify RCS pressure LESS THAN 1500 E-3, Step psia (1800 psia ADVERSE CTMT) 1.a lead to step 2.

E-3, Step US Proceed to step 2 l.a, RNO NOTE: Crew should identify SG B as ruptured based on rad levels and/or increasing level.

us .Identify Ruptured SGs High radiation from any SG steam line as indicated by the trend history or alarm status E-3, step If Crew does not recognize B is ruptured, they will GO TO step 7 and return to step 3 OR High radiation from any SG sample 2

when the ruptured S/G is identified.

Booth Operator

. Unexpected increase in any SG level If the TD AFWpump is the only E-3, Step Tell Control Room Nogross activity available source for feed flow, steam 3,

in any of the samples Wehaveto supply to the TD AFWpump must be CAUTION count the samples. maintained from at least one SG.

I I I At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown BOP Isolate Flow From Each Ruptured SG E-3, Step 3,

CAUTION E-3, Step 3 ~~

Verify each ruptured SG atmospheric E-3, Step dump valve controller - IN AUTO AT 3.a 1125 psig Check each ruptured SG atmospheric E-3, Step dump valve - CLOSED 3. b I I

~

Check each ruptured SG atmospheric E-3, Step dump bypass valve - CLOSED 3.c CLOSE each ruptured SG steam supply Important Step Closing 3MSS*MOVl7B stops release to the BOP ..

isolation valve to TD AFW pump 3MSS*MOVl7A E-3, Step 3.d environment.

. 3MSS*MOVl7B 3MSS*MOV17C G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 37 of 54

Verify each ruptured SG blowdown E-3, Step RO isolation valve CLOSED RO Verify each ruptured SG blowdown sample isolation valve - CLOSED I E-3, Step 3.f 3DTM*AOV29B RO Verify each ruptured SG chemical feed isolation valve - CLOSED I E-3, Step 3.g 3DTM*AOV61B Using table, CLOSE the main steam line E-3, Step BOP drains upstream of MSlVs and TD AFW 3DTM*AOV63B 3.h pump for the ruptured SG(s) 3DTM*AOV64B BOP CLOSE each ruptured SG MSlV and MSlV bypass valve.

If any ruptured SG is faulted, feed flow I E-3, Step 3.i to that SG should remain isolated E-3, Step during subsequent recovery actions 4, unless the SG is needed for RCS CAUTION cooldown.

BOP Check Ruptured SG Level I :-3, step us Verify one of the following is satisfied.

Ruptured SG WR level GREATER THAN 67% (95% ADVERSE CTMT) E-3, Step

. Ruptured SG NR level - GREATER THAN 8% (42% ADVERSE CTMT) 4.a CRITICALTASKEa-AAM.

E-3, Step OVERFEEDING SG REDUCES TIME TO SG BOP Isolate feed flow to ruptured SGs.

4.b OVERFILL CONDITION.

Steps 3.d and 3.i for isolating the E-3, Step ruptured SG must be completed prior 5 to continuing to step 5. CAUTION

~ ~~~~ ~~

Check Ruptured SGs Pressure E-3, Step BOP GREATER THAN 530 psig 5 If RCPs are NOT running, the following steps may cause a false E-3, Step entry into the INTEGRITY Status Tree 6 for the affected loop. Disregard the affected loop Tc indication until after CAUTION performance of step 27.

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 1\Scenario 1.doc Page 38 of 54

To allow steam dump operation to continue during a controlled cooldown, ensure the Low-Low Tavg interlock is bypassed at 553°F.

E-3, Step Ensure Low Steam Line Pressure SI is 6 blocked when pressurizer pressure is LESS THAN 2000 psia. NOTE After the Low Steam Line Pressure SI signal is blocked, MSI will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoin is exceeded.

F E-3, Step RO Initiate RCS Cooldown 6

1 Check RCPs -ANY RUNNING E-3,Step 6.a Booth Operator Locally, Place the eight RCP overcurrent 3 minutes after requested, report to trip switches (43PP and 43PB) in the E-3, Step US that RCP overcurrent switches COLD position using CO Key Locker Key 6. b are in the COLD position #7.

Determine required core exit temperature 515°F during pre-validation E-3, Step without interpolating (use lower and validation. 6.c pressure).

Dump steam to condenser from intact E-3, Step SGs at maximum rate. 16.d TBVs to Condenser are preferred. I Verify the following I

However, with PT505 failed, TBVs 1.

must be manually controlled. ADVs can be used in AUTO. . Intact SG MSlVs - OPSN Verify annunciator CONDENSER AVAIL FOR STM DUMP C-9 (MB4D I E-3, Stes 6.d.l) '

5-6)

Adjust steam pressure controller to E-3, Step obtain zero output in MANUAL 16.d.2)

Transfer condenser steam dumps to E-3, Step Steam Pressure Mode 6.d.3)

BOP 1 Place both condenser interlock selector switches - ON E-3, Step 6.d .4)

Adjust steam pressure controller to dump E-3, Step steam to condenser. 6.d.5)

Dump steam to atmosphere at maximum E-3, Step 1 min to establish full demand rate from intact SGs using SG 6.d, RNO to minimize the chance of

~ ~~~~ ~~~

atmossheric dums valves or SG G:VIRS\Osb\BalianLMillstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 39 of 54

receiving a MSI based on Low atmospheric dump bypass valves (MB or Steam Line Pressure rate locally).

compensated.

The RNO would only be used Verify cores exit TCs - LESS THAN E-3, Step if the crew receives a MSI us REQUIRED TEMPERATURE 6.e signal.

The BOPwill have to increase AFW flow while dumping I steam.

The RO will need to restart the second charging pump when I BOP Stop RCS cooldown E-3, Step 6.f Pzr level is 15%.

CRITICAL TASKE-3-B. CRITICAL TO REMAIN IN E-3. TRANSITIONING OUT FOR Maintain core exit TCs - LESS THAN E-3, Step LOSS OF SCM (HI TEMP)OR RED-REQUIRED TEMPERATURE 64 ORANGE ON SlJBCRlT-INTEGRITY (LO TEMP)IS FAILURE CRITERIA.

E-3, step Check Intact SG Levels 7

I Verify NR level - GREATER THAN 8%

(42% ADVERSE CTMT)

Control feed flow to maintain NR level E-3, Step 7.a E-3, Step between 30% and 50% (42% and 50%

7.b ADVERSE CTMT)

IF NR level in any intact SG continues to increase in an uncontrolled manner, E-3, Step THEN Stop RCS cooldown and Return to 7.b, RNO CAUTION prior to step 1.

If any PZR PORV opens because of E-3, Step high PZR pressure, step Sa should be repeated when pressure decreases to 8, CAUTION LESS THAN 2350 psia.

E-3, step Check PZR PORVs And Block Valves 8

E-3, Step Verify PORVs - CLOSED 8.a Verify PORV block valves - AT LEAST E-3, Step ONE OPEN 8.b If offsite power is lost after SI reset, E-3, Step manual action to restart safeguards 9, equipment may be required. CAUTION G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 40 of 54

Do not reset CDA if recirculation E-3, Step spray pumps are required and have 9, not automatically started. CAUTION RESET ESF Actuation Signals If Required SI

.. CDA E-3, Step 9

CIA

. CIB LOP E-3, Step RO Establish Instrument Air to Ctmt 10 Check instrument air compressors - AT E-3, Step LEAST ONE RUNNING 10.a OPEN instrument air Ctmt isolation E-3, Step valves 10.b E-3, Step BOP Restore MCC 32-3T 11 Booth Operator - Remove:

EDRl8 (resets 323T)

EDR-44 (resets battery alarms)

BOP Check emergency buss 34C -

ENERGIZED E-3, Step 1l.a E-3, Step BOP Using GA-1, Energize MCC 32-3T 1l.b To provide adequate ECCS flow, RCS pressure should be monitored to E-3, Step ensure that the RHR pumps are manually restarted if pressure 12, CAUTION decreases to LESS THAN 300 psia (500 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

Check If RHR Pumps Should Be E-3, Step us Stopped 12 Verify RCS pressure - GREATER THAN E-3, Step RO 300 psia (500 psia ADVERSE CTMT) 12.a E-3, Step RO STOP RHR pumps and Place in AUTO 12.b Check If Cooldown Should Be E-3, Step us Stopped 13 E-3, Step RO Check Cooldown - IN PROGRESS 13.a G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 41 of 54

Check core exit TCs LESS THAN

-' E-3, Step REQUIRED TEMPERATURE 13.b E-3, Step RO Stop RCS cooldown 13.c CRITICALTASKE-3-B. CRITICALTO REMAIN IN E-3. TRANSITIONING OUT FOR Maintain core exit TCs - LESS THAN E-3, Step LOSS OF SCM (HI TEMP)OR RED- RO REQUIRED TEMPERATURE 13.d ORANGE ON SUBCRIT-INTEGRITY(LO TEMP)IS FAILURECRITERIA.

RO/ Check Ruptured SGs Pressure - E-3, Step BOP STABLE OR INCREASING 14 Check RCS Subcooling Based on us Core Exist TCs GREATER THAN 52°F E-3, Step 15 (135°F ADVERSE CTMT)

CRITICALTASKE-3-C. CRITICALTO CR Depressurize RCS To Minimize Break E-3, step STOP LEAKAGE INTO THE SG. EW Flow and Refill PZR 16 E-3, Step us Verify normal PZR spray - AVAILABLE 16.a Spray PZR with maximum available spray until one of the following occur RCS pressure - LESS THAN ruptured SGs pressure AND PZR level is Horse-race between:

SG Pressure < RCS GREATER THAN 16% (50%

ADVERSE CTMT)

OR E-3, Step Pressure as demonstrated 16.b

. by SG Pressure or PZR level reaching 73%

PZR level GREATER THAN 73%

(63% ADVERSE CTMT)

OR RCS subcooling based on core exit TCS - LESS THAN 32°F (I 15°F ADVERSE CTMT)

Steps 16.c to f. not repeated E-3, Step RO CLOSE normal PZR spray valves here. 16.e G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 42 of 54

Step 16 depressurizes w/ Normal PZR Spray if NOT available, procedure directs use of PORVs or Aux Spray. Intent is to lower RCS pressure below S/G pressure to stop RCS leak and refill PZR.

Both PORVs are available if necessary - remember leaking PORV can be used.

During pre-validation, RC-Ps ran entire time. Therefore, normal spray flow was available.

t-3, Proceed to CAUTION prior to step Step 19.

16.f Voiding in the upper head region shall not preclude SI termination. E-3, SI MUST be terminated when Step 19, termination criteria are satisfied to CAUTIO prevent overfilling of the ruptured N SGs.

Check If ECCS Flow Should Be E-3, us Terminated Verify RCS subcooling based on core E-3, RO exit TCs - GREATER THAN 32°F Step (115°F ADVERSE CTMT) 19.a BOP .

Verify secondary heat sink:

Total feed flow to SGs - GREATER Step THAN 530 gpm AVAILABLE E-3, 19.b

. NR level in at least one intact SG -

GREATER THAN 8% (42%

ADVERSE CTMT)

E-3, RCS pressure - STABLE OR RO Step INCREASING 19.c E-3, PZR level - GREATER THAN 16%

RO Step (50% ADVERSE CTMT)

I 19.d

- 1 RO STOP ECCS Pumps I t-3, Step20 STOP SI pumps and Place in AUTO a STOP all but one charging pump and Place in AUTO G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 43 of 54

Path Step 21 Establish Normal Charging Flow E-3, Path Step 21 Question to SRO Applicant: What Emergency Action Level should be declared for this scenario?

Answer: ALERT Charlie One based RCB4 (prolonged release).

Question to SRO Applicant: When Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter 3RCS*PT455 failed low, what Technical Specification LCOs or action statements were in effect?

Answer: 3.3.1, Action 6 - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to trip, 3.3.2, Action 20 - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to trip, 3.3.3.5 - No. of Op. Chnls met, 3.3.2.1 - 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to trip.

Question to SRO Applicant: When Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter 3MSS-PT505 failed low, what Tech SDec LCOs or action statements were in effect?

Answer: 3TRM-7.2 (best efforts but continue to operate), 3.3.1 action 8 (check P-7 & P-13 in the required state or 3.0.3)

Question to SRO Applicant: When the Pressurizer PORV, 3RCS-PCV456, was leaking, what Tech Spec LCOs or action statements were in effect?

Answer: 3.4.4, Action A, 3.4.6.2 - leakage Blocked, 3.4.9.3 - Applies to Mode 4,3.4.1 I, Action C defers to TS 3.4.4.

ENDOF SCENARIO G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 44 of 54

SECTION 3 SIMULATOR EXAM SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

SUMMARY

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: 0 TIME *QA INSTRUCTOR AIDS DESCRlPTlON MALF, RF, IO T=O RDI 6 Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert.

FW20A Failure of Auto Start on MDAFW "A" FW20B Failure of Auto Start on MDAFW "B" FW2OC Failure of Auto Start on TDAFW Pump S107B Failure of Auto Start on SI Pump Examiner Initiated

1. RXOSA Severity = 0% 3RCS*PT455 fails low

2. RX16A Severity = 0% 3MSS-PT505 fails low

3. RC07B Severity 1% 3RCS*PCV456 leakage

4. RX15 Severity = 0% 3MSS-PT507 fails low

5. FW08B Severity = 100% 3FWC-FCV520 fails open

6. SGOl B Severity = 38% SGTR of 340 gpm (ramp from 100 to 340 over 2 minutes).

Summary of Simulator Booth Operator Cues

1. During the rapid downpower, respond to request for Chemistry Samples.

2. During the Crew's Response to a leaking PZR PORV, disable AMSAC

3. Following the Reactor Trip, during the SGTR, respond to request to Close and Dog Control Building Pressure Boundary doors.

4. Before cooldown per E-3, place all 8 Reactor Coolant Pump overcurrent switches to COLD

5. During E-3, reset 32-3T.

G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 45 of 54

SECTION 4 VALIDATION CHECKLIST

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number I ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: -0 Remote functions: Verified by All remote functions contained in the guide are certified.

Malfunctions:

All malfunctions contained in the guide are certified.

Initial Conditions:

The initial condition(s) contained in the guide are certified or have been developed from certified IC's in accordance with NSEM-4.02.

Simulator Operating Limits:

The simulator guide has been evaluated for operating limits and/or anomalous response.

Test Run:

The scenario contained in the guide has been test run and validated (validation sheet completed, next page)on the simulator. Simulator response is reasonable and as expected.

Examination Scenario Review The dynamic examination review checklist is complete.

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SECTION 5 REFERENCES AND CRITICAL TASK TRACKING

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario I Revision: 0 I.

References:

TS* MP3 Technical Specifications TRM Technical RequirementsManual OP 3272 EOP User's Guide OP 3204 At Power Operation OP 3353 Main Board Annunciator Response Procedures AOP 3566 Immediate Boration AOP 3555 Reactor Coolant System Leak AOP 3573 Radiation Monitor Alarm Response AOP 3576 Steam Generator Tube Leak OP 3353.MB4A 2-1 RCS WIDE RANGE TEMP LOW COLD LEG AOP 3571 Instrument Failure Response EOP*35 E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection ES-0.1 Reactor Trip Response EOP*35 E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture EPIP*EPIP4400 Event Assessment, Classification and Reportability NUREG 1021 Examiners Standards G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 47 of 54

II. Critical Tasks Covered in this Test:

The following Critical Tasks are covered in this exercise:

CRITICAL TASK I

BASIS FOR SEL

- Description Establish 530 GPM AFW flow 06 1000 Failure to establish the minimum required AFW to the SGs before transition out A3.01 flow rate, under the postulated plant conditions, of E-0, unless the transition is 4.214 -2 results in "adverse consequence(s) or a to FR-H.l, in which case the significant degradation in the mitigative task must be initiated before capability of the plant." In this case, the RCPs are manually tripped in minimum required AFW flow rate can be LL accordance with step 3 of established by performing the appropriate I FR-H.I manual action. Therefore, failure to manually s

w establish the minimum required AFW flow rate also represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to:

Take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety Effectively direct/manipulate ESF controls Recognize a failure/incorrect auto actuation 01 an ESF system or component" Establish/maintainan RCS 000-038 Failure to establish and maintain the correct temperature so that transition EA1.I 6 RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a from E-3 does not occur 4.4/4.3 transition from E-3 to a contingency because the RCS temperature procedure, which constitutes an incorrect is in either of the following EAI.36 performance that 'I.. .necessitates the crew conditions: 4.3/4.5 taking compensating action which Too high to maintain complicates the event mitigation strategy...."

m [minimum required SGA.06 I

subc~oling]~ 3.8/4.O 3

W OR Below [the RCS temperature that causes an extreme (red-SGA. 12 3.814.0 path) or a severe (orange-path) challenge to the subcriticality and/or the integrity CSFI4 G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 48 of 54

Depressurize RCS to meet [SI 000-038 Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a termination criteria]* before EA1.04 ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS

[plant-specific criteria 4.3/4.1 (when it is possible to do so) needlessly 0 exceededI3 complicates mitigation of the event. It also I

SGA.06 constitutes a "significant reduction of safety 12 I 3.8/4.0 margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario."

SGA. 12 3.8/4.O Isolate Feedwater/Auxiliary 000-038 Failure to isolate AFW flow into the ruptured Feedwaterflow into the EA1.16 SG in a timely fashion results in a higher level ruptured SG with Steam 4.4 14.3 in the ruptured SG. With an unnecessary Generator Level >8% NR higher level, the time calculated to terminate

(>65% WR) upon AFW SI and prevent SG overfill condition isolation but less than 20% NR. significantly drops and can lead to an w unnecessary radioactive release to the environment. Either of these actions results in the crewhnit taking compensating actions which complicates the mitigation strategy.

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 49 of 54

ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: 0 Note: The following criteria list scenario traits that are 'numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios.

QuantitativeAttributes 7 13. Total malfunctions inserted: 4-8/10-I4 (3RCS*PT455,3MSS-PT505,3RCS*PCV456,3MSS*PT505) 3 14. Malfunctionsthat occur after EOP entry: 143-6 (5 Rods Out, AFW Auto Start Failure, Safety Injection Pump Failure) 3 15. Abnormal Events: 1 -2/2-3 (3Instrument Failures)

I 16. Major Transients: 1-2/2-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) 2 17. EOPs used beyond primary scram response EOP: 1 -3/3-5 (ES-0.1, E-3) 0 18. EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-3/1-3 90 19. Approximate scenario run time: 45-60 minutes (one scenario may approach 90 minutes) 70% 20. EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time 4 21. Crew Critical Tasks: 2-5/58 (E-O-F, E - S B , E-3-C, E - S A A M )

Yes 22. Technical Specifications are exercised during the test COMMENTS:

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 50 of 54

C h Number Element Description Limits Temp Alarm Status EEQ I TS Deg F G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 51 of 54

G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 52 of 54 G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1.doc Page 53 of 54 SECTION 6 SCENARI0 INIT1AL CONDIT10NS Reactor Power: 81%

Operating History: 3 days on line RCS Boron: 1524 ppm Core Burnup: I.3 MWD/MTU Condensate Demins: 7 IN SERVICE Evolutions in Progress: Raising reactor power.

Major Equipment 00s: Motor Driven AFW Pump 3FWA*PlA Crew Instructions:

The plant is at 81% power and returning to full power following a refueling outage. The crew was to continue the power escalation at 3% per hour per OP 3204. However, CONVEX has just ordered a rapid power reduction to -65%.

The specific CONVEX order was Reduce output to 650 MW-net, push 150 MVARS.

Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump, 3FWA*PlA is out of service for emergent maintenance. 3FWA*PlA was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago and expected return to operability is 32 hours3.703704e-4 days 0.00889 hours 5.291005e-5 weeks 1.2176e-5 months from now. Limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.1.2, action a. has been entered.

PlantlSimulator Differences:

0 If not using the speed dial option, dial 3333 or 3334 to reach the desired person(s).

0 The following PPC programs do not function on the simulator:

It Samarium Follow If Xenon Follow (I Sequence of Events G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario l\Scenario 1 .doc Page 54 of 54

Appendix D Page 4 of 4 Form ES-D-1 Facility: Millstone, Unit 3 Scenario No.: Two Op-Test No.: One Examiners: Don Jackson Operators: SRO 1 throuah 3 Gil Johnson RO 7 throuah 9 RO Surrouate as BOP Initial Conditions: 100% Power, Steadv State Turnover: Millstone Unit 3 is at 100% Dower with one MDAFW Pump, 3AFW*PlA out of service for emeraent maintenance. The crew is to maintain full 7 Event 1.

Malf. No.

N107A Event Type*

Event Description Power Range Nuclear Instrument N-41 fails high I (RO)

2. CVO4B I (RO) Letdown Temperature Instrument fails low

3. FWI 6C R (BOP) Heater Drain Pump Trip

4. SWOIC C (RO) SW Pump Trips. STBY Pump fails to auto start.

RC1I D 3RCS-PI D Locks Up (Trips). Auto RX Trip fails.

5. RPO9A & B C (RO) ATWS: Crew performs FR-S.1.

I RPIOA & B RTBs oDened manuallv -2 minutes later.

Automatic turbine trip fails.

6. TC03 TC04 Manual trip succeeds while performing FR-S.l Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident

7. RC03D M (LBLOCA).

SRO Classifies the Event 8.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\0utiine\MS3 ES-D-1 Scenario 2.wpd NUREG-I 021, Revision 9

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE APPROVAL SHEET I.

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 2 Revision: -

0-II. Initiated:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 28 May 2004 Developer Date III . Reviewed:

Reviewer Date IV. Approved:

Operations Manager Date Operator Training Supervisor Date

AI 99-6848 G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 1 of55

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTIONS LISTED IN ORDER I. Exam Overview

2. Instructor Guide

3. Sequence of Events Summary

4. Validation Checklist

5. Reference and CriticJ Task Tracking Form

6. Scenario Initial Conditions Sheet G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 2 of 55

SECTION 1 EXAM OVERVIEW

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 2 Revision: 0

1. Exam Brief:

The Crew takes the shift at 100% power with no significant evolutions in progress. Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump 3AFW*PlA is out of service for emergent maintenance.

This has no impact on the scenario.

Event number Iopens the scenario opens when power range nuclear instrument failure NI-41 fails high. The Crew responds per AOP 3571 and trips the associated bistables. The SRO Applicant refers to Technical Specifications and determines that continued operation is permissible. Note the PRNI-41 bistables are Protection Set 1.

Event number 2 is a failure of the Letdown Temperature Instrument low, such that cooling flow to the letdown heat exchanger lowers. Manual control of the Letdown Heat Exchanger flow controller will be required.

Event number 3 is a trip of Heater Drain Pump C. The crew responds per alarm response OP3353.MB6A 5-7 and lower main turbine load by 75 Mwe. The crew then removes the Heater Drain Pump from service per OP 3320. If Event number 4 is a loss of service water pump 3SWP*P1C due to breaker failure.

3SWP*PlA fails to automatically start but can be manually started per AOP 3560. This is a simple component malfunction for the Crew to respond to before initiating the major event.

Event number 5 is a reactor coolant pump, 3RCS-PI D, trip followed by an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS). Event number 5, failure of the turbine to automatically trip, accompaniesthis. The crew enters E-0 and is directed to functional recovery guide FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power GenerationIATWS. When the crew orders a PEO to open the RTBs, it will take at least 5 minutes to force the crew to perform FR-S.1. The crew returns to E-0, FR-Z.l and FR-P.1 when FR-S.l is completed.

Event 7 is the major event - a large break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA). The event initiates while the Applicants are performing FR-S.I. They should recognize that FR-S.1 is the higher precedent procedure and remain with FR-S.1 to completion before transitioning to FR-P.l, FR-Z.l and returning to E-0, Step 15. The Crew will continue through E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection), into E-I (Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant) and into ES-1.3 (Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation). The scenario ends when satisfied that the Crew has or can successfully establish cold leg recirculation.

2. PlantISimulatordifferences that may affect the scenario are: None.

3. Duration of Session: 1% hour G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 3 of 55

SECTION 2 INSTRUCTOR GUIDE

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 2 Revision: 0 All Control Room Conduct, Operations and Communicationsshall be in accordance COP 200.1 ,Conduct of Operations, and OP 3260,Unit 3 Conduct of Operations.

"Review the Simulator Operating Limits(design limits of plant) and the Simulator Modeling Limitations and Anomalous Response List prior to performing this training scenario on the simulator. The instructor should be aware if any of these limitations may be exceeded." (NSEM 6.02)

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario Z\Scenario 2.doc Page 4 of 55

SIMULATOR PROBLEMS DURING EXAMS It is the responsibility of the Instructors in the simulator to insure that exam interruptions have a minimum negative impact on the Crew and the examinations we provide.

Be aware that at all times the Operators should treat the simulator as if it were the plant and you too should treat it as much like the plant as possible when they are in the simulator.

As soon as the Instructors are aware of a simulator problem that will adversely affect the exam in progress (computer fault, etc.) the Instructor should:

1. Place the simulator in FREEZE if possible.

2. Announce to the Crew that there is a simulator problem.

3. Request that the Crew leave the simulator control room. (The Crew should leave the simulator for problems which involve major switch alignments).

4. Deal with the problem (reboot, call STSB, etc.)

5. After the Instructors believe the simulator is restored to service, the Crew should be told how the exam will continue. If it is possible and felt to be acceptable to the evaluators, the examination can begin where it left off with an update on plant parameters and each Crew member is prepared to restart. If the examination will not begin where it left off, the crew should be told how and where the exam will begin again.

6. Once the Crew has been told how and where the exam will begin, have the crew conduct a brief so that the Instructor and evaluators can insure that the crew has all the necessary information to continue with the scenario.

7. Once all Crew members, Instructors and evaluators are satisfied that they have the necessary information to continue the scenario, place the simulator in RUN and announce to the Crew that you have continued the evaluation session.

G:DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 5 of 55

EVENT #O TITLE: INITIAL SETUP Setup Instructions:

Enter IDT as follows :

At any XTERM window, type 4dt>

When the SUN asks for an executive type: UEXEC or RTEXEC? enter <r>: this will

.. bring up a blank idt page.

To go to a previously saved idt file type <read> at the prompt When the SUN asks for a file name of the file you wish to view type in the appropriate file name:

The old "Landon" files are as follows:

Old ISD pages 1-8 are idt file OPS Old ISD pages 9-16 are idt file OPSl Old ISD pages 17-19 are idt file OPS2 0 -IF the step counters are athear 000, THEN REMOVE the STEP COUNTER OVERRIDE, allow the counters to step out during the IC reset, Reset to IC-I8 REINSTATE the step counter OVERRIDE Adjust the various pot settings to the valued specified by the chart located in the sim booth for the selected IC.

Place Simulator to RUN Set the STEP COUNTERS PLACE the Main Turbine on the LOAD LIMITER Verify annunciator, "COMPUTER FAILURE" (MB4C, 1-1I), is NOT LIT.

Place MOL Curve Book in Shelf for Operator use. Remove other Curve Books from the floor.

Clear the DCS Alarms PLACE THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT IN PTL or align as needed:

Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump 3AFW*PlA Equipment 0 0 s : O 3AFW*PlA 0

Synchronize the MONITOR Time Display with digital time display on MB4.

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Initial Malfunctions/lOs/lDAs:

T=O RPOSA Manual Reactor Trip Failure at MB4 RPOSB Manual Reactor Trip Failure at MB7 RPIOA Train AAutomatic Reactor Trip Failure RPIOB Train B Automatic Reactor Trip Failure ED1-3NJSACB-BF Trip Off Unable to deenergize 326 and 32N ED1SNNSACB-BF Trip Off Unable to deenergize 32B and 32N SWOZA SW Pp Fails to Auto Start.

TC03 Turbine Fails to Trip I/Os N107A Severity = 100% PRNl 41 Fails High CV04B Severity = 0% 5 min ramp Letdown TI Fails Low FWI 6C Heater Drain Pump C Trips SWOIC SW Pp IC Trips.

RC11D 3RCS-PI D Rotor Locks Up.

RC03D Severity = 100% RCS Cold Leg D Rupture.

CS04 Severity = 2% RWST Leak Post Exam Data Collection Reactor Power trend data Turbine Generator Load trend data Pressurizer Pressure trend data (PT455 & PT456)

SG Levels (all SGs, both NR & WR)

Rod Positions Auxiliary Feedwater Flowrate trend data (all SGs)

All console and panel strip charts or recorded digital data (may be collected at end of day for all crews.

G:\DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 7 of 55

Do not leave the rod selector switch in AUTO while diagnosing a 3571 Step I related instrument failure unless CAUTION the reason for rod movement is a turbine runback.

If a reactor trip occurs, immediately 3571 Step 1 go to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety NOTE Injection.

Determine The Initiating Rod Control will be the Parameter And Place The 3571 Step I affected controller.

Affected Controller In MANUAL.

Crew Stabilize The Plant Parameters. 3571 Step2 It is desired that I&C personnel trip the bistables specified in this procedure. If, during off-hours, I&C personnel are not able to trip the necessary bistables within the time 3571 Step3 limitations required by the NOTE TechnicaI Specifications, Operations Department personnel may trip the bistables using the guidance provided within this procedure.

Perform Corrective Actions Using Appropriate Attachment D 3571 Step 3 Appropriate Attachment Defeat the failed channel input. 3571 Att.D 30 step I At the detector current comparator drawer, turn the following switches 3 0 will perform these actions. to the failed channel:

3571 Att.D JS will Peer Check these 30 1. Rod Stop Bypass, step l a 3ctions 2. Upper Section,

3. Lower Section,

4. Power Mismatch Bvpass.

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 8 of 55

At the comparator and rate drawer, turn the following switch to the 3571 Att.D RO failed channel: Comparator step I b Channel Defeat.

Restore TAVE TREF error to 3571 Att.D RO within 1 OF and place rod control in step 2 automatic.

If the plant calorimetric source is 3571 Nls, the failure of one NI channel Attachment D will disable the calorimetric Step 3 moaram. NOTE When conditions have stabilized, observe MB board annunciators and parameters and immediately 3571 Att.D CREW report any unexpected or step 3 unexplained conditions to the Shift Manaaer.

Trip the associated Reactor 3571 Att.D us Protection System bistable(s): step 4 Place a check mark in the box above the appropriate channel that 3571 Att.D requires tripping on the last page of step 4a this Attachment.

3.3.1 actions 6 (OPAT) & 2 applies. Trip associated Refer to Technical Specification 3571 Att.D bistables in 6 hrs and bypass us 3.3.1. step 4b for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for testina G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 9 of 55

Check the existing bistable status to ensure a reactor trip will not 3571 Att.D RO step 4c occur when the failed channel is tripped.

Remove the appropriate control 3571 Att.D US will peer check this. RO power fuses for the affected step 4d channel.

Request the I&C Departmenttrip 3571 Att.D us the appropriate bistables using step 4e Attachment D and Attachment S.

Verify the appropriate bistable 3571 Att.D RO ster>4f status liahts are lit.

Within one hour, determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window (s) that the following interlocks are in their required state for the existing plant condition (Tech, Spec. 3.3.1 ,

AOP is more restrictive than Tech Specs. Tech Specs requires action 8 only if less than the minimum # of us .

Action 8):

Rx or turbine not at power P-7 (MB4D 5-3) 3571 Att.D step 5 instruments Three loop permissive P-8

. (MB4D 3-3)

NIS power range P-9 permissive

. (MB4D 6-1)

Reactor at power P-IO (MB4D 4-3).

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 10 of 55

The following step for removing the failed PR channel from Program 3R5 restores OPERABILITY to the AFD Monitor Alarm and must be completed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.2.1 .I .I.b 357I must be performed.

. Attachment D The following step for removing Step 6 the failed PR channel from NOTES Program 3R5 does NOT restore OPERABILITY to the QPTR Alarm Monitor; therefore, TABLE 3.3-1, ACTION 2.c and SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.4.1 .b and 4.2.4.2 are in effect.

Perform the following to remove 3571 the affected power range input to Attachment D the AFD and QPTR monitor alarm Step 6 (Program 3R5):

3571 On the plant process computer, Attachment D Select the NSSS menu, page 2.

Step 6a 3571 At the NSSS menu, Select Tilting Attachment D Factors (F9). Ster, 6b

~ ~

Press the key (F5 through F8) that 357 .I corresponds to the channel to be Attachment D removed. Step 6c G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 11 of 55

Refer to the following Technical Specifications and Perform any required actions:

Surveillance Requirement 4.2.1 .I.I.b 357 1 Attachment D TABLE 3.3-1, ACTION 2.c Step 7 Surveillance Requirement 4.2.4.1 .b Surveillance Requirement 4.2.4.2 I 1)

I Request I&C Department perform 3571 corrective maintenanceon failed Attachment D I I instrument. Step 8 Initiate Event 2 at Chief Examiners Discretior G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario %.doc Page 12 of 55

Op-Test No.: 1 :

I CV04B (0% with a 5 minute ramp)

Check 3CHS

TI 130, letdown 3353.MB3A RO heat exchanger outlet temperature 5-5, to confirm alarm NOTE: driving blind If temperature is >134F verify that 3353.MB3A Ro Must use VCT Temoerature 3CHS

TCVl29 is in DIVERT 5-5, 2 If directed, place 3CHS

TK 130 This step should be ordered letdown heat exchanger cooling and will be successful in 3353.MB3A RO water temperature controller in 5-5, lowering letdown temperature Manual and reduce temperature to

< I 15F If letdown temperature increases Should be NIA to greater than 150F close the 3353.MB3A Ro letdown orifice isolation 5-5, 4 valves8149A,B,C If letdown temperature cannot be Must use VCT Temperature reduced to 4 3 4 F then remove 3353.MB3A RO charging and letdown from service 5-5, 5 Der OP 3304A I . I iitiate Event 3 G:DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 13 of 55

CHECK heater drain pump current and 353.

BOP pressure to determine affected heater drain B6A teP I BOP ADJUST feedwater flow to match steam flow.

IF reactor power is loo%, REDUCE main Reactivity Manipulation BOP turbine load by 75 MWe.

IF directed by SM/US, STOP affected heater BOP drain pump.

IF heater drain pump trip is due to feedwater Not due to feedwater heater low level us heater low level, PERFORM the following:

us Feedwater Heater Drains and Vents," and REMOVE affected heater drain pump from heater levels. All feedwater heater levels should be closely monitored when reDositionina the valve.

Reactivity Manipulation RO VERIFY reactor power level is <93%. 1320,

-4.I us IF stopping 3HDL-PI C, heater drain pump Cy PERFORM the following: 1 320,

-4.4 G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 14 of 55

and slowly CLOSE the valve (3CNM-PNLAC).

STOP 4TH PT HTR DRAIN PPS PP C 320, BOP (MB6).

A.4.c IF feedwater heater string is isolated, Go To 353.

AOP 3567, Operation With One Feedwater B6A Heater String Isolated. teD 1 G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 15 of 55

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 16 of 55 G:U)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 17 of 55 Using Feedwater Heater Level" display, 353.

MONITOR affected string feedwater B6A heater levels (Foxboro DCS) for operation of

-7, normal and emergency drain valves.

teP

~~

G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario Z\Scenario 2.doc Page 18 of 55

G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 19 of 55 Annunciators:

MBIC 5-3 (SWP Trip/OC) Ro I Recognize the Trip Service Water Pump and report to BOP

.Other MBI C alarms VP-1AIC 3-3 RO Transition to AOP 3560, Loss of Service Water 3560 Entry Conditions No pressure/flow indicated:

Alarm Response Procedures provide 3SWP-PI 26A 3560, guidance to initially address a service 3SWP-PI 26B RO Step 1, water piping rupture and, when 3SWP-FI43A Note appropriate, transitions to this procedure.

3SWP-FI43B Ro Check Busses 34C AND 34D POWER - 3560, AVAILABLE Step 1 If a transition to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, is made due to a loss of 3560, RO service water, use the guidance in Step 2, Attachments A and B of this procedure Note as required.

Check Status Of Service Water 3560, RO System Step 2 Verify at least one SW pump - 3560, Ro RUNNING Step 2,a Verify at least one SW pump in each 3560, Ro Train - RUNNING Step 2.b 3560, RO Proceed to Step 2.d. Step 2.b, RNO Check affected Train's 3560, RO SW pumps - IN PULL-TO-LOCK DUE Step 2.d TO A NON-ISOLABLE SW LEAK Perform the following:

1) START a SW pump in the affected Train. IF one SW pump can NOT be 3560, Step 2.d RO started in the RNO affected Train, THEN Proceed to step Column 2.e.

2) Proceed to step 2.i.

Verify service water supply valves to TPCCW 3560, RO (3SWP*MOV71A and Step 2.i.

3SWP*MOV71B) - OPEN G:V)FS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario Z\Scenario 2.doc Page 20 of 55

Verify RPCCW heat exchanger SW inlet 3560, RO isolation valves 3SWP*M4V50A and Step 2.j.

3SWP*MOVSOB) - OPEN Determine Additional Actions I' Refer to the following Technical Specifications for applicability and any 3560, SRO required actions:

Step 3 T/S 3.7.4 ss/

- TIS 3.8.1.1 TIS 3.8.1.2 3560, Check Plant Conditions Stabilized.

PEO Step 4 VGifyonly one SW pump in each train -

~

3560, PEO RUNNING Step 4.a.

3560, Step 4.a.

BOP START/STOP pumps as necessary.

RNO Column Refer to OP 3326, "Service Water," and 3560, RO remove air from MCC/Rod Control ACUs, Step 4.b.

as necessary Verify MB annunciators and parameters 3560, BOP are as expected Step 4.c.

Continue with normal plant operations 3560, RO using applicable plant procedures Step 4.d G:U>RS\Osb\BalianWillstone3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 21 of 55

. Foldout page must be open

. ADVERSE CTMT defined as GREATER THAN 180°F or GREATER THAN 1O5 R/h, E-0, in containment. Step 1,

. The reactor can be interpreted as "tripped" when any two of the three bullet NOTE substeps of step 1 are satisfied.

Verify Reactor Trip

. Check reactor trip and bypass breakers

- OPEN E-0, RO

. Check rod bottom lights - LIT Step 1

. Check neutron flux - DECREASING TRIP the reactor.

IF reactor will NOT trip, THEN

a. TRIP Bus 32B and 32N. E-0, Step 1 RO

b. IF the rod bottom lights are lit OR RNO neutron flux is decreasing, THEN Column Proceed to step 2.

IF reactor trip can NOT be verified, THEN Go to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power GeneratiodATWS NOTE If RHR is in service, all references to AFW us are NOT applicable.

FR-S.l, Step 1 G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 22 of 55

Verify Reactor Trip Check reactor trip and bypass breakers -

RO

. OPEN Check rod bottom lights - LIT FR-S. 1, Step 1 Check neutron flux DECREASING TRIP the reactor. IF the reactor will NOT FR-S.I, RO trip, THEN Step 1, Drive rods in (AUTO or MANUAL). RNO FR-S.1, BOP Verify Turbine Trip Step 2 BOP Check all turbine stop valves - CLOSED FR-S.1, Step 2.a TRIP the turbine.

IF the turbine will NOT trip, THEN Runback FR-S.l ,

BOP the turbine to close the control valves. Step 2.a, IF the turbine can NOT be runback, THEN 3N0 CLOSE MSlVs and MSlV bypass valves.

Verify AFW Pumps Running Check MD pumps - RUNNING 3FWA*PlA is 00s BOP 'R-S.l ,

Check TD pump - RUNNING, IF Step 3 NECESSARY RO/ 'R-S.l, nitiate Immediate Boration of RCS BOP Step 4 ROI 'R-S.1,

heck SI - NOT ACTUATED BOP step 4.a G:\DRS\Osb\BalianVMillstone3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 23 of 55

RO/ FR-S.1, Check one charging pump - RUNNING BOP Step 4.b Align boration path:

I)START at least one boric acid transfer ROI Pump FR-S. 1, BOP Step 4.c

2) OPEN emergency boration valve (3CHS*MV8104)

Check normal charging flow path aligned Charging flow control valve - CAPABLE

. OF BEING THROTTLED Charging header loop isolation valve (3CHS*AV8146 or 3CHS*AV8147) -

ROI FR-S.l, BOP OPEN Step 4.d Charging header isolation valves -

OPEN 3CHS*MV8106 3CHS*MV8105 FR-S.l, us Proceed to step 6.

Step 4.e ROI FR-S.l, Verify Boration Flow BOP Step 6 ROi Check PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2350 FR-S.l, BOP psia Step 6.a ROI Check normal charging flow path - FR-S.I, BOP ALIGNED Step 6.b RO/ Place charging flow control valve in FR-S.1, BOP MANUAL Step 6.c ROI Adjust boration flow to the RCS EQUAL FR-S.1, BOP TO OR GREATER THAN 35 gpm Step 6.d Check The Following Trips Have FR-S.l, us Occurred Step 7 G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 24 of 55

FR-S.1, Verify reactor trip breakers - OPEN Step 7.a FR-S.l, Locally TRIP the reactor trip and bypass Step 7.a, breakers.

RNO 5 minutes chosen to force crew to FR-S. 1, Verify turbine - TRIPPED perform FR-S.1. Step 7.b FR-S.1, Check if SI is Actuated.

Step 8 Verify SAFETY INJECTIONACTUATION FR-S.I, RO annunciator (MB4D 1-6 or MB2B 5-9) - LIT Step 8.a Proceed to step 9. and IF SI occurs, THEN FR-S.1, Perform steps 3-14 of E-0, Reactor Trip Step 8.a, and Safety Injection. RNO FR-S.I, Check AFW Suction Source Step 9 Check DWST level - LESS THAN 80,000 FR-S.1, gal Step 9.a Proceed to step I O . and, IF DWST level FR-S.1, decreases LESS THAN 80,000 gal, THEN Step 9,a, Perform step 9.b. RNO FR-S.1, Check SG Levels Step 10 Verify NR level in at least one SG - FR-S.1, BOP GREATER THAN 8% (42% ADVERSE Step CTMT) 10.a Control feed flow to maintain NR level FR-S.1, BOP between 8% and 50% (42% and 50% Step ADVERSE CTMT) 10.b G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 25 of 55

Verify All Dilution Paths Isolated Check primary makeup water to blender RO . (3CHS*FCVl II A ) - CLOSED Locally check chemical mix tank outlet FR-S.1,

. isolation valve (3CHS*V317) - CLOSED Locally check manual dilution valve (3CHS*V305) - CLOSED Step I 1 Check For Reactivity Insertion From RO .

Uncontrolled RCS Cooldown RCS temperature - DECREASING IN AN FR-S.l ,

BOP

. UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR Any SG pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER Step 12 Verify Main Steam Lines Isolated Check MSlVs and MSlV Bypass Valves FR-S.1, BOP

. - CLOSED Check ESF Group 3 status lights - LIT Step I 3 FR-S. 1, BOP Initiate MSI. Step 13, RNO Identify Faulted SGs Check pressures in all SGs:

ANY SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN FR-S.1, BOP

. AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED Step 14 FR-S.l ,

us Proceed to step 16. Step 14, RNO RO Check Core Exit TCs LESS THAN FR-S.l, 1200-F Step 16 G:\DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 26 of 55

Verify Reactor Subcritical Check power range channels - LESS

. THAN 5%

Check intermediate range channels -

NEGATIVE STARTUP RATE FR-S.I, Step 17 FR-S.l, Verify No Fuel Damage Step 18 FR-S.l, Request Chemistry obtain RCS activity Step samples 18.a FR-S.l, Request Chemistry obtain RCS activity step samples 18.b Verify SLCRS Doors - CLOSED FR-S.l, Step 19 CAUTIO N

Boration should continue to obtain Cre precedin adequate shutdown margin during W g FR-subsequent actions.

S.l, Step 20 Initiate Monitoring Of The CSF Status FR-S.l, Enters FR-P.l us Trees And Go To Procedure And Step In Step 2o Effect I I I End of Events 5 & 6. Event 7 has inil en G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 27 of 55

LBLOCA will require entry into:

FR-P.l Thermal Shock (first step returns to E-0cause RHR flow > 1,000 gpm)

FR-Z.1 Containment Pressure (Crew needs to perform this FR)

FR-Z.3 Containment Radiation (second step returns to E a ; not reprinted below).

These are not written into this scenario auide.

. If RWST level decreases to LESS THAN 520,000 gal, Go to ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, to align the CAUTION

. ECCS system. FR-P.1, If DWST level decreases to LESS THAN Step 1 80,000 gal, Shift AFW pump suction to the CST usina GA-4.

us Check RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN FR-P.1, RCS Press will be 500 300 psia (500 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

RO Step I RHR flow will be > 1,000.

Perform the applicable action:

I' IF RHR pump flow is LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO I000 gpm, THEN Proceed FR-P.1, Crew should go to FR-Z.l 1IS

. to step 2.

"IF RHR pump flow is GREATER THAN 1000 gpm, THEN Go to procedure and Step 1 RNO

- step in effect.

Check If CDA Required

1. Check Ctmt pressure - GREATER THAN 23 psia FR-Z. 1, 30

2. Verify annunciator "CONTAINMENT Step 1 DEPRES ACTUATION" (MB2B 5-5) -

LIT Verify CIA FR-Z.1,

a. Check ESF Group 2, Step 2 columns 2 though I O - LIT Verify CIB Check RPCCW CTMT supply and return FR-Z.1, header isolation valves - CLOSED Step 3 Check RPCCW pumps - STOPPED STOP all RCPs G:V>RS\OsbU3alian\Millstone3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 28 of 55

CAUTION If ECA-1.I, Loss of Emergency Coolant preceding Recirculation, is in progress, Ctmt spray FR-Z.1, should be operated as directed in ECA-1.I.

Step 4 Verify Quench Spray System Operation

a. Check annunciator RWST EMPTY QSS PP OFF

b. (69,331 gal) (MB2A 5-2) NOT LIT

c. Verify quench spray pumps - RUNNING FR-Z.1,

d. Verify quench spray pump discharge Step 4 valves OPEN 3QSS*MOV34A 3QSS*MOV34B STOP All Main Circulating FR-Z. I, BOP Water Pumps Step 5 Check ContainmentVentilation BOP -

Verify CAR fans STOPPED FR-Z.1, Verifv CRDM fans - STOPPED Step 6 Verify Recirculation Spray System Operation

a. Check recirculation spray pump suction isolation valves - OPEN 3RSS*MOV23A 3RSS*MOV23B minutes after CDA 3RSS*MOV23C initiates. Procedure RO FR-Z.1, 3RSS*MOV23D directs manual starting IF Step 7

b. Check annunciator CTMT RECIRC sump level supports it. PUMP AUTO START SIGNAL (MB2B 1-

8) - LIT

c. Check recirculation spray pumps - ANY RUNNING

- d. Proceed to step 7.a.

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 29 of 55

Verify recirculation spray pump spray header isolation valves - OPEN ON RO ..

RUNNING PUMP(S)

For pump A - 3RSS*MOV20A FR-Z.I, For pump B 3RSS*MOV20B For pump C 3RSS*MOV20C For wmD D - 3RSS*MOV20D Step 7.g I

RO Check recirculation spray FLOW- FR-Z.1 INDICATED IN AT LEAST ONE TRAIN Step 7.h IF running pump amps, flow, or discharge pressure oscillate THEN I ) RESET SI and CDA FR-Z.1

2) STOP affected pump(s) Step 7.i

3) Proceed to ECA-I .I, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Proceed to step 9. FR-Z.1 Step 7.j Verify ESF Group 4 Lights - LIT FR-Z. 1, SteD 9 Verify Main Steam Line Isolation Check MSlVs and MSlV bypass valves

'R-Z. 1,

. - CLOSED Check ESF Group 3 lights - LIT Step 10 Verify Main Feedwater Isolation Verify MD FW pump -TRIPPED

. Verify TD FW pumps - TRIPPED Verify FW isolationtrip valves -

. CLOSED Verify SG feed regulating valves - 'R-Z. 1,

. CLOSED Verify SG feed regulating bypass valves

- CLOSED Step 11 Verify SG chemical feed isolation valves

- CLOSED G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 30 of 55

. At least one SG must be maintained

. available for RCS cooldown.

If all SGs are faulted, at least 100 gpm feed flow should be maintained to each CAUTION preceding FR-Z.I SG. Step 12 Check If Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Should Continue To All SGs

a. Check pressure in all SGs-NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN FR-Z. I,

. AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED Step 12 Returns to E-0, Step 15 Go To Procedure And Step In Effect FR-Z.1, Step 13 Determine If ADVERSE CTMT Conditions Exist Crew will work through E-0 Ctmt temperature GREATER THAN 180°F E-0, until foldout page criteria for Step 15 cold leg recirc is met.

OR Ctmt radiation GREATER THAN IO5 R/hr E-0, Verify ECCS Flow Step 16 Check charging pumps - E-0, Step 16 FLOW INDICATED .a E-0, Check RCS pressure - GREATER THAN

?O 1650 psia (I 950 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

Step 16

- .b E-0, us Proceed to Step 16.e Step 16

- .byRNO G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 31 of 55

E-0, RO -

Check SI pumps FLOW INDICATED Step 16

.e E-0, Check RCS pressure - LESS THAN 300 RO Step I 6 psia (500 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

.f E-0, RO Check RHR pumps - FLOW INDICATED. Step 16 4.

E-0, BOP Verify Adequate Heat Sink Step 17 Check NR level in at least one SG - r C-0, BOP GREATER THAN 8% (42% ADVERSE Step 17.a CTMT)

Control feed flow to maintain NR level - -20, BOP BETWEEN 8% and 50% (42% and 50%

Step 17.b ADVERSE CTMT) us i-0, Proceed to step 18.

Step 17.c BOP EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT Verify AFW Valve Alignment PROPER E-0, Step 18 RO Verify ECCS Valve Alignment PROPER :-0, EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT Step I 9 E-0, us Check Plant Status Step 20 I

Booth Operator Sec E-0 ,

When requested, report all SLCRS Verify SLCRS doors - CLOSED urity Step 20.a doors are closed I

CBI Should be lit as crew Check CONTROL BUILDING ISOLATION manually actuated SI annunciator (MB4D 3-6) - LIT G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 32 of 55

I 1 1 1 Ro -

Verify ESF Group 2 CBI lights LIT E-0, Step 20.c Verify Control Building purge supply fan E-0, and purge exhaust fan NOT RUNNING Step 20.d Verify Control building air bank isolation E-0, valves - OPEN Step 20.e E-0, BOP STOP kitchen exhaust fan Step 20.f Close and Dog (as applicable) Control E-0, Building pressure boundary doors. Step 20.g I 1 RO Check RCS Temperature E-0, Step 21 IAlternate paths through Step 21 - all lead to Step 22.

F' E-0, RO Check PZR Valves Step 22 E-0, RO Verify PORVs - CLOSED Step 22.a E-0, Verify normal PZR spray valves - CLOSED Step 22.b E-0, RO Verify PZR safety valves - CLOSED Step 22.c To prevent damage to the RCP seal(s), E-0, us seal injection flow should be maintained to Step 23, all RCPs. CAUTION The leak should be large E-0, enough to require the RCPs us Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped Step 23 tripped G:U>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 33 of 55

E-0, RO Verify RCPs -ANY RUNNING Step 23.a Verify RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1500 E-0, RO Step 23.b psia (1800 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

Verify charging or SI pumps - AT LEAST E-0, RO Step 23.c ONE RUNNING RCPs were probably tripped E-0, in Step 11 above.

us Stop all RCPs Step 23.d BOP/ Check If SG Secondary Boundaries Are E-0, Intact Step 24 RO Check pressure in all SGs BOP/ NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN E-0, AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER Step 24.a RO NO SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED Ensure crew request activity E-0, Check If SG Tubes Are Intact Step 25 samples with HP coverage E-0, I Ro Sample all SGs for activity Step 25.a RESET SG blowdown sample isolation OPEN SG blowdown sample isolation valve(s)

Request Chemistry obtain activity samples using HP coverage G:\DRS\OsbU3alianWillstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 34 of 55

Check steam generator levels - NO SG E-0, LEVEL INCREASING IN AN Step 25.b UNCONTROLLED MANNER Verify trend history and alarm status of radiation monitors Main steam line - NORMAL E-0, Step 25.c Condenser air ejector - NORMAL

. SG blowdown - NORMAL G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 35 of 55

1. RCP TRIP CRITERIA Trip all RCPs if BOTH conditions listed below occur:

a. At least one charging OR SI pump is running AND

b. RCS pressure is LESS THAN 1500 psia (1800 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

2. AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION If DWST level decreases to LESS THAN 80,000 gal, AFW pump suction must be shifted to the CST and the DWST filled using GA-4. Z-0

=olda it

'age

3. COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERION If RWST level decreases to LESS THAN 520,000 gal, Go to ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold

-eg Recirculation.

8. CONTROL BLDG VENTILATION REALIGNMENT CRITERION (CBI)

Nith CBI actuated for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , establish Zontrol Bldg outside filtered air using GA-18.

G:U>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 36 of 55

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 37 of 55 G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 38 of 55 G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 39 of 55 G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 40 of 55 G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page41 of55 G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3Bcenario 2Bcenario 2.doc Page 42 of 55 G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 43 of 55 maintained at all times.

If offsite power is lost after SI reset, CAUTION manual action to restart safeguards preceding equipment may be required.

ES-I .3, High radiation levels may be Step 1 experienced in the Auxiliary and ESF buildings following the transfer to cold leg recirculation.

NOTE Functional Response procedures should preceding not be implemented until completion of ES-1.3, step 5.

Step 1 RESET ESF Actuation Signals, If Required 0 SI ES-1.3, RO CDA Step 1 LOP CIA I CIB G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 44 of 55

STOP Both RHR Pumps And Place Control Switches In PULL-TO-LOCK All ECCS pumps taking a suction from the RWST should be stopped if RWST Step 2 CAUTlOh level decreases to 100,000 gal.

preceding Consult with the ADTS prior to ES-1.3, dispatching personnel to locally operate Step 3 RHR and RecirculationSpray System valves.

NOTE Either train of recirculation spray can preceding supply water to the core. ES-1.3, Step 3 Align RHR And Recirculation Spray ES-1.3, Systems For Cold Leg Recirculation Step 3 Verify cold leg recirculation capability (if previously performed, proceed to step 3. b.)

I ) Power to recirculation spray pumps - ES-I .3, AVAILABLE Step 3.a

2) Using Attachment A, Verify power for cold leg recirculation valves -

AVAILABLE Verify recirculation spray heat exchanger SW inlet isolation valves - OPEN 3SWP*MOV54A 3SWP*MOV54B ES-I .3, Step 3.b derify recirculation spray header isolation Jalves -OPEN ES-1.3,

. 3RSS*MOV20A 3RSS*MOV20B derify recirculation spray pumps A AND B -

Step 3.c ES-1.3, 3UNNING Ster, 3.d

=LOSE RHR cold leg injection valves 3SIL*MV8809A 3SIL*MV8809B ES-I .3, Step 3.e

LOSE RWST/RHR pump suction valves 3SIL*MV8812A 3SIL*MV8812B ES-1.3, Step 3.f G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 45 of 55

. 3RHS*MV8716A 3RHS*MV8716B t3-1 .a, Step 3.g CLOSE SI pump recirculation valves to RWST 3SIH*MV8813 ES-1.3, 0 3SIH*MV8814 Step 3.h 3SIH*MV8920 CLOSE charging pump miniflow isolation valves to RWST 3CHS*MV8511A ES-1.3, 3CHS*MV8511B Step 3.i 0 3CHS*MV8512A 3CHS*MV8512B Verify RSS pumps have been in operation ES-1.3,

-AT LEAST TWO MINUTES Step 3.j OPEN recirculation spray RHR isolation valves 3RSS*MV8837A ES-1.3, Step 3.k 3RSS*MV8837B OPEN RHR to CHG and SI suction isolation valves RO

. 3SIL*MV8804A 3SIL*MV8804B ES-1.3, Step 3.1 OPEN SI/CHG pump cross-connect valves ES-I .3, 3SIH*MV8807A Step 3.m 3SIH*MV8807B Verify a flow path from the Ctmt sump to ES-1.3, the RCS -AT LEAST ONE ESTABLISHED Step 3.n Verify at least one charging ES-I .3, AND one SI pump - RUNNING Step 3.0 If a Loss of Offsite Power occurs in the NOTE Recirculation Mode, the EDG sequencer preceding automatically restarts cold leg recirculation ES-1.3, components. Ster, 4 G:V>RS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 46 of 55

Complete Cold Leg Recirculation Alignment Step 4 CLOSE RWST/SI pump suction ES-I .3, (3SIH*MV8806) Step 4.a CLOSE RWSTKHG pump suction valves 3CHS*LCV112D 3CHS*LCV112E ES-1.3, Step 4.b Locally Place RWSTKHG pump suction valve breakers to OFF ES-1.3, 32-1R-R4J (3CHS*LCVl12D) Step 4.c 32-1W-R4J (3CHS*LCVl12E)

ES-I .3, Verify Cold Leg Recirculation Step 5 Check injection flow to RCS from charging ES-1.3, pumps AND SI pumps - ESTABLISHED Step 5.a Verify at least one recirculation spray pump in each train - ALIGNED FOR ES-1.3, RO Step 5.b COLD LEG RECIRC AND RUNNING NOTE Functional Response procedures may now preceding us be implemented as necessary. ES-1.3, Ster, 6.

Plannec End of Scenari CZuestion to SRO Applicant: What Emergency Action Level should be declared for this scenario?

hswer: SITE AREA EMERGENCY CHARLIE 2, entered FR-S.l from E-0.

TERMINATE EXAM G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 47 of 55

SECTION 3 SIMULATOR EXAM SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

SUMMARY

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 2 Revision: 0 TIME *QA INSTRUCTOR AIDS DESCRlPTI0N MALF, RF, IO T=O RPOSA Manual Reactor Trip Failure at MB4 RPOSB Manual Reactor Trip Failure at MB7 RP1OA Train A Automatic Reactor Trip Failure RPIOB Train B Automatic Reactor Trip Failure EDI-3NJSACB-BF Trip Off Unable to deenergize 32B and 32N EDI-3NNSACB-BF Trip Off Unable to deenergize 32B and 32N SWO2A SW Pp Fails to Auto Start.

TC03 Turbine Fails to Trip I/OS I. N107A Severity = 100% PRNl 41 Fails High

2. CV04B Severity = 0% 5 min ramp Letdown TI Fails Low

2. FW16C Heater Drain Pump IC Trip

3. SWOIC SW Pp C Trips.

4. R C l l D 3RCS-PI D Rotor Locks Up.

5. RC03D Severity = 100% RCS Cold Leg D Rupture.

CS04 Severity = 2% RWST Leak Summary of Significant Simulator Booth Operator Cues.

1) Trip bistables and door alarms during Event 1 Close and report 3CHS*V314, V316,V297, V295 Remove TC03 when Crew attempts to manually trip turbine to allow success.

Locally open RTBs 2 minutes after requested.

Initiate Event 7 during Event 6.

Report SLCRS and Control Building Doors closed . . .

Acknowledge requests for Chemistry Samples Reset 32-3T.

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SECTION 4 VALIDATION CHECKLIST

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 2 Revision: -0 Remote functions: Verified by All remote functions contained in the guide are certified.

MaIfunctions:

All malfunctions contained in the guide are certified.

Initial Conditions:

The initial condition(s) contained in the guide are certified or have been developed from certified IC's in accordance with NSEM-4.02.

Simulator Operatina Limits:

The simulator guide has been evaluated for operating limits and/or anomalous response.

Test Run:

The scenario contained in the guide has been test run and validated (validation sheet completed, next page)on the simulator. Simulator response is reasonable and as expected.

Examination Scenario Review The dynamic examination review checklist is complete.

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SECTION 5 REFERENCES AND CRITICAL TASK TRACKING

Title:

NRC initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: 2

1.

References:

TS* MP3 Technical Specifications OP 3272 EOP User's Guide OP 3204 At Power Operation OP 3353 Main Board Annunciator Response Procedures AOP 3571 instrument Failure Response AOP 3567 Operation with One Feedwater Heater String Isolated AOP 3569 Loss of Service Water EOP*35 E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety injection EOP*FR-S.l Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS EOP*35 E-I Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant EOP*35 ES-1.3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation ES-0.1 Reactor Trip Response EPIP*EPiP 4400 Event Assessment, Classification and Reportability NUREG 1021 Examiners Standards G:\DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 50 of 55

II. Critical Tasks Covered in this Test:

The following Critical Tasks are covered in this exercise:

ES-1.3 - Transfer to cold leg 000-01I --

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE Omission or P recirculation and [establish EA1.I 1 incorrect performance of this task ECCS recirculation flow 4.214.2 results in "adverse consequence(s) or a

[that at least meets the 000-011 significant degradation in the mitigative assumptions of the EA1.13 capability of the plant."

plant-specific LOCA 4.114.2 ana lyse^]^]' Failure to transfer to cold leg 000-01I recirculation before the RWST inventory EA2.02 is totally depleted results in the loss of 3.313.7 all pumped safety injection and containment spray when the RWST 000-009 empties.

EAI.02 3.813.8 Provided that transfer to cold leg recirculation is possible (as is postulated 006-030 in the plant conditions), a failure to A4.02 transfer resulting in loss of pumped 4.414.4 injection and containment spray constitutes "mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded ECCS...capacity." It also constitutes a "significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario."

Failure to transfer to cold leg recirculation under the postulated plant conditions can result in unnecessary challenaes to the followina CSFs:

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, CRITICAL TASK DESCRIPTION, 0 Core cooling 0 Containment Thus, failure to transfer represents a "demonstrated inability by the crew to take an action or combination of actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safetv."

vlanually trip the main 045.010 Failure to trip the main turbine under the urbine [before a severe A3.01 postulated plant conditions causes orange-path) challenge 3.513.6 challenges to CSFs beyond those jevelops to either the irreparably introduced by the postulated wbcriticality or the integrity 045-050 conditions. Additionally, such an X F I 5 or [before transition to A I .Ol omission constitutes a demonstrated XA-2.1],6 whichever 3.8i4.1 inability by the crew to "take an iappens first action...that would prevent a challenge to A I .02 plant safety."

3.313.7 The situation described in the plant A3.01 conditions is effectively a large steamline break downstream of the MSlVs that 3.313.5 sannot be closed in this case. This

'effective steamline break" is also located jownstream of the main turbine stop dalves, which can be closed by manually tripping the turbine. Failure to perform the critical task results in uncon-trolled jepressurization of all SGs and in Jncontrolled cooldown of the RCS, both 2f which are unnecessary G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3Bcenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 52 of 55

OPERATIONAL EXAM VALIDATION SHEET Program

Title:

NRC Initial License Training, NRC Scenario Number I Examination Name: NRC Scenario Number 1 Exam ID Number: NRC 1 Revision: 2 By their signature below, the people acknowledge the confidentiality and validity of the material contained within and will not willfully disclose its contents to others enrolled in the Millstone Three Initial Licensed Operator Training Program.

Validated By:

Print Signature Date SM I RO I BOP G:VIRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 53 of 55

ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: 0 Note: The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios.

Quantitative Attributes 6 13. Total malfunctions inserted: 4-8/10-14 (PRNI41, Letdown Temp. Inst, HD-P-IC, 3SWP*PIA & C,)

2 14. Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1 4 3 - 6 (ATWS, Turbine Trip) 2 15. Abnormal Events: I-2/2-3 (IInstrument Failures, Loss of 3SWP*PlA) 1 16. Major Transients: 1-2/2-3 (LBLOCA) 1 17. EOPs used beyond primary scram response EOP: 1-3/3-5 (ES-I .3) 3 18. EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-3/1-3 (FR-S.l, FR-Z.1, FR-P.l) 90 19. Approximate scenario run time: 45-60 minutes (one scenario may approach 90 minutes) 65 20. EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time 2 21. Crew Critical Tasks: 2-5/5-8 (Trip Turbine, Cold Leg Recirc)

Yes 22. Technical Specificationsare exercised during the test COMMENTS:

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SECTION 6 SCENARIO INITIAL CONDITIONS Reactor Power: 100%

Operating History: 258 days on line RCS Boron: 953 ppm Core Burnup: 10,000 MWD/MTU Condensate Demins: 7 Intake structure: Green PRA Status: Green Protected train: B Train protected Evolutions in Progress: Millstone Unit 2 is in a Refueling Outage Major Equipment 00s: 3AFW*PlA Crew Instructions:

Motor drive auxiliary feedwater pump, 3AFW*PlA is out of service for emergent maintenance. 3AFW*PlA was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago and expected return to operability is 32 hours3.703704e-4 days 0.00889 hours 5.291005e-5 weeks 1.2176e-5 months from now. Limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.1.2, action a. has been entered.

Continue to operate at full power.

PlantlSimulator Differences:

0 If not using the speed dial option, dial 3333 or 3334 to reach the desired person(s).

0 The following PPC programs do not function on the simulator:

II Samarium Follow It Xenon Follow It Sequence of Events G:DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 2\Scenario 2.doc Page 55 of 55

Aooendix D Paae 4 of 4 F o ES-D-1

~

Facility: Millstone. Unit 3 Scenario No.: Three Op-Test No.: One Examiners: Operators: SRO Surrogafe Don Jackson SRO Applicants Ito 3 Harry Balian / John Caruso RO Apdicants 4 to 6 Initial Conditions: 9% Power, Steady State Turnover: Unit is at 9% Dower with one MDAFW Pump (3FWA*PIA) out of service for emergent maintenance.

I/ Event No. I Malf. No. I Event Type* I I. R (RO) Raise power from 9% to 1I%. P-I 0 Fails.

2. RX12F I (BOP) SG "B" LT529, fails to 0 over 5 mins.

3. CV05 I (RO) Letdown Press Xmtter, PTI31, fails low.

4. ED08A C (RO, BOP) Loss of VIAC-I (3VBA*INV-1 Deenergized)

5. MSO6A C MSlV "A" closes inadvertently.

6. FWIOD M FW Rupture on "D" feedwater line.

7. MS12B, C, D C (BOP) MSlVs "B", "C", "D"stick open SI Fails to Actuate, can be manually

8. RP07A&B C(R0) actuated.

9. FW18B, 21B C No flow from 3FWA*Pl B SRO Classifies the Event 10.

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Outline\MS3 ES-D-1 Scenario 3.wpd NUREG-1021, Revision 9

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE APPROVAL SHEET I.

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 3 Revision: 0 II. Initiated:

Nuclear Regulatow Commission 3 June 2004 Developer Date Ill. Reviewed:

Reviewer Date IV. Approved:

Operations Manager Date Operator Training Supervisor Date

AI 99-6848 G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 1 of46

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTIONS LISTED IN ORDER

1. Exam Overview

2. Instructor Guide

3. Sequence of Events Summary

4. Validation Checklist

5. Reference and Critical Task Tracking Form

6. Scenario Initial Conditions Sheet G:V>RS\Osb\BalianWillstone3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 2 of 46

SECTION 1 EXAM OVERVIEW

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number I ID Number: NRC Scenario 3 Revision: 0

1. Exam Brief:

The Crew takes the shift at 9% power during a startup following a planned refueling outage. Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 3FWA*PlA is out of service for emergent maintenance. The Crew is to raise reactor power per OP 3203, Step 4.3.10, using control rods. All preceding steps have been completed and the Crew should be briefed in advance of taking the shift. When power rises above I 1%, the Crew will find that P-10 permissive annuciator has failed to energize. The SRO Applicant should refer to Technical Specifications and recognize that 3.0.3 applies.

Event 2 is a slow failure of Steam Generator B water level transmitter, 3FWS-LT529, to zero. The crew should respond by taking manual control of 3FWS-LK560 (SG B feedwater flow control bypass valve) and maintaining SG water level at 45%

to 55%. The crew will defeat affected instrumentation and direct I&C to trip bistables per AOP 3571.

Event 3 is a sudden failure of Letdown Pressure Transmitter, 3CHS-PT131. This causes the Letdown pressure control valve to open and letdown pressure to rise.

The Letdown line relief valve will open on high pressure. The crew responds per alarm response OP 3353.MB3A 4-5 and may refer to OP 3353.MB3A 4-6. They will take letdown pressure control, 3CHS*PKl31 to Manual and maintain 300 psig to 350 psig. The Examiners may promptkue the Crew to bypass the pressure control valve through 3CHS*V14.

Event 4 is a Loss of Vital instrument AC Power (VIAC-1). This forces both the RO and BOPto respond by taking various controllers to HAND. The loss of VIAC-I also raises Technical Specification issues for the SRO Applicant to demonstrate proficiency with.

Event 5 is an inadvertent closing of Main Steam Isolation Valve 3MSS*CTV27A.

The Crew should respond per OP 3353.MB5C 2-7 and reopen the MSIV. The scenario is meant to promptly proceed to the major event once the Crew reopens the MSIV.

The major event consists of Events 6, 7, and 8. Event 6 is a Feedwater Line rupture on the D Steam Generator downstream of the last check valve before the SG. The plant may automaticallytrip or the Crew may recognize the symptoms and manually trip and initiate SI. The event is complicated by no flow from 3FWA*P1B (its discharge valve is closed).

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 3 of 46

Event 7 is the failure of SI to automatically initiate and it is a critical task for the crew to manually initiate SI. The train Afailure is partly attributable to the loss of VIAC-

1. However, automatic actuation is defeated by simulated malfunction for both trains.

Event 8 is the failure of MSlVs 3MSS*ClV27B, 3MSS*Cn/27C and 3MSS*ClV27D to close. MSlV 3MSS*CTV27C can be closed from the control room. However, 3MSS*ClV27B and 27D remain stuck open until closed locally.

2. Plant/Simulatordifferences that may affect the scenario are: None.

3. Duration of Session: 1% hour G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 4 of 46

SECTION 2 INSTRUCTOR GUIDE

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 3 Revision: 2 All Control Room Conduct, Operations and Communicationsshall be in accordance COP 200.1,Conduct of Operations, and OP 3260,Unit 3 Conduct of Operations.

"Review the Simulator Operating Limits(design limits of plant) and the Simulator Modeling Limitations and Anomalous Response List prior to performing this training scenario on the simulator. The instructor should be aware if any of these limitations may be exceeded." (NSEM 6.02)

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SIMULATOR PROBLEMS DURING EXAMS It is the responsibility of the Instructors in the simulator to insure that exam interruptions have a minimum negative impact on the Crew and the examinations we provide.

Be aware that at all times the Operators should treat the simulator as if it were the plant and you too should treat it as much like the plant as possible when they are in the simulator.

As soon as the Instructors are aware of a simulator problem that will adversely affect the exam in progress (computer fault, etc.) the Instructor should:

I. Place the simulator in FREEZE if possible.

2. Announce to the Crew that there is a simulator problem.

3. Request that the Crew leave the simulator control room. (The Crew should leave the simulator for problems which involve major switch alignments).

4. Deal with the problem (reboot, call STSB, etc.)

5. After the Instructors believe the simulator is restored to service, the Crew should be told how the exam will continue. If it is possible and felt to be acceptable to the evaluators, the examination can begin where it left off with an update on plant parameters and each Crew member is prepared to restart.

If the examination will not begin where it left off, the crew should be told how and where the exam will begin again.

6. Once the Crew has been told how and where the exam will begin, have the crew conduct a brief so that the Instructor and evaluators can insure that the I crew has all the necessary informationto continue with the scenario.

7. Once all Crew members, Instructors and evaluators are satisfied that they have the necessary information to continue the scenario, place the simulator in RUN and announce to the Crew that you have continued the evaluation session.

G:U>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 6 of 46

EVENT #O TITLE: INITIAL SETUP Setup Instructions:

Enter IDT as follows :

At any XTERM window, type 4dt>

When the SUN asks for an executive type: UEXEC or RTEXEC? enter <P: this will bring up a blank idt page.

To go to a previously saved idt file type <read> at the prompt When the SUN asks for a file name of the file you wish to view type in the appropriate file name:

The old "Landon" files are as follows:

Old ISD pages 1-8 are idt file OPS Old ISD pages 9-16 are idt file OPSl Old ISD pages 17-19 are idt file OPS2 IF the step counters are athear 000, THEN REMOVE the STEP COUNTER OVERRIDE, allow the counters to step out during the IC reset, Reset to Ic-8 REINSTATE the step counter OVERRIDE Adjust the various pot settings to the valued specified by the chart located in the sim booth for the selected IC.

Place Simulator to RUN Set the STEP COUNTERS PLACE the Main Turbine on the LOAD LIMITER Verify annunciator, "COMPUTER FAILURE" (MB4C, 1-1I), is NOT LIT.

Place MOL Curve Book in Shelf for Operator use. Remove other Curve Books from the floor.

Clear the DCS Alarms PLACE THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT IN PTL or align as needed: 3FWA*PlA Equipment 00s: O 3FWA*PlA 0

Synchronize the MONITOR Time Display with digital time display on MB4.

From IC-8, the following must be completed per OP3203 I. Startup Turbine Driven Main Feedwater Pump "A"

2. Run the simulator 5 to 10 minutes to clear startup kinks.

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Initial Malfunctions/lOs/lDAs:

T=O NI-I1 P-I 0 Fails to Actuate MB4G 01-04 NI Off P-IO Bistable fails to actuate MB4G 02-04 NI Off P-I 0 Bistable fails to actuate MB4G 03-04 NI Off P-I 0 Bistable fails to actuate MB4G 04-04 NI Off P-IO Bistable fails to actuate MSl2B MSlV (ClV27-B) Stuck Open MSl2C MSlV (ClV27-C) Stuck Open MSl2D MSIV (CTV27-D) Stuck Open RP07A SI Auto Actuation Failure Train A RP07B SI Auto Actuation Failure Train B FW21B 3FWA*V18 (3FWA*P1B Disch Valve) Closed.

I/Os RX12F Severity = 0% 5 Min Ramp SG ByLvl Xmttr, LT529 fails to 0 over 5 mins.

CV05 Severity = 0% Letdown Press. Xmttr, PT131 fails to 0 ED08A Loss of Instrument Buss VBI MSOGA Main Steam Isolation Valve ATrip FWIOD Severity = 100% 5 Min Ramp Feedwater Line Rupture Inside Containment FW18B 3FWA*P1B Trips - if Crew attempts to cross-connect MDAFW Discharge Header.

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Post Exam Data Collection Reactor Power trend data Turbine Generator Load trend data Pressurizer Pressure trend data (PT455 & PT456)

SG Levels (all SGs, both NR & WR)

Rod Positions Auxiliary Feedwater Flowrate trend data (all SGs)

All console and panel strip charts or recorded digital data (may be collected at end of day for all crews.

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Objective of this Event is to provide a Reactivity/Power Maneuver for the RO Applicant at the controls (ATC) and to provide a Technical Specification interpretation opportunity for the SRO Applicant. If scenario runs with a SRO Surrogate, waiting for the Crew to recognize the P-IO failure and make the Tech Spec call is unnecessary.

For this Scenario to be successful, P-IO must be repaired and the IR low power reactor trip must be blocked per OP 3203, Step 4.3.1 1.b. If not, the plant will trip when WAC-1 is deenergized for Event Number 4.

With the SG bypass level control CAUTION valves in "AUTO," reactor power preceding OP should be increased slowly to 3203, Step avoid feed control instabilities. 4.3.1 0 INCREASE reactor power to between 15% and 19% by one of the following while continuing with this procedure:

WITHDRAW control rods at a rate not greater than OP 3203,

. approximately 2 stepdminute DILUTE RCS boron concentration at a rate not Step 4.3.10 greater than approximately 10 to I 5 Dcm/minute I

If reactor power is allowed to decrease below 9.2% CAUTION subsequent to blocking the preceding OP intermediateand power range 3203, Step reactor trips, the trips will be 4.3.1 1 reinstated.

WHEN reactor power increases OP 3203, above approximately 11%,

PERFORM the following:

Step 4.3.1 1 G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 10 of 46

CHECK the following permissive annunciators:

MB4D 4-3, REACTOR AT POWER P-10, lit OP 3203, RO Step 4.3.1 I.a MB4D 5-3, RX OR TURB NOT AT POWER P-7 not lit Recognize that P-IO is NOT lit s a minimum, System instrumentation TS 3.3.1 channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE Reactor Trip System Interlocks:

b. Low Power Reactor Trips TS Table 3.3-Block, P-7 (P-IO Input or P-13 I,Line 17.

Input). (Mode 1) Both refer to

e. Power Range Neutron Flux, Action 8.

P-IO. (Modes I& 2)

With less than the Minimum Number of Channels NOTES OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

1. After SRO has made TS call, determine by observation of the Action 8 of TS direct Booth Operator to associated permissive Table 3.3-1.

repair P-IO per cue above. annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state

2. Before event 4 (Loss of WAC- for the existing plant condition,

1) is initiated, P-IO must be or acmlv SDecification 3.0.3.

repaired and IRNl Low Power Reactor Trip must be blocked. Crew recognizes that Action 8 requires entry into TS 3.0.3 or Power Reduction to below 10%.

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 11 of46

Proc Step PRESS both P R block pushbuttons: OP 3203, NMP*N47A Step 4.3.1 1.b NMP*N47B CHECK the following permissive annunciators lit:

0 MB4D 1-3, POWER RANGE OP 3203, RX TRIP BLOCK TR A Step 4.3.1 1.c MB4D 2-3, POWER RANGE RX TRIP BLOCK TR B Under RX RESETIBLOCK PRESS both I R block pushbuttons: OP 3203, Step 4.3.1 1.d NMI*N38B Under RX RESET/BLOCK PRESS both I R block pushbuttons: OP 3203, NMI*N38A Step 4.3.1 1.e NMI*N38B

-or this Scenario to be successful, P-I 0 must be repaired and the IR low power reactor trip must be

,locked per OP 3203, Step 4.3.1 1.b. If not, the plant will trip when VIAC-1 is deenergized for Event lumber 4.

Initiate Event 2 at Chief E hers Discretion.

G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 12 of 46

Identifies SG B LT529 Failed Determine The Initiating Low and takes 3FWS-FK520 BOP Parameter And Place The 3571, I.

to MANUAL (Bypass Valve) Affected Controller In MANUAL Restores SG B Level to BOP Stabilize The Plant Parameters 3571,2.

-50%

It is desired that I&C personnel trip the bistables specified in this procedure. If, during off-hours, I&C personnel are not able to First alarms: trip the necessary bistables MB5B 3-3 within the time limitations preceding required by the Technical AOP 3571, MB5B4-3 Specifications, Operations Step 3.

Department personnel may trip the bistables using the guidance provided within this procedure.

Perform Corrective Actions US goes to Attachment N. I US 1 Using Appropriate

Attachment:

Attachment N - Narrow Range SG Level Channel Failure

- I3571,3 The following annunciators are symptoms of a failed NR SG Expect rise in SG B Level .

level instrument:

SG B LEVEL DEVIATION MBSB 4-3 3571, Att N, Note preceding SG B LEVEL HI-HI MBSB 1-3 Step 1 STM GEN B LEVEL HI-HI MB2D 1,2,3,4-10 If the failed NR level channel is selected as the input to SG level 3571 ~ tNt 1 control, Perform the following:

- . . I Verifv the affected SG feed - -- . -

1 Will ha1ve to taKe. * -

HOW Gontroi reguiating valve controller is in 3571, Att N, Valve bypas:3 to Manual.

3-MANUAL. 1.a BOP Restore SG level to normal. II 3571, 1.b Att N, Defeat the failed channel input RO by selecting the alternate 3571, Att N, channel on the level selector. 1.c G:\DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 13 of 46

When SG h e 1 is restored to normal and feedkteam flow are matched, Place the affected 3571, Att N, steam generator feed regulating 1.d valve controller in AUTO.

When conditions have stabilized, Observe MB annunciators and Returns 3FWS-FK520 to parameters. Immediately report 3571, Att N, any unexpected or unexplained I.e conditions to the Shift Manager.

Trip the associated Reactor Protection System bistable(s): 3571, Att N, 2 Place a check mark in the box above the appropriate channel 3571, Att N, us that requires tripping on the last 2.a pages of this Attachment.

Refer to Technical Specification 3571, Att N, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3.5 and 3.3.3.6. 2. b Check the existing bistable status to ensure a reactor trip 3571, Att N, I Ro will not occur when the failed channel is tripped.

Request the I&C Department trip 2.c the appropriate bistables using 3571, Att N, Attachment N and Attachment S. 2.d Verify the appropriate bistable 3571, Att N, status lights are lit. 2.e If any two of the NR level channels which serve as inputs to AMSAC are failed (LT-551, LT-552, LT-538, or LT-547),

Perform the following: 3571, Att N, 3 I) Using OP 3350, "ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitrv." Place AMSAC in G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 14 of 46

Bypass.

2) Refer to 3TRM-7.2, "AMSAC."

If either indicator 3FWS*LI 529A or 3FWS*LI 548A is failed, Refer LT529 - n/a to TRM Table 7.4.1, Fire Related 3571 ~ t Nt 4 Safe Shutdown Components, "Auxiliary Feedwater System."

Request I&C Department us perform corrective maintenance 3571, ~ tN,t 5

, on failed instrument.

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Event No.: 3 OP 3353.MB3A Actions hou CHECK 3CHS-PI 131, letdown RO pressure (MB3), to confirm 4-5, Step 1 alarm.

PLACE 3CHS*PK131, letdown RO pressure controller (MB3), in 4-5, Step 2 "MANUAL."

RO has no pressure indication.

Can restore valve to original MAINTAIN letdown pressure 300 RO to 350 prig. 4-5, Step 3 position or flow rate to original value IF "LETDOWN RELIEF W TEMP HI" (MBA 4-6) is lit, Monitors 3RCS*TI125 for CHECK 3RCS*TI 125, letdown RO relief valve temperature (MB3), 4-5, Step 4 lowering temperature.

to check 3CHS*RV8117, letdown relief valve, seated.

IF directed by SM/US, PERFORM the following:

5.1 ADJUST 3CHS*Vl4, low pressure controller bypass, us and MAINTAIN letdown 4-5, Step 5 pressure 300 to 354 psig.

5.2 CLOSE 3CHS*V12, low pressure controller inlet isolation.

IF directed by SM/US, Refer To OP 3304A, "Charging and Letdown," and REMOVE 4-5, Step 6 charging and letdown from service.

CHECK 3RCS*TI 125, letdown Completed above relief valve temperature (MB3),

RO 4-6, Step 1 by 4-5, Step 4 to confirm alarm.

3CHS*RV8117, letdown relief NOTE valve, lifts at 600 psig. preceding 4-6, Step 2 CHECK 3CHS*PI 131, letdown Completed above a

Dy 4-3,s t e p 3 RO pressure (MB3), 300 to 350 prig. 4-6, Step 2 G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 16 of 46 r.

IF directed by SM/US, PLACE 3CHS*PK131, letdown pressure Completed above RO controller, in "MANUAL," and 4-6, Step 3 by 4-5, Step 2 MAINTAIN letdown pressure 300 to 350 psig.

CHECK 3RCS*TI 125, letdown Monitors 3RCS*TI125 for relief valve temperature (MBA),

RO to check 3CHS*RV8117, 4-6, Step 4 lowering temperature.

letdown relief valve. seated.

NOTE: 3CHS-PK131 may be confusing. Operator should press the lower button to raise demand.

This Opens the valve and causes Pressure to rise. -1 G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 17 of 46

IF power supply failure results in loss of 1 3353.MB Alarm responses all send protective system channel, Go To AOP 4 c 1-1, Crew to AOP 3564. 3564, Loss of One Protective System Step 1 Channel.

SEND Operator to 3VBA*INV-I, number I 3353.MB US may dispatch a PEO to 8A 1-5, inverter panel, to determine cause of the Inverter.

alarm. Step 1 IF 3VBA*INV-I, number Iinverter panel, 3353.MB is deenergized, Go To AOP 3564, Loss of 8A 1-5, One Protective System Channel. Step 2 Loss of VlAC 1 or 2 deenergizes the associated EDG sequencer. If an ESF actuation takes place, the following will CAUTIO NOT occur automatically on the associated N train: precedin Important CAUTION EDG start (except on LOP) g 3564, Emergency bus load stripping Step I

. Load sequencing Check Control System Operation Verify rod control - OPERATING

. NORMALLY IN AUTO Verify SG level - OPERATING RO BOP . NORMALLY IN AUTO Verify PZR level OPERATING NORMALLY IN AUTO 3564,l Verify PZR pressure OPERATING NORMALLY IN AUTO Perform the following:

RO a. Place the affected controller(s) in 3564,l BOP MANUAL. RNO

b. Stabilize Dlant Darameters.

Verify Cold Overpressure Protection 3564,2 Svstem BLOCKED Block the affected Train of Cold 3564,2 Overpressure Protection System. RNO G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\R.lillstone3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 18 of 46

Defeat The Failed Channel Input 3564,3 3564, Check VlAC 1 - DEENERGIZED 3.a Using Table, Align switches to the required 3664, position 3. b Name Switch ID Position LOOP TEMP CUTOUT-AT (MB4) 3RCS-TS/411F LOOP A (pull out)

LOOP TEMP CUTOUT-Tavg (MB4 3RCS-TS/412T LOOP A (pull out)

PZR LEVEL SEL CNTL (MB4) 3RCS-LS459D CHAN 3-2 PZR PRES SEL CNTL (MB4) 3RCS-PS455F CHAN 3-4 STM FLOW SEL (MB5) 3MSS-FS512C, 522C, 532C, 542C CHAN 2 FW FLOW SEL (MB5) 3FWS-FS51OC, 520C, 530C, 540C CHAN 2 LVL SEL (MB5) 3FWS-LS519CI 529C, 5396,549C CHAN 2 IST STG STM PRES CH SEL (MB7) 3MSS-PS505Z CHAN 2 Proceed to step 3.k. 3564, 3.c Select an unaffected channel for the following recorders:

PZR level recorder (Select switch RO . 3RCS-LS459E)

PZR pressure recorder (Select switch 3RCS-PS455G) 3564, 3.k

. OP/OT AT recorder (Select switch 3RCS-TS411E)

IRO I BOP Return affected controllers to AUTO, when desired.

- IN SERVICE 3564, 3.1 RO Verify Normal Letdown 3564,4 3564,4 Using GA-13, Establish normal letdown.

RNO G:\DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 19 of 46

3.: 3 Event No.: 4 Prepare For Restoration a Check letdown orifice isolation valves - CLOSED RO

.. 3CHS*AV8149A 3CHS*AV8149B 3CHS*AV8149C b Check letdown containment isolation valves (3CHS*CV8160 and 3CHS*CV8152) - OPEN c Check the letdown isolation valves (3RCS*LCV459 and 3RCS*LCV460) OPEN -

Align For Letdown a Check normal charging flow -

ESTABLISHED IF aligning charging AND letdown desired, THEN

1) Place charging flow controller (3CHS-FKl21) in MANUAL and Adjust to 33% demand position

2) CLOSE the charging flow controller isolation (3CHS*MV8106).

RO 3) Proceed to step 2.c.

b Adjust charging flow controller (SCHS-FKI 21) in MANUAL to approximately 55 gpm.

c Place the letdown pressure controller (3CHS-FK131) in MANUAL and Adjust to 50%

output d Place the letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature controller (3CHS-TK130) in MANUAL and Adjust to 60%

output.

G:DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 20 of 46

Establish Letdown a Check normal charging flow -

ESTABLISHED RNO Perform the following:

1) Simultaneously OPEN the following:

Charging flow controller isolation valve (3CHS*MV8106)

One letdown orifice isolation valve (3CHS-AV8149B or 3CHS*AV8149C)

2) Proceed to step 3.c.

OPEN one of the following letdown orifice isolation valves 3CHS*AV8149A (45 gpm)

. 3CHS*AV8149B 3CHS*AV8149C Adjust letdown pressure controller (3CHS-PK131) to maintain 350 psig and Place in AUTO Adjust the letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature controller (3CHS-TK130)to maintain between 7OoFand 115 F and Place in AUTO Adjust charging flow to obtain desired PZR level Verify Pressurizer LeveI

a. Check PZR Level - AT DESIRED LEVEL

b. If desired, Place charging flow controller in AUTO RO c. Check head vent letdown - IN SERVICE

d. Using OP 3304A, Charging and Letdown, Remove excess letdown from service.

e. Go to procedure and step in effect.

G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 21 of 46

Align Normal Charging Flow Path I

a. Verify charging flow control valve -

CAPABLE OF BEING THROTTLED

b. Verify charging header loop isolation valves (3CHS*AV8146 or 3CHS*AV8147) - ONE OPEN C. Verify charging header isolation valves (3CHS*MV8106 and 3CHS*MV8105) - OPEN

d. CLOSE the charging pump RO miniflow isolations to the RWST (3CHS*MV8511A and 3CHS*MV8511B)

e. CLOSE both charging pump cold leg injection valves

f. OPEN the charging pump recirculation isolation valves:

w 3CHS*MV8111A w 3CHS*MV81I 1B w 3CHS*MV8111C rn 3CHS*MV8110 g- Go to Drocedure and ster, in effect Verify VCT Live1 (Using Cornp'uter Point RO CHS-L112) CONTROLLING 3564,5 NORMALLY Usinc >A*, Perform the following:

a. Align for manual makeup. 3564,5

b. Maintain VCT level between 40% and 60%. RNO Ro I Check Aligning For Auto Makeup DESIRED Boric acid flow of 0 to 40 gpm corresponds GA-9

- GA-9 Step 1 to 0 to I O turns on 3CHS-FK1I O , boric Step 2 acid makeup flow controller as determined NOTE on page 8.

RO Align For Auto Makeup -0

?

- fiL--I* A^.. --u:.--sa, Le":- -...:.-ma...

a. bIIt%K pol S ~ l l l l l yIUI I UUllLi aLlU l l U W co rate - DETERMINED BY EOP IN 5

(D W

EFFECT 3:DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 22 of 46

Step Determine pot setting for boric acid GA-9 flow for current conditions using the Step 2.a B.A. Flow Rate table on page 8. RNO

b. Adjust boric acid blended flow controller (3CHS-FK1IO) to determined pot setting

c. Verify total makeup flow controller (3CHS-FKI 11) pot - SET FOR 80 gpm

d. Check boric acid transfer pumps (3CHS*P2A or 3CHS*P2B) - ONE PUMP IN AUTO I e. Place total makeup flow controller f.

(3CHS-FK111) in AUTO Place boric acid blended flow controller (3CHS-FK1I O ) in AUTO I g. Place REAC CLNT MAKEUP SELECT SWinAUTO I h. Place REAC CLNT MAKEUP START i.

SWinsTART Verify batch counters - RESET TO 000000:

US Notify I&C Department. GA-9, 2.i RNO Boric acid batch counter (3CHS- 0 FY11OB) P co ater batch counter (3CHS-k?

D 10 G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 23 of 46

Locally Establish Power To Affected Protective System Channel Specifications/TRM F& Applicable Actions:

If in Mode 2 and LESS THAN IO- IR amps, 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation:

o Action 4 (FU 6.a)

. o Action 8 (FU 17.a) 3.3. I,Reactor Trip System Instrumentation:

. o Action 8 (FU 17.b) 3.3.2, ESF Actuation System Instrumentation:

us o Action 16 (FU 7.d) o Action 17 (FU 2.c & 3.b.3) o Action 18 (FU 7.e) o Action 20 (FU 8.a & 8.br

. "entry into T/S 3.0.3 required If in Mode 5 or 6, o 3.3.2, ESF Actuation System

. Instrumentation: Action 26 (FU 3.c)

If in Modes 4,5 or 6, o 3.4.9.3, Overpressure Protection

. Systems 3.8.3.1 and 3.8.3.2, Onsite Power Distribution scretion G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 24 of 46

OPEN affected main steam isolation valves:

MONITOR main steam isolation valve status for spurious operation.

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 25 of 46

RP07A & B FW Line Break (8E6 Ibm/hour) should cause:

Feed header pressure decrease Feedwater Flowrate increase Steam Generator level decrease Containment Temperature, Pressure, Dewpoint increase Containment Sump Level increase Automatic Trip on LO-LO S/G Water Level This ,vent may create Red or Orange paths on the PTS or Containment CSFs. If so,the crew will transition to the appropriate Functional Recovery Procedures:

FR-P.l Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition FR-P.2 Response to Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition

'R-Z.1 Response to High :ontainment Pressure

. Foldout page must be open

. ADVERSE CTMT defined as GREATER THAN 180°F or GREATER THAN IO5 E-0, R/h, in containment. Step 1,

. The reactor can be interpreted as "tripped" when any two of the three NOTE bullet substeps of step 1 are satisfied.

Verify Reactor Trip RX is tripped because . Check reactor trip and bypass breakers

- OPEN E-0, breakers are open and neutron flux is decreasing.

RO

. Check rod bottom lights - LIT Step I

. Check neutron flux - DECREASING G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 26 of 46

E-0, BOP Verify Turbine Trip Step 2 E-0, BOP Check all turbine stop valves - CLOSED Step 2.

a E-0, BOP Verify Power to AC Emergency Busses Step 3 Check busses 34C and 34D - E-0, BOP Step 3.

BOTH ENERGIZED a E-0, Check If SI Is Actuated Step 4 Verify SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION E-0, Not LIT because automatic RO annunciator - (MB4D 1-6 or MB2B 5-9) - Step 4.

actuation malfunction.

LIT a

. w ~

Check SI isrequired:

CTMT pressure GREATER THAN I 8 Critical Task E-0-D

. psia OR PZR pressure LESS THAN 1890 psia Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards before any of .. OR PZR level LESS THAN 9% OR E-0, Step 4.

the following:

o Transition to any E-I series, E-2 series, or E-3 series procedure or

. RCS subcooling LESS THAN 32-F OR SG pressure LESS THAN 660 psig a

RNO Colum IF SI is required, THEN Initiate SI and transition to any FRG Proceed to step 4.c. n o Completion of [step 5.a of ES-0.11 IF SI is NOT required, THEN Initiate monitoring of CSF Status Trees and Go to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

E-0, RO Check Reactor trip and bypass breakers - Step 4.

OPEN C

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 27 of 46

RO Verify Service Water Pumps AT - E-0, LEAST ONE PER TRAIN RUNNING Step 5 RO Verify Two RPCCW Pumps ONE PER- E-0, TRAIN RUNNING Step 6 Verify ECCS Pumps Running Check SI pumps - RUNNING E-0, RO

. Check RHR pumps - RUNNING Check two charging pumps - RUNNING Step 7 BOOTH OPERATOR: if at any time

-the Crew decides t o cross-E-0, connect the MDAFW discharge BOP Verify AFW Pumps Running Step 8 header through 3FWA*AOV62A/B, insert FWI8B to trip 3FWA*P1B.

~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

3FWA*PlA is 00s E-0, 3FWA*P1B Disch Vv Shut BOP Check MD pumps - RUNNING Step 8.

Trip 3FWA*P1B if Crew a attempts to crossconnect E-0, Check turbine - driven pump - RUNNING, BOP Step 8.

IF NECESSARY b

G:\DFG\Osb\BalianUlillstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 28 of 46

Verify FW Isolation

. Check SG feed regulating valves -

CLOSED

. Check SG feed regulating bypass valves - CLOSED

. Check FW isolation trip valves -

CLOSED Booth Operator Crew may ask for MSlV fuses here or sooner. Wait BOP

. Check TDFW pumps -TRIPPED E-0,

-5 minutes, then pull fuses. RO

. Check MD FW pump - STOPPED Step 9

. Check SG blowdown isolation valves -

CLOSED

. Check SG blowdown sample isolation valves - CLOSED

. Check SG chemical feed isolation valves - CLOSED Check If Main Steam Lines Should Be E-0, RO Step I Isolated 3

Verify Ctmt pressure GREATER THAN 18 BOP psia E-0, Step 1 RO ).a Any SG pressure LESS THAN 660 psig G:\DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 29 of 46

E-0, Verify MSlVs and MSlV bypass valves -

BOP Step 1 CLOSED 0.b E-0, Step 1 Initiate MSI. IF MSI will NOT actuate, 0. b THEN CLOSE the MSlVs and MSlV bypass valves. RNO Colum n

E-0, Check ESF Group 3 lights - LIT. Step 1 0.c E-0, Required during pre-RO Check if CDA Required Step I validation.

1 Verify Ctmt pressure GREATER THAN 23 psia E-0, RO Step I I.a Ctmt spray - INITIATED Verify quench spray initiated Check quench spray pumps - RUNNING E-0, RO Check quench spray pump Step I 1.b discharge valves (3QSS*MOV34A and 3QSS*MOV34B) - OPEN E-0, RO Check RPCCW pumps - STOPPED Step I 1.c G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 30 of 46

FW1E Time E-0, BOP Check CAR fans - STOPPED Step I 1.d E-0, BOP Check CRDM fans - STOPPED Step I 1.e E-0, RO STOP all RCPs Step 1 1.f E-0, BOP STOP all main circulating water pumps Step 1 14 E-0, RO Verify ESF Group 4 lights - LIT Step I 1.h E-0, us Proceed to step 13. Step I 1.i E-0, RO Verify CIA Step 1 3

EOP us Check ESF Group 2 status columns 2 35 E-0, through 10 - LIT Step 1 RO 3.a Verify Proper ESF Status Panel Indication E-0, RO Step 1 Verify ESF Group 1 lights OFF 4 Verify ESF Group 2 lights - LIT G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 31 of 46

Determine If ADVERSE CTMT Conditions Exist Ctmt temperature GREATER THAN E-0, 180°F I Ro Step 1 5

Ctmt radiation GREATER THAN I O 5 R/hr E-0, Verify ECCS Flow Step 16 Check charging pumps - E-O, 16.

FLOW INDICATED a I Ro Check RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 1650 psia (1950 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

E-0, 16.b E-0, us Proceed to Step 16.e 16.b, RNO 1 Ro Check SI pumps - FLOW INDICATED E-0, 16.e I Ro Check RCS pressure LESS THAN 300 psia (500 psia ADVERSE CTMT)

E-0, 16.f I Ro Check RHR pumps - FLOW INDICATED.

E-0, 16.g.

1 BOP rlerify Adequate Heat Sink

-0, 17

heck NR level in at least one SG - :-0, BOP 3REATER THAN 8% (42% ADVERSE 17.a 2TMT)

G:VIRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 32 of 46

Control feed flow to maintain NR level -

E-0, BOP BETWEEN 8% and 50% (42% and 50%

17.b ADVERSE CTMT)

E-0, us Proceed to step 18.

17.c BOP Verify AFW Valve Alignment PROPER- E-0, EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT 18 RO Verify ECCS Valve Alignment - E-0, PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT 19 I us SM/

Check Plant Status E-0, 20 When requested, report all E-0, SLCRS doors are closed Sec Verify SLCRS doors - CLOSED 20.a urity CBI Should be lit as crew Check CONTROL BUILDING ISOLATION manually actuated SI annunciator (MB4D 3-6) - LIT I Ro Verify ESF Group 2 CBI lights LIT Verify Control Building purge supply fan E-0, 20.c E-0, BOP and purge exhaust fan - NOT RUNNING 20.d Verify Control building air bank isolation E-0 ,

BOP valves - OPEN 20.e 50, STOP kitchen exhaust fan 20.f G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 33 of44

Booth Operator: I I SM/

When requested, report that the Close and Dog (as applicable) Control E-0, control building pressure PE Building pressure boundary doors. 20.g boundary doors are closed and 0 dogged.

E-0, RO Check RCS Temperature 21 IAlternate paths through Step 21 - all lead to Step 22.

E-0, RO Check PZR Valves 22 E-0, RO Verify PORVs - CLOSED 22.a Verify normal PZR spray valves - E-0, CLOSED 22.b E-0 RO Verify PZR safety valves - CLOSED 22.C E-0, To prevent damage to the RCP seal(s),

US seal injection flow should be maintained to 23, ZAUTI all RCPs. 3N E-0 US Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped 23 Verify RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1500 E-0, psia (I800 psia ADVERSE CTMT) 23. b G:\DRS\Osb\BalianUIIillstone3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 34 of 46

Verify charging or SI pumps - AT LEAST E-0, RO ONE RUNNING 23.c E-0, us Stop all RCPs 23.d BOP I Check If SG Secondary Boundaries Are E-0, Intact 24 RO D depressurizing through FW Check pressure in all SGs line rupture.

BOP NO SG PRESSURE DECREASING By following D down through I E-0, IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER the open MSIVs. 24.a RO 9 NO SG COMPLETELY May be depressurized by now. DEPRESSURIZED Examiner Notes:

1. FR-Z.1 High Containment Pressure.

CTMT pressure probably > 23 psia. E-0,

2. Must manually energize SRNls. Only Initiate monitoring of CSF Status Trees 24.a Byworks (loss of VIAC-1). and Go to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator RNO

3. RSS will not automatically start with Isolation. Colum WAC-1 deenergized (loss of power to n the timer). Must be manually started 2 11 minutes after CDA initiates.

FR-Check If CDA Required z.l, 1 FR-Check Ctmt pressure GREATER THAN z.1, 23 psia I.a G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 35 of 46

_ c II FR-z.1, Go to procedure and step in effect.

1.a

. At least one SG must be maintained RNO

. available for RCS cooldown.

Any faulted SG or secondary break should remain isolated during CAUTI subsequent recovery actions unless ON needed for RCS cooldown or sampling precedi

. is required .

If RWST level decreases to LESS THAN 520,000 gal, Go to ES-1.3, Transfer to ng E-2, 1

Cold Leg Recirculation, to align the ECCS system.

Check Main Steam Isolation And RO E-2, 1 Bypass Valves CLOSED E-2, I CLOSE valves. IF flow path(s) can NOT be isolated, THEN Using Attachment A for RNO guidance, Locally Close valve(s) Colum

~

n Check At Least One SG Secondary BOP E-2, 2 Boundaw Is Intact ~ ~

Check pressures in all SGs - AT LEAST E-2, BOP ONE STABLE OR INCREASING 2.a Crew Identify Faulted SGs E-2, 3 Check pressure in all SGs -

ANY SG PRESSURE DECREASING IN E-2, Crew ANUNCONTROLLEDMANNER-

. ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED.

3.a G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 36 of 46

FWI a Time CAUTI If the TD AFW pump is the only available ON source of feed flow, a steam supply to tie precedi TD AFW pump must be maintained from ng E-2, at least one SG.

4

..Isolate Each Faulted SG Verify main feed line - ISOLATED

.. TRiP TD FW pumps Place MD FW pump in PULL-TO-LOCK

. Isolate AFW flow path CLOSE steam supply isolation valve

. to TD AFW pump Verify SG atmospheric dump and Critical Task: E - 2 -A:

bypass valves CLOSED Verify SG blowdown isolation valve -

Isolate the faulted SG before transition out of E-2 RO . CLOSED Verify SG blowdown sample isolation Crew must recognize that B, BOP . -

valve CLOSED Verify SG chemical feed isolation E-2, 4 C, D Steam Generators are all faulted and isolate AFW flow to each of them.

valve CLOSED Using table, Verify main steam line drains upstream of MSlVs and TD A F W pump CLOSED 03DTM*AOV29B, C, D o3DTM*A4V61B, C, D o3DTM*AOV63B, D 0 3DTM*AOV64B, D End S :enario.

Question to SRO Applicant: What Emergency Action Level should be declared for this scenario?

hswer: Not an EAL or Judgement. State posture code is Echo G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 37 of 46 k

A

SECTION 3 SIMULATOR EXAM SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

SUMMARY

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 3 Revision: 0 TIME *QA INSTRUCTOR AIDS DESCRIPTION MALF, RF, IO T=O NI-11 P-IO Fails to Actuate MB4G 01-04 P-I 0 Bistable fails to actuate MB4G 02-04 P-I 0 Bistable fails to actuate MB4G 03-04 P-I 0 Bistable fails to actuate MB4G 04-04 P-I 0 Bistable fails to actuate MSl2B MSlV (CTV27-B) Stuck Open MSl2C MSlV (CTV27-C) Stuck Open MSl2D MSlV (CTV27-D) Stuck Open RP07A SI Auto Actuation Failure Train A RP07B SI Auto Actuation Failure Train B FW21B 3FWA*V18 (SFWA*PIB Disch Valve) Closed.

Booth Operator or Examiner Initiated I.RX12F Sev = 0% 5 Min Ramp SG B Lvl Xmtr fails to 0 over 5 mins.

2. CV05 Sev=O% Letdown Press. Xmttr, PT131 fails to 0

3. ED08A Loss of Instrument Buss VBI

4. MSOGA Main Steam IsolationValve A Trip

5. FWIOD Sev = 100% 5 Min Ramp Feedwater Line Rupture Inside Containment

6. FW18B 3FWA*P1B Trips - if Crew attempts cross-connect MDAFW Disch Hdr.

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 38 of 46

Summary of Simulator Booth Operator Cues or Actions

1. Trip PT505 Bistables if Examiners allow Event 2 to run long enough.

2. Report to US that Inverter Iis deenergized when dispatched as a PEO

3. Insert malfunction RCl2C when Crew begins returning controllers to AUTO following loss of VIAC-I

4. If Crew gets a FWlV when securing 3RCS-PICyimmediately initiate Event 6, wait 2 minutes and initiate Event 7.

5. Remove MSOGA to permit reopening of A MSlV should the crew elect to do that

6. Initiate Event 7 if the Crew elects to trip the plant in response to inadvertent MSIV closure.

7. Trip 3FWA*P1B if crew attempts to cross-connect MDAFW Pump Discharge Headers.

8. Pull MSIV control power fuses 5 minutes after requested.

9. Report that the Control Building Pressure Boundary doors are closed and dogged when requested.

I O . Locally close MSIVs: first valve closed 10 minutes after requested. Remaining two valves in 10 minute intervals.

G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 39 of 46

SECTION 4 VALIDATION CHECKLIST

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number I ID Number: NRC Scenario 3 Revision: 0 Remote functions: Verified by All remote functions contained in the guide are certified.

Malfunctions:

All malfunctions contained in the guide are certified.

Initial Conditions:

The initial condition(s) contained in the guide are certified or have been developed from certified ICs in accordance with NSEM-4.02.

Simulator Operating Limits:

The simulator guide has been evaluated for operating limits and/or anomalous response.

Test Run:

The scenario contained in the guide has been test run and validated (validation sheet completed, next page)on the simulator. Simulator response is reasonable and as expected.

Examination Scenario Review The dynamic examination review checklist is complete.

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 40 of 46

SECTION 5 REFERENCES AND CRITICAL TASK TRACKING

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number I ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: 1 I.

References:

TS" MP3 Technical Specifications OP 3272 EOP User's Guide OP 3203 Plant Startup OP 3353 Main Board Annunciator Response Procedures AOP 3562 Loss of Instrument Air AOP 3571 Instrument Failure Response AOP 3554 RCP Trip or Stopping a RCP At Power EOP*35 E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP*35 E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation EPIP*EPIP 4400 Event Assessment, Classification and Reportability NUREG 1021 Examiners Standards G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 41 of 46

II. Critical Tasks Covered in this Test:

The following Critical Tasks are covered in this exercise:

G:\DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 42 of 46

CRITICAL TASK OR SELECTION DESCRIPTION

[Manually actuate]' at least 006-030 Failure to manually actuate SI under the one train of SIS-actuated A2.01 postulated conditions constitutes safeguards before any of 4.5 1418 "mis-operation or incorrect crew the following: performance that leads to degraded 0 Transition to any E-I 006-030 ECCS capacity."

series, E-2 series, or E-3 A4.01 series procedure or 4.4 i 4.4 In this case, SI can be manually transition to any FRG actuated from the control room.

0 Completion of [step 5.a 013-000 Therefore, failure to manually actuate of ES-0.112 A I .01 SI also represents a "demonstrated 4.0 14.2 inability by the crew to:

013-000 0 Take an action or combination of A I .02 actions that would prevent a 3.9 I 4.2 challenge to plant safety 0 Effectively directlmanipulate ESF 013-000 controls A I .05 0 Recognize a failureiincorrect auto 3.4 13.6 actuation of an ESF system or component" 013-000 A3.02 Additionally, under the postulated plant 4.1 14.2 conditions, failure to manually actuate SI (when it is possible to do so) results 0 I3-000 in a "significant reduction of safety SGA. 14 margin beyond that irreparably 4.2 14.2 introduced by the scenario." Finally, failure to manually actuate SI under the postulated conditions is a "violation of the facility license condition."

G:\DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 43 of 46

CRITICAL CRITICAL TASK WA >j= 3.0 TASK ## DESCRIPTION Exams only

[Isolate the faulted SG]* 000-040 Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be

[before transition out of EAl.01 isolated causes challenges to CSFs E-2I3 4.6 14.6 beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, EA1.02 depending upon the plant conditions, it 4.5 14.5 could constitute a demonstrated inability by the crew to recognize a failure of the EAI.04 automatic actuation of an ESF system or 4.3 14.3 cornponent.

EA1.06 Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result 4.0 14.1 in challenges to the following CSFs:

0 Integrity EA1. I O 0 Subcriticality 4.1 14.1 0 Containment (if the break is inside containment)

EA1.I I 3.2 13.1 EA1.I3 4.2 14.2 EA2.04 4.5 14.7 G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3 .doc Page 44 of 46

ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 Revision: 0 Note: The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios.

Quantitative Attributes 7 1. Total malfunctions inserted: 4-8/10-I4 (3FvvS-LT529,3CHS-PT131, VIAC-lI3MSS*CTV27A) 3 2. Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1413-6 (Auto SI, MSlVs Open, 2FWA*Pl B) 3 3. Abnormal Events: I-2/2-3 (3FWS-LT529, WAC-1, 3RCS-PIC) 1 4. Major Transients: 1-2/2-3 (Faulted SG)

I 5. EOPs used beyond primary scram response EOP: 1-313-5 (E-2) 1 6. EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-3/1-3 (FR-Z.l) 90 7. Approximate scenario run time: 45-60 minutes (one scenario may approach 90 minutes) 65% 8. EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time 2 9. Crew Critical Tasks: 2-5/5-8 (E-O-D, E-2-A)

Yes IO. Technical Specifications are exercised during the test COMMENTS:

G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 45 of 46

SECTION 6 SCENARIO INITIAL CONDITIONS Reactor Power: 9%

Operating History: 2 days on line RCS Boron: 1453 ppm Core Burnup: 0 MWD/MTU Condensate Demins: 5 Intake structure: Green PRA Status: Green Protected train: "B" Train protected Evolutions in Progress: Millstone Unit 2 is in a Refueling Outage Major Equipment 00s: 3AFW*PIA Crew Instructions:

Motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump, 3FWA*PlA is out of service for emergent maintenance. 3FWA*PlA was taken out of service 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ago and expected return to operability is 32 hours3.703704e-4 days 0.00889 hours 5.291005e-5 weeks 1.2176e-5 months from now. Limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.1 2, action a. has been entered.

You are to continue the Plant Startup per OP 3203, Step 4.3.10. All preceding steps have been completed satisfactorily. Reactor Engineer's reactivity plan directs you to use control rods to raise power.

PlantEimulator Differences:

0 If not using the speed dial option, dial 3333 or 3334 to reach the desired person(s).

0 The following PPC programs do not function on the simulator:

I!

Samarium Follow It Xenon Follow II Sequence of Events G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 3\Scenario 3.doc Page 46 of 46

Appendix D Page 1 of 1 F O IES-D-1

~

Facility: Millstone. Unit 3 Scenario No.: Four Op-Test No.: One Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% Power. Steady State Turnover: Unit is at 100% Dower with the Turbine Driven AFW Pump 00s For Maintenance, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months into a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCO

/I Event I Malf.

Event Type* Event Description p

No. NO.

I (RO) Pressurizer Level Transmitter fails high.

C (RO, BOP) Loss of 4160 Volt Bus 34D

3. FWOI R (RO, BOP) Loss of Cond Vacuum. RaDid Load Reduction (I 4. I FWOI M I Loss of Condenser Vacuum, Reactor Trip C (BOP) Failure of Turbine To Trip, MSlV Isolation C (BOP) Trip of AFW Pump (3FWA*PIA)

Loss of All Feed, Core Cooling restored by M feeding SG with Condensate Bypass or Bleed and Feed Coolina.

I S% Determines the EAL G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\0utline\MS3 ES-D-1 Scenario 4.wpd NUREG-1021. Revision 9

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE APPROVAL SHEET 1.

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam ID Number: NRC Scenario 4 Revision: 0 II. Initiated:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 14June2004 Developer Date III. Reviewed:

Reviewer Date IV. Approved:

Operations Manager Date Operator Training Supervisor Date G:VIRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 1 of 47

SIMULATOR EXAM GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTIONS LISTED IN ORDER I. Exam Overview

2. Instructor Guide

3. Sequence of Events Summary

4. Validation Checklist

5. Reference and Critical Task Tracking Form

6. Scenario Initial Conditions Sheet G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4Ecenario 4.doc Page 2 of 47

SECTION 1 EXAM OVERVIEW

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam ID Number: NRC Scenario 4 Revision: 0

1. Exam Brief:

The Crew takes the shift at 100% power with no significant evolutions in progress. The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (3FWA

P2) is out of service for governor maintenance. The pump has been out of service for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , and the maintenance is expected to take another 1Ihours.

Event number Ioccurs as Pressurizer Level Channel (3RCS-LT459) fails high.

This will cause charging flow to reduce to minimum flow, and the Reactor Operator will have to control charging in manual to maintain programmed pressurizer level. The crew will enter AOP3571 to respond to the instrument failure. Technical Specification actions will need to be addressed, and the appropriate RPS bi-stables must be placed in the tripped condition.

Event number 2 is a Loss of the 34D 4160VAC bus. A fault on the bus causes the annunciator "Bus 34D Bus Diff" on Main Board 8C to annunciate. Several other associated alarms come in as a result of the bus loss. Charging is lost since the running charging pump loses power. The crew takes actions in accordance with the Alarm Response Procedure OP-3353.MB8C 4-2. Charging is restored per EOP3506. Loss of 34D also causes a loss of SW and RPCCW.

These systems are realigned per AOPs 3560 (Loss of Service Water) and 3561 (Loss of Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water).

Event number 3 is a Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum that begins slowly and progressivelyworsens until a Manual Reactor and Turbine Trip is required. The crew initially enters AOP 3559 to commence a rapid load reduction in accordance with AOP 3575. As load is lowered approximately 10% and with the concurrence of the lead examiner, the condenser vacuum loss worsens significantly such that a trip is required. Upon the Manual Reactor Trip, the Main Turbine fails to trip in all modes, causing Main Steam Line Isolation either Automatically or with operator intervention.

The crew proceeds with E-0, and will stay in E-0 because a Safety Injection is initiated by low SG pressure. At a predetermined point in the EOP network the 3 FWA

P I A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trips due to an electrical fault on the motor. The crew transitions to FR-H.1 "Loss of All Feedwater".

Attempts to restore Auxiliary Feedwater are not successful. The Main Feedwater System is not available due to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum and a failure of the motor driven main feedwater pump. FR-H.l will direct the crew to Bleed and G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 3 of 47

Feed cooling or to establish a secondary heat sink by whatever means are available. The crew should recognize that feeding SGs from the Condensate system is their most likely success path. The scenario is terminated once core cooling is established by directing condensate flow to one or more steam generators or initiating Bleed and Feed cooling.

2. Plant/Simulatordifferences that may affect the scenario are: None.

3. Duration of Session: 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 4 of 47

SECTION 2 INSTRUCTOR GUIDE

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam ID Number: NRC Scenario 4 Revision: 0 All Control Room Conduct, Operations and Communicationsshall be in accordance COP 200.1 ,Conduct of Operations, and OP 3260,Unit 3 Conduct of 0perations.

"Review the Simulator Operating Limits (design limits of plant) and the Simulator Modeling Limitations and Anomalous Response List prior to performing this training scenario on the simulator. The instructor should be aware if any of these limitations may be exceeded." (NSEM 6.02)

G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 5 of 47

SIMULATOR PROBLEMS DURING EXAMS It is the responsibility of the Instructors in the simulator to insure that exam interruptions have a minimum negative impact on the Crew and the examinations we provide.

Be aware that at all times the Operators should treat the simulator as if it were the plant and you too should treat it as much like the plant as possible when they are in the simulator.

As soon as the Instructors are aware of a simulator problem that will adversely affect the exam in progress (computer fault, etc.) the Instructor should:

I. Place the simulator in FREEZE if possible.

2. Announce to the Crew that there is a simulator problem.

3. Request that the Crew leave the simulator control room. (The Crew should leave the simulator for problems which involve major switch alignments).

4. Deal with the problem (reboot, call STSB, etc.)

5. After the Instructors believe the simulator is restored to service, the Crew should be told how the exam will continue. If it is possible and felt to be acceptable to the evaluators, the examination can begin where it left off with an update on plant parameters and each Crewmember is prepared to restart. If the examination will not begin where it left off, the crew should be told how and where the exam will begin again.

6. Once the Crew has been told how and where the exam will begin, have the crew conduct a brief so that the Instructorand evaluators can insure that the crew has all the necessary information to continue with the scenario.

7. Once all Crew members, Instructors and evaluators are satisfied that they have the necessary informationto continue the scenario, place the simulator in RUN and announce to the Crew that you have continued the evaluation session.

G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 6 of 47

EVENT #O TITLE: INITIAL SETUP Setup Instructions:

Enter IDT as follows :

At any XTERM window, type <idt>

When the SUN asks for an executive type: UEXEC or RTEXEC? enter <r>: this will bring up a blank idt page.

To go to a previously saved idt file type <read> at the prompt When the SUN asks for a file name of the file you wish to view type in the appropriate file name:

The old "Landon" files are as follows:

Old ISD pages 1-8 are idt file OPS Old ISD pages 9-16 are idt file OPSl Old ISD pages 17-19 are idt file OPS2

-IF the step counters are athear 000, THEN REMOVE the STEP COUNTER OVERRIDE, allow the counters to step out during the IC reset, Reset to IC-I8 REINSTATE the step counter OVERRIDE Adjust the various pot settings to the valued specified by the chart located in the sim booth for the selected IC.

Place Simulator to RUN Set the STEP COUNTERS PLACE the Main Turbine on the LOAD LIMITER Verify annunciator, "COMPUTER FAILURE" (MB4C, 1-1I), is NOT LIT.

Place MOL Curve Book in Shelf for Operator use. Remove other Curve Books from the floor.

Clear the DCS Alarms PLACE THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT IN PTL or align as needed:

Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (3FWA *P2) -Tagged Out Equipment 0 0 s :

0 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (3FWA *P2) 0 Synchronize the MONITOR Time Display with digital time display on MB4.

G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 7 of 47

Initial Malfunctions/lOs/lDAs:

T=O FWI9 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Tripped TC03 Turbine Fails to Trip TC04 Main Turbine Fails to Runback TCO6A Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

TCO6B Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

TCO6C Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

TCO6D Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

RP08A Automatic MSI Failure RP08B Automatic MSI Failure PBI-3MSS-SLI Off PB23MSS-SLI Off I/OS Remote1 RXIOA Severity = 100% LT459 Fails High Remote 2 ED04D 34D 4160VAC Bus Fails Remote3 FWOI Severity = 60% Lower Main Cond Vacuum Remote4 FWOI Severity = 100% Lower Main Cond Vacuum TC07A Severity = 37% Main Turb CV Failure TC07B Severity = 37% Main Turb CV Failure TC07C Severity = 37% Main Turb CV Failure TC07D Severity = 37% Main Turb CV Failure Remote 5 SGROI to 04 Lowers SG level FW07A Stop MFW Pp Restoration FW07B Stop MFW Pp Restoration FWO7C Stop MFW Pp Restoration Remote 6 FWl8A 3FWA*PIA Trip

?? RPR44 Remove A2 13 Cards RPR45 Remove A213 Cards G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 8 of47

Post Exam Data Collection Reactor Power trend data Turbine Generator Load trend data Pressurizer Pressure trend data (PT455 & PT456)

SG Levels (all SGs, both NR & WR)

Rod Positions Auxiliary Feedwater Flowrate trend data (all SGs)

All console and panel strip charts or recorded digital data (may be collected at end of day for all crews.

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 9 of 47

Do not leave the rod selector Alarms switch in AUTO while diagnosing 3571 1 MB4A 3-1, PZR Level High a related instrument failure unless CAUTION the reason for rod movement is a MB4A 4-1, PZR Level Deviation turbine runback.

If a reactor trip occurs, 3571 1 immediately go to E-0, Reactor NOTE Trip or Safety Injection.

May take flow control (FK121) or level control to MAN. Either is acceptable. Determine The Initiating RO , Parameter And Place The 3571 1 I Affected Controller In MANUAL.

Must take master to manual eventually to reset integrators.

3571 2 It is desired that I&C personnel trip the bistables specified in this procedure. If, during off-hours, I&C personnel are not able to trip the necessary bistables within the 3571 3 time limitations required by the NOTE Technical Specifications, Operations Department personnel may trip the bistables using the rovided within this erform Corrective Actions Using Appropriate Attachment C riate Attachment 3571 3 G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 10 of 47

Proc The following annunciators are symptoms of a PZR level instrument failure:

PRESSURIZER LEVEL HI

. MB4A 3-1 PRESSURIZER LEVEL

. DEVIATION MB4A 4-1 CHARG PP FLOW HVLO MB3A 4-9 VCT LEVEL HVLO MB3A 4-10 PZR LEVEL HI MB4F 1.2.3-2 PZR LVL SEL CNTL RECORD 3571 Att.C RO Defeat the failed channel input.

3-2 3 I 3571 Att.C RO Restore PZR level to normal 2

If necessary, restore letdown per 3571 Att.C RO 3P 3304A 3

'lace the PZR level controller into 3571 Att.C RO 4uto ~~

4 RO Reset PZR heaters as necessarv 3571 AttC 5 Nhen conditions have stabilized, ibserve MB board annunciators and parameters and immediately 3571 Att.C

-eport any unexpected or 6 inexplained conditions to the Shift Manager.

rrip the associated Reactor

>rotectionSystem bistable(s): 3571 Att.C 7

'lace a check mark in the box above the appropriate channel 3571 Att.C hat requires tripping on the last 7a

)age of this Attachment.

I I They have more than minimum I US I iefer to Technical Specification 3571 Att.C G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4Bcenario 4.doc Page 11 of 47

Proc number of channels 7b Check the existing bistable status to ensure a reactor trip will not 3571 Att.C I Ro occur when the failed channel is tritmed.

Request the I&C Department trip 7c 3571 Att.C the appropriate bistables using 7d Attachment C and Attachment S.

Verify the appropriate bistable 3571 Att.C I Ro status liahts are lit. 7e If indicator 3RCS*LI 459C is TRM 7.4-1, Action a. in effect. failed, Refer to TRM Table 7.4.1, 3571 Att.C 14 day (a.1) / 30 day (a.3) Fire Related Safe Shutdown 7f clocks. Components, "Reactor Coolant System."

Request I&C perform corrective maintenance on failed instrument. 3571 Att.C 7g I

1to Event Number 2 G:\DRS\Osb\BalianUIIillstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 12 of 47

Refer to the following procedures and Stabilize the plant:

E-0, Reactor Trip, Safety Injection EOP 3505,Loss of SDC or RCS 34D is a 4kV ES buss that is not Invento ry 3353.MB8C to be cross-connectedwith 34C AOP 3506, Loss of All Charging 4-2, I in mode 1.

AOP 3560, Loss of All Service Water AOP 3561, Loss of Rx Plant Component Cooling Water OP 3322, Aux Feed System If NSSA was supplying bus 348, 3353.MB8C RO verify bus 34B Energized 4-2, 2 Refer To Tech Specs- 3.8.1 .I, 3353.MB8C RO 3.8.3.1 4-2, 3 NOTE Foldout page must be opened. preceding EOP3506,l RO Verify Charging Pumps NONE- EOP3506,l RUNNING Check If Standby Charging I us Bo Pump Should Be Immediately Started Verify charging pump loss - DUE EOP3506,Z EOP3506,Z.a P TO LOSS OF BUS 34C OR 34D Zheck all RCPs # I seal inlet

emperatures- All LESS THAN Starts A Pump I us RO 230°F (PPC, NSSS screen 15)

START standby charging pump EOP3506,2.b EOP3506, 2.c

heck procedure entered from -

I us 3-0.1, REACTOR TRIP 3ESPONSE EOP3506, 2.d EOP3506, 30 to AOP 3560, Loss of Service 2.d, RNO Nater.

Column

heck Busses 34C and 34D - 3560,l 30TH ENERGIZED G:VIRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 13 of 47

3 Proc emergency diesel generator. IF the bus can NOT be energized from its emergency diesel generator, THEN 3560,l RNO

a. RESET LOP from MB2.

b. Using OF 3343, "Station Electrical Service 4.1 6 Kv," Try restoring bus 34C or 34D to service.

Check Status Of Service Water Booth Operator Cue:

Report to control room that "B" EDG temperatures are rising.

E System Verify at least one SW pump RUNNlNG 3560,2 3560,2.a Verify at least one SW pump in 3560,2.b "B" EDG is running w/o cooling.

Can not be stopped until timer runs each Train RUNNING 3560,2.b, out. Proceed to step 2.d.

RNO Check affected Train's SW pumps

- IN PULL-TO-LOCK DUE TO A 3560,2.d NON4SOLABLE SW LEAK Perform the following:

I ) START a SW pump in the affected Train. IF one SW 3560,2.d, pump can NOT be started in RNO the affected Train, THEN Proceed to step 2.e Check service water supply valve to TPCCW from affected train 3560, 2.e (3SWP*MOV71A or 3SWP*MOV71B) - CLOSED 3560,2.e, CLOSE valve. RNO START the second SW pump in 3560, 2.f

~

the non-affected Train Verify service water supply valve to TPCCW from the operating SW 3560, 2.9 RO train (3SWP*MOV71A or 3SWP*MOV71B) - OPEN 3560,2.g, OPEN valve.

RNO G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 14 of 47

to 3560, Step Iinstead of 2. This Plant Component Cooling Water, makes a difference in which attachment us step 2. and Open the Foldout 3560,2.h is used in 3561 Page REACTOR /RCP TRIP CRITERIA If any of the following conditions occur, first trip the reactor, then trip the affected RCP:

RCP bearing oil temperature is I'

GREATER THAN 195"R

" RCP No. 1 seal inlet temperature can NOT be maintained LESS THAN 230°F Transition to 3561

. (PPC, NSSS screen 15)

RPCCW System pressure can NOT be restored to BOTH 3561 Foldout

. containment headers.

I' RCS temperature is GREATER THAN 400°F AND VCT temperature is GREATER THAN 135" F VCT temperature is GREATER THAN 150°F VOTE 3561,l 3561, 1.a G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 15 of 47

RO 3561,2 RPCCW Heat Exchangers Verify RPCCW heat exchanger SW inlet isolation valves 3561, 2.a (3SWP*MOV50A and 3SWP*MOV50B) - OPEN Verify service water flow to each operating RPCCW heat 3561,2.b exchanger GREATER THAN 6200 aDm 3561,2.b, Proceed to Attachment B.

RNO Verify Service Water Status Check one of the following conditions - MET No service water pump can be

. started on the affected train OR All service water pumps on the affected train in PULL-TO-3561, LOCK due to a non-isolable

. service water leak OR Service water inlet isolation valve to the affected RPCCW Attachment B, 1

heat exchanger (3SWP*MOVSOA or 3SWP*MOVSOB) closed due to a downstream service water DiDe rupture 3561, Cross-Connect RPCCW RO Attachment B, Containment Headers 2

Verify the RPCCW containment 3561, supply and return header isolation Attachment B, valves in the non-affected train -

OPEN 2.a G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 16 of 47

Op-Test No.: 1 I Scenario No.: 4 ED04D (Console 8 C4-2 for 34D Buss C Comments I1 header cross-connect valves :

3CCP*AOV179A 3561, Attachment B, 3CCP*AOV179B 3 L

3CCP*AOV180A 3CCP*AOV180B CLOSE the RPCCW containment 3561, supply and return header isolation Attachment B, valves in the affected train 3561, Bo Isolate Auxiliary Steam To Attachment B, P Auxiliary Building 3

3ASS *AOV 102A 3ASS*AOV102B Remove Affected RPCCW Train 3561, RO Attachment B, From Service 4

3561, Zheck the affected RPCCW train - Attachment B, TRAIN B 4.a G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 17 of 47

Comments Perform the following:

1) Simultaneously Perform the

. following:

CLOSE the charging header

. flow control valve.

CLOSE the in-service letdown orifice isolation valve(s).

2) CLOSE the charging isolation valve (3CHS*MV8106).

3) Throttle RCP seal injection flow GA-14 not reprinted iere

. to maintain BETWEEN 8 and 13 gpm.

4) Using GA-14, Establish head vent letdown to the VCT IF 1 B, head vent letdown to the VCT can NOT be established, THEN Using GA-14, Establish head vent letdown to the PRT

5) CLOSE Train A RPCCW heat exchanger SW inlet isolation valve (3SWP*MOVSOA).

6) Proceed to step 4.f.

STOP the affected train RPCCW 3561, pump and Place in PULL-TO- Attachment B, LOCK 4.f Check the standby RPCCW pump 3561,

-ALIGNED TO THE AFFECTED Attachment B, TRAl N 4.9 3561, Proceed to step 4.i. Attachment 6, 4.9, RNO Locally Check RPCCW process 3561, radiation monitor (3CCP-RE31) - Attachment B, ALIGNED TO NON-AFFECTED 4.i TRAl N 3561, Bo Maintain Containment Pressure Attachment B, P

5 G:DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4Bcenario 4.doc Page 18 of 47

D Comments Proc .

Using OP 3313E, "Containment Vacuum," Maintain normal 3561, operating containment pressure - Attachment B, BETWEEN 13.7 psia and 13.9 5.a nsia 3561, Check Charging Pump Cooling us Alignment Attachment B, 6

Verify charging pump cooling suction and discharge cross-tie valves - OPEN 3561, 0 3CCE*AOV26A 3CCE*AOV26B CCE*AOV30A Attachment B, 6.a a 3CCE*AOV30B 3561, Bo Verify Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Attachment B, P Alignment 7

Using RPCCW safety header flow indication and RHR HX RPCCW 3561, flow indication, Check RPCCW to Attachment B, the in-service spent fuel pool 7.a cooling heat exchanger FLOW I NDICATED Verify Service Water Flow To The Operating Control Building Chiller Heat Exchanger For chiller A (HVK* CHLIA)

Check annunciator CONTROL BLDG CHLR CNDSR A SW 3561, FLOW LO (VPIA 3-3) - NOT Attachment B,

. LIT For chiller B (HVK"CHL1B)

Check annunciator CONTROL 8

BLDG CHLR CNDSR A SW FLOW LO (VPIC 3-3) - NOT LIT G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 19 of47

D Comments Proc Stabilized

a. Verify MB annunciators and parameters are as expected 3.7.3 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months clock b. b. Refer to the following 3.7.4 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months clock Technical Specifications for any 3.8.1.1 - 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months actions and 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months clock 3.8.1.2 n/a us . additional required actions :

T/S 3.7.3, Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water 3561, Attachment B, 3.6.1.4 is not specified in procedure one hour clock

. System T/S 3.7.4, Service Water 9

on high CTMT pressure.

. System

, Sources -

TIS 3.8.1 .IAC

. Operating T/S 3.8.1.2, AC Sources -

Shutdown Boot1 Consult With Duty Officer And 3561, Site C US Determine Need To Commence Attachment B, that c A Plant Shutdown 10 P

statu LZ I I

Name

...._ I TS/TRM Action 3FWA*PlB 1 MDAFW Pump I

I 1 - 7 4 b

83.1. I

. ~

.2.a 3

72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months clock I N/a With both 3FWA*Pl B and 3FWA*P2 inoperable, TS 3.7.1.2 puts them on a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months clock.

3:\DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 20 of 47

3.Q.L.d I / L IlUUI GIU 3.5.2.a I, 72

. - hour

..- clo

-.-~k I

I I EDG B I 3.8.l.I.c I various I I

I nt 3, Initiate Event 4 G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4Bcenario 4.doc Page 21 of 47

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 22 of 47 Goal is to have crew respond to loss of vacuum by performing a rapid load reduction. When the Examiners are satisfied with the Crews performance, severity will be raised to 100% to force the crew to trip the plant I I Check if Turbine Load should be reduced:

Crew Commences Rapid Verify Backpressure <7.5Absolute, If Load Reduction at 4.5 us Load>36OMWe, begin Rapid Downpower Per 3559 1 inHg absolute AOP 3575 Until Backpressure <5, or Load at I I 360 MWe Check Circulating Water System Operation:

Leak Is In Condenser, ICirc Water Pump Running Per Condenser, 3559 These Actions Will Not Be BOP Verify Waterbox Outlet Valves Open, Restore 2 Effective Circulating Pumps As Necessary Check Condenser Air Removal Alignment Booth Operator Verify steam to air ejectors (ASS-AOV-22),

Acknowledge Control Room 3559 BOP place both air ejectors in service, verify requests and orders as PEO. 3 isolation dampers for gaseous waste open, Take no further action verify one process vent fan running.

I I BOP Check Gland Seal Pressure between 2 and 6 psig 3559 4

Check Condensate Surge Tank Level:

3559 I >18000gal. and not lowering in an unexpected 5

1 Tech Specs RIL DNB manner Check Exhaust Hood Temperature BOP Annunciators EXH Hood A,B,C Temp Hi-Not Lit 3559 6

This is the cause of the vacuum difficulty and it is not recoverable.

At the discretion of the lead BOP Check For Condenser In-Leakage 3559 examiner- Insert 100% vacuum 7 failure

. A CONVEX requested emergency generation reduction should be completed Not all 3575 (Rapid Load . within 15 minutes of notification.

If a unit shutdown is required, the final desired power level should be between 20% NOTE Reduction) repeated here. Steps I to 7 initiate the load reduction. and 25% reactor power. 3575 Step 9 is used to restore RILs. If at any time ROD CONTROL BANKS 1 LIMIT LO-LO (MB4C 4-9) annunciator is received, DO NOT go to AOP 3566, Immediate Boration. Immediately perform G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenano 4.doc Page 23 of 47

us Determine Power Reduction Rate (%lmin) 3575 I

Check desired power reduction rate EQUAL- 3575 TO OR LESS THAN 5%/min 1.a Check power reduction - CONVEX 3575 REQUESTED 1.b 3575 Proceed to step 1.d 1.b, RNO Determine power reduction rate (%/min) using 3575 Table I.d RO -

Check Rod Control IN AUTO Align EHC Panel

a. Check turbine OPERATING MODE -

MANUAL

b. Check LOAD LIMIT LIMITING light - LIT

c. Intermittently Press DECREASE LOAD pushbutton until LOAD LIMIT LIMITING BOP light NOT LIT 3575

d. Rotate LOAD LIMIT SET adjust knob at 3 least one full turn in raise direction

e. Select DECREASE LOADING RATE to ON

f. Select LOAD RATE LIMIT %/MIN to power reduction rate (%/min) determined in step 1.

us Verify Power Reduction Rate 3575 14 Check power reduction rate - 5%/MIN 3575 4.a Perform the applicable action:

IF power reduction rate is 3%/min, 3575

. THEN Proceed to step 5.

IF power reduction rate is LESS THAN 3%/min, THEN Proceed to step 6.

4.a, RNO 3575 May go to step 5 or 6. Not all sub- RO Initiate Rapid Boration 5

steps repeated here.

RO Align RCS Makeup System For Bora-t 3575 G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4Bcenario 4.doc Page 24 of 47

3575 Check turbine OPERATING MODE - MANUAL 7.a Check either of the following:

Rapid or gravity boration - IN PROGRESS OR 3575 Turbine load reduction - REQUIRED TO 7. b STABLIZE PLANT Check LOAD RATE LIMIT %/MIN set at - 3% 3575 Maintain initial MVAR loading during power 3575 reduction, unless directed otherwise 7 .f 3575 Check boration IN PROGRESS 7.a Crew recognizes vacuum problem worsening and orders a Manual Reactor Trip and a Transition to E-O, Reactor Trip and Safety- Injection Transition to Event Number 5 G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 25 of 47

Verify Reactor Trip:

Check trip and bypass breakers Open, Check E-0 I Rod Bottom Lights Lit, Check Neutron Flux Decreasing (orange-path) challenge Verify Turbine Trip:

E-0 2 Check all turbine stop valves Closed- and Runback the Turbine to close Control Valves- RNO Needs to close MSlVs I B EDG is running with no cooling 1 RO Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses E-0 3 Check if SI is Actuated: Checks Safety Injection Annunciator Not Lit, and the SI is not SI is expected RO warranted: Transitions to ES-0.1, Reactor E-0 4 Trip Response I I I Ro Verify Safety Injection Actuation annunciator LIT E-0, 4.a By observation of ESF Group 2 Status Panel E-0, lights, Verify both trains of SI - ACTUATED 4. b I I Check reactor trip and bypass breakers -

OPEN E-0, 4.c I I -

Verify Service Water Pumps AT LEAST E-0, 5 G:\DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 26 of 47

Step Crew should perform a short brief and come out of RO Verify Two RPCCW Pumps ONE PER E-0, 6 Master Silence at the TRAIN RUNNING completion of step 6.

I RO Verify ECCS Pumps Running E-0, 7 Check SI pumps - RUNNING Check RHR pumps - RUNNING Check two charging pumps - RUNNING BOP Verify AFW Pumps Running E-Or8 1 BOP Check MD pumps - RUNNING E-0, 8.a I BOP -

Check turbine - driven pump RUNNING, IF E-0, NECESSARY 8. b BOP Verify FW Isolation BOP -

Check SG feed regulating valves CLOSED BOP Check SG feed regulating bypass valves -

CLOSED I BOP Check FW isolation trip valves - CLOSED I BOP -

Check MD FW pump STOPPED I BOP -

Check TD FW pumps TRIPPED E-0, 9 Valves closed on Hi Check SG blowdown isolation valves -

Radiation CLOSED Check SG blowdown sample isolation valves -

RO CLOSED Check SG chemical feed isolation valves -

RO CLOSED Check If Main Steam Lines Should Be BOP E-0, 10 Isolated Check Ctmt pressure GREATER THAN 18 psia E-0, 3 any SG pressure LESS THAN 660 psig 10.a G:\DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 27 of 47

E-0, Proceed to step 11 IO.a, RNO RO Check if CDA Required I E-0, I 1 Check Ctmt pressure is GREATER THAN 23 psia E-0,

-OR 1l.a Ctmt spray is initiated E-0, Proceed to step 12. II.a, RNO I I 1 BOP Verify CAR Fans Operating In Emergency Mode E-O, Check CAR fan status:

CAR fans A and B - RUNNING CAR fan C - STOPPED E-0, 12.a.

E-0, 12.a.

STARTETOP CAR fans as necessary RNO Column I1

~~

Verify RPCCWzrnt supply and returnheader E - 6 isolations - OPEN ~ 12.b Verify Train A and B RPCCW supply and E-0, return to chill water valves - OPEN 12.c Verify CIA I E-0, 13 10 LIT I Check ESF Group 2 status columns 2 through E-0, 13.a Verify Proper ESF Status Panel Indication Verify ESF Group Ilights - OFF Verify ESF Group 2 lights LIT E-0, 14 E-0, Align cornponent(s) as necessary for minimum safety function. 14, RNO G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 28 of 47

TC03 Step '

Determine If ADVERSE CTMT Conditions Exist RO

. E-0, 15

. Ctmt temperature GREATER THAN 180°F Ctmt radiation GREATER THAN IO5 R/hr E-0, DO NOT use ADVERSE CTMT parameters. 15, RNO Crew may perform short brief and come out of RO Verify ECCS Flow E-0, 16 Master Silence.

RO Check charging pump flow indicator FLOW E-0, INDICATED 16.a Check RCS pressure - GREATER THAN E-0, RO 1650 Dsia (1950 Dsia ADVERSE CTMT) 16.b E-0, RO Check PORV block valves - OPEN 16.c E-0, RO Open energized block valves 16c,

~

RNO E-0, us Proceed to Step 17:

16d us Verify Adequate Heat Sink E-0, 17 Check NR level in at least one SG - E-0, BOP GREATER THAN 8%. 17.a E-0, BOP Proceed to Step 17.d 17.a RNO E-0 ,

Verify Total AFW Flow - GREATER THAN 17.d 530 GPM.

RNO G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenano 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 29 of 47

I Event Nos.: 4,5,6

TC03, START pumps and Align valves as necessary.

E-0, If AFW Flow GREATER THAN 530 gpm can 17.d NOT be establihse, THEN initiate monitoring RNO of CSF Status Trees and Glo to FR-H.l, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink If total feed flow is LESS THAN 530 gpm due to operator action, DO NOT FR-

. PERFORM THIS PROCEDURE.

Feed flow must not be reestablished to any faulted SG if a non-faulted SG is H.l 1 CAUT ION available.

us I Check IF Secondary Heat Sink is Required.

FR-H.l 1 FR-Verify RCS pressure - GREATER THAN Ro H.1 ANY NON-FAULTED SG PRESSURE.

1.a Verify RCS hot leg W temperature - FR-Ro H.1 GREATER THAN 350OF. I.b

~ ~ ~ ~

us I Check Charging Pump Status -AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

F R-H.l 2 G:U>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 30 of 47

. Steps I O . through 14. (bleed and feed) of this procedure must be immediately initiated if either of the following occur:

WR level in any 3 SGs is LESS THAN 29% (59% ADVERSE CTMT)

OR PZR pressure is GREATER THAN FR-OR EQUAL TO 2350 psia due to loss H.l 3 of secondary heat sink indicated by CAUT l . core exit TCs increasing.

If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action to restart safeguards ION

. equipment may be required.

If the recirculation spray pumps are required and have not started, DO NOT reset CDA.

Try to Establish AFW Flow to at Least FR-us OneSG. H.l 3 Check SG blowdown isolation Verify SG blowdown isolation valves - FR-RO

. CLOSED Verify SG blowdown sample isolation valves - CLOSED H.1 3.a

~

FR-Verify AFW valve alignment - PROPER H.l EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT.

3. b BOP .

Verify DWST suction valves 3FWA*AOV61A 3FWA*AOV61B FR-H.1 3.c FR-Check DWST level - GREATER THAN H.1 80,000 gal 3.d G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 31 of 47

[vent Nos.: 4,5,6 Proceed to step 3.f and, DWST level FR-This step may not be H.l necessary us decreases to LESS THAN 80,000 gal, 3.d THEN Perform step 3.e.

RNO FR-Using GA-4, Shift AFW pump suction to the BOP H.l CST and Fill the DWST 3.e FR-BOP -

Check MD pumps RUNNING. H.1 3.f START pumps.

FR-

-IF the pump(s) do NOT start, THEN H.1 BOP Restore power to the pumps (MB or 3.f locallv). RNO FR-BOP Check turbine - driven pump - RUNNING. H. I 34 OPEN steam supply valve(s).

IF the pump does NOT start, THEN

- FR-BOP OPEN steam supply isolation valves: H. 1 3MSS*MOV17A 34 RNO 3MSS*MOV17B 3MSS*MOVl7D I FR-Locally restore AFW flow using Attachment PEO H.l A, if required.

3. h BOP Check total flow to SGS - GREATER THAN H.l FR-530 gpm 3.i Perform the applicable action:

FR-B - IF no AFW flow is indicated, THEN H.l Crew goes to step 4 us Proceed to step 4.

b - IF any AFW flow indicated, THEN Proceed to ster, 3.k.

1 3.i RNO I

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 32 of 47

TC03 RO STOP All RCPs.

FR-

. DO NOT reinstall the A213 logic cards until an adequate heat sink has been H.1 4 made available. Reinstallation of a lobic card may cause actuation of the FWI FR-

. circuit.

Removal of the A213 cards defeats the low steam pressur eSI from Loops Iand H.l 5 CAUT ION

2. Manual actions may be required to initiate safety injection for a low steam pressure condition.

Try to Establish Main FW Flow to At FR-us Least One SG. H.1 5 FR-Verify at least one condensate pump -

BOP H.1 RUNNING.

5.a Perform the following to start one condensate pump:

I.CLOSE a condensate pump discharge isolation valve:

3CNM-MOV79A 3CNM-MOV79B 3CNM-MOV79C

2. Place the selected condensate pump FR-BOP discharge isolation valve switch to OPEN H. 1 and, WHEN 5.a RNO Dual indication is observed on the discharge MOV (MB6),

THEN START the selected condensate pump.

IF one condensate pump can NOT be started, THEN Proceed to Step 9.

G:\DRS\Osb\BalianUvlillstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 33 of 47

FR-BOP Check FW isolation trip valves - OPEN. H.l

5. b Perform the following:

IF SI

1. - P-14 has actuated, WHEN SG levels LESS THAN the P-14 setpoint, THEN RESET SI AND Remove universal logic card A213 from both Trains of the Solid State Protection System (3RPS*RAKLOGA and FR-BOP 3RPS*RAKLOGB).

H.1

/RO 2. RESET FWI at MB2. 5.b

3. RESET FWI at MB5. RNO

4. Adjust SG feed regulating and SG feed regulating bypass valve controllers to zero output.

5. RESET the FW isolation trip valves, THEN OPEN the valves.

6. -IF no FW isolation trip valve can be opened, THEN Proceed to Ster, 9.

FR-Perform the following to start the MD FW us pump:

H. 1 5.c FR-Place FW pumps P4 trip bypass selector BOP H.l switch to BYPASS 5.c. 1 FR-Place the MD FW pump control switch in BOP H.l STOP.

5.c.2 G:\DFS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 34 of 47

FR-Place the MD FW pump control switch in BOP H.l START.

5.c.3 FR-H.l us Proceed to CAUTION prior to Step 7.

5.c.2

-t . PZR level may decrease off scale low to RNO

. SG depressurization.

Following block of automatic SI actuation, manual SI actuation may be FR-H.l 7 CAUT required if conditions degrade beyond ION operator control.

To allow condenser steam dump operation to continue during depressurization, ensure Low-Low Tavg FR-

. interlock is bypassed at 553OF.

After the low Steam Line Pressure SI signal is blocked, MSI will occur if the H.l 7 NOTE high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded. ~

Try to Establish Feed Flow From FR-us Condensate System H.l 7 FR-Check condensate pumps - AT LEAST ONE BOP H.1 RUNNING 7.a G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 35 of 47

TC03 Perform the following:

I.CLOSE the appropriate condensate pump discharge isolation valve:

3CNM-MOV79A 3CNM-MOV79B 3CNM-MOV79C

2. Place the appropriate condensate pump discharge isolation valve control switch to OPEN and, FR-H.l BOP WHEN 7.a dual indication is observed on the RNO discharge MOV (MB),

THEN START the condensate pump.

IF one condensate pump can NOT be started, THEN Proceed to Step 9.

FR-RO Verify letdown - IN SERVICE. H.l 7.b Use one PZR PORV to depressurize to LESS THAN 1950 psia and Proceed to Step FR-7 .f H.l RO

7. b IF a PZR PORV can NOT be used, THEN

- RNO Proceed to Ster, 7.c FR-Place control switches for all PZR heaters to RO H.1 OFF.

7.f Check the following:

us FR-RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1950 psia H.1 RO Annunciator MB4D 3-5, "PRESSURIZER TO 74 INTERLOCK P-I 1."- LIT.

G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4doc Page 36 of 47

lvent Nos.: 4,5,6 RO ..

Block SI signals BLOCK Main Steam Pressure SI BLOCK PZR Pressure SI FR-H.l

7. h FR-Maintain RCS pressure LESS THAN 1950 RO H.1 psia.

~~

7.i BOP Verify condenser steam dump capability:

Check MSlVs -ANY OPEN Check annunciator "CONDENSER FR-H.l 7.j AVAIL FOR STM DUMP C-9" (MB4D 5-6) - LIT Perform the following:

1. CLOSE the MSIVs.

2. Dump steam to atmosphere at maximum rate (MB or locally) to depressurize at FR-least one SG to LESS THAN 400 psig. H.1 BOP 7.j IF steam can NOT be dumped to

- RNO atmosphere, THEN Proceed to Step 9.

3. Proceed to Step 7.m.

FR-Establish condensate flow alignment to BOP H.1 selected SG(s).

7.m OPEN the TD FW pump discharge isolation valves FR-BOP H.1 3FWS-MOV23B 7.m.l 3FWS-MOV23C G:V>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4doc Page 37 of 47

FR-Locally, (Turbine Bldg, northeast 38) OPEN H.1 PEO main feed pump bypass valve (3FWS-7.m.l V996).

RNO Throttle open the FW regulating valves FR-BOP bypass valve(s) to the selected SG(s) as H.l desired 7.m.2 FR-Verify selected SG(s) - LESS THAN 400 H.1 psig. 7.n FR-H.1 7.n RNO FR-H.1 7.0

~

FR-Control selected SG(s) pressure LESS H. 1 THAN required to maintain condensate flow 7.P Maintain condensate flow to the selected FR-BOP SG(S) using the FW regulating bypass H.1 valve(s). 74 1 BOP I Check SG Levels.

FR-H.1 8 Verify NR level in at least one SG - FR-BOP GREATER THAN 8% (42% ADVERSE H.l CTMT). 8.a G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 38 of 47

Perform the following:

I.Verify feed flow to at lest one SG as follows:

e WR level in at least one SG is increasing. FR-AND H.l us 8.a e Core Exit TCs are stable RNO decreasing.

2. feed flow to at least one SG is verified, THEN Maintain flow to restore NR level to GREATER THAN 8% (42%

ADVERSE CTMT). ~

FR-us Go to procedure and step in effect. H.l 8.b Check for Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Verify WR level in any 3 SGs - LESS THAN 29% (59% ADVERSE CTMT)

FR-BOP Verify PZR pressure - GREATER THAN H.l 9 OR EQUAL TO 2350 psia DUE TO A LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK INDICATED BY CORE EXIT TCs INCREASING.

FR-us Return to CAUTION prior to Step I. H.l 9 RNO FR-Steps 10. through 14. must be performed H.l quickly in order to establish RCS heat IO removal by RCS bleed and feed. CAUT ION FR-RO -

Check All RCPs STOPPED. H.1 IO G:VIRS\Osb\BalianWillstone3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4doc Page 39 of 47

FR-H.1 1 Ro Stop pump(s).

10 RNO FR-RO Initiate SI. H.1 11 FR-Verify RCS Feed Path. H.l I2 Check pump status:

Charging pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING FR-H.1 12.a

. SI DumDs - A T LEAST ONE RUNNING Check valve alignment for operating pumps FR-

- PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT H.1 12.b FR-Establish RCS Bleed Path H.l 13 Verify PZR PORV block valves - BOTH FR-OPEN H.1 13.a FR-OPEN both PZR PORVs. H.l 13.b Verify Adequate RCS Bleed Path FR-H.1 Check PZR PORVs BOTH OPEN Check PZR PORV block valves -

14 BOTH OPEN G:V)RS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 40 of 47

FR-Verify Steps 1-14 Of E-0, Reactor Trip H.l And Safety Injection 15 Answer; Alert C-I based on RCI TERMINATE EXAM G:U>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 41 of 47

SECTION 3 SIMULATOR EXAM SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

SUMMARY

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number I ID Number: NRC Scenario 4 Revision: 0 TIME *QA INSTRUCTOR AIDS DESCRIPTION MALF, RF, IO T=O FW19 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Tripped TC03 Turbine Fails to Trip TC04 Main Turbine Fails to Runback TCOGA Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

TCOGB Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

TCOGC Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

TCOGD Main Turbine Stop Valves Fail in Position.

RP08A Automatic MSI Failure RP08B Automatic MSI Failure PB13MSS-SLI Off PB2-3MSS-SLI Off I/OS Remote 1 MIOA Severity = 100% LT459 Fails High Remote 2 ED04D 34D 416OVAC Bus Fails Remote 3 FWOI Severity = 60% Lower Main Cond Vacuum Remote 4 FWOI Severity = 100% Lower Main Cond Vacuum TC07A Severity = 37% Main Turb CV Failure TC07B Severity = 37% Main Turb CV Failure TC07C Severity = 37% Main Turb CV Failure TC07D Severity = 37% Main Turb CV Failure Remote 5 SGROI to 04 Lowers SG level FWO7A Stop MFW Pp Restoration FW07B Stop MFW Pp Restoration FWO7C Stop MFW Pp Restoration Remote 6 FWI8A 3FWA*PlA Trip

?? RPR44 Remove A2 13 Cards RPR45 Remove A213 Cards G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 42 of 47

SECTION 4 VAL IDATlON CHECKLIST

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number 1 ID Number: NRC Scenario 4 Revision: -0 Remote functions: Verified by All remote functions contained in the guide are certified.

Malfunctions:

All malfunctions contained in the guide are certified.

Initial Conditions:

The initial condition(s) contained in the guide are certified or have been developed from certified IC's in accordance with NSEM-4.02.

Simulator Operating Limits:

The simulator guide has been evaluated for operating limits and/or anomalous response.

Test Run:

The scenario contained in the guide has been test run and validated (validation sheet completed, next page)on the simulator. Simulator response is reasonable and as expected Examination Scenario Review The dynamic examination review checklist is complete.

G:\DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 43 of 47

SECTION 5 REFERENCES AND CRITICAL TASK TRACKING

Title:

NRC Initial License Exam Number I ID Number: NRC Scenario 4 Revision: 3 I.

References:

TS* MP3 Technical Specifications OP 3272 EOP User's Guide OP 3204 At Power Operation OP 3353 Main Board Annunciator Response Procedures AOP 3571 Instrument Failure Response AOP 3559 Loss of Condenser Vacuum EOP*35 E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP*35 E-S-0.1 Reactor Trip Response FR-H.1 Response To Loss of Secondary Heat Sink EPIP*EPIP 4400 Event Assessment, Classification and Reportability NUREG 1021 Examiners Standards G:U>RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone3\Scenario 4Bcenario 4.doc Page 44 of 47

II. Critical Tasks Covered in this Test:

The following Critical Tasks are covered in this exercise:

E-0 -- Q Manually trip the main 045-010 Failure to trip the main turbine under the turbine [before a severe A3.01 postulated plant conditions causes 3.513.6 challenges to CSFs beyond those (orange-path) challenge develops to either the irreparably introduced by the postulated 045-050 conditions. Additionally, such an subcriticality or the integrity CSFI5or [before transition A I .01 omission constitutes a demonstrated 3.814.1 to ECA-2.1],6 whichever inability by the crew to "take an A I .02 happens first 3.313.7 action...that would prevent a challenge IInitiating Bleed and Feed A3.01 3.313.5 to plant safety."

Allows for core cooling via Safety Injection and Bleeding flow out of the Promptly When Conditions PORVs prior to RCS temperature rising Are Met RO-3.4 to a point which Bleed and Feed would SRO-4.4 be ineffective to remove core heat.

Initiate Condensate Flow to E05EA2.1 Restore a secondary heat sink before any SG to restore a Bleed and Feed cooling is required to Secondary Heat Sink preserve core integrity.

G:\DRS\Osb\BalianWillstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 45 of 47

ID Number: NRC Scenario 1 , Revision: 0 Note: The following criteria list scenario traits that are numerical in nature. A second set of numbers indicates a range to be met for a set of two scenarios.

Quantitative Attributes 5 13. Total malfunctions inserted: 4-8/10-I4 (Pzr Level Transmitter, Bus 34D Loss of Vacuum) 2 14. Malfunctions that occur after EOP entry: 1 4 3 - 6 (Failure of Turbine Trip, Failure of All Feed) 2 15. Abnormal Events: 1-2/2-3 (Pzr Level Transmitter, Loss of Vacuum) 1 16. Major Transients: 1-2/2-3 (Failure of All Feed) 0 17. EOPs used beyond primary scram response EOP: 1-3/34 1 18. EOP Contingency Procedures used: 0-311-3 (FR-H. 1) 60 19. Approximate scenario run time: 45-60 minutes (one scenario may approach 90 minutes) 50% 20. EOP run time: 40-70% of scenario run time 2 21. Crew Critical Tasks: 2-5/58 (Close MSIVs, Restore Core Cooling)

Yes 22. Technical Specifications are exercised during the test COMMENTS:

G:V)RS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3Wcenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 46 of 47

SECTION 6 SCENARIO INITIAL CONDITIONS Reactor Power: 100%

Operating History: 258 days on line RCS Boron: 953 ppm Core Burnup: 10,000 MWD/MTU Condensate Demins: 7 Intake structure: Green PRA Status: Green Protected train: B Train protected Evolutions in Progress: Millstone Unit 2 is in a Refueling Outage Major Equipment 00s: Turbine Driven AFW Pump 3FWA

P2 00s Crew Instructions:

The Turbine Driven AFW Pump (3FWA

P2) is out of service for emergent maintenance. The Turbine Driven AFW Pump 3FWA

P2 was taken out of service 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ago and expected return to operability is 11 hours1.273148e-4 days 0.00306 hours 1.818783e-5 weeks 4.1855e-6 months from now.

Limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.1 -2, action a. has been entered.

Continue to operate at full power.

PlanVSimulator Differences:

0 If not using the speed dial option, dial 3333 or 3334 to reach the desired person(s).

0 The following PPC programs do not function on the simulator:

If Samarium Follow If Xenon Follow 14 Sequence of Events G:\DRS\Osb\Balian\Millstone 3\Scenario 4\Scenario 4.doc Page 47 of 47

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