ML042040151
| ML042040151 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  (DPR-026, DPR-028) |
| Issue date: | 07/27/2004 |
| From: | Holden C NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD1 |
| To: | Hatten N Borough of Tenafly, NJ |
| Milano P, NRR/DLPM , 415-1457 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML042040099 | List: |
| References | |
| G20040419, LTR-04-0388, TAC MC3665, TAC MC3666 | |
| Download: ML042040151 (4) | |
Text
July 27, 2004 Ms. Nancy Hatten Borough Clerk Borough of Tenafly 100 Riveredge Road Tenafly, NJ 07670
Dear Ms. Hatten:
On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am responding to the Resolution dated June 10, 2004, by the Mayor and Council of the Borough of Tenafly, NJ, expressing concern about the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 ad 3. As the basis for its resolution, the Council states that (1) there have been credible terrorist threats to nuclear power plants, (2) a July 2002 report by the National Research Council that states that the threat risk is high, and (3) the NRC has issued numerous alerts to nuclear plant operators and has acknowledged that nuclear facilities were not designed to withstand or repel a substantial terrorist threat.
On November 18, 2002, the NRC responded to a petition, pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), filed by Riverkeeper, Inc. requesting similar actions to those in your resolution.
As discussed in the Directors Decision responding to the petition, the NRCs primary mission is to ensure protection of public health and safety. In addition, the NRC regulations (See Part 73 of 10 CFR and recent NRC Orders) set high standards for effective security programs at nuclear power plants and other sensitive nuclear facilities. In this regard, the NRC closely monitors nuclear power plants to ensure that they are maintained and operated in accordance with NRC regulations. Nuclear power plants are built of massive structures with thick exterior walls and interior barriers of reinforced concrete. The plants are designed to withstand tornadoes, hurricanes, fires, floods, and earthquakes. As a result, the structures inherently afford a measure of protection against deliberate aircraft impacts. The layers of protection offered by plant design features, sophisticated surveillance equipment, physical security protective features, professional security forces, and access authorization requirements provide an effective deterrence against potential safety or security problems related to terrorist activities that could target equipment vital to nuclear safety.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the NRC has sought to ensure the continued protection of the nations nuclear power plants, working in close coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security (formerly the Office of Homeland Security), the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Defense, State and local authorities, and other intelligence and law enforcement agencies, as well as NRC licensees. NRC coordination with these agencies remains ongoing.
N. Hatten The NRC requirements for the defense of nuclear power plants are defined, in part, by the "design basis threat" (DBT). The DBT was prepared by safeguards experts on the basis of information from the Department of Energy and the intelligence community about terrorist-related information both abroad and in the United States. The DBT is a reasonable characterization of an adversary force against which nuclear power plant licensees must design their physical protection systems and response strategies.
Contrary to the statement in the resolution, there have been no specific credible threats against the nations nuclear power plants. However, the NRC has taken a number of steps to improve the already high level of security at the nuclear power plants, including more training for security guards and requiring additional guards at the plants. Other NRC actions include issuing: (1)
Orders formalizing certain security enhancements, security force fitness-for-duty and training improvements, and DBT revisions, (2) more than sixty advisories to licensees to describe threat conditions or recommend additional measures, and (3) an NRC Threat Advisory and Protective Measures System, consistent with the Homeland Security Advisory System, to rapidly respond to changes in the national threat environment. The revised DBT includes changes in the adversary characteristics that the NRC considered appropriate for inclusion in the current threat environment. These and other actions make nuclear power plants even better prepared to withstand or repel a terrorist threat.
The effectiveness of these security programs has been verified by the NRC, as well as other authorities, including the FBI and authorized State organizations. NRC continues to take other actions including a pilot program to resume force-on-force exercises on a 3-year cycle. These exercise are designed to test the adequacy of licensee security programs. In July 2003, a force-on-force exercise was conducted at Indian Point during which the Indian Point security force personnel successfully protected the plant from repeated mock-adversary attacks. The results of these activities indicate that the licensee has a strong defensive strategy and capability. We also continue to inspect the facilities to confirm the enhanced security actions and activities taken by the licensees.
Although any security program is open to improvement, the NRC considers the Indian Point facility to be operated safely and the current security posture to be strong. On the basis of the actions taken to date, the NRC does not feel that the operation of the Indian Point facility should be suspended. The NRC continues to actively monitor safety and security at Indian Point and is prepared to take measures to ensure the continued safety of Indian Point and all of our nations nuclear facilities.
N. Hatten Regarding the Boards resolution for transition to a non-nuclear alternative for Indian Point, the NRC does not have jurisdiction over this matter. Conversion would be an economic decision made by the licensee with review by the New York State Public Service Commission.
I hope that this letter has been responsive to your concerns.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Cornelius F. Holden, Jr., Director Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
N. Hatten Regarding the Boards resolution for transition to a non-nuclear alternative for Indian Point, the NRC does not have jurisdiction over this matter. Conversion would be an economic decision made by the licensee with review by the New York State Public Service Commission.
I hope that this letter has been responsive to your concerns.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Cornelius F. Holden, Jr., Director Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DISTRIBUTION:
PUBLIC PDI-1 R/F L. Reyes W. Kane E. Merschoff P. Norry M. Virgilio W. Dean S. Burns/K. Cyr J. Dyer R. Zimmerman, NSIR H. Miller, R-I B. Sheron L. Marsh/J. Lyons E. Leeds N. Mamish C. Holden R. Laufer R. Rosano, NSIR L. Hill, NSIR P. Milano T. McGinty P. Milligan B. McDermott, R-I T. Walker, R-I S. Little K. Johnson A. Huffert, OCM L. Cox SECY (LTR-04-0388)
NRR Mailroom (GT20040419)
OGC OPA OCA Package: ML042040099 Incoming No.: ML041750333 Accession No.: ML042040151 OFFICE PDI-1/PM PDI-1/LA RI/DRP NSIR PDI-1/SC PDI-1 NAME PMilano SLittle SBarr RRosano RLaufer CHolden DATE 07/22/04 07/26/04 07/22/04 07/22/04 0726/04 07/26/04 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY