ML041450398
| ML041450398 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  (DPR-059) |
| Issue date: | 12/30/2003 |
| From: | Picciano J US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Miller H NRC Region 1 |
| References | |
| Download: ML041450398 (79) | |
Text
REcEIVEU RE.GION 1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security 26 Federa1 Plaza, 13" Floor New York New York 10278 December 30,2003 Mr. Hubert J. Miller U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-141 5
Dear Mr. Miller:
Please find enclosed five copies of the Final Exercise Report for the James A. FitzPatrick NPS Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise conducted on June 3,2003.
The State of New York and local emergency response organizations successfully demonstrated the capabilities to implement their off-site radiological emergency response plans and procedures, based on the evaluation of this exercise by the Regional Assistance Committee and a team of Federal evaluators. There were no deficiencies and three Areas Requiring Corrective Actions identified.
Please find attached plan issues identified during the exercise. In addition, please note that the Regional Assistance Committee is currently reviewing the state and local plans and will provide its suggestions for improvement under separate cover when this review is completed.
The State and local preparedness is adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the James A. FitzPatrick NPS and provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Robert F. Reynolds, Chair of the Regional Assistance Committee at (212) 680-3621.
Sincerely yours, AYZji7
/$
Joseph F. Picciano Acting Regional Director Enclosures
J. A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Station Planning Issues Identified at the June 3,2003 Exercise Oswego County Backup Route Alerting (Actual)
Condition: The maps provided to the deputy showed the area affected by the siren failure, including all the roads, but did not have a defined route for route alerting. This meant the deputy had to take time to figure out a route and also had to make certain that all roads had been included in this route. This slowed down the alerting process.
Possible Cause: 'No routes have been designated.
Reference:
NUREG-0654 E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c Effect: Could cause failure to provide route alerting in a timely m m e r (45 minutes) if there were a siren failure.
Recommendation: Maps should be updated to include a defined route with clear indications of a starting point, the route to follow, and an end point.
Host County Reception Center Issue - 1 Condition: The demonstrated initial monitoring process was slower than that specified in the plan. The timesneeded to process the six evacuees in three lanes were 77,80 and 79 seconds, respectively.
Possible Cause: Getting evacuees into and out of the portal monitors exceeded the 5 seconds specified in the plans.
Reference:
NUREG-0654, J. 12 Effect: Using the times demonstrated the three portal monitors could process 9,885 evacuees or, if the fourth instrument was in service, 13,180 could be processed in a 12-hour period. Based on current population figures for the 10-mile EPZ, the planning basis would be approximately 12,340 potential evacuees.
Recommendation: Repair and include the 4" portal monitor in the documentation in the plan, Procedure 3, Section 2.3, and revise the scan time to what was demonstrated (about 13 seconds per person).
Host County Reception Center Issue - 2 Condition: Some of the activities demonstrated are currently not documented in the plan of record. The following specific actions are currently not documented in the plan:
I December 3 1,2004
Uncontaminated evacuees are stamped Clean at the portal monitors.
Successfully decontaminated evacuees were not stamped with the Clean indication as they exited the decontamination areas as specified in the plan. Instead they were stamped Clean after they exited the additional portal monitor.
There is no procedural step to assure the portal monitors meet the FEMA Standard by checking to verify that the monitors alarm when a 1 uCi Cs-137 is held in the center of the fiame.
There is no provision for providing a receipt for the specific contaminated articles taken fiom evacuees.
The plan states (Procedure 3, Section 3-4) that KI will be made available to evacuees and the Clean Monitoring Log contains a space for KI Accepted while there is no KI shown on the inventory in Appendix B or Procedure 10.
Possible Cause: Failure to document current practices.
Reference:
NUREG-0654, J. 12 Effect: While the activities were adequate and appropriate, there is no assurance that in future activations of this center the same processes will be used.
Recommendation: Revise plan to document demonstrated practices.
2 December 3 1,2004
Final Exercise Report J.A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Licensee:
Entergy Exercise Date:
June 3, 2003 Report Date:
December 22,2003 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION I1 26 Federal Plaza New York New York 10278
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
1 II.
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................
2 ID.
EXERCISE OVERVIEW.......................................................................... 4 A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description..........................................
4 B.
Exercise Participants 5
C.
Exercise Timeline 7
IV.
EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS................................................
10 A.
Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation.,
10 B.
Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated 13 1.
STATE OF NEW Y O N.........................................................
15 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 New York State Emergency Operations Center/State Emergency Coordmation Center..........................................................
15 New York State Accident Assessment....................................
15 Emergency Operations Facility.............................................
15 Joint News Center............................................................
16 EAS Radio Station - WSYR................................................
19 2.
OSWEGO COUNTY...............................................................
20 Oswego County Warning Point..............................................
20 Oswego County Emergency Operations Center...........................
20 Oswego County Accident Assessment......................................
20 2.4 Oswego County Radiological Field Monitoring Teams.................. 21 Oswego County Personnel Monitoring Cent...............................
21 2.6 Oswego County Traffic Control Points 22 2.7 Oswego County Route Alerting.............................................
22 2.8 Oswego County School Interviews.........................................
23 2.9 Oswego County School Bus Evacuation...................................
23 2.10 Oswego County Special Population Bus....................................
24 2.1 1 Oswego County Reception Center..........................................
24 2.12 Oswego County Congregate Care Center....................................
25 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.5 i
FitzPatrick '
Final Report 12-22-03 2.13 Oswego County Medical Drill................................................ 26 List of Appendices APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS..................................
27 APPENDIX 2 -EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS....................
30 APPENDIX 3 - EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT........................................
32 APPENDIX 4 - EXERCISE SCENARIO SYNOPSIS.......................................
69 List of Tables Table 1 -
Exercise Timeline........................................................................... 8
. Table 2 -
Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation.........................................,...... 1 1 111
FitzPatrick' Final Report 12-22-03 I.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
On June 3, 2003, an exercise was conducted in the 10-mile Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the FibPatrick Point Nuclear Power Plant by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region II. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radioiogical emergency response plans (RERPs) and procedures.
The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on December 4,2001. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on September 15, 198 1.
FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in New York, and Oswego and Onondaga Counties who participated in this exercise.
Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities.
Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.
This report contains the final evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of the following out-of-sequence activities: School Interviews (Oswego City School District on May 28,2003; Mexico School District, Mexico Middle School and Oswego County BOCES on May 30, 2003); School Bus Evacuation (Oswego School District on May 28, 2003; Mexico Academy and Central Schools on May 30,2003); Special Population Bus Run (CNY Centro on May 28, 2003); Reception Center (NY State Fairgrounds on May 29, 2003);
Congregate Care Centers (Red Cross Interview on June 2, 2003); and Medical Drill (Facilities portion, Syracuse University Hospital on December 13,2002 and Transportation portion, Oswego County Highway Garage on June 3,2003).
The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were no Deficiencies and three (3) Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified as a result of this exercise. In addition, corrective actions were demonstrated for three (3) prior ARCAs that were closed.
1
FitzPatrick' Final Report 12-22-03
- 11.
INTRODUCTION On December 7,1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350,35 1 and 352. These regulations are akey element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.
FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local governments' participation in joint exercises with licensees.
FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
0 Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by State and local governments; Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments; Responding to requests by the US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993); and 0
Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:
U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of the Interior, and U.S. Food and Drug Administration.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2
FitzPatrick '
Final Report 12-22-03 Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region II Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
Formal submission of the RERPs for the Nine Mile Point and James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plants (JAFNPP) to FEMA Region 11 by the New York State and involved local jurisdictions occurred on July 15 1981. Formal approval of the RERPs was granted by FEMA on February 1,1985, under 44 CFR 350.
A REP exercise was conducted on June 3, 2003 by FEMA Region 11 to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response orgariizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.
The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region 11 RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Director.
The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:
0 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-lY Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and.Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980; 0
"Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology," published in the Federal Register on September 12, 2001, and revised April 25, 2002, and contained in the Interim REP Program Manual (August 15,2003)
Section lII of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.
Section IV of this report, entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise objectives at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains: (1) descriptions of all Deficiencies and ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' schedule of corrective actions for each identified exercise issue and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the OROs' efforts to resolve them.
FitzPatrick.
Final Report 12-22-03 111.
EXERCISE OVERVIEW Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the December 4,2001, exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant. This section of the exercise report includes a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.
A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description The area within the Nine Mile PointlJames A. FitzPatrick site is located on Lake Ontario and in Oswego County. Oswego County is predominantly rural in nakre with approximately 75 percent of its total land acres consisting of woodland, wetlands, and inactive agricultural land. Although active agriculture land only accounts for 16 percent of the local land acres, agriculture is the major land use in the county. The major agriculture activity in Oswego County is dairy, accounting for approximately 63 percent of the value of all farm products produced in the county. The major harvested crops are hay, alfalfa, and corn. The major livestock animals are cattle and hogs.
The 10-mile EPZ contains a total population of 41,284 (2000 Population Estimates).
The Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant site is located seven miles to the northeast of the city of Oswego and thirteen miles north of the city of Fulton. Aside fiom these two areas of population concentration, the region is sparsely populated.
The industrial activities within the 10-mile EPZ are confined principally to the metropolitan area within the city of Oswego, with little industry in the outlying communities of Scriba, Minetto, Volney and Mexico. Manufacturing firms directly account for 33 percent of the total employment of Oswego County.
The public institutions, aside fiom the schools and churches, within the EPZ ofthe site are a hospital, a college, and a jail. There are also a number of special facilities located within the 1 0-mile EPZ.
Continuing urban and industrial expansion of the area will increase both the population that the population in the region will increase by about 30 percent in the next twenty and the amount of land used for residential and commercial purposes. It is anticipated years, with larger increases in the urban areas.
4
FitzPatrick-Final Report 12-22-03 B. Exercise Participants The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant exercise on December 4,2001.
NEW YORK STATE New York State Emergency Management Office New York State Department of Health New York State Police New York State Department of Environmental Conservation New York State Department of Transportation New York State Department of Labor New York State Department of Aging New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets New York State Thruway Authority New York State Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation New York State Correction Services New York State Office of Mental Health New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control New York State Department of Education New York State Department of Energy New York State Public Service CommissiodDept. of Public Service New York State Division of Military and Naval Affairs New York State Office of Cyber Security and Critical Infkastructure Organization RISK JURISDICTIONS OSWEGO COUNTY Oswego County Sheriffs Department Oswego County Department of Public Works Oswego County Office of Emergency Preparedness Oswego County Chairman of the Legislature Oswego County Information Technology Oswego County Personnel Department Oswego County Administration Oswego County Administrative Services Oswego County Department of Social Services Oswego County Department of Social Welfare Oswego County Highway Department Oswego County Superintendent of Schools 5
FitzPatrick' Final Report 12-22-03 Oswego County Department of Health Oswego County Fire Coordinators Oswego County Attorney Oswego County Promotion and Tourism Oswego County Probation Department Oswego County Planning Department Oswego County Assembly Office Oswego County Emergency Medical Services Oswego County Communication Center - 91 1 Cooperative Extension New York State Emergency Management Office New York State Police New York State Department of Health New York State Assembly New York State Department of Environmental Conservation BOCES Schools SUPPORT JURISDICTIONS Town of Palermo Fire Department City of Oswego City of Fulton Fulton Police Department Onondaga County Emergency Management Office Onondaga City Emergency Management Office Cooperative Extension Oswego County School District Mexico Central School District PRIVATENOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS American Red Cross RACES New York Power Authority - James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Entergy - James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Constellation Energy Corporation - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant WSYR Radio Station, Syracuse Volunteer Data Analysis Pioneer Land Search and Rescue Centro of Oswego Bus Company 6
FitzPatrick Final Report 12-22-03 C. Exercise Timeline Table 1, on the following pages, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant exercise on June 3, 2003. Also included are times that notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions/functional entities.
7
FitzPatrick Final Report 12-22-03 Table 1. Exercise Timeline I
FitzPatrick Final Report 12-22-03 LEGEND:
S-Support Jurisdiction D -Decision Making Jurisdiction A - Activating Jurisdiction NA - Not Applicable N/O -Not Observed
FitzP atrick Final Report 12-22-03 IV.
EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the June 3,2003 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the J.A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria contained in the September 12,2001 Federal Register Notice (revised April 25,2002) and in the Interim REP Program Manual (August 15,2003).
Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.
A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2 The matrix presented in Table 2, on the following page(s), presents the status of all exercise criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those objectives is indicated by the use of the following letters:
M Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)
D Deficiency assessed A
ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) fi-om prior exercise(s)
N Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B) 10
A cn C
v, rn 5
0
-n rn X
rn A
E cn rn a
1; C
0 Z
D 7J 0
9 h
v v,
a 2
3 4
I Rad Assmt PARS Based on Avail Information Rad Assmt PADs for General Public Prot Action Decisions for Special Population's Rad Assmt & Decision Making for Ingest Exposure I E 1
~
~
~
1 Rad Assmt & Dec Making for Relo/Re-entry/& Return Implementation of PADs for Special Population's lementation of Traffic Access & Control
~$$&&l Imp1 of RelocationlRe-entrylReturn Decisions P "$,$
+'t I y Ik&?:%jl Plume Phase Measurement & Analysis Equip Post Plume Phase Field Measurements & Sampling I
I I $ 13&i:qTrans
& Treatment of Contam Injured Individuals I
FitzPatrick Final Report 12-22-03 B.
Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and fimctional entity, in a jurisdiction-based, issues only format.
Presented below is a definition of the terms used in ths subsection relative to objective demonstration status.
0 Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise objectives under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.
0 Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise objectives under which one or more Deficiencies were assessed during this exercise. Included is a-description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.
Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated exercise objectives under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.
Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.
0 Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise objectives which were not demonstrated as scheduled during ths exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.
0 Prior ARCAs - Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises that were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.
Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.
The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues that are discussed in this report.
0 A Deficiency is defined in the Interim REP Program ManuaZ (August 15, 2003) as...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational 13
FitzPatrick' Final Report 12-22-03 performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."
0 An ARCA is defined in the Interim REP Program Manual (August 15,2003) as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety. "
FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.
The identifylng number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).
0 Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.
0 Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.
0 Objective Number - A two-digit number corresponding to the objective numbers in FEMA-REP-14.
0 Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.
0 Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.
14
FitzPatrick '
Final Report 12-22-03
- 1.
STATE OF NEW YORK 1.1 New York State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/State Emergency Coordination Center
- a.
MET: l.a.1; l.c.1; l.d.1; l.e.1; 2.a.l; 2.b.l; 2.b.2; 2.c.l; 3.c.l; 5.a.l; 5.b.l
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.2 New York State Accident Assessment (AA)
- a.
MET: l.e.1; 2.a.l; 2.b.l
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.3 Emergency Operations Facility @OF)
- a.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE MET: 1.a.l; l.b.1; 1.c.l; 1,d.l; l.e.1
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 15
FitzPatrick' Final Report 12-22-03
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.4 Joint News Center (JNC)
- a.
MET: l.a.1; l.b.1; l.c.1; l.d.1; l.e.1; 5.a.l
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
ONE Issue No.: 24-03-5.b.l-A-01 Condition: There were three EAS messages prepared for notification of the public. The first was actually read over the telephone and recorded at the station. The activator read messages # 2 and 3, simulating contact with the radio station.
However, message #2, which contained the first PAD, took over two minutes (2 minutes and fifteen seconds to be exact) to read. Therefore, the concluding portion of this message would not have been broadcast, since it exceeded 2 minutes, the maximum message length allowed by the EAS system.
Possible Cause: Messages are too long andor are read too slowly.
Reference:
NUREG-0654, E.5 Effect: The public would not hear a complete message and information needed to implement protective actions such as evacuation, sheltering or to take KI.
Recommendation: Prepare condensed pre-scripted EAS messages that can be broadcast in two minutes (120 seconds).
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE 16
FitzPatrick Final Report 12-22-03
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: TWO Issue No: 40-01-12-A-02 Condition: Failure to issue follow up news releases to correct inconsistencies on previous news releases disseminated by different organizations.
Information on one organizations latest news release was not always consistent with information of another organizations latest news release.
For example, the last news release from Constellation Energy issued at 1226 indicated that a radiation release was in progress. One minute earlier at 1225, Oswego County issued a news release confirming an EAS message broadcast at 1219 indicating that a radiation release was not in progress. These were the last news releases issued by both organizations during the exercise. At the time of the Oswego County news release, the Constellation Energy public information staff at the JNC had informed the Oswego public information staff at the JNC that a radiation release was underway. Because the radiation release had not been confirmed by the County EOC, the JNC public information staff issued the news release without updated information. The exercise was terminated at 1421, a period of almost two hours ftom the release of the conflicting messages.
The Oswego County public information staff (at the JNC and the Oswego County EOC) did not take adequate steps to resolve the conflict of information during this time. Since the Public Inquiry staff uses these news releases and since all media at the JNC may not have heard comments by the Oswego County spokesperson during the media briefmg, there remains the possibility that incorrect information could be provided to the public and media representatives.
Corrective Action Demonstrated: News release were developed by the county (7), the State (3), utility (5), and the NRC (4). Information contained in the News Releases was accurate, consistent and timely.
Issue No: 40-01-12-A-03
==
Description:==
The Oswego County Plan incorporates the requirements of Nine Mile Point Joint News Center Procedures and Public Education Work Plan. This procedure requires that all news releases be... faxed to the respective Emergency Operations Centers and the Emergency 17
FitzPatrick.
Final Report 12-22-03 Operations Facility. The news releases generated by the State of New York were prepared in Albany, NY and e-mailed to the JNC for release.
The State news releases were distributed within the JNC, but were not faxed to the County EOC and EOF as required. All news releases prepared by Constellation Energy and by Oswego County were faxed to all emergency facilities as required. The lack of the State news releases in the EOF and County EOC has the potential to cause inconsistency of information released by all three organizations.
Corrective Action Demonstrated: News Releases were provided to the media and to the public and media inquiry staff and the NRC upon their arrival, all located within the Joint News Center. They were also faxed to Entergy (EOF), the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) andstate Public Information Officer (PIO), the Oswego County EOC, and NRC Headquarters and Region I.
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.5 EAS Radio Station (WSYR)
- a.
MET: 5.a.l; 5.b.l
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: ONE Issue No.: 24-03-l.d.1-A-02 Condition: There is no reliable back-up communication system to the land-line telephone.
Possible Cause: At one time there was a two-way radio system. Now there are several cell phones and in addition almost all of the staff have personal cell phones. However, there is no cell phone that stays at the station or in the newsroom permanently.
Reference:
NUREG-0654, F. 1 Effect: If telephone lines were inoperable, there would be no way to reach the EAS station to send out a message.
18
FibPatrick.
Final Report 12-22-03 Recommendation: Backup communications must be established at the newsroom on a permanent basis as part of the nuclear emergency equipment, and the information should be included in the Oswego County and Joint News Center plans and procedures.
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 19
FitzPatrick Final Report 12-22-03
- 2.
OSWEGO COUNTY 2.1 Oswego County Warning Point (WP)
- a.
MET: l.a.1; l.b.1; l.d.1; l.e.1
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2 Oswego County Emergency Operation Center (EOC)
- a.
MET: l.a.1; l.b.1; 1.c.I; l.d.1; l.e.1; 2.a.l; 2.b.l; 2.b.2; 2.c.l; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 3.c.l; 3.c.2; 3.d.l; 3.d.2; 5.a.l; 5.a.3; 5.b.l
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRJNG CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED:
2.3 Oswego County Accident Assessment (AA)
- a.
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE MET: l.e.1; 2.a.l; 2.b.l; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 4.a.2
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 20
FitzPatrick Final Report 12-22-03
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- d.
ARCAS-RESOLVED: ONE Issue No: 40-01-7-A-04
==
Description:==
The staff produced a comprehensive printout from the EDAMS projections that showed the calculated isotopic mixture in the projected plume. The radionuclide mixture shown was technically impossible. The staff did not question this result.
Corrective Action Demonstrated: The dose assessment staff carefully reviewed the output of the dose projection computer code. They verified that there was no anomalous data and that the projected isotopic composition of the plume was reasonable.
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.4 Oswego County Radiological Field Monitoring Teams
- a.
MET: l.a.1; l.d.1; l.e.1; 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 4.a.l; 4.a.3
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.5 Oswego County Personnel Monitoring Center
- a.
MET: 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 6.a.l; 6.b.l
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 21
FitzPatrick Final Report 12-22-03
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.6 Oswego County Traffic Control Points
- a.
MET: 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 3.d.l
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.7 Oswego County Route Alerting (June 4,2003)
- a.
MET: 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 5.a.3
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE PRIOR ARCAs 2 RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.8 Oswego County School Interviews (City of Oswego, Kingsford Elementary School - May 28,2003; Mexico School District, Mexico Middle School - May 30,2003; Oswego County, BOCES - May 30, 2003) 22
Fieatrick.
Final Report 12-22-03
- a.
MET: 3.c.2
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.9 Oswego County School Bus Evacuation (Oswego School'District
- May 28,2003; Mexico Academy and Central Schools - May 30,2003)
- a.
MET: 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 3.c.2
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.10 Special Population Bus Runs (CNY Centro, hc.- May 28, 2003)
- a.
MET: 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 3.c.l
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE C.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE 23
FitzPatrick Final Report 12-22-03 2.1 1
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE Onondaga County Reception Center - NY State Fairgrounds (May 29,2003)
- a.
MET: 3.a.l
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- d.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: ONE Issue No.: 24-03-3.b.l-A-03 Condition: The informational materials provided by the nurses at the Clean Monitoring Log Desk contained conflicting information with regard to dosage of KI for children. The vendor data indicates that babies under one year old should be given ?4 a tablet (or 65 mg), while the N Y S DOH Information for the Public sheet indicates that for children over one month to 3 years should be given '/4 tablet (32 mg) and for infants from birth to one month 1/8 tablet (1 6 mg). The N Y S DOH document explains how to prepare a 16 mg dose.
Possible Cause: Inaccurate information in the vendors material.
Reference:
NLTREG-0654, J. 1O.e Effect: Confusion in the population with regard to dosage.
Recommendation: Discontinue distribution of the vendor information since almost all of the other information is contained in the State DOH informational sheet.
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS -UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.12 Oswego County Congregate Care Centers - Red Cross Interview (June 2,2003) 24
FitzPatrick' Final Report 12-22-03
- a.
MET: 6.c.l
- b.
DEFICIENCY: NONE
- c.
- d.
NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE
- e.
PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE
- f.
PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.13 Oswego County Medical Drill (Facilities: Syracuse University Hospital, Syracuse, NY, December 13,2002; Transportation - Oswego County Highway Garage, June 3,2003)
- a.
- b.
C.
- d.
- e.
- f.
MET: 3.a.l; 3.b.l; 6.d.l DEFICIENCY: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 25
FitzPatrick' Final Report 12-22-03 APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations used in this report.
AA Accident Assessment ACP Access Control Point ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action ccc Congregate Care Center CFR Code of Federal Regulations CPm Counts Per Minute DOC U.S. Department of Commerce DOE U.S. Department of Energy DO1 U.S. Department of the Interior I
DOT U.S. Department of Transportation DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter EAS ECL EEM EOC EOF EPA EPZ ERPA Emergency Alert System Emergency Classification Level Exercise Evaluation Methodology Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Facility US. Environmental Protection Agency Emergency Planning Zone Emergency Response Planning Area FDA FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FR Federal Register U.S. Food and Drug Administration GE General Emergency GM Guidance Memorandum HHS HQ Headquarters U.S. Department of Health and Human Services JNC Joint News Center 26
FitzPatrick' Final Report 12-22-03 KI KLT NRC NUREG-06 5 4 N Y S OCEOC.
OCFA OEM OnFA OR0 PAD PAG PAR PI0 PMC R
RAC RACES RC REM REP RERP R/h SAE SECC SEOC SOP TEDE TCP TL TLD Potassium Iodide K.L. Travis and Associates U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980 New York State Oswego County Emergency Operations Center Oswego County Field Activity Office of Emergency Management Onondaga County Field Activity Offsite Response Organization Protective Action Decision Protective Action Guide Protective Action Recommendation Public Information Officer Personnel Monitoring Center Roentgen Regional Assistance Committee Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service Reception Center Roentgen Equivalent Man Radiological Emergency Preparedness Radiological Emergency Response Plan Roentgen(s) per hour Site Area Emergency State Emergency Coordination Center State Emergency Operations Center Standard Operating Procedure Total Effective Dose Equivalent Traffic Control Point Team Leader Thermoluminescent Dosimeter 27
USCG USDA WP U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Department of Agriculture Warning Point FibPatrick' Final Report 12-22-03 28
APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant exercise on December 4, 2001. Evaluator Team Leaders are indicated by the letters "(TL)" after their names. The organization which each evaluator represents is indicated by the following abbreviations:
FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency NFX - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission FDA - U.S. Food and Drug Administration USDA-U.S. Department of Agriculture DOT - U.S. Department of Transportation ICF - Consulting Finn Performing Evaluation EVALUATION SITE Exercise Oversight STATE OF NEW YORK State EOC State Warning Point EOF Joint News Center EAS Radio Station WSYR OSWEGO COUNTY Oswego County EOC OSWEGO COUNTY (Cont'd)
Field Monitoring Team A Field Monitoring Team B EVALUATOR Rebecca Thomson Brian Hasemann (TL)
Paul Malool (EOC/WP)
Marcy Campbell (AA)
Paul Malool Richard Barkley Mike Beeman ('AO)
Deborah Bell (TL)
Kevin Reed Sam Nelson Joseph Keller (TWAA)
David Petta Angeles Thompson Russell Fox (WP)
Ronald Bernacki Jeanette Eng 30 ORGANIZATION FEMA FEMA FEMA ICF FEMA NRC FEMA FEMA FEMA FEMA ICF DOT FEMA FEMA FDA EPA
Personnel Monitoring Center Neil Gaeta CDR Thomas Mignone Traffic Control Points Russell Fox Sam Nelson OUT-OF SEQUENCE EVALUATIONS School Interviews (5/28/03)
School Bus Evacuation (5/28/03)
Special Population Buses (5/28/03)
Reception Center (5/29/03)
Congregate Care Center (6/2/03)
MS-1 Medical Drill Facilities (1 2/13/02)
Transportation (6/3/03)
Sam Nelson Sam Nelson Sam Nelson Joseph Keller Sam Nelson Sam Nelson Brian Hasemann Neil Gaeta CDR T. Mignone FitzPatrick' Final Report 12-22-03 ICF PHS FEMA ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF ICF FEMA ICF PHS 31
APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT EXTENT-OF-PLAY GROUND RULES REAL LIFE EMERGENCIES TAKE PRIORITY OVER EXERCISE PLAY.
The Scenario Development Team will develop the fkee play messages. The State Controller will inject the message to the County Emergency Management Director or designee for action.
Free play messages for Public Inquiry at the JNC will be developed by the Scenario Development Team. Rumor control messages will be injected at the JNC by a control cell to enable the public inquiry function to identify trends and false rumors.
The State Controller will inject radiological data for any radiological field activities (Field Teams, EWPMC, Reception Center).
The distribution and ingestion of KI for the general public and emergency workers will be simulated.
According to REP Program Strategic Review Initiative 1.5, During tabletop exercises, drills and other demonstrations conducted out-of-sequence from an integrated exercise, if FEMA and the offsite response organizations (ORO) agree, the FEMA Evaluator may have the participants re-demonstrate an activity that is determined to be not satisfactorily demonstrated. Immediate correction of issues in an integrated exercise is authorized only if it would not be disruptive and interrupt the flow of the exercise and affect other Evaluation Areas. This initiative is not applicable to EOC/JNC/EOF demonstrations during the June 3,2003 exercise.
32
EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element 1.a - Mobilization Criterion l.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3,4; E.l, 2; H.4)
WARNING POINTS (NYS and Oswego County)
Extent-of-Play Aweement:
0 The latest revised call lists will be provided at the FederaVState evaluators briefing session the day before the exercise, if requested by FEMA. The lists.wil1 contain home and business telephone numbers and it is requested that these lists remain confidential.
0 There will be no free play messages introduced at the Warning Points.
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
The State Liaison will be pre-positioned in the area and will arrive at the County EOC no sooner than 30 minutes after the ALERT or greater ECL notification is received by the State. The Utility Technical Liaison assigned to the State EOC will be pre-positioned and arrive at the State EOC no sooner than 30 minutes after the ALERT or greater ECL notification.
EOF Ext en t-of-Play Agreement :
0 State liaisons will be pre-positioned in the area and will arrive at the EOF no sooner than 30 minutes after the ALERT or greater ECL notification is received by the State.
33
Extent-of-Play Ameement:
0 State JNC Staff will be pre-positioned and arrive at the JNC no sooner than 30 minutes after the ALERT or greater ECL notification is received by the State.
34
EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element 1.b - Facilities Criterion I
.b.l : Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.
( N U RE G -0 6 54, H.3)
Exten t-of-Play Agreement :
a Back-up power is available, but will not be activated, at the State and County EOCs.
35
EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control Criterion 1.c.l: Key personnel with leadership roles for the OR0 provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.l.d; A.2.a., b.)
Extent-of-Play Aweement:
0 The State Controller will inject free play messages to the County Emergency Management Director or designee for action.
Public Inquiry messages will be injected at the JNC by a control cell.
36
EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element 1.d - Communications Equipment Criterion l.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.l, 2).
Extent-of-Play Ameement:
0 A State Controller will inject a free play message to the County Emergency Management Director to initiate the demonstration of backup systems at/or to communicate with the SEOC, EOF, JNC, OCEOC, EWPMC, and Field Monitoring Teams.
37
EVALUATION AREA 1 : EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element 1.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Criterion 1.e.l: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG0654, H.7, 10; J.lO.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
0 equipment such as barriers, traffic cones, signs, etc. will be deployed to the field.
38
EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING Sub-element 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 2.a.l: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, J.lO.e, f; K.4)
Exten t-of-Play Ameemen t :
A State Controller will inject a free play message that will cause the County Radiological Officer to discuss what actions would be taken should a Field.
Monitoring Teams dose rate exceed the turn-back value. This will be a discussion only activity.
39
EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency Criterion 2.b.l: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and OR0 dose projections, as well as knowledge of on-site and off-site environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654, 1.8, I O and Supplement 3).
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/Countys plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
40
EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING Sub-element 2.b. Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADS) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if OR0 policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, lO.f, m).
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
AI1 activities will be based on the StateKountys plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
41
EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING Sub-element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations Criterion 2.c.I : Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.lO.d, e)
TRANSPORTATION DEPENDENT POPULATION Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/Countys plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
NOTIFICATION OF HEARING IMPAIRED Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/Countys plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
NON-INSTITUTIONALIZED MOBILITY IMPAIRED INDIVIDUALS Exten t-of-Play Agreement :
All activities will be based on the State/Countys plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
SCHOOLS Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on L e State/Countys plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
SPECIAL FACILITIES Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/Countys plans and procedures.
EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING 42
Sub-element 2.d. -Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway Criterion 2.d.l: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the OR0 planning criteria. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.l I).
Not to be demonstrated during this exercise.
43
EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING Sub-element 2.e. - Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Criterion 2.e.l: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs plan andlor procedures. (NUREG-0654, 1.1 0; J.9; M.l)
Not to be demonstrated during this exercise.
44
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 3.a.l: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the StateKountys plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
45
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.b - Implementation of KI Decision Criterion 3.b.l: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, J.10. e)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/Countys plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
46
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.c - Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations Criterion 3.c.l:
Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.
(NUREG-0654, J.IO.c, d, 9).
EVACUATION OF TRANSPORTATION DEPENDENT POPULATION Extent-of-Play Agreement:
0 Bus companies will be interviewed prior to the June 3,2003 exercise as per the offsite extent of play activities schedule.
Each company will provide a dispatcher and at least 5-10% of that companys drivers needed to implement the Plan for interview.
During the June 3,2003 exercise, there will be initial contact with the transportation providers (telephone call) by the Transportation Coordinator. Initial contacts will be actual and some follow-up contacts may be simulated. All calls will be logged at the County EOC.
0 There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles during the exercise.
NOTIFICATION OF HEARING IMPAIRED Exten t-of-Play Agreement:
0 The hearing impaired list will be available for inspection at the County EOC.
The list will be reviewed but not retained by the Federal evaluator. The procedures for notification will also be discussed at the County EOC.
0 There will be no actual notification of hearing impaired individuals during the exercise.
47
EVACUATION OF NON-INSTITUTIONALIZED MOBILITY IMPAIRED INDIVIDUALS Extent-of-Play Agreement:
The list of non-institutionalized mobility impaired individuals will be available for inspection at the County EOC. The lists will be reviewed but not retained by the Federal evaluator.
There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles for transport of non-institutionalized mobility impaired individuals.
During the exercise, there will be no actual contact of non-institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals identified on the list.
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.c - Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.lO.c, d, 9).
EVACUATION OF SCHOOL POPULATIONS Extent-of-Play Apreement:
0 Bus companies will be interviewed prior to the June 3,2003 exercise as per the offsite extent-of-play activities schedule.
Each company will provide a dispatcher and at least 5-10% of that companys drivers needed to implement the Plan for interview.
0 0
During the June 3,2003 exercise, there will be initial contact with the schools (telephone call) by the School Coordinator. Initial contacts will be actual and some follow-up contacts may be simulated. All calls will be logged at the County EOC.
SCHOOL INTERVIEWS Extent-of-Play Agreement:
0 Schools in the Oswego City and Mexico School Districts and BOCES will be interviewed as per the offsite extent-of-play activities schedule.
Additional schools will be interviewed after the exercise as agreed to by Oswego County EMO, FEMA, and NYSEMO.
0 All schools will interviewed using the REP Exercise Preparation Guide.
SPECIAL FACILITIES Extent-of-Play Agreement:
During the exercise, there will be initial contact with the special facilities (telephone call). Initial contacts will be actual and some follow-up contacts may be simulated.
All calls will be logged at the County EOC.
0 There will be no actual dispatch of vehicles to the special facilities.
49
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.d. - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Criterion 3.d.l: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.lO.g, j)
TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL POINTS (TCPs and ACPs)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
During the June 3,2003 exercise, law enforcement officials will discuss how to activate TCPs/ACPs in the field at mutually agreed upon locations.
There will be interviews of two (2) different law enforcement agencies responsible for staffing the designated TCPs/ACPs.
Each designated law enforcement agency will provide one officer for interview.
The TCPslACPs will be identified by a free play message provided by the State Controller to the County Emergency Management Director or designee.
50
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTI0.N IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.d. - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Criterion 3.d.2:
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.
NUR REG-0654, J.10. k).
IMPEDIMENTS TO EVACUATION Extent-of-Play Agreement:
The County will demonstrate the organizational ability to deal with at least two (2) impediments to evacuation.
The State Controller in the County EOC will hand the free play messages'to the County Emergency Management Director or designee for action to test the procedures for the removal of traffic impediments.
No equipment (Barriers, Traffic cones, Signs, etc.) will be deployed to the field.
This demonstration will notinvolve the dispatch of a police or other emergency vehicle to the scene of a simulated impediment. Initial contact of resource providers will be actual and some follow-up contacts may be simulated. All calls will be logged at the County EOC.
51
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions Criterion 3.e.l: The OR0 demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.9,II).
Not to be demonstrated during this exercise.
52
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11).
Not to be demonstrated during this exercise.
53
EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.f. - Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions Criterion 3.f.l: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654, M.l, 3).
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
0 A State Controller will inject a free play message at the State EOC to initiate discussions to close ARCA 32-99-29-A-01. This discussion will take place at the State and County EOC.
0 This is a no-risk discussion for Oswego County.
54
EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses Criterion 4.a.l: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; 1.7, 8, 9)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
0 The monitoring teams will not be suited up in anti-contamination clothing.
However, the clothing will be available for inspection.
55
EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; 1.8, 11; J.1O.a)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/Countys plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
56
EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected.
Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, 1.9).
FIELD MONITORING TEAMS Extent-of-Play Agreement:
The County will dispatch two (2) radiological monitoring teams. Each team will be provided with a State Controller and FEMA evaluator.
The monitoring teams will not be suited up in anti-contamination clothing.
However, the clothing will be available for inspection.
Each team will take at least six (6) ambient radiation measurements and at least two (2) air samples. All teams must take the air samples as though they were in the presence of the plume (even teams that may not be impacted by the plume).
The use of silver zeolite cartridges will be simulated and charcoal cartridges will be used. However, the silver zeolite cartridges will be available at dispatch point of kit.
There will be no actual packaging or transport of samples to the laboratory. EOC staff will be questioned & regarding means of transportation of air samples to a central point and the location of the laboratory. Field teams will demonstrate how to obtain air samples during the exercise and will be questioned only regarding the procedures for the pick-up point of air samples.
The R02A and E140N do not have installed check sources. Button sources for appropriate instruments are available for inspection.
57
EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-element 4.b - Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling Criterion 4.b.l: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-0654, 1.8; J.11)
Not to be demonstrated at this exercise.
58
EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations Criterion 4.c.l: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3; J.11)
Not to be demonstrated during this exercise.
59
EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION Sub-element 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Criterion 5.a.l: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (IO CFR Part 50, Appendix E.1V.D & NUREG-0654, E.5,6, 7)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
0 There will be no actual siren sounding, no actual tone alert radio activation, and no broadcasting of EAS messages. The Nine Mile Point siren system was last successfully tested on November 8,2002. The next test is scheduled for November 7, 2003.
0 Airing of at least one EAS message will be simulated with the radio station.
Contact with the radio station for subsequent EAS messages may be simulated.
0 Regular programming responsibilities of the radio station may preclude participation at the time of the issuance of the simulated EAS message.
60
EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION Sub-element 5.a - Activation of.the Prompt Alert and Notification System Criterion 5.a.2: RESERVED 61
EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION Sub-element 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation.
Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the O R 0 of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c).
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
0 There are no exception areas that require supplementary route alerting.
0 During the June 3,2003 exercise, one (1) simulated siren failure will be discussed at the County EOC. The State Controller will inject a free play message regarding this siren failure to the County Emergency Management director or designee for action to test route-alerting procedures.
0 During the June 3,2003 exercise, an interview of one law enforcement representative will be conducted at the County EOC. A vehicle capable of public notification will be available for the interview.
0 On June 4,2003, one law enforcement representative with a vehicle capable of public notification will actually drive the route for the simulated siren failure identified during the exercise.
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EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION Sub-element 5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media Criterion 5. b.1:
OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c).
PUBLIC INSTRUCTION AND EMERGENCY INFORMATION Extent-of-Play Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/Countys plans and procedures as L e y woulc in an actual emergency.
EMERGENCY INFORMATION Extent-of-Plav Agreement:
All activities will be based on the State/Countys plans and procedures as they would in an actual emergency.
PUBLIC INQUIRY Extent-of-Play Agreement:
0 The public inquiry function at the JNC will be staffed by at least four operators with one supervisor.
Inject messages will indicate false or misleading information to enable the public inquiry function to identify trends and false rumors.
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EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES Sub-element 6.a - Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers, and Registration of Evacuees Criterion 6.a.l: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees andlor emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.1O.h; J.12; K.5.a)
Extent-of-Play Apreement:
0 The Reception Center will be demonstrated prior to the June 3,2003 exercise as per the offsite extent of play activities schedule.
Monitoring and Decon staff and technique will be demonstrated as follows. Staff will be provided to simulate evacuees.
One lane for vehicle monitoring with at least 1 monitor monitoring at least 2 vehicles; One portal monitoring station monitoring at least 6 individuals; One registration station (social services) with 2 personnel registering at least 2 individuals each; One male and one female decon station with 2 monitors to simulate at least 1 personnel decon each; One vehicle decon station with at least 1 monitor to simulate at least 2 vehicle decons; Other staff will be demonstrated through the use of rosters; The facility will be set up as it would be in an actual emergency with all route markings and contamination control measures in place with the exception that Reception Center floors will not be covered with paper/plastic.
Decontamination techniques will be simulated.
The monitoring and decontamination teams will not be suited up in anti-contamination clothing. However, the clothing will be available for inspection.
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Normal and back-up communications (RACES) will be tested between the Reception Center and the Oswego County EOC during the demonstration.
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EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATIONPFACILITIES Sub-element 6.b - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment Criterion 6.b.l: The facilitylOR0 has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b).
Extent-of-Play Agreement 0 The Emergency Worker Personnel Monitoring Center (EWPMC) will be demonstrated during the June 3,2003 exercise.
Monitoring and Decon staff and technique will be demonstrated as follows. Staff will be provided to simulate emergency workers.
One lane for vehicle monitoring with at least 1 monitor monitoring at least 2 vehicles; One portal monitoring station to monitor at least 2 individuals; Two personnel decon stations with at least 1 monitor each to simulate at least 2 personnel decons; One vehicle decon station with at least 1 monitor to simulate at least 1 vehicle decon; Other staff will be demonstrated through the use of rosters; PMC floors will not be covered with paper/plastic; The monitoring and decontamination teams will not to be suited up in anti-contamination clothing. However, the clothing will be available for inspection.
Decontamination actions are to be simulated.
Normal and back-up communications (RACES) will be tested between the EWPMC and the Oswego County EOC during the demonstration.
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EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees Criterion 6.c.I : Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE-Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.1 O.h, 5.12).
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
0 Congregate Care Centers will be evaluated prior to the June 3,2003 exercise'.as agreed to between Oswego County EMO, FEMA and the Onondaga-Oswego Chapter of the ARC.
0 Capabilities will be demonstrated through an interview process coordinated between FEMA and ARC.
0 The evaluation of the capabilities will be conducted by FEMA and ARC as specified in the ARC-FEMA Memorandum of Understanding.
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EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals Criterion 6.d.l:
The facilitylOR0 has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.
(NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)
Extent-of-Play Agreement:
The transportation and facility component of this medical drill will be demonstrated on or before the June 3,2003 exercise as per the offsite extent-of-play agreement schedule.
The transportation component of this drill will end when the vehicle is ready to depart for the hospital with the patient from an offsite location. This component will be demonstrated during the June 3,2003 exercise.
The facility component of this drill will involve the transport of a patient from the Nine Mile Point site to University Hospital for treatment. This component was evaluated on December 13,2002.
The use of flashing lights and sirens for exercise play is not required.
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FITZPATRICK REP EXERCISE JUNE 3,2003 SCENARIO SYNOPSIS 69
MESSAGE!/
ISSUED SUPPLEMENTAL TOBY TIMELINE EVENT
- 1.
Prior to start of drill - distribute DriZZ Power Message 1 Plant staffEP staff Operation Current Chemistry Summary for 06103103.
- 2. 0700
- a.
- b.
C.
Message 2 CR Operators/ Simulator Lead controller Shift relief:
Full power steady state, approaching middle of Cycle (MOC) 115 KV NMP Line #4 00s for planned maintenance; removed at 0800 on 6/2/03
- i. For Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, Action Table 3.8.1.A has entered and Required Actions completion in progress
- 1. Per Operations Department Standing Order #02-015, LCO 3.8.1.a is NOT met. ActionTable Section A has been entered:
- a. Required Action 3.8.1.A.1 has been successfidly accomplished.
- b. Required Action 3.8.1.A.2 has been evaluated and is NOT applicable at this time. Monitoring will continue.
- c. Required Action 3.8.1.A.3 is active; the 7-day clock will expire on 6/9/03 @,
0800.
ii. The #4 Line is expected to be returned for resumption of service by the end of the current shift.
CR Operators/ Simulator Lead controller Elevated Dose Equivalent I-13 1 concentration in reactor coolant Message
- i. Action Level 1 actions per Ap-08.02 in progress, which can include:
- 1. Increased monitoring of Offgas Radiation levels
- 2. Increased monitoring of coolant activity
- 3. Convening the Failed Fuel Task Force 70
- 4. Reviewing need for Flux Tilt Testing / power suppression
- 5. Reviewing related plant and industry OE ii. Troubleshooting Action Plan IAW AP-03.12 being developed, including preparation for Flux Tilt Testing per RAP-7.3.35
- a. Operators should respond IAW:
- i. Annunciator Response Procedures on panel ii. AOP-72, which includes:
- 1. Consideration of contacting NRC for enforcement discretion to avoid a plant shutdown if TS Completion Time is reached without restoration of offsite power 09-8, iii. Technical Specifications Action Table 3.8.1.C which has Required Actions for:
- 1. Maintaining awareness of degraded redundant equipment, iv. ODSO-10 which involves:
- 1. Using Attachment 2 to record flags and relay operation for the abnormal breaker operation, 2.Possible request for I&C assistance to interpret findings and troubleshoot,
- v. Communication with ECC, Nine Mile Point and
- zeiT4,5,6(as b.At - 0730, with recognition of no power available from EITHER 115 KV Line, Emergency Plan Classification of NUE 6.1.1 is expected.
- 4.
-0735 IF the NUE has not been classified at this point :zeiT (if inject Message #7.
- 5.
0830 Information received on toxic atmosphere Supplemental occurrence and personnel injury in Power Block (EAL - Table 8.3 area).
- a. Upgrade to Emergency Plan classification of ALERT 8.3.5 expected.
- b. Response JAW Emergency Plan, First Aid Supp1ementa12 Team, and AP-09.10 for Hazardous Material response.
- 2. Starting an additional 7-day clock for line restoration Niagara Mohawk Regional Operator.
I&C Controller/I&C Tech OR, Simulator Controller/ CR Operator Simulator Controlled CR Operator Simulator Lead ControlledShift Manager Safety Controlled person in Cable spreading room area Safety ControllerEire Brigade andor first aide team 71
- 6.
-0850 IF the Alert has not been classified at this point inject Message #9.
- 7.
-0930 Some time after upgrade to ALERT is executed, Restoration of power to 11 5KV LHH Line #3 occurs.
- 8. 1045 Initiation of small HPCI Steam Line leak in d/w entrance area.
- a. Temperatures in d/w entrance will eventually rise to require entry into EOP-5 and also reach area temperature isolation set point for HPCI/RCIC steam valves.
i.EOP-5 actions will involve actions to Control Secondary Containment Rahation, Temperature and Level concurrently including:
- 1. An attempt to isolate any primary system leaking into the Secondary Containment 2.23 MOV-15 will NOT auto isolate. Moreover, when manual closure is attempted, valve breaker will trip, leaving valve NOT FULL CLOSED.
- 3. Direction to enter EOP-2 as Secondary Containment parameters approach MAX SAFE values Crew expected response:
- a. At a minimum by initiating plant shutdown and
- b. At the extreme by initiating reactor scram (probably via EOP-5 to EOP-2 entry as area temperatures in d/w entrance continue to rise) 4.1100 - Inadvertent reactor scram (if necessary). Also (if necessary) to fail Bypass Valves closed.
- 5. Following scram crew will stabilize RP water level, pressure and power, including initiation of normal plant cooldown at 4 0 0 deg Fihr
- 9.
-1115 Upgrade to Emergency Plan Classification of Site Area Emergency 3.4.1 expected with the recognition of leak in Reactor Building with failure to isolate
-1135 IF the Site Area Emergency has not been classified at this point inject Message #11.
- 10.
- 11.
1215 DBA-sized LOCA occurs in drywell
- a. CS Pump A will trip after several minutes of severely oscillating parameters (as if suction path is impeded) 72 Message 8 Simulator controller or TSC controller/
Emergency Director operator Message 9 Simulator controller/ CR Message 10 osc controllerMP0 dispatched to investigate Supplemental 3 OSC Controller/ Damage Control Team Message 11 TSC or EOF ControllerED
- b. 1OP-3D will NOT start.
- c. Significantly less than expected flow will be provided from LPCI Subsystem A (more effects from impeded flow path)
- d. Condensate injection will cease after -5 minutes due to low Hotwell inventory, causing trip of Condensate and Condensate Booster Pumps
- e. RPV level will return to between -50 and -
30, but no higher due to degraded ECCS injection.
Crew expected to determine that level will NOT restore to >-19:
- i. EOPs will be exited and Severe Accident Operating Guidelines (SAOGs) and associated Technical Support Guidelines (TSGs) will be entered.
- 12.
-1220 A release will begin from the Stack through Standby gas treatment and continue to trend up to approximately 16 mR/hr on the Stack High Range Effluent Monitor.
Release will exceed Tech Specs at Approximately 1230.
- 13.
1230
- a. Upgrade to Emergency Plan Classification of General Emergency 3.4.2 is expected due to primary system leak with failure to isolate, AND RPV water level<O(TAF).
Emergency Plan Classification of General Emergency 2.1.3, Primary Containment Flooding Required, would also be applicable at this point.
- b. Protective Action Recommendations will be issued - ERPAs for evacuation 1,2,3,4,7,9, 26,27 shelter all remaining.
- c. Radiation monitors ramp IAW Exercise timeline
- 14.
Post 1230 OSC Controlled Damage Control Team
- a. Support restoration of 1OP-3D as ERO troubleshoots and attempts repair. Efforts should be successful.
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- 15.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
- c. Continue to modify radiation monitors IAW Exercise timeline
-1235 IF the General Emergency has not been classified at this point inject Message #12.
-1300 Release rate peaks and begins to trail off and will go below Tech Specs at approximately 1600.
-1345 A wind shift will occur that will result in ERPA 5 being added to the Protective Action Recommendation.
-1600 Exercise is Terminated - this is injected at the Direction of the Emergency Planning Manager.
Supplemental 5 TSC conwoller and Simulator conWolledSM Message 12 TSC or EOF Conwoller/
ED Message 13 All facility lead Controllers/AlI facility managers 74