ML041410115
| ML041410115 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/2004 |
| From: | Ernstes M Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Byrne S South Carolina Electric & Gas Co |
| References | |
| 50-395/04-301 | |
| Download: ML041410115 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000395/2004301
Text
May 19, 2004
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
ATTN: Mr. Stephen A. Byrne
Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
P. O. Box 88
Jenkinsville, SC 29065
SUBJECT:
VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION - NRC EXAMINATION REPORT
Dear Mr. Mr. Byrne:
During the period April 19-22, 2004, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administered
operating tests to employees of your company who had applied for licenses to operate the Virgil
C. Summer Nuclear Station. At the conclusion of the examination, the examiners discussed the
examination questions and preliminary findings with those members of your staff identified in
the enclosed report. The written examination was administered by your staff on April 28, 2004.
All six Reactor Operator applicants passed both the written and operating examinations. A
Simulation Facility Report is included in this report as Enclosure 2. There were three post
examination comments. Post examination comment resolutions are included in this report as
Enclosure 3.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter
and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs
document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site
at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (404) 562-4638.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael E. Ernstes, Chief
Operator Licensing and
Human Performance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No.:
50-395
License No.:
Enclosures: (See page 2)
SCE&G
2
Enclosures:
1. Report Details
2. Simulation Facility Report
3. Post Examination Comment
cc w/encls:
R. J. White
Nuclear Coordinator Mail Code 802
S.C. Public Service Authority
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Electronic Mail Distribution
Kathryn M. Sutton, Esq.
Winston & Strawn LLP
Electronic Mail Distribution
Henry J. Porter, Director
Div. of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.
Dept. of Health and Environmental
Control
Electronic Mail Distribution
R. Mike Gandy
Division of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.
S. C. Department of Health and
Environmental Control
Electronic Mail Distribution
Jeffrey B. Archie, General Manager
Nuclear Plant Operations (Mail Code 303)
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Electronic Mail Distribution
Ronald B. Clary, Manager
Nuclear Licensing & Operating
Experience (Mail Code 830)
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Electronic Mail Distribution
Steve Furstenburg
Training Manager
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
P. O. Box 88 (Mail Code P-40)
Jenkinsville, SC 29065
SCE&G
Distribution w/encls:
K. Cotton, NRR
C. Evand, (Part 72 Only)
L. Slack, RII EICS
RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB
PUBLIC
OFFICE
RII:DRS
RII:DRS
RII:DRS
RII:DRP
SIGNATURE
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
NAME
RBaldwin:pmd
LMiller
MErnstes
KLandis
DATE
5/12/04
5/14/04
5/17/04
5/17/04
E-MAIL COPY?
YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO YES
NO
PUBLIC DOCUMENT
YES
NO
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\\ORPCheckout\\FileNET\\ML041410115.wpd
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket No.:
50-395
License No.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) Company
Facility:
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Location:
P. O. Box 88
Jenkinsville, SC 29065
Dates:
Operating Test, April 19 - 22, 2004
Written Examination, April 28, 2004
Examiners:
Richard S. Baldwin, Chief, Senior Operations Engineer
Lee R. Miller, Senior Operations Examiner
Approved by:
M. Ernstes, Chief
Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
ER 05000395/2004301; 04/19 - 22/04; Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station; Licensed Operator
Examinations.
The NRC developed the written examination, the NRC and licensee co-developed the operating
test. The operator licensing initial examination outlines were developed by the NRC and the
details to those outlines were developed by the licensee, reviewed by the NRC and
administered by NRC examiners in accordance with the guidance of NUREG-1021, Operator
Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Draft Revision 9. The examination
implemented the operator licensing requirements of 10 CFR §55.41, and §55.45.
The NRC administered the operating examinations April 19 - 22, 2004. The licensee
administered the written examination on April 28, 2004. All six Reactor Operator applicants
passed the operating and written examinations.
No significant issues were identified.
Report Details
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA5 Operator Licensing Initial Examinations
a.
Inspection Scope
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA5 Operator Licensing Initial Examinations
a.
Inspection Scope
The NRC developed the written examination. The NRC and licensee co-developed the
operating test. The operator licensing initial examination outlines were developed by the
NRC and the details to those outlines were developed by the licensee, reviewed by the
NRC and administered by NRC examiners in accordance with the guidelines specified
in NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Draft
Revision 9. The NRC examination team reviewed the proposed examination.
Examination changes agreed upon between the NRC and the licensee were made
according to NUREG-1021 and incorporated into the final version of the examination
materials.
The examiners reviewed the licensees examination security measures while preparing
and administering the examinations to ensure examination security and integrity
complied with 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests.
The examiners evaluated six Reactor Operator (RO) applicants who were being
assessed under the guidelines specified in NUREG-1021. The examiners administered
the operating tests during the period of April 19 - 22, 2004. Members of the Virgil C.
Summer Nuclear Station training staff administered the written examination on April 28,
2004. The evaluations of the applicants and review of documentation were performed
to determine if the applicants, who applied for licensees to operate the VC Summer
Nuclear Station, met requirements specified in 10 CFR Part 55.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
The licensees operating examination submittal was within the range of acceptability
expected for a proposed examination. All six RO applicants passed both the operating
test and written examination. The licensee submitted three post examination comments
concerning the written examination. The RO written examination and answer key, and
licensees post examination comments may be accessed in the ADAMS system
(ADAMS Accession Numbers, MLO41320360 and MLO41320358).
2
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
On April 23, 2004, the examination team discussed generic issues with Mr. K. Nettles
and members of his staff. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials
examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary
information was identified.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee personnel
B. Davis, Training Instructor, Operations
C. Dickey, Training Instructor, Operations.
D. Edwards, Control Room Supervisor
S. Furstenburg, Manager, Nuclear Training
D. Gatlin, Manager, Operations
A. Koon, Supervisor, Operations Training
K. Nettles, General Manager, Nuclear Support
R. Quick, Senior Training Instructor, Operations
R. Sweet, Supervisor, Licensing
NRC personnel
J. Reese, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
Enclosure 2
SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT
Facility Licensee: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1
Facility Docket No.: 05000395
Operating Tests Administered on: April 19-22, 2004
This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit
or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of
noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification or
approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information that may be used in future
evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were
observed:
ITEM
DESCRIPTION
Panel 6108 Power Spike
There appeared to be a power spike on this
board during one simulator scenario. All
the meters and indications on this board
oscillated. The board returned to normal
and it appeared that the fluxuation did not
effect the simulator performance. This
event was not repeated during the rest of
the scenarios.
Enclosure 3
NRC Resolutions to Virgil C Summer Nuclear Station Initial Post Exam Comments
RO QUESTION #11:
Comment:
The question asks what is the response of the pressurizer level system
with the selector switch in the 460/461 position, when a leak develops in
the sensing line on transmitter 460s reference leg near the connection to
the D/P Cell. The answer key indicates answer B as the correct answer
(i.e., a rise in LT-460, a decrease in charging flow, a decrease in actual
pressurizer level and pressurizer deviation alarm will come in). The
licensee recommends a change of the correct answer to D (i.e., a rise in
LT-460, an increase in charging flow, a decrease in pressurizer level, and
pressurizer heaters will energize). This recommendation is based on the
system line up. LT-460 is only used for indication while LT-461 is used to
control charging and other functions of the control system. The question
asked the expected plant response for the failure of LT-460, which is to
provide indication. The initial answer would have been correct if the
question asked the same information about LT-461, which is the
controlling channel. The licensee used the simulator in two different
instances, (different steam space leak rates of 10 and 75 gpm
respectively) to determine the expected response. In each case, the
simulator proved that answer D was the correct answer. The licensee
recommends that answer B be replaced with answer D.
NRC Resolution:
Recommendation accepted. Review of the additional reference material
confirmed that for selection switch position 460/461, D is the correct
answer. The answer key was changed to reflect that D as the only
correct answer.
RO QUESTION #15:
Comment:
The question asks what would could cause an CMPTR ROD DEV alarm.
The answer key indicates D (An IPCS computer Alarm) as the correct
answer. This answer was obtained from the annunciator response
procedure (ARP) for the above alarm. The licensee points out that the
ARPs list of probable causes in not encompassing and that other items
not listed could also cause this annunciator to go into alarm. The
licensee recommends that C (An error or failure from both DRPI data
cabinets) could also be an answer. This recommendation is based on
System Matter Expert (SME) opinion. The SME states that Without
specifically stating what the failure mode is, it is possible to have this
alarm in response to many types of DRPI data cabinet failures.
NRC Resolution:
Recommendation accepted. Review of additional reference material
provided and SME opinion, confirmed that, under certain conditions, C
could be an additional correct answer. The answer key was changed to
reflect C as an additional correct answer.
2
Enclosure 3
RO QUESTION #38:
Comment:
The question asks what would be the effect on the ESFLS system when
performing maintenance on XIT-5901 while in an A1 work week.
Because of this maintenance APN-5901 power was obtained from APN-
1FA. The normal feeder breaker for APN-1FA, trips open due to a fault.
The answer key indicates that C (A Train loads will remain connected
and ESFLS will be disbled) is the correct answer. The licensee
recommends that answer D (B Train Loads will remain connected and
ESFLS will be disabled) also be considered an additional correct answer.
The licensee states that the stem does not stipulate that a vital bus is lost
and it does not stipulate that ESFLS on Train B will not be actuated.
They additionally state that Train A or B running equipment will remain
running. Therefore the first part of distractors C and D are correct.
When APN-1FA power is lost, this causes the A train of ESFLS to be
lost, rendering it disabled. The second part of distractor C and D
stated the same information, that ESFLS is disabled. The licensee
correlated that if ESFLS Train A was disabled due to the conditions in
the stem, then the assumption could be made that this was equivalent to
the words used in distractors C and in the case for distractor D since
the words did not specifically state the B Train of ESFLS then both
distractors would answer the question adequately. The licensee
recommended that both answers C and D are acceptable.
NRC Resolution:
Recommendation accepted. The possible answers, distractors C and
D, did not specify the respective train of ESFLS that was affected or the
whole ESFLS system. This inadvertently increased the number possible
answers. The question was written with the understanding that the train
designation at the beginning of the distractor was carried throughout the
entire distractor and encompassed the train of ESFLS. The licensee
pointed out that not designating the train affected could result in
confusion when deciding which answer was correct. In light of this new
information, it was decided that an additional answer of D be allowed.
The answer key was changed to allow D as an additional correct
answer.