ML041120304

Undated Evaluation of Corrosion Identified on Several Containment Air Cooler Nuts and Welds

ML041120304
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	04/16/2004
From:	- No Known Affiliation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2004-0140
Download: ML041120304 (2)

Text

Evaluation of Corrosion Identified on Several Containment Air Cooler Nuts and Welds On February 11, during a tour of the containment building, the inspectors identified four material condition issues. The licensee initiated condition report (CR) 04-01177, 'Items Identified During Senior NRC Tour of Containment," and documented the issues/resolutions as follows:

• Pressurizer Heater Cables Were Supported By Blue Tie-Wraps: The tie-wraps were removed and cables arranged appropriately by electricians.

• Containment Air Cooler Drain Was Cloacid and Spilling Water: The licensee issued a work order and performed work to clear14f6 clogged line.

• Rust Found on Containment Air Cooler Stainless Steel Header Piping: This issue had been previously identified and documented in CR 03-04638, "Unexpected Observation of Material Used for Containment Air Coolers." The licensee's evaluations of the issue stated the rust was due to surface contamination either during or after fabrication, with the probable source being embedded particles of carbon steel left by commonly used carbon steel cleaning tools such as wire brushes or needle grinders. The licensee concluded that the oxidized layer remained thin and presented no danger of serious degradation, therefore required no additional corrective actions.

• Containment Air Cooler Service Water Tree Support Header Pedestal Bolts Found With Surface Rust: This issue had been previously identified in CR 03-09479, "CAC Service Water Tree Fasteners Corroding." The licensee closed this issue with the following justification: "Design Engineering and the drawings for these bases, specify ASTM A193, Grade B-7 bolting, which is carbon steel. The reason engineering chose the B-7 material in lieu of stainless steel, was for shear strength. Engineering also said that no painting of the bolts was required. No Deficiency exists." %J

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Subsequent to the questions raised by the inspectors and the initiation of CR 04-01177,.

the licensee initiated further evaluated the containment air cooler bolting issue in CR 04-01212, "Bolts on the Supports for the CAC Piping are Unpainted and Shows Signs of Rust." The evaluation stated that the engineering work request that installed the supports required that all exposed carbon steel and concrete surfaces shall be primed and painted. The resolution of the issue was to initiate a work order [Order 200083336]

to coat the subject bolts in accordance with appropriate specification. This will be accomplished prior to Mode 2.

Although the condition report stated that the work would be accomplished prior to Mode 2, the issue was dispositioned by the RSRB as a post-restart item and the Mode 2 restraint was closed with a due date [for the corrective action of coating the bolts] of March 28, 2004. After discussions with the inspectors regarding the timeliness of this corrective action, the Maintenance Supervisor is currently reassessing the disposition of this corrective action as post-restart.

The inspectors will further evaluate what may be a work performance issue regarding whether or not the engineering work request specifically required the carbon steel bolts to be coated.

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's actions to correct the deficiencies described above and found them to be adequate.

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Emergency Preparedness and Security Work Item Backlog Assessment In preparation for this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the Special Inspection Report, dated 12/22/03, from the Indian Point 2 Station, which discussed three green findings associated with backup power supplies to their emergency response facilities.

The inspectors requested a listing of backlog items associated with Emergency Preparedness and Security issues. The licensee provided the inspectors with a list of condition reports and corrective actions for each area. The breakdown of the Emergency Preparedness issues consisted of:

• 15 condition reports still under evaluation;

• 71 condition reports with open corrective actions; and

• 107 open corrective actions.

The breakdown of the Security issues consisted of:

• 22 condition reports still under evaluation;

• 46 condition reports with open corrective actions; and

• 80 open corrective actions.

Through discussions with licensee staff and review of the open condition reports and corrective actions, the inspectors did not identify any outstanding equipment issues that would significantly challenge the licensee's performance in the areas of Emergency Preparedness or Security.