ML041070384

Letter from Rep. Nita Lowey to Chairman Diaz Re Security at Indian Point

ML041070384
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	08/20/2003
From:	Lowey N US Congress
To:	Diaz N NRC/Chairman
References
FOIA/PA-2004-0042
Download: ML041070384 (2)

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I FAX: 1041 447 FR- pa~n sa"I O18tit, ;Z0331ti ViXork August 20,2003 Nils 1.Diaz, Ph.D.

Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Chairman Diaz:

I am writing to call your attention to a glaring security oversight at Indian Point Energy

Center in Buchanan, New York. Indian Point's three spent fuel pools, weakly reinforced and poorly guarded, remain highly vulnerable to a terrorist strike. Swift action to protect these facilities, which contain hundreds of tons ofradioactive material, is impcrativc to protect the

>* nearly 20 million people residing within a fifty mile radius of the plants.

Intelligence gathered since September 1,2001, suggests terrorist intentions to strike nuclear infrastructure. Plans ofU.S. nuclear facilities discovered in Al Quaida caves during U.S.

military operations in Afghanistan provided perhaps the earliest indication that terrorists had not casually contemplated but Tather assiduously studied the option of sabotaging'a nuclear reactor.

In early March, fresh intelligence confirmed our worst fears: terrorists continued to plot attacks against nuclear and other critical infrastructure. Reports of a terrorist plan to sabotage the Palo Verde nuclear power plants in Arizona were sufficiently serious that the National Guard was immediately deployed to secure the plant.

.While tfle security of the Indian Point's perimeter and reactors have received considerable attention since September 11, 2001,protection of spent fuel pools hasbeen largely ignored. Tcrroristsmight use trucks fllled with explosives, backpack-sized platter charges, shoulder-fired missiles, or fue-laden commercial aircraft to damage these fragile facilities.

Unfortunately, none of the 300 force-on-force drills conducted by NRC at the nation's nuclear power plants since 1991 have included attacks on the spent fuel pools. It remains uiiclear whether the force-on-force drill recently held at Indian Point incorporated a spent fuel pool scenario.

The dismal performance of Indian Point guards in smaller, planned drills does not inspire confidence. In a mid-August 2002 test, a mock assault force gained access to the spent fuel pools in 60 seconds. In an earlier drill, it was able to simulate placement of explosives throughout those buildings in 36 seconds. Amazingly, The NRC has failed to assess the vulnerability of spent fuel pools to several plausible attack scenarios. A study conducted by the NRC in February 2001 (REG-1738), for example, excluded, "the potential consequences of a ZOOj XVA L:ST ISA CO/MM/OT

sabotage event that could directly cause off-site fissio product dispersion, for example, a vehicle bomb driven into or otherwise significantly daging the spent fuel pool."

Although the precise effect of a bomb or missile attack on the spent fuel ponds remains uncertain, the likely impact of an aircraft collision is b4ter understood. An October2000 NRC study on spent fuel pool accident risks found a 45% probability that "a large aircraft crash would penetrate a 5-foot-thick reinforced concrete wall." Th' walls and roof of the structure housing Indian Point's spent fuel pools contain approximately 8 inches and 6 inches of concrete, respectively. More worrisome, the study estimated 50 ,Olikelihood that a collision would uncover the stored fuel, rising a catastrophic radioactive fire. Although the two planes that struck the World Trade Center flew directly over Indian Point, NRC has failed to require additional hardening of spent fuel pools to withstand aircraft impact. The revised design basis threat, which specifies the types of threats nuclear plaxts must anticipate, excludes an airborne attack on spent fuel pools.

This neglect is striking, given the economic and public health consequences of a successful strike on parts of the plant. Indian Point's tiree spent fuel pools contain approximately 700 tons ofradioactive material, much ff which is Cesium 137, a-long-lived isotope that moves swiftly up the food chain. The NR ' has acknowledged that a spent fuel pool fire could lead to release of all radioactive material in the pools. The Institute for Resource and Security Studies found that a spent fuel pool fire at Indian Point 2 and 3 could render uninhabitable a land area of 95,000 square kilometers and 75,000 square kilometers, respectively. The human casualties and economic impacts of such a release would be too chilling to contemplate.

I urge you to carefully consider all options for strengthening security at Indian Point's spent fuel pools, including reinforcement of spent fuel Fool walls, increased spacing between spent fuel rods to reduce the risk: of catastrophic fire, aid transfer of cooled fuel into dispersed, dry casks. Attacks involving bomb-laden general aviation aircraft, fuel-laden commercial aircraft, and large truck bombs should be incorporated Into the design basis threat and tested in future force-on-force exercises. In light ofDepartmen of Homeland Security warnings of

. imminent suicide hijackings, continued inaction is unasceptable.

Recogaizing the vulnerability of Indian Point'sfspent fuel pools and reactors to a terrorist attack, I called for the orderly decommissioning ofthe plants last year. Until that day arrives, I will continue to fight for the best possible safety and se urity at this facility.

Thank you in advance for your attention, and I jook forward to hearing from you soon.

, . Sincerely.

-Nita M. Ifwcyy coo. Il oO/tZ/O7