ML040640734
| ML040640734 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/2002 |
| From: | Lloyd M, Jacqwan Walker Entergy Operations |
| To: | NRC Region 4 |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2003-0358 02-E-0004-01, Rev 0 | |
| Download: ML040640734 (31) | |
Text
Zone 99-M PSA Analysis for Operator Action SDP Table of Contents Purpose..........
2 References..........
2 Assumptions..........
2 Analysis..........
3 Results.........
5; 5
Electronic Files..........
6 Attachment I..........
7.........
13.........
18.........
23.........
25.........
26.........
27.........
31 Prepared By: Jessica Walker Reviewed By: Michael Lloyd Initi Initials~
Date: 3A4 D; Date:_3-/-!6'/
Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page I Calc 02-E-0004-01. Rev. 0 N I,\\/
Purpose:
The purpose of this write up is to document the calculation of the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) for the ANO-1 model given a fire in zone 99-M.
The CCDP can then be used in combination with the fire ignition frequency to provide a total CDF for a fire in zone 99-M.
The secondary purpose of this write up is to provide the NRC review staff with the information they requested to perform their phase 3 of the Significance Determination Process (SDP)
(Reference 3).
The NRC has requested the following CCDP values for zone 99-M:
- 1. The CCDP with current assumed cable failures given NO operator action
- 2. The CCDP with red cables wrapped given NO operator action
- 3. The CCDP with green cables wrapped given NO operator action
References:
- 2. ANO Calculation 98-E-0039-04,Rev. 0, "ANO-1 HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS WORK PACKAGE FOR THE ANOI PSA MODEL REVISION 2":
- 3. ANO Condition Report: CR-ANO-1-2001-0723 Corrective Action 8.
Assumptions:
I. The ANO-I IPEEE fire model was used for this evaluation. This model was taken from Reference 1. The method of quantification used in the IPEEE fire evaluation was adhered to for this evaluation. It is important to note that this method does vary from the current PSA practices seen in the base PSA model. For example: the fire model has HRA values directly in the fault tree with their nominal values. The fire model also conservatively takes no credit for the station blackout diesel. The only deviation from the IPEEE fire method was the truncation value. The new technology will allow truncation at IE-09 instead of the previous
- tC.
value of IE-07. The lower truncation was used to ensure greater completeness of the cutset results.
- 2. The fire protection engineers provided the failures in the zone listed in Attachment 1. For most valves and breakers, no attempt was made to establish failure mode.
Rather, all components listed by fire protection were failed in all of their failure modes unless specifically stated otherwise in the fire protection component listing.
- 3. Based on Reference 1, the main feedwater system was assumed to fail as a result of a fire in zone 99--M. However, the PSA model requires an operator action to prevent overfill by main fedwater.
Since the main feedwater system is assumed to fail, this failure mode was eliminated from the PSA model for fire zone 99M. This was accomplished by setting the following events to FALSE:
EXCESSMFWA, EXCESSMFWB,
- XSMFWTOA, XSMFWTOB, and SGOFREC.
Prepared by J. M. Walker Page 2 Calc 02-E-0004-0I. Rev. 0 Reviewved by M. Lloyd
- 4. An operator action is placed in the model to manually stop overfill of the steam generators A>
due to EFW. The recovery only appears with the P-7A pump. Since the P-7A pump will ONLY be operated and controlled with a local manual action, the operator action includes the requirement to prevent overfill and a secondary recovery is unnecessary.. This was accomplished by setting the event SGOFREC2 to FALSE.
- 5. The EFW system has solenoid control valves that are normally open and are energized to close valves. Cables for the P-7B side control valves (CV-2646 and CV-2648) pass through zone 99-M. Based on the cables going through the zone, the fire could cause the either of the cables to short and cause it associated valve to go closed. The probability of this hotshort is considered higher than a typical hotshort probability for MOVs (6.8E-02, based on NUREG/CR-2258). A value of 0.25 has been used in this evaluation based on Attachment 6.
- 6. The NRC has requested an evaluation assuming green train cables are wrapped. However, the zone in question contains green train equipment. Since wrapping the green train cable would not protect the actual components in the zone, the components in the zone are considered failed when the green train raceways are wrapped.
- 7. It is assumed that the NRC request for the CCDP without operator action refers to operator ))
J action OUTSIDE of the control room. This assumption is based on the fact that the available staff for ex-control room action will be diminished due to the fire brigade manpower a, requirements. Therefore, only operator actions outside of the control room will be set to TRUE in the no operator action analyses.
- 8. With the exception of the post-initiator operator recovery events QHFPWRSHT (Operator Fails to deenergize CV-2646 and 2648), XHFIMEDXXX (OPERATOR FAILS TO BEGIN HPR FOLLOWING M-LOCA), and XHFI SMALLX (OPERATOR FAILS TO BEGIN HPR FOLLOWING S-LOCA), post-initiator operator recoveries were credited only if the recoveries were also credited in the ANO-I IPEEE fire analysis, Reference 1. Recovery QHFPWRSHT is described in the Analysis Section, below; XHFIMEDXXX and XHF I SMALLX are in-control room responses that are not affected by the fire.
An alvsis:
Fire Protection provided the list of components either in 99-M or with cables in 99-M. This list is provided as Attachment 1. Attachment 1 shows the components are separated into 5 categories.
- Blue (blank in Column 1) - fire modeling has shown the cable will not be affected by a fire so the component does not need to be failed even though it has a cable in the zone.
- Black (B in Column 1) - This component will fail regardless of which conduits are wrapped.
- Red (R in Column 1) - These components are considered protected when the red train cables are wrapped in the zone
- Green (G in Column 1) - These components are considered protected when the green train cables are wrapped in the zone.
- Orange (O in Column 1) - These are swing components. They typically have redundant power supply or control cables and are considered protected with either red or green train wrapped cables.
Consistent with the NRC request specified in the Purpose, three scenarios will be evaluated:
Prepared by J. M. Walker Page 3 Calc 02-E-0004-01. Rev. 0 Reviewed by M. Lloyd
- 1. All current failures: components coded Black, Red, Green and Orange will befailed
- 2. Red train wrapped: components coded Black and Green will be failed
- 3. Green train wrapped: components coded Black and Red will be failed (plus Green equipment located in the zone)
Once these three lists of components were created, the associated lists of basic events were created. The mapping file from Reference I (betagal.dbf) was used to create the list of basic events affected by a fire in zone 99-M. This mapping file relates a component with every basic event it affects in the model. Since the fire fault tree model also contains module events and since their constituent basic events have been pruned from the model, these module events are also listed in the mapping file. Attachments 2 through 4 list the basic events (including module events) which will be set to TRUE in the fault tree model for each of the above scenarios.
Prior to using them, each of the mapping files were reviewed for appropriateness. Three errors in the Reference I tag file were found as part of this process. The following maps were removed from Attachment 2, 3 and 4 map files for the reason given.
- DMMIYIIIAC to B5141B, because breaker B5141B is actually a spare breaker with no function
- SMV13641XK to CV3641, because CV-3641 has been changed to a manual valve
- QMM I P7BTRF to CV2869, because valve CV-2888 is in the recirculation path for P-7B and failure of CV-2869 alone would not cause flow diversion and fail the pump. -4 list the final basic event lists provided for each scenario.
For each scenario, a set of equivalence gates was created using the basic events in each basic event list. In this process, each basic event was set equal to ".T." in an equivalence gate. Each set of equivalence gates was then input into the Reference I ANO-I fire fault tree model to create three versions of the fault tree model, one for each scenario. The model is then reviewed for possible recoveries or problems with the failed events.
In zone 99-M, the two P-7B control valves are affected as discussed in Assumption 5. However for the B side generator the only failure of module QMMlSGBP7B is CV-2648. Since this valve is not a definite failure and will require a hotshort to go closed, the model will be changed to account for this and provide a more realistic risk estimate. Attachment 5 shows the exact model changes made. Basically, a new gate CNTVLVFAILS was added to the "OR" gate above QMMISGBP7B. This gate is an "AND" gate of two events. Event HSCV2648 is the hotshort of CV-2648 set to 0.25 and event QHFPWRSHT is the failure of operations to de-energize the valve and cause it to fail open. Operations Procedure OP-1 106.006 provides discussion of these valves and instructs the operations staff on which panel provides the capability to de-energize and open the valves. An operator action was created for this event using the spreadsheet method discussed in Reference 2. A printout of the HRA spreadsheet output for QHFPWRSHT is provided in Attachment 8. The value provided from the spreadsheet is 2.26E-I.
In addition to the above modeling changes, initiating event TI (REACTOR/TURBINE TRIP) was set to TRUE, since the fire in assumed to produce a reactor trip. This is consistent with the Reference I fire modeling.
Prepared by J. M. Walker Page 4 Calc 02-E-0004-01, Rev. 0 Reviewed by M. Lloyd
Once these changes were made, all ".T." events were set to TRUE and each of the three trees were compressed.
The PRAQuant software was then used to quantify the TOP gate in each scenario model at a truncation of IE-9. The resulting cutsets then went through a short set of manipulations before the final answer was reached.
The mutually exclusive file was then DELTermed from each of these cutsets. Then, all of the events discussed in Assumptions 3 and 4 were set to FALSE (i.e., EXCESSMFWA, EXCESSMFWB, XSMFWTOA, XSMFWTOB, SGOFREC, SGOFREC2). The post -initiator recoveries not credited in the IPEEE were also set to TRUE in the cutsets. The complete list of these recoveries is located in Attachment 7.
The process followed was similar for all three scenarios discussed above. However, for the red train wrapped scenario, no model changes were needed, since the additional fire wrapping will protect the valves from fire damage.
To generate the CCDP without credit for ex-Control Room operator recoveries, the recovery events listed in Attachment 7 were set to TRUE in three cutsets and each of the cutsets were subsumed.
Results:
The following table shows the final results from the analysis of zone 99-M and the associated cutset file.
Zone 99-M CCDP with ex-control room recoveries True ANO CCDP value with recoveries applied 1.27E-03 f"
3 8.32E-04 5 "
1.26E-03 LO < - w t ALL Current Failures RED train protected Green train protected 5.76E-02 7.96E-03 5.76E-02 Prepared by J. M. Walker Resiewed by M. Lloyd Page 5 Calc 02-E-0004-01. Rev. 0
Electronic Files:
The following electronic files are included with this document.
.1 File Name File Size File Date File Time Description (KIB)::
Zone99MSDP.zip n/a 03/01/02 n/a WINZip file containing electronic files associated with this calculation This WINZip file contains the following files File Name File Size File Date File Time Description 21299MG.CAF 128,449 02/21/02 03:43p 99M Green wrapped CAFTA fault tree file before trues compressed (Scenario 3) 21299MGC.CAF 60,421 02121/02 03:43p 99M Green wrapped CAFTA fault tree file after trues compressed (Scenario 3) 21299MR.CAF 127.845 02121/02 03:00p 99M Red wrapped CAFTA fault tree file before trues compressed (Scenario 2) 21299MRC.CAF 63,089 02/21/02 03:01p 99M Red wrapped CAFTA fault tree file after trues compressed (Scenario 2) 99-M FAILED 31,232 02/28/02 09:17p List from Fire protection for Zone 99-M components (colorcoded 215) (2).xls 99M Changes made.xls 37.376 02125/02 09:47a List of fault tree changes made in 99-M 99m SDP Write UP.doc n/a 03/01/02 rn/a WORD document of this calculation 99M.QNT 5,036 03/01/02 08:59a PRAQuant file used to quantify for this write up 99mbase.CUT 1,069,446 03/01/02 08:54a 99M Baseline cutset file (Scenario 1) 99MGR.cut 1.060,286 03/01/02 09:00a 99M Green wrapped cutset file (Scenario 2) 99MRED.cut 832,230 03/01/02 08:56a 99M Red wrapped cutset file (Scenario 3)
ANOIFIRE.BE 531,456 03/01/02 08:47a Basic Event file with new hotshort components and recoveries ANOIFIRE.GT 1,110,016 11/26/01 08:53a Original ANO-l Fire IPEEE gt file ANOIFIRE.TC 108,544 12/20/95 06:34p Original ANO-I Fire PEEE tc file APPRC.CAF 60,713 02/25/02 09:47a 99M Baseline CAFTA fault tree file after trues compressed (Scenario I)
APPRONLY.CAF 129,077 02/21/02 02:53p 99M Baseline CAFTA fault tree file before trues compressed (Scenario 1)
QHFPWROFF_99m.X 34,304 02/25/02 09:13a HRA spreadsheet for recovery QHFPWRSHT L S_
MODEL.ZIP 265,707 11/07/01 03:25p Original set of files from ANO-I Fire IPEEE Calculation File Name File Size File Date File Time Description MODEL.ZIP 265,707 11/07/01 03:25p Original set of files from ANO-I Fire [PEEE Calculation (see listing below)
DATABASE.ZIP 272,273 11/07/01 03:25p Original set of files from ANO-I Fire IPEEE Calculation (see listing below)
This WINZip file contains the following files File Name File Size -
File Date File Time Description (KA)
ANOIFIRE.
C F 131,355 03105196 12:45p
_Original file from ANO-I Fire IPEEE Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 6 Calc 02-E-0004-01, Rev. 0
Calculation ANOIFIRE.BE 531,456 03/05/96 09:29a Original file from ANG-I Fire IPEEE Calculation ANOIFIRE.GT 1,110,016 03105/96 09:30a Original file from ANO-1 Fire IPEEE Calculation ANOIFIRE.TC 108,544 12/20/95 06 :34p Original file from ANO-1 Fire IPEEE Calculation MUTEXC 7,795 11/09/92 09:29a Original file from ANO-I Fire IPEEE Calculation MUTEXC.CUT 14,114 08/29/95 05:41p Original file from ANO-1 Fire IPEEE Calculation File Name File Size File Date File Time Description DATABASE.ZIP 272,273 11/07/01 03:2Sp Original set of files from ANO-1 Fire IPEEE Calculation This WINZip file contains the following files File Name File Size File Date File Time Description BETAGA1.DBF 625,301 03/05/96 03 :44p Original file from ANO-1 Fire IPEEE Calculation BETAGA1.MDX 95,232 03/05/96 03:45p Original file from ANO-I Fire IPEEE Calculation CRIT.DBF 2,226 03104/96 06 :24p Original file from ANO-I Fire IPEEE Calculation CRIT.TXT 700 03/29/95 09:36p Original file from ANO-I Fire IPEEE Calculation FINAL.DBF 15,236 03/05/96 05:00p Original file from ANO-I Fire IPEEE Calculation LOCA1.DBF 1,662,014 03/05/96 03:43p Original file from ANO-1 Fire IPEEE Calculation LOCAI.MDX 460,800 03/05/96 03:4 4p Original file from ANO-I Fire IPEEE Calculation LOCA197X.DBF 1,662,014 03/04/96 03:33p Original file from ANO-I Fire IPEEE Calculation LOCA197X.MDX 460,800 03/04/96 03:33p Original file from ANO-I Fire IPEEE Calculation SCEN.DBF 27,902 03/05/96 07:02p Original file from ANO-I Fire IPEEE Calculation SCEN.MDX 7,168 03/05/96 07:02p Original file from ANO-I Fire IPEEE I Calculation Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 7 Calc 02-E-0004-01, Rev. 0
Attachment I Initial List of Components Affected by the Fire from Fire Protection Sorted into 5 Color Categories with Fire Protection Comments Red - Red train Appendix R component; Green - Green train Appendix R component Orange - Swing component that would be available for either train.
Black - BOP equipment: Blue - equipment that will be available for any credible fire scenario Components were extracted from FIVE (cablesxls) and PDMS (Fire Zone impact report for 99-M}. In addition, some Black components were assumed to have cables in the zone.
In addition, some Black components were assumed to have cables in the zone.
Note: RTDs and related indicators were not compilied.
B A104 AllM Al 12 B
A211 B
A212 A3 A302 B
A304.
A305 A306 R
A307 R
A308 R
A31 0 A311 G
A4 G
A401 G
A402 G
A403 B
A404 G
A405 G
A406 S
A407 G
A408 G
A409 G
A410 0
A601 B
B15 B24 B25 B
B31 B
B41 B
B43 B
B44 B5 B512 B5122 B
B55 Listed cables do not affect operation of Al 1I Listed cables do not affect operation of Al 12 RCD 11 04A provides control power to A3. Fire models determined that realistic fires would not impact the cable.
Listed cables do not impact operation of breaker listed cable does not affect operation of A305 Fire models determined that realistic fires would not impact the associated cables.
Same cable as for P7B. Will not affect start of pump from control room.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Listed cable does not affect operation of component Listed cable does not affect operation of component Fire models determined that realistic fires would not impact the associated cables.
Fire models determined that realistic fires would not impact the associated cables.
Listed cable does not affect operation of breaker Swing appendix R component, but it is located in the zone.
Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 8 Calc 02-E-0004-1, Rev-. 0
856 B5622B B5653 B57 B8 B61 B612 B6123 B614 B6145A B6145B B62 B621 B622 B623 B63 B633 B634 864 B65 B7 B712 B72 C187 C539 Swing appendix R component, but it is located in the zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component in zone.
Component is listed due to loss of power source. However source is RS1. which is unaffected for a fire in this zone.
Component is listed due to loss of power source (861). Valve will fail in normally open position.
Component is risted due to loss of power source (661). Valve will fail in normally open position.
Component is listed due to loss of power source (861). Valve will fail in normally closed position.
Component is listed due to loss of power source (B611. Valve will fail in normally closed position.
Component is listed due to loss of power source (861). Valve will fail in normally open position.
Component is listed due to loss of power source (B61). Valve will fail in normally closed position.
Component is listed due to loss of power source IB61). Valve will fail in normally closed position.
Component is listed due to loss of power source (861). Valve will fail in normally closed position.
Component is listed due to loss of power source (8621. Valve will fail in normally closed position.
Valve listed due to loss of power (D25). D25 is not affected by a fire in this zone.
Cable listed does not impact valve operation. However, power to the valve (i.e. via RS2) is lost.
Valve listed due to loss of power. If ADVs are not needed then valve is in correct position.
This valve is powered from a red source (D
- 15) but is classified green because it is associated with P7A.
G G
B B
G G
G G
G 0
G G
G BG GGB C540 CV'000 CVIO09 CV1206 CV1221 CV1227 CV1228 CV1274 CV1400 CV1404 CV1406 CV1408 CVI410 CV1416 CV1 435 CV1437 CV2235 CV2613 CV2617 CV2618 CV2619 CV2620 B
6 6
G B
CV2625 Prepared by 1. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 9 CaUc 02-E0004-01, Rev. 0
CV2626 Valve listed due to loss of power. Valve is normally open. Therefore, loss of power causes valve to fail in proper position.
8 CV2627 This valveis powered from a red source (0I5) but is classified green because it is associated with P7A.
B CV2630 CV2645 R
CV2646 CV2647 R
CV2648 R
CV2663 R
CV2667 R
CV2668 CV2670 B
B R
R R
CV2674 CV2680 CV2692 CV2800 CV2802 CV2803 CV2806 CV2869 CV2870
.B CV3640 CV3641 G
CY3642 B
CV3643 G
CV3644 G
CV3807 G
CV3821 CV3840 G
CV3841 R
CV3850 R
CV3851 B
CV5611 B
CV7472 B
CV7473 B
005 D1104 D1109 R
D15 021 G
D2104 G
D2109 025 K4A G
K4B G
LTI002 B
LT2617 Valve listed due to loss of power. Loss of power causes valve to fail in proper position.
Valve listed due to loss of power. Loss of power causes valve to fail in proper position.
Valve listed due to loss of power. Valve is normally open. Therefore, loss of power causes valve to fail in proper position.
Fire models determined that realistic fires would not impact the associated cables.
Fire models determined that realistic fires would not impact the associated cables.
Valve listed due to loss of power (D25). Valve is normally closed. Therefore, loss of power causes valve to fail in proper position.
Changed to a manual valve. Will not fail Component is listed due to loss of power source (862). Valve will fail in the closed position.
Valve listed due to apparent loss of power. However, power is from RS1, which is not affected in this zone.
Same cable for A3 This is the control power for 85 which was survived fire modeling Component is listed due to loss of power source (10021. 002 is not affected by a fire in this zone.
Component is listed due to loss of power source (102). 002 is not affected by a fire in this zone.
Fire models determined that realistic fires would not impact the associated cables.
Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 10 Calc 02-E-0004-01. Rev. 0
LT2618 Component listed due to loss of power source (RS1). However, RSI is unaffected in this zone.
LT2620 Component listed due to loss of power source (RSI. However. RS1 is unaffected in this zone.
LT2622 Component listed due to loss of power source fY28). However, Y28 is unaffected in this zone.
LT2624 Component listed due to loss of power source (Y28). However, Y28 is unaffected in this zone.
LT2667 Component listed due to loss of power source (RS1). However, RS1 is unaffected in this zone.
B LT2668 LT2669 Component listed due to loss of power source (RS1). However, RS1 is unaffected in this zone.
LT2671 Component listed due to loss of power source fY28). However. Y28 is unaffected in this zone.
LT2673 Component listed due to loss of power source fY28). However. Y28 is unaffected in this zone.
B M55A G
P1 6B Component is listed due to loss of power source (I61)
G P34B P36A Fire models determined that realistic fires would not impact the associated cables.
0 P36B G
P36C P4A Listed cables do not prevent remote operation.
P48 Red train of pump would always be available.
G
- P4C R
P64A 0
PUB G
P64C G
- 7A A........................
P7B Failure of cable does not prevent starting of pump from control room.
B PT2617A
-PT26BA Component listed due to loss of power source (RS1). However, RS1 is unaffected in this zone.
PT26.88.
Component listed due to loss of power source Y28). However, Y28 i unaffected in this zone PT2667A Component listed due to loss of power source (RS8. However, RSY is unaffected in this zone.
PT2667B Component listed due to loss of power source Y28). However, Y28 is unaffected in this zone.
B
- PT2668A RA2 Component is listed due to loss of power source (DO2). D02 is not affected by a fire in this zone.
G RS2 G
RS4 SG2 Valve is normally open. Affected cables cannot cause spurious operation.
G
.ISG4 G
S
.G6 G
SG7 SV1072 IComponent is listed due to loss of power source (021)
- .SV1074 IComponent is rested due to loss of power source (D21). 021 is not affected by a fire in this zone.
SVlO82_ Component is Elsted due to loss of power source (021). 021 is not affected by a fire in this zone.
sviO84 Comnponent is listed due to loss of powersource (021). 021 is not affected by a fire in this zone.
- SVi092 iComponent is listed due to loss of power source (021). 021 is not affected by a fare in this zone.
?SV1O94
~Component is listed due to loss of power source (021). 021 is not affected by a fare in this zone.
- SV1270 Component is listed due to loss of power source (021). 021 is not affected by a fire in this zone.
!11........... _._
SV1271.Component is listed due to loss of power source (D211. D21 is not affected by a fire in this zone.
SV1272
'Component is ted due to loss of power source (021). D21 is not affected by a fire in this zone.
SV1273
'Component is listed due to loss of power source (021). D21 is not affected by a fire in this zone.
.SV2610 3 Valve islted due to loss of power (025). 025 ii not affected by a fire in this zone.
B
- SV3805 Prepared by J. M. Walker Page 11 Calc 02-E-0004-O1, Rev. 0 Review ed by M. Lloyd
iSV3815 SV3841
.SV5237
- SV5239 TE1 002 A
T1V79Oi Component is listed due to loss of power source (B611
- A _..,
TV7902 SComponent is listed due to loss of power source (861)
- B
.VEF24C Component is listed due to loss of power source (861)}
VEF24D;Component is listed due to loss of power source IB61}
iVSF1C IVSFID IVUC7B
.XO3 Annunciator cables have no effect on component X6 Component in zone.
Y22 Component in zone.
- Y24 Component in zone.
Y25 Component in zone. This is a new component that is probably not in the IPEEE model Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 12 Calc 02-E-0004-01. Rev. 0 List of affect events for Scenario I
-iComponent jj
+w!1 - BE:NAMECM?3
.P36B
?ARE11P36BE
!RS2
__DB4IOORS2F
.D2104
.DCD12104XR DOS IDMM1OOODo5 I B5622B
'DMMI1000D05 iD5
- DMM1000DO5
? D15
? DMM1000D15__
- Y22 DMM1000Y22
{Y22
___DMM1000Y22
?
NY22 DMMIOOOY22 IY22
,DMMIOOOY22 rYZ
?- ;DMM1Y22AAC
?
'Y(22 DMMIY22AAC
?(22
?:DMM1Y22AAC Y22
? DMM1Y221AC
~~~~~~~~~~~~~..................
'(22
- DMM1Y22IAC
?Y22
- DMMIY221AC
- --?
Y22
?_DMM1Y221AC
?
~~~~~-
IY22 I DMM1 Y221AC j
Y22
? DMM1Y2IDC N'Y22 DMM1Y221DC
?
Y22
- DSI100Y22F i Y22
?DSI1100YZ2X
?
A409
- ECB1A409XR K4B
- EDG1A4XXXO
~~~~~~.....................
K4B REDG1DG2XXA K4B
.EDGI Dd2X iTV7902A EMC17902AN
?TV7902B
- EMC17902BN A4 jEMM1A4XXXX A4 EMMlA4XXXX
?
IB55 EMM1B55B56
- B56 bEMMIB55BS6
?B622
?EMM1BSSBS6 j?856
? EMM1B5SB56
'B55 IEMM1B55B56 IB61 IEMMIB61XXX IB621 EEMM1B61XXX 1161
- EMM1B61XXX 4._........_._
B614 i EMM1B62XXX B62
?EMM1B62XXX B62
- EMM1B62XXX
- B63
- EMMl B63XXX Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 13 Calc 02-E-0004-O1. Rev. 0
8163_____ EMM1B63XXX
- A401
____EMMlB6XXXX
~B6
~
EMMI B6XXXX 1136
'EMM1B6XXXX
~1B612 IEMMIB6xxxx IX6 I:EMMlB6XXXX A~iiIEMMICE21IX A211 EMMlCB211X
'A21 2
'EMMIC8221X A212
- IEMMICB212X
- A308 iEMMICB308X A308
~
EMAr1 CB308X A408 iEMMICB408X iA408 iEMMICB40sX P168
- EMMIDG2FXA
'P168
___:M1GFXF
- SV5237
- EMMlDG2SAC
'SV5239 IEMM1DG2SAD
.CV3807
,EMMIDG2SW
- CV3807
~EMMi G2SWC
.T.7................L.A ITV7902A 1,EMMIRMCLCA
.623
'EMMIRMCLCF
- TV7902B
- EMMIRMCLDA
- TV7902B IEMMI RMCLDF
- A211
- ERE1211SRR
- A4
!.ERElA4LXXK
~A4
- EREIA4XlUE
- A4 ifERE'A4,(2E 8B6
!ERE1B6XUJXE
- B6
- ERElB6XUXK K4B
.ERE1DG2LXK
!K4B
-:EREIDG2UXK-
- CV2625
- FMM1CV2625
!CV2625
-"FMMICV2625
!CV2674 iFMM1CV2674 I CV2674
.FMMI CV2674 X
I FMMINNIYPO AS4 _
FMMiNNIYPO iRS4 IFMM1NNIYPO RS4
.FMM1NNIYPO
- CV2680 iFMM1 SGABVC
.CV2680 FMM1 SGABVC T CV2630
- MMI SGBEIVC
.L_
.CV2630 FMM1SGBBVC iSV3815 TGMM1TRAN2M
.SV3815
- GMM1TRAN2M Prepared by J. M. Walker Page 14 Calc 02-E-0004-01, Rev. 0 Reviewed by M. Lloyd
!,VSF1C 2:GMMlVSFlCM 4B62-3 "---,iGMMlVSFI1CM CV7472 GMMlVSFlCM
.VSFIC
- GMMIVSFICM I;VSF1 D
!GMM1VSFIDM
~B633'GM1lVSFIDM
'CV7473
- GMMIVSFlDM
.SFID
___iGMMIVSFIDM CV20
- HMM1CV120'6---
CVI 227 iHMM1MU1214 CV1 227
- HMMlMU1214 CV1228
'IHMMlMU12I5
______28 HMMlMU1215 1P36B HMMIP36BFR kA30 Y;HMMlP36BFR P36B IHMM1P36BFS
.A307 HMM1 P36BFS
- A406
- HMMIP36CFR
- P36C H1-MM1P36CF-R P36C
- HMMlP36CFS A406 HNIM1 P36CF-S-'
CV1 406
- LMMICV1406
- CV1406
- LMMlCV1406 iCV1408 LMMICV140i.........
- CV1408
- LMM1CV1408 A405 LMM1 MPP34B
_:,O LMMI MPP34B
- P34B IMMIMPP34BT A405
- LMM1 MPP34B C6VI437""'
LMViO1437K CQV26I8 QAVI 02618C
- CV2668 i QAVI 02668C C1 87
- QBI11L2618N..
C-1
- iQBI1112622N iQBI1L2667N
.C187
- QBI1L267IN
- C187 IQLCI INAPXD IC187 i LCI INAXXD
- C187 IQLCI INBPXD
- C187 QLClINBXXD
.C187 LCI lNCPXD C187QLCI1INCXXD 1i87 QLC1IINDPXD
- C187 QLC1 INDXXD
- C187 2
- QMM126450A
~C187 iQMM126470A Prepared by J. M. Walker Rexiewed by M. Lloyd Page 15 Calc 02-E-0004-01. Rev. 0
IC187 1QMM126470A
.C187
, QMM1L2617H 1C18i
.QMM1L2617H iLT2617 iiQMMIL2617H
'C187 iQMM1L2618H jC187 iQMM1L2620H C87 QMM1U2621H
,187
,QMM1L2621H
.C187 QMMI L2622H
,C187 QMM1 L2624H
,C187' QMM1 L2668H LT2668
,QMM1L2668H
.C187 iQMMiL2668H i
C187 QMM1L2669H IC1 87
___QMM1l-2672H
- C187
,QMM1L2672H rC187 QMM1 L2673H
.C187
,QMM1MSAATP
.C187
.QMM1MSABTP
- C187
,.QMMIMSBATP Ci 87 MM1MSBBTP tCV2680
.QMM1MSLIAA
- .CV2680
!;QMM1MSLIAF
'CV2630
.QMMIMSLIBA
- CV2630 QMM1MSLIBF
'PT2617A QMM1P2617A t18
- MMP6A I C187 QMM1 P2617A
.C187
.:QMM1P2617A
- C187
- QMM1P2617B
.C187
.QMM1P2617B iC187
- QMMlP2618A
- .C187
.QMMIP2618A
.C187 QMM1P2618B
'.C187
.QMM1 P2618B
'.C187
- QMM1P2667A
.187
'QMMI P2667A PT2687 0MM1P 667B i __- _
.C187 _QMMIP2668A
- .P268A i QMM1 P2668A j
0:C187 QMM1 P2668B
- C187
- QMM1P2668B iP7A lQMM1P7ATRA i
..CV2802 iQMMIP7ATRA
.PiA
.QMM1 P7ATRF
- CV2627
.QMMlSGAP7A Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 16 Calc 02-E.0004-01, Rev. 0
3CV2627 3QMM1SGAP7A
.CV2646 QMM1SGAP7B 3CV2667 3 QMM1SGASTM
- CV2620 QMM1SGBP7A 3CV2620
.QMM1SGBP7A
- CV2648
'QMM1SGBP7B 3CV2617 3QMM1SGBSTM 3
.QMM1TASADM 3CV2663 3QMM1TASADM
.C187
!QMM1TMAEFW
'C187 i MM ITMAEFW IC187
'QMMITMBEFW IC187 iQMMITMBEFW C_87
.MMTMBEF
.C187 IQMM1TMBEFW 3C187
'QMM1VMAORD 3C187 IQMMIVMAORD 0C187 OQMM1VMBORC iC187 3 QMMIVMBORC
- CV2663 QSV1 02663N iCV2663 QTDI C2663F iCV1000 IRMMIBIOOOC CV187O 3RMM1BIOOOC
- OViODO
-RMMICV1000 CV18000 3RMM1CVIOOO iA403 SCBIA403XR iA6OI SCBlA601XR ICV3644
- SMM123AXXXQ
.CV3640
_SMMI3XXX C3C187 3Q:SMM123BXXX iCV3643
=
SMMIAUXCLG
.3CV2663
.SMMVAUXCLG
'85653 ISMMlAUXCLG
- CV3841
- SMMlAV384I
- SV3841 ISMMIAV384I 3CV3841 3DSMM1AV3841 ISV3841
~SMMIAV384I
- CV3821 3SMM1E35BSW 3CV3821 3SMM1E35BSW A403 C
0SMM1P4BXXA CV3643 3SMV13643XK 3CV3644 ISMV1 3644XR SG4
.SSG1SG4XXK i
Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 17 Calc 02-E-0004-01, Rev. 0 List of Basic Events for Scenario 2 (Red Train Wrapped)
I RS2 ID D41ORS2F D2104 IDCD121O4XR B56228 DMM1000DO5 MOSDM MM1OOODO5 00D5
!DMM100DOD0____
iY22 MMM1000Y22
- Y22
'DMM100OY22 IY22
!DMMIOOOY22 Y22
!DMM1000Y22
- Y22
- DMM1Y22AAC
'Y22
!DMM1Y22AAC.-__
FY22 DMMlY22AAC IY22
- DMMlY221AC X22~MM1IY22IAC DMMM1YMAC IY22
~
DMM1Y22IAC IY22 DMM1Y221AC
- Y22 A:MM1Y221DC.
Y22
.DSIIOOY22F
- Y22
~
-DSt1 00YY22X X4B IEDGIDG2XXA
- K4B
'EDGIDG2XXF
- TV7902A EMC17902AN
'TV7902B
- EMC17902BN
- A4
- EMMIA4XXXX A4
- EMMIA4XXXX
!B56
- EMM1B55B56
- B56 iEMMi B55B56
- B55 MM1B5556
- 8622 4EMM1B55B56
- B55 IEMM1 B55B56 18621
- EMM1B61XXX MB61 EM16XXX
- B61 EMM1B6 XXX
- B614
- EMM1BB62)0XX
- B62 EMB2XXX
- 8B62
- EMM1B62XXX 863- _ _
EMMlB63XXX B63
- EMMIB63XXX A401
- EMMIB6XXXX Prepared by J. M. Walker Page 18 Calc 02-E.0004-01, Rev. 0 Re~iewed by M. Lloyd
- B612 IEMM1B6XXXX
.B6
', EMM1B6XXXX B6 EMM1 B6XXXX
'X6 EMM1B6XXXX A211 iEMM1CB211X
,A211 tEMMICB211X A212 EMMICB212X A212 zEMM1CB212X
'A408 IEMMICB408X
!A408.E EMM1CB408
!Pi6B rEMM1DG2FXA iP16B
'EMM1DG2FXF
'SV5237 lEMM1 DG2SAC
.SV5239
,iEMM1DG2SAD
'CV3807 i EMM1DG2SWC
.CV3807
.EMM1DG2SWC
_;_7 9 A
_EMM1 RMCLCA
!TV7902A
EMM1RMCLCF
!TV7902B f EMM1RMCLDA 1B6123
!.EMM1 RMCLDA
.TV79028 iEMM1RMCLDF
.A211 IERE1211SRR A4
.ERE1A4LXXK A4 ERE1A4X1UE
- A4
..ERE1A4X2UE
.B6
'ERE1 B6XUXE
,B6 ERE1B6XUXK
- K4B
'ERE1DG2LXK i__..._._.. ___
.K4B
'ERE1 DG2UXK
.CV2625 MM1CV2625
.CV2625
.'FMMICV2625 CV2674 FMM1 CV2674
.'CV2674
,FMM1CV2674 74 FMM1NN2YPO
,RS4
.FMMINNIYPO
'RS4
!.FMM1 NNIYPO
.RS4 F 1FMM1NNIYPO iCV2680
'FMM1SGABVC
- CV2680
!FMMISGABVC
_FMMl SGBBVC
'CV2630
,FMM1SGBBVC ISV3815
,GMM1TRAN2M
- SV3815
.GMMITRAN2M
.CV7472 i GMM1 VSF1CM
'VSF1C
.GMM1VSFICM B623
- GMM1VSF1CM VSFIC
, GMM1VSF1CM
- Prepared by 3. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 19 Calc 02-E-0004-O1, Rev. 0
IVSFI D
!GMMIVSFIDM B633 iGMMlVSFIDM CV7473 GMMIVSFIDM
- VSFlD
- GMMIVSFlDM
~CV126
!HMMICV1206 CV1227 HMMlMU1214 CV1227 HMMIMU1214
- CV1228
-HMMU25__
'CV1228
!HMMIMU1215 A406
'HMMI P36CFR i;P36C IHMM1P36CFR
~A406 iHMMlP36CFS IP36C
!HMMIP36CFS
- CV1406 iLMMICV1406
!CV1406
!LMMICV14D6
- CV1408 iLMMICV14O8 CV1408
- LMMlCV1 408 T34B
- LMMlMPP34B
!P34B
)'LMMI MPPP3BB A405 I ;LMWiPP34B................
~A405
- LMMlMPP34B
~~i437 LM Vi01437K
- CV2618
- AV1O2618C
.C187
___:QB11L2618N
- C187 I OB11 L2622N
'C187 QBl1L2667N iC187
- QBI1L267IN C187 LCI NAPXD
- C187 QLC1 INAXXD C187 OLCI INBPXD
- C187 iQLCIINBXXD
- C187
- QLC1 INCPXD JC187 IQLC1 INCXXD
- TC187 I QLCI INDXX IC187 QMM126450A
- C187
- QMM126450A
- C187
- QMM126470A IC187
'QMM1L26470A CIT267
- QMMIL2617H
- C187
- TQMM1L2617H IC187
- QMM1L2620H
'C187
~
.QMML2621 IC187
'QMM1L2621H C18f7 _
- 0QMMlL2622H Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 20 Calc 02-E-0004-01. Rev. 0
!C187 QMM1L2624H1i
- LT2668
,QMMIL2668H C187__
QMM1L2668H 1C187
!;QMM1L2668H 1 C187
,0MM1L2669H
- C187 jQMMIL2672H C187 IQMM1L2672H 0C187
.QMM1L2673H cI87 IQMM1MSAATP 0C187 IQMMIMSABTP
,C187 IQMM1MSBATP
,C187 QMM1MSBBTP
'CV2680 jQMM1MSLIAA
,CV2680 iQMM1MSLIAF iCV2630 QMM1MSLIBA
,CV2630
!QMM1MSLIBF iC187
!QMMIP2617A i.
0C187 QMM1 P26187A PT2617A QMM1P2617A iC187
!QMMIP26187B IC187
!QMMIP2617B
'0187OM MlP26567A 0C187
,QMM1P2618A
_i 0C187
,QMMIP2618B 0
C187
, QMM1P2618B I
0187
,QMM1P2668A 0C187
,QMM1P2667A IC187
- QMM1P26678 0C187
,QMM1P2667B 012687 fQMM1P2668Ai
,0187
,' MM1 P2668AB 0C187
,QMM1 P2668A
'P7A
- QMMIP7ATRA IP7A
- QMMlP7ATRF_ _
CV2627
,QMM1SGAP7A CV2627 3 QMM1SGAP7A 0iV2620 PQMM1SGBP7A_
CV2620
!QMM1SGBP7A iCV2617 iQMM1SGBSTM 0C187 iQMM1TMAEFW 0C187 OMMITMAEFW_-__
0187
_QMM.TMBEFW iC187
!QMM1TMBEFW jC187
'QMM1TMBEFW
,C187
!;QMMITMBEFW
- j.. _...................
Prepared by J. M. Walker Re-vewed by M. Lloyd Page 21 Calc 02-E-0004-01. Rev. 0
.C187
'QMM1VMAORD iC187
.QMM1VMAORD C187
!QMM1VMBORC iC187 jQMM1VMBORC
' CV1000 IRMM1B1000C
'CVio0
,RMM1B1O00C CV1000
, RMM1CV1000 i
jCV1000 1,RMMICV1000 A403 iSCBIA403XR iCV3644 iSMM123AXXX CV3640
'SMM23BXXX CV3642 SMM123BXXX
!CV3643
, SMM1AUXCLG
,B5653 jSMM1AUXCLG j
.CV3643
' SMM1AUXCLG iV84
___-.8I iCV3841 iSMM1AV3841 L___.___
TCV3841
.SMM1AY3841 SV3841 SMMIAV3841 iSV3841 i'SMM1AV3841 i CV3821 jSMMIE35BSW iCV3821 iSMM1E35BSW IA403 iSMM1P4BXXA
- CV3643
' SMV1 3643XK CV3644 i SMV13644XR
......._;==____............................
SG4
.SSG1SG4XXK Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewcd by M. Lloyd Page 22 Calc 02-E-0004-01. Rev. 0 List of Basic Events for Scenario 3 ( Green Train Wrapped)
J-Component I tJ=
E NAMEM..
.A211
.ERE1211SRR jA211
- EMMICB211X A211
,EMM1CB211X A212 iEMM1CB212X
'A212 IEMM1CB212X
!A307 jHMMIP36BFS
':A307
! HMM1P36BFR A308
_EMM
_CB3_8X A308
'EMM1CB308X jA4
'EMMIA4XXXX
.A4
,ERE1A4X2UE
.A4 jEREIA4XIUEi iA4 EMM1A4XXXX jA4
.EREIA4LXXK A401 iEMM1B6XXXX
.A403
- SCBIA403XR
.A403
'SMM1P4BXXA
,A405 LMM1 MPP34B
,A405 j LMM1 MPP34B
'A406
- .HMMIP36CFR
- A406
.HMM1P36CFS IA408
.EMMICB408X
- A408
.EMMiCB408X A409 ECB1A409XR
.B55
.EMM1B55B56 jB55
.EMM 855B56 B56
'j EMM1B55B56 6 B56 EMM1B55B56
.:85622B
.DMM1000DO5 B5653 SMMIAUXCLG B6
.EMM1B6XXXXj i B6
- EMM1B6XXXX iB6
.EREIB6XUXE
'B6
_EREIB6XUXK
.B612
' EMMi B6X)XX
'B6123
- EMM1RMCLDA
- B614
.EMM1B62XXX IB621 jEMM1B61XXX j
- B622
.EMM1B55B56 iB623 2,GMM1VSF1CM B633 i GMMIVSFIDM i
'.C187_
QLC1INDPXD C187 i QLCI INCXXD Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 23 Calc 02-E-0004-01. Rev,. 0
- C187
.'QMM1L2620H
- C187 iQMM126470A
,C187
,QMM1L2618H
.Ci87 QMMIL2617H
,C187
.QMM1L2617H
- -87 QMM1VMBORC
- .C187
.0MM126470A
- C187 QMM1VMBORC___
i_
iC187 OMM1TMBEFW iC187 iQMM1VMAORD j C187iQMM1 TMBEFW 0C187 3QMM126450A
_C187 iQMM1TMBEFW si;8 _:QMMITMAEFW iC187 QMM1TMAEFW s
,C187 iQMM126450A i
0187
.QMM1TMBEFW
.C187 QLC1INDXXD i
iC187 i QMM1VMAORD iC187
'iQMM1L2621H 01i87 QMM1L2622H i
iC187 QMM1L2668H C187I*QMM1 MSBBTP iCi87 iQLCIiNCPXD
.01i 87
.QMM1L2668H 0187
-QMMP2617A iC187-
- QBI1L2671N
- C187
- QBl1L2667N C1s87 iQMMIP26i7A C187
.QMM1MSBATP C187 jQMM1P2617B
...... _.........-ii 0
C187
- QMM1MSABTP
.... _. + _._........
C187
,QMM1 L2624H C18' QMMiL2669H iC187
- QMM1MSAMTP i
- C187
.QMM1L2672H_1 i.......__
_.i
- C187
!:QMM1L2672H C187
.,QMMlL2673H iC187
,QMM1L2621H
,C187
.QBI1L2622N 0C187 ^
0MM1P2667B i0b187 i QLC1INBXXD 0187 QLC1 INBPXD iC187 IQMM1P2668B I
iC187 QLC1 INAXXD C187 i QMM1 P2668B 0C187
- QMM1P2668A Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 24 Calc 02-E-0004-0 1. Rev. 0
IC187
- iQBI1L2618N Ci87
~
QLC1 INAPXD-C187E0M1 P2667B
!Ci87 iQMM1P2667A
!C187 10MM1P2667A
- C187 QOMMIP2618B Cl 87
'QMMlP2618B i
- C187 iQMM1P2618A~
.C187 iOMM1P2618A
'C187 iOMMIP26I7B
~C187
- QMMIP2668A
- CV1206
- HMMlCV1206 ICV2617
'QMMISGBSTM ICV2625 FMMICV2625
'CV2625
- FMMlCV2625
- CV2630 QMMIMSLIBF
- CV260 IFMMlSGBBVC
- CV2630
- FMMISGBBVC 0 V2-o QMMlMSLIBA
- CV2646
- QMMlSGAP7B
- CV2648
- QMMISGBP7B
!CV2663
- QSV1O2663N
.CV2663 QM~iM1TASADM
.:CV2663
- QMMlTASADM CV2663 OTD1C2663F
- C 2ii7 IQMM1 SGASTM CV2668 AV1 02668C
.........2..........
7 C...-
26---------4
- CV2674 i FMM1CV2674 CVGBio QMM1 MSLIAF
- CV2680 I:QMMlMSLIAA B
- CV2680
- FMM1lSGABVC CV2802
- QMMIP7ATRA
- CV364'0
- SMM123BXXX CV3643
~SMVI13643XK
- CV3643 SMMlAUXCLG
- CV 3 64 ~ _
- SMMlAUXCLG CV7472
' GMMlVSFICM-CV7473 GMMIVSFlDM bos
- DMM1OOODOS MOS DMMIOOODO5
- D15
-;DMM1OOOD15 ILT2617 IQMMIL2617H_____
ILT2668
- QMMItL2668H
- PT2617A_
IQMMI P2617A
- PT2668A
- QMMlP2668A Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 25 Calc 02-E-0004-01. Rev. 0
sSV3815 IGMMITRAN2M SV3815 3GMM1TRAN2M
.SV5237 iEMM1DG2SAC
_i iSV5239 EMM1DG2SAD NVSF1C
.GMMIVSFiCM
'VSF1 C iGMM1VSFICM iVSF1D iGMM1VSF1DM
- VSF1D i GMM1VSF1DM iX6
,EMM1B6XtXX IY22 DMM1Y221AC Y22 DMM1Y22A
- 'Y22
- DMM1Y22AAC Y22
, DMMIY221AC
'Y22
';DMM1Y221AC iY22 iDMM1Y221AC I
Y22 iDMM1Y221DC
~~~~~.
Y22
.DSIIOOY22F Y22 tDSIIOOY22X Y22
'j DMM1000Y22 Y22 ___
DMMIY22AAC
- Y22 iDMM1Y22AAC Y(22 DMM1 OY22AA Y(22 iDMM1000Y22 IN 2 Y
Y IW
.Y22
.DMM1Y221DC Prepared by J. M. WValker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page.26 Calc 02-E.0004-01, Rev. 0 Super C listing of PSA Fault tree Changes Logic Changes:
30090 30090 CNTVLVFAILS OR 30092F 30110 OR 30092F 30110 AND QHFPWRSHT HSCV2648 QCVIFW56BN QOCVI FW56BN 3QP7B-BMAN 3QP7B-BMAN CNTVLVFAILS DELETED(OLD)
INSERT(NEW)
INSERT(NEW)
Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 27 Calc 02-E-0004-01, Rev. 0 Estimation of the Probability that a Hotshort will Close CV-2646 or CV-2648 CV-2646 and CV-2648 are both normally-open solenoid-operated valves (SOVs).
The inadvertent closure of either valve will cause the loss of flow from one EFW pump to one Steam Generator. The control power cables for CV-2646 and CV-2648 both run through zone 99-M.
The motive power cables for these valves are conservatively assumed to be unaffected by the fire, since loss of its motive power will cause these valves to fail open. The control cable for each valve contains two conductors (Fl and F2). The two conductors form a current loop through the valve controller. The current flow in the loop modulates the valve position. When the current is 4 ma or less, the valve is fully open; when the current is between 4 ma and 20 ma, the valve is partially open; and, when the current is 20 ma, the valve is fully closed.
The fire is assumed to independently affect the cables and, as such, they are treated separately.
In addition, it is assumed that one outcome is possible as a net effect of the fire. Given this, there are six possible outcomes of the fire on the conductors of a given valve.
I. [Fl and F2 are not in contact] and [F1 is not grounded (i.e., normally energized) and F2 is not grounded (i.e., normally energized)].
For this case, the fire has no effect on the conductors and the valve remains fully open.
- 2. [Fl and F2 are not in contact] and [Fl is grounded and F2 is not grounded (i.e., normally energized)]. For this case, the valve closes.
- 3. [Fl and F2 are not in contact] and [F1 is not grounded and F2 is grounded]. For this case, the valve remains fully open or opens, if closed or partially closed.
- 4. [Fl and F2 are not in contact] and [Fl is grounded and F2 is grounded]. For this case, the valve remains fully open or opens, if closed or partially closed.
- 5.
[F1 and F2 are in contact] and [F1 is not grounded and F2 is not grounded]. For this case, the valve remains fully open or opens, if closed or partially closed.
- 6. [Fl and F2 are in contact] and [F1 is grounded and F2 is grounded]. For this case, the valve remains fully open or opens, if closed or partially closed.
Given that the probability associated with each case is not known, it is assumed that each is equally likely. Since only Case 2 results in the valve going closed due to the fire, the probability that the valve will close is estimated to be I in 6 (i.e., 0.167). This value is rounded up to 0.25 for conservatism. It is noted that the assumption that only one outcome is possible as a net effect of the fire is conservative, since most states drive the valve to an open state.
Prepared by J. M. Walker Page 28 Caic 02-E-0004-01, Rev. 0 Reviewved by M. Lloyd Recoveries The following recoveries were used in the original IPEEE analysis:
ICWCLGISO I
IOPERATOR FAILS TO ISOLATE ICW AFTER AUTO SW ISO. FAILS ON ES; P7AMANREC OPERATOR FAILS TO START AND CONTROL P7A MANUALLY WHEN
_OFFSITE POWER IS AVAIL.
QP7BMANREC OPERATOR FAILS TO START AND CONTROL P7B MANUALLLY DURING FIRE MANDREC OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN BRKR LOCALLY AT Al FROM UAT (A212 OR
_A211)
MANEDGREC OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY CLOSE BREAKER 152-308 OR 152-408 MANEFWSTRT OPERATOR FAILS TO OVERRID FALSE EFW.SIGNAL AND MANUALLY OPEN P7B ISO VLVS SGOFREC OPERATOR FAILS TO PREVENT SG OVERFILL DUE TO EXCESSIVE MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW SGOFREC2 OPERATOR FAILS TO PREVENT SG OVERFILL DUE TO EXCESSIVE EFW SWECPREC OPERATOR FAILS TO ALIGN SW PUMPS TO ECP UPON LOSS OF SW SUCTION FLOW QHF1HPITRl OPERATOR FAILS TO THROTTLE HPI TO PREVENT RCS PRESSURE RELIEF QHF1HPITRD OPERATOR FAILS TO THROTTLE HPI TO PREVENT SRV LIQUID RELEASE QHF1RCPTRP OPERATOR FAILS TO TRIP RCPS ON 30 MINUTES UHF1THPIAD I
IOPERATOR FAILS TO ATTEMPT HPI COOLING Note that Section 4.6 of Reference 1 listed only some of these recoveries; the others were located in the cutset file associated with zone 99-M.
The following post-initiator recoveries were not used in the original IPEEE model and were set to true in our analysis as well.
OPER-13H OPERS FAIL TO RE-ENERGIZE H1/H2 FROM ST2 GIVEN TRANS EVENT OPER-F1 OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE SW CROSSOVER VALVES TO PREVENT FLOW DIVERSION RHFIB1000X OPERATOR FAILS TO OPEN CV-1000 OPER-15 OPER DOES NOT XFER TO D01 BACKUP CHRGR (D03) W/ENERGIZED SRC OPER-16 OPER DOES NOT XFER TO D02 BACKUP CHRGR (DOS) W/ENERGIZED SRC SWEDGMOV OPERATOR FAILS TO MANUALLY OPEN SW CLG JKT VALVES UPON AN MOV SIGNAL FAILURE AFWFEEDREC OPERATOR FAILS TO START AND ALIGN AFW PUMP P75 AFTER LOSS OF EFW MANESSTART OPERATOR FAILS TO START ES UPON ACTUATION AT PROPER SETPOINT.
OPER-13 OPERS FAIL TO RE-ENERGIZE A1/A2 FROM ST2 GIVEN TRANS EVENT RHFl BLOCKD OPERATOR FAILS TO CLOSE BLOCK VALVE AFTER PRESS. RELIEF SWSWINGREC OPERATOR FAILS TO START AND ALIGN OP SW PUMP INCLUDING AVAILABLE POWER SOURCE Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 29 Calc 02-E-0004 01. Rev. 0
As discussed in assumption 8 of the calculation the following post initiator recoveries were credited in our assessment but not in the original IPEEE analysis.
XHF1 MEDXXX XHFI SMALLX QHFPWRSHT OPERATOR FAILS TO BEGIN HPR FOLLOWING M-LOCA OPERATOR FAILS TO BEGIN HPR FOLLOWING S-LOCA Operator Fails to deenergize CV-2646 and 2648 Of the recoveries listed above the following are ex-control room recoveries and were set to true in order to provide the numbers needed for the NRC reviewer.
ICWCLGISO P7AMANREC QP7BMANREC MANDREC MANEDGREC QHFPWRSHT Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 30 Calc 02-E-000-Ol. Rev. 0 HRA Spreadsheet for QHFPWRSHT Ex-Control Room Model
- 1. EVENT QHFPWROFF99m
- 2. EVENT IDENTIFICATION 2.1 Descriptor 2.2 Comment Operator fails to switch power off to CV-2646 and CV-2648 1106.006 discussion section
- 3. EVENT CATEGORIZATION 3.1 Event type 3.2 Location of action(s)
- 3.3 Failure mode post-initiator recovery ex-control room mistake
- 5. INPUT PARAMETERS 5.1 Mean response time (min), ml 5.2 Additions to response time 5.3 Model error factor, fl 5.4 Adjustments to error factor 5.5 Model uncertainty error factor, fU 5.6 Available time (min), t no default.
default is 0 generic is 4.3905 default is 0 generic is 1.68 no default 10 5
default I
default 36
- 6. CALCULATED PARAMETERS 6.1 Adjusted mean response time, mean 6.2 Adjusted error factor, fR 6.3 Median response time, m
- 7. EVENT OCCURENCE PROBABILISTIC ESTIMATES 7.1 Mean (explicitly includes associated equipment failures) 7.2 95th percentile 7.3 5th percentile 7.4 Error Factor
- 8. ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY TREATMENT 8.1 Human reliability event mean failure probability 8.2 Associated equipment reliability limited (1=yes,0=no) 8.3 Associated equipment failure probability (see E49) 8.4 Combined human and equipment failure probability 15.0 6.332 14.3 2.3E-01 3.6E-01 1.IE-01 1.84 2.3E-01 I
2.26E-0 I Prepared by J. M. Walker Reviewed by M. Lloyd Page 31 Calc 02-E-0004-01. Rev. 0