Text

Revision 4, Change 2 to PMP-2080-EPP-101, Emergency Classification.
	ML040560523
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	02/17/2004
From:	Nelson T; Indiana Michigan Power Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	56828N PMP-2080-EPP-101, Rev 4
	Download: ML040560523 (230)
	v • d • e

zco 01 C,

CVI co to CONTROLLED DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL 0, z)

LO, Transmittal#: 56828N Effective Date: 02/17/2004 Creator TRACY NELSON Page: 1

==

Description:==

ISSUE OF 1 PMP-EPP PROCEDUR

E. PROCEDURE

IS BEING ISSUED IN ITS ENTIRETY. PLEASE DISCARD COMPLETE PROCEDURE IN YOUR BOOK AND REPLACE WITH ENTIRE PROCEDURE ATTACHED.

Distribution Group(s): Procedures: EPP: PMP-2080-EPP-101 SectionlName Mail Zone Copies Comments Berrien Cty Emerg Ops Ctr - Sgt. M. P3 IC Bradley Emergency Planning Coord 11 IC Maint: MTIS, M. Lower 10 IC Managerial 1 IC M. Nazar Ml Dept Environ Quality P29 IC NDM: Temporary Box 1* COPY NGH: EOF (via EDCC) 22* 5C NGH: JPIC (via EDCC) 22* IC NRC: On Site 4A IC NRC: Region IlIl P14 2C

CW-ashhngto_-t Operations Library 5B* IC OSC 1* IC S.M. Office 29* IC Simulator 11 2C Site Protective Services 8B IC State of Michigan - T. Katarsky P2 IC Training Cart I - T. Ott 11 IC Training Cart 2 - S. Stiger 11 IC Training Cart 4 - S. Stiger 11 IC Training Cart 5 - M. McKeel 11 IC Training Cart 6 - M. McKeel 11 IC Training Lib:Master Copy 11 ORIG Training Library. 11 iC TSC 1* 3C Unit I Control Room 29* 2C Unit 2 Control Room 29* 2C Transmitted Controlled Document Listing:

Document Revision Title PROCEDURE SEE ATTACHED Controlled Document Transmittal Receipt and File Acknowledgemen CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS ONLY Signature Date 6CIS Please sign and return within 16 calendar days to: D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Nuclear Documents Mgmt (Mail Zone #1)

Bridgman, Ml. 49106

Page 1 of 1 Search Results of Last Search Total of 1 items found PMP-2080-EPP-1O1 Properties Actions Edit Revision: 004 Change Sheet: 02 AEP Status: Appnved

Title:

EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION Document Series: Procedures Document Type: Emergency Planning - Response Approval/Record Date: 02/11/2004 Effective Date: 02/17/2004 TOO of Page 1ttrv Ihipnr aidQIrv.bin (I? i i,1,t5itp ill h.dA 1Annid i,9iipuf'jll cirr1, fnrilit'iRytimpiinhm /1 7/9A0z1

APPROVAL REVIEW AND TRACKING FORM Number: PMIIP-2080-EPP-1O1 . Rev. '4 Change 2

Title:

EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION Category (Sel&fOri O1y)4: ' 'Tx'c.:2 El Correction (Full Procedure)* El Change (Full Procedure) with Review of Change Only. . -

0 Correction (Page Substitution) El Change (Page Substitution) with Review of Change Only El Cancellation 1J New Procedure or Change with Full Review ...

El Superseded (list superseding procedures): . .;;. -

Change Driver/CDI Tracking No(s): .0 N/A Cross-Discipline Reviews: Programmatic Reviews:

El Chemistry El Training QALARA- El Reactivity Mgmt Team O Maintenance El Work Control El Component Enginering El SPS (Safety & Health)

QNDM El______ El Design Engineering Q Surveillance Section El Operations El __________ El Exnerg Oper Proc Grp El System Engineering El PA/PV: El __________ El Environmental El SOMS Administrator

[I] Reg Affairs El _________ El ISIIIST Coordinator .El ORP.' 0 None Required El Performance Assurance *0 None Required El Cognizant Org Review: - Date: I /

0 Technical Review:) . .. - Date: i/I) IVY' K..> Con e&e:'-' 2< %

El Ops Director Concurrence: ___________ Date: I.*-I Updated Revision Summary attachec I? - -' 0 Yes te? Tracking No.:______________ ElYes ON/A

.** 10 CFR 50.59 Requirements cornple

Plan developed? (Ref. Step 3.4.17) ElYes ON/A

.... Package Complete: LAA. Date: ii 0 q PORC Review Required: ElYes ONo Mtg. No.:______

Administrative Hold Status: El Releasued 0 N/A CR No.:________

Approval Authority Review/Approv N/A Date: *ZI//I.j.

Expiration Date/Ending Activity Date: J/jgjg

.Effective Periodic Review conducted? (Data SheetS Complete). . El Yes. 0 No.

Foil WAiti6ii ?

Commitment Database update requested in accordance with PMP-7100-CMP-OQl? El Yes - 0 N/A NDM notified of new records or change s to records that could affectrecord retention? El Yes 0 N/A WtAMFM 5EflG .,. t..

COffl1iifo1iiiition ororin Tracki

..g9iy 5 +jI?tart.of.Fornf FEB 1 7 2004 This form is derived from the information in PMP-2010-PRC-002, Procedure Correction, Charge, and Review, Rev. 12, Data Sheet 1, WfTROQm OcLYAEJff Review and Approval Tracking Form. Page / of c(

REVISION

SUMMARY

Number: PMP-2080-EPP-lO1 Revision: 4 Change: 2

Title:

EMERGENCY CU SSIFICATION Section or Step Change/Reason For Change Attachment 3, Change: Replaced "All" with "Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4" page. 97, EAL S Rason: To correct a typographical error; this EAL is addressed in 7: Unusual Event Modes 5 and 6 by EAL C-5 as referenced in Attachnient 1 of

- Fuel Clad.. this procedure. Correction criterion "m"-correct information Degradation* . located elsewhere in the procedure.

"Mode Applicability" Attachment 3, Change: Replaced wording under "EAL THRESHOLD VALUE",

page 108, EAL "BASIS", AND "TERMINATION/RECOVERY CRITERIA" C-5: Unusual sections of this EAL with the wording under EAL S-7 (on Event Fuel Clad

- page 97).

Degradation Reason: To correct an editing error; these EALs are identical with the exception of Mode Applicability; the basis for C-S is stated

. . **.. . correctly in Attachment I (pg. 21) of this procedure-correction criterion "in".

- Office "'F4idkiim This is a free-form as called out in PMP-2010-.PRC-002, Procedure Correction, Change; and Review, Rev. 12.

b.V'i PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev.4 Page lof 112 j I

IL CILraffei Reference riter Emergency Classification S. M. Partin Owner.

Effective Date q //2/03 Site Protective Services Cognizant Organization TABLE OF CONTENTS.

1 PLJ1I.IOSE ANL S2OPE..2 2 lJF'INrJ7IOIS A.NIUJ AlIBI E'TJA'J7IO1S .. ...2 3 DE'I'AII. 4S..6 4 F'JI'A.I 4 CONLITIONS..7 S ...........7.

Attachment 1: Emergency Condition Categories -. - . -

Attachment 2: Critical NUREG 0737 Parameters.22 Attachment 3: Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489).23 Change 1 affects pages 1,68, and 70. . . . I Change 2 affects pages 1, 97, and 108.

K-'

I.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Emergency Classification Rev. 4 Pa e 2 of 112 J 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE NOTE:The operator aids located in the control rooms, simulator, Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility are updated when changes are made to this procedure. -

1.1 To ensure correct and timely classification of abnormal events into one of four emergency classification levels if appropriate. Attachments may be used as operator aids in a format different than the procedure provided the content remains the same.

2 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS Term Alert Meaning Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to

-. - small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. -'

K-' Control Placing all local controls in position necessary for operation from remote panels and the shift supervisor has determined that the systems for controlling reactivity, RCS inventory, RCS temperature, and the heat sink functions have been established.

Critical Safety Subcriticality, core cooling, heat sink, pressure-temperature-Function (CSF) stress (RCS.integrity), containment, and RCS inventory as monitored in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures.

Critical Safety The method by which the level of challenge to each CSF is Function Status Tree determined in accordance with the Emergency Operating (CSFST) Procedures?

Emergency Action A pre-determined, site-specific, observable threshold for a Level (EAL) plant Initiating Condition that places the plant in a given emergency class. An EAL can be an instrument reading; an equipment status indicator, a measurable parameter (onsite or offsite); a discrete, observable event; results of analyses; entry into specific emergency operating procedures; or another phenomenon which, if it occurs, indic&es entry into a

___________________ particular emergency class.

Emergency A grouPing of Initiation Conditions, recognizable to the Site Condition Category Emergency Coordinator, applying to the same area of' (ECC) concern and that can logically lead to escalating the

____________________ emergency class.

I Reference I PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 I Rev. 4 Emergency Classification -

I Page 3 of 112 K> Term Meaning Emergency These are taken from 10 CFR 50- Appendix E. They are in Classification Level escalating order. (Notification of) Unusual Event (UE),

(ECL) *Alert, Site Area Emergency (SAE), and General Emergency (GE).

Explosion A rapid, violent, uncontained combustion or catastrophic failure of

pressurized equipment that potentially imparts significant energy t6 nearby structures or equipment.

Fission Product One of the three principal barriers to uncontrolled release of*

Barrier radionuclides, i.e., fuel clad, reactor coolant system (RCS),

and the containment building (CNTMT).

General Emergency Events are m progress or have occurred which involve actual (GE) or imminent substantial c6re degradation ormelting with potential for loss ofcontainment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action.

Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate

. site area.

Initiating Condition One of a predetermined subset of nuclear power plant (IC) conditions where either the potential exists for a radiological

. . emergency, 6r such an emerg&ncy has occurred.

Lbss (of a fission Severe challenge to a fission product barrier sufficient to.

K> product barrier) consider that barrier incapable of containing fission products.

Normal Charging The normal charging flow path through the volume control; system including design and alternate flow paths, and flow to Mode . . . - -

reactor coolant pump seals.:

Potential Loss (of a Challenge to a fission product barrier sufficient to consider fission product the barrier degraded in its ability to contain fission products.

barrier)

Protected Area The fenced area which requires a Cook security badge for

. unescorted access.

Recognition. A logical and convenient grouping of ECCs used to quickly

Category eliminate non-applicable ICs from consideration during

____________________ Emergency Classification.

Safe Shutdown Area Selected areas within the Protected Area that may be occupied for the security or safe shutdown of the units.

-. .. The safe shutdown areas are:

Control rooms

Central alarm station

Containment buildings in Modes 5 and 6 The following are Safe Shutdown areas, if a Control Room must be evacuated:

Diesel Generator rooms K>

4kV.rooms.

__________________

Vicinity of all Local Shutdown Stations * . .

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Page 4 of 112 I Emergency Classification Term Meaning Safe Shutdown Selected components deemed necessary to place and maintain Equipment a unit in Hot Shutdown with capability to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown as described in SafeShutdown Capability Assessment, ProPosed Modifications and Evaluations (ALEPSC), Rev. 11986. In brief, the safe shutdown equipment can be described as:.

RCS makeup path from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) via the Centrifugal Charging Pumps (CCPs) and Boron Injection Tank (BIT) injection lines;

Secondary Heat Sink consisting of:

- CondensateStorage Tank (CST)

- all three Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) pumps

- Associated AFW valves

- Steam Generators (SGs)

- . SG Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)

- SG safeties and PORVs..

Component Cooling Water (CCW) system.

Essential Service Water (ESW) system including alternate

. supply t AFW.

Residual Heat Removal RHR system.

Diesel Generators and the emergency AC buses

CRIDs and most CRID-powered instmrnentation

DC distribution system including batteries and battery

chargers.

All Local Shutdown Stations.

Unit crossties for BIT flow, RCP seal injection, CSTs and

____ AFW.

Site Area Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual Emergency (SAE) or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases, are not expected to

. result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action

- Guideline ex osure levels exce t near the site bounda Toxic Exposure to the worker in excess of limits specified in 29 CFR

- 1910.1000. in practice, this should be considered for concentrations which are capable of incapacitatIng th worker.

Transient -. A condition (1) beyond the expected steady-state fluctuations.

in temperature, pressure, power level, or 'atr l&.'el, (2) beyond the normalmanipulations of the Control Room operating crew, and (3) that would be expected to require actuation of fast-acting automatic control or protection systems

'K> to bring the reactor to a new safe, steady-state condition..

.*1

I. Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Emergency Classification Rev. 4 Pa e S of 112 Term Meaning - -

Uncontrolled A change that is not the result of a planned evolution.

Unisolable. A leak that cannot be isolated from the control room.

Unplanned Any activity is unplanned if it is not being performed in accordance with the plan of the day, the outage schedule, the

preventative maintenance schedule, a job order, or an approved procedure. 1n addition, the activity can be considered "unplanned" if resultant conditions exceed expected or authorized limits (e.g., a planned waste gas

release should be considered "unplanned" if release, conditions do not conform to values specified in the discharge permit). -

Unusual Event (UE) Unusual events are in progress or have occurred which

- indite a potential degradation of the level of safety of the

plant. No releases of radioactive material .requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further

___________________ degradation of safety system occurs.

Valid Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be suspect. Verification can be obtained by a) an instrument channel check, or b) indications on related or -

redundant indicators, or. c) by direct observation by plant

personnel. Implicit in This definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15-minutes.

Vital Area - - Selected areas within the Protected Area that contain

equipment necessary for the security or safe shutdown of the

-: units. The vital areas are:

Control rooms

- - **

Control room and auxiliary cable vaults

-

C6ntainxnent buildings

Diesel Generator rooms-

Auxiliary feedwater pump rooms

Essential service water pump rooms and switchgear

Spent fuel poo 1 area and new fuel vault*

4 kY switchgear rooms (D/G 4kV switchgear rooms)

-

UPS battery and inverter rooms

Central alarm station

- -

N-Train battery rooms and N-Train battery chargers

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 6 of 112 Emergency Classification K-'

3 DETAILS 3.1 Using Attachment 1, determine which *Recognition Category applies to the abnormal conditions. .

)TE: It is likely that an event will have to be classified using more than one NC Recognition Category.

3.1.1 Classify the event within 15 minutes of when the classification criteria (EAL-LARU'OflflJAt V a.I..w ..a..Jta.

a. IF the classification criteria is N6T recognized within 15 minutes AND the condition still exists, ThEN classify the event..

b. IF the classification criteria is NOT recognized with 15 minutes AND the condition no longer exists, THEN do NOT classify the event..

Make notifications in accordance with PMP-7030-OO1-OO1, Piompt NRC Notification.

K.> 3.1.2 Review ALL appropriate Initiating Conditions within the selected Recognition Categories starting in the left-most applicable cblumn. *.

313 Determine whether the threshold values for Emergency Classification have been exceeded.' . . . . .; . . . . . ,

a. classification2 under Attachment may beECC needed S6: inLoss making a determination of Alarms of emergency or Indications.

b. The appropriate basis pages (Attachment 3) may also be used if clarification is needed in making proper determination of emergency classification in any of the Recognition Categories.

3 14 The Initiating Conditions in Attachment 1 that are marked with an X do NOT have the entire EAL description listed in Attachment 1. In order to properly classify an event, the basis pages in Attachment 3 must be reviewed to insure the full description of the EAL is considered when ;r.*..'.. K.=

making the classification. 'The page numbers listed in the Initiating'.. -

Condition boxes in Attachment 1 refer t the appropriate section of the basis pages, Attachment 3.

'I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 7 of' 112 I Emergency Classification 3.1.5 If the threshold value has been exceeded, the higher Emergency*.

Classification Levels within the associated ECC must be checked to ensure the highest ECL has been determined.

3.2 The Emergency Classification Level is the highest ECL determined in step 3.1 as appropriate -OR any higher Emergency Classification Level as determined by Site

.Emergency Coordinator (SEC) judgement as described in Attachment 1 and Attachment 3. .. . . .. .. . .. .

3.3 The SEC shall evaluaje plant conditions at least every 15 minutes to determine if

conditions have deteriorated to the point that the Emergency Classification Level should be upgraded to a higher level until the event is terminated. The need to upgrade to a higher level could be indicated by:

Critical Safety Function Status Trees

Additional radiation monitor alarms Reports from plant personnel 4 FINAL CONDITION 4 1 Event Classified 5 REFERENCES

.7 51 Use

References:

5.1.1 None 5.2 Writing

References:

5.2.1 Source

References:

a. NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2; "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels".

b. NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev.'4, "Methodology'for Development of.

. Eni&rgency Action Levels'> K. K. *.

c. Regulatory Analysis: "Revision of Regulatory Guide 1.101 to Accept

the Guidance in NUMARCINESP-007, Rev. 2 as an Alternative K> Methodology for the Development of Emergency Action Levels"

. 4 * . ... .* . .. . .* . *.* .... .. .

renc PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 8 of 112 Emergency Classification

d. NUMARC letter: "Methodology for the Development of Emergency Action Levels," NUMARCINESP-007, Revision 2, Questions and Answers, June 1993 from Thomas E. Ti to NUMARC Administrative Points of Contact 5.2.2 General References

a. Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan K>

.j.

Reference PMP-2O8OEPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 9 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION

Attachment 1 Emergency Condition Categories Pages:

9-21 Page .' Emergency Condition Category -

10 Fuel Ciad Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Table 10 RCS Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Table

11 Containment Barrier Loss/PotentialLoss Table 12 ECC 11-1. SEC Judgement

13 ECC 11-2 Security Events 13 ECC 11-3 Control Room Evacuation 13 ECC 11-4 Fire 13 ECC 11-5 Toxic or Flammable Gases 14 . ECC N-i Seismic Activity 14 ECC N-2 Tornado/High Wind 14 ECC N-3 Visible Structural Damage -

14 ECC NA Vehicle Collision . .

14 ECC N-S. Main Turbine Rotating Component Failure 14 ECC N-6 Plant Flooding 14 ECC N-7 Unanticipated Explosion. - *. - .

15. ECC R-1 Radioactive Effluent Release 15 ECC R-2 Increasing In-Plant Radiation Level 15 ECC R-3 Loss of Water Level in Any Area Holding Irradiated Fuel

16 ECC 5-1 Failureof Reactor Pr6tection System 16 ECC S-2 Loss of AC Power (Modes 1-4) 16 ECC S-3. Loss of DC Power (Modes 1-4)

16 ECC 5-5 Loss of Systems Needed to Achieve/Maintain Hot Shutdown 17 . ECC S-6 Loss of Alarms

17 ECC S-7 . Fuel Clad Degradation

17, ECC S-8 Excessive RCS Leakage 17 ECC S-9 . Tech Spec Compliance 17 ECC S-10. Loss of Communication Systems (Modes 1-4) 18 ECC 11-2 11-5 Hazards and Other Conditions (Modes 5, 6) 19 ECC N-i N-7 Natural/DestructivePhenomena (Modes 5, 6) 20 ECC R-1 R-3 Abnormal Radiation Levels/Effluents (Modes 5, 6) 21 ECC C-3

Cold ShutdownlRefueling/Defueled Loss of AC Power (Modes 5, 6) 21 ECC CA Cold Shutdown/Refueling Inabilityto Maintain Cold Shutdown 21 ECC C 5 Cold Shutdown/Refueling Fuel Clad Degradati6n (Modes 5 6) 20 ECC C 6 Cold Shutdown/Refueling Loss of Communications (Modes 5 6) 20 ECC C 7 Cold Shutdown/Refueling Loss of DC Power (Modes 5 6)

/

1: Reference

'C>

PTvIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 10 of 112

<C I. Emergency CLASSIFICATION Emergency Pages:

Attachment 1 Condition Categories 9 - 21

- - 7' -

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX - Mode 1-4 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY. ALERT . -* UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of TWO Fission Product Any TWO of the Following: Loss or Potential Loss of Either Fuel Loss or Potential Loss of Containment

'. . . . ,.. 3 Loss of Containment Barrier. . . . .

Barriers AND Potential Loss 1 Loss or Potential Loss of Fuel Clad. Clad or RCS Barrier. Barrier.

of Third Barrier.. :.. 2 Loss or Potential Loss of RCS. -. .. .. .' .*.. . .:* .* ...... - - . A *. --

1. FUEL CLAD BARRIER . LOSS (L) . POTENTIAL LOSS (P)

.1 Core Cooling CSFST . ".' . . Core Cooling CSFST -RED.- Core Exit Thermocouples > 75r

.*. OR RVLIS Level ' . 46% .

(Narrow Range) OR

____________________________________ __________________________________________ Heat Sink CSFST - RED

.2 Containment Radiation > 200 RJhr.' . . . .. . *.. None .. . .. *. .

.3 Primary Coolant Activity >300 uCilcc 1-131 dose equivalent . None .. ... .

OR

____________________________________________________ Core Damage> 5.0% clad failure ___________________________________________________________________

2. RCS BARRIER . . .. LOSS (L) ... . POTENTIAL LOSS (P) *.

.1 RCS Leak Rate (unisolabte) > available makeup capacity as indicated by complete > capacity of one centrirugat charging pump in normal charging

____________________________________________ loss of RCS subcooling line up.

.2 Steam Generator Leakage Entry into 01W 4023 E 3 SGTR Ruptured SG with leak> capacity of one charging pump in AND normal charging lIne up..

Non-isolable secondary line break results in a Prolonged (>30 minutes) radioactive release to

____________________________________________________ theenvironmentfromtheaffectedSG

.3 Containment Radiation .. > 10 RIhr . None .

.4 RCS Integrity CSFST None . RCS Integrity CSFST - RED

.5 heat Sink CSFST None Heat Sink CSFST - RED.

Does not include a release through the condenser air ejectors or the gland steam condenser vents for the purpose of declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY..

C K Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 11 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 1 II Emergency Condition Categories Pages:

9-21 I

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX - Mode 1-4 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY'. . . ALERT. . UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of TWO Fission Product Any TWO of the Following: Loss or Potential Loss of Either Fuel . Loss or Potential Loss of Containment of Third Barrier. or Potential Loss of RCS. . - , .. . . .

BarriersAND Potential Loss. . . Loss orPotentialLoss of Fuel Clad.

ss of Containment Barrier.

-. Clad or RCS Barrier.-. .

I Barrier.

3. CONTAINMENT BARRIER LOSS (L) :. , :.. POTENTIAL LOSS (P)

.1 Containment Radiation . -. None . . .. >ioooRnr.

OR

_____________________________________________________ Core damage> 20% clad failure 2 Containment Integnty . . . - . Unisolable breach of containment '. . . None OR Rapid unexplained containment pressure or sump level drop following pressure rise caused by a LOCA OR Containment pressurelsump level NOT performing as expected for conditions OR Entry into ECA 1.2, LOCA Outside Containment 3 SG Secondary Side Release Ia. Primary to secondary leak rate > Tech Spec limit (p34) .. None AND

. . b. Secondary

(>30 mm.)line break to the OUTSIDE Containment results in releae environment . .. . .... ..

OR . . .

2 Release of secondary coolant from the affected SG to the . .

_________________________________________________ environment withalertalarmon anySGPORVrad monitor.t Z 4 Containment CSFST None Containment CSFST -RED

.5 Containment Hydrogen . . .. None . . >4.0%

Containmeni ilydrogen >0.5% AND any Hydrogen Control equipment*

_______________________________________________ ________________________________________________________ noperable. .

.6 Containment Pressure Control . None BOTh CIS trains OR BOTh! containment air recire fans Inoperable OR fail to auto start on their containment pressure setpoznt OR containment pressure

______________________________________ _____________________________________________ > l2psig.

.7 Core Exit Thermocouples . None Core Cooling CSFST .. RED .. . .:

K AND

_________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________ Restoration procedures not efTectivewithin 15 minutes

'Does not include a release through the condenser air ejectors or the gland steam condenser vents, for the purpose of declaration of a SITE AREN EMERGENCY

- Reference

.*: .** *' . . PMP-2080.EPP.1O1

§6<.. ' Rev. 4 Pa e 12 of 112 C Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 1 Categories Pages:

Emergency'Condition 9 21 -

SEC Judgement SEC Judgement may be used to determine that a Fission Product to, Barrier is lOST or POTENTIALLY LOST based on factors other than those listed in Attachment 1. Examples may include, but are not limited events such as loose parts in the core or loss of all ECCS -

pumps. . . . .. . .

to carry the barrier as lost. If the Once a barrier has been lost, the symptoms may disappear. SEC judgement may be used t determine whether

.1 -7:.-

ability to monitor a barrier, is lost or. degraded; SEC judgement must be used to determine barrier status.

trends, then IMMINENT barrier If escalation to Site Area Emergency or General Emergency is expected within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months based on current 7:.

degradation should be assumed and the SEC should make the appropriate classification.. .

I -

ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT . . :

GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY *. . . . .

SEC Judgenient - All Modes K . 2> ' *...... . .* . . . . . . . . ... .. ........ .

H-i SEC Judgement (p.45) 11-1 SEC Judgement (p.44) *. 7. . Il-i SEC Judgement (p.42)..

TI-i SEC Jiidgement (p.46) .... ..

Conditions indicate a potential degradation of the Conditions indicate likely or actual major failures Conditions indicate that plant safety systems may Conditions indicate actual or imminent substantial level of safely of the plant.

of plant functions needed to protect the public be degraded and additional personnel are needed core damage with potential loss of containment or for additional monitoring. . . . . . . .. . . .

the potential exists for axi uncontrolled radioactive . . . . .,

release that Imay exceed boundary.' . EPA

'.. limits at. the site ...:. .. ., .

z EAL's in these tables are NOT complete Refer to referenced basis page (Attachment 3) for complete description.

6 K

C:.. "C Rererence PMP-2080.EPP1O1.. Rev. 4 Pa e 13 or 112 Emergency Attachment 1 . Emergency Condition Categories - Pages:*

INITIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 1- 4 I SITE AREAEMERGENCY I ALERT 9-21 .. UNUSUALEVENT. ;.

I GENERAL EMERGENCY .

HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS . . . . . ..

11-2 Security (p.48) 11-2 Security (p.47)..

11-2 Security (p.50) . 11-2 Security (ps$9) . -

Security Event In the Protected Area Security Event that potentially degrades level of.

Security Event resulting in loss of ability Security event in a Vital Area 1.Tntrusion by hostile force . 1.Jntruion by hostile force . plant safety;... .

to reach and maintain Mode 5>.*." '.9 OR . 1.Bomb in Protected Arealoutside vital area.

OR' 2.Loss of control of Vital Area 2.Civil disturbance within Protected Area. . . * .. . OR......

1.Loss of physical control of Control Room'. . ,

. (NOT Control Room) 2.Credible bomb threat OR' '> . . . :

OR 2 Loss of physical control of remote SD capability. .. .. OR .

3.Confirmed bomb In Vital Area. ' 3.Crdible attack threat OR 4.llostagelextortion potentially affecting plant

______________________________________________ operations 11-3 CR Evacuntion (p.52) II 3 CR Evacuation (p 51) *' . .

Control Room evacuated AND control not Control Room evacuation initiated . .

______________________________________________ established in 15 minutes E ________________________________________________ _____________________________________________

- , 11.4 Fire (p 55) 11-4 Fire (p 54)

Fire OR explosion affecting plant operations. Fire in Protected Area NOT extinguished E within 15 minutes of detection.

II 5 Toxic Gas (p 58) 11-5 Toxic Gas (p 56)

. . Toxic OR flammable gas release that ' . Toxic OR flammable gas release

. .. threatens lives OR affects ability to :. affecting plant operation.

_________________________________________________________________________________ achieve and maintain Mode 5 .. ,.

C Reference - PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 14 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION -

Attiichment 1 En'CdTCte mergecyoniionagories Pages:

9-21 INITIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 1-4

- GENERAL EMERGENCY . I . SITE AREA EMERGENCY. .*. ALERT I. UNUSUAL EVENT NATURALIDESThUCTIVE PhENOMENA N I Seismic (p.62) N-i Seismic (p 60)

Seismic event indicated by: Seismic event indicated by I Seismic instrument activated I Seismic instrument activated

OR OR

2 Ground motion detected by Control Room crew 2 Ground motion detected by Control Room crew AND 1 VisbIe major damage in vital area.

OR .

2.Plant Trip.

z

N-2 Tornado/wind (p.62) N-2 Tornado/wind (p.60)

. *.. . . -.. . . , l.Tornado strike in Vital Area . - l.Tornado strike within Protected Area.

- . :. **. . ;.>9oinphwindror OR

___________________________________ cruired to achieve and maintain Mode S. .

. -* .*: containing systems.

N-4 Vehicle CollisIon (p.62) .. .. . N-4 Vehicle Collision (pdiO)

Vehicle collision arfecting Vital Area. Vehicleuicollision within riuiiu affecting Area. systems or structures N-S MTFailure (p62) .. . N-S MT Failnre(p.60)

Main turbine generated missile penetrates Vital Area. Main turbine rotating component failure causes

_____________________________________________________ _______________________________________________ visible damage or damages generator seals.

N 6 Flooding (p.62) .. .* . ..

______________________________________________ _________________________________________ Flooding In Vital Are alTects safety related equipment. . . . . . ..

- .. . . . . N-7 Explosion (p.60) . *. . .

Unanticipated causes visible explosion

_______________________________________________ . within Protected Area

____________________________________________ _______________________________________ equipment. damage- to permanent structures or

C C Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa c 15 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION N . .

Atiachment 1 , Emergency Cfldition Categories Page:

INITIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 1- 4 GENERAL EMERGENCY. I SITE AREA EMERGENCY I ALERT. I UNUSUAL EVENT.. I

- *.t '1 **r.*.

'. ABNORMAL RADIATION LEVELSIEFFLUENTS R-1 Effluent release (p 70) R-1 Emuent release (p.68) R-1 Emuent release (p.66) R-1 Emtient release (p.64) limits for Site boundary dose> 1 REM TEDE or 5 REM CDE Site boundary dose> 100 mrem TEDE Unplanned Rad release > 200X ODCM limits Unplanned Rad release > 2X ODCM to thyroid based on: or 500 mrem CDB to thyroid based on: for >15 mm based on > 60 minutes based on:

1.Survey results I .Survey results

.. - OR OR I 200X rad monitor high alann etpolnt I .Rad monitor 2X high alarm setpoint.

2.Dose assessment. 2.Dose assessment. OR * .... OR

OR OR 2 Gas or liquid sample results 2.Gas or liquid sample results>"

3.Emuent monitor readings >15 minutes 3.Emuent monitor readings> 15 minutes..;

E R-2 PlantthatRad Rad levels impede level plant(p.73) ',.

operations based .. . R-2 Plant reading Unexpected Rad level(p.72) on Area Monitor IOOOX o - . . . the24hraverage.

- . . -. .. . *. . ... . 1>15 mRihr in Control Rm(s) ICAS .

2 >100 mR/hr at remote SID areas.

R-3 Loss of level (p.77) . :. R-3 Loss of level (p 75)

Major damage to irradiated fuel or loss of. Uncontrolled lowering In refueling cavity, SFP level that has or will uncover fuel outside of . or Transfer Canal indicated by the reactor vessel based on: . . .

1.Visual observation of levels. . . . I.Inabillty to maintain > 6434" in SF? or Transfer Canal OR . with irradiated fuel present OR *i 2.Inability to maintain > 643'4" in the refueling cavity 1.'*.'

.. , . . . .. ... . . *

2.Rad monitor alarms 1: **. . . .. OR 3.Level < 632'4 SF? or Transfer Canal. . with irradiated fuel in containment.

-.4 I.

'2 C Rererence.

or C

PMP-2080 Br'- --

I: Emergecy CLASSIFICATION

/

Attachment '1 Emergency Condition Categories Pages:'

921 INITIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 1-4 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY .;. - ALERT UNUSUAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS (p51) . ' .. S-i R.PS failure (p.80) ir, failure S-i RPS failure (p.79) . . .. .' .

l.Auto and manual Reactor Trip fail from Control Auto and manual Reactor Trip fails from ,: ii Auto Reactor Trip fails AND manual trip Rm AND Subcriticality and Core Cooling CSFSTs Control room. successful from Control Room .* ..

areRED -

- OR 2.Subcritlcality and Heat Sink CSFs are RED S-2 Loss of AC (p.86) ;' S-2 Loss of AC (p 85) S-2 Loss of AC (p.81) 5-2 Loss of AC (p.83)

I .Prolonged loss of all AC (A and D T buses) ,. Loss of all AC (A and D T buses) for AC power supply to T buses reduced to a Loss of ALL OFF-SITB power (Auxiliary Reserve and AND Core Cooling CSFST - ORANGR >15 minutes. 7 single source for > 15 minutes. 69kv Transformers) to the T Buses for> 15 minutes 2.Loss of all AC (A and D - T buses) expected to last . .* * , '

for>4 hrs. - -

. Z

- 5-3 Loss of DC power (p.88)

Loss of ALL vital DC buses AB AND CD for

> 15 minutes (bus volts 220v)

5-5 Loss of hot SD sys (p.89)

Loss of ability to achieve or maintain hot shutdown based on entry into:*.

. 1.01W 4023.FR.H.l. Response to Loss of

. Secondary Heat Sink OR 2.OHP 4023.FR-C.l. Response to Inadequate Core Cooling. ____________________________________ _______________________________________________

C C.

t . .

INITIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 1-4

- GENERAL EMERGENCY: . SITE AREA EMERGENCY . . .. ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT I SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS S-6 Loss of Alarms (p.95) .. S-6 Loss or Alarms (p.92) 5-6 Loss of Alarms (p.90)

Loss of ability to monitor alarms during a Unplanned loss of most or all Safety System 1.Unplanned loss of Safety System annunciators or transient indicated by: . . . annunciators or Attachment 2 indicators for indicators or Attachment 2 parameters for> 15 1.Loss of Safety System annunciator panel(s) for: >15 minutes with transient in progress or minutes. . .* . .... .

>15 minutes. . . . compensatory indicators unavailable and

.AND additional monitonng is required 2.Additional monitoring requIred.

AND 2.Loss of Attachment 2 Critical .

Parameters for > 15 minutes. 3.Compensaiory indications for lost annunciators are

.A4D available - . ,.

3.Compensatory indications not available (PPC, SPDS).

E S-7 Degraded Clad (p.97) :

I.RCS activity >. 1.0 uCT/gram 1-131 dose equivalent for >48 brs.

. .. OR

__________________________________ 2.RCS activity l00/E uCilgram.

S-8 RCS Leakage (p.98)

RCS leakage exceeds 10 gpm pressure boundary leakage. SO tube leakage or unidentified leakage..

____________________________ OR.> 25 gpm Identified leakige. ..

S-9 Tech Spec (p.99) *

. Unit not in required mode within LCO time limits

. * . .. S-10 Losslossof.,Comm.(p.100)

Unplanned of all on or off-site communications

C ,..... . . __ C Reference .PMP 2080.EPP.1O1 . Rev. 4 Page 18 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 1 Emergency Condition' Categories ages:

9'-21 INTIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 5 &6 and Defueled GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT

UNUSUAL EVENT.

HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS II 2 Security (p 50) H 2 Security (p.49) H 2 Security (p 48) II- 2 Security (p.47)

Security Event resulting in loss of Security event ma Vital Area Security Event in the Protected Area.. Sec urity Event that potentially degrades ability to reach! maintain Mode 5 1 Intrusion by hostile force 1 Intrusion by hostile force levi l of plant safety.

OR OR .* 3omb in Protected Area.

1 Loss of physical control of Control Room 2 Loss of control of Vital Area 2 Civil disturbance within Protected Area. * . OR OR .* (NOT Control Room). . rdible bomb threat 2 Lossof physical control of remote SD.... . .7 OR. OR capability.

3. Confirmed bomb in Vital Area. redible attack threat.

4.1 lostage/extortion potentially.

_____________________________________________ at fecting plant operations.

H-3 CR Evacuation: (p.52) *. . H 3 CR Evacuation (p.51)

Control Room evacuated AND control not Control Room evacuation initiated established within 15 minutes.

11-4 Fire (p.55) . . H-4Fire(p.54).

.j. Fire OR explosion affecting plant operations. Fii e in Protected Area NOT extinguished within

. . . . 15 minutes. .

H-S Toxic Gas (p.58) H-S Toxic Gas (p. 56 ).

Toxic OR flammable gas release that . To do OR flammable gas release affecting nt operation.

.:, threatens livesMode and maintain OR afTects

5. ' ability* to achieve

, plai

.'C Reference - PMP-2080.EPP.1Oi Rev. 4 Pa e 19 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 1 Emergency Condition Categories Pages:

9-21 INITIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 5& 6 and Defueled GENERAL EMERGENCY I SITE AREA EMERGENCY I ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT I.

NATUL/DRUCVE PhENOMENA Seismic event indicated by: Seismic event indicated by:*

OR. 1.Seismic instrument activated.

.. . *. . N-i Seisni ic (p.62) . N-i Seismic* (p.60) 2.Ground motion detected by . . OR AND 2.Ground motion detected by Control Room crew.

a Visbie major damage in vital area. . . .. .

OR b Plant Trip. -

N 2 Tornado/wInd (p 62) 7 N-2 Tornado/wind(p.60) l.Tornado strike in Vital Area l.Tornado strike in Protected Area..

OR

2.>90 mph wind for >15 minutes.

N-3 VisibleStructural damage to a (p.62)'

structure containing systems required . . *

to achieve and maintain Mode S.

N-4 Vehicle Collision (pXi2) . N-4 Vehicle Colllslon(p.60)

Vehicle collision affecting Vital Area. Vehicle collision affects systems or structures

. . in the Protected Area N-S MT Failure (p.62) . . . N-S MT FaIlure (p.60).

Main turbine generated missile penetrates Vital Area. . Main turbine rotating component failure causes

- .. . . . visible damage or damages generator seals.

N-6 Flooding (p.62) .*

________________________________ floodin in Vital Area affects safety related equip. .

- '.. .... N-7 Explosion (p.60) . . .-..-.

. .. . . Unanticipated explosion visibledamage to permanentwithin Protected structures orArea causes equipment.

. . . I.

Reference PMP 2080.EPP.1O1 I C Rev. 4 Pa e20 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION

Attachment 1 yEmerg -

ency Condition Categories Pages:

9-21 f -

INITIATING CONDITIONS -. Mode 5 &6 and Defueled

GENERAL EMERGENCY- - SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT ABNORMAL RADIATION LEVELS/EFFLUENTS 11-1 Effluent release (p.70) R-1 Effluent release (p.68) R-1 Effluent release (p.66) . R-l EfTitient release (p.64)

Site boundary dose > 1 REM TEDE Site boundary dose > 100 mrem TEDE Unplanned Rad release >200X 013CM limits for Unplanned Rad release >2X ODCM limits for or 5 REM CDE to thyroid based on or 500 mrem CDII to thyroid based on: **: >15 minutes based on: . > 60 minutes based on: .

I .Survey results : :; . . *. ... . . . .

OR 1.Survey results .. . .: 1.200X rad monitor high alarm setpoint. . 1. Rad monitor 2X high alarni setpoint 2.Dose assessment . , . ... OR OR . . . . OR.

OR 2.Dose assessment . 2 Gas or liquid sample results. *. 2.Gas or liquid sample results

.Effluent monitor readings >15 mInutes. *., .

3.Effluent monitor readings OR .. . .. -

>15 minutes .2 .. ,

. E E

. . . . ., R 2 Plant Rad level (p.73) R-2 Plant Rad level (p 72).

- . Rad levels that Impede plant operations based on Unecpected reading on Area Monitor IOCOX the 24 hr

- .. . . . average.

I. > 15 mR/hr in Control Room(s) or CAS OR*

2. >100 mRlhr at remote SID areas.

.. . . 1..

11-3 Lo5s of level (p.77) . R-3 Loss or level (p 75)

Major damage to irradiated fuel or loss of . . Uncontrolled lowering in refueling cavity level that has or will uncover fuel outside of . SF? or Transfer Canal Indicated by the reactor vessel based on: . . .

I .Visual observation of 2 levels. . I.lnability to maintain> 643 4 in SF? or Transfer

,: OR .* * *. . Canal with irradiated fuel present 2.Rad monitor alarms * .. . . . .. . . * * . OR OR . 2.lnability to maintain> 64V4 in the refueling cavity 3.Level < 632 4 SFP or Transfer Canal. with irradiated fuel in containment

:. E

C Rev. 4 Pa e 21 of 112 Rererence . PMP-2080.EPP. 101 Emergency. CLASSIFICATION Attachment 1 Emergency Categories Pages:

Condition 9-21 INITIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 5 & 6 and Defueled GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY . .. .. ALERT : UNUSUAL EVENT COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS .. :1 C-3 Loss or AC(p.104) C-3 Loss or AC (p.102)

. .. Loss of Mi AC power to A and D T-buses for Loss of ALL OFV-SITE power (Auxiliary,.

> .15 minutes. ' . ' Reserve and 69kv transforrnrs) to the T buses for> 15 mInutes. ..

____________________________ _____________________________________________ Mode 5.6 and def'ueled Mode 5,6 C-4 Loss or Water Level In the Reactor Vessel C-4 Inability to Maintain a Unit In

. that has or will Uncover Fuel In the Reactor,*.. . Cold Shutdown (p.105) . . . .

Vessel (p.107)... .. I .Loss of shutdown cooling as evidenced by entry I Loss of shutdown cooling as evidenced by entry into OHP , intO 01W 4022.017.001. Loss of RHR Cooling.

, 4022.017.001 ..Loss of RHR Cooling ' . *. . . . . .. . AND

2.Temperature rise that either:

2 Core uncovery as indicated by:: a. Exceeds TiS cold shutdown limit of 200SF

a. RVLIS NR <46% :0 RCPs .

OR b Results in an UNCONTROLLED RCS b Reactor Vessel Water Level <614 teet temperature rise approaching the cold shutdown T15 limit at 200T Mode56.. ModeS6 .

- C-S Degraded Clad (p.1O8)

.RCS activity > 1.OpCilgrams 1.131 dose.

equivalent for> 48 hrs.

2.RCS activity> 100/E uCllgram.

______________________________ Mode5,6 C-6 Loss or Comm. (p.109)

Unplanned loss of all on or ott-site communications. . *...7. , . . ...

__________________________ ________________________________ Mode5.6 *. '. . -.

C-7 Loss or DC power (p.111)

Unplanned loss of ALL vital DC buses AR AND CD for >15 mInutes (bus volts *220v)

________________________________ __________________________________________________ _______________________________________ Modes 5.6 *..*'.. .. .

C Reference . . - PMP-2080.EPP.101 . Rev. 4 Pa e 22 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION

- I . Page:

Attachment 2

Critical NUREG 0737 Parameters 22 PARAMETERS. . . ... . . . **. . .. INSTRUMENTATION Neutron Flux (Gammametrics)...NRI-2

- 1, 23.

Reactor CoolantPressure (Wide Range) . . . NPS-121, 122 Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature THOT (Wide.Range) .NTR-1 10, 130 Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature TCOLD (Wide Range) NTR-210, 230 Incore Thermocouples (Core Exit Thermocouples) . . TIS 1-65 Reactor Coolant SystemSubcooling Margin Monitor SUBCOOL.MAR Reactor Coolant Inventory System (Reactor Vessel Level Indication) NLI-1 10, 111, 120, 121, 130, 131 .

Pressurizer Water Level'* . . .... . NLP-151, 152; 153 . . .

Char in Pump Flow . - . . . ... .. .. .IFI-51; 52,53, 54

Charging Pump Breaker Status . . lE, 1W; 2E, 2W. Control Room Position Indicating Lights for Breakers Safety Injection Pump Breaker Status* iN, iS, 2N, 2S Control Room Position Indication Lights for Breakers.

Safety Injection Flow . . . IFI-260 266 Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level . . . ILS-950,.951 Containment Water Level . NLA-320, NLT-321 Containment Pressure (Wide Range) . . . PPA-3 io; 312 Containment Pressure (Narrow Range) . . PPP-300, 301, 302, 303 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring * . ESR-lthru9

Containment Isolation Valve Position Monitoring Control Room Position Indicating Lights Containment Area Radiation Monitor (High Range) Unit .1VRA-1310, 1410, Unit 2-23 10, 2410 Steam Line Pressure . MPP-210, 211, 212, 220, 221, 222, 230, 231, 232, 240, 241, 242 Steam Generator. Water Level (Wide Range)

9 BLI-ilO, 120, 130, 140 . . ..

Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Range) . . BLP-110, 111, 112, 120, 121, 122, 130, 131, 132, 140, 141, 142

Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate FFI-21 0, 220, 230, 240 Condensate Storage Tank Level . .. *CLI-113, 114, CLR-110, 111

Reference ' PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 23 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K.> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

Pages:

23 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION FUEL CLAD BARRIER 1.1: CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES MODE APPLICABILITY Modesl,2,3,4 . .*. .. ..

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE LOSS:

Core Cooling Critical Safety Function Status Tree - RED POTENTIAL LOSS:

Core Exit Thermocouples > 752 OR-,.

RVLIS level <46% (Narrow Range)

OR-Heat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Tree - RED.

BASIS (References) . .

LOSS The core cooling critical safety function RED path indicates significant superheating and core uncovery and is considered to indicate a loss of the fuel clad barrier. One of the indicators of the core

cooling critical safety function red is when the core exit thermocouple temperature is equal to or greater than 1200 degrees Fahrenheit. .. *.. . . .. .-

POTENTIAL LOSS Core exit thermocouple temperature equal to or greater than 752 degrees.

Fahrenheit or RVLIS level <46% (Narrow Range) corresponds to a loss of subcooling and is .

indicative of a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier The Heat Sink Critical Safety Function RED path indicates that the heat sink is under extreme challenge and is indicative of a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None I .

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.191 Rev. 4 Pa e 24 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages: -

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION -

FUEL CLAD BARRIER 1.2 - CONTAINMENT RADIATION MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

LOSS:. .. .

Containment area radiation greater than 200 R/hr.

POTENTIAL LOSS:**

None .

BASIS (References) . ... ..

LOSS The 200 RIhr value is based on a reasonable assessment of a single number representing the expected monitor reading on the upper containment area radiation monitorsVRA 1310/ 1410 (Unit 1) or VRA 2310/2410 (Unit 2): This represents the expected reading for loss of coolantaccidents with fuel failure in the range between 2 and 5% (depending on core inventoiy which will vary with the time after reactor shutdown). . . - .. ..

The 200 R/hr value was determined on the basis of the D. C. Cook Core Damage Assessment Methodology, taking into account that the radiation levels resulting from the release of noble gases from failed fuel will vary as a function of core shutdown time. Typically, these curves show that for.

noble gases the containment radiation monitors will read 1325 RIhr after 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months of core shutdown, and assuming 100% fuel cladding damage based on noble gas release only. This would correspond to 200 Rlhour for 5% cladding damage and noble gas release 90 minutes after the reactor is shut down.

- The reading is based on noble gas reading alone, and does not include the intantaneous release and dispersal of the reactor coolant iodine inventory associated with a concentration of 300 microcuries per gram 1-131 equivalent into the cOntainment atmosphere as suggested by Revision 2 of NUREGINESP 007. The addition of the iodine activity from the reactor coolant vould result in higher monitor readings, thus making the200 R/hr value a conservativethreshold value..: ... .

This assumption is appropriate ince it is consistent with the curren't 'dose assessment methodology of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant; an ice condenser containment plant. -

POTENTIAL LOSS - None DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

K.> . Calculation of radiation monitor reading is based on dispersal of noble gases only (iodine inventory not included) from the reactor coolant.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 25 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION FUEL CLAD BARRIER 1.3: PRIMARY COOLANT ACTIVITY MODE APPLICABILITY Modes 1, 2, 3, 4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE i

LAJ. -

Reactor Coolant System activity level greater than 300 microcuries per cc 1-131 dose equivalent.

-OR-Assessment of core damage greater than 5%cIad failure.

(NRC commitment #7991) .. . ..

- POTENTIAL LOSS: None .

BASIS (References) . - -

LOSS 300 microcuires percc1-131 dose equivalent corresponds to a value which is cited in Revision

2 of NUMARC/NESP 007 as being well above that expected for iodine spikes and corresponding to 2 to 5% fuel clad damage. This amount of cladding damage indicates significant clad heatinKand thus -

theFuel Clad Barrier is considered lost.. This value will b determined from Cook Nuclear Plant -

procedure PMP 2081 EPP.105, "Core Damage Assessment". ..

Assessment may be performed by authorized shift personnel prior to TSC activation or the TSC after*

TSC has been activated.

POTENTIAL LOSS - None DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None

'I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 26 of 112 Emergency CLASS W[CATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 - 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSSIPOTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION ROS BARRIER 2.1: RCS LEAK RATE MODE APPLICABILITY Modes 1, 2, 3, 4 EAt THRESHOLD VALUES: I LOSS:

UNISOLABLE RCS leak rate greater than available makeup capacity as indicated by a complete loss of RCS subcooling. . .

POTENTIAL LOSS:

UNISOLABLE RCS leakage greater than capacity *of one centriftigal charging pump in normal charging

- lineup. .... - . *. - . . *.. . *..

BASIS (References)

UNISOLABLE - A leak that cannot be isolated from the control room.

NORMAL CHARGING LINEUP The normal charging flow path through the volume control system

. including design and alternate flow paths, and flow to reactor coolant pump seals.

- LOSS Leakage that results in complete loss of subcooling is a fundamental indication that the

.. inventory control systems are inadequate for maintaining RCS pressure and inventory.

POTENTIAL LOSS Unisolable leakage in excess of the capacity of one centrifugal chaiging pump in the normal charging mode is considered to be the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory in the RCS an&assures that any event that results in a significant inventory loss or shrinkage will result in an ALERT classification. -

This leak is NOT isolable from the control room OR an attempt for isolation from the control room has been made and was unsuccessful An attempt for isolation should be made prior to the accident classification If isolable upon identification this initiating condition is not applicable DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K-I

/

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 27 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment (Commitment: 6489)23-112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION' RCS BARRIER 2.2: STEAM GENERATOR LEAKAGE MODE APPLICABILITY Modes 1; 2, 3, 4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE .

LOSS:

- Entry into OIIP-4023.E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture" AND -a non-isolable secondary line break resulting in a prolonged release (>30 minutes) radioactive release to the environment from the affected steam generator..

POTENTIAL LOSS: ,

Ruptured steam generator with primary to secondary leak rate greater than capacity of one charging pump in normal charging mode.: -. .. : ..... *. *..

BASIS (References) §.. -. . - .

NORMAL CHARGING MODE The normal charging flow path through volume control system including design and alternate flow paths, and flow to reactor coolant pump seals.

LOSS This is intended to address the full spectrum of steam generator tube rupture events and addresses the direct release of radioactive ijiaterial to theenvironment. Dose assessment is required when there is indicati6n that the fuel matrix/clad is potentially lost. This EAL encompasses steam.

breaks, feed breaks, and stuck open safety or relief valves. The assumed break flow termination time

period in our steam generator tube rupture dose consequence analysis is 30 minutes; therefore, 30 minutes is used to define prolonged.

POTENTIAL LOSS Unisolable leakage in excess of the capacityof one centrifugal charging pump in the normal charging mode iconsidered to be the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory in the RCS and assures that any event that results in a significant inventory loss or shrinkage will result in an.

ALERT classification.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K>

/

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 28 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels P ages:

K-' Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) . 23 112 I.

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION.

RCS BARRIER 2.3: CONTAINMENT RADIATION MODE APPLICABILITY Modes 1, 2, 3, 4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE LOSS:

Containment radiation greater than 10 k/hr.

POTENTIAL LOSS: . -. . .. .. .. . *..- *. . . - -

None . . . .'

BASIS (References)

.LOSS-A value of 10 R/hr as indicated onYRA 1310/1410 (Unit 1) and VRAO23lO/2410 (Unit 2) was choen because it is above the ambient background -adiation and represents a detectable radiation level above allowed Technical Specification radiochernistry limits but less than the 2-5% fuel clad damage'.

used in the fuel clad fission product barrier threshold value. - . .. .- -.

The 10 k/hr value was determined on the basis of the Donald C. Cook Core Damage Assessment methodology, taking into account that the radiation levels resulting from noble gases released from the coolant will vary as a function of core shutdown time. The reading is based on noble gas reading alone approximately 90 minutes after reactor shutdown. This assumption is consistent with the current core damage assessment methodology for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant. . .

The use of noble gases alone for a EAL threshold is conservative since if iodine or other radioactive materials were present, the doses would be higher The use of a value reflecting a plant shutdown of one hour was selected as a reasonable reflection of the phenomena being considered without concern about setting the threshold too high or too low The actual fission product barrier threshold will be declared at any time the value indicated is exceeded POTENTIAL LOSS - None DEVIATION FXOM NUMARC -. - . . - - -' I - -

Calculation of radiation monitor reading is based oji dispersal of noble gases only (iodine invntory not included) from the reactor coolant.

-I

Reference PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1. Rev. 4 Pa e 29 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

K> Attachment (Commitment: 6489)' 23 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS & DESCRIPTION RCS BARRIER 2.4: RCS INTEGRITY CSFST MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUUE LOSS: None - '

POTENTIAL LOSS:

nr'e. 1.!.. +/-,....l r -. flTTh AL. iiiwgiiy L.iiLIL.11 41L LUIILLIUII L4LU 1L - 1ULIJ BASIS (References) - -

LOSS - None .. ..

K> POTENTIAL LOSS -

The RCS Integrity Critical Safety Function RED indicates an extreme challenge to the safety function and a potential loss of the ROS barrier. .

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None

. I . **.

/

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 30 of 1121 Emergency CLASSIFICATION I

.. I.

I Attarhmnt .

I Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489) I

. Pages:

23-112 1

j FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION.

RCS BARRIER 2.5: HEAT SINK CSFST MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUES -

. . LOSS: None POTENTIAL LOSS:

Heat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Tree RED BASIS (References)

LOSS - None POTENTIAL LOSS -

7.'

The Heat Sink Critical Safety Function RED path indicates that the heat sink is under extreme challenge and is indicative of a Potential loss of the RCS barrier DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None

. .i. -.

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 31 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels ages:

7 - (Commitment: 6489) I 23-112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION.

CONTAINMENT BARRIER 3.1 - CONTAINMENT RADIATION - -

MODE APPLICABILITY . .. .. . . ... .

1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE LOSS:

None.

POTENTIAL LOSS:

Containment Radiation greater than 1000 R/hr.

-OR- ..

Assessment of core damage greater than 20% clad failure BASIS (References) -. ... -..

. . .. It LOSS-None, . ..-. ..- *,-*.* .*...** -. .>.. . -.

POTENTIAL LOSS - The 1000 R/hr value is based on a reasonable assessment of a single number representing the expected monitor reading on the upper containment high range area radiation monitors VRA 13 10/1410 (Unit 1) or VRA 23 10/2410 (Unit 2). The reading represents the expected reading for loss of coolant accidents with 20% fuel clad damage.

The 1000 R/hr value was determined on the basis of the Donald C. Cook Core Damage Assessment Methodology, taking into account that the radiation levels resulting from the release of noble gases from failed fuel will vary, as a function of core shutdown time. As with the RCS and Fuel Clad barriers containnient radiation EALs, this reading is based on release of noble gases only, approximately 90 minutes after shutdown.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC; Calculation of radiation monitor reading is based on dispersal of noble gases only (iodine inventory not included) from the reactor coolant.

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Reference PMP-2080.EP2P.101 Rev. 4 Pace 32 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICAflON Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION CONTAINMENT BARRIER 3.2: CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 . .

'AT TTYDttTY<ITA1TTE'L Jt.J.A I IL1JhIIJLJJJ tLLJI.JL LOSS:

1. UNISOLABLE breach or bypass of containment

-OR-

2. Rapid unexplained containment pressure or sump level drop following pressure rise caused by LOCA OR

3. Pressure/Sump level NOT performing consistent with expected conditions OR

4. Entry into ECA-1.2, "LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT" -

3/4> POTENTIAL LOSS: .... ..

BASIS (References)

UNISOLABLE - A breach that cannot be isolated from the control room.

LOSS An unisolable breach of containment includes any open unisolable containment penetration. A breach of containment has occurred if an inboard and outboard pair of isolation valves fails to close on an automatic activation signal or from a manual action in the control room and opens a release path to the environment. Plant procedure OHP 4023 .E-0, "Reacior Trip or Safety Injection," provides lists of containment isolation valves required to close on high or HI HI containment pressure.

The beach is considered unisolable if it cannot be isolated from the control room or an attempt for isolation was made from the control room and was unsuccessful. An attempt for isolation should be made prior to a'ccident classification. If isolable upon identification this initiating condition is not applicable. - . ... . .. . -, -.. *. .< S The rapid pressure drop following an initial pressure rise indicates a failed containment. Failure of containment pressure to elevate or containment sump level to rise is also indicative of containment.

bypass or a loss of containment scenario ECA 1 2 is entered when there is evidence of excessive auxiliary building radiation while a loss of reactor or secondary coolant is occurring.

POTENTIAL LOSS None

Reference . PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 - Rev. 4 Pa e 33 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 . Basis For Emergency.Action (Commitment: 6489)

Levels 23Pages:.

- 112 -

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None K-'

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 34 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K' Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Leve]s (Commitment: 6489) I P ages:

23 112 -

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION CONTAINMENT BARRIER 3.3 - STEAM GENERATOR SECONDARY SIDE RELEASE MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE LOSS:

la. Primary to secondary leakage rate greater than technical specification limit.

AND

b. Secondary line break outside containment results in release (>30 minutes) to the environment.

OR.

2. Release of secondary coolant from the associated steam generator to the environment is occurring with an alert alarm on any SG PORV radiation monitor.

POTENTIAL LOSS: . -

None - . *,. -.

BASIS (References)

NORMAL CHARGING LINEUP The normal charging flow path through the volume control system including design and alternate flow paths, and flow to reactor coolant pump seals.

LOSS Secondary side release paths to the environment include atmospheric relief valves and main steam safety valves. Site Area Emergency declaration will be based on evidence of levated RCS activity as indicated by SG PORV radiation monitor alert alarm.- The SG PORV radiation monitor alert alarm setpoint corresponds to SAE site boundary dose rate. . - .

For smaller breaks, not exceeding the capacity of orie charging pump in the NORMAL CHARGING MODE, n UNUSUAL EVENT classifi&ation will result if the ruptured steam generator is'isolated.

For larger breaks; if the steam generator remains unisolated, this EAL will be a discriminator for SITE AREA AND GENERAL EMERGENCIES. The threshold for Site Area Emergency i based on elevated RCS activity indicated by an alert alarm on aSG PORV radiation monitor. -

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 35 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attahmt Basis For Emergency Action Levels . *. Pages:

cen (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 Z If the MSIV on the affected SG is stuck open, the classification is not upgraded to a Site Area Emergency unless there are other complicating factors present. Any complicating factors present should be considered in order to determine if the tube rupture should be classified asa Site Area

. Emergency. These fact6rs may include, but are not limited to, elevted RCS activity (300 jic/ec I-131 dose equivalent indicates significant failed'fiiel, >1%), or significant unisolable steam leakag&

downstream of the MSIV.

SEC judgement should be used when evaluating the steam leak size and any other complicating factors that are not specifically addressed in the EAL, when making the determination to classi1 the tube rupture as a Site Area Emergency.

POTENTIAL LOSS . . .. . .

None DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: .

NUMARC does not use the elevated RCS activity as discriminator for Site Area Emergency.

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Reference PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1' Rev. 4 Pace 36 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3' Basis For Emergency Action Levels . Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) -. 23- 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION CONTAINMENT BARRIER 3.4 - CONTAINMENT CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS

.5 '. -

TREE.*.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE LOSS:

None POTENTIAL LOSS:

Containment critical safety function status tree - RED .

BASIS (References) . . .. .. .. .

K-', LOSS - None POTENTIAL LOSS'- The RED path indicates an extreme challenge to the containment and represents a potential loss of containment. . - - . .

In addition to a containment isolation system, the Cook Nuclear Plant design includes an ice condenser system, containment air recirculation hydrogen skimmer fans, containment spray system, and an RIIR system. The lower containment high pressure .setpoint is 1.1 psig at which a partial containment isolation will occur and the containment air recirculation fans are automatically started after a short time delay. Containment spray is automatically started when containment pressure reaches its HI HI pressure of 2.9 psig.. RHR spray will be initiated if both containment spray trains are not running and 50 minutes has elapsed since the reactor trip. This 12 psig value is also the containment pressure which indicates Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree RED, this EAL indicates the potential of the containment exceeding its design pressure of 12 psig hence the potential of loss of containment DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 - Rev. 4 Pa e 37 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION.'

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels .. Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION CONTAINMENT BARRIER 3.5: CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 . . .

EAL THRESHOLD VALUES.

LOSS:

Initiating conditions for LOSS included under initiating conditions for loss of FPB 3.2, CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.

POTENTIAL LOSS:

1 Hydrogen greater than 4.0% .'*. . .

-OR-

2. Containment hydrogen concentration greater than 0.5% AND any bydrogen control equipment (Containment air recirculationIhdrogen skimmer systems electric hydrogen recombiner OR igniters) inoperable. .... .* . . ., .. .. *. ..

BASIS (References) . . . . . .

LOSS - None POTENTIAL LOSS Cook Nuclear Plant is a Westinghouse plant with an ice condenser containment.

Due to its smaller volume than comparable plants with dry containments, it relies more heavily on engineered safety features for overpressure protection than do dry containments. Overpressure may be*

caused by buildup of steam or noncondensibles in containment, or the consequences associated with ignition of hydrogen gas in the containment.

The potential for loss of containment may be caused by the accumulation of hydrogen gas and the inability of at least one train of required safety components required for the control of hydrogen gas to be inoperable. A 0.5% or greater volume percent is indicative that significant hydrogen gas has formed in containment, and control measures are warranted. Equipment to limit accumulation of hydrogen includes the containment air recirculation fans and the containment air rcirculationIhydrogeii skimmer system: ,Failure of this equipment is indicative of accumulating per itages of hydrogen until 4 volume percent, the lower flammability limit for hydrogen gas is exceeded Above this percentage the hydrogen igniters are the principal equipment relied on to reduce hydrogen gas concentration to below 4 percent.

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Reference . I . PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 I Rev. 4 I Page 38 of 112 Emergency CLASSW[CATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels - Pages:

- (Commitment: .6489) -. . 23 112 DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

A threshold value has been added for hydrogen concentration greater than 0 5% and key hydrogen control equipment inoperable.

Reference PMLP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4. Pa e 39 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23 - 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION CONTAINMENT BARRIER 3.6 - CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CONTROL.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 . -. *. ..

EAL THRESHOLD VALUES LOSS:

Initiating conditions for LOSS included under initiating conditions for loss of FPB 3.3, -

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY... . **

POTENTIAL LOSS:

1. Both containment spray systems both inoperable OR fail to automatically actuate on HI-HI containment pressure. .

K-' 2 Both containment air recirculation fans inoperable OR fail to automatically actuate on HI containment pressure. OR 3 Containment pressure exceeds 12 psig BASIS (References)

LOSS - None POTENTIAL LOSS Cook Nuclear Plant is a Westinghouse plant with an ice condenser containment.

Due to its smaller volume than comparable plants with dry containments, it relies more heavily on engineeredsafety features for overpressure protection than do dry containments. Overpressure may be

caused by buildup of steam or noncondensibles in containment, or the consequences associated with ignition of hydrogen gas in the containment.

Containment pressure control is achieved through the Containment Spray system and the Containment

.<. KAir Recirculati6nlhydrogen skimmer system., Total failure of both these systems may allow steam to K .:- build up within containment, and, ijnabated, this steam buildup may cause the internal cbntainment pressure buildup to exceed the design pressure of 12 psig. Studies have shown that the containment can withstand pressures well above this value.

Both the recirculation fans and the containment spray pumps are actuated atuomatically following receipt of a HI or HI HI containment pressure signal, respectively. However, rapid startup of these

systems is not required, since the ice condenser will serve as a passive steam pressure.reduction device

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 40 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K> I Basis For Emergency Action Levels w Pages:..

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) . . 23 112

until the ice has melted. Therefore, if these systems should fail, it is permissible to start both these

systems manually without being overly concerned about the potential loss of containment due to* ..

overpressure. 'However, the failure of automatic startup of redundant equipment isconsidered .;

symptomatic of potentially degraded key safety equipxiieiit. Thus the potential loss categorization will remain until it can be determined that the failure to start automatically was not symptomatic of major system degradation. . . . .... .* . . .

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: . -

INUI1.

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 . Pa e 41 of 1121 Emergency CLASSIEICATION .1 Basis For.Emergency Action Levels Pages Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 J FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION CONTAINMENT BARRIER 3.7 CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLES MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUES .. *.. . . I . . -.

LOSS: . . . . .

None .

POTENTIAL LOSS:

Cooling Critical Safety Function Status Tree - RED

-AND-Restoration procedures not effective within 15 minutes.

BASIS (References) . *. .. : ,.7

- LOSS - None . . .. . . .. . ..... .

POTENTIAL LOSS The conditions in this EAL re,resent imminent fuel melt sequence which, if not corrected could lead to vessel failure and an increased potential for containment failure. Severe accident analysis reactor vessel has concluded in many core damage that functional and that theProcedures scenarios, retoration likelihood cali arrest core damage of containment small the failure isvithin for -

these evejits. Whether or not the procedures will be effective should be apparent within 15 minutes of taking action as directed by the procedure. The SEC should make the declaration as soon as it is

- determined that the procedure appears to be ineffective.

The core cooling status tree - RED is indicative that major fuel damage has occurred, and radioactive release can be expected. The conditions which indicate this condition are either 1) core exit RVLIS (Reactorgreater

'thermocouples Vesel thanLevel degrees System)

Indication 1200 F or corenarrow range less thangreater exit thermocouples 46% with than no 752reactor degreescoolant F and.

.. :* . pump running.* This represents a' more conservative position guidance than recommended in Revision 2 of.

NUMARCINESP 007, but is taken to be 6nsistent with the afforded by the Westinghouse.

Owners Group as to the indication of when c6re cooling may be considered to be lost. .-

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None.. .

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Reference*. PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 42 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFJCATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels . Pages: -

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION 11-1: UNUSUAL EVENT - SEC JUDGEMENT INITIATING CONDITION Other conditions existing which in the judgement of the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) warrant declaration of an Unusual Event.

MODE APPLICABILITY All

- EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

In the judgement of the SEC, conditions indicate a notential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. -

BASIS (References) . .

This ECC is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency becaue conditions exist which are believed by the SEC to fall under the Unusual Event emergency class. . . i From a broad perspective, one area that may warrant SEC judgemeni is related to likely or actual breakdown of site specific event mitigatin actions. Examples to consider include inadequate emergency response procedures, translent response either unexpected or not understood, failure or unavailability of emergency. systems during an accident in excess of that assumed in accident analyses, or insufficient availability of equipment and/or support personnel.

Specific examples of actual events that may require SEC judgement for Unusual Event declaration are listed here for consideration. However, this list is by no means all inclusive and is not intended to limit the discretion of the SEC.

Aircraft crash on -site but, outside the protected area

Train derailment on-site but, outside the protected area

Near site explosion which may adversely affect normal site activities but doesn t directly affect activities required to maintain safe operation of the plant

Near site releases of toxic or flammable gas which may adversely affect normal site activities but doesn t directly affect activities required to maintain safe operation of the plant K.>

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 43 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION I flad Pnr Pmrrnrv Agtmnn T vk I . . Pcypv 1 . Attachment 3 (Comxnitnent:6489) of events I

as23-112 defined here. This It also intended that the SEC's judgeinent not be limited by any lists provided solely as examples for consideration and it is recognized that actual events may not always follow a pre-conceived description. -

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA -

The condition which caused the declaration to be made no longer exists, or in the SEC's judgement, the condition will not cause a degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None .,

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 44 of 112 Emergency CLASS WICAT ION..

Levels ages:

.2 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESC RIPTIQN

- H-I: ALERT - SEC JUDGEMENT 1N11IA11IN.i CUNJJIJJUIN Other conditions existing which in the judgement of the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) warrant declaration of an Alert.

MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE In the judgement of the SEC .. . -

1 conditions indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded, ...

.* *. -AND-2 increased monitoring of plant functions is needed.

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BASIS (References) , .

This ECC is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the SEC to fall under the Alert emergency class.

TERMINIATION/RECOVERY CRITERIA :....

The condition which caused the declaration to be made no longer exists, or in the SEC sjudgement the condition will not cause a degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 - Rev. 4 Pa e 45 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112

- ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-i: SITE AREA EMERGENCY - SEC JUD CEMENT INITIATING CONDITION *. I Other conditions existing which in the judgement of the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

MAiW APPTT('ATUT.TTV All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

In the judgement of the SEC Conditions indicate likely or actual major failures of plant functions needed for the potection of the BASIS (References)

- . This ECC is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that .

warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the SEC to fall under the Site Area Emergency, emergency classification..

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA The condition which caused the declaration to be made no longer exists, or in the SEC's judgement, the condition no longer indicates likely or actual major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public health and safety DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.iO1 Rev. 4 Pa e 46 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION.

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels

- (Commitmejit: 6489) II Pages:

23-112 EGG CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-i: GENERAL EMERGENCY - SEC JUDGEMENT INITIATING CONDITION .*.

Other conditions existing which in the judgernent of the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) warrant declaration of a General Emergency. .

MODE APPLICABILITY -

All.

EAL ThRESHOLD VALUE In the judgement of the SEC:

I Condition indicate an actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential loss of affected unit s containment.

2 for uncontrolled radioactive OR Potential exists an release that may exceed EPA limits at the site boundary. .

BASIS (References)

The ECC is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the SEC to fall under the General Emergency, emergency classification.. .- . - . .. . .* . .,

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA . . . .

In the SEC s judgement a General Emergency no longer exists and entry into recovery procedures is appropriate The affected unit has achieved a cold shutdown DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None .

Reference PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 47 of 112 Emergncy CLASSIFICATION K' Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

P ages 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H 2 UNUSUAL EVENT - SECURITY EVENTS INITIATING CONDITION Confirmed Security Event which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant:

MODE APPLICABILITY All.. - - -. *.. - . *. *..*

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE 1 Bomb device discovered within the protected area and outside the vital area.

-OR-2 Credible bomb threat.

K' ,. -OR-3 Credible attack threat.

-OR-4 Hostage/Extortion incident potentially affecting plant operations.

BASIS (References)

This EAL is based on the Modified Amended Security Plan (MASP). Security events which do not represent at least a potential degradation in the level of safety of the Plant, are reported under 10 CFR 73.71 or in some cases, under 10 CFR 50.72.' The plant protected area boundary is the area within the

- security isolation zone as defined in the Modified Amended Security Plan. Bomb devices discovered within the plant vital area would result in EAL escalation. -.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA :.-: . .

The hazard to the level of safety of the plant no longer exists DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K>

Reference PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 48 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION acen 3 Attlunt Basis For

. Emergency Action (Commitment: 6489) Levels Pages:

23 - 112 ECC CATEGORY 'NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION 11-2: ALERT - SECURITY EVENTS INITIATING CONDITION Security Event in a Plant Protected Area MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. Intrusion into protected area by a hostile force OR 2 Civil disturbance within the protected area K..> BASIS (References) - -

This class of security events represent an scalajed threat to plant safety above that contained in the Unusual Event. Intrusion into a 'vital area by a hostile force will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency. . . . . * .:.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA.

Challenge to the safety of the plant no longer exists.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None K.>

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 49 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

_____ (Cdmmitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS AND DESCRIPTION H-2: SITE AREA EMERGENCY SECURITY EVENTS INITIATING CONDITION A Security event in a plant vital area.

MODE APPLICABILITY All EAt THRESHOLD VALUE - 9 1 Intrusion into any vital area by a hostile force OR 2 A security event which results in the loss of control of any vital area (other than the control room).

3 A confirmed bOmb device discovered BASIS (References)

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert IC in that a hostile force has progressed from the protected area to a vital area.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA The condition causing the event has been eliminated DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1: Rev. 4 Pa e 50 of 112 Emergency CLASS WICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels . Pages:

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23 - 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-2: GENERAL EMERGENCY - SECURITY EVENTS INITIATING CONDITION Security Event resulting in loss of ability to reach and maintain cold shutdown.

MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE - j .* ..

1. Loss of physical control of the control room due to a security event.

-OR-2 Loss of physical control of a unit's remote shutdown capability due to a security event.

BASIS (References)

This Initiating Condition encompasses conditions under which a hostile force has taken physical control of either thecontrol room or all remote shutdown capabilities resulting in a loss of physical control of the facility. This EAL is an escalation of the Site Area Emergency declaration for a hostile force intrusion into a vital area.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA . .. A-..

The security threat has been eliminated and cold shutdown can be maintained.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 51 of 112

Emergency CLASSIFICATION K> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels, Pages

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS. AND DESCRIPTION 11-3: ALERT - CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION INITIATING CONDITION Control room evacuation has been initiated....

MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE.

Control room' evacuation has been initiated.

BASIS (References) ... .: .* .. *.. .':

CONTROL Placing all local controls iii position necessary for operation from remote panels and the

'shift supervisor has determined that the systems for controlling reactivity, RCS inventory, RCS.

K> temperature, and the heat sink functions have been established. '.7 . .. . .' .

Evacuation of the control room represents a potential for substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant and, therefore, re'quires an ALERT declaration.' Additional support, monitoring, and direction is required and accomplished by activation of the Technical Support Center at the' Alert classification level.' Inability to establish plant CONTROL from outside the control room will escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency. * :

Cook Nuclear Plant has separate control rooms for each unit. The Cook Nuclear Plant procedure governing control room evacuation and establishing plant c6ntrol 'outide the control room is (01-for Unit I, 02-for Unit 2) OHP 4025.001.001, "Emergency Remote Shutdown".' .

TERMINIATIONfRECO VERY CRITERIA . *. .

Control of the plant has been reestablished from the control room.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K-,

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 52 of 112' Emergency CLASSIFICATION

- Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Cominitnient: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-3: SITE AREA EMERGENCY - CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION ThYT'TY A flT1 IYTSWVI%Y Control room evacuation has been initiated and plant CONTROL cannot be established.

MODE APPLICABILITY . ..

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE .

The following conditions' exist:

I 'Control Room evacuation has been initiated.

..-AND-2 CONTROL of any one of the following processes is not established within 15 minutes

Reactivity -'

RCS inventory

RCS temperature

SGheatsink.

BASIS (References)

CONTROL Placing all local control switches in local control necessary for operation from remote panel and *the shift supervisor has determined that the systems for controlling reactivity; RCS inventory, RCS temperature, and the heat sink functions have been establish&d.

,Cook Nuclear Plant has separate control rooms for each unit. The Cook Nuclear Plant procedure

- - governing control room evacuation and establishing plant control outside the control room is (01-for Unit 1, 02-for Unit 2) OUP 4025.001.001, "Emergency Remote Shutdown",. . The 15 minute time for CONTROL being established outside of the control room is taken from Revision 2 of NUMARC/NESP 007.. .. > . ... . . .

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Control of the plant has been reestablished from the control room K> DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None

Reference Attachment 3 PMP-2O8O.EPP.1O1.

Emergency CLASSIFICATION

. (Commitment: 6489)

Rev. 4 Basis For Emergency Action Levels.

. Pa e 53 of 112 Pages:.

23 112 I1 j

The inability to establish control of RCS inventory RCS temperature, reactivity and heat sink functions outside of the control room within 15 minutes requires the declaration of a site area emergency K.

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Reference PMLP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 54 of 112 Emeecy CLASSIFI CATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489)23-112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-4: UNUSUAL EVENT FIRE -

INITIATING CONDITION Fire in protected area boundazy not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection.

MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE -

Fire within the protected area boundary not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection.

BASIS (References)

The purpose of this EAL is to address only fires which are potentially significant precursors to safety system damage. This excludes such items as fires within office buildings, waste basket fires, and other small fires of no consequence. This EAL applies td buildings and ar&as contiguous jo plant vital areas or other significant buildings and areas. The intent is not to include buildings (or warehouses) that are not contiguous or immediately adjacent to areas where safety system performance would be adversely affected or there could be an uncontrolled release of radioactive material. -

-I Areas of concern at the Cook Nuclear Plant for this initiating condition (H-i: UNUSUAL EVENT) include the protected area. The radioactive material building (RMB) is not included since it is outside the protected area, and not required to safely shutdown the plant. In the unlikely event that a fire were to occur where 100% of the RMB contained adioactive material were released, it could result in an offsite dose of 2.5 rem. If a fire or explosion were to occur that could result in an offsite radioactive release, the SEC would initially declare as unusual event under the classification requirements of H-5, SEC judgment. >The classificationcould be escalated in accordance with the requirement of R-l, if field measurements show large offsite releases have actually occurred.

TERMINIATIONJRECO VERY CRITERIA Fire Extinguished.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC; None K-I

Reference PMSP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 55 of 112 Emergency CLASS IFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 - 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION.

H-4: ALERT FIRE OR EXPLOSION AFTECTING OPERABILITY OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT . . . -

INITIATING CONDITION.

Fire or explosion affecting OPERABILITY of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown.

.. MODE APPLICABILITY All' EAL THRESHOLD VALUE . .

I Fire or explosion that affects the OPERABILITY of systems required for the current operating mode OR for safe shutdown. *.o 2 Fire or explosion that causes visible damage to any of the following structures: containments, K> auxiliary buildings, essential service 'water system enclosures, auxiliary feedwater pump rooms, refueling water storage tank, or condensate torage tank.

BASIS (References) -

EXPLOSION - A rapid, violent, uncontained combustion or catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that potentially imparts significant energy to nearby structures or equipment.

If a fire affects operability of only one of two redundant systems, then this EAL is not applicable.

The purpose of this EAL is to address only fires which are potentially significant precursors to safety system damage. This excludes such items as fires within office buildings, waste basket fires, and other small fires of no consequence. This EAL applies to building and areas contiguous to plant vital areas or other significant buildings and areas. The intent is not to include buildings (or warehouses) that are not contiguous or immediately adjacent to areas where the safety system performance would be adversely affected. ... - .

Only explosions of significant force to cause damage (deformation, scorching) to structures or equipment required for safe operation should be 'considered. . *. *. . '. * . *..

- ' -- - t TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Plant capability to operate safety no longer affected by the event.

DEVIATION FROM NLJMARC: None -

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1Oi. Rev. 4 Pa e 56 of 112 Emergency CLASSLEICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels ages:

(Commitment: 6489) - 23 112 EGG CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION 11-5: UNUSUAL EVENT - TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES INITIATING CONDITION Release of toxic or flammable gases deemed detrimental to safe operation of the plant.

MODE APPLICABILITY All NOTE: 1 or OHP-4021-028-014, Operation of the Control Room AirCondiion ana k'ressurizationI.Aeanup rilter system contains instructions br control room isolation in the event of a toxic gas release.

j EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

-

Release of toxic or flammable gases within or near site boundaiy that may affect normal

. . operation of the plant. . OR .:-

2 Report by local, county, or state officials of potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event. - . . . . . - ..

BASIS (References) :.

TOXIC Exposure to the worker in excess of limits specified in 29 CFR 1910.1000. in practice, this should be considered for concentrations which are capable of incapacitating the worker.

This initiating condition is based on release in concentrations within the site boundary that will affect the health and safety of plant personnel or affect safe operation of the plant.

The potential for the degradation in the level of safety of the plant through the affect of toxic OR flammable gas on the health of personnel or operation of the plant is to be considered for declaration of the UNUSUAL EVENT.. The source of the toxic or flammable gas could be from inside or outside the site Although carbon dioxide (C02) concentrations can be lethal it is not considered a toxic gas for the purpose of classification unless access is required and cannot be made in an area where equipment needed for the safe shutdown of the plant is maintained K>

Reference - PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 - Rev. 4 Pa e 57 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRiTERIA The release of toxic material is terminated and the operational Impact of the release has been eliminated. . .

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None -

K>

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 58 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFI CATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489)23-112

ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-5: ALERT - TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES INITIATING CONDITION Release of toxic of flammable gases within a facility structure which jeopardizes operation of systems

'required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown.

MODE APPLICABILITY All NOTE: 1 or 2 OILP-4021-028-014, Operation of the Control Room Air Conditioning and Pressurization/Cleanup Filter System contains instructions for control room isolation in the event of a toxic gas release.

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE . . .

1. Report or detection of toxic gases within a facility, structure in concentrations that will be life

.. .. threatening to personnel. - .

-OR- . .* ..

2 Report or detection of flammable gases within a facility structure in concentiitions that will laffect the safe operation of the plant.

BASIS (References) ..

TOXIC - Exposure to the worker in excess of limits specified in 29 CFR 1910.1000. In practice, this*

should be considered for concentrations which capable of incapacitating the worker.

This EAL is based on gases that have entered plant structures that will affect the safe operation of the plant. These structures include buildings and areas contiguous to plant vital areas and other significant buildings or area. The intent of this EAL is not to include buildings that are not contiguous or immediately adjacent to plant vital areas. The source of the toxic or flammable gas could be from inside or outside the site. . *. .. *.

The source of the release is not of immediate concern for these threshold values. The c6ncrn is for the health and safety of plant personnel and their ability to maintain the plant in a safe operating condition.

This EAL is reached whenever the shift manager determines that protective gear is' required to be worn by plant personnel required to safely operate the unit

F.

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 59 of 112

- . Emergency CLASSIFICATION -

I Basis For Emergency .Action Levels - Pages:

Attachment 3 . (Commitment: 6489) . 23 112 Although carbon dioxide (C02) concentrations can be lethal, it is not considered a toxic gas for the purpose of classification unless access is required and cannot be made in an area where equipment needed for the safe shutdown of the plant is maintained TERMINIATION!RECO VERY CRITERIA Plant operations are no longer affected.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K>

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 - . Rev. 4 Pa e 60 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 - 112 EGG CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION N-i to N-7: UNIJSUAL EVENT - NATURAJ.I OR DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA -. , -

INITIATING CONDITION Natural or destructive phenomena inside protected area.

MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE. . .

1 CONFIRMED seismic event as indicated by seismic instrument activation or based on ground motion felt at th nuclear plant and recognized as an earthquake based on consensus of control room operators on duty at the time.

K> 2. Report of a tornado strike Wi

. thin the protected area. . - ... . . .;.

- Vehicle collision affecting structures or systems within the protected area.

Main turbin.

4 rotating component failure causing visible damage or damage to the generator seals.

-OR-5 Report by plant personnel of an unanticipated explosion within the protected area boundary resulting in visible damage to permanent structures or equipment.

BASIS (References)

These threshold values are natural or destriciive phenomena whiclirepresent potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The affects of the phenomena should also be evaluated on a system or component basis in relation to. the Technical Specifications and evaluated for further classification via either site emergency coordinator (SEC) judgement or plant procedures as apPropriate.

Threshold Value 1 Seismic events at the 1o.vest instrument activation, 0.02g (or based on ground motion felt at the nuclear plant and recognized as an earthquake bas&d onconsensus of control room operators on duty at the time) may cause damage to systems and represent a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant A confirmation call to the National Earthquake Center will confirm that an earthquake has occurred and may provide an estimate of the magnitude of the earthquake in the vicinity of Cook Nuclear Plant Further information regarding anticipated actions may be found in plant.

procedures OUP 4022 001 007 "Earthquake"

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 61 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489):

Pages:

23 112 -

A call to one of the following may be used to verif'/confirm a seismic event. National Earthquake Center (phone number (303) 273-8500 or 1-800-525-7848), Local television stations, or, University - .

monitoring stations. .

Threshold Value 2 - Any report that a tornado has touched down within the protected area.

Threshold Value 3 A collision of any vehicle on land, from the air, or on water (plane, train, barge, etc.) which affects structures or equipment within the protected area may potentially damage plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. If the crash is confirmed to affect a plant vital area, the event may be escalated to Alert.

Threshold Value 4 Failure of the rotating components has the potential for leakage of flammable fluids (oil and hydrogen) into the turbine building.

Threshold Value 5 - Only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or ..

equipment within the protected area should be considered. As used here an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially

imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. No attempt is made in the EAL to assess .

the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of evidence of - * ..

damage (e.g., deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. The SEC also needs to consider

-K> any security aspects of the explosion, if applicable. . . . . . . .* . .- . -.. ... . -

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA . . . .* . .*

No furthef hazard exists, and damage assessment is complete, and termination is allowed in accordance with the requirements of the event termination procedure. . . . ..

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

A separate ECC category name was established for these "Natural or Destructive Phenomena". They are included in the "Hazards And Other Conditions" Category in NUMARC/NESP 007.

K>

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 62 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 (Conimitirient: 6489)" 23 - 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION N-i to N-7: ALERT - NATURAL OR DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA INSIDE A VITAL AREA INITIATING CONDITION Natural or destructive phenomena inside vital areas.

MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE 1 CONFIRMED seismic event as indicated by seismic instrument activation or based on ground motion felt at the nuclear plant and recognized as an earthcuake based on consensus of control room operators on duty at the time AND which causes visible major damage to structures,

- systems, and components in the vital area or causes a plant trip to occur. ..

-OR-2 Report of a tornado strike in a plant vital area or SUSTAINED high wind (>15 miii.) greater than9Omilesperhour. *<..<:; .. : <.3: :...: *. - ' . - 9. .

3 -, Report of visible structural damage to a structure containing systems required to establish and maintain cold shutdown. -

4 Vehicle collision affecting a vital area.

5. - Turbine failure generated missiles penetrating a vital area.

-OR-

6. Flooding in a vital area affecting safety related equipment.

BASIS (Refcrenccs These threshold values are natural or destructive phenomena which represent actual or potential

- substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The affects of the phenomena should also be

, evaluated on a system or component basis in relation to the Technical Specifications and evaluated for further classification via either Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) judgement or plant procedures as appropriate. . . *.* .> ..: *. -

Threshold Value - Seismic events at the lowest instrument'activation (O.02g ground acceleration) or*.

ground motion felt at the nuclear plant and recognized as an earthquake based on consensus of controf room operators on duty at the time. The effect of the earthquake has significantly affected plant operations (up to and includingmantial or aut6matic plant trip) or has caused visible damage that has:

the potential for major degradation of systems required to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition A call to the National Earthquake Center will confirm that an earthquake has occurred and may provide an estimate of the magnitude of the earthquake in the vicinity of the Cook Nuclear Plant.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Emerencv CLASSIFICATION Rev. 4 Pa e 63 of 112 I

K> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action (Commitment: 6489) Levels Pages:

23 - 112 K:.

Operator walkdowns of plant systems, structures and components will be performed to assess potential damage levels. . . . - -*

A call to one of the following may be used to veriI'/confirm a seismic event: National Earthquake Center (phone number (303) 273-8500 or 1-800-525-7848), local television stations, or university monitoring stations.

Threshold Value 2 A tornado strike must include an affect on systems or components that affects the operability or integrity of the system or structure within a vital area. The threshold value of 90 mph is the FSAR design basis wind load.

Threshold Value 3 Should be used in conjunction with investigation of threshold values 1 and 2, or on a stand alone basis: A detailed, description or assessment of damage is not intended to meet the intent of this threshold value. The list of critical structires is the same as that included under 11-4 ALERT (containments, auxiliary buildings, ESW system enclosures, auxiliary feedwater pump rooms, refi.ieling water storage tank, condensate sto#age tank).

Threshold Value 4 A collision by any vehicle on land, from the air, or on water (plane, train, barge etc.) which affects structures or equipment within a vital area.

Threshold Value 5 This threshold value addresses the threat to safety equipment imposed by missiles generated by main turbine rotating component failures. This includes all areas-classified as vital areas of the plant. . . - . . - - -

Threshold Value 6 Flooding in vital areas which affect OPERABILITY of safety related systems or components. The-source of the flooding need not be known.

The word "OPERABLITY" refers to the definition in the Technical Specifications where required redundant safety equipment will be made inoperable. The only types of floods anticipated to, trigger*

this threshold are major catastrophic pipe ruptures in the plant that have not been previously evaluated or floods caused by severe external phenomena such as seiches.

TERMLNIATIQNIRECO VERY CRITERIA No further hazard exists, damage assessment is complete, and termination is allowed in accordance with the requirements of the event termination procedure. - - - - -

-I DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: -

A separate ECC category name was established for these "Natural or Destructive Phenomena." They are -included in the "Hazards And OtherConditions" category in NUMARC/NESP 007. - -- ->-- - - - -

The EAL for earthquakes does .not include a real time seismic instrumentation reading. Cook Nuclear -

Plant seismic instrumentation does not provide indication of the level of earthquake as an Operations Basis Earthquake (OBE) or Design Basis Earthquake (DBE). This EAL is written using the operator -

assessment method specified in NUMARCINESP 007. -

Reference . . PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 .. Pa e 64 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages: -

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489)23-112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-1: UNUSUAL EVENT - RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE INITIATING CONDITION Unplanned release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds two times the ODCM release limits for 60 minutes or longer.

MODE APPLICABILITY All.

NOTE: The term "one or more of the following monitors" in the EAL means that the lotal of all monitors is to be considered when classifying an event.

[Commitment 5116]

EM1 THRESHOLD VALUE . ....

valid on one re of the following monitors that exceeds 2 times the high alarm setpoint for 60 minutes of longer..

VRS-1500/2500 (Noble Gas)

SRA-1800/2800 (Noble Gas)

SRA-1900/2900 (Noble Gas) * . .. -.

R-20

R-28 . .

-OR-2 A VALID radiation monitor reading 2 times the high alarm setpoint for any monitored release pathway for> 60 minutes.

-OR- . . .

3 Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicates concntratioiis or release rates exceeding 2 times the ODCM maximum instantaneous release limit for> 60 minutes..

BASIS (References) j., - . . . - .

VALID Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be suspect.

Verification can be obtained by a) an instrument channel check, or b) indications on related or redundant indicators or c) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment i e within 15 minutes

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 65 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION acen 3 Atthrnt Basis For (Commitment: 6489) Levels Emergency Action 23Pages:

- 112 UNPLANNED Means the release occurred without a discharge permit or the conditions specified on the discharge permit have been exceeded. . . -':".

Environmental release limits for effluent radiation monitor alarms are calculated using methods specified in the offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM). An UNPLANNED release in excess of two times the ODCM release limit for 60 minutes, or longer, represents an uncontrolled situation, and hence, a potential degradation in the level of safety. Although the final integrated dose is very low in the Unusual Event emergency class, the degradation in plant control implied by the fact that the release cannot be terminated in 60 minutes is the primary concern.

Declaration of an Unusual Event should be made as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely' exceed 60 minutes. A dose assessment should be performed to ensure that a higher

classification is not warranted. If the monitor reading(s) is sustained for longer than 60 minutes and the required assessments cannot be completed within this period, then the declaration must be made based on the valid reading.

Radioactive gaseous release pathways are monitored by either the unit vent monitor (VRS-l500/2500),

the gland steam condenser exhaust effluent monitors (SRA-1 800/2800), the steam jet air ejector vent effluent monitors (SRA-1900/2900), or the steam generator 'relief monitors. The 'first three monitors are included in threshold I 2.Steam generator relief monitors are excluded. The reason is that . -

radioactive gas release via the steam generator PORVs and safety valves is believed to be a pathway that' could not; under normal operating conditions, lead to release of radioactive gases to the environment in sufficient amounts so as tocause exceeding the technical specification limits. The steam generator relief monitors ar included as an EAL threshold in the site area emergency classification for abnormal release of radioactive materials. "

With the exception' of possible releases from the essential 'water system (monitored by R-20 and R-28) release of radioactive liquids to the environment are planned and controlled. Before a batch of radioactive liquid is released to the environment, the sample is analyzed. If the radioactivity of the sample is withinacceptable limits, the liquid will be released,' monitored, and recorded. The alarm on

the monitor is set in accordance with ODCM limits. *To cover the potential that something may go wrong with the liquid release process, threshold 2 addresses any valid radiation monitor reading.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA The source of the release is determined and isolated (terminated). Environmental field team samples:.

have been taken and 'the environmental impact assessment is in progress."

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: . * '

Example EALs from NUMARC/NESP 007 numbers 3 and 4 (i.e., perimeter radiation monitoring and real time dose assessment) were not used because Cook Nuclear Plant does not have those 'capabilities The initiating condition is stated in terms of exceeding ODCM limits rather than exceeding radiological technical specifications. '"' '

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 66 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:*

(Conimitmnt: 6489)23-112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-1: ALERT - RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE -

INITIATING CONDITION Any unplanned release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment, greater than 200 times' ODCM release limits, which lasts for 15 minutes or longer.

MODE APPLICABILITY All NOTE: The term "one or more of the following monitors" in the EAL means that the total of all monitors is to be considered when classifying an event.

[Commitment 5116]

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. A valid reading on one or more of the following monitors which is greater than 200 times high

alarm setpoint for > 15 minutes.

VRS-150012500 (Noble Gas)

. SRA-1800/2800 (Noble Gas)' . *.

SRA-1900/2900 (Noble Gas) .

R-20

R-28

-OR- .

2 A valid radiation monitor reading indicating 200 times the high alarm setpoint for any monitored release pathway for> 15 minutes>.

-OR-

3. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicates concentrations or release

rates exceeding 200 times the ODCM maximum instantaneous release limit for> 15 minutes.

BASIS (References) . :. . .. .. ' .. . .

VALID Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be suspect Verification can be obtained by a) an instrument channel check or b) indications on related or redundant indicators, or c) bydirect observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the 'need for timely, assessment, i.e.; within 15 minutes: - . - - ... . .

UNPLANNED Means the release occurred without a discharge permit or the conditions specified on the discharge permit have been exceeded

-I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 67 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Ku Attachment 3 I Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

I (Comniitment: 6489) 23 1.12 This event escalates from the Unusual Event by escalating the magnitude of the release by a factor of

100. Prorating the 500 mR/yr criterioji for both time (8766 hr/yr and the 200 multiplier, the associated site boundary dose rate would be 10 mR/hr. The required release duration was reduced to 15 minutes in recognition of the increased severity. s. *. .

Declaration of an Alert should be made as soon as it is determined ihat the release duration has orwill likely eiceed .15 minutes. A dose assessment should be performed to ensure that a higher classification is not warranted.

assessments cannotIfbethecompleted monitor reading(s) within thisisperiod, sustained thenforthelonger declaration than 15must minutesbe madeand the basedrequired on the *

valid reading.

Further information on the basis of EAL threshold 1 cited above may be found in the basis document

-

for the Unusual Event associated with R-1. . *. . .

TERMINIATIONJRECO VERY CRITERIA

The source of the release is determined and isolated (termirated). Environmental field team samples have been taken and the environmental impact assessment is in progress. . .... . . .. - . .. .

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: . .**.* .

K>

Example EALs from NUMARC/NESP 007 numbers 3 and 4 (i.e., perimeter radiation monitoring and real time dose assessment) were not used because Cook Nuclear Plant does not have those capabilitis.

The initiating condition is stated in terms of exceeding ODCM limits rather than exceeding radiological*

technical specifications. . *. - . - . . . . j * -

K-,

/

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 68 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K.,' Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

Pages 23 112 I ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-1: SITE AREA EMERGENCY - RADIOACTIVE EFThUENT RELEASE INITIATING CONDITION Site boundaiy dose resulting from an actual or release of' gaseous radioactivity exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release

MODE APPLICABILITY All NOTE: The term "one or more of the following monitors" in the EAL means that the total of all monitors is to be considered when classifying an event.

[Commitment 5116]

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE K> 1 Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding 100 mR/hr B y or a CDE thyroid exceeding 500 mrem for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of inhalation at the site boundary

-OR-'

2 . A valid dose assessment indicates greater than 100 rurem TEDE or 500 mrern CDE thyzoid tJPj1..I the site boundary.. ' .- ' ,. - . *-.***.

-OR-3 A valid reading on one or more of the following monitors (noble gas channels) that exceeds or

is expected to exceed the value shown indicates that the release may have exceeded the above criterion and indicates the need to assess the release in accordance with appropriate plant procedures.

. VRS-1500/2500> 1.07 E-1 pcilcc (Unit Vent)

VRS-1800/2800> 7.90 E0pci/cc (Steam Packing Exhauster)

SRA-1900/2900> 1.95 E+3 . pci/ce (Air Ejector)

MRA-1600/2600> 1.00 E+2 pci/cc (SG PORV) 1700/2700 NOTE: The above monitor readings are based on an assumed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months event duration. If the monitor reading(s) is sustained for longer than 15 minutes and the required assessments cannot be completed within this period, then the declaration must be based on the valid monitor reading. The rnonitor ranges should be se1ectd in accordance with guidance in RMT-2080-TSC-00l. . . . 7 .. ICi BASIS (References)

K,' VALID Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be suspect. Radiation readings can be confirmed by redundant instrumentation local readings, or grab samples.

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.IO1 Rev. 4 Pa e 69 of 112 Emergency CLASS WICATION -

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489)23-112 The 100 mrem integrated dose in this initiating condition, is based on the 10 CFR 20 annual average population exposure. This value also provides a desirable gradient (one order of magnitude) between the Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classes. The 500 mrem CDE thyroid dose is -

consistent with the 1.5 ratio of the EPA Protective Action Guidelines for Total Effective Dose**

Equivalent and Committed Dose Equivalent to the thyroid. :.. 7 A release duration of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is assumed. For analysis of longer or shorter duration releases, the 100

mremlhr TEDE and 500 mremlhr CDE thyroid dose rates should be adjusted accordingly. . '

The releases on the monitors in threshold #3 above are calculated using the Cook Nuclear Plant Dose Assessment Program (DAP) and are based on average plant meteorology, the assumption that the release is one hour duration, and a site boundary dose of 100 mremlhour. Details may be found in AEP Radiological Support Section calculation RS-C-283. Analysis of gaseous releases shorter or longer duration or different meteorologic conditions is performed during the dose assessment. If the monitor release is sustained for greater than 15 minutes and the dose assessment cannot be completed in

this time period; thenemergency classification will be solely on whether the monitor readings are valid..*.

and whether they exceed the values cited in thrshold #3 above.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA * -.

The source of the release has been determined and isolated (terminated) Environmental field samples -

-.'. :7 2: have been taken and environmental impact assessment is in progress. . . . . *. .. .::. . -

DEViATION FROM NUMARC NUMARC/NESP 007 example EAL number 2 (i e , perimeter radiation monitoring system) was not used because Cook Nuclear Plant does not have that capability.

K>

I

Reference PMJP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rei'. 4 Pa e 70 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)23-112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-1: GENERAL EMERGENCY - RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE INITIATING CONDITION Site boundaxy dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivity exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 rurem CDE thyroid for the actual or projected duration of the release.

MODE APPLICABILITY All NOTE: The term "one or more of the following monitors" in the EAL means that the total of all monitors is to be considered when classifYing an event.

[Commitment 5.116]

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE .

K> 1. Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding 1000 niR/hr f3 yor a CDE thyroid exceeding 5000 mrem for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of inhalation at the site boundary.

-OR- . -

2. A valid dose assessment indicates gxeater than 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrern dDE thyroid

-OR-*

3. A valid reading on one or more of the following monitors (noble gas channels) that exceeds or

.is expected to exceed the value shown indicates that the release may haye exceeded the above criterion and indicates the need to assess the release in accordance with the appropriate plant procedures.

VRS-1500/2500> 1.07 E+0 pci/cc (Unit Vent)

SRA-1800/2800> 1.57 E+2 pcilcc (Steam Packing Exhauster)

SRA-1900/2900> 5.78 E+3 pci/cc (Air Ejector) -

NOTE: The above monitor readings are based on an assumed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months event duration. If the monitor reading(s) is sustained for longer than 15 minutes and the required assessments cannot be completed within this period, then the declaration must be based on the valid monitor reading The monitor ranges should be selected in accordance with guidance in RMT-2080-TSC-001. Cl (References) .. .

VALID Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be suspect Verification can be obtained by a) an instrument channel check, or b) indications on related or K> redundant indicators, or c) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

I,

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 71 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K.> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

Pages:

23412 The 1000 mrem TEDE and 5000 mrem CDE thyroid values are based on the EPA protective action guidance which indicates that public protective actions are indicated if those values are exceeded. This is consistent with the emergency class description for a General Emergency.

A release duration of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months has been assumed for analysis if longer or shorter duration, releases, the 1000 mrem/hr TEDE and 5000 mrem/hr thyroid CDE dose rates should be adjusted accordingly.

The release on the monitors in threshold #3 above are calculated using the Cook Nuclear Plant Dose Assessment Program (DAP) and are based on average plant meteorology, the assumption that the release is one hour duration, and a site boundary dose of 1000 mrem. Details may be found in AEP

Radiological Support Section calculation RS-C-283. Analysis of gaseous releases shorter or longer duration or different meteorologic conditions is performed during the dose assessment. If themonitor release is sustained for greater than 15 minutes and th dose assessment cannot be completed in this time period, then emergency classification will be solely on whether the monitor readings are valid and whether they exceed the values cited in threshold #3 above.

TERMINATIONIRECO VERY CRITERIA The source of the release has been determined and isolated (terminated). Environmental field samples have been taken and environmental impact assessment is in progress.**

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: *' .

NUMARCJNESP 007 example EAL number2 (i.e., perimeter radiation monitoring system) was not used because Cook Nuclear Plant does not have that capability.

.1 K.>

I.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1. Rev. 4 Pa e 72 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K.> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-2: UNUSUAL EVENT - RISING IN-PLANT RADIATION LEVELS ,. . . -

INITIATING CONDITION . . .- .. . .. . .;.. -.

Unexpected higher in plant radiation levels.

MODE APPLICABILITY . . .

All *..

EAL ThRESHOLD /JJJJ A valid unexpected reading on an area monitor 1000 times higher than the 24-hour average BASIS (References)

VALID Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be suspect Verification can be obtained by a) an instrument channel check, or b) indications on related or redundant indicators, or c) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes . '. -

This event has a long lead time relative to potential radiological release outside the site boundary thus

impact topublic health and safety is very low. It represents a degradation in the control of radioactive material, and represents a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant TERMINIATIONJRECO VERY CRITERIA The source of the higher radiation levels has been determined and levels have decreased to below the threshold values. Radiological controls have been implemented and are effective.

DEVIATiON FROM NUMARC:

NUMARCINESP 007 AU2 example EALs numbers 1 and 2 are included under R-3, Unusual Event, "Loss of Water Level in Any Area Holding Irradiated Fuel" Example EAL number 3 was not used because Cook Nuclear plant does not have a dry storage area for irradiated spend fuel.

K.>

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 - Pa e 73 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION -

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489)23-112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTiON R-2: ALERT - RISING IN-PLANT RADIATION LEVELS INITIATING CONDITION Release of radioactive material or higher in-plant radiation levels within the facility that impede operation of systems required to maintain safe operation or to establish or maintain cold shutdown MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. Unexpected radiation levels > 15 mR/hr in any of the following areas.

UI Control Room

U2 Control Room

. Central Alarm Station KI. OR

** 2. Radiation level of> 100 mR/hr at any station required by plant procedure OHP 4025.001.001,

"Emergency Remote Shutdown and associated subtier procedures. ... .,

BASIS (References)

This IC addresses higher radiation levels that impede xiecessary access to operating stations, Or' other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually, in order *to maintain safe operation or performing a safe shutdown It is impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or

potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The cause and/er magnitude of the higher in radiation levels is not a concern of this IC. The SEC must consider the source or cause of the higher levels and determine if any other ICs may be involved. For example, a dose rate of 15 mR/hr in the control room may be a problem in itself. However, the higher reading may also be indicative of

- high dose rates in the containment due to LOCA. In this latter case,, an SAE or GE may be indicated based on the fission product barrier matrix ICs.

1- .

These EALs could result in declaration of an Alert at one unit due to a radioactivity rel&ase or radiatioxi

. shine resultiiig from a major accident at the other unit. This is appropriate if the higher levelsimpair operations at the operating unit. This IC is not meant to apply to higher levels in the containment dome radiation monitor as these are events which are addressed in the fission produci barrier matrix iCs, nor is it intended to apply to anticipated temporary higher levels due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfer, etc.).

-K>

Procedure OHP 4025.001.001 refers to the emergency remote shutdown procedures for the Donald C.

Cook Nuclear Plant. The procedure provides an alternate method of achieving safe shutdown with and ,.* *-

I . * * -- .

.*<W***.. : * *-

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 74 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489)23-112 without offsiie pdwer available in the event that control of plant equipment is not available from the control room or hot shutdown panel. The procedure gives priority to achieving reactor and turbine trip, establishing auxiliary feedwater for heat removal, and etablishing charging for the reactor coolant pump seal injection and ieactivitycontrol. Special consideration is given to establishing primary and secondary system isolation and preventing fire induced spurious operation of plant equipment. In event that CVCS, AFW, CCW, and ESW crossties are utilized to achieve safe shutdown, special -

consideration is given to maintaining the opposite unit in safe configuration.

Threshold 2 refers to the specific locations throughout the plant that are necessary to man to perform the functions cited in procedure OHP 4025.001 .001, and related subtier procedures.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA The source of the higher radiation levels is determined and levels have dropped to below their threshold values. Radiological controls have been implemented and are effective.

- DE TIATION FROM NUMARC:. None K-I

-I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4' Pa e 75 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels P ages:

K> Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) I 23 112 ECC CATEGO1Y NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-3: UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN ANY AREA HOLDING IRRADIATED FUEL . -

INITIATING CONDITION -

An UNCONTROLLED water level drop in the reactor refi.iehng cavity, the spent fuel pool, and/or the

fuel transfer canal with all irradiated fuel assemblies covered by water.

MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. Inability to maintain water level in the spent fuel pool and/or transfer canal at > 643' 4" with irradiated fuel present. . =. . .

-OR-

2. ,Inability to maintain refueling cavity level > 643' 4" with irradiated fuel in containment.

BASIS (References) - - -

VALID Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be suspect.

Verification canbe obtained by a) an instrument channel check, or b) indications or related or redundant indicators, or C)by direct observatio'n by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the

need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

UNCONTROLLED - A change that is not the result of a planned evolution.

The above EALs indicate events which have long lead times relative to potential for radiological release outside the site boundary, thus impact to public health and safety is very low. Classification as an

Unusual Event is warranted as a precursor to a more serious event.

The level of 643' 4" refers to the water level that is 23 feet above the top of the spent fuel, the plant.

technical specification limit. Prior to that water level being reached; the operators will be warned that the level decrease is occurring via the spent fuel pool low level alarm (RLA-500 at 644'9" or 24'-5 1/2" above the top of the fuel) and low level alarzii (RLA-501 644'-2 1/2" or 23 '-11" above the top of the:

fuel). Local visual confirmation that the level has dropped below th& technical specification limit is

.- possible since much less water than 23 feet is needed for protection of the plant staff from excessive Kradiological doses. Twenty-three feet of water is required to protect members of the public from the anticipated radiolocical consequences of a fuel handing accident TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA The cause of the loss of water inventory is identified and actions to recover water level are successful.

/

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 76 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION

'Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

K> (Commitment: .6489)23-112 DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:. - -

NUMARCINESP 077 AU2 example EAL number 3 (radiation reading for irradiated spent fuel in dry storage) was not included because Cook Nuclear Plant d6es not have irradiated fuel in dry storage.

K> ..

K>

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4' Pa e 77 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 . Basis For Emergency Action Levels ..Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) .23- 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-3: ALERT - LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN ANY AREA HOLDING IRRADIATED FUEL INITIATING CONDITION Major damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside of the Reactor Vessel.

MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered in the spent fuel pool, transfer canal, or refueling cavity.

2 An UNPLANNED VALID alarm on one of the following radiation monitors

VRS 1101.1201 (Unit 1) '(Upper Confainnient)

K

VRS R-5

- 2101/2201 (Unit 2) (Upper Containment)

(SFP) . -

1< . Portable radiation monitors . .. . .. .. . . -

Water level <632'4" in the spent fuel pool, transfer canal or reactor cavity that will result in*

fuel uncovery. ... . - . . . . - . . -

BASIS (References)

UNPLANNED - Not anticipated as part of a scheduled testing, surveillance, or maintenance activity.

VALID Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be suspect.

Verification can be obtained by a) an instrument channel check, or b) indications on related or -

redundant indicators, or c) by direct observation by plant personnel.. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.; within 15 minutes.

This IC applies to spent fuel* requiring water coverage and is not intended to address spent fuel which is

- . . Klicensed for dry storage. . *1** -. :. *'. *,-*- :.*

actions! and potential for substantial fuel no damage.is*time There availableNUREG/CR-4982 In addition, tb take corrective indicates that there even is if utile corrective actions are not taken prompt fatalities are predicted, and that risk of injury is low. Thus, an Alert classification for this event is appropriate..-.

632 4 refers to the water level that is 12 feet above the top of the spent fuel pool Prior to that water level being reached the operators will be warned that the level drop is occurring via the spent fuel pool

-I

Reference PMP-2080.EPPJO1 Rev. 4 Pa e 78 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFJCATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) . 23 - 112 low level alarm (RLA-500 at644'9" or 24'-5 'A" above the top of the fuel) and low level alarm (RLA-501 644'-2 'A" or 23'-11" above the top of the fuel); Local visual confirmation that the level has dropped below 632'4" is possible since 12 feet of water provides adequate radiation shielding for staff personnel from excessive radiation doses in the area of the spent fuel pool. .

VRS 1101/1201 and 2101/2202 are the upper containment area radiation monitors, and are set to alarm at 54 mR/hr. R-5 (RCC-330) is a monitor in thespent fuel pool area. R-5 is set to alarm at 15 mR/hr.

In addition to the above radiation monitors, during refueling operations, portable area radiation monitors are located on the manipulator crane inside containment and on the spent fuel bridge crane.

These monitors are set to alarm at radiation levels equal to about twice the background radiation, and thus provide early warning of any fuel uncovery problems.

Due to the potential of high personal radiation exposure, actual observation of an irradiated fuel**

assembly without benefit of shielding is not considered likely. If (as indicated under threshold #1 above) this should occur, it is appropriate that an ALERT be declared.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA .. .

The cause of the loss of water inventory is identified and actions to recover water level are successful K> Radiological controls have been implemented and are effective.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None K>

I . .-..

Reference PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 79 of 112

Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachhient 3 .. Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 -

ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-i: ALERT - FAILURE OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INITIATING CONDITION *.*

Failure of Reactor Protection System (RPS instrumentation to comolete or initiate an automatic reactor trip once an RPS setpoint has been exceeded A manual reactor trip was successful.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,and3 .

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE An anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) was terminated by a manual reactor trip from the

-.. . control room. *. * . . . .

BASIS (References) *. . ..

Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) An anticipated operational occurrence followed by the -

failure of the reactor trip portion of the protection system. Anticipatedoperational occurrences are those occurrenes of normal operation which are expected to occur one or more times during the life of

the plant and include, but are not limited to, loss of power toall reactor coolant pumps, tripping of the' turbine generator set, isolation of the main condenser, and loss of all offsite power.

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation All 'equipment associated with the measurement of process -

variables, and generation and implemei tation of trip signals.

This condition indicates failure of the automatic reactor protection system to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus, plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alert is indicated because conditions exist..

that lead to potential loss of fuel clad or RCS. Reactor.protection system setpoint being exceeded

- (rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded) is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. . - . .

A manual reactor trip is any set of actions by the reactor operator(s) in the control room which cause control rods to be rapidly inrted into the' c6re and brings the reactor subcritical (e.g., reactor trip

- switches). Failure of manual trip would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency. *y.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA I-lot shutdown conditions established, an investigation as to the cause is in progress, and an assessment of any significant damage to the fuel or RCS has been completed.

. DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None *' * .i ..

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 80 of 112 Emergency CLASSLFICATJON -

K> Attachment 3 Basis For EmergencyAction Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 - 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-i: SITE AREA EMERGENCY - FAILURE OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM .

INITIATING CONDITION Failure of Reactor Protection System (RPS) instrumentation to complete or initiate an automatic reactor trip once an RPS setpoint has been exceeded. A manual, reactor trip was NOT successful.

MODE APPLICABILITY land2 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE An anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) was NOT terminated by a manual reactor trip from the control room. .. .

BASIS (References)

K> Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) An anticipated operational occurrence followed by the failure of the reactortrip'portion of the protection system. Anticipated operational occurrences are**

those occurrences of normal operation which are expected to occur one or more times during the life of the plant and include, but are not limited to, loss of power to all reactor coolant pumps, tripping of the turbine generator set, isolation of the main condenser, and loss of all offsite power. -

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation All equipment associated with the measurement of process variables, and generation and implementation of trip signals.

Automatic and manual trips are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console was required to trip the reactor.

- 'Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS. Although this IC may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response. - .

TERMINIATIONIRECO VERY CRITERIA . '

I A Hot shutdown conditions established, an investigation as to the cause .is in progress, and as assessment of any significant damage to the fuel or RCS has been completed K> DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pace 81 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-i: GENERAL EMERGENCY - FAILURE OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INITIATING CONDITION Failure of Reactor Protection System (RPS) to complete an automatic trip and manual trip was NOT successful and there is indication of an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core.

MODE APPLICABILITY land2 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. ATSW was NOT terminated by manual reactor trip from the control room.

-AND

2. Suberiticality AND Core Cooling CSFSTs are RED.

- . -OR-Subcriticality AND Heat Sink CSFSTs are RED.

BASIS (References) . - . . .. . . -

- . Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) An anticipated operational occurrence followed by the failure of the reactor trip portion of the protection system. Anticipated operational occurrences are those occurrences of normal operation which are expected to occur one or more times during the life of the plant and include, but are not limited to, loss of power to all reactor coolant pumps, tripping of the turbine generator set, isolation of the main condenser, and loss of all offsite power.

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation All equipment associatd with the' measurement of process variables, and generation and implementation of trip signals.

Automatic and manual trips are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to trip the reactor.

Under the conditions of this IC and its associated EAL, the efforts to bring the reactor subcritical have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed. Although there are capabilities away from the reactor control console, such as emergency boration, the continuing temperature rise indicates that these capabilities are not effective This situation could be a precursor for a core melt sequence The extreme challenge to the ability to cool the cote is intended to mean that the core exit temperatures are at or approaching 12000 F or that the reactor vessel water level is at approximately three feet and the core exit thermocouples are greater than 700 0 F This GE EAL equates to a Core Cooling RED condition

'I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 82 of 112 Emergency CLASS WI CATION -

3 Basis For Emergency Action (Commitment: 6489). Levels- Pages:

23 - 112 Another consideration is the inability to initially remove heat during the early stages of this sequence.

If emergency feedwater flow is insufficient to remove the amount of heat required by design from at least one steam generator, an extreme challenge should be considered to exist. This EAL equates to a Heat Sink RED condition.

In the event either of these challenges exist at a time that the reactor has not been brought below the power associated with the safety system design (5%power as represented by a RED condition on the subcriticality CSFST), a core melt sequence exists. In this situation, core degradation can occur rapidly. For this reason, the General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the .

fission product barrier matrix declaration to permit maximum offsite intervention time.

TEP JIINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Hot shutdown conditions established, an investigation as to the cause is in progress, and an assessment iy significant damage to the fuel or RCS has been completed.

of ar DE IATION EROM NUMARC: None .

I ReferencePMP-2080.EPP.1O1 I ' Rev. 4 1 Page 83 of 112 I Emergency CLASS WICATION I Paopc.

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489) 23112 EGG CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION 5-2: UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF AC POWER INITIATING CONDITION Loss of all offsite power to essential buses for reater than 15 minutes.

I'AAT1 ADDY WATZH TTV 1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. ALL of the OFFSITE power sources indicated by the following list of transformers are LOST to the T-buses for*> 15 minutes: NOTE Evaluate each units' power supply separately

a. Normal Auxiliary Power Source (Auxiliary Transformer)'

TR1AB/TR2AB

TR1CD/TR2CD Ku

b. Preferred Offsite Power Sources (Reserve Transformer).

. TRiO1ABITR2OlAB. . '

TR1OICD/TR2OICD:

c. Emergency Offsite Power Source (69Kv Transformer)

T-12-EP-1 ' .

2. At least two diesel generators per unit are supplying power to the emergency buses.

BASIS (References)

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrade's the level of safety of' th plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout).

Fifteen minutes was 'selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Offsite power can be supplied via the 69Kv emergency feed lines or from the switchyard via the reserve.

transformers.' Backfeed through the unit auxiliary transformers is also considered an adequate source of offsite power.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA A reliable power supply to ESF buses from offsite sources is re-established Ku DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 84 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-2: ALERT - LOSS OF AC POWER -

INITIATING CONDITION AC Power capability to essential buses reduced to a single power source for greater than 15 minutes such that any additional single failure would result in a station blackout.

MODE APPLICABILITY j1,,2, 3,4

*. EAL THRESHOLD VALUE Power to the T-buses has been degraded to a single source of AC power consisting of only one of the following transformers or diesel generators for greater than 15 minutes. NOTE: Evaluate each units' power supply separately.'

***. TR-1O1ABITR-2O1AB

TR-1O1CD/TR-2OICD

TR-1AB/TR-2AB .*..

TR..1CD/TR-2CD EDG 1AB/EDG2AB

EDG1CDIEDG2CD TR-12-EP-1 -

BASIS (References)

In Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, the condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the offsite and onsite power systems such that any additional single failure would result in a station blackout. This condition could occur due to a loss of all offsite power with a c6ncurrent failure of one emergency generator to supply power to its emergency buses or failure of emergency diesels and four of the five offsite power transformers. The subsequent loss of another single power source would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Restore power from at least one additional soutce -.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None *- -

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 85 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For E Attachment 3 mergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 EGG CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-2: SITE AREA EMERGENCY - LOSS OF AC POWER INITIATING CONDITION Loss of ALL offsite power and loss of ALL onsite AC power to essential buses.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 i EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. Loss of both of the following T-buses for >15 minutes

a. - TilA, TilD (Unit 1)

-OR-

b. T2lAT2lD(Unit2)

NOTE: Evaluate each units' power supply separately.

BASIS (References) - --

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and ESW Prolonged loss of all AC power will cause core.

uncovering and loss of containment integnty thus this event can escalate to a General Emergency.

Per ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power", no specific time limitation is given for restoration of power to the emergency buses. Therefore, Cook uses the NUMARC/NESP 007 generic limit of 15 minutes.

Escalation to General Emergency is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or IC S-2A, "Prolonged*

Loss of All Offsite Power and Prolonged Loss of All OnsiteAC Power.".

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Cold shutdown is established or a reliable power supply to the ESF buses is established.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:. ..

This EAL is specified by loss of essential pump buses rather than loss of transformers and emergency generators. *. *

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 86 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K..> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION, S-2: GENERAL EMERGENCY - LOSS OF AC POWER INITIATING CONDITION Prolonged loss of ALL offsite power and ALL onsite AC power to essential buses.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. Loss of both of the following T-buses on a unit AND Core Cooling CSFST is ORANGE

a. TilA, TilD (Unit 1)

-OR-

b. T21AT21D(Unit2). -

- OR 2 Loss of both of the following T-buses that is expected to last for > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

a. TilA, TilD (Unit 1)

-OR-

b. T21A, T21D (Unit 2)

NOTE: Evaluate each units' power supply separately.

BASIS (References)

PROLONGED - Restoration of at least one emergency bus within four (4) hours is not likely.

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety ystems requiring electric power including RHR ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and ESW. Prolonged loss of all AC power could lead to loss of' fuel clad, RCS, and containment. ,In accordance with letters AEP:NRC:0537D, dated April 14, 1989, and AEP:NRC:0537E, dated March 30,' 1990, Cook Nuclear Plafit falls within thefour hour station blackout (SBO) coping category.

This IC is specified to assure that in the unlikely event of a prolonged station blackout timely recognition of the seriousness of the event occurs and that declaration of a General Emergency occurs I

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 87 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATJON Attachment 3 I

I Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

Pages:

23 112 as early as is appropriate, based on a reasonable assessment of the event trajectory.' Although this IC may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response.

The likelihood of restoring at least one emergency bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation since a delay in an upgrade decision based on only a chance of mitigating the event could result in a loss of valuable time in preparing and implementing public protective actions.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRI¶ERIA Cold shutdown is established or a reliable power supply to the ESF buses is established and other initiating conditions requiring maintenance of the general alert status are not present.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

This EAL is specified by loss of essential pump buses rather than loss of transformers and emergency generators. . .

i

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Page 88 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:..

(Commitment: 6489)23-112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIP'rION S-3: SITE AREA EMERGENCY - LOSS OF DC POWER INITIATING CONDITION Loss of all vital DC power for greater than 15 minutes . .

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,and4 -

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE Loss of DC buses AR AND CD as indicated by bus voltage < 220 volts DC for greater than 15 7 minutes. . .. . -

BASIS (References)

VITAL - All 250 volt DC power.

The loss of all vital DC power compromises the ability to monitor and control plant functions required

<'forthe of the public and c a loss of ui ese cions A loss ofc6ntrol protection onsiuereu is ffint prolonged power may result in core uncovering and loss of containment integrity if there is sufficient decay heat generated by the core and sensible heat in the RCS. .. . .

The threshold value was chosen to recognize a loss of DC power at a voltage level low enough to be

.. .. ... ** indicative of a severe control system problem. This value is high enough to provide reasonable .. -.

assurance that the 250 volt batteries will last at least 15 minutes prior to reaching a designed minimum

voltage of 210 volts. .

The N Train battery supplies TDAFW control bus and the AMSAC inverter. Since these are backup

systems, this bus is not included in this EAL.

TERMINIATIONIRECO VERY CRITERIA Power is restored to at least one 250 volt DC bus and an investigation as to the cause is underway.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None I...-.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 89 of 112 Emergency.CLASSIFICATIONx Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 - 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS AND DESCRIPTION S-5: SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS OF SYSTEMS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE OR MAINTAIN HOT SHUTDOWN . . - .

INITIATING CONDITION Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain Hot Shutdown.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,and4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE Entry into one of the following procedures has occurred:

OUP 4023.FR-H1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink". -

-OR-OHP 4023.FR-C1, "Response to Inadequate Core Cooling" BASIS (References) . . -. . . <... . . . .

This EAL addresses complete loss of functions, including ultimate heat sink and reactivity control, required for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressure and temperature. Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public. Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted. Escalation General Emergency would be via Abnormal Rad -

Levels/Radiological Effluent; Site Emergency Coordinator Judgement, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRiTERIA Hot Shutdown operation is capable of being maintained DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K>

Reference . PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 90 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION .

K> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency. Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

Pages:

23 112-ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-6: UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF ALARMS OR INDICATION INITIATING CONDITION

Unplanned loss of safety system annunciators and/or indications in the Control Room for 'greater than.

15 minutes.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1, 2, 3, and 4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. Loss of one of the following:

a. Loss of one or more safety system annunciator panels in a unit for> 15 minutes:

Panels 104-114,119 120(Urutl)

Panels 204-214,219 220 (Unit 2) . . . .. *.

b A known loss of indications associated with the following parameters for> 15 minutes (See Attachment 2): . .

Neutron Flux Gammametrics)

Reactor Coolant Pressure (Wide Range)

Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature Thot (Wide Range)

Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature Tcold (Wide Range)

Incore Thermocouples (Core Exit Thermocouples)

Reactor Coolnt System Subcooling 'Margin Monitor Reactor Pressurizer Charging Pump Flow Level System (Reactor Vessel *Level Indication)

WaterInventory Coolant

Charging Pump Breaker Status

Safety Injection Pump Breaker Status

.* Safety Injection Flow -'

Refueling Water Storage T.nk Water Level

Containment Water Level' ,

Containment Pressure (Wide Range) - >. ," : . .: . . -:

Containment Pressure (Narrow Range)X .. .. ..

Containment Hydrogen Monitoring

Containment Isolation Valve Position Monitoring K>

Containment Area Radiation Monitors (High Range)

Steam Line Pressure

Reference* PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 91 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages: -

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) - 23 112-.

Steam Generator Water Level (Wide Range)

Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Range)

Auxiliary Feedwajer Flow Rate

Condensate Storage Tank Level

-AND-

2. In the opinion of the Shift Supervisor, the loss of annunciators or indications requiresadditional surveillance to safely operate the unit..-

-AND-

3. Annunciator/Indicator loss does not result from PLANNED action.

4. Compensatory Non-Alarming Indications for the above annunciator panels are available BASIS (References)

Compensatoiy Non-Alarming Indication C6mputer-based information (SPDS, plant process computer, etc.) which could be monitored by control room operators. ..* . .

PLANNED - Loss of annunciators or indicators that is the result of scheduled mainteflance.ortesting.

This EAL is intended to recognize the difficulty associated with operating the plant safely without major groups of safety annunciators or indications. Compensatory non-alarming indications may

include local process indications, or control room indicators/recorders/computer points in the event of an annunciator-system-only failure. Two types of failures are considered; the failure of redundant panels of indications important to safety, and the loss from all sources of any of the key safety indications as to the statns of the nuclear steam supply system.

PLANNED maintenance or surveillance activities associated with annunciators or indicators are excluded from the EALs indicated herein.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA The minimum number of required annunciators are restored to operability and an investigation of the cause of the problem is in progress. - . *.... . . ... ..

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None .. .,... . . .. -

7

Reference PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 92 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels - Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 - 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-6: ALERT - LOSS OF ALARMS OR INDICATION INITIATING CONDITION Unplanned loss of most or all safety system annunciators or indications in the Control Room with either (1) a significant transient in progress, or (2) compensatory non-alarming indicators are una ailable MODE APPLICABILITY 1, 2, 3, and 4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE ,. -

-. 1. Loss of one of the following:

a. Loss of one or more safety system annunciator panels in a unit for > 15 minutes: 1

. Panels 104-114, 119, 120 (Unit 1) . . .

Panels 204-214, 219, 220 (Unit 2) .,*

b. A known loss of indications associated with the following parameters for > 15 minutes (See Attachment 2): . ;.. ::....: ... ..

Neutron Flux Gammametrics).

*. Reactor Coolant Pressure (Wide Range)

Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature met (Wide Range)

Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature Tcold (Wide Range)

Incore Thermocouples (Core Exit Thermocouples)

Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor

Reactor Coolant Inventory System (Reactor Vessel Level Indication)

Pressurizer Water Level .

Charging Pump Flow -

Charging Pump Breaker Status

Safety Injection Pump Breaker Status

Safety Injection Flow Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level

Containment Water Level

Containment Pressure (Wide Range)

Containment Pressure (Narrow Range)

Containment Hydrogen Monitoring

Containment Isolation Valve Position Monitoring K>

Containment Area Radiation Momtors (High Range)

. Steam Line Pressure

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 93 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 0 Steam Generator Water Lvel (Wide Range) 0 Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Range)

0 Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate

0 Condensate Storage Tank Level

-AND-

2. In the opinion of the Shift Supervisor, the loss of annunciators or indications requires additional surveillance to safely operate the unit.

. -AND-

3. Annunciator/Indicator loss does not result from PLANNED action.

. . . -AND-4 Either

a. A significant transient is in progress,

-OR-b Compensatory Non-Alarming Indications from the plant process computer or safety' parameter display system are NOT available BASIS (References)

Compensatory Non-Alarming Indication Computer based information (SPDS, plant process computer, etc.) which could be monitored by control room operators.

PLANNED - Loss of annunciators or indicators that is the result of scheduled maintenance or testing.

This EAL is intended to recognize the difficulty associated with operating the plant safety without*

major groups of safety annunciators or indications. Compensatory non-alarming indications may include local process indicators, or control room indicators/recorders/computer points in the event of an annunciator-system-only failure; * * - * :. - . . -

* *. .

Examples of significant transients include: 1) reactor trips, 2) unanticipated power changes of greater than 10% and 3) valid ESF actuations >.:

PLANNED maintenance or surveillance activities associated with annunciators or indicajors are excluded from the EALs indicate herein K>

-- I

Reference PMiP-2080.EPIP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 94 of 112 Emergency CLASS WICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489)23-112 TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA . . -

The minimum number of required annunciators is restored to operability and an investigation of the cause of the problem is in progress. *...<: .

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: Nohe K-I

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4. Pa e 95 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K.> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels P ages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 :112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION 5-6 SITE AREA EMERGENCY - LOSS OF ALARMS OR INDICATION INITIATING CONDITION

Inability to monitor a significant transient in progress.

. . K MODE APPLICABILITY . .

. - 1,2,3,and4

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE .j ..

Loss of one of the following:

I Loss of one or more safety system annunciator panels in a unit for > 15 minutes:

. Panels 104-114, 119, 120 (Unit 1): . .,. -

Panels 204-214,219, 220 (Unit 2) K .. , .1 ..:.

2 'A known loss of indications associated with the following parameters (See Attachment 2) for>

15 minutes which in the opinion of the' Shift Supervisor .significantly affects the ability to safely operate 6r shutdown the unit. - -.. .. .- . *;. -

Neutron Flux Gammametrics).

Reactor Coolant Pressure (Wide Range)

Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature That (Wide Range)

.. Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature Tcold (Wide Range) - .. .

Incore Thermocouples (Core Exit Thermocouples)

Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor

Rea'ctor' Coolant Inventory System (Reactor Vessel Level Indication) . . . . . -

Pressurizer Water Level

ChargingmpFlow ** .* . .

Charging Pump Breaker Status .

Safety Injection Pump Breaker Status

.-' Safety Ihjection Flow .. 3'

.* Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level

Containment Water Level '. :.

Containment Pressure (Wide Range) .<.*

Containment Pressure (Narrow Range)

Contaifunent Hydrogen Monitoring

Containment Isolation Valve Position Monitoring

Containment Area Radiation Monitors (High Range)

Steam Line Pressure

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 96 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATJON K> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489)23-112

Steam Generator Water Level (Wide Range)

Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Range)

Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate - -

Condensaje Storage Tank Level -

-AND-

3. Compensatory Non-Alarming Indications from the plant process computer or safety parameter display system are NOT available.

-AND-A significant transient is in progress.

BASIS (References)

Compensatory Non-Alarming Indication Computer based information (SPDS, plant process computer, etc.) which could be monitored by control room operators.

This EAL is intended to recognize the difficulty associated with operating the plant safely without major groups of safety annunciators or indications. Compensatory non-alarming indications may include local process indications, or control room indicators/recorders/computer points in the event of an annunciator-system-only failure. A significant transient .is not intended to be strictly defined, however, the following examples are provided: 1) reactor trips; 2) unanticipated power changes of

<..>10 %,and 3) valid ESF actuations. NUREG 0737 instruments are included in this EAL to provide a

redundant means for monitoring the plant should annunicators become unavailable. To prevent overclassif'ing an event to a Site Area Eiiiergency, Shfit Supervisor discretion has been provided for.

This allbwsthe Shift Supervisor to decide if the specific indications which are unavailable are needed to monitor the transient in progress.

TERMLNIAT[ON/RECO VERY CRITERIA Transient is terminated and ability to monitor plant parameters is restored. *

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K>

/

Reference PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 97 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-7: UNUSUAL EVENT - FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION INITIATING CONDITION Indication of Fuel Clad Degradation in Active Fuel MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,and4 LC2 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. Activity Ž 1.0 pCi/gram 1-131 dose equivalent for >48 hours in the RCS.

2. RCS activity> 100/E pCilgram BASIS (References) . .. -, .

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it is considered to be a poiential degradation in the' level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. .* .:. .K ¶ . -.

Per Cook Technical Specification 3.4.8, "Reactor Coolant System Activity", fuel clad degradation is indicated if dose equivalent 1-13 1 levels are greater than 1 pCi/gram for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , dose equivalent 1-131 levels are greater than the limits of technical specifications Figure 3.4-1, or gross.. :.

radioactivity levels are > iooit pCi/gram.

The coolant sample activity values indicate fuel clad degradation greater than technical specification allowable limits. . .

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Technical specification 3.4.8 limit or action requirements are met.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: . - . S Cook Plant does not have failed fuel monitors

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 98 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 EGG CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-8: UNUSUAL EVENT - ESCESSIVE RCS LEAKAGE INITIATING CONDITION Reactor Coolant System Leakage .

. . = sanr I1iUU,

fin.

A1ALADLLdJ Tfl A flfl I 111W?

.1,2,3,4. .

EAt THRESHOLD VALUE Reactor coolant system leakage exceeds one of the following values:

1 Pressure boundary leakage> 10 gpm

-OR-2 SG tube leikage> 10 gpm

-OR-..

K> 3 Identified leakage >25 gprn Unidentified leakage >10 gpm ..

- *1* /

BASIS (References)

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it may be a precursor of more senous conditions and as a result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 10 gpm value for unidentified or pressure boundary leakage was selected because it is observable with normal control room indications. Lesser values must generally be determined through time-consuming surveillance test (e.g 4 mass balances). The geiiric EAL for identified leakage is set at a higher value (25 gpm) due to the lesser significance of identified leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage. *.

Only operating modes in which there is fuel in the reactor coolant system and the system is pressurized are specified. ... . . . . - . -

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA I .' '.

Leakage is isolated OR Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)is established DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None --.......... ...

KJ 1

Reference PMF-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 99 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION.

S-9: UNUSUAL EVENT - TEChNICAL SPECIFICATION TIME LIMIT EXPIRED INITIATING CONDITION Inability to reach required shutdown within Technical Specification time limits.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 . .

rAT A.f1J.J rUDrTJITfl A ALR'.LAAAJL.JL v.7ATTTr V t)J.JV.JL Unit is NOT placed in required MODE within Technical Specification LCO action time limit.

BASIS (References)

Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) require the plant to be brought to a required shutdown mode.

when the technical specification required configuration cannot be restored. Depending on the circumstances, this may ormay not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition. In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site technical specification requires a four hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b) Non-emergency events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shutdown within the allowable action statement time in the technical specifications. An immediate Notification of an Unusual Event is required when the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action statement time in the technical specifications; Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the LCO-specified action statement time period elapses under the site technical specifications and is not related to how long a condition may have -

existed. Other required technical specification shutdowns that involve precursors to more serious events are addressed by other System Malfunction, Hazards, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs..

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Unit has reached cold shutdown (Mode 5) or other mode as specified in the limiting condition for operation action statement.

- . .... - . - -OR-Unit has been placed in a Mode where the LCO no longer applies DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K-'

/

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 100 of 112 Emergency CLASS WI CATION.

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels P ages:

I (Commitment: 6489) - 23 112

ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-1O: UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS INITIATING CONDITION Unplanned loss of all onsite or offsite communications.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

. 1. UNPLANNED loss of ALL onsite electronic communication capabilities

.. Page System. . . . .. *. . * -. .

Radios ..

-OR-2 UNPLANNED loss of ALL offsite electronic communication capabilities Telephone (offsite)

Microwave transmission

Cphone. ....-. .

State Police/Sheriff Department Emergency Radios . . .

BASIS (References) .

UNPLANNED The loss of communication is not a result o planned testing, maintenance or surveillance activities.

The purpose of this IC and its associated generic EALs is to recognize a loss of communications capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks or the ability to

communicate problems with offsite authorities. The loss of offsite communications capability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than that addressed by 10 CFR 50.72. The loss of.

offsite communications capability is applicable when no direct means is available to communicate with or makes notifications to the load dispatcher or state and federal authorities V TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA At least one form of onsite and offsite communications has been established DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 .* Rev. 4 Pa e 101 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION -

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489)23-112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION C-3 UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF AC POWER ALL OFFSITE POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSES FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES.

INITIATING CONDITION . . .

Loss of all offsite power to essential buses for greater than 15 minutes. - .** -. ... -

MODE APPLICABILITY

5. 6 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE .

1. ALL of the following OFFSITE power sources indicated by the following list of transformer are LOST to the T-buses for > 15 minutes. .*

.a. Normal Auxiliary Power Source (Auxiliary Transformer)

TR1AB/TR2AB . .*.*

TR1CD/TR2CD b Preferred Offsite Power Sources (Reserve Transformer)

TR1O1AB/TR2O1AB

TR1O1CD/TR2O1CD .. .

c. Emergency Offsite Power Source (69Kv Transformer) S T-12-EP-1

-AND-

2. - At lease one diesel generator per unit is supplying power to the emergency buses.

BASIS (References). - . .. ,. . .. . .. . .* '.. .

Prolonged loss'of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more 'vulnerable to a complete Loss of *AC Power (Station Blackout).-

Fifteen minutes 'was selected a a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Offsite power can be supplied via the 69Kv eiiergency feed lines or from the switchyard via the reserve transformers. During outages switchyard power may be supplied via the nornial transformers aligned

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 102 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Paged:

Attachment ' (Commitment: 6489) - 23 112 for "backfeed". During outages, the backfeed alignment should be considered equivalent to reserve feed for the purpose of emergency classification level determinations I *...

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRiTERIA A reliable power supply to ESF buses from offsite sources is re-established;*.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None . ..

K>

.1

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 103 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION C-3 ALERT - LOSS OF AC POWER ALL OFFSITE POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ONSITE -.

AC POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSES . i 7-..

INITIATING CONDITION *., :)..

Loss of ALL offsite power and loss of ALL onsite AC power to essential buses.

MODE APPLICABILITY 5, 6 or defueled EAL THRESHOLD VALUE.. .

1. Loss of both of the following T-buses for> 15 minutes when fuel is in the reactor..

a. TIlA, TilD (Unit 1)

-OR- .

K-, b. T2lA, T21D (Unit 2) 7 . .. .

2. Loss of power to all the following buses when defueled TilA, TilD, T21A, T21D

. . BASIS (Refercnces)

- In Modes5 and 6, loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal, Spent Fuel Heat Removal, and ESW. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can beclasifid as an Alert, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure. An Alert is declared in these modes due to the less severe threat to the protection of the health and safety of the public because of the much

longer time available to restore power and decay heat removal systems. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. Escalating to Site Area Emergency, if appropriate, .is by Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, or SEC Judgement ICs.

When a unit is defueled, power from an essential bus on either unit will be sufficient to provide emergency power to required plant safety systems I

1 TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Restore power to at least one T-bus.

K> DEVIATION FROM NUMARC

'I.

Reference I PMIP-2080.EPP.101 I Rev. 4 -' I Pare 104 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 This EAL is specified by loss of essential pump buses rater than loss of transformers and emergency generators K-/

K>

/

Reference PNfP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 105 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency. Action Levels Pages:

- (Commitment: 6489) I 23-112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION C-4: ALERT - INABILITY TO MAINTAIN A UNIT IN COLD SHUTDOWN INITIATING CONDITION Inability to maintain plant in Cold Shutdown MODE APPLICABILITY 5,6 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE 1 Loss of shutdown cooling as evidenced by entry into OHP 4022 017 001, "Loss of RUR Cooling."...

AND-2 Temperature increase that either

a. exceeds Technical Specification cold shutdown limit of 2000 F *s. .. . .

-OR-.

results in an UNCONTROLLED increase in RCS temperature rise

b. . approaching the cold shutdown technical specification limit of 2000 F.

BASIS (References)

UNCONTROLLED means a temperature increase that is not the result of a planned evolution. It is included to preclude the declaration of an emergency for circumstances where decay head removal is intentionally removed from service and is controlled within the requirements of the technical specifications.:

The threshold value indicates a substantial degradition in the level of safety of the plant by indicating a potential complete loss of the ability to removal decay heat in the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.

NRC concerns expressed in Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal" are the basis for the threshold value as an anticipo sequence leading to core uncovery and clad d The threshold related to an uncontrolled temperature rise is necessary to preserve the anticipatory

- philosophy of NUREG-0654 for events starting from temperatures much lower. ihan 2000 F. Th

- . inability to reach cold shutdown is to include instances where decay heat removal capability is lost prior to reaching the cold shutdown mode.

I,

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 106 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Ij..

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels rages:

(Commitment: 6489)23-112 TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Cold shutdown conditions have been established and can be maintained.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None Ku

.2-I.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 107 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K.> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels* Pages (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION -

C-4 SITE AREA EMERGENCY - INABILITY TO MAINTAIN A UNIT IN COLD SHUTDOWN . ..... .. ... . -

INITIATING CONDITION...:

LOSS of water level in the reactor vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the reactor vessel MODE APPLICABILITY

.5,6

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE Loss of reactor vessel water level as indicated by 1 LOSS of shutdown cooling as evidenced by entry into OFIP 4022.017.001 "Loss of RHR Cooling." . .

AND 2 Core uncovery as indicated by

a. .* RVLIS NR <46% - 0 RCPs

.-.- OR-

b. Reactor Vessel Water Level k,6 14' BASIS (References)

LOSS - Inability to restore RHR operability (e.g., restart the RHR pumps) when required The threshold values indicate thaCsevere core damage can occur and RCS integrity may not be assured*

and thus indicate failures of functions needed for the protection of the public.

These conditions address prolonged boiling as a result of loss of decay heat removal.

TERMINIATIONJRECO VERY CRITERIA Restoration of lost core inventory isin progress level is above the top of the active fuel, and decay heat removal capability hasbeen restored. -.

I -

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: . .

None

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Paoe 108 of 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION C-5: UNUSUAL EVENT - FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION INITIATING CONDITION

(. . .. .

Fuel clad degradation. . . . . .

MODE APPLICABILITY 5, 6 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE I. Activity > 1.0 j.tCilgram 1-131 dose equivalent for >48 hours in the RCS.

- - . -OR-2 RCS activity > 100/B jiCi/gram BASIS (References) .. .. ' . .. . -

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it is considered to be a potential degradation in the' C2 level 6f safety of the plant and a potential precursor of rnbre serious problems.

Per Cook Technical Specification 3.4.8, "Reactor Coolant System Activity fuel clad degradation is indicated if dose equivalent 1-131 levels are greater than 1 pCi/gram' for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , dose equivalent 1-131 levels are greater than the limits of technical specifications Figure 3.4-1, or gross radioactivity levels are.> lOO/E pCi/gram.

The coolantsample activity values indicate fuel clad degradation greater than technical specification allowable limits.

TERMINIATIONIRECO VERY CRITERIA -

Technical specification 3 4 8 limit or action requirements are met DEVIATION FROM NUMARC Cook Plant does not have failed fuel monitors K-I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 109 of 112 Emergency CLASS WICATION 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:*

Attachment (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION C-6: UNUSUAL EVENT - UNPLANNED LOSS OFALL ONSITE OR OFFSITE

COMMUNICATION CAPABILITIES

- INITIATING CONDITION *** - ,. . - .. -

Unplanned loss of all onsite or offsite communications.

MODE APPLICABILITY 5,6 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE 4 UNPLANNED loss of ALL onsite electronic communication capabilities

Telephone .

Page System

Radios UNPLANNED loss of ALL offsite electronic communication capabilities

Telephone (offsite) .

Microwave transmission *.. . ... . . ..

NRC phone .

State Police/Sheriff Department Emergency Radios BASIS (References)

UNPLANNED The loss of communication is not a result of planned testing, maintenance or surveillance activities. .: :. . ** ... -.. . . . .. .

The purpose of this IC and its ass6&iated neric EALs is to recognize a loss of communicati5ns capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks or the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities. The loss of offsite communications capability is

expected to be significantly more comprehensive than that addressed by 10 CFR 50.72. The loss of offsite communications capability is applicable when no direct means is available to communicate with or makes notifications to the load dispatcher or state and federal authorities

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 110 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K-, Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

Pages:

23 112 TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA At lease oiie form of onsite and offsite communications has been established.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None K-,

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 111. of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23 -'112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION C-7 UNUSUAL EVENT UNPLANNED LOSS OFDC POWER FOR GREATER TITAN 15 MJNu'rES *':K. . .** *. - ... -

INITIATING CONDITION: '**. . -

Unplanned loss of required DC power during cold shutdown or refueling mode for greater than 15 minutes. . ... . . .

1AAflT' APDTTV'AlflTTTV .

U EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

UNPLANNED loss .of 250 volt DC buses AB AND CD as indicated by bus voltage <220 volts DC for' greater.than 15 minutes.

BASIS (References) . . '.: '. - *...

Ku The purpose of this IC and its associated gneiic EAL is to recognIze a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or

Refi.ieling'operations This EAL is iniended to be anticipatory in as much as the operating crew may not have necessary indication and control equipment needed to respond to the loss.

The threshold value was chosen to recognize a loss of DC power at a voltage level low enough to be indicative of a severe control system problem. This 'value is high enough to provide reasonable, assurance that the 250 volt batteries will last at least 15 minutes prior to reaching a designed minimum voltage of 210 volts.

UNPLANNED is included in this IC and EAL to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities. Routinely, plants will perform maintenance on a train related basis during shutdown periods. It is intended that the loss' of the operating (operable) train is to be considered. If this loss results in the inability to maintain cold 'shutdown, the escalation to Alert will be.

per CA, "Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown with Irradiated Fuel in the Reactor Vessel.".

Plant Specific Information * .. '

DC systems are not shared between Cook Units I and 2.

I Reference PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1:

Emergency CLASSIFICATION Rev. 4 Pa e 112 of 112

]I Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

Pages 23 112 j The Cook 250 VDC system includes three major battery groups for each unit.

Station or Plant Battery Traiii A (supplies 250 Bus CD)

Station or Plant Battery Train B (supplies 250 Bus AB)

N Train Battery -

The N train battery supplies TDAFW control bus and the AMSAC inverter. Since these are back-up systems, this bus is not included in this EAL.

The above symptoms include equipment which may be used to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refuelingoperations (i.e., annunciators, PZ PORVs, steam dumps, SG PORVs).

TERMINIATIONIRECO VERY CRITERIA Power is restored to at least one 250 volt DC bus aiid an investigation as to the cause is underway..

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None K>

REVIEW AND APPROVAL TRACKING FORM

-'7 Number: PMP-2080-EPP-1O1 . P:ev. 4 Chane: 2' K>

Title:

EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION El Correction (Full Procedure) El Change (Full Procedure) with Review of Change Only 0 Correction (Pate Substitution) El Change (Page Substitution) with Review of Change Only El Cancellation . ' El New Procedure or Change with Full Review El Superseded (list superseding procedures): ""'S'(.

Ai'odifed rC6fifiIacfAssessments ...

Chajige Driver/CDI Tracking No(s).: ' . . '

Cross-Discinline Reviews: Programmatic Reviews:'

El Chemistry El Training ElALARA El Reactivity Mgmt Team El Maintenance El Work Control El Component Engineering El SPS (Safety & Health)

ElNDM. El El Design Engineering El Surveillance Section El Operations El El Enirg Oper Proc Grp El System Engineering 0 PA/PV El El Environmental El SOMS Administrator El Reg Affairs El' El 151/1ST Coordinator* El_____

ElRP 0 None Required El .Perf6rmance Assurance' 0 None Required ognizant Org Review: ... N/A ElC Date: I' .1 0 Technical Review:.. . . .. . ' . I Date: /11, IOV' K-'

[1 . Os Director Concurrence: N/A ' ' '". "< Date:.' '/**/

Updated Revision Summary',attached?. >'.I'j.*i'<'." -; " *.: . 0 Yes 10 CFR 50.59 Requirements complete?. Tracking..

No.:__________________

ElYes ON/A:

Implementation Plan developed? ' ' (Ref. Step 3.4.17) El Yes ' 0 N/A:.

PackageComplete: AA Date: '._/IIc"-)

PORC Review Required: El Yes 0 No ' Mtg. No.:_________

Administrative Hold Status: El Releasued 0 N/A CR No.:________

Approval Authority Review/Approval: _______________________________ Date: -t////,j Expiration Date/Ending Activity: ' " N/A .'.' 'Effective Date: /j7/qJ (Data Sheet 5 Complete).

ll Periodic Review conducted? ',' :. :. '." ..'. DYes ONo':

Commitment Database update requested in accordance with PMP-7100-CMP-OOl?

NDM notified of new records or changes to records that could affect record retention?

I El Yes El Yes 0 0 N/A N/A j

I; .. . . .

IUWJJC &A&4, dj ' 2"""' ""' ' LAt "'"4 -..- -'

Offlciiifoniiation 1ForFoIziiiTr1cking Only 1t'Pai't of Form K> -

FEB 172004 This form isderived from the information in PMP-2010-PRC-002,

. Procedure Correction, Change, and Review, Rev. 12, Data Sheet 1, Review and Approval Tracking Form.:' " Page 1 of

REVISION

SUMMARY

Number: PMP-2080-EPP-1Ol Revision: 4 Change: 2 Tide: EMERGENCY CLA SSTFICATTON Section or Step Change/Reason For Change , Change: Replaced "All" with "Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4" page 97, EAL Reason: To correct a typographical error; this EAL is addressed in 7: Unusual Event Modes 5 and 6 by EAL C-5 as referenced in Attachment I of

- Fuel Clad s procedure. Correction criterion "m"-correct information Degradation iocaiea elsewhere in me procedure.

"Mode Applicability" , Change: Replaced wording under "EAL THRESHOLD VALUE",'

page ios, EAL "BASIS", AND "TERMINATION/RECOVERY CRITERIA" C-5: Unusual sections of this EAL with the wording under EAL 5-7 (on Event Fuel Clad

- page 97).

Degradation Reason: To correct an editing error; these EALs are identical with the exception of Mode Applicability; the basis for C-S is stated correctly in Attachment 1 (pg. 21) of this procedure-correction criterion "in".

This is a free-form as called out in PMP-2010-PRC-002, Procedure Change, and Review, Rev. 12. /

___ PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Page 1 of 112 Emergency Classification Reference Effective Date: q /12/03 C. J. Graffenius S. M. Partin Site Protective Services Writer Owner. Cognizant Organization TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 PIJIIIiPOSE ANID SCoPE...2 2 AJiD ...2 3 FE'IiJL.,S ... 6 4 F.IiNAJ CONII1'IONS...7 s IIFE1I:ErCIES...7 Attaclunent 1: Emergency Condition Categories.9 Attachment 2: Critical NT.JREG 0737 Parameters.22 Attachment 3: Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489).23 Change 1 affects pages 1,68, and 70.

Change 2 affects pages 1, 97, and 108.

K-I

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 2 of 112 Emergency Classification K> 1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE NOTE: The operator aids located in the control rooms, simulator, Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility are updated when changes are made to this procedure. -

*. 1.1 To ensure correct and timely classification of abnormal events into one of four emergency classification levels if appropriate Attachmentsmay be used as operator

aids in a format different than the procedure provided the content remains the same 2 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS Term Meaning Alert Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any releases are expected to be limited to

- small fractions of the EPA Protective* Action Guideline

___________________ exposure levels. -

Control Placing all local controls in position necessary for operation from remote panels and the shift supervisor has determined that the.

systems for contr6lling reactivity, RCS inventory, RCS -

temperature, and the heat sink functions have been established.

Critical Safety Subcriticality, core cooling, heat sink, pressure-temperature-Function (CSF) , stress (RCS integrity), containment, and RCS inventory as monitored in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures.

Critical Safety The method by which the level of challenge to each CSF is Function Status Tree determined in accordance with the Emergency Operating (CSFST) Procedures.

Emergency Action A pre-determined, site-specific, observable threshold for a Level (EAL) plant Initiating Condition that places the plant in a given emergency class. An EAL can be an instrument reading; an equipment status indicator, a measurable parameter (onsiteor offsite); a discrete, observable event; results of analyses;

-, . . - .. entry into specific emergency operating procedures; or another phenomenon which, if it odcurs, indictesentr into a particular emergency class; Emergency * * . A grouping of Initiation Conditions, recognizable to the Site Condition Category Emergency Coordinator, applying to the same area of*

(ECC) concern and that can logically lead to escalating the K> emer ency class.

I Reference I PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1 Emergency Classification I Rev. 4 I Page 3 of 112 Term Meaning Emergency Level These are taken from 10 CFR 50-Appendix E. They are in escalating order. (Notification of) Unusual Event (UE),

(ECL) , Alert, Site Area Emergency (SAE), and General Emergency (GE).

Explosion A rapid, violent, uncontained combustion or catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that potentially imparts significant energy to nearby structures or equipment.

Fission Product One of the three principal barriers to uncontrolled release of Barrier radionuclides, i.e., fuel clad, reactor coolant system (RCS),

_________________ and the containment building (CNTMT).

General Emergency. Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual (GE) - or imminent substantial c6re degradation or melting with potential for l6ss of containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action.

Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate

____________________ site area:

Initiating Condition One of a predetermined subset of nuclear power plant (IC) . .. conditions where either the potential exists for a radiological

_________________ emergency, or such an emergency has occurred:

Lbss (of a fission Severe challenge to a fission productbarrier sufficient to product barrier) consider that barrier incapable of containing fission products.

Normal Charging The normal charging flow path through the volume control; Mode . . system including design and alternate flow paths; and flow to

___________________ reactor coolant pump seals..

Potential Loss (of a Challenge to a fission product barrier sufficient to consider fission product the barrier degraded in its ability to contain fission products.

barrier) ___________________________________________________________

Protected Area The fenced area which requires a Cook security badge for unescorted access.

Recognition. A logical and convenient grouping of ECCs used to quickly Category eliminate non-applicable ICs from consideration during Emergency Classification.

Safe Shutdown Area Selected areas within the Protected Area that may be

- . occupied for the security or safe shutdown of the units.

The safe shutdown areas are:

. Control rooms . :.

Cental alarm station - :.. -'

Containment buildings in Modes 5 and 6 The following are Safe Shutdown areas, if a Control Room must be evacuated:

Diesel Generator rooms K>

4 kV.irooms. .

__________________

Vicinity of all Local Shutdown Stations

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e4of 112 Emergency Classification PtAnn Safe Shutdown Selected components deemed necessary to place and maintain

. Equipment.. *aunit in Hot Shutdown with capability to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown as described in Safe-Shutdown':

Capability Assessment, Proposed Modifications and Evaluations (AEPSC), Rev. 11986. In brief, the safe shutdown equipment can be described as:. -

RCS makeup path from the Refueling Water Storage .Tank (RWST) via the Centrifugal Charging Pumps (CCPs) and Boron Injection Tank (BIT) injection lines.

Secondarj Heat Sink cojisisting of:

- Condensate Storage Tank (CST)

- all three Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) pumps

- Associated AFW valves

- Steam Generators (SGs)

- . SG Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)

SG safeties and PORVs.

Component Cooling Water (CCW) system.

Essential Service Water (ESW) system includihg alternate

. *.'supply to AFW.

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system

Diesel Generators and the emergency AC buses CRIDs and most CRID-powered instrumentation

- *.

DC distribution system including batteries and battery chargers.

A11 Local Shutdown Stations.

Unit crossties for BIT flow, RCP seal injection, CSTs and AFW.

Site Area E'ents are in progress or have occurred which involve actual Emergency (SAE) or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.

Toxic Exposure to the worker in excess of limits specified in 29 CFR 1910.1000. in practice, this should be considered concentrations which are capable of incapacitating th worker.

Transient A condition (1) beyond the expected.steady-state fluctuations.

in temperature, pressure, power level or wat& level (2) beyond the normal manipulations of the Control Room operating crew and (3) that would be expected to require actuation of fast acting automatic control or protection systems

___________________ to bring the reactor to a new safe steady state condition

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 PageS Emergency Classification Term Meaning Uncontrolled A change that is not the result of a planned evolution.

Unisolable. A leak that cannot be isolated from the control room.

Unplanned Any activity is unplanned if it is not beingperformed in accordance with the plan of the day, the outage schedule, the

preventative maintenance schedule, a job order, or an approved procedure.. In addition, the activity can be

considered "unplanned" if reaiiltant conditions exceed expected or. authorized limits (e.g., a planned waste gas release should be considered "unplanned" if release.

conditions do not conform to values specified in the discharge permit).-

Unusual Event (UE) Unusual events are in progress or have occurred which*

indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or mdnitoriiig are expected unless further

-. degradation* of safety system occurs.

Valid Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be suspect. Verification can be obtained by a) an instrument channel check, or b) indications on related or -

redundant indicators, or c) by direct observation by plant

personnel. Implicit in This definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes. i Vital Area Selected areas within the Protected Area that contain

equipment necessary for the security or safe shutdown of the*

units. The vital areas are:

Control rooms

Control room and auxiliary cable vaults **

Containment buildings

Diesel Generator rooms*

Auxiliary feedwater pump rooms

Essential service water pump rooms and switchgear

Spent fuel pool area and new fuel vault*

4 kY switchgear rooms (DIG 4kV switchgear rooms)

UPS battery and inverter rooms

Central alann station

.

N-Train battery rooms and N-Train battery chargers

I Reference I PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1 I Rev. 4 Emergency Classification I ' Page 6 of 112 K.

3 DETAILS 3.1 Using Attachment 1, determine which Recognition Category applies to the abnormal conditions.

NOTE: It is likely that an event will have to be classified using more than one Recognition Category.

3 11 Classify the event within 15 minutes of when the classification criteria (EAL -

threshold value) exists.

a. ii the classification criteria is NOT recognized within 15 minutes AND the condition still exists, ThEN classify the event.

b. IF the classification criteria is NOT recognized with 15 minutes AND the condition no longer exists, THEN do NOT chisify the event..

Make notifications in acc6rdan&e with PMP-7030-OOi-OO1, Prompt NRC Notification.

3.1.2 Review ALL appropriate Initiating Conditi6ns within the selected Recognition Categories'starting in the left-most applicable column 3.1.3 Determine whether the threshold values for Emergency Classification have been exceeded.

a. Attachment 2 may be needed in making a determination of emergency

.. classification under ECC S-6: Loss of Alarms or Indications.

b. The appropriate basis pages (Attachment 3) may also be used if clarification is needed in making proper determination of emergency classification in any of the Recognition Categories.

3 14 The in Attachment 1 that are marked with an X do NOTInitiating have the Conditions entire EAL description listed in Attachment 1; In order to properly classify an event, the basis pages in Attachment 3 must be reviewed to insure the full description of the EAL is considered when making the classification.' The page numbers listed in the Initiating Condition boxes in Attachment 1 refer to the appropriate section of the basis pages, Attachment 3. - .

K-,

-I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 7 of 112 Emergency Classification -I 3.1.5 If the threshold value has been exceeded, th higher Emergency Classification Levels within theassociated ECC must be checked to ensure the highest ECL has been determined. . . .. .....

3.2 *The Emergency Classification Level is the highest ECL determined in step 3.1 as appropriate OR any higher Emergency Classification Level as determined by Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) judgement as described in Attachment 1 and Attachment 3.

3.3 The SEC shall evaluate plant conditions at least every 15 minutes to determine if conditions have deteriorated to the point that the Emergency Classification Level

. should be upgraded to a higher level until the event is terminated. The need to* . .

upgrade to a higher level could be indicated by:.

Critical Safety Function Status Trees

Additional radiation monitor alarms

Reports from plant personnel FINAL CONDITIONS

4.1.. Event Classified REFERENCES .

5 1 Use

References:

- 5.1.1 None 52 Writing

References:

5.2.1 Source

References:

a. NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, "Methodology for Development of

Emergency Action Levels"

b. NUMARCINESP-007; Rev. 4, "Methodology for Development of

Emergency ActionLevels"

7...:.: . .: *.

c. Regulatory Analysis: "Revision of Regulatory Guide 1.101 to Accept the Guidance in NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2 as an Alternative Methodology for the Development of Emergency Action Levels" "I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1D1 Rev. 4 Pa e 8 of 112 Emergency Classification

. . d.

NUMARC letter: "Methodology for the Development of Emergency Action Levels," NUMARCINESP-007 Revision 2, Questions and Answers, June 1993 from Thomas E Tipton, to NUMARC Administrative Points of Contact 5.2.2 General References .

a. Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan K>

1 -

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 9 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment .1 -* Emergency Condition Categories Pages:

9-21 Page Emergency Condition Category 10 Fuel Clad BarrierLoss/Potential Loss Table 10 RCS Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Table 11 Containment Barrier Loss/Potential Loss Table 12 ECC H-i SEC Judgement 13 ECC 11-2 Security Events 13 ECC H-3 Control Room Evacuation 13 ECCH-4 Fire 13 ECC H-5 Toxic or Flammable Gases 14 ECC N-i

Seismic Activity

14. EGG N-2 Tornado/High Wind 14 EGG N-3

Visible Structural Damage 14 ECCN-4 Vehicle Collision 14 ECCN-5 Main Turbine Rotating Component Failure 14 *,. ECCN-6 Plant Flooding*

14 ECCN-7 Unanticipated Explosion.

.15 ECCR-1

Radioactive Effluent Release

15. :* ECCR-2

Increasing InPlant Radiation Level 15 ECCR-3 Loss of Water Level in Any Area Holding Irradiated Fuel 16 ECCS-1. Failure of Reactor Protection System -

16 . ECCS-2 Loss of AC Power (Modes 1-4).y.

16 ECCS-37

Loss of DC Power (Modes 1-4) 16 - EGGS-S Loss of Systems Needed to Achieve/Maintain Hot Shutdown

17 ECCS-6

Loss of Alarms 17 EGCS-7 Fuel Clad Degradation 17 EGCS-8 Excessive RCS Leakage 17 EGG S-9 Tech Spec Compliance.

17 ECC S-10

Loss of Communication Systems (Modes 1-4)

18 ECCH-2-1 1-5 Hazards and Other Conditions (Modes 5, 6) 19 ECCN-1-? 1-7 Natural/Destructive Phenomena (Modes 5, 6) 20 ECCR-1-I -3 Abnormal Radiation Levels/Effluents (Modes 5, 6)

21 ECCC-3 Cold ShutdownlRefueling/Defueled Loss of AC Power (Modes 5, 6) 21 . ECCC-4 Cold Shutdown/Refueling Inabilityto Maintain Cold Shutdown

- ... 21 EGCC-5 Cold Shutdown/Refueling Fuel Clad Degradation (Modes 5 6) 20 ECC C-6 Cold Shutdown/Refueling Loss of Communications (Modes 5 6) 20 .. ECCC-7 Cold ShutdownlRefueliru' Loss of DC Power (Modes 5 6)

/

C <'Wi. § C Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4' Pa e 10 of 112

.. . Emergency CLASSIFICATION -

Attachment 1 Emergency ,Categories Pages:

Conditi6n 9 21 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX - Mode 1-4 . .

.GENERALEMERGENCY Loss of.TWO Fission Product SITE AREA EMERGENCY Any TWO of the Following: . .... ., '

'. ALERT Loss or Potential Loss of Either. Fuel

.J..: UNUSUAL EVENT Loss or Potential Loss of Containment Barriers AND Potential Loss 1 Loss or Potential Loss of Fuel Clad. Clad or RCS Barrier *. Barrier.s::. >*. -

of Third Barrier... 2. Loss or Potential. Loss of RCS. '- . . . ... . -:. .* *. -

________________________ 3 Loss of Containment Barrier. . .. .. . -.. -

1. FUEL CLAD BARRIER

' LOSS (L) POTNTIL LOSS (P)

.1 Core Cooling CSFST ' .'.. Core Cooling CSFST RED. - Core Exit Thermocouples> 752

. . RVLIS Level ' 46% (Narrow Range)

.. > .... . .: . . - RED OR .... . -. .-

.2 Containment Radiation .. - > 200 R/hr . . .. None ' . . . . ...

.3 Primary Coolant Activity >300 uCiIce 1.131 dose equivalent . . None.

____________________________________________________ Core Damage > 5.0% clad failure -

2'. RCS BARRIER . ... .. . LOSS (L).' .. POTENTIAL LOSS (P)

.1 RCS Leak Rate (unisolable) > available makeup capacity as indicated by complete > capacity of one centrifugal charging pump in normal charging

_______________________________________________ loss of RCS siibcooling. ': lIne up . ....

.2 Steam Generator Leakage. . .. . Entry into OHP 4023.E-3. SGTR . .. . SG withline Rupturedcharging leak> capacity of one charging pump in

. .. . 'AND normal up..' ..

Non-Isolable secondary line break reults in a . .. . . . . . ..

Prolonged (>30 mInutes) radioactive release to . . . . . .

____________________________________________________ the environment from affected SO.

.3 Containment Radiation .': . > 10 R/hr . . None

.4 RCS Integrity CSFST. .' .: None .. .*.... ' . . RCS Integrity CSFST - RED

.5 Heat Sink CSFST None .. Heat Sink CSFST - RED Does not include a release through the condenser air ejectors or the gland steam condenser vents for the purpose of declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.

C C Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa c 11 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION .

Attachment

Emergency 1 Condition Categories Pages:

9-21 FTSTON PUODTICT RARUTEU MATUTY - Mnr1 1 d GENERAL EMERGENCY Loss of TWO Fission Product of Third Barrier.. K.

Barriers AND Potential Loss SITE AREA EMERGENCY Any TWO of the Following:.'

2. Lossor Potential Loss of RCS.

1. Loss or Potential Loss of Fuel Clad.

. Loss of Containment Barrier..

ALERT Loss or. Potential Loss of Either Fuel Clad or.RCS Barrier..

I I.

Barrier.

UNUSUAL EVENT Loss or Potential Loss of Containment

3. CONTAINMENT BARRIER

,

LOSS (L) . . POTENTIAL LOSS (P)

.1 Containment Radiation .' None . . >1000 R/hr.

____________________________________________ _____________________________________________________ Core damage >20% cd ;.

2 Containment Integrity ... Unisolable breach of containment. . None ..

OR"-.:.

Rapid unexplained containment pressure or sump level drop following pressure rise caused by a LOCA.

OR Containment pressurelsump level NOT performing as expected for conditions OR

________________________________________ Entry into ECA 1.2. LOCA Outside Containment ___________________________________________________

3 SG Secondary Side Release . la. Primary to secondary leak rate > Tech. Spec limit (p34) None

b. (>30 mlii.)line Secondary break OUTSIDE Containment results in release to the . . . . . . .

Release of secondary coolant from the affected SG to the

_______________________________________________ environment with alert alarm on any SG PORV rad monitor.1 4 Containment CSFST None . Containment CSFST - RED

.5 Containment Hydrogen .- : . None - >4.0%

Containmeni Hydrogen >0.5% AND any Hydrogen Control equipment*

____________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ inoperable. . .... - .

.6 Containment Pressure Control . None - BOTH CTS trains OR 130TH containment air recira fans inoperable OR fail

. . to auto start on their containment pressure selpoint OR containment pressure

________________________________________ > l2psig.

.7 Core Exit Thermocouples None Core Cooling CSFST - RED . .

.1 AND

____________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________ Restoration rocedures not effectivewithin 15 minutes Does not include a release through the condenser air ejectors or the gland steam condenser vents for the purpose of declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.

C*.j C Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 12 of 112

- Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 1 Pages:

Emergency Condition Categories 9 21 SEC Judgement SEC Judgement may be used to determine that a Fission Product Barrier is LOST or POTENTIALLY LOST based on factors other than those listed in Attachment 1. Examples may include, but are not limited to, events such as loose parts in the core or loss of all ECCS pumps.

Once a barrier has been lost, the symptoms may disappear. SEC judgement may be used to determine whether to carry the barrier as lost. If the ability to monitor a barrier is lost or. degraded, SEC judgement must be used to determinebarrier status. . . . .

If escalation to Site Area Emergency. or General Emergency is expected within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months based on current trends, then IMMINENT barrier

degradation should be assumed and the SEC should make the appropriate classification. - ... .. -

GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY . ALERT . . UNUSUAL EVENT EC Judgenient - All Modes -. ..

114 SEC Judgenient (p.46)

I.Conditions indicate actual or imminent substantial jI H-i SEC Judgement (p.45)

Conditions indicate likely or actual major failures

[H-i SEC Judgement (p*44) . .. 1 11-1 SEC Jndgement (p*42) .

Conditions indicate that plant safety systems may I Conditions indicate a potential degradation of the 1

I core damage with potential loss of containment or of plant functions needed to protect the public. and additional personnel are needed level of safety of the plant.

the potential exists for an uncontrolled radioactive tar additional monitoring... I

+/-

releasethatmayexceedEPAlimitsatthesite-- . . . . . .

x EAL's in these tables are NOT complete Refer to referenced basis page (Attachment 3) ror complete description.

C Refcrcnce PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 - Rev. 4 Pa e 13 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION 11.....

Attachment 1 Emergency onditionCategories .,. rug.

INITIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 1- 4 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ;.** ... .. ALERT . . UNUSUAL EVENT hAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS .

11-2 Security (p.50) 9. . :.*. . 11-2 Security (p.49) H-2 Security (p.48)' H-2 SecurIty (p.47)

Security Event resulting inloss of ability Security event in a Vital Area. Security Event in the Protected Area Security Event that potentially degrades level of.

to reach and maintain Mode S. 2,* l.!ntrusion by hostile force. . lintrusion by hostile force plant safety.. . . *.

OR . OR . . l.Bomb in Protected Arealoutside vital area.

l.Loss of physical control or Control Room 2.Loss of control of Vital Area 2.Civlj disturbance within Protected Area 2 OR K..' OR (NOT Control Room) . Credible bomb threat.

2 Loss of physical control of remote SD capability.. . OR 7 .,* OR

. 3.Confirnied bomb in Vital Area 3 Credible attack threat.

.OR:

4 Hostage/extortion potentially affecting plant H-3 CR Evacuation (p.52) H-3 CR Evacuation (p 51)

Control Room evacuated AND control not Control Room evacuation initiated established in 15 minutes ______________________________________________ ___________________________________________

H-4 Fire (p 55) 11-4 Fire (p.54).

Fire OR explosion affecting plant operations Fire in Protected Area NOT extinguished

______________________________________________ __________________________________________ E within 15 n'unutes of detection 11-5 Toxic Gas (p 58) 11 5 Todc Gas (p.56)

Toxic OR flammable gas release that .

Toxic OR flammable gas release threatens lives OR affects ability to * . affecting plant operation.

___________________ _________________ achieveamaintaMode5 . Z .

C -C Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 14 of 112 CLASSIFICATION Emergcnc .. '. . . .

- Pages:

Attachment 1 Emergency Condition Categories 9-21 INITIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 1-4 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY . .. . ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT NATURAL/DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA N-1.Selsmlc (p.62).. . N-i Seismic (p 60)

Seismic event indicated by: Seismic event indicated by 1.Seismic instrument activated I Seismic instrument activated OR 2 Ground motion detected by Control Room crew.

2,Ground otioiiected iy Control Room crew

.Visble major damage in vital area. ,

- OR

-, 2.Plant Trip.

E

.* . . . . - N-2 Tornado/wind (p.62) . N-2 Tornado/wind (p.60)

- . ... . l.Tornado strike in Vital Area . . . I .Tornado strike within Protected Area.

. OR . .

2.>90 mph wind for >15 minutes...

. .. . .. N3 Structural (p.62) . . . . . ..

Visible damage to a structure containing systems

______________________________________________ required to achieve and maintain Mode 5. _____________________________________________

.. N-4 Vehicle Collision (p.62) . . N-4 Vehicle Collision (p.tSO)

Vehicle collision affecting Vital Area. Vehicle collisi6n affecting systems or structures within the Protected Area.

N-S MT FaIlure (p.62) . N-S MT Failure(p.60)

Main turbine generated missile penetrates Vital Area. . Main turbine rotating component failure causes

__________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________ visible damage or damages generator seals.

N-6 FloodIng (p.62) . .. . . . .... . . . .

. . ____________________________________ Flooding In Vital Area affects safety related equipment. . . . .. . ....

. . N-7 Explosion (p6O) . . .

. .. Unanticipated xplosiowithin Protected Area.

causes equipment. visible damng permanent structures

C C 'C Reference - PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 15 of 112 v' .Emc "CLASSIFICATION rgency Pages:

Attachment 1 *. Emergency Condition Categories 9-21

. - INITIATING CONDITIONS -Mode 1- I.....

GENERAL EMERGENCY. . SITE AREA EMERGENCY- ALERT . UNUSUAL EVENT ABNORMAL RADIATION LEVELS/EFFLUENTS R-1 Effluent release (p.70) R-1 Effluent release (p.68) R-1 Effluent release (p.6 6) R-1 Effluent release (p.64) .

Site boundary dose> I REM TEDE or S REM CDE Site boundary dose> 100 mrem TilDE Unplanned Rad release > 200X ODCM limits Unplanned Rad release > 2X ODCM limits for to thyroid based on: or 500 mrem CDE to thyroid based on for>15 mm. based on: > 60 minutes based on:

I .Survey results OR 2.Dose assessment. .2.Dose I.Survey results assessment.

OR .

i.200X rad monitor high alarm selpoint.

'*'.. OR; .

. . l.Rad monitor 2X high alarm setpoint.

. . OR -,

I, OR i.,OR -.. ' 2.Gas or liquid sample results. 2.Gas or liquid sample results> . -

3.Emuent monitor readings >15 minutes 3.Effluent monitor readings> iS minutes., . . .

. . E .

R-2 Plant Rad level (p.73) - -, 11-2 Plant Rad level(p.72)

Rad levels that Impede plant operations based Unexpected reading on Area Monitor IOOOX on: . . . . . . the 24 hr average.

1.>, 15 mR/hr in Control Rm(s) /CA5 .

-. 2. o'* ..

> 100 mRlhr at remote S/D areas 11-3 Loss of level (p.77) R 3 Loss of level (p 75)

Major damage to irradiated fuel or loss or Uncontrolled lowering in refueling cavity, SFP level that has or will uncover fuel outside of or Transfer Canal indicated by the reactor vessel based on:

1.Visual observation of levels I Inability to maintain > 6434 in SFP or Transfer Canal OR with irradiated fuel present

2.Rad monitor alarms . OR OR 2 Inability to maintain > 643'4" in the refueling cavity 3.Level < 63T4" SFP or Transfer Canal with irradiated fuel In containment

C INITIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 1-4

I GENERAL EMERGENCY I . SITE AREA EMERGENCY '.. ALERT . UNUSUAL EVENT SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS 3/4.

S-i RPS failure (p.81).. :. S-i RPS failure (p.80) *. .... . S-i RPS failure (p.79) -

l.Auto and manual Reactor Trip fails from Control Auto and manual Reactor Trip fails from . Auto Reactor Trip fails AND manual trip Rm AND Subcriticality and Core Cooling CSFSTs Control room. . . successful from Control Room.

are RED .

- OR,< - - .

2,Subcriticality and Heat Sink CSPSTs are RED . ________________________________ __________________________________________

5-2 Loss of AC (p.86)

I .Prolonged loss of all ,-. S-2 Loss of AC (p.85) S-2powerLoss supply of ACto (p.84) S-2 Lois of AC (p 83)

AC (A and D. -T buses) .. Loss of all AC (A and D T buses) - for -. AC T buses reduced to a

- Loss of ALL OFF.SITE power (Auxiliary. Reserve and AND Core Cooling CSFST-ORANGfl. . >15 minutes. .;. ... . . singlesource foi> 13 mInutes.. 69kv Transformers) to the T Buses for> 15 minutes.

AC and D buses) expected to last . . - ... . .. . . . .

for> 4hrs.. _____________________________

E

- S-3 Loss of DC poiver (p.8 8 ) ____________________________________

Loss of ALL vital DC buses All AND CD for

_____________________________________________ >_15_minutes_(busvolts ...22Ov): ______________________________________ _________________________________________________

S-S Loss of Hot SD sys (p.8 9 )

Loss of ability to achieve or maintain hot shutdown based on entry into: K l.OIIP 4023.FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink:.

2.0111' 4023JR.C.1, Response jo Inadequate

_________________________________ Core Cooling. ____________________________ ____________________________________

C I.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 17 of 112 Emergency, CLASS WICATION Attachment 1- Emergency Condition Categories Pages:

9 21 INITIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 1-4 SITE AREA EMERGENCY I ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT

GENERAL EMERGENCY I -

SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS S-6 Loss of Alarms (p.95) S.6 Loss of Alarms (p 92) S-6 Loss of Alarms (p.90)

Loss of bilizy to monitor alarms during a Unplanned toss of most or all Safety System I.Unplanned loss of Safety System annunciators or transient indicated by: annunciators or Attachment 2 indicators for indicators or Attachment 2 parameters for > 15 1.Loss of Safety System annunciator panel(s) for > 15 minutes with transient in progress or minutes. -

AND- ...... .

>15 minutes. -. compensatory Indicators unavailable and ANT) additional momloring is required 2.Addttional monitoring required 2.Loss of Attachment 2 Critical Parameters for > 15 mInutes..: 3.Compensatory indicaflons for lost annunciators are.

available 3.Compensatory indications not available (PPC, SPDS).

z

. .*. S-7Dgraded Clad (p.97) >

for > 45 hrs. . * . .

OR.

2.RCS activity> IOOIE uCilgram.

S-8 RCS Leakage (p.98)*

RCS leakage exceeds 10 gpm pressure boundary leakage, SG tubo leakage or unidentified leakage

___________________________________ ____________________________________ OR> 25 gpm Identified leakige.

5-9 Tech Spec (p.99).

_________________________________ _________________________________ Unit not in required mode within LCO time limits.

5-10 Loss of Comm (p.100)

Unplanned loss of all on or off-site communications

.. . . z

(:...>.j*

C C Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 18 of 112 N.-

CLASSIFICATION Emegncy Attachment 1 . Emergency ConditionCategories Pagcs:

9-21

INTIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 5 &6 and Defueled

GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY. ALERT T7V UNUSUAL EVENT Jj.

hAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS . . . . :..

(p.50) in -toss ot- 11-2 SecurIty (p. 4 8) H-2 Security (p.47) iecurity Event resulting Security event an a Vital Area. Security Event in the Protected Area. Security Event that potentially degrades ability to reach! maintain Mode S I lntrusrnn by hostile force. I Tntnision by hostile force level of plant safety.

<OR OR I. Bomb in Protected Area.

1. Loss of physical control of Control Room 2 Loss of control of Vital Area .2 2 Civil disturbance within Protected Area OR OW . -

(NOT Control Room). 2. Credible bomb threat.

2. Loss of physical control of remote SD OR OR capability. 3 Confirmed bomb in Vital Area. 3. Credibleattack threat.

OR;

4. Hostage/extortion potentially.

affecting plant operations.

.. 11-3 CR Evacuation (p.52) 11-3 CREvacuation (p.51) .. . .

. . . Control Room cvacuated AND control not Control Room evacuation initiated.

________________ I __________________ ____________________

11-4 Fire (p.55)

Fire OR explosion affecting plant operations.

11-4 Fire (p.54)

Fire in Protected Area NOT extinguished within

. I 15 minutes.

Toxic OR flammable gas release that . . Toxic OR flammable gas release affecting

________________________________ -. H-S Toxic Gas (p.58) . ... * . 11.5 Toxic Gas (p.56) . .. .

threatens and livesMode maintain OR affects

5. ability to achieve plant operation. .

C C Rererence - PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 19 of 112

. . Emergency CLASSIFICATION

Pages:

Attachment 1 Eniergency Condition Categories 9 21 INITIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 5 & 6 and Defueled I GENJ ERAL EMERGENCY . I SITE AREA EMERGENCY ** I ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT NATURAL/DESTRUCTIVE PhENOMENA **.

-. . . . . .. N-i Selsmlc(p.62) . . N-i Seismic (p.60) *:

Seismic event indicated by... . Seismic event indicated by:.

.Seismic instrument activated. i .eismi Instrument activated.

2 Ground motion detected by Control Room crew. . . OR*

a major AND . 2.Ground motion detected by Control Room crew.

Visbie damage in vital area. - . . ..

OR b Plant Trip.

__________________ z N 2 Tornado/wind (p.62) N-2 Tornado/wlnd(p.60):

. I .Tornado strike in Vital Area - I .Tornado strike In Protected Area.

. -. OR.

____________________________ 2.>90 mph wind for >15 minutes.

N-3 Structural (p62).*

. . to achieve and maintain ModeS.

Visible damage to a structure containing systems required N-4 Vehicle Collision (p.62) . N-4 Vehicle CoIllslon(p.60)

Vehicle collision affecting Vital Area. Vehicle collision affects systems or structures

- in the Protected Area.

N-S MT Failure (p.62) . N-S MT Failure (p.60).

Main turbine generated missile penetrates Vital Area.. Main turbine rotating component failure causes

__________________________________________________ visible damage or damages generator seals.

N-6 Flooding (p.62) *. .* .

floodin in Vital Area affects safety related equip.

<** * . . *. ..... . . * * .. *; N-7 Explosion (p.60) . * .

.. . . . . .. .. . .. .* .. ... ...

Unanticipated explosion within Protected Area causes

______________________________________ ________________________________ _____________________________________________ visibl&damage to permanent structures or equipment.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 20 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 1 Pages:

Emergency Condition Categories 9 -21 INITIATING CONDITIONS - Mode 5 & 6 and Defueled GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT ABNORMAL RADIATION LEVELS/EFFLUENTS R-l Effluent release (p.'7O) R-l Effluent release (p.68) R-I Effluent release (p.66) R-l Effluent release (p.64)

Site boundary dose > 1 REM TEDE Site boundary dose > 100 mrem TEDE Unplanned Rad release > 200X ODCM limits for Unplanned Rad release > 2X ODCM limits for or 5 REM CDE to thyroid based on: or 500 mrem CDE to thyroid based on: > 15 minutes based on: > 60 minutes based on:

1.Survey results OR 1.Swwey results I .200X rad monitor high alarm setpoint. I. Rad monitor 2X high alarm setpoint.

2.Dose assessment OR OR OR OR 2.Dose assessment 2.Gas or liquid sample results. 2.Gas or liquid sample results.

3.Effluent monitor readings > 15 minutes. OR 3.Effluent monitor readings > 15 minutes.

R-2 Plant Rad level (p273) R-2 Plant Rad level (p.72)

Rad levels that impede plant operations based on: Unexpected reading on Area Monitor lOCOX the 24 hr average.

1. > 15 mR/hr inControl Room(s) or CA5 OR

2. > 100 mR/hr at remote 5/D areas.

R-3 Loss of level (p.77) R-3 Loss of level (p.75)

Major damage to irradiated fuel or loss of Uncontrolled lowering in refueling cavity, level that has or will uncover fuel outside of SFP or Transfer Canal indicated by:

the reactor vessel based on:

l.Visual observation of levels. l.Inability to maintain > 643'4" in SFP or Transfer OR Canal with irradiated fuel present.

2.Rad monitor alarms OR OR 2.Inability to maintain > 643'4" in the refueling cavity 3.Level < 632'4" SFP or Transfer Canal. with irradiated fuel incontainment.

C .

Reference

.. ... C PMP 2080.EPP. 101

, Rev. 4 Pa e2lofl Emergency CLASSI FICATION . ..

Pages:

ategories .

9-21 INITIATING CONDiTIONS - 1V lode 5 & 6 and Defueled I GENERAL EMERGENCY I SITE AREA EMERGENCY I - ALERT .* I UNUSUAL EVENT.

COLD SHUTDOWN/REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS . . . . <.

. . .,- . i. I .

C-3 Loss of AC(p.104) C-3 Loss of AC (p 102)

. Loss of AtL AC power to A and D

> 15 minutes.

T-buses for Loss of ALL OFF-SITE power (Auxiliary.

Reserve and 69kv transformers) to the T buses for > 15 minutes

______________________________ ________________________________________________ Mode 5.6 and defueled ModeS 6 C-4 Loss of Water Levcl In the Reactor Vessel C-4 Inability to Maintain a Unit in that has or will Uncover Fuel In the Reactor .. Cold Shutdown (p.105)

Vessel (107) .. . . 1.Loss of shutdown cooling as evidenced by entry I Loss of shutdown cooling as evidenced by entry into OHP . into OTIP 4022.017.001. "Loss of RI-IR Cooling". -.

4022.017.001, "Loss or RHR Cooling .. . . AND K 2.Temperature rise that either:

2 Core uncovery as indicated by:. a. Exceeds TiS cold shutdown limit of 200P.

.* *.. <46%ORCPs .* OR-OR. b. Results in an UNCONTROLLED RCS b Reactor Vessel Water lkvel <614 feet .

. . temperatur shutdown TISriselimit of 200F the, cold*

approaching . .

Mode5,6 Mode5.6 ________________________________

.. . -. C-S Degraded Clad (p.108)

.RCS activHy > 1.OpCi/grams 1-131 dose.

equivalent for > 48 hrs.

OR

2.RCS activity> 100/B uCilgram.

_______________________________________________ Mode 5.6 C-6 Loss of Comm. (p.109)

Unplanned loss of all on or ofT-site communications.

Mode 5,6 .

C-7 Loss of DC power (p.111)

Unplanned loss of ALL vital DC buses AB AND CD for >15 minutes (busvolts <220v)

___________________________ ___________________________________________ _________________________________ Modes 5.6 .

C:>>;. C C Reference . PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e22 oCt12 Emergency CLASSIFICATION

Attachment 2 . .. .** Critical NUREG 0737 Parameters , . Page:

PARAMETERS. .. .. .. INSTRUMENTATION Neutron Flux - (Gammametrics) . . .. .. . . - NRI-21,23 Reactor Coolant Pressure (Wide Range) NPS-121, 122 Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature THOT (Wide Range) . , NTR-110, 130 -

Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature TCOLD (Wide Range) NTR-210, 230 Incore Thermocouples (Core Exit Thermocouples) T/S 1-65 Reactor Coolant System Subcooling.Margin Monitor SUBCOOL MAR Reactor Coolant InventorySystem (Reactor Vessel Level Indication) NLI-110, 111, 120, 121, 130, 131 Pressurizer Water Level': NLP-151, 152; 153 Charging Pump Flow -. . . IFI-51,52, 53, 54 Charging Pump Breaker Status . . . - lE, 1W, 2E, .2W Control Room Position Indicating Lights for Breakers Safety Injection Pump Breaker Status .

iN, 15; 2N, 25 Control Room Position Indication Li hts for Breakers.

Safety Injection Flow -- . IFI-260 - 266 .... .

Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level ILS-950, 951 .

Containment Water Level '. NLA-320, NLT-321 Containment Pressure (Wide Range) . . . PPA-3 10, 312 . .. .

Containment Pressure (Narrow Range) PPP-300, 301, 302, 303 .

Containment Hydrogen Monitoring ESR-1 thru 9 Containment Isolation Valve Position Monitoring Control Room Position Indicating Lights Containment AreaRadiation Monitor (High Range) Unit 1 VRA-1310, 1410, Unit 2-2310, 2410 Steam Line Pressure . . . MPP-210, 211, 212, 220, 221, 222, 230, 231, 232, 240, 241, 242 Steam GeneratorWater Level (Wide Range) . . BLI-ilO, 120, 130, 140 . ., .. ** . . . .

Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Range) .BLP-110, 111, 112, 120, 121, 122, 130, 131, 132, 140, 141, 142 Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate FFI-210, 220, 230, 240 * * . .

Condensate Storage Tank Level CLI-113, 114, CLR-110, 111 . . ..

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 23 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION .*

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels P ages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION FUEL CLAD BARRIER 1.1: CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES MODE APPLICABILITY Modes 1, 2, 3, 4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE LOSS:

Core Cooling Critical Safety Function Status Tree - RED POTENTIAL LOSS:

Core Exit Thermodouples > 7520 .9

-OR-RVLIS level <46% (Narrow Range)

-OR-* -

I-Teat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Tree - RED.

BASIS References .

LOSS The core cooling critical safety function RED path indicates significant superheating and core uncovery and is considered to indicate a loss of the fuel clad barrier; One of the indicators of the core cooling critical safety function, red is when the core exit thermocouple temperature is equal to or greater than 1200 degrees Fahrenheit. -.

POTENTIAL LOSS Core exit thermocouple temperature equal to or greater than 752 degrees Fahrenheit or RVLIS level <46% (Narrow Range) corresponds toa loss of subcooling and is indicative of a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier The Heat Sink Critical Safety Function RED -

- path indicates that the heat sink is under extreme challenge and is indicative 6f a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier. . . .- .

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K>

I

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 24 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Ation Levels Attachment3 (Commitment: 6489)

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSSIPOTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION

FUEL CLAD BARRIER 1.2 - CONTAINMENT RADIATION MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE LOSS:

Containment area radiation greater than 200 R/hr.

POTENTIAL LOSS:

None ... ....

BASIS (References) . .. - - . . .

LOSS The 200 R/hr value is based on a reasonable assessment of a single number representing the

.expected monitor reading on the upper containment area radiation monitors VRA 1310/1410 (Unit l)or VRA 2310/2410 (Unit 2). This represents the expected reading for loss of coolantaccidents with fuel i., .

failure in the range between 2 and 5% (depending on core inventory which will vary with the time after reactor shutdown. . ..

The 200 R/hr value was determined on the basis of the D. C. Cook Core Damage Assessment.

Methodology taking into account that the radiation levels resulting from the release of nobl gases from failed fuel will vary as a function of cbre shutdown time. Typically, these curves show that f6r noble gases the containment radiation monitors will read 1325 R/hr after 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months of core shutdown, and assuming 100% fuel cladding damage based on noble gas release only. This would correspond to 200 Rlhour for 5% cladding damage and noble gas release 90 minutes after the reactor is shut down.

The reading is based on noble gas reading alone, and does not include the instantaneous release and dispersal of the reactor coolant iodine inventory associated with a concentration of 300 microcuries per gram 1-131 equivalent into the containment atmosphere as suggested by Revision 2 of NUREGINESP 007. The addition of the *iodine activity from the reactor coolant would result in higher monitor readings, thus making the 200 R/hr value a conservative threshold value This assumption is appropriate since it is consistent with the current dose assessment methodology of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant an ice condenser containment plant I POTENTIAL LOSS - None K> DEVIATION FROM NUMARC Calculation of radiation monitor reading is based on dispersal of noble gases only (iodine inventory not included) from the reactor coolant

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 25 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

Pages:.

23 112-FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION FUEL CLAD BARRiER 1.3: PRIMARY COOLANT ACTIVITY MODE APPLICABILITY Modes 1, 2, 3, 4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE LOSS:

Reactor Coolant System activity level greater than 300 microcuries per cc 1-131 dose equivalent.

-OR-(NRC commitment Assessment #7991) of core damage greater than 5%clad failure.

POTENTIAL LOSS: None . .- . . . .

BASIS (References) ... ... .. . . . . - . . -

LOSS 300 microcuires per cc 1-131 dose equivalent corresponds to a value which is cited in Revision 2 of NUMARC/NESP 007.as being well above that expected for iodine spikes and corresponding to 2 to 5% fuel clad damage. This amount of cladding damage indicates significant clad heating and thu the Fuel Clad Barrier is considered lost.. This value will be determined from Cook Nuclear Plant procedure PMP 2081 EPP.105, "Core Damage Assessment". . K . .

Assessment may be performed by authorized shift personnel prior t6 TSC activation or the TSC after*

TSC has been activated.

POTENTIAL LOSS - None DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K>

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 26 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K..> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (C*t I P 6489' -112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION RCS BARRIER 2.1: RCS LEAK RATE MODE APPLICABILITY Modes 1, 2, 3, 4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUES:

LOSS:

UNISOLABLE RCS leak rate greater than available makeup capacity as indicated by a complete loss of

. . RCS subcooling.

POTENTIAL LOSS: . . .

UNISOLABLE RCS leakage greater than capacity of one centrifugal charging pump in normal charging lineup. . . . -

BASIS (References) . .. . ..

UNISOLABLE - A leak that cannot be isolated from the control room.

NORMAL CHARGING LINEUP The normal charging flow path through the volume control system including design and alternate flow paths, and flow to reactor coolant pump seals.

LOSS Leakage that results in complete loss of subcooling is a fundamental indication that the inventory c6ntrol systems are* inadequate for maintaining RCS pressure and inventory. *. :..

POTENTIAL LOSS Unisolable leakage in excess of the caPacity of one centrifugal charging pump in the normal charging mode is considered to be the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory in the RCS andassures that any event that results in a significant inventory loss or shrinkage will result in an ALERT classification..

This leak is NOT isolable from the control room OR an attempt for isolation from the control room has been made and was unsuccessful. An attempt for isolation should be made prior to the accident classification If isolable upon identification this initiating condition is not applicable DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K.>

-I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 27 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 - 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION RCS BARRIER 2.2: STEAM GENERATOR LEAKAGE MODE APPLICABILITY Modes 1; 2, 3, 4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE LOSS:

Entry into OHP-4023.E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture" AND a non-isolable secondary line break

- resulting in a prolonged release (>30 minutes) radioactive release to the environment from the affected steam generator.

POTENTIAL LOSS:

Ruptured steam generator with primary to secondary leak rate greater than capacity of one charging pump in normal charging mode.:* :-* .. . .. . .. - ..

BASIS (References) . -

NORMAL CHARGING MODE The normal charging flow path through volume control system including design and alternate flow paths, and flow to reactor coolant pump seals.

LOSS This is intended to address the full spectrum of steam generator tube rupture events and addresses the direct release of radioactive material to the environment. Dose assessment is required when there is indication that the fuel matrix/clad is potentially lost.* This EAL encompasses steam breaks, feed breaks, and stuck open safety or relief valves. The assumed break flow termination time period in our steam generator tube rupture dose consequence analysis is 30 minutes; therefore, 30 minutes is used to define prolonged:

POTENTIAL LOSS Unisolable leakage in excess of the capacity of one centrifugal charging pump in the normal charging mode is consideredto be the inability to maintain normal liquid inventdry in the RCS and assures that any event that results in a significant inventory loss or shrinkage will result in an.

ALERT classification DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None

-I

Reference PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 28 of 112

- - Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels [. P ages:

I (Commitment: 6489) I 23-112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSSJPOTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION.

RCS BARRIER 2.3: CONTAINMENT RADIATION

MODE APPLICABILITY ...

Modesl,2,3,4 . . . .

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE LOSS

- . Containment radiation greater than 10 R/hr POTENTIAL LOSS:

None BASIS (References)

LOSS A value of lORIhr as indicated on VRA 1310/1410 (Unit 1) and VRAO23lO/2410 (Unit 2) was*

chosen because it is above the ambient background radiation and represents a detectable radiation level above allowed Technical Specification radiochemistry limits but less than the 2-5% fuel clad damage' - - '

used in the fuel clad fission product barrier threshold value. -

The 10 R/hr value was determined on the basis of the Donald C. Cook Core Damage Assessment methodology, taking into account that the radiation levels resulting from noble gases released from the

- coolant will vary as a function of core shutdown time. ;The reading is based on noble gas reading alone approximately 90 minutes after reactor shutdown. This assumption is consistent with the current core damage assessment methodology for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.

The use of noble gases alone for a EAL threshold is conservative since if iodine or other radioactive materials were present, the doses would be higher. . The use of a value reflecting a plant shutdown of one hour was selected as a reasonable reflection of the phenomena being considered withoutconcern about setting the threshold too high or too low. The actual fission product barrier threshold will be declared at any time the value indicated is exceeded POTENTIAL LOSS - None DEVIATION FROM NUMARC Calculatidn of radiation monitor reading is based on dispersal of noble gases only (iodine 1nvnto1y not included) from the reactor coolant K>

'I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1. Rev. 4 Pa e 29 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION.

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489)'23-112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION ROS BARRIER .2.4: RCS INTEGRiTY CSFST . .. .

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUUE LOSS: None POTENTIAL LOSS:

RCS Integrity Critical Safety Function Status Tree RED -

BASIS (References)

LOSS None . . .. *. *. . .. .

POTENTIAL LOSS -

The RCS Integrity Critical Safety Function RED indicates an extreme challenge to the safety function and a potential loss of th RCS barrier. . . :>'.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 30 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489)23-112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION RCS BARRIER 2.5: HEAT SINK CSFST . - -

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUES LOSS: None POTENTIAL LOSS:

Heat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Tree RED BASIS (References)

LOSS - None .. -

POTENTIAL LOSS -

The Heat Sink Critical Safety Function RED path indicates that the heat sink is under extreme challenge and is indicative of a potential loss of the RCS barrier DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None K>

I.....

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 31 of 112 Emergency CLASS WICATION Attachment Basis For (Commitment: 6489) Levels Emergency. Action Pages:

23 - 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION -

CONTAINMENT BARRIER 3.1 - CONTAINMENT RADIATION -

MODE APPLICABILITY -

1A a, -, .. ', -r EAL THRESHOLD VALUE LOSS:

?'Jnn.

POTENTIAL LOSS:

Containment Radiation greater than 1000 R/hr. . ... . .. . -. .

Assessment of core damage greater than 20% clad failure -- . - - . .

BASIS (References) . ..

LOSS-None - . . . -.

POTENTIAL LOSS The 1000 R/hr value is based on a reasonable assessment of a single number

representing the expected monitor reading on the upper containment high range area radiation monitors.

VRA 1310/1410 (Unit 1) or VRA 2310/2410 (Unit 2). The reading represents the expected reading for loss of coolant accidents with 20% fuel clad damage.

The 1000 R/hr value was determined on the basis of the Donald C. Cook Core Damage Assessment Methodology, taking into account that the radiation levels resulting from the release of noble gases from failed fuel will vary as a function of core shutdown time. As with the RCS and Fuel Clad barriers containment radiation EALs, this reading is based on release of noble gases only, approximately 9Q*

minutes after shutdown. . . - . ..

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC Calculation of radiation monitor reading is based on dispersal of noble gases only (iodine inventory not included) from the reactor coolant

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 32 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: .6489) 23 - 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION CONTAINMENT BARRIER 3.2: cONTAINMENT INTEGRiTY MODE APPLICABILITY EAL THRESHOLD VALUES . . .

LOSS: .

1. UNISOLABLE breach or bypass of containment

-OR-

2. Rapid unexplained containment pressure or sump level drop following pressure rise caused by LOCA

. -OR-

3. Pressure/Sump level NOT performing consistent with expected conditions

. .. . . - OR

4. Entry into ECA-1.2, "LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT K7.

POTENTIAL LOSS:

None.

BASIS (References) . - .

UNISOLABLE - A breach that cannot be isolated from the control room.

LOSS An unisolable breach of containment includes any open unisolable containment penetration. A breach of containment has occurred if an inboard and outboard pair of isolation valves fails to close on an automatic activation signal or from a manual action in the control room and opens a release path to the environment. Plant procedure OHP 4023.E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," provides lists of

containment isolation valves required to close on high or HI HI containment pressure.

The breach is considered unisolable if it cannot be isolated from the control room or an attempt for isolation was made from the control room and was unsuccessful. An attempt for isolation should be made prior to accident classification. If isolable upon identification this initiating condition is not applicable. . >... . - . . .. *.. .; . *..

The rapid press - .,. ..... . . - .,

tire drop following an initial pr&ssure ris6 indicate a failed cohtainrnent. Failure of.-

containment pressure to elevate or containment sump level to rise is also indicative of containment bypass or a loss of containment scenario ECA 1 2 is entered when there is evidence of excessive K> auxiliary building radiation while a loss of reactor or secondary coolant is occuifing.

POTENTIAL LOSS None I.-

Reference PMLP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 33 of 112

- Emergency CLASSIFICATION .

Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:.

Attachment 3 (Commitmexit: 6489) 23 112 DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None

Reference PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 34 of 112 Emergency CLASSIEICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION CONTAINMENT BARRIER 3.3 - STEAM GENERATOR SECONDARY SIDE RELEASE MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4

- EAL THRESHOLD VALUE LOSS:

la Primary to secondary leakage rate greater than technical specification limit.

AND -

b Secondary line break outside containment results in release (>30 minutes) to the environment OR 2 Release of secondary coolant from the associated steam generator to the environment is occurring with an alert alarm on any.SG PORV radiation monitor.

POTENTIAL LOSS:

None BASIS (References) -* . . .. .

NORMAL CHARGING LINEUP The normal charging flow path through the volume control system including design and alternate flow paths, and flow to reactor coolant pump seals.

LOSS Secondary side release paths to the environment include atmospheric relief valves and main steam safety valves. Site Area Emergency declaration will be based on evidence of elevated RCS activity asindicatedby SG PORV radiation monitor alert alarm. The SQ PORV radiation monitor alert alarm setpoint c to SAE dose rate.

For 2 orresPonds site boundary CHARGING smaller breaks, not exceeding the capacity of orie charging pump in the NORMAL MODE, an UNUSUAL EVENT classification wiliresult if the ruptured steam generator is isolated. -

For larger breaks, if the steam generator remains unisolated, this EAL will be a discriminator for SITE AREA AND GENERAL EMERGENCIES. The threshold for Site Area Emergency is based on elevated RCS activity indicated by an alert alarm on a SQ PORV radiation monitor.

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 35 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFiCATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23 2 112 If the MSIV on the affected SG is stuck open, the classification is not uPgraded to a Site Area Emergency unless there are other complicating factors present. Any complicating factors present should be considered in order to determine if the tube rupture should be classified asa Site Area Emergency. These factors may include, but are not limited to, elevated RCS activity (300 jic/cc I 131 dose equivalent indicates significant failed fuel, >1%), or significant unisolable steam leakage downstream of the MSIV.

SEC judgement should be used when evaluating the steam leak size and any other complicating factors that are not specifically addressed in the EAL, when making the determination to classify the tube rupture as a Site Area Emergency. . . . . .. - -.

POTENTIAL LOSS

None DEVIA1IUN k RUM INUMAI{L NUMARC does not use the elevated RCS activity as discriminator for Site Area Emergency.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1' Rev. 4 Pane 36 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) -. . 23 - 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION*

CONTAINMENT BARRIER 3.4- CONTAINMENT CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREE .

MODE APPLICABILITY 1, 2, 3, 4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE LOSS:

None. .*** - . *. . .. . -

POTENTIAL LOSS:

Containment critical safety function status tree - RED BASIS (References)

LOSS - None .

POTENTIAL LOSS The RED path indicates an extreme challenge to the containment and represents a potential loss of containment..- . . ..

In addition to a containment isolation system, the Cook Nuclear Plant design includes an ice condenser system, containment air recirculation hydrogen skimmer fans, containment spray system, and an RHR system. The lower containment high pressure setpoint is 1.1 psig at which a partial containment isolation will occur and the containment air recirculation fans are automatically started after a short time delay. Containment spray is automatically started when containment pressure reaches its HI I-Il pressure of 2.9 psig.. RHR spray will be initiated if both containment spray trains are not running and 50 minutes has elapsed since the reactor trip. This 12 psig value is also the containment pressure which indicates Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree RED, this EAL indicates the potential of the containment exceeding its design pressure of 12 psig, hence the potential of loss of containment.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None -.. *.. . -

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1OI Rev. 4 Pa e 37 of 112 Emergency CLASSLFJ CATION.

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels .. Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) .23-112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION CONTAINMENT BARRIER 3.5: CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUES LOSS:

Initiating conditions for LOSS included under initiating conditions for loss of FPB 3.2, CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.

POTENTIAL LOSS:

1. Hydrogen greater than 4.0%

- 2. Containment hydrogen concentration greater than 0 5% AND any hydrogen control equipment.

*. (Containment air recirculationlhydrogen skimmer systems electric hydrogen recombiner OR igniters) inoperable.

BASIS (References) . . ..

LOSS None POTENTIAL LOSS Cook Nuclear Plant is a Westinghouse plant with an ice condenser containment.

Due to its smaller volume than comparable plants with dry containments, it relies more heavily on engineered safety features for overpressure protection than do dry containments Overpressure may be caused by buildup of steam or noncondensibles in containment, or the consequences associated with ignition of hydrogen gas in the containment.

The potential for loss of containment may be caused by the accumulation of hydrogen gas and the inability of at least one train of required safety components required for the control of hydrbgen gas to be inoperable. A 0.5% or greater volume percent is indicative that significant hydrogen gas has formed in c6ntainment, and control measures are warranted. Equipment to limit accumulation of hydrogen includes the containment air recirculation fans and the containment air recirculationlhydrogen skimmer system. .Failure of this equipment is indi6ative of accumulating percentages 6f hydrogen until 4 volume percent, the lower flammability limit for hydrogen gas is exceeded. Above this percentage, the '*

hydrogen igniters ar&the principal equipment relied on to reduce hydrogen gas concentration to below 4 percent. .

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Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pane 38 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels - Pages:

- (Commitment: .6489) __ .23-112 DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

A threshold value has been added for hydrogen concentration greater than 0.5% and key hydrogen control equipment inoperable. ...

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 39 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112-FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSS/POTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION CONTAINMENT BARRIER 3.6 - CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CONTROL MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 . -

EAL THRESHOLD VALUES LOSS:

. . Initiating conditions for LOSS included under initiating conditions for loss of FPB 3.3, CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. .. .

POTENTIAL LOSS: V. . - .. *. .

1 Both containment spray systems both inoperable OR fail to automatically actuate on HI-HI containment pressure. -OR- . . . . . -

2 Both containment air recirculationfaiis inoperable OR fail to automatically actuate on HI containment pressure. .. j -OR-

.3. Containment pressure exceeds 12 prig. . **. - . .

BASIS (References)

LOSS - None POTENTIAL LOSS Cook Nuclear Plant is a Westinghouse plant with an ice condenser containment.

Due to its smaller volume than comparable plants with dry containments, it relies more heavily on engineered safety features for overpressure protection than do dry containments.. Overpressure may be caused by buildup of steam or noncondensibles in containment, or the consequences associated with ignition of hydrogen gas in the containment. -

Containment pressure control is achieved through the Containment Spray system and the Containment Air skimmer Total* ese systems may alloW steam to Recirculation/hydrogen system., failure of both th build up within containment, and, unabated, thissteam buildup may cause the internal cbntainment pressure buildup to exceed the design pressure of 12 psig. Studies have shown that the containment can withstand pressures well above this value. . .* .:

- Both the recirculation fans and the containment spray pumps are actuated atuomatically following receipt of a HI or HI HI containment pressure signal, respectively. However, rapid startup of these systems is not required, since the ice condenser will srv as a passivesteam pressure reduction device I

Reference PM.P-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 40 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION -

3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels 2',: Pages:

Attachment ' (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 until the ice has melted. Therefore, if these systems should fail, it is permissible to start both these systems manually without being overly concerned about the potential loss of containment due to overpressure. However, the failure of automatic startup of redundant equipment is considered symptonatic of potentially degraded key safety equipment. Thus the potential loss categorization will remain until it can be determined that the failure to start automatically was not symptomatic of major system degradation. -

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: -. - -. -. -

None.

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 - Rev. 4 Pa e 41 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels - Pages (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER NAME, LOSSJPOTENTIAL LOSS, & DESCRIPTION CONTAINMENT BARRIER 3.7 - CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLES -

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4

EAL THRESHOLD VALUES.

LOSS:

None POTENTIAL LOSS:

Core Cooling Critical Safety Ftinction Status Tree - RED Restoration procedures not effective within 15 minutes BASIS (References)

LOSS - None .

POTENTIAL LOSS The conditions in this EAL represent imminent fuel melt sequence which, if not corrected could lead to vessel failure and an increased potential for containment failure. Severe accident nalysis has concluded that functional restoration Procedures can arrest core damage within the.

reactor vessel in many core damage scenarios, and that the likelihood of containment failure is small for these events. Whether or not the procedures will be effective should be apparent within 15 minutes of taking action as directed by the procedure. *The SEC should make the declaration as soon as it is determind that the procedure appears to be ineffective.

The core cooling status tree RED is indicative that major fuel damage has occurred, and radioactive release can be expected. The conditions which indicate this condition are either 1) core exit

'thermocouples greater than i200 degrees F or core exit thermocouples greater than 752 degrees F and RVLIS (Reactor Vessel Level Indication System) narrow range less than 46% with no reactor coolant pump running. This represents a more conservative position than recommended in Revision 2 of.

NUMARCINESP 007 but is taken to be cbnsistent with the guidance afforded by the Westinghouse Owners Group as to the indication of when core cooling may be considered to be lost.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K>

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 42 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 (Commitmeiit: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-i: UNUSUAL EVENT - SEC JUDGEMENT .

INITIATING CONDITION Other conditions existing which in the judgement of the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) warrant declaration of an Unusual Event.

MODE APPLICABILiTY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE In the judgementof the SEC, conditions indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the BASIS (References) . .

This ECC is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that K> warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the SEC to fall under the Unusual Event emergency class.. - -:

From a broad perspective, one area that may warrant SEC judgernent is related to likely or actual breakdown of site specific event rnitigatin actions. Examples to consider include inadequate I-emergency response procedures, transient response either unexpected or not understood failure or unavailability of emergency systems during an accident in excess of that assumed in accident analyses, or insufficient availability of equipment and/or support personnel. -

Specific examples of actual events that may require SEC judgement for Unusual Event declaration are listed here for consideration. However, this list is by no means all inclusive and is not intended to limit the discretion of the SEC. . . . *..*.

0 Aircraft crash on -site but, outside the protected area.

0 Train derailment on-site but, outside the protected area. ... -

0 Near-site explosion which may adversely affect nbrinal site activities but, doesn t directly affect activities required to maintain safe operation of the plant.:

Near-site releas&s of toxic or flammable gas which may adversely affect normal site activities but, doesn't directly affect activities required to maintain safe operation of the plant.

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 . Pa e 43 of 112 Emergency CLASS WICATION I n,..... ,s. Vrnarn.ann.r A ntnn T annie I Da floe.

I Attachment 3 I Ii1iLu.q r1L4iJ1A .LA..VL.13 . -.

It is also intended that the SEC's judgement not be limited by any lists of events as defined here. This*

. list is provided solely as examples for consideration and it is recognized that actual events may not always follow a pre-conceived description.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA The condition which caused the declaration to be made no longer exists, or in the SEC's judgement, the

condition will not cause a degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K

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Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 44 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 - Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489),23-112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-i: ALERT - SEC JUDGEMENT TT'T¶ATTh.TI ('AlgflT'rTAT.J . . . -

Other conditions existing which in the judgement of the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) warrant declaration of an Alert.

MODE APPLICABILITY . .

All.

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE In the judgement of the SEC:

1 conditions indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded,

-AND-..

2 increased monitoring of plant functions is needed. * . . ... >. - ;.

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BASIS (References) .

This ECO is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the SEC to fall under the Alert emergency class.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA . . *.

The condition which caused the declaration to be made no longer exists, or in the SEC's judgement, the condition will not cause a degradation of the level of safe of the plant.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None . . . .

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Reference PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rei'. 4 Pa e 45 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

Pages:

23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-i: SITE AREA EMERGENCY - SEC JUDGEMENT INITIATING CONDITION Other conditions existing which in the judgement of the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE .

In the judgement of the SEC: -

Conditions indicate likely or actual major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public. '.. . . . .

BASIS (References) .

This ECC is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the SEC to fall under the Site Area Emergency, emergency classification.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA -

The condition which caused the declaration to be made no longer exists, or in the SEC's judgement, the condition no longer indicates likely or actual major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public health and safety. . .

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None.

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 46 of 112 Emergency CLASSWICATION.

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-i: GENERAL EMERGENCY - SEC JUDGEMENT INITIATING CONDITION Other conditions existing which in the judgement of the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) warrant declaration of a General Emergency.

MODE APPLICABILITY All.

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE In the judgernent of the SEC:

1 Condition indicate an actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential loss of affected unit s containment. . . . . .

-. . -OR-limits the 2 Potential exists for an uncontrolled radi6active relese that may exceed EPA at site boundary. - - - -, ... *. . . . - . 7.

BASIS (References) . -.

The ECC is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the SEC to fall -.

under the General Emergency, emergency classification.. .- . - . . .-

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA In the SEC's judgement, a General Emergency no longer exists and entry into recovery procedures is appropriate. The affected unit has achieved a cold shutdown.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None .

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 47 of 112

7 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages K> .. Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-2: UNUSUAL EVENT - SECURITY EVENTS INITIATING CONDITION .

Confirmed Security Event which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant:

MODE APPLICABILITY All . .. -.

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE .

1. Bomb device discovered within the protected area and outside the vital area.

-OR-2 Credible bomb threat.

K> ., ... -OR-3 Credible attack threat.

1,

-OR-4 Hostage/Extortion incident potentially affecting plant operations.

BASIS (References)

This EAL is based on the Modified Amended Security Plan (MASP). Security events which do not represent at least a potential degradation in the level of safety of the Plant, are reported under 10 CFR 73.71 or in some cases, under 10 CFR 50.72. The plant protected area boundary is the area within the security isolation zone as defined in the Modified Amended Security Plan. Bomb devices discovered within the plant vital area would result in EAL escalation.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA The hazard to the level of safety of the plant no longer exists DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K>

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 48 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) - .23-112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-2: ALERT - SECURITY EVENTS INITIATING CONDITION Security Event in a Plant Protected Area.

MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. Intrusion into protected area by a hostile force OR

. . 2. Civil disturbance within the protected area .. :. :.. .. : - .. . . -. .

BASIS (References).

This class of security events rePresent an escalated threat to ,plant safety above that contained in the Unusual Event. Intrusion into a vital area by a hostile force will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency. *: . ;.. U . *. .. . . . . .. . .

TERMINIATIONIRECO VERY CRITERIA .. .. . . . . *.

Challenge to the safety of the plant no longer exists. .*.. ... . .. .

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None ..

. Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 49 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K.> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

I. (Commitment: 6489) 23 - 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-2: SITE AREA EMERGENCY - SECURITY EVENTS INITIATING CONDITION . .. -

Security event in a plant vital area.

MODE APPLICABILITY A11 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE ...

1 Intrusion into any vital area by a hostile force.

2 A security event which results in the loss of control of any vital area (other than the control room).

-OR-3 A confirmed bomb device discovered in a vital area.

BASIS (References)

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert IC in that a hostile force has progressed from the protected area to a vital area.

TERMINIATIONIRECO VERY CRITERIA The condition causing the event has been eliminated.

DEVIATION FROM NLJMARC None

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101. Rev. 4 Pa e 50 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 -112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION 11-2: GENERAL EMERGENCY -. SECURITY EVENTS

- INITIATING CONDITION ..

. Security Event resulting in loss of ability to reach and maintain cold shutdown.

MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL '1XRESIIOLD VALUE 1 Loss of physical control of the control room due to a security event.

-OR-2 Loss of physical control of a unit's remote shutdown capability due to a security event BASIS (References) .*

. - This Initiating Condition encompasses conditions under which a hostile force has taken physical control of either thecontrol room or aliremote shutdown capabilities resulting in a loss of physical control of the facility. This EAL is an escalation of the Site Area Emergency declaration for a hostile force intrusion into a vital area.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA The security threat has been eliminated and cold shutdown can be maintained.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None K>

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 51 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels. Pages K-' Attachment (Coniniitnient: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION 11-3: ALERT - CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION INITIATING CONDITION.

Control room evacuation has been initiated.

MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE Control room evacuation has been initiated. :..

BASIS (References) . . . . *. . .

CONTROL Placing all local controls in Position necessary for operation from remote panels and the shift supervisor has determined that the systems for controlling reactivity, RCS inventory, RCS *..; . - . -

temperature, and the heat sink functions have been established. .. . . ..

Evacuation of the control room represents a potential for substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant and, therefore, requires an ALERT declaratioh Additional is required and a.ccomplished by activation of the Technical monitong, and direction Support Center ai the Alert classification level! liability to establish plant CONTROL from outside the control room will escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

;.. .*: Cook Nuclear Plant has separate control rooms for each unit. The Cook Nuclear Plant procedure governing control room evacuationand establishing plant control outide the control room is (01-for Unit 1, 02-for Unit 2) 01W 4025.001.001, "Emergency Remote Shutdown".

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA.

Control of the plant has been reestablished from the control room.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K>

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 52 of 112 -'

Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(C6mein:6489) 23 - 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION 11-3: SITE AREA EMERGENCY - CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION INITIATING CONDIITON Control room evacuation has been initiated and plant CONTROL cannot be established MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL ThRESHOLD VALUE .

The following condijions exist: - - . -

I Control Room evacuation has been initiated.

..-AND-2 CONTROL of any one of the following processes is not established within 15 minutes

- Reactivity -

RCS inventory . . . -

RCS temperature '-. . .... .. .. .

SGheatsink . . . . . .

BASIS (Refcrences . *. ..

CONTROL Placing all local control switches in local control necessary for operation from remote panel and the shift supervisor has determined that the systems for controlling reactivity, RCS inventory, RCS temperature, and the heat sink functions have been established.

Cook Nuclear Plant has separate control rooms for each unit. The Cook Nuclear Plant procedure governing control room evacuation and establishing plant control outside the control room is (01-for Unit 1, 02-for Unit 2) OHP 4025.001.001, "Emergency Remote Shutdown",.

The 15 minute time for CONTROL being established outside of the control room is taken from Revision 2 of NUMARCINESP 007..

TERMINIATIONJRECO VERY CRITERIA- -

Control of the plant has been reestablished from the control room K> DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 .' Rev. 4 Pae 53 of 112

. Emergency CLASSWICATION K-I Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

. . . Pages:..

23 112

The inability to establish control of RCS inventory RCS temperature, reactivity and heat sink functions outside of the control room within 15 minutes requires the declaration of a site area emergency K-,

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 - Rev. 4 Pa e 54 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels . Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) I 23-112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-4: UNUSUAL EVENT FIRE -

INITIATING CONDITION Fire in protected area boundary not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE.

Fire within the protected area boundary not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection.

BASIS (References) .. ;

The purpose of this EAL is to address only fires which are potentially significant precursors t6safety system damage. This excludes suchitems as fires within office buildings, waste basket fires, and other K:. small 4..

-J no consequence. This EAL applies to buildings and areas contiguous to . vital areas or other significant buildings and areas. The intent is not to include buildings (or warehouses) that are:

79 not coiitiguous affected or thereorcould immediately adjacent to release be an uncontrolled areas where safety system of radioactive performance would be adversely material.

Areas of concern at the Cook Nuclear Plant for this initiating condition (H-i: UNUSUAL EVENT) include the protected area. The radioactive material building (RMI3) is not included since it is outside the protected area, and not required to safely shutd6wn the plant.* In the unlikely event that a fire were to occur where 100% of the RMB contained adioactive material were released, it could result in an offsite dose of 2.5 rem. :If a fire or explosion were to occur that could result in an offsite radioactive release, the SEC would initially declare as unusual event under the classification requirements of H-5, SEC judgment. The classification could be escalated in accordance with the requirement of R-1, if field measurements show large offsite releases have actually occurred. .

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Fire Extinguished.

. DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None K>

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 55 of 112

. Emergency CLASS WICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 . (Cmt 6489) 23 - 112.

ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION 11-4: ALERT FIRE OR EXPLOSION AFFECTING OPERABILITY OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT .. :. - ...-. - **. -

INITIATING CONDITION .... *. .

Fire or explosion affecting OPERABILITY of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain

safe shutdown.. .. . . ..

. MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE 1 Fire or explosion that affects the OPERABILITY of systems required for the current operating mode OR for safe shutdown.

OR 2 Fire or explosion that causes visible damage to any of the following structures: containments, -

auxiliary buildings, essential service water system enclosures, auxiliary feedwater pump rooms,

refueling water storage tank, or condensate storage tank. -

BASIS (References) -

EXPLOSION A rapid, violent, uncontained combustion or catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that potentially imparts significani energy to nearby structures or equipment.

If a fire affects operability of only one of two redundant systems, then this EAL is not applicable.

The purpose of this EAL is to address only fires which are potentially significant precursors to safety system damage. This excludes such items as fires within office buildings, waste basket fires, and other small fires of no consequence. This EAL applies to building and areas contiguous to plant vital areas or other significant buildings and areas. The intent is not to include buildings (or warehouses) that are not contiguous or immediately adjacent to areas where the safety system performance would be adversely affected.

Only explosions of significant force to cause damage (deformation, scorching) to structures or equipment required for safe dperation should b&considered.

TERMINIATION[RECO VERY CRiTERIA -... 2.

Plant capability to operate safety no longer affected by the event.

K> DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None -

Reference . PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4. Pa e 56 of 112

Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 . Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

K.>. (Commitment: 6489)

EGG CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-S: UNUSUAL EVENT - TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES INITIATING CONDITION .

Release of toxic or flammable gases deemed detrimental to safe operation of the plant.

MODE APPLICABILITY . . .

All NOTE: 1 or 2 OIIPAO21-028 014 Operation of the Control Room Air Conditioning and Pressurization/Cleanup Filter System contains instructions for control room isolation in the event of a toxic gas releae.

. EAL THRESHOLD VALUE .. . :.. ... .

1 Release of toxic or flammable gases within or near site boundary that may affect normal operation of the plant. .

-OR- -

2 - Report by local, county, or state officials of potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event. -.

BASIS (References) .. . .. . .

TOXIC Exposure to the worker in excess of limits specified in 29 CFR 1910.1000. in practice, this should be considered for concentrations which are capable of incapacitating the worker.

This initiating condition is based on release in concentrations within the site boundary that will affect the health and safety of plant Personnel or affect safe operation of the plant.

The potential for the degradation in the level of safety of the plant through the affect of toxic OR flamniablegas on the health of personnel or operation of the plant is to beconsidered for declaration of the UNUSUAL EVENT. The source of the toxic or flammable gas could be from inside or outside the Although carbon dioxide (C02) concentrations can belethal, it is not considered a toxic gas for the purpose of classification unless access is required and cannot be made in an area where equipment needed for thesafe shutdown of the plant is maintained.

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Reference - PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4. Pa e 57 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For* Emergency Action Levels Pages:.

Attachment 3 . (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA The release of toxic material is terminated and the operational impact of the release has been eliminated. . ..

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None K>

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Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 . Pa e 58 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency. Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 (Comrnitnient: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION H-5: ALERT - TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES INITIATING CONDITION Release of toxic of flammable gases within a facility structure which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown.

MODE APPLICABILITY All.

INOTE: 1 or 2 OHP-4021-028-014. Oneration of the Control Room Air Conditioning I and PressurizationICleanu Filter System contains instructions for control room isolation in the event of a toxic gas release.

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE . . :... . ...

1 Report or detection of toxic gases within a facility structure in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel. . . . . - . ,....,. .

OR 2 Report or detection of flammable gases within a facility structure in concentiitions thai will affect the safe operation of the plant. . . . . . . -

BASIS (References)

TOXIC Exposure to the worker in excess of limits specified in 29 CFR 1910.1000. In practice, this

should be considered for concentrations which are capable of incapacitating the worker.

This EAL is based on gases that have entered plant structures that will affect the safe operation of the plant. These structures include buildings arid areas contiguous to plant vital areas and other significant.

buildings or area. The intent of this EAL is not to include buildings thatare not contiguous or immediately adjacent-to plant vital areas. The source of the toxic or flammable gas could be from inside or outside the site.* ., . -' . *.. . . . .*. . . ..

- The sou'rc of the relea.se is not of immediate concern for these threshold values. .The concm is for the health and safety of plant personnel and thefr ability to maintain the plant in a safe operating condition.

This EAL is reached whenever the shift manager determines that protective gear is required to be worn by plant personnel required to safely operate the unit.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 59 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION -

cent 3 Attahm Basis For (Commitment: 6489) Levels Emergency Action . 23 - 112 Pages:

Although carbon dioxide (C02) concentrations can be lethal it is not considered a toxic gas for the purpose of classification unless access is required and cannot be made in an area where equipment needed for the safe shutdown of the plant is maintained.

TERMINIATIONJRECO VERY CRITERIA Plant operations are no longer affected.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.i01 - Rev. 4 Pa e 60 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION N-i to N-7: UNUSUAL EVENT - NATURAL OR DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA .

INITIATING CONDITION Natural or destructive phenomena inside protected area MODE APPLICABILITY

All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE -. ... -

1 CONFIRMED seismic event as indicated by seismic instrument activation or based on ground motion felt at th nuclear plant and recognized as an earthquake based on consensus of control*

room operators on duty at the time.

Report of a tornado strike within the protected area. . *.. ... .

-OR-3 Vehicle collision affecting structures or systems within the protected area.

.-. - -OR-4 Main turbine rotating component failure causing visible damage or damage to the generator seals.

-OR-5 Report by plant personnel of an unanticipated explosion within the protected area boundary resulting in visible damage to permanent structures or equipment.

BASIS (References)

These threshold values are natural or destructive phenomena whichrepresent potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The affectsof the phenomena should also be evaluated on a system or componeni basis in relation to the Technical Specifications and evaluated for further classification via either site emergency coordinator (SEC) judgement or plant procedures as appropriate.

Threshold Value 1 Seismic events at the loivest instrument activation, 0.02g (or based on ground motion felt at the nuclear plant and recognized as aii earthquake based on consensus of control room operators on duty at the time) may cause damage to systems and represent a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant A confirmation call to the National Earthquake Center will confirm that an earthquake has occurred and may provide an estimate of the magnitude of the earthquake in jlie vicinity of Cook Nuclear Plant Further information regarding anticipated actions may be found in plant procedures OHP 4022 001 007 "Earthquake"

Reference . PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 61 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K.> . Attachment 3 *. Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489):

Pages:

23-112

... i. 1 A call to one of the following may be used to verify/confirm a seismic event. National Earthquake -*

Center (phone number (303) 273-8500 or 1-800-525-7848), Local television stations, or, University monitoring stations. . .. '. ;.

Threshold Value 2 Any report that a tornado has touched down within the protected area.

Threshold Value 3 A collision of any vehicle on land, from the air, or on water (plane, train, barge, etc.) which affects structures or equipment within the protected area may potentially damage plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. If the crash is confirmed to affect a plant vital area, the event may b escalated to Alert.

Threshold Value 4 Failure of the rotating components has the potential for leakage of flammable fluids (oil and hydrogen) into the turbine building. . . . . . . . - ... -

Threshold Value 5 Only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or

equipment within the protected area sh6uld be considered. As used here an explosion is a rapid, -

violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially .

- imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. No 'attempt is made in the EAL to assess

the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of evidence of damage (eg., deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. The SEC also needs to consider any security aspects of the explosion, if applicable.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA . . .* . .. -

No furtherhazard exists, and damage assessment is complete, and termination is allowed in accordance with the requirements of the event termination procedure. .. . .

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

A separate ECC category name was established for these "Natural or Destructive Phenomena". They are included in the "Hazards And Other Conditions" Category in NUMARC/NESP 007.

K>

[ Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Emergency CLASSIFICATION' Rev. 4 Pa e 62 of 112 K> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:..

omnuunent: O4bY)" L3 -*IiL ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION N-i to N-7: ALERT - NATURAL OR DESThUCTIVE PHENOMENA INSIDE A VITAL AREA INITIATING CONDITION Natural or destructive phenomena inside vital areas.

MODE APPLICABILITY All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE .

1. CONFIRMED seismic event as indicated by seismic instrument activation or based on ground motion felt at the nuclear plant and recognized as an earthquake based on consensus of control room operators on duty at the time AND which causes visible major damage to structures, systems, and components in the vital area or causes a plant trip to occur.

-OR-

2. Report of a tornado strike in a plant vital area of SUSTAINED high wind (>15 ruin.) greater than 90 miles per hour.

K> -OR-

3. - Report of visible structural damage to a structure containing systems required to establish and maintain cold shutdown. - -

-OR- . ..

4. Vehicle collision affecting a vital area.

-OR-

5. Turbine failure generated missiles penetrating a vital area.

. .. -OR-

6. Flooding in a vital area affecting safetS' related equipment.

BASIS (References)

These threshold values are natural or destructive phenomena which represent actual or potential

- substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The affects of the phenomena should also be

evaluated on a system or component basis in relation to the Technical Specifications and evaluated for further classification via either Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) judgement or plant procedures as appropriate. . . . . . ... ** . .. . ,. -. . .

Threshold Value 1- Seismic events at thelowest instrumentactivation (O.02g ground acceleration) or ground motion felt at the nuclear plant and recognized as an earthquake based on consensus 'of control room operators on duty at the time. The effect of the earthquake has significantly affected Plant operations (up to and includingmanual or automatic plant trip) or has caused visible damage that has K> the potential for major degradation of systems required to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition A call to the National Earthquake Center will confirm that an earthquake has occurred and may provide an estimate of the magnitude of the earthquake in the vicinity of the Cook Nuclear Plant

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pace 63 of 112J

.1 Emerencv CLASSIFICATION I I Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

Pages:

23-112 Operator walkdowns of plant systems, structures and components will be performed to assess potential .

damage levels. . *.

A call to one of the following may be used to veri1/confirm a seismic eVent: National Earthquake 1 O/V C' 7OAO l,,,..t .

..1LLL-L YJIkRUiJL- IIUIIIUL-L .JLJ..)) LIJUJ'J'J UI £U JI0tOJ, JUL.41 1VA1U1I L4LAUii, Uk U111VLMLJ monitoring stations. .

Threshold Value 2 A tornado strike must include an affect on systems or components that affects the operability or integrity of the system or structure within a vital area. The threshold value of 90 mph is the PSAR design basis wind load.

Threshold Value 3 - Should be used in conjunction with investigation of threshold values 1 and 2, or on a stand alone basis: A detailed descriptionor assessment of damage is not intended to meet the intent of this threshold value. The list of critical structures is the same as that included under 11-4 ALERT (containments, auxiliary buildings, ESW system enclosures, auxiliary feedwater pump rooms, refueling water storage tank, condensate storage tank).

Threshold Value 4 A collision by any vehicle on land, from the air, or on water (plane, train, barge, etc.) which affects structures or equipment within a vital area.

Threshold Value 5 This threshold value addresses the threat to safety equipment imposed by missiles generated by main turbine rotating component failures. This includes all areas* classified as vital areas of the plant. ...

Threshold Value 6 Flooding in vital areas which affect OPERABILITY of safety related systems or

components. The source of the flooding need not be known.

The word "OPERABLITY" refers to the definition in the Technical Specifications where required redundant safety equipment will be made inoperable. The only types of floods anticipated to trigger

this threshold are major catastrophic pipe ruptures in the plant that have not been previously evaluated or flo6ds caused by severe external phenomena such as seiches.

TERMINIATIONIRECO VERY CRITERIA No further hazard exists, damage assessment is complete, and termination is allowed in accordance with the requirements of the event termination procedure. . ..

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

A separate ECC category name was established for these "Natural or Destructive Phenomena." They are included in the "Hazards And Other Conditions" cateory in NUMARC/NESP 007.

The EAL for earthquakes does not include a real time seismic instrumentation reading. Cook Nuclear Plant seismic instrumentation does not provide indication of the level of earthquake as an Operations Basis Earthquake (OBE) or Design Basis Earthquake (DBE). This EAL is written using the operator assessment method specifiedin NUMARC/NESP 007.- .

Reference PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1 .. Rev. 4 Pa e 64 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489)23-112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-1: UNUSUAL EVENT - RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE INITIATING CONDITION Unplanned release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds two times the ODCM release limits for 60 minutes or longer.

MODE APPLICABILITY

All.

NOTE: The term "one or more of the following monitors" in the EAL means that the

total of all monitors is to be considered wheii classifying an event. .

[Commitment 5116]

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

.1. A valid reading on one or more of the following monitors that exceeds 2 times the high alarm

7. setpoint for 60 minutes of longer. * ..... ..

. VRS-1500/2500 (Noble Gas)

SRA-1800/2800 (Noble Gas) . .:. . 7> - >. . . ..

SRA-1900/2900 (Noble Gas)

R-20 -.-

R-28 .. <. .

-UK-

2. A VALID radiation monitor reading 2 times the high alarm setpoin for any monitored release pathway for > 60 minutes.

-OR- '... ..

3 Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicates concentrations or release exceeding release limit for> 60 rates 2 times the ODCM maximum instantaneous . minutes.

BASIS (References)

VALID Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be suspect Verification can be obtained by a) an instrument channel check, or b) indications on related or redundant indicators, or c) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment i e within 15 minutes .

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1. Rev. 4 Pa e 65 of 112

Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

K> Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23- 112 UNPLANNED Means the release occurred without a discharge permit or the conditions specified on the discharge permit have been exceeded.

Environmental release limits for effluent radiation monitor alarms are calculated using methods specified in the offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM); An UNPLANNED release in excess of two times the ODCM release limit for 60 minutes, or longer, represents an uncontrolled situation, and hence, a potential degradation in the level of safety. Although the final integrated dose is very low in the Unusual Event emergency class, the degradation in plant control implied by the fact that therelease cannot be terminated in 60 minutes is the primary concern.

Declaration of an Unusual Event should be made as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 60 minutes. A dose assessment should be performed to ensure that a higher classification is not warranted. If the monitor reading(s) is sustained for longer than 60 minutes and the required assessments cannot be completed within this period, then the declaration must be made based on the valid reading.

Radioactive gaseous release pathways are monitored by either the unit vent monitor (VRS-1500/2500),

>the gland steam condenser exhaust effluent monitors (SRA-1800/2800), the steam jet air ejectorvent effluent monitors (SRA-1900/2900), or the steam generator relief monitors. The first three monitors are included in threshold 1 Steam generator relief monitors are excluded. The reason is that radioactive gas release via the steam generator PORVs and safety valves is believed to be a pathway that could not, under normal operating conditions, lead to release of radioactive gases to the environment in sufficient amounts so as tocause exceeding the technical specification limits The steam generator relief monitors are included as an EAL threshold in the site area emergency classification for abnormal release of radioactive materials.

With the exception of possible releases from the essential water system (monitored by R-20 and R-28) release of radioactive liquids to the environment are planned and controlled. Before a batch of *.

radioactive liquid is released to the environment, the sAmple is analyzed. If the radioactivity of the sample is within acceptable limits, the liquid will be released, monitored, and recorded. The alarm on the monitor is set in accordance with ODCM limits. To cover the potential that something may go wrong with the liquid release process, threshold 2 addresses any valid radiation monitor reading.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA The source of the release is determined and isolated (terminated). Environmental field team samples have been taken and the environmental impact assessment is in progress.*

DEViATION EROM NUMARC: -

Example EALs from NUMARCJNESP 007 numbers 3 and 4 (i.e., perimeter radiation monitoring and

real time dose assessment) were not used because Cook Nuclear Plant does not have those capabilities.

The initiating condition is stated in terms of exceeding ODCM limits rather than exceeding radiological technical specifications. -

Reference. PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 66 of 112 Emergency CLASSW[CATION A+..,,4,.,,.,t 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:.

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-1: ALERT - RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE INITIATING CONDITION . . . .

Any unplanned release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment, greater than 200 times*

ODCM release limits, which lasts for 15 minutes or longer.

MODE APPLICABIUTY All NOTE: The term "one or more of the following monitors" in the EAL means that the total of all monitors is to be considered when classifying an event.

[Commitment 5116]

EAL ThRESHOLD VALUE

- 1. A valid reading on one or more of the following monitors which is greater than 200 times high alarm setpoint for >. 15 minutes.

VRS-1500/2500 (Noble Gas)

SRA-1800/2800 (Noble Gas) . ...... . . . . .

SRA-1900/2900 (Noble Gas)

R-20 S R-28*. -OR-2 A valid radiation monitor reading indicating 200 times the high alarm setpoint for any monitored release pathway for > 15 minutes

'OR

3. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicates concentrations or release rates exceeding 200 times the ODCM maximum instantaneous release limit for > 15 minutes.

BASIS (References) .. . . . .. *.* .* . . .

VALID Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be, suspect.

Verification can be obtained by a) an instrument channel check or b) indications on related or redundant indicators, or c) bydirect observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

UNPLANNED - Means the releaseoccurred without a discharge permit or the conditions specified on thedischarge permit hale been exceeded

'I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 67 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:-

(Commitment: 6489) 23 1.12 This event escalates from the Unusual Event by escalating the magnitude of the release by a factor of

100. Prorating the 500 mR/yr criterion for both time (8766 hr/yr and the 200 multiplier, the associatd V.

site boundary dose rate would be 10 mR/hr. The required release duration was reduced to 15 minutes

in recognition of the increased severity.

Declaration of an Alert should be made as soon as it is determined that the release duration has orwill

likely eiceed 15 minutes. A dose assessment should be performed to ensure that a higher classification is not warranted. If the monitor reading(s) is sustained for longer than 15 minutes and the required assessments cannot be completed within this period, then the declaration must be made based on the

valid reading.

Further information on the basis of EAL threshold 1 cited above may be found in the basis document

*.. for the Unusual Event associated with R-1.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA The source of the release is determined and isolated (terminated). Environmental field team samples

- have been taken and the environmental impact assessment is in progress....:*

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

K Example EALs from NUMARC/NESP 007 numbers 3 and 4 (i.e., perimeter radiation monitoring and real time dose assessment) were not used because Cook Nuclear Plant does not have those capabilities.

I The initiating condition is stated in terms of exceeding QDCM limits rather than exceeding radiological * . -.

technical specifications. .*

ii

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 68 of 112

.;.Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 - 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-1: SITE AREA EMERGENCY - RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE INITIATING CONDITION Site boundary dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivity exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release.

MODE APPLICABILITY All NOTE: The term "one or more of the following monitors" in the EAL means that the total of all monitors is to be considered when classifying an event.

[Commitment 5116)

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE -

1 Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding 100 mR/hr B-y or a CDE 1.

thyroid exceeding 500 mrem for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of inhalation at the site boundary.

- -OR-2 *Avalid dose assessment indicates greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem CDE thyroid at the site boundary.

-OR- .. .. .

3 A valid reading on one or more of the following monitors (noble gas channels) that exceeds or is expected to exceed the value shown indicates that the release may have exceeded the above criterionand indicates the need to assess the release in accordance with appropriate plant

procedures.>

VRS-1500/2500> 1.07 E-1 pci/cc . (Unit Vent)

VRS-1800/2800 > 7.90 E0pci/cc (Steam Packing Exhauster)

SRA-190012900> 1.95 E+3.pci/cc (Air Ejector)

MRA-1600/2600> 1.00 E+2 jxci/cc (SG PORV) 1700/2700 NOTE: The above monitor readings are based on an assumed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months event duration. If the monitor

reading(s) is sustained for longer than 15 minutes and the required assessments cannot be completed within this period; then the declaration must be based on the valid monitor reading. The monitor ranges should be selected in accordance with guidance in RMT-2080-TSC-001. 1 BASIS (References)

VALID Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be suspect Radiation readings can be confirmed by redundant instrumentation local readings, or grab samples.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 69 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112-The 100 mrem integrated dose in this initiating condition, is based on the 10 CFR 20 annual average population exposure. This value also provides a desirable gradient (one order of magnitude) between

the Alert, Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classes. The 500 mrem CDE thyroid dose is ..

consistent with the 1.5'ratio of the EPA Protective Action Guidelines for Total Effective Dose Equivalent and Committed Dose Equivalent to the thyroid. . .

A release duration of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is assumed. For analysis of longer or shorter duration releases, the 100

mremlhr TEDE and 500 mrem/hr CDE thyroid dose rates should be adjusted accordingly.

The releases on the monitors in threshold #3 above are calculated using the Cook Nuclear Plant Dose Assessment Program (DAP) and are based on average plant meteorology, the assumption that the release is one hour duration, and a site boundary dose of 100 mremlhour. Details may be found in AEP Radiological Support Section calculation RS-C-283. Analysis of gaseous releases shorter or longer duration or different meteorologic conditions is performed during the dose assessment. If the monitor release is sustained for greater than 15 minutes and the dose assessment cannot be completed in this time period, thenemergency classification will be solely on whether the monitor readings are valid ...

and whether they exceed the values cited in threshold #3 above..

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITEIUA -

The source of the release has been determined and isolated (terminated) Environmental field samples have been taken and environmental impact assessment is in progress. . . .

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

NUMARCJNESP 007 example EAL number 2 (i.e., perimeter radiation monitoring system) was not used because Cook Nuclear Plant does not have that capability.

K>

'I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 70 of 112 Emergency CLASSWICATION K> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 - 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-1: GENERAL EMERGENCY - RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE.

INITIATING CONDITION Site boundary dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivity exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE thyroid for the actual or projected duration of the release.

MODE APPLICABILITY All NOTE: The term "one or more of the following monitors" in the EAL means that the

total of all monitors is to be considered when classifying an event. .

[Commitment 5116]

EAL TIIRESHOLD VALUE K> 1. Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding 1000 mR/hr - 'yor a CDE thyroid exceeding 5000 mrem for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of inhalation at the site boundary. 7:.:

-OR- -

2 A valid dose assessment indicates greater than 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem CDE thyroid at the site boundary. ... . .

-OR-*

3 A valid reading on one or more of the following monitors (noble gas channels) that exceeds or is expected to exceed the value shown indicates that the release may have exceeded the above criterion and indicates the need to assess the release in accordance with the appropriate plant procedures. -.

VRS-1500/2500> 1.07 E+0 pci/cc (Unit Vent)

SRA-1800/2800 > .1.57 E+2 pci/cc (Steam Packing Exhauster)

SRA-1900/2900> 5.78 E+3 pci/cc (Air Ejector) .

NOTE: The above monitor readings are based on an assumed 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months event duration. If the monitor reading(s) is sustained for longer than 15 minutes and the required ssessments cannot be completed

iwithin this period, tlen the declaration must be based on the valid monitor reading. The monitor ranges should be selected in accordance with guidance in RMT-2080-TSC-001. . . .. . Cl BASIS (References) . . ** *.. .*** . .

VALID Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be suspect.

Verification can be obtained by a) an instrument channel check, or b) indications on related or K> redundant indicators, need for timely or c) byi.e.,

assessment, direct withinobservation 15 minutes. by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 71 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

K-I Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 The 1000 mrem TEDE and 5000 miem CDE thyroid values are based on the EPA protective action guidance which indicates that public protective actions are indicated if those values are exceeded. This is consistent with the emergency class description for a General Emergency.

A release duration of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months has been assumed for analysis if longer or shorter duration, releases, the 1000 mrem/hr TEDE and 5000 mrem/hr thyroid CDE dose rates should be adjusted accordingly.

The release on the monitors in threshold #3 above are calculated using the Cook Nuclear Plant Dose Assessment Program (DAP) and are based on average plant meteorology, the assumption that the release is one hour duration, and a site boundary dose of 1000 mrem. Details may be found in AEP Radiological Support Section calculation RS-C-283.. Analysis of gaseous releases shorter or longer duration or different meteorologic conditions is performed during the dose assessment. If the monitor release is sustained for greater than 15 minutes and the dose assessment cannot be comPleted in this time period, then emergency classification will be solely on whether the monitor readings are valid and whether they exceed the values cited in threshold #3 above.

TERMINATION/RECOVERY CRITERIA The source of the release has been determined and isolated (terminated). Environmental field samples have been taken and environmental impact assessment is in progress. . .

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

NUMARCINESP 007 example EAL number 2 (i.e., perimeter radiation monitoring system) was not used because Cook Nuclear Plant does not have that capability.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 - Rev. 4 Paoe 72 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attahmtcen 3 Basis For Emergency Action (Commitment: 6489) Levels I 23P ages:

- 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-2: UNUSUAL EVENT - RISING IN-PLANT RADIATION LEVELS INITIATING CONDITION Unexpected higher in plant radiation levels.

MODE APPLICABILITY All<

EAL TIIRESHOLD VALUE A valid unexpected reading on an area monitor 1000 times higher than the 24-hour average.

BASIS (References)

VALID - Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be suspect Verification can be obtained by a) an instrument chaniiel check, or b) indications on related or K.> -

redundant indicators, or c) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes. .

This event has a long Jead time relative to potential radiological release outside the site boundary thus impact to public health and safety is very low. It represents a degradation in the control of radioactive:

material, and represents a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

TERMINIATIONIRECO VERY CRITERIA The source of the higher radiation levels has been determined and levels have decreased to below the

threshold values. Radiological controls have been implemented and are effective.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

NUMARC/NESP 007 AU2 example EALs numbers 1 and 2 are included under R-3, Unusual Event,

... "Loss of Water Level in Any Area Holding Irradiated Fuel." Example EAL number 3 was not used because Cook Nuclear plant does not have a dry storage area for irradiated spend fuel -

K'.

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 73 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K..> Atahint 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

tcen I (Commitment: .6489) 23- 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-2: ALERT - RiSING IN-PLANT RADIATION LEVELS INITIATING CONDITION Release of radioactive material or higher in-plant radiation levels within the facility that impede operation of systems required to maintain safe operation or to establish or maintain cold shutdown.

MODE APPLICABILITY All -

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. Unexpected radiation levels > 15 mR/hr in any of the following areas.

Ul ControlRoom . .- ..

U2 Control Room Central Alarm Station *.

K.> . OR

2. Radiation level of> 100 mRihr at any station required by plant procedure OHP 4025.001.001, "Emergency Remote Shutdown", and associated subtier procedures. . ....

BASIS (References)

This IC addresses higher radiation levels that impede necessary access .to operating stations, or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually, in order*to maintain safe operation or..

performing a safe shutdown. It is impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The cause and/or magnitude of the higher in radiation levels is not a concern of this IC. The SEC must consider the source or cause of the higher levels and determine if any other ICs may be involved. For example, a dose rate of 15 mR/hr in the control room may be a problem in itself. However, the higher reading may also be indicative of high dose rates in the contaiximent due to LOCA. In this latter case, an SAE or GE may be indicated based on the fission product brrier matrix ICs.

These EALs could result in fdeclaration of an Alert at one unit due to a radioactivity release or radiation

- shine resultizigthefrom operations a majorunit.

operating acident This at ICthe other is not unit. toThis meant applyis to appr6priate if theinhigher higher levels levelsimpair the containment dome radiation monitoi as these are events'which are addressed in the fission product barrier matrix ICs, nor is it intended to apply to anticipated temporary higher levels du to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfer, etc.).

-K>-

Procedure OHP 4025.001.001 refers to the emergency remote shutdown procedures for the Donald C.

Cook Nuclear Plant. The procedure provides an alteinate method of achieving safe shutdown with and

. . -'I.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4' Pa e 74 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K. Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

Pages:

23-112 without offsite power available in the event that control of plant equipment is not available from the control room or hot shutdown panel. The procedure gives priority to achieving reactor and turbine trip, establishing auxiliary feedwater for heat reujioval and establishing charging for the reactor coolant pump seal injection and reactivity control. Special consideration is given to establishing primary and secondary system isolation and preventing fire induced spurious operation of plant equipment. In event that CVCS, AFW, CCW, and ESW crossties are utilized to achieve safe shutdown, special consideration is given to maintaining the opposite unit in safe configuration.

Threshold 2 refers to the specific locations throughout the plant that are 'necessary to man to perform the functions cited in procedure OUP 4025.001.001, and related subtier procedures.

TERMINIATION(RECO VERY CRITERIA The source of the higher radiation levels is determined and levels have dropped to below their threshold.

values. Radiological controls have been implemented and are effective.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None K-',

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 75 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION .

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels23-112 (Commitment: 6489) I ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-3: UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN ANY AREA HOLDING IRRADIATED FUEL . -

INITIATING CONDITION An UNCONTROLLED water level drop in the reactor refueling cavity, the spent fuel pool, and/or the fuel transfer canal with all irradiated fuel assemblies covered by water.

MODE APPLICABILITY .. .

All EAL THRESHOLD VALUE 1 Inability to maintain water level in the spent fuel pool and/or transfer canal at > 643' 4" with irradiated fuel present.

2 .,Inability to maintain refueling cavity level > 643' 4" with irradiated fuel in containment..

BASIS (References) - .. . . .*. . . .

VALID Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading t6 be suspect Verification can be obtained by a) an instrument channel check, or b) indications or related or redundant indicators, or c) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, .i.e., within 15 minutes.

UNCONTROLLED - A change that is not the result of a planned evolution.

The above EALs indicate events which have long lead times relative to potential for radiological release outside the site boundary, thus impact to public health and safety is very low. Classification as an Unusual Event is warranted as a precursor to a more serious event.

The level of 643' 4" refers to the water level that is 23 feet above the top of the spent fuel, the plant technical specification limit. Prior to that water level being reached, the operators will be warned that the level decrease is occurring via the spent fuel pool low level alarm (RLA-500 at 644'9" or 24'-5 1/2" above the top of the fuel) and low level alarm (RLA-501 644'-2 1/2" or 23'-ll" above the top of the fuel). Local visual confirmation that the level has dropped below the technical specification limit is possible since much less water than 23 feet is needed for protection of the plant staff from excessive radiological doses. Twenty-three feetof water is required to protect members of the public from the anticipated radiological conseqUences of a fuel handing accident TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA K> The cause of the loss of water inventory is identified and actions to recover water level are successful.

I

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 76 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION

'Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: .6489) 23 - 112>:

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC NUMARC/NESP 077 AU2 example EAL number 3 (radiation reading for irradiated spent fuel in dry storage) was not included because Cook Nuclear Plant does not have irradiated fuel in dry storage

<1

-I

ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION R-3: ALERT - LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN ANY AREA HOLDING IRRADIATED FUEL INITIATING CONDITION Major damage to irradiated fuel or loss of watei level that has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside of the Reactor Vessel.

MODE APPLICABILITY All IMI EAL THRESHOLD VALIJE

1. Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered in the spent fuel pool, transfer canal,.:

. or refueling cavity.

-OR-2 An UNPLANNED VALID alarm on one of the following radiation monitors

VRS 1101.1201 (Unit 1) (Upper Containment)

VRS 2101/2201 (Unit 2) (Upper Containment) sR-S (SF?)-

Portable radiation monitors . .< OR .

3 Water level <632'4" in the spent fuel pool transfer canal or reactor cavity that will result in*

fuel uncovery.

BASIS (References)

UNPLANNED - Not anticipated as part of a scheduled testing, surveillance, or maintenance activity.

VALID Readings are assumed valid unless circumstances cause the reading to be suspect.

Verification can be obtained by a) an instrument channel check, or b) indications on related or redundant indicators, or c) by direct observation by plant personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e., within 15 minutes.

This IC applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage and is not intended to address spent fuel which is

.. . . licensed for dry storage.-

,- . S There damage.is time to take corrective indicates availableNUREG/CR-4982 in addition, actions, and that there even is if little potential corrective actions f& substantial fuelno are not taken prompt fatalities are predicted and thit risk of injury is low. Thus, an Alert classification for this event is appropriate;.

632 4" refers to the water level that is 12 feet above the top of the spent fuel pool. Prior to that water level being reached the operators will be warned that the level drop is occurring via the spent fuel pool

'I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 78 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489)23-112 low level alarm (RLA-500 at644'9" or 24'-5 'A" above the top of the fuel) and low level alarm (RLA-501 644'-2 'A" or 23'-1 1" above the top of the fuel). Local visual confirmation that the level has dropped below 632'4" is possible since 12 feet of water provides adequate radiation shielding for staff personnel from excessive radiation doses in the area of the spent fuel pool.

VRS 1101/1201 and 2101/2202 are the upper containment area radiation monitors, and are set to alarni at 54 mR/hr. R-5 (RCC-330) is a monitor in the spent fuel pool area. R-5 is set to alarm at 15 mR/hr. -

In addition to the above radiation monitors, during refueling operations, portable area radiation monitors are located on the manipulator crane inside containment and on the spent fuel bridge crane.

These monitors are set to alarm at radiation levels equal to about twice the background radiation, and thus provide early warning of any fuel uncovery problems.

Due to the potential of high personal radiation exposure, actual observation of an irradiated fuel assembly without benefit of shielding is not considered likely. If (as indicated under threshold #1 above) this should occur, it is appropriate that an ALERT be declared.

TERMINIATIONJRECO VERY CRITERIA The cause of the loss of water inventory is identified and actions to recover water level are successful Radiological controls have been implemented and are effective.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None Ky

/

4 . ....

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 79 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Acent Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) . 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION

/

S-i: ALERT - FAILURE OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INITIATING CONDITION Failure of Reactor Protection System (RPS) instrumentation to complete or initiate an automatic reactor trip once an RPS setpoint has been exceeded. A manual reactor trip was successful.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,and3 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE An anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) was terminated by a manual reactor trip from the

.* .control room.

BASIS (References) . . .* . . ... .

Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) An anticipated operational occurrence followed by the failure of the reactor trip portion of the protection system. Anticipated operational occurrences are

- those occurrences of normal operation which are expected to occur one or more times during the life of...

the plant and include,' but are not limited to, loss of power to all reactor coolant pumps, tripping of the -

turbine generator set, isolation of the main condenser, .and loss of all offsite power.

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation All equipment associated with the measurement of process variables, and generation and implementation of trip signals.

This condition indicates failure of the automatic reactor protection system to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus, plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alert is indicated because conditions exist..

that lead to potential loss of fuel clad or RCS. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded (rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded) is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue... - .. . .'.. .

A manual reactor trip is any set of actions by the reactor operator(s) in the control room which cause control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core and brings the reactor subcritical (e.g., reactor trip switches).. Failure of manual trip would escalate the event to a Site* Are Emergency. . 7 . .

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Hot shutdown conditions established, an investigation as to the cause is in progress, and an assessment of any significant damage to the fuel or RCS has been completed.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None -.

'I...

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 80 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For EmergencyAction Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489)23-112 EGG CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-i: SITE AREA EMERGENCY - FAILURE OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INITIATING CONDITION Failure of Reactor Protection System (RPS) instrumentation to complete or initiate an automatic reactor trip once an RPS setpoint has been exceeded. A manual reactor trip was NOT successful.

MODE APPLICABILITY land2 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE An anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) was NOT terminated by a manual reactor trip from the control room... . -

BASIS (References)

K. Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) An anticipated operational occurrence followed by the failure of the reactor trip portion of the protection system. Anticipated operational occurrences are'

- those occurrences of normal operation which are expected to occur one or more, times during the life of the plant and include, but are not limited to, loss of power to all reactor coolant pumps, tripping of the turbine generator set, isolation of the main condenser, and loss of all offsite power.

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation All equipment associated with the measurement of process'.

variables, and generation and implementation of trip signals:** ..

Automatic and manual trips are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console was required to trip the reactor.

Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS Although this IC may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is necessary to better assure

timely recognition and emergency response.: >. . ' . - . -. .* ... - .. . -

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA . . .. .

Hot shutdown conditions established, an investigation as to the cause is in progress; and asassessment of any significant damage to the fuel or RCS has'been completed.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None

'I

Reference PMLP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Paoe 81 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION -

S-i: GENERAL EMERGENCY - FAILURE OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM

INITIATING CONDITION Failure of Reactor Protection System (RPS) to complete an automatic trip and manual trip was NOT successful and there is indication of an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core.

MODE APPLICABILITY land2 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. ATSW was NOT terminated by manual reactor trip from the control room.

-AND-

2. Subcriticality AND Core Cooling CSFSTs are RED.

-OR-

- Subcriticality AND Heat Sink CSFSTs are RED.

K' BASIS (References)

Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) An anticipated operational occurrence followed by the failure of the reactor trip portion of the protection system. Anticipated operational occurrences are those occurrences of normal operation which are expected to occur one or more times during the life of the plant and include, but are not limited to, loss of power to all reactor coolant pumps, tripping of the turbine generator set, isolation of the main condenser, and* l6ss of all offsite power.

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation All equipment associated with the measurement of process variables, and generation and implementation of trip signals.

Automatic and manual trips are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control

console is required to trip the reactor.

Under the conditions of this IC and its associated EAL, the efforts to bring the reactor subcritical have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactoris producing more heat than the maximum decay heat capabilities away from the react6r load for which the safety systems were designed. Although there are control console, such as emergency boration, the continuing temperature rise indicates that these capabilities are not effective. This situation could be a precursor for a core melt sequence The extreme challenge to the ability to cool the coe is intended to mean that the core exit temperatures are at or approaching 12000 F or that the reactor vessel water level is at approximately three feet and the core exit thermocouples are greater than 700 0 F This GE EAL equates to a Core Cooling RED condition I.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1Ol Rev. 4 Pa e 82 of 112 Emergency CLASS WICATION Attachment 3* Basis For Emergency Action Levels - . Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 Another consideration is the inability to initially remove heat during the early stages of this sequence.

If emergency feedwater flow is insufficient to remove the amount of heat required by design from at least one steam generator, an extreme challenge should be considered to exist. .This EAL equates to a Heat Sink RED condition. .. . . .. ..

In the event either of these challenges exist at a time that the reactor has not been brought below the power associated with the safety system design (5%power as represented by a RED condition on the subcriticality CSFST), a core melt sequence exists. In this situation, core degradation can occur rapidly. For this reason, the General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the fission product barrier matrix declaration to permit maximum Offsite intervention time.

TERMINIATIONIRECO VERY CRITERIA Hot shutdown conditions established, an investigation as to the cause is in progress, and an assessment of any significant damage to the fuel or RCS has been completed.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 - Rev. 4 Pa e 83 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K.>: Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action (Commitment: 6489) Levels Pages:

23-112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION 5-2: UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF AC POWER INITIATING CONDITION Loss of all offsite power to essential buses for greater than 15 minutes.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAL ThRESHOLD VALUE

1. ALL of the OFFSITE power sources indicated by the following list of transformers 'are LOST to the T-buses for:> 15 minutes. NOTE: Evaluate each units' power supply separately.

a. Normal Auxiliary Power Source (Auxiliary Transformer) .

TR1AB/TR2AB

TR1CD/TR2CD -

K> b. Preferred Offsite Power Sources (Reserve Transformer) I .

TR1O1AB/TR2O1AB

TR1O1CD/TR2O1CD

c. Emergency Offsite Power Source (69Kv Transformer)

T-12-EP-1 .7.

2 At least two diesel generators per unit are supplying power to the emergency buses BASIS (References)

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of

the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout).

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Offsite power can be supplied via the 69Kv emergency feed lines or from the switchyard via the reserve

s. offsite

. transformers.

power. Backfeed through the unit auxiliary transformers is also considered an adequate source of TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA.* : . .

A reliable power supply to ESF buses from offsite sources is re-established. .

K> DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 84 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K> Attachment 3 Basis Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION 5-2: ALERT - LOSS OF AC POWER INITIATING CONDITION AC Power capability to essential buses reduced to a single power source for greater than 15 minutes such that any additional single failure would result in a station blackout.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,,2, 3, 4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE Power to the T-buses has been degraded to a single source of AC power consisting of only one of the following transformers or diesel generators for greater than 15 minutes. NOTE:* Evaluate each units' power supply separately.

TR-1O1AB/TR-201AB TR-lO1CP/TR-2O1CD

TR-lAB/TR-2AB -

TR-1CD/TR-2CD

EDG1AB/EDG2AB

-* . EDG 1CD!EDG 2CD

TR-12-EP-1 BASIS (References)

In Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, the condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the offsite and onsite power systems such that any additional single failure would result in a station blackout. This c6ndition could occur due to a loss of all offsite power with a c6ncurrent failure of one emergency generator to supply power to its emergency buses or failure of emergency diesels and four of the five offsite power

transformers. The subsequent loss of another single power source would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

TERMINIATIONJRECO VERY CRITERIA Restore power from at least one additional source DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None K>

I.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 85 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION.

Attachment 3 (Commitment:

Basis For 6489) Levels Emergency Action . 23Panes

. 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-2: SITE AREA EMERGENCY - LOSS OF AC POWER INITIATING CONDITION. .

Loss of ALL offsite power and loss of ALL onsite AC power to essential buses.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 . .

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. Loss of both of the following T-buses for >15 minutes'

.. *. .** a. - T11AT11D(Unitl)

-OR-

b. T21AT21D(Unit2) ' - - -

NOTE: Evaluate each units' power supply separately.

BASIS (References)

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, EGGS, Containment Heat Removal and ESW Prolonged loss of all AC power will cause core.

uncovering and loss of containment integnty thus this event can escalate to a General Emergency.

:* Per ECA-O.O, "Loss of All AC Power", no specific time limitation is given for restoration of power to the emergency buses. Therefore, Cook uses the NUMARCINESP 007 generic limit of 15 minutes.

Escalation to General Emergency is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or IC S-2A, "Prolonged Loss of All Offsite Power and Prolonoed Loss of All Onsite AC Power."

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Cold shutdown is established or a reliable power supply to the ESF buses is established.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARCK

This EAL is specified by loss of essential pump buse rather than loss of transformers and emergency generators.

-I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pane 86 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages: -

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-2: GENERAL EMERGENCY - LOSS OF AC POWER INITIATING CONDITION Prolonged loss of ALL offsite power and ALL onsite AC power to essential buses.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE Loss of both of the following T-buss on a unit AND Core Cooling CSFST is 0 RANGE

a. TilA, TilD (Unit 1)

-OR-

b. T2lA, T21D (Unit 2)

-OR-2 Loss of both of the following T-buses that is expected to last for > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months -

a. TilA, TilD (Unit 1).

-OR- . .*

b. T21A, T21D (Unit 2)

NOTE: Evaluate each units' power supply separitely.

BASIS (References) .

PROLONGED - Restoration of at least one emergency bus within four (4) hours is not likely.

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety ysterns requiring electric power including RHiR ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and ESW. Prolonged loss of all AC power could lead to loss of fuel clad, RCS, and containment. In accordance withIetters AEP:NRC:0537D, dated April 14, 1989, and AEP:NRC:0537E, dated March 30, 1990, Cook Nuclear Plafit falls within the'four hour station blackout (SBO) coping category.

This IC is specified to assure that in the unlikely event of a prolonged station blackout timely ii recognition of the. seriousness of the event occurs and that declaration of a General Emergency bccurs*

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 87 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

I Pages:

23-112 as early as is appropriate, based on a reasonable assessment of the event trajectory. Although this IC may be viewed as redundaiit to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is necessaxy to better assure timely recognition and emergency response.

The likelihood of restoring at leasi one emergency bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation since a delay in an upgrade decision based on only a chance of mitigating the event could result a of valuable time in preparing and implementing public protective actions..

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Cold shutdown is established or a reliable power supply to the ESF buses is established and other initiating conditions requiring maintenance of the general alert status are not present.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

This EAL is specified by loss of essential pump buses rather than loss of transformers and emergency generators K>

**1

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23- 112 EGG CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-3: SITE AREA EMERGENCY - LOSS OF DC POWER ....... ,

INITIATING CONDITION Loss of all vital DC power for greater than 15 minutes. .. . ...

MODE APPLICABILITY 1, 2, 3, and 4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE Loss of DC buses AB AND CD as indicated by bus voltage < 220 volts DC for greater than 15 minutes. -

- - *BASIS (References) - . -. . -. . - ... . . . . . .. -

VITAL All 250 volt DC power. :. :-. :1..

The loss of all vital DC power compromises the ability to monitor and control plant functions required for the protection of the public and is considered a loss of these functions. A prolonged loss of cdntrol power may result in core uncovering and loss of containment integrity if there is sufficient decay heat generated by the core and sensible heat in the RCS. ... . . -

The thresh6ld value was chosen to recognize a loss of DC power at a voltage level low enough to be indicative of a severe control system problem. This value is high enough to provide reasonable assurance that the 250 volt batteries will last at least 15 minutes prior to reaching a designed minimum voltage of 210 volts.

The N Train battery supplies TDAFW control bus and the AMSAC inverter. Since these are backup systems, this bus is not included in this EAL. K . . .

TERMINIATJON/RECO VERY CRITERIA Power is restored to at least one 250 volt DC bus and an investigation as to the cause is underway.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K>

I,

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pace 89 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 - 112 ...

EGG CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S-5: SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS OF SYSTEMS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE OR MAINTAIN HOT S ThOWN . . . - .. - . .j . .. -.

INITIATING CONDITION . . . .

Complete loss of function needed to achieve or maintain Hot Shutdown.

MODE APPLICABILITY I,2,3,and4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE Entry into one of the following procedures has occurred: .,.

- .. -. . . -' - OHP 4023 .FR-H 1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink" -

-OR-OUP 4023.FR-Cl, "Response to Inadequate Core Cooling" BASIS (References) *... - . :.: .. -

This EAL addresses fu t* ld ultimate heat sink nd reactivity control complete loss of ncionsincuing required for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressure and temperature. Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public. Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted. Escalationto General Emergency would be via Abnormal Rad:

Levels/Radiological Effluent, Site Emergency Coordinator Judgement, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Hot Shutdown operation is capable of being maintained DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None

/

Reference . PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 90 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) *23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS;AND DESCRIPTION S-6: UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF ALARMS OR INDICATION INITIATING CONDITION Unplanned loss of safety system annunciators and/or indications in the Control Room for greater than 15 minutes.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3, and4

' AT T'TT1)YXIT T TTAT TTE Li A LJIII7j.JLi1J tLLLJE, 1 Loss of one of the following:.

a. Loss of one or more safety system annunciator panels in a unit for> 15 minutes:

Panels 104-114, 119 120 (Unit 1)

Panels 204-214,219 220 (Unit2)

b. A known loss of indications associated with the following parameters for > 15 minutes (See Attachment 2): - -j...&.

Neutron Flux Gammametrics)

Reactor Coolant Pressure (Wide Range) . .. . .. .

Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature Thot (Wide Range)

Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature Tcold (Wide Range)

Incore Thermocouples (Core Exit Thermocouples)

. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor

Reactor Coolant Inventory System (Reactor Vessel Level Indication

Pressurizer Water Level

. Charging Pump Flow

Charging Pump Breaker Status

Safety Injection Pump Breaker Statu

Safety Injection Flow

Refueling Water Stoiage Tank Water Level -

Containment Water Level . . * -. . ***.. .. . .

Containmeni Pressure (Wide Range)

Containment Pressure (Narrow Range) - .

Containment Hydrogen Monitoring

Containment Isolation Valve Position Monitoring K>

Containment Area Radiation Monitors (High Range)

Steam Line Pressure

Reference PMiP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 91 of 112

. Emergency CLASSIFICATION K> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

- (Comnijitment: 6489) - 23 - 112

Steam Generator Water Level (Wide Range)

Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Range)

Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate -

Condensate Storage Tank Level

. -AND-N

2. In the opinion of the Shift Supervisor, the loss of annunciators or indications requires additional surveillance to safely operate the unit. -

-AND-

3. Annunciator/Indicator loss does not result from PLANNED action.

-AND-4 Compensatory Non-Alarming Indications for the above annunciator panels are available.

BASIS (References)

Compensatory Non-Alarming Indication C6mputer-based information (SPDS, plant process computer,:etc.) which could be monitored by control room operators. .. .

PLANNED - Loss of annunciators or indicators that is the result of scheduled maintenance or testing This EAL is intended to recognize the difficulty associated with operating the plant safely without major groups of safety annunciators or indications. Compensatory non-alarming indications may*

include an local process indications, or control room indicators/recorders/computer points in the event of annunciator-system-only failure. Two types of failures are considered; the failure of redundant panels of indications important to safety, and the loss from all sources of any of the key safety indications as to the statns of the nuclear steam supply system.

PLANNED maintenance or surveillance activities associated 'with annunciators or indicators are excluded from the EALs indicated herein.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA The minimum number of required annunciators are restored to operability and an investigation of the . -

cause of the problem is inprogress...: 7 . . 7 -.- 7 .. :* . .: .

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K>

/

I Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Paoe 92 of 112 J Xii1iti 21L3 .. Ld1i3IF AIi I AJ.L Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489)

ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION -

5-6: ALERT - LOSS OF ALARMS OR INDICATION INITIATING CONDITION Unplanned loss of most or all safety system annunciators or indications in the Control Room with either, (1) a significant transient in progress, or (2) compensatory non-alarming indicators are unavailable.

MODE APPLICABILITY

.1,2,3,and4 .

EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. Loss of one of the following:

a. Loss of one or more safety system annunciator panels in a unit for > 15 minutes:

.. Panels 104-114,;119 120(Unxtl)

. Panels 204-214, 219 220 (Unit 2)

b. A known loss of indications associated with the following parameters for > 15 minutes (See Attachment 2): -. . ... *.* . *-

Neutron Flux Gammametrics)

Reactor Coolant Pressure (Wide Range)

Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature Thot (Wide Range)

Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature Teold (Wide Range)

Incore Thermocouples (Core Exit Thermocouples)

Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor

Reactor Coolant Inventory System (Reactor Vessel Level Indication)

Pressurizer Water Level

Charging Pump Flow

Charging Pump Breaker Status

Safety Injection Pump Breaker Status

Safety Injection Flow

. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level

-

Containment Water Level .1

. Containment Pressure (Wide Range).:;- *-

-

Containment Pressure (Nariow Range) - . -

Containment Hydrogen Monitoring

Containment Isolation Valve Position Monitoring K

Steam Line Area Radiation Monitors (High Range)

Containment

- * -I,

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 93 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489) ..

Pages:

23 112

0 Steam Generator Water Lvel (Wide Range) -

0 Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Range)

S Auxiliaiy FeedwaterFiow Rate S Condensate Storage Tank Level

-AND-

.3.

2. In the opinion of the Shift Supervisor, the loss of annunciators or indications requires additional surveillance to safely operate the unit.

-AND-

3. Annunciator/Indicator loss does not result from PLANNED action.

-AND-4 Either

a. A significant transient is in progress,

-OR-

. Compensatory Non-Alarming Indications from the plant process computer or safety' parameter display sysiem are NOT available . ..

.3 . ..

BASIS (References)

Compensatory Non-Alarming Indication Computer based information (SPDS, plant process computer, etc.) which could be monitored by control r6om operators.

PLANNED - Loss of annunciators or indicators that is the result of scheduled maintenance or testing.

This EAL is intended to recognize the difficulty associated with operating the plant safety without major groups of safety annunciators or indications. Compensatory non-alarming indications may include local process indicators, or control room indicators/recorders/computer points in the event of an annunciator-system-only failure; -. . - . - ... .

Examples of significant transients include: 1) reactor trips, 2) unanticipated power changes of greater than 10%, and 3) valid ESF actuations. . . .*. . . - -. .

PLANNED riaintenance or surveillance activities associated with annunciators or indicators are

excluded from the EALs indicate herein. .

I -

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 rmn..nnn,..,

J.4111L4 5LIt3 A CCTTC t.AjfliJ&.71A CT Lt..tlL A Rev.. 4 110+/-1I TTflNT .

Pa e 94 of 1121 I

Atahm tcent3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels.

(Commitment: 6489):<..

Pages:.23-112 j

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRiTERIA 7. >.. .

The minimum number of required annunciators is restored to operability and an investigafion of the cause of the problem is in progress.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: Nojie Ku

.a K->

/

Reference PMIP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 - Pa e 95 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Atthmt 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

acen (Commitment: 6489) 23- 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION - . . . ...

56 SITE AREA EMERGENCY - LOSS OF ALARMS OR INDICATION INITIATING CONDITION Inability to monitor a significant transient in progress.

MODE APPLICABILITY EAL THRESHOLD VALUE ..

Loss of one of the following:

1 Loss of one or more safety system annunciator panels in a unit for > 15 minutes:

Panels 104-114, 119, 120 (Unit 1)

Panels 204-214, 219, 220 (Unit 2). - . ,*. *.

2 A*known loss of indications associated with the following parameters (See Attachment 2) for>

15 minutes which in the opinion of the Shift Supervisor significantly affects the ability to safely operate or shutdown the unit. - .. -.

Neutron Flux Gammametrics)

Reactor Coolant Pressure (Wide Range):

Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature Thot (Wide Range)

Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature Tcold (Wide Range) . .

Incore Thermocouples (Core Exit Thermocouples)

Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor*

. Reactor Coolant Inventory System (Reactor Vessel Level Indication)

Pressurizer Water Level - ..

0 Charging rump Flow

Charging Pump Breaker Stitus

Safety Injection Pump Breaker Status

Safety Injection Flow -.. - *. .. .

Reftieling Water Storage Tank Water Level

Containment Water Level

Containment Pressure (Wide Range)

Containment Pressure (Narrow Range)

Containment Hydrogen Monitoring

Containment Isolation Valve Position Monitoring K>

Containment Area Radiation Monitors (High Range)

Steam Line Pressure

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 96 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K.> Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

Pages:

23 112

- Steam Generator Water Level (Wide Range)

Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Range)

Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate . -

Condensate Storage Tank Level

-AND-

3. Compensatory Non-Alarming Indications from the plant process computer or safety parameter display system are NOT available.

-AND-

4. A significant transient is in progress.

BASIS (References).

Compensatory Non-Alarming Indication Computer based information (SPDS, plant process computer, etc ) which could be monitored by control room operators.

This EAL is intended to recognize the difficulty associated with operating the plant, safely without major groups of safety annunciators or indications. Compensatory non:-alarming indications may include local process indications, or control room indicators/recorders/computer points in the event of an annunciator-system-only failure. A significant transient is not intended to be strictly defined, however, the folloWing examples are provided: 1) reactor trips; 2) unanticipated power changes of

>10%, and 3) valid ESF actuations. NUREG 0737 instruments are included in this EAL to provide a redundant neans for monitoring the plant should annunicators become unavailable. To prevent .

.... overclassiing an event to a Site Area Emergency, Shft Supervisor discretion has been provided for.

This allows the Shift Supervisor to decide if the specific indications which are unavailable are needed to monitor the transient in progress: . *- . -.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Transient is terminated and ability to monitor plant parameters is restored.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None

Reference* PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 97 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION K-" Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION S 7 UNUSUAL EVENT - FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION INITIATING CONDITION Indication of Fuel Clad Degradatioh in Active Fuel MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,and4 1C2 EAL ThRESHOLD VALUE

1. Activity Ž 1.0 pCi/gram 1-13 1 dose equivalent for >48 hours in the RCS.

-OR- -

2 RCS activity > 100/E pCi/gram BASIS (References)

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it is considered to be a poientiai degradation in the' level of safety of the plant and a potential wecursor of more serious problems.

Per Cook Technical Specification 3.4.8, "Reactor Coolant System Activity", fuel clad degradation is indicated if dose equivalent 1-131 levels are greater than 1 pCi/gram for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months dose equivalent 1431 levels are greater than the limits of technical specifications Figure 3.4-1, or gross:*.

radioactivity levels are > i00/ pCi/gram.

The coolant sample activity values indicate fuel clad degradation greater than technical specification allowable limits.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Technical specification 3.4.8 limit or action requirements are met.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

Cook Plant does not have failed fuel monitors K>

-I

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489)

ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION -

5-8: UNUSUAL EVENT - ESCESSIVE RCS LEAKAGE

INITIATING CONDITION

Reactor Coolant System Leakage MODE APPLICABILITY 1 2 3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE Reactor coolant system leakage exceeds one of the following values:

1 Pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm.

-OR-2 SG tube leakage> 10 gpm . . -

3 Identified leakage >25 gpm

-OR- - . . . -

4 Unidentified leakage >l0gpm *.. '., - - .

BASIS (References)

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and as a result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 19 gpm .

value for.unidentified or pressure boundary leakage was selected because it is observable with normal control roomtest surveillance indications.

(e.gL, massLesser values The balances). mustgeneric generally EALbefordetermined identified through leakage time-consuming is set at a higher value the lesser.significance of identi (25 gpm) due to fled leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure

boundary leakage.

Only operating modes in which there is fuel in the reactor coolant system and the system is pressurized are specified. ...i; . * ..

TERMINIATIONJRECO VERY CRITERIA Leakage is isolated OR Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)is established DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None K-'

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 99 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) 23 112 EGG CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION 5-9: UNUSUAL EVENT - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TIME LIMIT EXPIRED INITIATING CONDITION -

Inability to reach required shutdown within Technical Specification time limits.

MODE APPLICABILITY

.1,2,3,4 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE Unit is NOT placed in required MODE within Technical Specification LCO action time limit.

BASIS (References)

Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) require the plant to be brought to a required shutdown mode when the technical specification required configuration cannot be restored;. Depending on the K)> circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition. In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site technical specification requires a four hour report under 10 CER 50.72 (b) Non-emergency events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shutdown within the allowable action statement time in the technical specifications. An. . -

immediate Notification of an Unusual Event is required when the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action statement time in the technical specifications. Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the LCO-specified action statement time period . -

elapses under the site technical specifications and is not related to how long a condition may have existed. Other required technical specification shutdowns that involve precursors to more serious events are addressed by other System Malfunction, Hazards, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

TERMINIATIONJRECO VERY CRITERIA .

Unit has reached cold shutdown (Mode 5) or other mode as specified in the limiting condition for

. oPeration action stateITent. -OR- -. . . .. **,. .. ... -

. the ...

S.

been placed in a Mode wher LCO no longer applies.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None .. . -

'I

Reference I PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Page 100 of 112 Emergency CLASS WICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) - 23 112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION 5-10: UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS -

INITIATING CONDITION Unplanned loss of all onsite or offsite communications.

MODE APPLICABILITY 1,2,3,4 EAt THRESHOLD VALUE

1. UNPLANNED loss of ALL onsite electronic communication capabilities Telephone . . .. .

Page System Radios- *. .. ... .

-OR-2 UNPLANNED loss of ALL offsite electronic communication capabilities Telephone (offsite)..

Microwave transmission NRC phone . .

State Police/Sheriff Department Emergency Radi6s .* :.

BASIS (References) . . . . . - .

UNPLANNED The loss of communication is not a result o planned testing, maintenance or surveillance activities. -.

The purpose of this IC and its associated generic EALs is to recognize a loss of communications.

capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks or the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities. The loss of offsite communications capability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than that addressed by 10 CFR 50 72 The loss of offsite communications capability is applicable when no direct means is available to communicate with or makes notifications to the load dispatcher or state and federal authorities:,

I .h.* .

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA -. . .. -... . -

At least one form of onsite and offsite communications has been established DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None

-I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 101 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis* For Emergency Action Levels .. .. Pages:

(Commitment: 6489).. *. 23 - 112

ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION C-3 UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF AC POWER ALL OFFSITE POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSES FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES .

INITIATING CONDITION.* , . . .*

Loss of all offsite power to essential buses for greater than 15 minutes. .

MODE APPLICABILITY 5, 6 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE 1 .: ALL of the following OFFSITE power sources indicated by the following list of transformer.

are LOST to the T-buses for*> 15 minutes. .

a. Normal Auxiliary Power Source (Auxiliary Transformer)

TR1AB/TR2AB

.. TR1CDI.TR2CD

b. Preferred Offsite Power Soufces (Reserve Transformer)

'.:TR1O1AB/Th201AB

- . TRiO1CD/TR2O1CD..

c. . Emergency Offsite Power Source (69Kv Transformer)

T-12-EP-1

. -AND-

2. At lease one diesel generator per unit is supplying power to the emergency buses.

BASIS (References) * . . .. . .. . .. . .. . . , . . -

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces reuired rediindancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerble to a complete Los of AC Power (Station Blackout).

Fifteen h-iinutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Offsite power can be suplied via the 69Kv emergency feed lines or from the switchyard via the reserve transformers During outages switchyard power may be supplied via the normal transformers aligned

- . . I.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 102 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attahment C 3, Basis For Emergency Action (Commitment: 6489) Levels 23Paged:

- 112 for "backfeed". During outages, the backfe'ed alignment should be considered equivalent to reserve feed for the purpose of emergency classification level determinationS.

TERMINIATIONJRECO VERY CRITERIA A reliable power supply to ESF buses from offsite sources is re-established.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None I

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 103 of 112 Emergency CLASS W[CATJON Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:.

Attachment 3 (Commitment: 6489) 23 112 -

ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION C-3 ALERT - LOSS OF AC POWER ALL OFFSITE POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSES .,. - ..

INITIATING CONDITION . . ... . .

Loss of ALL offsite power and loss of ALL onsite AC power to essential buses.

MODE APPLICABILITY -

5, 6 or defueled EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

1. Loss of both of the following T-buses fdr> 15 minutes when fuel is in the reactor.

a. TiIA, TilD (Unit 1)

b. T21A, T2lD (Unit 2) 2 Loss of power to all the following buses when defueled TiIA, TilD, T2lA, T2ID -

IS (References)

In Modes 5 and 6, loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal, Spent Fuel Heat Removal, and ESW. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can beclassifid as an Alert, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure. An Alert is declared in these modes due to the less severe threat to the protection of the, health and safety of the public because of the much*

longer time available to restore power and decay heat removal systems. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or niomentary power losses. Escalating to Site Area Emergency, if appropriate, is by Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, or SEC Judgement ICs.

When a unit is defueled, power from an essential bus on either unit will be sufficient to proyide emergency power to required plant safety systems TERMINIATIONIRECO VERY CRITERIA Restore power to at least one T-bus.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

K>

-I.

Reference . PMP-2080.EPLP.101 Rev. 4 - Pane 104 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:

I (Commitment: 6489)23-112 This EAL is'specified by loss of essential pump buses rater than loss of transformers and emergency

- . . generators. ..

K-/

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 105 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency. Action Levels Pages:

(Comniitment: . .23-112 6489)

EGG CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION C-4: ALERT - INABILITY TO MAINTAIN A UNIT IN COLD SHUID OWN INITIATING CONDITION Inability to maintain plant in Cold Shutdown. .

MODE APPLICABILITY 5,6 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE 1..* Loss of shutdown cooling as evidenced by entry into OUP 4022.017.001, "Loss of RHR Cooling.". .

-AND-2 Temperature increase that either K> a. exceeds Technical Specification cold shutdown limit of 2000 F

-OR- - -

b. - results in an UNCONTROLLED increase in RCS temperature rise approaching the cold shutdown technical specification limit of 2000 F.

BASIS (References) . . .

UNCONTROLLED means a temperature increase that is not the result of a planned evolution. It is included to preclude the declaration of an emergency for circumstances where decay head removal is intentionally removed from service and is controlled within the requirements of the technical specifications.

The threshold 'alue indicates a substantial degradation in the level of safety of th plant by indicating a potential complete loss of the ability to removal decay heat in the Cold Shutdown and Refueling modes.

NRC concerns expressed in Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal" are the basis for the threshold value as an anticipatory sequence leading to core uncovery and clad damage. * .*

The threshold related to an uncontrolled temperature rise is necessary to preserve the aticipatory 0

philosophy of NUREG-0654 for events starting from temperatures much lower than 200 F. The inability to reach cold shutdown is to include instances where decay heat removal capability is lost prior to reaching the cold shutdown mode

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 106 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFJ CATION K> Ahni ttacent 3 Basis For Emergency Action (Commitment: 6489) Levels 23Pages:

- 112 TERI1INIATIONIRECO VERY CRITERIA Cold shutdown conditions have been established and can be maintained.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC None.

K-i K>.

.1

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 107 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

Pages:

23-112 -I EGG CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS AND DESCRIPTION C-4: SITE AREA EMERGENCY INABILITY TO MAINTAIN A UNIT IN COLD SHUTDOWN ..

INITIATING CONDITION LOSS of water level in the reactor vessel that has or will uncover fuel in the reactor vessel.

MODE APPLICABILITY 5, 6 EAt THRESHOLD VALUE Loss of reactor vessel water level as indicated by:

1. LOSS of shutdown cooling as evidenced by entry into OH!' 4022.017.001, "Loss of RHR

... ., Cooling." .. ... .

2. Core uncovery as indicated by:*

a. RVLISNR<46%-ORCPs

. b. -OR- ..

Reactor Vessel Water Level < 614' BASIS (References)

LOSS - Inability to restore RHR operability (e.g., restart the RI-IR pumps) when required.

The threshold values indicate that severe core damage can occur and RCS integrity may not be assured and thus indicate failures of functions needed for the protection of the public.

These conditions address prolonged boiling as a result of loss of decay heat removal.

TERMINIATION1RECO VERY CRITERIA Restoration of lost core inventory is in progress level is above the top of the active fuel, and decay heat

- * - . removal capability has been restored. .. . . . ... . . .. .. .. . .

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: .. ... .. .. ..

None. .

K-,

/

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 . Pa e 108 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency. Action Levels Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) -

ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION C-5: UNUSUAL EVENT - FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION INITIATING CONDITION Fuel clad degradation. . .

MODE APPLICABILITY 5, 6 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE 1 Activity> 1.0 tCi/gram 1-131 dose equivalent for >48 hours in the RCS.

-OR-2 RCS activity> 100/n iCiIgram BASIS (References)

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it is considered to be a potential degradation in the C2 level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of nfore serious problems. K> -*. .

Per Cook Technical Specification 3.4.8, "Reactor Coolant System Activity", fuel clad degradation is indicated if d6se equivalent 1-131 levels are greater than 1 pCi/gram for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , dose equivalent 1-131 levels are greater than the limits of technical specifications Figure 3.4-1, or gross*

radi6activity levels are > 100IE pCi/gram. . *.

The coolant sample activity values indicate fuel clad degradation greater than technical specification allowable limits.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Technical specification 3 4.8 limit or action requirements are met.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC:

Cook Plant does not have failed fuel monitors K-,

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.101 Rev. 4 Pa e 109 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels P ages:

(Commitment: 6489)23-112 ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION C-6: UNUSUAL EVENT - UNPLANNED LOSS OFALL ONSITE OR OFFSITE COMMUNICATION CAPABILITIES

INITIATING CONDITION

Unplanned loss of all onsite or offsite communications.

?.AT1' 1A.PLL APTflWATUTTTV LA A J.JA.rA3.,AAJA A A 5, 6 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE

4. UNPLANNED loss of ALL onsite electronic communication capabilities

Telephone * -

, Page System Radios

-OR-5 UNPLANNED loss of ALL offsite electronic communication capabilities

Telephone (offsite)

. Microwave transmission

NRC phone . I.

State Police/Sheriff Department Emergency Radios BASIS (References)

UNPLANNED The loss of communication is not a result of planned testing, maintenance or surveillance activities...

The purpose of this IC and its asso&iated generz6EALs is to recognize a loss of communications' capability that either defeats the plant operations 'staff ability to perform routine tasks or the ability to commumcafe problems with offsite authorities The loss of offsite cdmmunicationscapabilityis expected to be significantly more comprehensive than that addressed by 10 CFR 50.72. The loss of offsite communications capability is applicable when no direct means is available to communicate with or makes notifications to the load dispatcher or state and federal authorities.

Reference PMP-2080.EPPJO1 . Rev. 4 Pa e 110 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency. Action Levels (Commitment: 6489)

Pages 23 112 L.

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA At lease one form of onsite and offsite communications has been established.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 111 of 112 Emeenc' CLASSIFICATION

Attachment 3 Basis For Emergency Action Levels . Pages:

(Commitment: 6489) . 23 - 112:

ECC CATEGORY NAME, EMERGENCY CLASS, AND DESCRIPTION C-7 UNUSUAL EVENT - UNPLANNED LOSS OF DC POWER FOR GREATER THAN 15

MINUTES INITIATING CONDITION Unplanned loss of required DC power during cold shutdown or refueling mode for greater than 15 minutes. .. . . - . -

MODE APPLICABILITY 5, 6 EAL THRESHOLD VALUE UNPLANNED loss of 250 volt DC buses AB AND CD as indicated by bus voltage <220 volts DC for greater than 15 minutes. *. -

BASIS (References) : . - .

The purpose of this IC and its associated generic EAL is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling operations. This EAL is ijijended to be anticipatory in as much as the operating crew may not have necessary indication and control equipment needed to respond to the loss.

The threshold value was chosen to recognize a loss of DC power at a voltage level low enough to be

indicative of a severe control system problem. This value is high enough to provide reasonable

.-assurance that th 250 volt batteries will last at least 15 minutes prior to reaching a designed minimum voltage of 210 volts.

UNPLANNED is included in this IC and EALto preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities. Routinely, plants will perfo* *maintenance on a train related basis during shutdown periods. It is intended that the loss of the operating (operable) train is to be considered. If this loss results in the inability to maintain cold shutdown the escalation to Alert will be per C-4, "Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown with Irradiated Fuel in the Reactor Vessel" Plant Specific Information DC systems are not shared between Cook Units land2...* . . . ... . ..

.. ... ., . - . *.*. * .1 * * *.

Reference PMP-2080.EPP.1O1 Rev. 4 Pa e 112 of 112 Emergency CLASSIFICATION Basis For Emergency Action Levels Pages:.

Attachment 3 (Comniitment: 6489) 23 112

- 7 The Cook 250 VDC system includes thiee major battery groups for each unit.

Station or Plant Battery Train A ( supplies 250 Bus CD)

Station or Plant Battery Train B (supplies 250 Bus AB)

N Train Battery The N train battery supplies TDAFW control bus and the AMSAC inverter. Since these are backup systems, this bus is not included in this EAL.

The above symptoms include equipment which may be used to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refiielingoperations (i.e., annunciators, PZ PORVs, steam dumps, SG PORVs).

TERMINIATION/RECO VERY CRITERIA Power is restored to at least one 250 volt DC bus and an investigation as to the cause is underway.

DEVIATION FROM NUMARC: None K>

K->

..

ML040560523

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