ML040360496
| ML040360496 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/2002 |
| From: | Marschall C NRC Region 4 |
| To: | Clark J, Smith K NRC Region 4 |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2003-0358 | |
| Download: ML040360496 (10) | |
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Charlie
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ANO BACKFIT MEETING On October 26,2001, and again on January 17,2002, we convenedX backfit panein accordance with NRC.Management Directive 8.4, "NRC Program for Aanagement jf Plant-Specific Backfitting of Nuclear Power Plants," to review your backfit claim as stated in your letter of September 28, 2001. After careful consideration of your appeal, we have determined that (1) the NRC did not Impose a regulatory staff position that Is new or different from a previously applicable staff position relative to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section l1l.G32; (2) the NRC did not approve the use of manual actions for complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, In the Unit 1 diesel generator corridor and north electrical switchgear room in lieu of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section lil.G.2.a, lI.G.2.b. or lli.G.2.c; and (3) your methodology for using manual actions (in the event of a fire In the Unit 1 diesel generator corridor and north switchgear room), in lieu of ensuring that one train of redundant cables and equipment of systems needed for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions was free of fire damage, does not comply with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section lll.G.2. Your claim that our position (that manual actions cannot be used to comply with I0 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section Ill.G.2) is a generic backft w-il! be addressed by the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation In their response to a letter from the Nuclear Energy Institute dated January 11, 2002. (cover letter, 4115102 Itr, Merschoff to Anderson)
NRC's Past and Present Positions Regarding the Use of Manual Actions for Meeting the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G In thcir letter dated September 28, 2001, Entcrgy stated that the NRC had acccpted on many occasions, including at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), the use of manual actions for complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section ll.G.2. Entergy stated that NRC generic Appendix R guidance documents, the NRC's Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Procedure 71111.05, and recent NRC fire protection reports all supported this position.
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Conclusion:==
The regulations, statements of consideration, and generic correspondnrn6e, as well as ANO-sperific documentation, are in agreement concerning tle use of manual autiuis foi achlieving and mainitaijirtig hot shutdown conditions as required in Section IIL.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. As these documents show, the NRC has not in the past and does not currently consider manual actions to be acceptable for complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, unless specifically reviewed and approved. The panel concludes that the position to disallow the use of manual actions for meeting 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section IIL.G.2 is not an imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting the Commission rules that Is either new or different from a previously applicable staff position. Therefore, this position is not a bacIt specific to ANO. Entergy's claim that NRC inspection report statements constitute a basis for their backfit claim is addressed in Section IV of this enclosure.
II.
ANO's Position Regarding 1D CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section illi.G In a letter dated September 28. 2001, Entergy summarized their positions concerning the use of manual actions as:
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ideniffiedf17e ateasis peirnitedby 10CFR50Appendix R. SerclinflJ.G.1 and does not violate 10 CFR 50, Section ilL.G.2;
- 2.
Compliance with IOCFR5O Appendix R, Soction IlL G.2 doos not roquiro protective features on circuits that are not required to function and, therefore, are nor necessary SyStenis requited to archieve safe shutdown conditions and regardless of fire damage cannotprevent the ability to ochivec safo shutdown conditions."
Cohbldisibn For the ANO plant, Entergy must meet the requifements of 10 CFR Patl 50, Section IU.G.1. In addition, whaee a rite area contains redundant trains of systems necess8ry to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions, Entergy rmust meet either Section Il.G.2 or Section III.G.3 for the protection of cables and equipment associated With systcms-necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditiomn, Pr obtaf n exempton. Section 1.Q.2 provides three spepifif methods for preventing fie dramage to equipment and cables associated with systems necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown, and to circuits whose rmaloperation could adversely affect the licensee's ability to achieve hot shutdown.
Section lli.G.3 provides the option of using alternative or dedicated shutdowrn capability for those fire areas in which the licensee cannot meet the requirements of Section 111.G.2. Therefore, the use of manual actions for meeting the requirements of Section 11LG.2 is not permitted, unless these actinns were specificFly reviewed and approved by tne NRC 3nid dodumiented it 3 satety evaluatiori fepiii.
-In. NRC Review and Approval of Manual Actions for Meeting the Requirements of 10 CFR Part s0, Appendix R, Section IlI.G in 14 Fire Zones at ANIO In their letter of September 28, 2001, Entergy stated that the use of manual actions to achieve safe shutdown conditions in the event of a fire has been a standard practice at ANO since the inception of Appendix R. In support of this position. Entergy cited an August 31, 1982, meeting between NRC and Arkansas Povwer and Light (documented by the NRC in a meetino su mmary dated September 3, 1982) and an Arkansas Power and Light response to an NRC request for additional information (RAI), dated October 5, 1982.
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Conclusion:==
The NRC requested additional information from the licensee in the context of alternative shutdown (10 CPR Part 50, Appendix R, tection iII.G.3) for 14 fire zones in wiich manual actions were credited. In their tesponse to the lequest, the licensee did not identify Fire Zones 98J and 99M as requiring manual action, and did not request an exemption from Section ill.G2 for these two fire zones. As stated in a subsequent safety evaluation report concerning altemativc shutdo-wn, for all other arcas, the NRC expected the licensee to either comply with Section lHl.G.2 or request an exemption.
Therefore, the use of manual actions for achieving and maintaining hot shutdovn conditions for Fire Zones 98J and 9PM, was not reviewed and approved by the NRC.
IY.
NRC's Al!cgcd Tacit Approval of the Licensec's Methodology for Complying with 10 CFR Part 60. Appendix R, Section 111.0
In their letter of September 28, 2001, Entergy stated that In 1982, they stmitted to the NRC a description of thirO metlodology for complying With Appendix R, which Included a statement that under certain conditions credit for manual operation of equipment was taken. Entergy also stated that because this statement was not challenged in subsequent NRC corrcspondence (such as Inspoction reports) or safcty evaluatlon reports, this silence constituted tacit approval of the use of manual actions, thus, making it part of te ANO licensing basis.
As discussed in NUREG 1409, simply not challefiging a licensee's practice in inspection reports would not be considered tacit approval. Furthermore, contrary to Entergy's clalm, the NRC was not silent regarding the use of manual actions. In an August 31, 1982, meeting between NRC and Arkansas Power and Light Company, as documented by the NRC In a letter dated September 3, 1982, the NRC requested additional information for fire zones that required some sort of manual action or non-routine operation. Fire Zones 98J and 99M were not identified by the licensee as requiring manual actions. By this licensee omission, the NRC staff would have concluded that no manual actions would be credited for m.!tigating fires, In Fire Zones 98J and 99M.
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Conclusion:==
Even if, as Entergy claims, the NRC approved (tacitly or otherwise) the use of manual actions for meeting Section III.G.2 of Appendix R (which It did not), this approval would have been dependent on the licensee doing so under the conditions described in their Appendix R compliance methodology. Hwever, for Fi rZones O 8i and 99M. the licensee did not meet their own conditions set forth for the use of manual actions.
In response to a question regardin9 vwhelher NRC Inspection Manual guldance 1: considorcd an cpprovod postion. Scect-n 3.3 of NUREG 1409, Backfitting Guidelines,- states, No.
Inspection procedures are not approved staff positions. Which Is the reason they are not reviewed by CRGR.- NUREG 1403 further states. Llcensees cannot be required tz Implerment positions discussed In an Inspection procedure or manual unless the same positions exist In the form of an approved regulatory staff position. Examples of approved staff pcsitions are described in Manual Chapter 0514 and include the SRP
[Standard Ro.-ci Plan]. brcnch tcch.laal pc-sttcns. rcgutatory cuides. ceneric lelters, and bulletins.-
I
- Section 11IG.1. recogntzes that some of the systems necessary to achieve shutdown may include emergency control stwtions in lo3u of cableo: In? thfe fira brcs.
Section III.G.1 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 provides the overall fLrc protcction cbjactivc to protect cquipmont so that In the event of a fire in any fire area, (a) one train of systems necessary for reaching hot shutdown conditions (from either the control room or emergency control stations) is free of fire damage; and (b) systems necessary for reaching cold shutdown conditions (from either the control room or
_110 Section lIl.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 provides three acceptable methods for ensuring cables and equipment associated with one train of systems necessary for achieving and maintalning hot shutdown conditions is free of fire damage. None of the three methods In Section III.G.2 describes the use of manual actions to mitinate the effects of a fire on safe shutdown equipment and cables. Rather, these methods have the objective of preventino fire damage through the use of specific protection features. Section lIN.G.2 also requires these same fire protection features for circuits whose damage (by fire) could advers_ affactthe 2CCOmplishment of
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'Where manual actions have been taken at emergency control stations for redundant safe shutdown equipment, those emergency control stations ara not conideared 'Alternate shutdown components' and section iI.L Altematve and Dedicated Shutdown Capabitydoes not apply.
Section III.G.1 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part5O provides the overall fire protection objective to protect equipment so that in the avant of a fire in any fta area. (a) one train of systems -
necessary for reaching hot shutdown conditions (from either the control room or emergency control stations) is free of fire damage; and (b) systems necessary for reaching cold shutdown conditions (from either the control room or emergency control stations) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Se'tion Ill.G.1.a. can be met by ensuring one train of safe shutdown systems Is tree from fire damage as specified In Section lll.G.2 of Appendix R. or by using an alternative safe Odown capability specified In Section III.G.
The use of manual actions to operate necessary components of redundant safe shutdown equipment located outside the identified fire areas Is permitted by 1 OCFR50 Appendix R,Section III.G.1 and does not violate 10CFRSO Section 111..2 For the ANO plant, Entergy must moot tho requwomants of 10 CFR Part SO Section III.G.1. In addition, where a fire area contains redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions, Entargy must meet either Section III.G.2 or Section III.G.3 for the protection of cables and equipment associated with systems necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions, or obtain an exemption.Section III.G.2 provides three specific methods for preventing fire damage to equipment and cables associated with systerm ncossary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown, and to circuits whose maloperation could adversely affect the licensee's ability to achieve hot shutdown.Section III.G.3 provides the option of using altemative or dedicated shutdown capability for those fire areas in which the licensee c-annot met the rantjrontontk of Sectinn III 1
_2 HZ
Compliance with 10 CFR50 Appendix R.Section III.G.2 does not require protective features on circuits that are not required to function and, thoroforo, are not necessary systems required to achieve safe shutdown conditions and, regardless of fire damage cannot prevent the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions.
The unprotected circuits (mentioned In the URI) associated with safe shutdown components are not part of the systems required to achieve safe shutdown conditions. Acceptable manual actions outside the fire area of concern provide the necessary control of systems required for safe shutdown.
Analysis has shown that these associated circuits will not Inhibit the ablity of ANO-1 to reach a safe shutdown condition.
Therefore, ANO is In compliance with III.G.2, and an exemption for the use of manual actions Is not required.
_ wSection III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 provides three acceptable methods for ensuring cables and equipment associated with one train of systoms necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions is free of fire damage. None of the three methods In Section III.G.2 describes the use of manual actions to mflioate the effects of a fire on safe shutdown equipment and cables. Rather, these methods have the objective of oreventino fire damage through the use of specific protection features.Section III.G.2 also requires these same fire protection features for circuits whose damage (by fire) could adversely affect the accomplishment of safe shutdown functions.
ANO submitted the use of manual actions for NRC review.
The NRC did ont challenge this methodology in subsequent correspondenca or SERs. Eased on this tacit approval, the use of manual actions became a part of the ANO licensing basis.
As discussed in NUREG 1409, sinply not challenging a licensee's practice in inspection reports would not be considered tact' approval. Furthermoro, contrary to Entorgy's claim, the NRC was not silent regarding the use of manual actions. In an August 31. 1982, meeting between NRC and Arkansas Power and Light Company, as documented by the NRC In a letter dated September 3, 1982, the NRC requested additional Information for fire zones that required some sort of manual action or non-routine operation. Fire Zones 98J and 99M werenotIdentifiedb thelicenseessrequIringrmanual actiondo NRC Inspection procedures and inspection reports from other licensees indicates that the NRC has previously taken a position consistent with current Industry practices concerning the use of manual actions. Considering the previously accepted Interpretation of Appendix R III.G.1 and III.G.2 requirements. ANO Is In compliance and Imposition of the new position should be considered a backfit that Is generic to all plants.
C.-
(Cover letter) 'After careful consideration of your appeal, we have determined that (1) the NRC did not impose a regulatory staff position that Is new or different from a previously applicable staff position relative to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix R. Section Ill.G.2; (2) the NRC did not approve the use of manual actions for complying with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.
in the Unit 1 diesel generator cordor and north electrical swltchgear room In Reu of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix R. Section IlI.G.2.a. ll.G.2.b, or IlI.G.2.c; and (3) your methodology for using manual actions (in the event of a fire In the Unit I diesel generator corridor and north switchgear room). In lieu of ensuring that one train of redundant cables and equipment of systems needed for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions w'.a3s free of fire damage, does not comply with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section IIIG.2. Your claim that our position (that manual actions cannot be used to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section IIIG.2) Is a generic backfit will be addressed by the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in their response to a letter from the Nuclear Energy Institute dated January 11. 2002.