ML040340591
| ML040340591 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 02/05/2002 |
| From: | FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2003-0358, NOP-LP-2001-01 CR 02-00921 | |
| Download: ML040340591 (2) | |
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cet3 _0fC h y 0 NOP-LP-2001-01 Beaver Valley CONDITION REPORT CR Number2 TITLE: FIRE PROTECTION ISSUE ARS-13 SAFE SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES DISCOVERY DATE TIME EVENT DATE TIME SYSTEM/ ASSET#
214/2002 j N/A N/A N/A N/A EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION N/A ____
DESCRIPTION OF CONDITION and PROBABLE CAUSE (if known) Summarize any attachments. Identify what, when, where, why, how.
0 ARS was contracted to perform an evaluation of BVPS-2 fire protection program. A similar R evaluation was performed for BVPS-1 prior to the NRC triennial inspection in 2001. The following issue was identified:
I 1. Step 10 of 20M-56C.4.C directs the NCO to "verify Seal Injection Flow Indicated at [2CHS-G; F1130A, 127A, and 124A]". The Beaver Valley Unit 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report does not I document that this instrument is available post-fire. 2. 20M-56C.4.D step 5b directs the operator to N Open OR Open [2SWS* MOV 13A] to ensure cooling water is available to the engine before the line A starter is deenergized in step 5g. Attempting to declutch and operate an MOV that is energized could T result in operator damage and presents a personnel hazard.
o 3. Procedure 20M-56B.3.B.2, Rev. 8, Tab 2 for the Service Building, under Fire Suppression (pg. 4 N of 47). The suppression capability for SB- 4 is missing from the list.
- 4. The Beaver Valley Unit 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report and associated safe shutdown procedures do not clearly Identify critical actions which must be accomplished within prescribed time frames. Examples include:
- Manual actions to restore EDG cooling
- Actions to prevent or terminate Quench Spray pump flow to prevent drain down of the RWST.
- Actions to restore RCP seal cooling
- Time to establish AFW flow.
- 5. The Beaver Valley Unit 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report, Section 3.35.10, Spurious Signal Evaluation, CVCS, indicates potential spurious actuation of 2CHS*FCV1 13A, Boric Acid to Blender Flow Control Valve. Operator action is "The operator will verify that the valve is open. If the valve is not open, the operator could de-energize its power source and manually open the valve." Procedure 20M-56C. 4.E, Revision 12 implements the function but in a different way from that stated in the above report. 2- OM-56C.4.E,Action 7), states "Open by closing the air supply valve and opening the pressure regulator petcock."
ARS-14 Fire Area SB-4 Fire Area SB- 4, Normal Switchgear Room, 760', is not identified as an alternate shutdown area for BVPS- 2. Also, NRC SER, Supplement 5 does not identify SB- 4 as alternate shutdown area.
However, Beaver Valley Unit 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report, Section 3.35.4, Manual Actions, list actions 2, 5, and 6 as performed at the Alternate Shutdown Panel (ASP). This suggest that the current licensing basis for SB- 4 is different than that approved by the NRC. Note that the Triennial Fire Protection Inspection report for Catawba, dated September 28, 2001 identified a URI, for a situation similar to the above, where additional Catawba fire areas credited alternate shutdown actions other than those reviewed and approved by the NRC in its SER.
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NOP-LP-2001 -01 Beaver Valley CONDITION REPORT NOP-LP-2001-01 Beaver Valley~0-0092 CR Number2 TITLE: FIRE PROTECTION ISSUE ARS-13 SAFE SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TAKEN / SUPV COMMENTS (Discuss CORRECTIVE ACTIONS completed, basis for closure.)
Enhancements to Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report and operating manual may be needed.
Item #4 requires additional attention. Following Design Engineering/Operations Procedure review additional Condition Reports will be generated if warranted.
QUALITY ORGANIZATION USE ONLY IDENTIFIED BY (Check one) D Self-Revealed lATTACHMENTS Quality Org. Initiated l Yes I Individual/Work Group a Internal Oversight I Quality Org. Follow-up El Yes El No Z Supervision/Management El External Oversight ; 2i Yes No ORIGINATOR ORGANIZATION DATE SUPERVISOR DATE PHONE EXT.
KAHL, H l 0030 2/4/2002 l MANOLERAS, M 2/4/2002 i 7738 SRO EQUIPMENT EVALUATION ORG. IMMEDIATE ORG. MODE REVIEW OPERABLE REQUIRED NOTIFIED INVESTIGATION REQUIRED NOTIFIED CHANGE L i Yes [:No IR Yes [:No El N/A El Yes R No []Yes ] No N/A EJ Yes i No MODE ASSOCIATED TECH SPEC NUMBER(S) ASSOCIATED LCO ACTION STATEMENT(S)
A N/ag>;/A In j, s~2- s. 4. ;' L1 N i #2 DECLARED INOPERABLE REPORTABLE? One Hour N/A APPLICABLE UNIT(S) o (Date/Time) EYes 9 No Four NiA'K P N/A Eval Re Eght Hour U 1 U2 Both E ____ a _____________ ______ ______
R COMMENTS A Consider dual unit implications as necessary in the resolution of this CR.
T The issues need to be evaluated individually. A new condition report should be submitted if an I actual problem is found to exist.
o CurrentMode- UnitIPowerLevel-Unit1 CurrentMode-Unit2 Power Level - Unit 2 N 1 I 100% 5 _
S SRO - UNIT 1 SRO - UNIT 2 D6ATE Daugherty, J Morgan, M 2/5/2002 CATEGORY/EVAL ASSIGNEDORGANIZATION DUEDATE R REPORTABLE?
CF 0030 3/21/2002 E [:]Yes EZl No [O ER No.
CRPATREND CODES Comp Type I ID Cause u REPORTABILITY REVIEWER
/ Process I Activity/ Cause Code(s) (If Cause T or W) Org A Sepelak, B SUPV CC1 1050 B02 0030 DTE
/ DATE R~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
MRS Y 02/05/02 INVESTIGATION OPTIONS lCLOSED BY I DATE E Malnt.Rule El OE Evaluation I I Page 2 of 2