ML033440495

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Influential Assumptions. Partially Withheld
ML033440495
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 11/07/2003
From:
- No Known Affiliation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
FOIA/PA-2003-0358
Download: ML033440495 (2)


Text

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Io Influential assumptions:

Sensitivity of results to each Influential assumption:

Contributions of greatest uncertainty factors and Impact on Previous similar analyses: N/A Proposed preliminary or final colorI U

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of IrformaIion FCL FO IA-0 3:.-

2.

.All Other Inspection Findings (not IE, MS, B cornerstones): NONE D.

Proposed Enforcement.

a..

Regulatory requirement not met.

10 CFR 50.48, Section (b) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections Ill.G.2, 1l1.G.3, and Il.L.

b.

Proposed citation.

During an NRC triennial fire protection inspection conducted on June 11 - 15, 2001, at. Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, the following violation of NRC requirements was identified. Note that ANO-1 was licensed prior to January 1, 1979; therefore, was required to meet le CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section tIl.G.

10 CFR 50.48, Fire protection, Section (b) states, "Appendix R to this part establishes fire protection features required to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part with respect to certain generic issues for nuclear power plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979.... With respect to all other fire protection features covered by Appendix R, all nuclear power plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, must satisfy the applicable requirements of Appendix R to this part, including specifically the requirements of Sections lll.G, lll.J, and 111.0."

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Paragraph II.G, "Fire protection of safe shutdown capability," states,

1.

"Fire protection features shall be provided for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown. These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that:

a.

One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage; and

b.

Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold "I 11/l shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station(s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

2.

Except as provided for in paragraph G.3 of this section, where cables or 6