ML032680836

Submittal of Revision 6 of the Nuclear Operating Business Practice, Restart Readiness Review Extended Plant Outage

ML032680836
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse  (NPF-003)
Issue date:	09/13/2003
From:	Myers L FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Dyer J Division of Nuclear Materials Safety III
References
1-1327
Download: ML032680836 (63)

Text

.* 'FENOC

• FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harboc Ohio 43449 Lew W. Myers Chief Operating Officer 4 19-32 1 - 7599 Fax: 4 19-32 1 - 7582 Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial 1-1327 September 13, 2003 Mr. James E. Dyer, Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I11 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532-4351

Subject:

Submittal of Revision 6 of the Nuclear Operating Business Practice, Restart Readiness Review Extended Plant Outage (DBBP-VP-0002)

Dear Mr. Dyer:

On July 30,2003 (Serial 1-1 323), the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) submitted Revision 5 of the Nuclear Operating Business Practice DBBP-VP-0002, Restart Readiness Review Extended Plant Outage. This business practice provides the review process to ensure Davis-Besse's materiel condition, programs and processes, and organization, including the organization's safety culture, are ready for plant restart and safe, reliable operation.

This Business Practice was subsequently revised to enhance and refine the Restart Readiness Review process. The purpose of this letter is to submit Revision 6 of the Nuclear Operating Business Practice DBBP-VP-0002, Restart Readiness Review Extended Plant Outage, dated August 20, 2003 as an enclosure to this letter. This revision supercedes Revision 5 in its entirety.

It should be noted that FirstEnergy Nuclear Ope\\ating Company may periodically update this document in the future. If you have any questions or require further information, please contact Mr. Kevin L. Ostrowski, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (419) 321-8450.

Sincerely yours, RJS Attachment/Enclosure cc:

USNRC Document Control Desk DB-1 Senior NRC/NRR Project Manager DB-1 Senior NRC Resident Inspector Utility Radiological Safety Board

G.

Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1327 Attachment Page 1 of 1 COMMITMENT LIST The following list identifies those actions committed to by the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by the DBNPS. They are described only for information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Affairs (41 9-321 -8450) at the DBNPS of any questions regarding this document or associated regulatory commitments.

COMMITMENTS DUE DATE None NIA

i Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1 - 1327 Enclosure Revision 6 of the Nuclear Operating Business Practice Restart Readiness Review Extended Plant Outage (DBBP-VP-0002)

(60 pages to follow)

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Number:

Title:

Revision:

1 DBB P-VP-0002 Page RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE I PLANT OUTAGE Approved:

Page 1 of 60 06 Vice President /

Approve-1 d m,-

Chief Op&&t&&f icer Effective Date AUG z o 2003

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Number:

Revision:

I Page DBBP-VP-0002 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.0 PURPOSE......................................................................................................

3 r >

2.0 APPLICABILITY.............................................................................................

3 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE 06 Page 2 of 60 3.0 RESPONSIBILITY.......................................................................................... 3 4.0 DETAILS........................................................................................................ 4 ATTACHMENT I: RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATORS.....................

7 ATTACHMENT 2:

PLANT RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX.....................

.9 ATTACHMENT 3:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW FOR PLANT SHUTDOWN.............................................................................

12 ATTACHMENT 4: PLANT INSPECTION DOCUMENTATION SHEET.................. 13 ATTACHMENT 5:

OPERATIONAL READINESS AFFIRMATION FORM.............. 14 ATTACHMENT 6:

CORE CONFIGURATION AFFIRMATION FORM................... 15 ATTACHMENT 7:

REACTOR STARTUP AFFIRMATION FORM.........................

16 ATTACHMENT 8 SYSTEM ENGINEEWPROGRAM OWNER READINESS AFFIRMATION FORM.............................................................

17 ATTACHMENT 9:

ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE..................................

18 APPENDIX A:

ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA................ 20 ATTACHMENT I O : SAFETY CULTURE ASSESSMENT INDICATOR MATRIX..... 60

Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Revision:

I Page 1.o 2.0 3.0 c

PURPOSE RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE I

06 I Paae3of60 The purpose of this Business Practice is to provide assurance that the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is ready to restart following the extended plant outage. The framework detailed here establishes a review process for areas not addressed by the Restart Test Plan and DB startup procedures to ensure that Davis-Besses materiel condition, programs and processes, and organization, including the organizations safety culture are ready for plant restart and safe, reliable operation.

This Business Practice applies to the first plant startup following the extended plant outage which began on February 16, 2002. It also applies to subsequent startups from this same outage and therefore shall be re-performed if the startup is halted resulting in an entry into a lower mode.

APPLl CAB I LlTY 6

Adherence to this Business Practice is mandatory.

RES PONS I B I L ITY The Vice President-Nuclear is responsible for initiating the Restart Readiness Review Process.

Each Section Manager and 0350 Restart List Responsible Individual is responsible for the accuracy and adequacy of the reviews performed, actions taken and action plans developed during the review process.

The Section Managers of Plant Engineering and Operations and the Director-Work Management (Maintenance) are responsible for ensuring plant walk-down inspections are conducted prior to power ascension.

The Manager-Operations is responsible for affirming: 1 ) the Operations Section has completed a review of operational readiness and is ready to support the safe and reliable startup and operation of the plant through the next operating cycle; 2) that the plant is in a condition of materiel readiness to support safe and reliable startup and operation and the operating crews are prepared and ready to startup and operate the plant in a safe and reliable manner through the next operating cycle.

The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering is responsible for: 1 ) following movement of fuel in the reactor core, changes to reactivity control components in the reactor core and/or changes to nuclear instrumentation in the reactor core, verifying that the reactor core is configured to support safe and reliable operation through the cycle.

This affirmation is required prior to installation of the reactor head; 2) prior to reactor startup, verifying that the required conditions exist to support a safe startup and power ascension.

I -

Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE c

Revision:

Page 06 Page 4 of 60 4.0 Each Director is responsible for the final review of the assessment and action plans developed during the review process by the sections in his department.

The Chief Operating Officer is responsible for final approval prior to plant restart.

DETAILS

1. The review process shall be initiated early enough to ensure it is completed prior to entry into Modes 6, 4 and 2. The review shall be completed by the milestone date as determined by the responsible Shift Outage Director. All Sections and 0350 Checklist Responsible Individuals, shall submit restart readiness reviews by the milestone dates; not all items have to be complete, provided bullet (4) in Step 3 is appropriately addressed.

2. The process consists of the review and assessment of the specified Restart Readiness Review Indicators. The matrix on Attachment 2 designates the minimum indicators from Attachment 1 that are applicable to each Section and/or 0350 Checklist Item. Each Section and 0350 Checklist Responsible Individual, shall address applicable indicators and should participate in the review and assessment of any indicator for which meaningful input can be provided.

3. The methodology for the review process consists of the following steps:

Monitor plant systemkomponent work activity progress during the outage Monitor emergent work/issues during the outage for shutdown concerns Monitor personnel and administrative issues during the outage for restart concerns Assess Restart Readiness Review Indicators as identified on Attachment 1, as applicable per Attachment 2.

Assess Safety Culture as identified on Attachment 9, Page 18 Identify items to be complete prior to the designated Mode (6, 4 or 2) that have not been completed as of the Shift Outage Director milestone date.

Ensure a reference is associated with each incomplete item that addresses completion of that item before needed in that mode.

4. Results of the individual indicator assessments, including the status of action plans to support plant restart, will be indicated on Attachment 1, and acknowledged by the signature of the Section Manager or 0350 Checklist Responsible Individual. Indicator assessments should be marked as Final (all conditions are acceptable to support plant restart) or Preliminary (one or more indicators are not currently complete or acceptable and action plans will support

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Number:

DBB P-VP-0002 plant restart when complete). Details on incomplete items and the status of action plans to eliminate them shall be attached.

r

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

~~~

Title:

Revision:

Page RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE 06 Page 5 of 60 The signed original Restart Readiness Review Indicators (Attachment 1 ) should be provided to the Restart Action Process Administrator at the end of the Readiness meetings for inclusion in the Mode Readiness notebook' Walk down inspections shall be completed prior to power ascension as described Plant Engineering Policy PE-02, System Walkdown Checklist. Results of walkdown inspections shall be documented in Attachment 4 and submitted to the in this document and in accordance with EN-DP-01503, System Walkdowns or Restart Readiness Review Indicators shall be reviewed by the Senior Leadership Team and approved by the Vice President-Nuclear or Chief Operating Officer, as provided on Attachment 3.

6 The Shift Manager of each crew should:

a. Conduct reasonable and appropriate activities to accomplish the objective of attaining, demonstrating and affirming operational readiness. The Shift Manager should consider the following to support the affirmation of operating crew readiness:

-adequacy of staffing levels, personnel experience and qualification levels.

-assure Operations personnel believe the Station can be operated safely by eliciting any outstanding safety concerns from shift personnel and ensuring that the concerns are resolved.

-completion of appropriate personnel refresher training of shift personnel, including training on plant, procedures and process changes.

-completion of training of shift personnel on the startup and power ascension plan. This training shall include discussion on the expected behavior and characteristics of the core for this startup.

b. Affirm to the best of their knowledge and judgment that the plant is in a condition of materiel readiness to support safe and reliable startup and operation. The Shift Manager should consider the following:

9 r

-adequacy of the materiel condition of the plant, including the current status of operator work-arounds, to support safe and reliable restart and operation during the next operating cycle.

Number:

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE D B B P-VP-0002

Title:

Revision:

Page RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE 06 Page 6 of 60

-all outage-related temporary fire suppression systems removed and fire protection requirements or commitments ready to support startup.

-temporary modifications, temporary power feeds, removed/MCCs restored, installed temporary power feeds, if applicable, reviewed to ensure they will not affect safety or operations.

c. Complete Attachment 5.

I O. The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering shall, following movement of fuel, changes to reactivity control components andlor changes to nuclear instrumentation in the reactor core, verify that the reactor core is configured to support safe and reliable operation through the cycle. This affirmation is required prior to installation of the reactor head. Attachment 6, Core Configuration Affirmation Form, details the required review areas and documents the affirmation.

11. The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering, shall, prior to a reactor startup, verify that the required conditions exist to support a safe startup and power ascension., Reactor Startup Affirmation Form, details the required review areas and documents that affirmation.

12. Each System Engineer and 0350 Program Owner shall complete Attachment 8, System EngineedProgram Owner Readiness Affirmation Form. The System Engineer forms shall be part of the Plant Engineering Manager's presentation for restart readiness. The 0350 Program Owner's form will be used as part of their readiness discussion. Selected systems (System Engineers) will be identified by the Manager-Operations, Manager-Plant Engineering and Plant Manager to be discussed during the Restart Readiness Review Meetings.

Number:

D BB P-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

=

~

Title:

Revision:

Page RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE 06 Page 7 of 60 ATTACHMENT 1:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATORS Page 1 of 2 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 11 12 Plant Section or 0350 Checklist Item Mode All assigned outage work activities are complete to support plant restart and operations. This includes a reconfirmation that previous dispositions of nonconforming conditions or Preventive Maintenance deferrals continue to provide a justification for continued operation. (Attachment 2, Column a)

Outstanding Operability Evaluations, CR corrective actions and new CRs generated during the shutdown have been evaluated for operability concerns are either closed or determined to have no impact on operability, (Attachment 2, Column b)

Regulatory and internal commitments have been evaluated for operability concerns or restart restraints and are either closed or determined to have no impact on operability. (Attachment 2, Column c)

Housekeeping walkdowns utilizing the guidelines of NG-DB-00215, Material Readiness and Housekeeping Inspection Program are complete. (Attachment 2, Column d)

The Power Ascension Schedule has been reviewed for accuracy and adequacy ensuring: (Attachment 2, Column e)

Post maintenance retest and special testing are identified and scheduled correctly with instructions in place.

Planned walkdowns are scheduled appropriately 0

Personnel, materials and special test equipment necessary to support power ascension retest and walkdown activities have been identified and availability is ensured during power ascension. (Attachment 2, Column 9 Contingency plans are established for immediate response to plan and repair steam leaks or high-risk test failures. (Attachment 2, Column g)

Standing orders have been reviewed for continued applicability and system status sheets completed as required by DB-OP-06911. Pre-Startup Checklist. (Attachment 2, Column h)

System walkdowns have been performed by Plant Engineering and Maintenance, as directed by Operations, to ensure system readiness for restart.

Operating Experience reports have been reviewed to ensure no potential operability concerns.

Procedure alterations/PCRs are ready for mode change or restart.

Work around and burdens identified prior to or during shutdown and not corrected have been confirmed acceptable. (Attachment 2, Column i)

Acceptable to support Rest a rt ?

Yes/No/NA 6

Number:

DB B P-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Revision:

Page 06 Page 8 of 60 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 ATTACHMENT I: RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATORS (Continued)

Page 2 of 2 Plant Section or 0350 Checklist Item Mode All Management and Human Performance Improvement Plan items required for restart are complete. (Attachment 2, Column j)

All 0350 Discovery Action Plan milestones identified as required for restart are complete. (Attachment 2, Column k)

All 0350 Implementation Action Plan milestones identified as required for restart are complete. (Attachment 2, Column I)

All Section Corrective Action Program Improvement Plan activities required for restart have been validated as ready to support restart. (Attachment 2, Column ii)

All Condition Reports and corrective actions, work orders, modifications (including EWRs and ECRs) categorized as 0350 are completed. (Attachment 2, Columns m, All Condition Reports and corrective actions, work orders, and modifications (including EWRs and ECRs) designated as required for restart by the Restart Station Review Board are complete. (Attachment 2, Columns q, r, s)

Any required for restart Condition Report or corrective action, work order or modification (including EWRs and ECRs), which cannot be completed prior to restart, has a written exemption from the RSRB. (Attachment 2, Column u)

All pending allegations have been reviewed and determined not to affect the restart of the plant. (Attachment 2, Column v)

Integrated Restart Report per NG-VP-00100 signed by the SMT. (Attachment 2, Column w) n, 0)

Acceptable Restart?

Yes/No/NA to support Check one Preliminary: I have reviewed the assessment of the Restart Readiness Review Indicators as indicated above and confirm that the attached plans will support plant restart when complete.

Final: I have reviewed the assessment of the Restart Readiness Review Indicators as indicated above and concur that the current conditions support plant restart.

Section Manager or 0350 Checklist Individual (Please Print Your Name) 6 Signature :

Date Section Manager or 0350 Checklist Individual

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Number:

DB B P-VP-0002 1

ATTACHMENT 2:

PLANT RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX Page 1 of 3

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE O

l d

Revision:

Page 06 Page 9 of 60 Operations x

x x

RP x

x x

Chemistry x

x Outage Management X

X and Work Control FIN 1 x 1 I

Mechanical l x l x I FRC 1 x 1 x I

Maint. Sew.

1 x 1 Support Services Regulatory Affairs x

x x

Quality Services X

Securitv I organizational I

I I

Development Training X

Safety X

Emergency X

x x

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X 6

l 6

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE ATTACHMENT 2:

PLANT RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX Page 2 of 3 Number:

Revision:

Page D B B P-VP-0002 06 Page 10 of 60 0350 CHECKLIST ITEM RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX

1. Adequacy of Root Cause Determinations-S. Loehlein, M. Roder, D. Gudger, J. Powers, D. Eshelman, F. von Ahn, L. Myers*

2. Adequacy of Safety Significant Structures, Systems and Components-D. Baker, A.

Stallard, T. Chambers, R. Hovland, J.

ONeill*

0350 Checklist Item X

X X

X X

X X

3. Adequacy of Safety Significant Programs--A.

McAllister, L. Dohrmann, S. Loehlein, M.

Shepherd, J. Grabnar, R.Farrell, J. Lee, R.

Perry, K. Ostrowski*

5. Readiness for Restart-C. Price, F. VonAhn, R. Hovland, R. Schrauder, A. Stallard, J.

Hirsch*

X X

I x

4. Adequacy of Organizational Effectiveness and Human Performance-R.

Fast, J.

Powers*

X X

7. Confirmatory Action Letter Resolution--L.

Myers, C. Price K. Ostrowski*

6. Licensing Issue Resolution--J. Powers, K.

Ostrowski*

X X

X X

X X

X X t 6

I 6

• Or an approved designated alternate

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Number:

Revision:

I Page DB B P-VP-0002 ATTACHMENT 2:

PLANT RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX Page 3 of 3 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE REQUIRED FOR RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX 06 Page 11 of 60 Restart Station Review X

Board Quality Services Station Review Board (Plant Operating Review Committee)

Com pan y Nuclear Review Board Restart Overview Panel 3

X I

X L

3s X

X X

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 ATTACHMENT 3:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW FOR PLANT STARTUP

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE RestaWMode Chanlqe Recommended By:

Revision:

Page 06 Page 12 of 60 Mode Plant Manager-Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Date Director-Davis-Besse Nuclear Engineering Date Director-Davis-Besse Work Management Date Director-Davis-Besse Support Services Date Director-Davis-Besse Restart Date Director-Davis-Besse Organizational Development Date RESTART /MODE CHANGE APPROVAL:

Vice President-Nuclear Date Chief Operating Officer Date

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Number:

DBB P-VP-0002 ATTACHMENT 4:

PLANT INSPECTIONMIALKDOWN DOCUMENTATION SHEET Page 1 of 1

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Mode Revision:

Page 06 Page 13 of 60 ASSET LABEL:

Or AREA INSPECTED:

NOUN NAME:

LOCATION:

DESCRIPTION :

MAINTENANCE TAGNVORK ORDER #:

CONDITION REPORT INITIATED (#)

MODE RESTRAINT:

Yes No SUBMITTED BY:

DATERIME I

(please print your name)

SIGN ATU RE :

Number:

DBB P-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED

_PLANT OUTAGE 06 Page 14 of 60

Title:

Revision:

Page ATTACHMENT 5:

OPERATIONAL READINESS AFFIRMATION FORM adequate.

Operations personnel believe the station can be operated safely. All safety concerns have Appropriate refresher training of shift personnel, including training on plant, been identified and addressed.

Shift Designator:

6 Shift Manager:

Mode (Please Print)

Review Summary:

The Shif& Manager should initial each item below to affirm that he/she and the operating crew have completed the required actions:

Affirmation:

Based upon an evaluation ofthe considerations set forth in Details, 4.0, and to the best of my knowledge and judgment, the plant is in a condition of materiel readiness to support the safe and reliable startup and power operation through the next operating cycle and the operating crew is ready to startup and operate the plant in a safe and reliable manner.

Shift Manager:

PrintlSignaturelDate Reviews and Approvals:

Manager-Operations:

Print/Signature/Date Remarks: (Attach a continuation sheet if applicable)

Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 r:

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Revision:

Page 06 Page 15 of 60 ATTACHMENT 6:

CORE CONFIGURATION AFFIRMATION FORM Review Su mmarv:

The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering, should initial each item below to affirm that the required conditions exist following movement of fuel in the reactor core, changes to reactivity control components and/or changes to nuclear instrumentation in the reactor core. This affirmation is required prior to installation of the reactor head.

All new fuel assemblies loaded into the reactor core were inspected, as required, to ensure that the manufacturing and design specifications were met.

All irradiated fuel assemblies present in the reactor core were inspected, as required, and dispositioned as acceptable for operation through the cycle.

No fuel assemblies in the reactor core are known leaking assemblies.

A I OCFR50.59 Reload Safety Evaluation governing reactor core operation has been approved by the Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC)

The reactor core loading has been verified.

All reactivity control components in the reactor core will meet their design functions.

All nuclear instrumentation in the reactor core will meet their design functions.

Affirmation:

Based on my knowledge and judgment, the required conditions exist and the reactor core is configured to support safe and reliable operation through the cycle.

Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering Pri nt/Sig nat u re/Date I

Remarks: (Attach a continuation sheet if appropriate)

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED Number:

Revision:

Page DB B P-VP-0002 ATTACHMENT 7: REACTOR STARTUP AFFIRMATION FORM Mode Review Summaw:

The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering should initial each item below to affirm that the required conditions exist prior to reactor startup.

Estimated Critical Conditions have been prepared and independently verified.

Preparations are complete for any necessary Low Power Physics Testing (i.e. equipment, procedures, calculations, training)

Personnel are available, as required, to support reactor startup and power ascension to 100%.

Required training has been completed for Nuclear Fuels personnel.

Reactivity plans are available, as required, to support reactor startup and power ascension to 100%. These plans include expectations for reactor behavior with emphasis on any behavior that is different from recent plant operation.

I The Core Monitoring System is operable.

All reactivity control systems will meet their design functions.

Sufficient nuclear instrumentation is available to safely startup and operate the reactor core.

There are no outstanding reactivity management issues impacting the safe operation of the reactor core.

Affirmation :

Based on my knowledge and judgment, the required conditions exist and the reactor core is ready to support a safe startup and power ascension.

Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering Print/Sig nature/Date Remarks: (Attach a continuation sheet if appropriate)

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE c

Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 ATACHMENT 8: SYSTEM ENGINEEWPROGRAM OWNER READINESS AFFIRMATION FORM RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Mode 06 Page 17 of 60

1. Name of System/Program:

2. The status of the system/program is (For systems, a brief description of the physical status of the system including System Health status and Maintenance Rule status. For programs, a brief status of the program):

3. System/Program is ready for Mode Yes-or No-

4. The system/program is ready for Mode because: (if not ready, skip to #5)

5. The systemlprogram is not ready for Mode because:

and the following actions are in place to address these issues:

The system/program will be ready for Mode by:

(Date)

6. Items in abnormal status or configuration (workarounds, temporary modifications, Control Room deficiencies) identified and not corrected have been reviewed and determined to be acceptable: Yes-or No-(Attach a list of the above items)

7. Housekeeping issues associated with this system/program have been addressed for Mode

Yes-or No-(Attach a list of those not resolved)

8. I have the following concerns about my system and its readiness for Mode Briefly identify concerns. (The Restart Readiness Review process will not resolve these concerns at the meeting. They should be scheduled for presentation to the Plant Support Center if there is a concern relative to this mode change.)

9. Open CRs, CAS, Work Orders or Engineering modifications required for Mode (Attach a list).

Name:

Extension :

(Please Print)

Signature:

Date:

Number:

DB B P-V P-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Revision:

Page 06 Page 18 of 60 ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE Assessment Summary:

Improving safety culture is a long-term activity that will be constantly monitored by Davis-Besse senior management. For Restart Readiness, it is important to show an improving safety culture. The individual indicators that make up the Commitment Areas may be green, white, yellow or red. Some of the Commitment Areas may be yellow (Policy or Corporate Commitment Area, Plant Management Commitment Area or Individual Commitment Area) however restart will not be approved if any of the three are red.

Remedial actions will be taken for any red indicators. Condition Reports will be written for all red and yellow indicators at the site and/or section level, with corrective actions to identify an existing or new plan for improvement. Corrective Actions may take credit for already existing activities. Red indicator corrective actions will be formally presented to the Senior Leadership Team. If a Condition Report is written at the site level for a red or yellow Commitment Area or indicator, it will encompass any red or yellow section Commitment Area or indicator and that section need not write a Condition Report. If there is no site wide red or yellow Commitment Area or indicator, then the Section Manager will write a Condition Report for his red or yellow Commitment Area or indicator.

The criteria for ratings of the attributes that comprise each indicator are provided in Appendix A. These criteria are guidelines. Management may consider other factors and adjust the ratings accordingly. Management judgment is a key factor that cannot be removed or quantified. The purpose of the collegial group review is to challenge, seek alternative input and to facilitate dialogue. If other factors are considered, they shall be documented in an attachment to the Rating sheet. The ratings are based on convergent assessment such as: performance indicators, management observations, demonstrated performance during critical plant conditions surveys and interviews, training and feedback from independent safety culture reviews and Nuclear Quality Assurance Assessments.

The ratings for an individual attribute will reflect recent activities or the most recent assessment data. If no applicable activities or assessments have been conducted within the past 12 months (Le., there is no information applicable to the review period), the attribute shall be marked "NA", (Not Applicable). If both objective and subjective data are available, differences in data will be evaluated and decisions on use of data made.

Safety Culture Commitment Areallndicator Ratings:

Green:

White:

Yellow:

Red:

all major indicators/attributes are acceptable with a few minor indicator deviations all major indicatorslattributes are acceptable with a few indicators requiring management attention all major indicators/attributes are acceptable with several indicators requiring prompt management action several major indicatorslattributes do not meet acceptable standards and require immediate management action 6

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE ATTACHMENT 9:

ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE Page 2 of 3 Number:

Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 06 Page 19 of 60 Each Section Manager will provide a Rating sheet (ATTACHMENT 9, Page 19,) with the Final Restart Readiness Indicators. For any individual attribute where only site-wide numbers are available (e.g. 4Cs surveys, ECP etc.), or for any individual attribute not applicable to a section (e.9. operator work-arounds for other than Operations), the Manager will NA that attribute on his backup sheets and that attribute will not be used as part of the site-wide tally for the indicator. For any attribute where surveys and/or interviews are used as the basis for the rating, these surveys must be written but may be anonymous. Interview results will also be documented as to results although they may also be anonymous. The results for surveys or interviews will be maintained by the Manager until after restart. Documentation for Attachment 9 may be in the form of a tally for these survey or interview results At the final Restart Readiness Review meeting for any mode, a site-wide Rating sheet will be prepared by the management team using the individual section ratings as a guideline. The final Rating sheet will be signed by the Vice President-Nuclear and maintained with the other Restart Readiness documentation.

Preliminarily, determination of the Commitment Areahndicator color will be based on a calculation of the average of the ratings of the associated indicators/attributes using the following:

Red=O points Yellow=l point White=2 points Green= 3 points Greater than one red attribute or indicator means the indicator or Commitment Area can be no better than yellow. If more than two or more than 1/3 (whichever is greater) of the attributes or indicators are red, the indicator or Commitment Area shall be red.

Red = 5.75 Yellow = >.75 to <I

.75 White = 21.75 to <2.5 Green= 22.5 For the overall plant ratings for Commitment Areadindicators, management will consider whether the problems taken collectively indicate a more significant concern than indicated by the averages. For example, one section may perform more activities related to safety with respect to an indicator than other sections, and management may adjust the color to give greater weight to that section in determining the final color rating. Similarly, if percentages or averages alone indicate a positive rating but there were several associated safety-significant events or conditions, management may provide a more negative color rating to reflect those events or conditions.

If such an adjustment is made, it shall be documented. Generally, if all sections have similar rating, the overall rating for the plant will be the same as the ratings for the individual sections. During group review, senior management will seek to verify that the entire Restart Readiness Review team not only concurs, but also aligns behind the assessment.

At the completion of the Safety Culture Assessment, an evaluation of the significance of the overall assessment ratings for indicators to focus on the process and organization will be completed using Attachment 10 at the end of the document.

6

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

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Title:

Number:

Revision:

I Page DBBP-VP-0002 ATTACHMENT 9:

ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE Page 3 of 3 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Rating Safety Culture Mode

/tern

1. Policy or Corporate Commitment Area

a. Policies on Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment clearly state that safety is a core value and are understood by the organization

b. Management values are clearly reflected in the Business Plan and are understood by the organization

c. Resources are available or can be obtained to ensure safe, reliable operations

d. Self-Assessment is a tool used to monitor, assess and improve our performance

e. Independent Oversight is a tool used to validate acceptable performance and identify areas for improvement or corrective action 06 Page 20 of 60

2. Plant Management Commitment Area

a. There is a visible commitment to safety: nuclear, industrial, radiological and environmental

b. Goals and roles are clear and teamwork is reinforced

c. Ownership and accountability is evident

d. Training and Qualification are valued

e. Commitment to continuous improvement is evident

f.

Cross-functional work management and communication

g. Creating an environment of engagement and commitment Color -

3. Individual Commitment Area

a. Drive for excellence-nuclear assets of people and plant are continuously improved to enhance margins of safety

b. Questioning attitude--challenges are welcomed

c.

Rigorous work control and prudent approach-performing activities in a quality manner is the standard

d. Open communications-associates are comfortable in voicing opinions, issues and concerns

e. Nuclear Professionalism-persistence and urgency in identification and resolution of problems is prevalent I have reviewed the Rating of Safety Culture as indicated above and concur that the current conditions support readiness for mode change.

Section Manager (Please Print Your Name)

Signature:

Date Section Manager Adjustments to ratings from the standard criteria should be documented and attached to this page.

D B B P-VP-0002

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE I

Revision:

Page 06 Paae 21 of 60 ATTRIBUTE Policy statement on Safety Culture* I-- -

Policy statement on Safety Conscious Work Environment (SC WE)

• Making employees aware of policy statements* I Employee understanding of policies Worker understanding of responsibility to raise safety concerns APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 1 of 39

1. POLICY COMMITMENT AREA la. CRITERIA RELATED TO STATEMENT OF SAFETY POLICY Policies on Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment clearly

.ate that safety is a core value and are ur RED Policy statement is issued but it is not reinforced by management Policy statement is issued but it is not reinforced by management.

Policy statements simply issued as part of FENOC Business Plan.

Surveys/interviews indicate less than 70% of employees in the section understand the policies.

Surveyshterviews indicate that less than 85% of workers in the section understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

YELLOW Policy statement is issued but only occasionally reinforced by management.

Policy statement is issued but only occasionally reinforced by management.

Policy statements distributed separately to employees in memo.

Surveys/interviews indicate that 70-80%

of the employees in the section understand the policies and consider safety a FE value.

Surveys/interviews indicate that between 85-90% of workers in the section understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

2rstood by the orgai WHITE Policy statement is issued and is frequently reinforced by management.

Policy statement is issued and is frequently reinforced by management.

Policy statements are communicated by at least two means. (e.g., hard copy distribution, newsletters, group meetings, training, stand down).

Su rveys/in terviews indicate that 80-90%

of employees in the section understand the policies and consider safety a FE value.

Su rveyslinterviews indicate that between 90-95% of workers in the section understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

zation GREEN Policy statement is issued and is continuously reinforced by management.

Policy statement is issued and it is a strong statement of safety conscious work environment and often reinforced.

Policy statements are communicated to employees and emphasized regularly in meetings and face to face communication.

~~

~~~

Surveys/interviews indicate that more than 90% of employees in the section understand the policies and consider safety a FE value and the normal way to do business.

Surveyslinterviews indicate that more than 95% of workers in the section understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Senior Management

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

. r

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA

1. POLICY COMMITMENT AREA 1 b. CRITERIA RELATED TO MANAGEMENT VALUES Page 2 of 39 Management values are clearlv reflected in the Business Plan and are understood bv the oraanizatic Number:

Revision:

Page D B B P-VP-0002 06 Page 22 of 60 ATTRIBUTE Corporate values*

Statement of mission, vision, and values

• FENOC Business P /an

• incentive program (FENOC Safety Culture Performance Indicator)*

RED There is no corporate level statement of safety values.

First Energy management does not express its safety values to plant personnel.

There is no statement of Mission, Vision, and Values and employees believe focus is on production and profits.

Business Plan contains no Strategic Objective Measures on safety.

The Safety Culture Assessment value is 40 points or less.

YELLOW There is a corporate level statement of commitment to safety.

FirstEnergy management meets infrequently with plant personnel to express its safety values.

The statement of Mission, Vision, and Values places weight on safety and often employees believe the overriding focus is safety Business Plan contains few Strategic Objective Measures on safety but no implementation plans The Safety Culture Assessment value is 40-60 points.

WHITE There is a corporate level statement of commitment to safety. First Energy management meets occasionally with plant personnel to express its safety values.

The statement of Mission, Vision, and Values places greater weight on safety than on production/profits and most employees agree that the overriding priority is on safety Business Plan contains Strategic Objective Measures on safety with implementation plans.

The Safety Culture Assessment value is 60-80 points.

GREEN There is a corporate level statement of commitment to safety.

FirstEnergy management meets frequently with plant personnel to express its safety values.

The statement of Mission, Vision, and Values emphasizes safety first, then allows consideration of production and profits and over 90% of employees agree based on surveys.

Business Plan contains Strategic Objective Measures on safety and all are being fully implemented.

The Safety Culture Assessment Value is above 80 points.

6 6

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Senior Management

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 3 of 39 I.

POLICY COMMITMENT AREA IC.

CRITERIA RELATED TO RESOURCES Resources are available or can be obtained to ensure safe, reliable operations Number:

Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 06 Page 23 of 60 ATTRIBUTE Three or four sections do not have sufficient personnel to perform their assigned responsibilities with or without contractor support (identify with or without)

Most identified improvements to nuclear safety, as identified by the PRC in the plant, programs, or other activities, are funded in a timely manner.

Adequacy of management resources*

One or two sections do not have sufficient personnel to perform their assigned responsibilities with or without contractor support (identify with or without)

The majority of identified improvements to nuclear safety, as identified by the PRC in the plant, programs, or other activities, are funded in a timely manner.

Adequacy of personnel resources#

Adequacy of funding **

RED More than five supervisor or above positions are not filled with ANSI qualified FENOC individuals.

More than four sections do not have sufficient personnel to perform their assigned responsibilities with or without contractor support (identify with or without)

Necessary activities, to improve nuclear safety, as defined by the Senior Leadership Team and Project Review Committee (PRC) are not being funded in a timely manner and funding was requested and rejected by FENOC Executive Management.

YELLOW More than three supervisor or above positions are not filled with ANSI qualified FENOC individuals.

WHITE Three or less supervisor or above positions are filled with ANSI qualified FENOC individuals.

I GREEN All management positions are filled with ANSI qualified FENOC individuals.

Each section has a full complement of personnel (minus normal attrition) to perform its assigned responsibilities.

Sufficient funding exists to perform all improvements, as identified by the PRC in plant, programs and other activities to improve nuclear safety.

Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources

1. Significance evaluation regarding resources will be discussed depending on contractor support by section "Site wide assessment only. Data provided by the chairman of the PRC 6

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

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Revision:

Page D B B P-VP-0002 06 Page 24 of 60

1. POLICY COMMITMENT AREA IC.

CRITERIA RELATED TO RESOURCES (continued)

Resources are available or can be obtained to ensure safe, reliable operations Adequacy of tools, material and equipment to complete site tasks Adequacy of took, material and equipment to complete Section tasks More than 30%

of scheduled tasks (PMs, Work Orders, ECRs and projects) are not being completed by the site in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.

More than 30%

of key scheduled tasks are not being completed by the section in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.

More than 25% of scheduled tasks (PMs, Work Orders, ECRs and projects) are not being completed by the site in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.

More than 25% of key scheduled tasks are not being completed by the section in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.

More than 20% of scheduled tasks (PMs, Work Orders, ECRs and projects) are not being completed by the site in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.

More than 20% of key scheduled tasks are not being completed by the section in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.

More than 10% of scheduled tasks PMs, Work Orders, ECRs and projects) are not being completed by the site in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.

More than 10% of key scheduled tasks are not being completed by the section in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Outage Management and Work Control 6

DBB P-VP-0002

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA

1. POLICY COMMITMENT AREA Page 5 of 39 Id. CRITERIA RELATED TO SELF-ASSESSMENT Revision:

Page 06 Page 25 of 60 ATTRIBUTE Use of Nuclear Quality Assurance to supplement the self-assessment process Self-assessments in accordance 2001, FENOC Focused Self-Assessment Guideline

• With NOBP-L P-Section Performance Indicators Personnel Performance Appraisals **

Self-Assessment is a tool used to monitl RED Less than 60% of the sections have used NQA input to supplement the self-assessment process as defined in NOBP-LP-2001 Less than 50% of sections ( 4 2 )

have scheduled any self-assessments for 4th quarter 2003 and I" quarter 2004.

Performance indicators related to safety and quality exist for the section The performance appraisal program does not include assessments of safety or quality of performance.

YELLOW Between 60-75% of the sections have used NQA input to supplement the self-assessment process as defined in NOBP-LP-2001 Between 50-65% of sections (1 2-1 5) have scheduled any self-assessments for 4th quarter 2003 and I" quarter 2004.

Section performance indicators exist for important activities affecting quality and safety but less than 75% of goals are met The performance appraisal program includes assessments of safety or quality of performance but most employee appraisals have not been performed.

-, assess and impro\\

WHITE Between 75-90% of the sections have used NQA input to supplement the self-assessment process as defined in NOBP-LP-2001 Between 65-80% of sections (1 6-20) have scheduled any self-assessments for 4'h quarter 2003 and 1 st quarter 2004.

Section performance indicators exist for important activities affecting quality and safety and more than 75% of goals are met The performance appraisal program includes assessments of safety or quality of performance but some appraisals have not been performed in timely manner and some employees do not have a current appraisal.

! our performance GREEN More than 90% of the sections have used NQA to supplement the self-assessment process as defined in NOBP-LP-2001 More than 80% of sections (>20) have scheduled any self-assessments for 4th quarter 2003 and I" quarter 2004.

Section performance indicators exist and are appropriate and are being regularly updated for important activities affecting safety and quality, with more than 90% of goals met.

The performance appraisal program includes assessments of safety and quality of performance and the appraisals are being performed in timely manner and all employees have a current appraisal.

6

'Site wide assessment made after Sections report "Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Number:

Revision:

I Page DBBP-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 6 of 39 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE I. POLICY COMMITMENT AREA le. CRITERIA RELATED TO INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT Oversight is a tool used to show acceptable performance and identify areas for 06 Page 26 of 60 improvement and corrective actions.

A7TRlBUTE Nuclear Committee of Board of Directors* L Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB) +

Nuclear Quality Assurance Learning from the experience of the industry RED The Nuclear Committee of the Board has little focus on safety performance in the agenda.

The CNRB has a safety performance assessment discussion on the agenda.

NQA is performing audits or assessments of important safety activities and there are many areas of concern causing Significant Conditions Adverse to Quality Personnel in the section do not participate in industry committees, visit other sites or host personnel from other sites YELLOW The Nuclear Committee occasionally discusses safety performance as a topic in the agenda.

The CNRB agenda has a safety discussion and monitors safety performance A number of NQA audits or assessments were performed when required and a number of areas of concern were identified for important safety activities causing Significant Conditions Adverse to Quality Personnel in the section seldom participate in industry committees, visit other sites or host personnel from other sites WHITE

~~

The Nuclear Committee routinely has safety performance as a part of the agenda The CNRB agenda has a safety discussion at meetings and reviews presentations on safety focus issues NQA audits or assessments were performed when required, for important safety activities and no Significant Conditions Adverse to Quality were noted Personnel in the section occasionally participate in industry committees, visit other sites or host personnel from other sites GREEN The Nuclear Committee has safety performance as a part of the agenda every meeting and requests additional presentations relative to specific issues to monitor performance The CNRB agenda has a safety discussion every meeting and is proactive in providing safety focus actions for FENOC NQA is regularly performing audits and assessments of important safety activities and identifying key issues for improvement that are below the Significant Condition Adverse to Quality threshold.

Personnel in the section routinely participate in industry committees, visit other sites or host personnel from other sites 6

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Senior Management

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by NQA Manager or VP Oversight

• '-This item is assessed by NQA only.

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READ I NESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Number:

Revision:

Page D B B P-VP-0002 06 Page 27 of 60 ATTRl BUTE

2. MANAGERS COMMITMENT AREA 2a. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO SAFETY Managemenf observations performed as scheduled with proper coaching*

6 Management observations are self critical*

Management emphasis on safety to employees; questioning attitude RED There is a management observation program and less than 65%

of the observations are performed as scheduled and

>90% indicate no coaching required.

Most management observations are not self-cri tical.

No method has been used in the last month to provide emphasis on safety to employees in the section (e.g., town hall, 4Cs, or All Hands meetings, standdowns, newsletters, and training).

YELLOW There is a management observation program and more than 65% of management observations are performed as scheduled and greater than 10% were rated coaching unsat.

More than 50% of the management observations performed are self-critical and corrective actions implemented.

One method has been used in the last month to provide emphasis on safety to employees in the section (e.g., town hall, 4Cs or All Hands meetings, standdowns, newsletters, and training).

WHITE There is a management observation program and more than 75%

are performed as scheduled and less than 10% rated as coaching unsat.

More than 75% of the management observations performed are self-critical and corrective actions implemented.

Two means have been used in the last month to provide emphasis on safety to employees in the section (e.g., town hall, 4Cs or All Hands

meetings, standdowns, newsletters, and training).

GREEN There is a management observation program and more than 90% are performed as scheduled and less than 5% rated as coaching unsat.

More than 90% of the management observations performed are self-critical and corrective actions implemented.

Multiple means have beenusedby management in the last month to provide emphasis on safety to employees in the section (e.g., town hall, 4Cs or All Hands meetings, standdowns, newsletters, and training).

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE L

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 8 of 39

2. MANAGERS COMMITMENT AREA 2a. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO SAFETY (continued)

There is a visible commitment to safety: nuclear, industrial, radiological and environmental Number:

Revision:

Page D B B P-VP-0002 06 Page 28 of 60 ATTRIBUTE Leadership in Action

• Problem solving RED Leadership in Action includes discussions on safety culture.*

And Employee feedback indicates it was not effective.**

And Leadership in Action training has been available for less than 75% of supervisors and above within 12 months of new appointment.*

A problem solving process exists but there is no use of the document in the section and CRs were written to document the failure to use the process during the previous quarter.

YELLOW Leadership in Action includes discussions on safety culture.*

And Employee feedback indicates it was effective.**

And Leadership in Action training has been available for more than 75% of supervisors and above within 12 months of new appointment.*

In more than 5 cases, the problem solving process NOP-EN-3001 has not been properly implemented in the section for applicable conditions and CRs were written in the previous quarter.

WHITE Leadership in Action includes discussions on safety culture.*

And Employee feedback indicates it was very effective.**

And Leadership in Action training has been available for more than 80% of supervisors and above within 12 months of new appointment.*

In all but one case, the problem solving process, NOP-EN-3001 has been properly implemented in the section for applicable conditions during the previous quarter.

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources

• • Site wide assessment only. Data provided through 4Cs program GREEN Leadership in Action includes discussions on safety culture.*

And Employee feedback indicates it was very effective. **

And Leadership in Action training has been available for more than 85% of supervisors and above within 12 months of new appointment.*

The problem solving process, NOP-EN-3001 has been properly implemented in the section for applicable conditions during the previous quarter.

6

Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 p

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

~

Title:

Revision:

Page RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED lPLANT OUTAGE 06 Page 29 of 60 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 9 of 39

2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA 2a. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO SAFETY (continued)

There is a visible commitment to safety: nuclear, industrial, radiological and environmental I

I ATTRIBUTE Decision making Improvements in safety margin

• Plant activities receive proper management attention and safety focus RED A Safety significant Condition Adverse to Quality indicates that decisions were made in the section in isolation without adequate information, management oversight, involvement and peer checking during the past month.

None of the improvements in safety margin required for restart are complete for this mode change.

A significant plant event, associated with the section, occurred during the previous quarter and a lack of a management attention or safety focus was indicated and an SCAQ written.

YELLOW A Safety significant Condition Adverse to Quality indicates that decisions are made in the section with minimal information, management oversight, involvement and peer checking during the past two months.

Between 70 and 80% of the improvements in safety margin required for restart for this mode change are complete.

Less than 2 Condition Adverse to Quality CRs associated with the section were written due to lack of management attention or lack of safety focus during the previous quarter.

WHITE Safety significant decisions, with few exceptions, were made in the section with adequate information, management oversight, involvement and peer checking during the quarter as indicated by no SCAQs.

Between 80 and 90%

of the improvements in safety margin required for restart for this mode change are complete.

Significant plant activities associated with the section had management oversight scheduled for the duration of the activity and only one CAQ event occurred indicating a lack of management attention during the previous quarter.

GREEN Safety significant decisions were made in the section with adequate information, management oversight, involvement and peer checking during the past six months as indicated by no SCAQs.

All improvements in safety margin required for restart for this mode change are complete).

Significant plant activities associated with the section had a management plan with a management sponsor and management oversight scheduled for the duration of the activity and no CAQ events occurred during the previous quarter.

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Outage Management and Work Control

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Number:

Revision:

I Page D B B P-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 10 of 39 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE

2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA 2.b CRITERIA RELATED TO ROLES AND TEAMWORK 06 Page 30 of 60 ATTRIBUTE Understanding fhaf safety is highest priority Program ownership

• Ownership of sorrecfive sctions Goal:

RED Station surveys and/or interviews show that less than 70% of employees in the section understand that safety is the highest priority.

Five of the 61 Phase 1 programs in the program review do not have assigned owners and five CRs were written against different programs in the past quarter.

More than 5% of SCAQ remedial and preventive restart required corrective actions and more than remedial and preventive restart required corrective actions for the section have

-equired more

han 4 extensions

'or the previous quarter.

10% Of CAQ and roles are clear YELLOW Station surveys and/or interviews, show that 70-80%

of employees in the section, understand that safety is the highest priority.

All 61 Phase 1 programs in the program review have assigned owners and more than three CRs were written on different programs in the past quarter.

5% of SCAQ remedial or preventive restart required corrective actions and 10% of CAQ remedial and preventive res tart required corrective actions for the section, have received more than 2 extensions for the previous quarter.

nd teamwork is reinforc WHITE Station surveys and/or interviews show that 80-90% of employees in the section, understands that safety is the highest priority.

All 61 Phase 1 programs in the program review have assigned owners. With several exceptions, program owners are implementing their assigned responsibilities and less than 3 CRs were written on different programs in the past quarter.

Less than 5% of SCAQ remedial or preventive restart required corrective actions and 10% of CAQ remedial and preventive restart required corrective actions for the section, have received 2 extensions for the previous quarter.

GREEN Station surveys and/or interviews show that more than 90% of employees in the section understand that safety is the highest priority.

All 61 Phase 1 programs in the program review have assigned owners. In general, program owners are implementing their assigned responsibilities and no CRs were written against programs in the last quarter.

Less than 5% of SCAQ remedial and preventive restart required corrective actions and less than 10% of CAQ remedial and preventive restart required corrective actions for the section have received less than 2 extensions for the previous quarter.

6

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Plant Engineering Manager

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

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Revision:

I Paqe D B B P-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 11 of 39 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE

2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA 2b. CRITERIA RELATED TO ROLES AND TEAMWORK (continued)

Goals and roles are clear and teamwork is reinforced 06 Page 31 of 60 ATTR I B U TE The individual error rate is <0.31 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

Ownership of engineering products as measured by the Engineering Assessment Board (EAB)

• The individual error rate isc0.29 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

Effectiveness of supervision of individuals **

Less than 85% of sections have statements of expectations and most employees are not familiar with them.

Intra-department teamwork and alignment ((Some unit supervisors will input to this attribute, such as Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Engineering and RRT.)

More than 85% of sections have statements of expectations and all employees meet them..

Expectations RED The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is greater than 3.0.

The individual error rate is

>0.30 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

As a Manager, I believe there is no alignment and little teamwork among my Department's managers.

There are statements of expectations for less than 75% of sections and employees routinely ignore them.

YELLOW The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is between 3.0 and 2.1.

1 WHITE The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is between 2.0 and 1.I.

As a Manager, I believe there is minimal alignment and some teamwork among my Department's managers.

As a Manager, I believe alignment is improving and teamwork can be seen in some key activities among my Department's managers.

I

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Director-Nuclear Engineering "Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Performance GREEN The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 1.O or less.

The individual error rate isc0.26 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

As a Manager, I believe alignment and teamwork are obvious among managers in all activities of my department.

There are statements of expectations for all sections and managers are reinforcing them and employees understand and implement them.

6

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2. MANAGERS COMMITMENT AREA 2b. CRITERIA RELATED TO ROLES AND TEAMWORK (continued)

Goals and roles are clear and teamwork is reinforced ATTRIBUTE Trust, openness and focused commitment **

Clear goals and priorities hput and involvement RED 4Cs surveys show less than 50% of employees feel that work groups display high levels of trust, opennessand commitment.

No clear goals and priorities have been established for the section No employee input and involvement Dccurs in the setting of department goals and sstablishing Nork priorities.

YELLOW 4Cs surveys employees feel that work groups display high levels of trust, opennessand commitment.

Show 50-70% Of Goals and priorities exist for the section but are not adequately understood and owned by employees.

Only managers and supervisors are involved in the setting of department goals and establishing work priorities.

WHITE 4Cs surveys show employees feel that work groups display high levels of trust, openness and com m i tmen t.

70-90% Of Goals and priorities exist for the section and some employees understand and own them.

Managers and supervisors occasionally request inputhnvolvement in the s, setting of department goals and establishing work priorities.

GREEN 4Cs surveys show more than 90% of employees feel that work groups display high levels of trust, openness and Commitment.

Most employees are clear about goals and priorities for the section as well as how their role contributes to achieving them.

Employees are appropriately involved in setting department goals and establishing work priorities.

6 6

• • Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chief Operating Officer

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

I RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED I

I I

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Revision:

I Paoe DB B P-VP-0002 I PLANT OUTAGE APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 13 of 39 06 Page 33 of 60

2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA 2c. CRITERIA RELATED TO OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY Ownership and accountability is evident I ATTRIBUTE Performance re views in accordance with Ownership for Excellence*

Development plans

• Restart Readiness Worker understanding of their responsibility to raise safety concerns RED Less than 70% of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence.

Less than 70% of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR There is no restart readiness review process.

Surveys and/or interviews indicate that less than 80% of workers in the section understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

only. Data provided

~~

YELLOW Between 70-80%

of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence.

Between 70-80%

of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR A restart readiness review process exists but implementation is poor as shown by lack of management participation.

Surveys and/or interviews indicate that Detween 80-90%

3f workers in the

section, Jnderstand their

• esponsibility to

-aise nuclear safety or quality zoncerns.

f Human Resources WHITE Between 80-90% of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence.

Between 80-90% of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR A restart readiness review process exists and is implemented with the majority of management participation.

Surveys and/or interviews indicate that between 90-95% of workers in the section, understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

GREEN More than 90% of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence More than 90% of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR A restart readiness review process exists and is implemented efficiently and with strong management participation.

Surveys and/or interviews indicate that more than 95% of workers understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

'Site wide assessme

'*Site wide assessment only. Data provided through discussion at the Restart Readiness Review meeting

' A NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

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2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA 06 Page 34 of 60 2c. CRITERIA RELATED TO OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABlLITY(continued)

Ownership and accountability is evident Willingness to raise safety concerns SRO reviews for Operability are performed in a timely manner for the identified period of this review**

System assessments+

Surveys show that less than 85% of personnel are willing to raise safety concerns through their supervisor, a CR or ECP.

Less than 80 %

were completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Less than 70% of restart required improvements in safety for this mode change are complete Surveys show that between 85-90% of personnel are willing to raise safety concerns through their supervisor, a CR or ECP.

Between 80-85%

were completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Between 70 and 80% of the restart required improvements in safety for this mode change are complete Surveys show that between 90-95% of personnel are willing to raise safety concerns through their supervisor, a CR or ECP.

Between 8595%

were completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Between 80-90% of the restart required improvements in safety for this mode change are complete Surveys show that more than 95% of personnel are willing to raise safety concerns through their supervisor, a CR or ECP.

More than 95% were completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

More than 90% of the restart required improvements in safety for this mode change are com ple te.

6 "Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Employee Concerns Program

• • This item assessed by Operations only

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Outage Management and Work Control

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED Number:

Revision:

Page DBB P-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 15 of 39

2. MANAGERS COMMITMENT AREA 2c. CRITERIA RELATED TO OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY (continued)

Ownership and accountability is evident NQA field assessments*

Management observations leading to coaching+

Timeliness of corrective actions NQA field assessments show that managers and supervisors are generally ineffective.

Less than 50%

of management participating in the Management Observation Program, has held a coaching session in the last month.

Less than 50%

of my sections corrective actions for this mode designated as required for restart are complete.

• This item assessed by NQA only NQA field assessments show that managers and supervisors are generally effective, with several noteworthy exceptions.

Between 50-74%

of management participating in the Management Observation Program, has held a coaching session in the last month.

Between 50%

and 74% of my sections corrective actions For this mode designated as required for restart are complete.

NQA field assessments show that managers and supervisors are generally effective, with a few exceptions.

Between 7589% of management participating in the Management Observation Program, has held a coaching session in the last month.

Between 75% and 89% of my sections corrective actions for this mode, designated as required for restart, are complete.

NQA field assessments show that managers and supervisors are genera I I y effective.

More than 90% of management participating in the Management Observation Program has held a coaching session in the last month.

More than 90% of my sections corrective actions for this mode, designated as required for restart, are complete.

6 6

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

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Revision:

Page D B B P-VP-000 2 06 Paae 36 of 60

2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA 2d. CRITERIA RELATED TO TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION Training and Qualification are valued ATTRIBUTE Supervisory evaluations

• Restart training lnitial Operator training**

Requalification training**

Roof cause training+

RED Most supervisors and managers have not been evaluated to assess their competence for their current positions.

Most required restart training for the section is not complete.

Less than 70% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.

Less than 70% of licensed operators have passed their requalification training.

Less than 50% of root cause evaluation personnel have received training on TapRoot.

YELLOW Between 50-74%

of supervisors and managers have been evaluated to assess their competence for their current positions.

Between 50-74%

of required restart for the section training is complete.

Between 70-84%

of new operators passed their initial license for the most recent class examination.

Between 70-84%

of the licensed operators have passed their requalification training.

Between 50%

and 74% of root cause evaluation personnel have received training on TapRoot.

WHITE Between 7549% of supervisors and managers have been evaluated to assess their competence for their current positions.

Between 75-99% of required restart training for the section is complete.

Between 85-95% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.

Between 85-95Oh of the licensed operators have passed their requalification training.

Between 75% and 89% of root cause evaluation personnel have received training on TapRoot.

GREEN More than 90% of supervisors and managers have been evaluated to assess their competence for their current positions.

100% of required restart training for the section is complete.

More than 95% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.

More than 95% of the licensed operators have passed their requalification training.

More than 90% of root cause evaluation personnel have received training on TapRoot.

Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources

• • This item assessed by Operations only

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Nuclear Training

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

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Revision:

Page DB B P-VP-0002 06 Page 37 of 60

2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA 2d. CRITERIA RELATED TO TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION (continued)

Training and Qualification are valued Opera bility determination training*

Training on SCWE **

Training on decision making process **

Training on standards and expectations I

Continuing training identified by Curriculum Review Committee (CRC) **

Less than 50% of applicable operators and engineers have received training on operability determinations.

Less than 70% of

managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

Less than 70 %

of applicable personnel have received training on the decision making process.

Less than 70% of applicable personnel in the section have received training on standards and expectations.

Less than 70% of scheduled training identified by the CRC is completed in a timely manner.

Between 50-74%

of applicable operators and engineers have received training on operability determinations.

Between 70-79%

of managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

Between 70-80%

of applicable personnel have received training on the decision making process.

Between 70-80%

of applicable personnel in the section have received training on standards and expectations.

Between 70-80%

of scheduled training identified by the CRC is completed in a timely manner.

Between 7590% of applicable operators and engineers have received training on operability determinations.

Between 80-89% of

managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

Between 80-90% of applicable personnel have received training on the decision making process.

Between 80-90% of applicable in the section personnel have received training on standards and expectations.

Between 80-90%of scheduled training identified by the CRC is completed in a timely manner.

More than 90% of applicable operators and engineers have received training on operability determinations.

~

More than 90% of managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

More than 90% of applicable personnel have received training on the decision making process.

More than 90% of applicable personnel in the section, have received training on standards and expectations.

~~~

More than 90% of scheduled training identified by the CRC is completed in a timely manner.

6 "This item assessed by Operations and Engineering only

• 'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Nuclear Training

Number:

DB BP-VP-0002

-4 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE

~

Revision:

Page 06 Page 38 of 60 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 18 of 39

2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA 2e. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT Commitment to continuous improvement is evident ATTRl BUTE Improvements in management staffing*

Restart Overview Panel (ROP) **

Corrective Action Review Board (CARB)+

Engineering Assessment Board (AB)++

RED Most requisitions for management positions (all exempt employees) have not been filled in the past month.

The ROP does not believe DB is ready to restart.

There are no directors on the CARB.

The backlog of documents awaiting CARB review is more than four weeks.

The backlog of documents awaiting EAB review is greater than four weeks.

~~

~~

YELLOW About 50% of open requisitions for management (all exempt employees) positions have been filled in the past month.

~

The ROP has expressed concerns over DB restart.

~

~~~

The CARB has been enhanced with director-level personnel.

The backlog of documents awaiting CARB review is less than four weeks.

The backlog of documents awaiting EAB review is less than four weeks.

WHITE About 75% of open requisitions for management positions (all exempt employees) have been filled in the past month.

The ROP has expressed some minor concerns and believes DB can restart.

The CARB has been enhanced with director-level personnel.

The backlog of documents awaiting CARB review is less than two weeks.

The backlog of documents awaiting EAB review is less than two weeks.

GREEN At least 85% of open requisitions for management positions (all exempt employees) have been filled in the past month.

The ROP is satisfied with DB progress to restart.

The CARB has been enhanced with director-level personnel.

The backlog of documents awaiting CARB review is less than one week.

The backlog of documents awaiting EAB review is less than one week.

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources

• • Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chief Operating Officer or Executive Vice President

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance Improvement

++Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Director-Nuclear Engineering 6

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06 1 Pane 39 of 60 Number:

Revision:

I Page D B B P-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 19 of 39

2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA 2e. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT (cont i n ued)

Commitment to continuous improvement is evident ATTRIBUTE Benchmarking againsf industry standards Management observations **

Temporary modifications+#

Number of Operator work-aroundsY#

Number of Control Room deficiencies *#

RED Less than 50%

( 4 2 ) of sections have scheduled any benchmarking in accordance with NOBP-LP-2002 or NG-EN-00385 for 4th quarter 2003 and 1 quarter 2004.

A management observation program has been established. Less than 70% of management observations are performed as scheduled, and observations are weak.

There are more than 11 temporary modifications.

There are more than 2 operator workarounds.

There are more than 4 Control Room deficiencies.

YELLOW Between 50-65%

sections have scheduled any benchmarking in accordance with or NG-EN-00385 for 4Ih quarter 2003 and 1

quarter 2004.

(1 2-1 5) of NOBP-LP-2002 A management observation program has been established.

More than 70% of management observations are performed as scheduled, and observations are weak.

There are 11 or less temporary modifications.

There are 2 operator workarounds.

There are 4 Control Room deficiencies.

• This item assessed by Operations only WHITE Between 65-80% of sections (16-20) have scheduled any benchmarking in accordance with NOBP-LP-2002 or NG-EN-00385 for 4'h quarter 2003 and I St quarter 2004.

A management observation program has been established.

More than 80% of management observations are performed as scheduled and most are considered acceptable.

There are 8 or less temporary modifications.

There is 1 operator workarounds.

There are 1-3 Control Room deficiencies.

GREEN More than 80% of sections (>20) have scheduled any benchmarking in accordance with NOBP-LP-2002 or NG-EN-00385 for 4'h quarter 2003 and I

" quarter 2004.

A management observation program has been established.

More than 90% of management observations are performed as scheduled and contain quality information.

There are 5 or less temporary modifications.

There are no operator workarounds.

There are no Control Room deficiencies.

• • Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation program

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Plant Engineering

1. Significance evaluation will be discussed during the Restart Readiness Review Safety Culture Assessment and the outcome of this discussion may affect any or all of the attribute ratings.

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED Number:

Revision:

Page DBB P-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 20 of 39

2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA 2e. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT (con t i n ued)

Commitment to continuous improvement is evident ATTRIBUTE Training on SCWE*

Licensed operator pipeline **

RED Less than 70% of

managers, supervisors and operators have received training on SCWE.

Less than 70% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.

YELLOW Between 70-79%

of managers, supervisors and operators have received training on SCWE.

Between 70-84%

of new operators passed their initial license for the most recent class examination.

~

WHITE Between 80-90% of

managers, supervisors and operators have received training on SCWE.

Between 8595% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.

GREEN More than 90% of managers, supervisors and operators have received training on SCWE.

More than 95% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Nuclear Training "This item assessed by Operations only.

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Title:

APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page21 of39 Number:

Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 06 Page 41 of 60

2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA

' Use of SCWERT*

2e. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT (continued)

SAFETY CONSCIOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT (SCWE)

Commitment to continuous improvement is evident I ATTRIBUTE Effectiveness of SC WERT in avoiding discrimination claims*

Effectiveness in avoiding NRC or ECP substantiated discrimin ation claims

• RED More than 4 CRs issued within the past six months related to failure to properly conduct SCWERT review of Davis-Besse work disciplinary actions prior to the action.

There are more than 5 NRC allegations or ECP concerns of discrimination submitted within the past six months There is more than one substantiated NRC or ECP discrimination claim within the past six months.

YELLOW Between 4-2 CRs issued within the past six months related to failure to properly conduct SCWERT review of Davis-Besse work disciplinary actions prior to the action.

There are 5 NRC allegations or ECP concerns of discrimination submitted within the past six months.

There is one substantiated NRC or ECP discrimination claim within the past six months WHITE Less than 2 CRs issued within the past six months related to failure to properly conduct SCWERT review of Davis-Besse work disciplinary actions prior to the action.

There are 4 NRC allegations or ECP concerns of discrimination submitted within the past six months.

There are no substantiated NRC or ECP discrimination claims within the past six months.

GREEN No CRs issued within the past six months related to failure to properly conduct SCWERT review of Davis-Besse work disciplinary actions prior to the action.

There are 2 or fewer NRC allegations or ECP concerns of discrimination submitted within the past six months There are no substantiated NRC or ECP discrimination claims within the past year.

6

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Employee Concerns Program

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

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Revision:

Page D B B P-V P-0 00 2 06 Page 42 of 60

2. MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA 2f. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CROSS-FUNCTIONAL WORK MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION Commitment to cross functional work management and communication is evident ATTRIBUTE Cross-functional team work Department interfaces Performance to schedule*

interdepartmental communication RED No cross-functional teamwork is evident among sections Many process breakdowns occur within the Department with extensive amounts of rework needed.

Less than 70% of work is completed on time, as scheduled, causing major consequences to overall site performance.

Information that impacts downstream implementation is not shared, causing significant negative consequences to other departments.

YELLOW Some cross-functional teamwork among sections exists but work is sub-optim ked.

Some process breakdowns occur within the Department with frequent amounts of rework needed.

Between 70-80%

of work is completed on time, as scheduled, with major adjustments to resource capacity required to improve performance.

Information that impacts downstream implementation is inconsistently shared, which keeps other departments in a reactive mode.

WHITE Cross-functional teamwork frequently occurs among sections, enabling efficient and effective workflow.

Minimal process breakdowns and rework occur within the Department with effective and efficient resolution of emergency issues.

Between 80 -90% of work is completed on time, as scheduled, with minimal adjustments to resource capacity required to improve performance.

Information that impacts downstream implementation is frequently shared on a timely basis, enabling departments to proactively plan and respond.

GREEN Cross-functional teams among sections are constantly forminglreforming around the best way to get work done.

Department interfaces are seamless; work flows efficiently between departments throughout the entire organization.

More than 90% of work is completed on time, as scheduled, within current resource capacity.

Information that impacts downstream implementation is communicated as soon as it's known, enabling departments to work proactively on a consistent basis.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Outage Manageme and Work Control

.r I.-

Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Revision:

Page 06 Page 43 of 60 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 23 of 39

2. MANAGERS COMMITMENT AREA 2f. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CROSS-FUNCTIONAL WORK MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION (continued)

Commitment to cross lnterdepartmental problem solving and decision making Systemic learning lncorporafing industry Operating Experience

• Problem solving and decision making occurs in isolation; non-involvement of other Departments or stakeholders.

Things are broken down, focus is on the pieces and discrete problems are fixed within the section with no understanding of interdependencies.

Industry operating experience is not consistently fully utilized to enhance site performance.

nctional work management and commi Cross-functional

sections, Departments or stakeholders are seldom involved when problems are being solved and decisions are made.

Discrete problems are fixed within the section with minimal understanding of interdependencies There is less than full utilization and minimal compliance to our Operating Experience Program Cross-functional

sections, Departments or stakeholders are frequently involved when problems are being solved and decisions are made.

Attention is focused on learning and discovering fundamental solutions to resolving long-standing andlor complex problems within the section There is full utilization and compliance with the Operating Experience Program ication is evident Cross-functional

sections, Departments or stakeholders are consistently involved when problems are being solved and decisions are made.

Streamlining and improving systems and process is constant to resolve long-standing andlor complex problems within the section Operating Experience is consistently and fully utilized in every department and is well-integrated into everyday activities to enhance plant performance.

6

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Operating Experience Program

'r NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

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Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 06 Page 44 of 60 I ATTRIBUTE FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies l------

Quality of management and employee relationships

• Organizational Commitment and shared success criteria RED FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies are not used by management personnel within the section Employee Concerns Program, Quality Assessment and 4Cs survey data indicates that employees openly express fear of retaliation and will not raise safety concerns with management.

Section management focuses on what is in the best interest of their section at the expense of what is in the best interest of the whole organization.

YELLOW FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies are inconsistently demonstrated by some management personnel within the section WHITE FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies are frequently demonstrated by some management personnel within the section Employee Concerns Program, Quality Assessment and 4Cs survey data indicates that more than 70%

of employees will bring safety concerns to management.

Employees Concerns Program, Quality Assessment and 4Cs survey data indicates that more than 80% of employees will bring concerns to management.

Section management occasionally supports what is in the best interest of their section without consideration to what is in the best interest of the whole organization.

Section management frequently supports doing what is in the best interest of the whole organization rather than what is in the best interest of their section.

I GREEN Most management personnel in the section have internalized and are living the FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies as demonstrated in their day to day actions.

Employee Concerns Program, Quality Assessment and 4Cs survey data indicate more than 90% of employees raise issues directly with management, work collaboratively to resolves issues and reflect favorable improvement.

Section management consistently supports doing what is in the best interest for the whole organization rather than what is in the best interest for their section.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by ECP, NQA and 4Cs

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE

Title:

APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 25 of 39 Number:

Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 06 Page 45 of 60

2. MANAGERS COMMITMENT AREA Between 80-90% of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence.

2g. CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT OF More than 90% of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence ENGAGEMENT AND COMMITMENT (continued)

An environment of engagement and commitment is evident Performance reviews in accordance with Ownership for Excellence*

Ownership for Excellence Development Plans*

Less than 70% of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence.

Less than 70% of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR Between 70-80%

of performance reviews for the section were completed for the review period per Ownership for Excellence.

Between 70-80%

of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources I

Between 80-90% of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR More than 90% of managers and supervisors have development plans submitted to HR 6

\\

L NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

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Revision:

Page DB BP-VP-0002 06 Page 46 of 60

3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA 3a. CRITERIA RELATED TO DRIVE FOR EXCELLENCE Nuclear assets of people and plant are continuously improved to enhance margins of safety ATTRl B UTE Maintenance Rule (a) (I) Systems*

Number of Operator workarounds **#

Number of Control Room deficiencies **#

Number of temporary modifications+#

Individual Error Rate++

RED There are more than 3 Red (a)(l) systems.

There are more than 2 operator workarounds.

There are more than 4 Control Room deficiencies.

There are more than 11 temporary modifications.

The individual error rate is

> 0.30 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

YELLOW There are 2 Red (a)( 1 ) systems.

There are 2 operator workarounds.

There are 4 Control Room deficiencies.

There are 11 or less temporary modifications.

The individual error rate is

~ 0. 3 1 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

WHITE There is one Red (a)(l) system.

There is 1 operator workarounds.

There are 1-3 Control Room deficiencies.

There are 8 or less temporary modifications.

The individual error rate is <0.29 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

GREEN There are zero Red (a)(l) systems.

There are no operator workarounds.

There are no Control Room deficiencies.

There are 5 or less temporary modifications.

The individual error rate is ~0.26 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Plant Engineering

• 'This item assessed by Operations only

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Engineering

++Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Performance

1. Significance evaluation will be discussed during the Restart Readiness Review Safety Culture Assessment and the outcome of this discussion may affect any or all of the attribute ratings.

6

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Title:

APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 27 of 39

3. INDIVIDUALS COMMITMENT AREA 3a. CRITERIA RELATED TO DRIVE FOR EXCELLENCE (continued)

Nuclear assets of people and plant are continuously improved to enhance margins of safety Number:

Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 06 Page 47 of 60 Percent of self-identified Condition Reports (C Rs)

• Number of open Condition Report evaluations*

Less than 80% of the CRs originated are self-iden tified.

Engineering Assessment Board (EAB) index**

80% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.

Performance during major plant evolutions+

At least 80-90% of SCAQ evaluations and 70-80% of CAQ evaluations were completed on schedule for the previous quarter.

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 3.0 or less.

Addressing Operating Experience At least 90% of SCAQ evaluations and 80-90% of CAQ evaluations were completed on schedule for the previous quarter.

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 2.0 or less.

Operational trant More than one significant event has occurred during a plant evolution in the past month One significant event has occurred during a plant evolution in the past month 90% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.

Less than 70% of operating experience reports applicable to the section are completed on time Less than 80% of SCAQ evaluations and less than 70%

of CAQ evaluations were completed on schedule for the previous quarter.

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is greater than 3.0.

Between 70-80% of Between 80-90% of operating operating experience experience reports reports applicable to applicable to the section are completed on time completed on time the section are Major plant evolutions have been performed in the past month with some less than significant challenges or transients.

~~

95% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.

All SCAQ evaluations and 90% of CAQ evaluations were completed on schedule for the previous quarter.

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is I

.O or less.

Major plant evolutions have been performed in the past month as planned.

More than 90% of operating experience reports applicable to the section are completed on time.

hutdown) and results in significant changes in primary or secondary plant parameters or results in significant changes in mechanical or electrical lineups.

Significant is defined by INPO as an event which caused or had the potential to cause an appreciable reduction in plant safety or reliability, excessive radiation exposure, the discharge of radioactivity offsite or serious harm to individuals. The significance of a particular event (including the discovery of a serious deficiency, lies in the actual or potential consequences of the event or in the likelihood that it is a precursor to a more serious event.

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance Improvement

• • Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Director-Nuclear Engineering

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Operations 6

t NUCLEAR OPEWTING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Number:

Revision:

I Paoe DBBP-VP-0002 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA 06 Page 48 of 60 Page 28 of 39

3. INDIVIDUALS COMMITMENT AREA 3b. CRITERIA RELATED TO QUESTONING ATTITUDE 6

iallenges are welc YELLOW Management observations and QA field observations show that most pre-job briefs are acceptable.

Between 13-1 5%

of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.

ned WHITE Management observations and QA field observations show that, with some exceptions, pre-job briefs are acceptable.

ATTRIBUTE GREEN RED Management observations and QA field observations show that most pre-job briefs are not acceptable.

Quality of pre-job briefs

• Management observations and QA field observations show that pre-job briefs in general are acceptable.

More than 17% of individuals wrote CRs during the past month.

Percent of CRs per person per group**

Between 15-1 7% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.

Less than 13% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.

The number of programmatic CRs indicates that individuals in general are reluctant to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.

The number of programmatic CRs indicates that most individuals are willing to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.

The number of programmatic CRs indicates that a large majority of individuals are willing to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.

The number of programmatic CRs indicates that individuals in general are willing to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.

Number of programmatic CRs**

Program and process error rate+

>0.48 program and process errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

~ 0. 4 8 program and process errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

~0.30 program and process errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

~0.27 program and process errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

Raising problems*

Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are not raising problems encountered in the field.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are raising problems encountered in the field.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that a large majority of individuals are raising problems encountered in the field.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that individuals in general are raising problems encountered in the field.

Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program and NQA.

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance Improvement.

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Performance

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3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA Page 29 of 39 3c. CRITERIA RELATED TO RIGOROUS WORK CONTROL AND PRUDENT APPROACH Performing activities in a quality manner is the standard ATTRIBUTE RED YELLOW WHITE GREEN Event Free Clock*

The event free clock is 30 to 39 days on average.

The event free clock is greater than 40 days on average.

The event free clock is between 20 and 30dayson average.

There are between 8 and 10 OSHA recordables per year.

The individual error rate is 0.31 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

The event free clock is less than 20 days on average.

There are 11 or more OSHA recordables per year.

Industrial safety performance **

There are 4 to 7 OSHA recordables per year.

There are no more than 3 OSHA recordables per year.

Individual error rate*

The individual error rate is ~ 0. 2 9 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

The individual error rate is ~ 0. 2 6 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

The individual error rate is

>0.30 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

>0.48 program and process errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

~~

~ 0. 4 8 program and process errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

<.30 program and process errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

~ 0. 2 7 program and process errors per 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> worked.

Program and process error rate*

Significant human performance errors resulting in plant transients There are fewer than 3 significant human performance errors per year resulting in plant transients.

There were no significant human performance errors per year resulting in plant transients.

There are fewer than 2 significant human performance errors per year resulting in plant transients.

There are more than 3 significant human performance errors per year resulting in plant transients.

There are more than 200 open PC Rs.

There are less than 200 open PCRs.

There are less than 150 open PCRs.

There are less than100 open PCRs.

Backlog of procedure change requests (PCRs)+

Operational transient I defined by INPO as a plant transient that occurs (reactor critical orb iile shutdown) and results in significant changes in primary or secondary plant parameters or results in significant changes in mechanical or electrical lineups.

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Performance "Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Industrial Safety

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance Improvement

r Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Revision:

I Page RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE 1

06 1 Paae 50 of 60 WHITE The deficiency rate for QC holds point is less than 15 %.

APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 30 of 39 GREEN The deficiency rate for QC hold points is less than 7 %.

3. INDIVIDUALS COMMITMENT AREA 3c. CRITERIA RELATED TO RIGOROUS WORK CONTROL AND PRUDENT APPROACH (continued)

There are between 149 and 134 CM activities outstanding.

Performing activities in a quality manner is the standard There are less than 134 CM activities outstanding.

ATTRl BUT E There is one Red are one or two (a)(l) systems.

Deficiency rate for QC holds*

There are zero Red (a)(l) systems.

Rework rate**

Ratio of completed to scheduled works orders per week+

Number of late preventive maintenance (PM) activities+

Backlog of corrective maintenance (CM) activities+

Number of Maintenance Rule (a)(?) systems++

RED Deficiency rate for QC hold points is more than 25%.

Rework rate is more than 3%.

Less than 50%

of scheduled work orders are completed.

Less than 50%

of scheduled work orders are completed.

There are more than 230 CM activities outstanding.

There are more than 3 Red (a)(l) systems.

YELLOW The deficiency rate for QC hold points is less than 25%.

The rework rate is 2.5-3.0%.

More than 50% of scheduled work orders are completed.

More than 50% of scheduled PMs are completed.

There are between 229 and 150 CM activities outstanding.

There are 2 Red (a)(l) systems.

I The rework rate is 2.1 -2.5%.

More than 75% of scheduled work orders are completed.

The rework rate is

<2.0%.

More than 90% of scheduled work orders are completed.

More than 75% of scheduled PM are completed.

More than 90% of scheduled PMs are completed.

I

• This item assessed by QC only.

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Outage Management and Work Control

• • This item assessed by Maintenance only

++Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Plant Engineering

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE I

06 1 Paae 51 of 60 DB B P-VP-0002 Revision:

I Page APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 31 of 39 RED More than one significant event has occurred during a plant evolution in the past month.

There are more than three transients during major plant evolutions prior to restart.

3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA YELLOW One significant event has occurred during a plant evolution in the past month.

There are three or fewer transients during major plant evolutions prior to restart.

3c. CRITERIA RELATED TO RIGOROUS WORK CONTROL AND PRUDENT APPROACH (con t i n ued)

Performing activities in a quality manner is the standard ATTRIBUTE Performance during major plant evolutions @

~

WHITE Major plant evolutions have been performed with some transients or one significant event during major plant evolutions prior to restart.

Use of procedures and work orders

• Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are not using procedures or work orders.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are using procedures or work orders.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that a large majority of individuals are using procedures or work orders.

GREEN Major plant evolutions have been performed as planned. There are no transients or significant events during major plant evolutions prior to restart.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that individuals in general are using procedures or work orders.

Operational transient is defined by INPO as a plant transient that occurs (reactor critical or while shutdown) and results in significant changes in primary or secondary plant parameters or results in significant changes in mechanical or electrical lineups.

Significant is defined by INPO as an event that caused or had the potential to cause an appreciable reduction in plant safety or reliability, excessive radiation exposure, the discharge of radioactivity offsite or serious harm to individuals. The significance of a particular event (including the discovery of a serious deficiency, lies in the actual or potential consequences of the event or in the likelihood that it is a precursor to a more serious event.

6

@ Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Operations

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program and NQA

NUCLEAR OPEWTING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 32 of 39

3. INDIVIDUALS COMMITMENT AREA 3d. CRITERIA RELATED TO OPEN COMMUNICATIONS Associates are comfortable in voicing opinions, issues and concerns Number:

Revision.

Page DBB P-VP-0002 06 Page 52 of 6C ATTRIBUTE Number of CRs per person per group Worker confidence in raising safety concerns feedback from 4Cs meetings+

Keep improving Performance (KIP) program++

RED Less than 13% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.

Surveys and/or interviews indicate that less than 80% of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

Feedback from the 4Cs meetings indicates that most individuals are not willing to raise concerns to management.

Each months total Safe behavior is 59%

or less.

YELLOW Between 13-1 5% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.

Surveys and/or interviews indicate that between 80-90%

of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

Feedback from the 4Cs meetings indicates that more than 70% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to management.

Each months total Safe behavior is 60%

to 69%.

WHITE

. Between 1517% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.

Surveys and/or interviews indicate that between 90-95% of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

Feedback from the 4Cs meetings indicates that more than 80% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to management.

Each months total Safe behavior is 70% to 79%.

GREEN More than 17% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.

Surveys and/or interviews indicate that more than 95%

of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

Feedback from the 4Cs meetings indicates that more than 90% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to management.

Each months total Safe behavior is 80% or higher.

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance Improvement

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chief Operating Officer

++Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Industrial Safety

i 5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Number:

DBBP-VP-0002

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED Revision:

Page APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 33 of 39

3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA 3d. CRITERIA RELATED TO OPEN COMMUNICATIONS (continued)

Associates are comfortable in voicing opinions, issues and concerns PLANT OUTAGE ATTRlB UTE 06 I Page 53 of 60 P re job briefings@

Intra-department information sharing Quality of communication RED Management observations and QA field observations show that most pre-job briefs are not acceptable.

No formal communication structures exist for sharing information among the sections of the department.

4Cs surveys indicate that more than 50%

of employees believe that the communication from their Managers is poor YELLOW Management observations and QA field observations show that most pre-job briefs are acceptable.

Infrequent information sharing exists among the sections of the department.

4Cs surveys indicate that more than 50% of employees believe that communication from their Managers is fair WHITE Management observations and QA field observations show that, with some exceptions, pre-job briefs are acceptable.

Formal communication structures exist and are occasionally used to share information among the sections of the department.

~~

4Cs surveys indicate that more than 70%

of employees believe that communication from their Managers is fair.

GREEN Management observations and QA field observations show that pre-job briefs in general are acceptable.

Formal communication structures exist and are consistently used to share information among the sections of the department.

4Cs surveys indicate that more than 70% of employees believe that communication from their Managers is good.

@Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program and NQA

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chief Operating Officer 6

6

L NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READ1 NESS REV1 EW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE ATTRIBUTE Employee awareness of SCWE policy Number:

Revision:

Page DBB P-VP-0002 06 Page 54 of 60 Training on SCWE

• Between 70-79% of managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

NQA interviews+

Between 80-89% of

managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

Worker confidence in raising safety concerns

~~~~

NQA interviews indicate that between 8590% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to their supervisors or ECP.

APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 34 of 39 NQA interviews indicate that between 90-95% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to their supervisors or ECP.

3. INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA 3d. CRITERIA RELATED TO OPEN COMMUNICATIONS (continued)

SAFETY CONSCIOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT (SCWE)

RED Surveys and/or interviews indicate that less than 80% of employees in the section are aware of policy.

Less than 70% of managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

NQA interviews indicate that less than 85% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to their supervisors or ECP.

Surveys and/or interviews indicate that less than 80% of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

YELLOW I

WHITE Surveys and/or interviews indicate that 80-90% of employees in the section are aware of policy and consider it a FE value.

Surveys and/or interviews indicate that 90-95% of employees in the section are aware of policy and consider it an FE value.

Surveys andlor interviews indicate that between 80-90% of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

Surveys andlor interviews indicate that between 90-95%

of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

GREEN Surveys and/or interviews indicate that more than 95%

of employees in the section are aware of policy and consider it an FE value and the normal way to do business.

More than 90% of

managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

NQA interviews indicate that more than 95% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to their supervisors or ECP.

Surveys andlor interviews indicate that more than 95%

of workers in the section believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Nuclear Training

'*Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Employee Concerns Program

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by NQA

L NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED I PLANT OUTAGE I

06 I Paae 55 of 601 Number:

Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 35 of 39 Between 70-80 %

of employees that use the ECP report being satisfied with the process.

3. INDIVIDUALS COMMITMENT AREA Between 80-90% of employees that use the ECP report being satisfied with the process.

3d. CRITERIA RELATED TO OPEN COMMUNICATIONS (continued)

EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM (ECP)

Employee surveys indicate between 70-80%

of individuals believe management supports ECP.

ATTRIBUTE Employee surveys indicate between 80-90% of individuals believe management supports ECP.

Ratio of concerns submitted to ECP vs. NRC allegations based on three month rolling average

• Satisfaction of employees using the ECP*

Complaints of breach of confidentiality of ECP*

Management support for ECP*

RED There are more NRC allegations than ECP concerns.

Less than 70% of employees that use the ECP report being satisfied with the process.

There are more than 2 complaints this year.

Employee surveys indicate less than 70% of individuals believe management supports ECP.

YELLOW I WHITE I

There are more ECP concerns than NRC allegations.

There are at least 4 times more ECP concerns than NRC allegations or there are no NRC allegations.

There are 2 complaints this year.

There is 1 complaint this year. I GREEN There are at least 8 times more ECP concerns than NRC allegations or there are no NRC allegations or ECP concerns.

~

More than 90% of employees that use the ECP report being satisfied with the process.

There are zero complaints this year.

Employee surveys indicate more than 90%

of individuals believe management supports ECP.

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Employee Concerns Program

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE I

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA

3. INDIVIDUALS COMMITMENT AREA 3e. CRITERIA RELATED TO NUCLEAR PROFESSIONALISM Page 36 of 39 Persistence and urgency in identification and resolution of problems is prevalent Number:

Revision:

Page D B B P-VP-0002 06 Page 56 of 60 6

l 6 ATTRIBUTE Ownership for Excellence Development Plans RED Less than 70% of applicable employees in the section have completed Ownership for Excel I ence development plans.

YELLOW Between 70-80 %

of applicable employees in the section have completed Ownership for Excellence development plans.

WHITE GREEN Between 80-90% of applicable employees in the section have completed Ownership for Excellence development plans.

More than 90% of applicable employees in the section have completed Ownership for Excellence development plans.

Training attendance **

Training attendance is less than 85%.

The rework rate is more than 3%.

Training attendance is between 8590%.

Training attendance is between 91 -98%.

Training attendance is greater than 98%.

Rework rate+

The rework rate is 2.1 -2.5%.

The rework rate is

<2.0%.

The rework rate is 2.5-3.0%.

~~

Results of EAB assessments++

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is greater than 3.0.

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EA6 is 3.0 or less.

The quality of engineering products as measure by the EA6 is 2.0 or less The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is I

.O or less.

Training performance score per 7507#

Radiation Protection events @

NOBP-TR-Overall Training performance score less than 60%

Overall Training performance score between 60-80%.

Overall Training performance score between 80-90%

Overall Training performance score greater than 90%

There are 1-3 radiation protection events per quarter.

There is I radiation protection event per quarter.

There are no radiation protection events per quarter.

There are more than 3 radiation protection events per quarter.

• • Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Nuclear

+This item assessed by Maintenance only aining

++This item assessed by Engineering only. Data provided by Director-Nuclear Engineering

1. This item assessed by Nuclear Training only.

@Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Radiation Protection. An RP event is defined as any radiological event that would be included in the NRC Performance Indicator for Radiation Safety Cornerstone.

Lr NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE t

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 37 of 39

3. I NDlVl DUALS COMMITMENT AREA 3e. CRITERIA RELATED TO NUCLEAR PROFESSIONALISM (continued)

Persistence and urgency in identification and resolution of problems is prevalent Number:

Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 06 Page 57 of 60 ATTRIBUTE Chemistry Performance Index Procedure compliance*

Personal initiative 0 wnership RED The index is greater than 1.036.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are not complying with procedures.

Few employees in the section routinely express why work cant be done or improved.

Employees in the section dont follow through on assigned commitments and seldom volunteer for ownership.

YELLOW The index is equal to or less than 1.036.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are complying with procedures.

Employees in the section work hard to do whats expected.

Employees in the section are inconsistent in following through to meet quality and timing of assigned commitments.

WHITE The index is equal to or less than 1.004.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that a large majority of individuals are complying with procedures.

Employees in the section do what it takes to get the job done.

Employees in the section follow through and do what is asked of them and do what is defined within their job description.

GREEN The index is equal to or less than 1.OOO.

~~

Management observations and NQA field observations show that individuals in general are complying with procedures.

Employees at all levels in the section take personal initiative to invent methods to achieve higher quality and greater efficiency.

Most employees in the section regularly volunteer to ownllead project, develop plans, coordinate efforts and see work through to completion.

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chemistry Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program and NQA 6

i 4

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Number:

Title:

Revision:

I Page DB B P-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 38 of 39

3. INDIVIDUALS COMMITMENT AREA 3e. CRITERIA RELATED TO NUCLEAR PROFESSIONALISM (continued)

Persistence in identification and resolution of problems is prevalent RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE ATTRIBUTE 06 Page 58 of 60 Implementation of CAP improvements*

WHITE Implementation of the CAP improvements for restart is completed but the associated training is not completed.

The root cause evaluation approval rate as determined by the CARB is between 7590%.

Root cause e valuation quality*

GREEN The CAP improvements designated for restart are completed and associated training is completed.

The root cause evaluation approval rate as determined by the CARB is 90% or greater.

CR category accuracy*

The CR category accuracy rate is between 80-90%.

90% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.

CR self-idenfification rate*

The CR category accuracy rate is 90% or greater.

95% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.

Employee survey+

Employee surveys indicate that between 52% of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

RED Employee surveys indicate that less than 2% of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

Implementation of the CAP improvements designated for restart has not

started, The root cause evaluation approval rate as determined by the CARB is less than 50%.

The CR category accuracy rate is less than 70% or greater.

Less than 80% of the CRs originated are self-identified.

Employee surveys indicate that more than 10 % of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

YELLOW Implementation of the CAP improvements designated for restart is started but none are completed.

The root cause evaluation approval rate as determined by the CARB is between 50-74%.

The CR category accuracy rate is between 70-80%.

80% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.

Employee surveys indicate that between 104% of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

I I

6

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance Improvement

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Employee Concerns Program

Y v

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Number:

Title:

Revision:

Page D B B P-VP-0002 RESTART READINESS REV1 EW EXTENDED APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 39 of 39

3. INDIVIDUALS COMMITMENT AREA 3e. CRITERIA RELATED TO NUCLEAR PROFESSIONALISM (continued)

Persistence in identification and resolution of problems is prevalent I ATTRIBUTE NQA interviews*

Timeliness of corrective actions RED NQA interviews indicate that more than 10%

of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

Less than 50% of corrective actions for section CRs are completed on schedule without extensions.

YELLOW NQA interviews indicate that between 104% of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

Between 50-74%

of corrective actions for section CRs are completed on schedule without extensions.

WHITE NQA interviews indicate that between -

5 2 % of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

Between 75-89%of corrective actions for section CRs are completed on schedule without extensions.

GREEN NQA interviews indicate that less than 2 % of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

More than 90% of corrective actions for section CRs are completed on schedule without extensions.

6

• Site wide assessment only. Data provided by NQA

r I

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE 4

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Number:

Revision:

Page D B B P-VP-0002 06 Page 60 of 60 ATTACHMENT I O :

SAFETY CULTURE ASSESSMENT INDICATOR MATRIX T

0 m

I Site wide I ;$clement Reactor En Regulatory t

Emergency t

I Business Services Human Resources