ML032660907

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Special Report Regarding Fire Detection and Suppression Systems Inoperable for More than 14 Days and Yard Fire Hydrant Inoperable
ML032660907
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/16/2003
From: Mecredy R
Rochester Gas & Electric Corp
To: Clark R
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML032660907 (2)


Text

Robert C. Mecredy R

OW Vice President Always at Your Service Nuclear Operations September 16, 2003 Mr. Robert L. Clark Office of Nuclear Regulatory Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

Special Report, Fire Detection and Suppression Systems Inoperable For More Than 14 Days and Yard Fire Hydrant Inoperable Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Clark:

In accordance with the Ginna Station Technical Requirements Manual (TRM), Required Actions TR 3.3.4.C.1, TR 3.7.2.B.1 and TR 3.7.6.B.1, this thirty (30) day special report is being submitted, outlining the causes of inoperability and plans for restoration to operable status of the following components/systems:

S-12, Diesel Generator Room A Fire Detection and Suppression System S-13, Diesel Generator Room B Fire Detection and Suppression System Yard Fire Hydrant #12 Beginning on August 11, 2003, activities affecting fire system components were initiated to support the modification of the piping associated with the fire suppression systems in the diesel generator rooms. Based on the scope of the modifications, it was anticipated during installation planning that the fire detection and suppression system components would be inoperable longer than specified in the TRM (14 days).

The Diesel Generator (DG) Room A and DG Room B fire detection and suppression systems (S-12 and S-13) were declared inoperable at approximately 0558 EST on August 11, 2003 and 0600 EST on August 13, 2003 respectively. Compensatory actions were immediately taken as per TRM Required Action TR 3.3.4.A.1 for the inoperable fire detection systems and 3.7.2.A.1 for the inoperable fire suppression systems. A continuous fire watch was established in each room with backup fire suppression equipment (additional fire extinguishers).

An equal opportunity employer 89 East Avenue I Rochester, NY 14649 tel (585) 546-2700 www.rge.com IOXYv' EF An Energy East Company

Per TRM Required Action 3.3.4.A.2 and 3.7.2.A.2, the fire detection and suppression systems are to be restored to operable status within 14 days. These Required Actions and associated Completion Times were not mets as had been anticipated before the start of the work on August 11, 2003. This resulted in entry into TRM Required Action 3.3.4.B.1 and 3.7.2.B.1 (30 day special report) on August 25, 2003 and August 27, 2003 respectively. The DG Room A fire detection and suppression system S-12 was restored to operable status on September 10, 2003, when that specific phase of the modification was completed. The DG Room B fire detection and suppression system S-13 was restored to operable status on September 12, 2003.

In an unrelated event, the required repairs of a leak in the town of Ontario site water supply line resulted in the inoperability of fire yard loop Hydrant #12 at 1614 EST on September 4,2003.

Per TRM Required Action 3.7.6.A.1, within one hour a 2.5 inch diameter hose is to be placed in an adjacent operable hose house of sufficient length to protect the transformers and standby auxiliary feedwater building. With the required repairs affecting the entire fire yard loop, there were no operable adjacent hose houses available. As a compensatory measure, a temporary alternate line (one 5" hose) was installed during the repair activity, such that manual fire fighting capability was available. It should be noted that the automatic suppression systems for the various transformer systems remained operable. The fire yard loop Hydrant #12 was restored to operable status at 0741 EST on September 5, 2003.

All required compensatory actions remained in effect until these fire system components were restored to operable status.

If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Thomas Harding, 585-771-3384.

Very tly yours, bert C. Mecredy I

xc:

Mr. Robert Clark (Mail Stop 0-8-C2)

Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Regional Administrator, Region 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S. NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector