Text

Submittal of Revision 5 of Nuclear Operating Business Practice, Restart Readiness Review Extended Plant Outage (DBBP-VP-0002)
	ML032380527
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	07/30/2003
From:	Myers L; FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Dyer J; NRC/RGN-III
References
	DBBP-VP-0002 Rev 5
	Download: ML032380527 (61)
	v • d • e

FENOC -

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor. Ohio 43449 Lew W. Myers Chief Operating Officer 4 19-32 1 - 7599 Fa: 4 19-32 1 - 7582 Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1323 July 30, 2003 Mr. James E. Dyer, Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 111 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532-4351

Subject:

Submittal of Revision 5 of the Nuclear Operating Business Practice, Restart Readiness Review Extended Plant Outage (DBBP-VP-0002)

Dear Mr. Dyer:

On June 15,2003 (Serial 1-1318), the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) submitted Revision 4 of the Nuclear Operating Business Practice DBBP-VP-0002, Restart Readiness Review Extended Plant Outage. This business practice provides the review process to ensure Davis-Besses materiel condition, programs and processes, and organization, including the organizations safety culture are ready for plant restart and safe, reliable operation.

This Business Practice was subsequently revised to enhance and refine the Restart Readiness Review process. The purpose of this letter is to submit Revision 5 of the Nuclear Operating Business Practice DBBP-VP-0002, Restart Readiness Review Extended Plant Outage, dated July 8, 2003 as an enclosure to this letter. This revision supercedes Revision 4 in its entirety.

No commitments are identified in the enclosure. Also, it should be noted that FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company may periodically update this document in the future.

If you have any questions or require further information, please contact Mr. Kevin L. Ostrowski, Manager - Regulatory Affairs, at (41 9) 32 1-8450.

Sincerely yours, GB/DG Attachment Enclosure

Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1323 Page 2 cc:

USNRC Document Control Desk J. B. Hopkins, DB-1 NRC/NRR Senior Project Manager C. S. Thomas, DB-1 Senior Resident Inspector Utility Radiological Safety Board

Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1323 Attachment Page 1 of 1 COMMITMENT LIST The following list identifies those actions committed to by the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by the DBNPS. They are described only for information and are not regulatory commitments.

Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Affairs (419-321-8450) at the DBNPS of any questions regarding this document or associated regulatory commitments.

COMMITMENTS None DUE DATE NIA

Docket Number 50-346 License Number NPF-3 Serial Number 1-1323 Enclosure Revision 5 of the Nuclear Operating Business Practice Restart Readiness Review Extended Plant Outage (DBBP-VP-0002)

(57 pages to follow)

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED

&PLANT OUTAGE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Numbec Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 05 Page 1 of 57 Approved:

I I

Vice President v A p p r o v e d : M d d

+

Ch-erating Officer Effective Date JR "8

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE

Title:

TABLE OF CONTENTS Paae Number Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 05 Page 2 of 57 I

.O PURPOSE.......................................................................................................

3 2.0 APPLICABILITY.............................................................................................

3 3.0 RESPONSIBILITY.........................

3 4.0 DETAILS........................................................................................................

4 ATTACHMENT 1:

ATTACHMENT 2:

ATTACHMENT 3:

ATTACHMENT 4:

ATTACHMENT 5:

ATTACHMENT 6:

ATTACHMENT 7:

ATTACHMENT 8 ATTACHMENT 9:

APPENDIX A:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATORS.....................

7 PLANT RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX....................................................................................

9 RESTART READINESS REVIEW FOR PLANT SHUTDOWN.............................................................................

12 PLANT INSPECTION DOCUMENTATION SHEET.................. 13 OPERATIONAL READINESS AFFIRMATION FORM.............. 14 CORE CONFIGURATION AFFIRMATION FORM................... 15 REACTOR STARTUP AFFIRMATION FORM......................... 16 SYSTEM ENGINEEWPROGRAM OWNER READINESS AFFIRMATION FORM.............................................................

17 ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE..................................

18 ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA................ 20 5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Tile:

Number:

Revision:

1 Page DBBP-VP-0002 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE 1.o PURPOSE 05 Page 3 of 57 The purpose of this Business Practice is to provide assurance that the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is ready to restart following the extended plant outage. The framework detailed here establishes a review process for areas not addressed by the Restart Test Plan and DB startup procedures to ensure that Davis-Besses materiel condition, programs and processes, and organization, including the organizations safety culture are ready for plant restart and safe, reliable operation.

2.0 APPLICABILITY This Business Practice applies to the first plant startup following this extended plant outage. It also applies to subsequent startups from this same outage and therefore shall be re-performed if the startup is halted resulting in an entry into a lower mode.

Adherence to this Business Practice is mandatory.

3.0 RESPONSIBILITY The Vice President-Nuclear is responsible for initiating the Restart Readiness Review Process.

Each Section Manager and 0350 Restart List Responsible Individual is responsible for the accuracy and adequacy of the reviews performed, actions taken and action plans developed during the review process.

The Section Managers of Plant Engineering and Operations and the Director-Work Management (Maintenance) are responsible for ensuring plant walkdown inspections are conducted prior to power ascension.

The Manager-Operations is responsible for affirming: I ) the Operations Section has completed a review of operational readiness and is ready to support the safe and reliable startup and operation of the plant through the next operating cycle; 2) that the plant is in a condition of materiel readiness to support safe and reliable startup and operation and the operating crews are prepared and ready to startup and operate the plant in a safe and reliable manner through the next operating cycle.

The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering is responsible for: 1 ) following movement of fuel in the reactor core, changes to reactivity control components in the reactor core and/or changes to nuclear instrumentation in the reactor core, verifying that the reactor core is configured to support safe and reliable operation through the cycle.

This affirmation is required prior to installation of the reactor head; 2) prior to reactor startup, verifying that the required conditions exist to support a safe startup and power ascension.

r NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Number:

DB B P-VP-0002

Title:

Revision:

Page RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE 05 Paae 4 of 57 4.0 Each Director is responsible for the final review of the assessment and action plans developed during the review process by the sections in his department.

The Chief Operating Officer is responsible for final approval prior to plant restart.

DETAILS

1. The review process shall be initiated early enough to ensure it is completed prior to entry into Modes 6, 4 and 2. The review shall be completed by the milestone date as determined by the responsible Shift Outage Director. All Sections and 0350 Checklist Responsible Individuals, shall submit restart readiness reviews by the milestone dates; not all items have to be complete, provided bullet (4) in Step 3 is appropriately addressed.

2. The process consists of the review and assessment of the specified Restart Readiness Review Indicators. The matrix on Attachment 2 designates the minimum indicators from Attachment I that are applicable to each Section and/or 0350 Checklist Item. Each Section and 0350 Checklist Responsible Individual, shall address applicable indicators and should participate in the review and assessment of any indicator for which meaningful input can be provided.

3. The methodology for the review process consists of the following steps:

Monitor plant systemlcomponent work activity progress during the outage Monitor emergent worWissues during the outage for shutdown concerns Monitor personnel and administrative issues during the outage for restart concerns Assess Restart Readiness Review Indicators as identified on Attachment 1, as applicable per Attachment 2.

Assess Safety Culture as identified on Attachment 9, Page 18 Identify items to be complete prior to the designated Mode (6,4 or 2) that have not been completed as of the Shift Outage Director milestone date.

Ensure a reference is associated with each incomplete item that addresses completion of that item before needed in that mode.

4.

Results of the individual indicator assessments, including the status of action plans to support plant restart, will be indicated on Attachment I, and acknowledged by the signature of the Section Manager or 0350 Checklist Responsible Individual. Indicator assessments should be marked as Final (all conditions are acceptable to support plant restart) or Preliminary (one or more indicators are not currently complete or acceptable and action plans will support

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Number:

Revision:

I Page DBB P-VP-0002 plant restart when complete). Details on incomplete items and the status of action plans to eliminate them shall be attached.

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE 05 Page 5 of 57

7. Completed Attachments 1 and 3 shall be included with the documentation package assembled in accordance with this Business Practice.

5. The signed original Restart Readiness Review Indicators (Attachment 1) should Readiness meetings for inclusion in the Mode Readiness notebook

6. Restart Readiness Review Indicators shall be reviewed by the Senior Leadership Team and approved by the Vice President-Nuclear or Chief Operating Officer, as be provided to the Restart Action Process Administrator at the end of the

8. Walk down inspections shall be completed prior to power ascension as described in this document and in accordance with EN-DP-01503, System Walkdowns and Plant Engineering Policy PE-02, System Walkdown Checklist. Results of walkdown inspections shall be documented in Attachment 4 and submitted to the on-shift Engineering Manager.

5

9. The Shift Manager of each crew should:

a.

b.

Conduct reasonable and appropriate activities to accomplish the objective of attaining, demonstrating and affirming operational readiness. The Shift Manager should consider the following to support the affirmation of operating crew readiness:

-adequacy of staffing levels, personnel experience and qualification levels.

-assure no uneasiness remains among Operations personnel regarding the Stations ability to operate safely by eliciting any outstanding safety concerns from shift personnel and ensuring that the concerns are resolved.

-completion of appropriate personnel refresher training of shift personnel, including training on plant, procedures and process changes.

-completion of training of shift personnel on the startup and power ascension plan. This training shall include discussion on the expected behavior and characteristics of the core for this startup.

Affirm to the best of their knowledge and judgment that the plant is in a condition of materiel readiness to support safe and reliable startup and operation. The Shift Manager should consider the following:

Number:

D B B P-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Revision:

Page 05 Page 6 of 57

-adequacy of the materiel condition of the plant, including the current status of operator work-arounds, to support safe and reliable restart and operation during the next operating cycle.

-all outage-related temporary fire suppression systems removed and fire protection requirements or commitments ready to support startup.

-temporary modifications, temporary power feeds, removed/MCCs restored, installed temporary power feeds, if applicable, reviewed to ensure they will not affect safety or operations.

c. Complete Attachment 5.

IO. The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering shall, following movement of fuel, changes to reactivity control components and/or changes to nuclear instrumentation in the reactor core, verify that the reactor core is configured to support safe and reliable operation through the cycle. This affirmation is required prior to installation of the reactor head. Attachment 6, Core Configuration Affirmation Form, details the required review areas and documents the affirmation.

11, The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering, shall, prior to a reactor startup, verify that the required conditions exist to support a safe startup and power ascension., Reactor Startup Affirmation Form, details the required review areas and documents that affirmation.

12. Each System Engineer and 0350 Program Owner shall complete Attachment 8, System EngineedPrograrn Owner Readiness Affirmation Form. The System Engineer forms shall be part of the Plant Engineering Manager's presentation for restart readiness. The 0350 Program Owner's form will be used as part of their readiness discussion. Selected systems (System Engineers) will be identified by the Manager-Operations, Manager-Plant Engineering and Plant Manager to be discussed during the Restart Readiness Review Meetings.

Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Revision:

Page RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE 05 Pane 7 of 57 I

1 2

3 4

5 6

7 8

9 10 11 12 ATTACHMENT 1 :

RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATORS Page 1 of 2 Plant Section or 0350 Checklist Item Mode All assigned outage work activities are complete to support plant restart and operations. This includes a reconfirmation that previous dispositions of nonconforming conditions or Preventive Maintenance deferrals continue to provide a justification for continued operation. (Attachment 2-a)

Outstanding Operability Evaluations, CR corrective actions and new CRs generated during the shutdown have been evaluated for operability concerns are either closed or determined to have no impact on operability. (Attachment 2-b)

Regulatory and internal commitments have been evaluated for operability concerns or restart restraints and are either closed or determined to have no impact on operability. (Attachment 2-c)

Housekeeping walkdowns utilizing the guidelines of NG-DB-00215, Material Readiness and Housekeeping Inspection Program are complete. (Attachment 24)

The Power Ascension Schedule has been reviewed for accuracy and adequacy ensuring: (Attachment 2-3)

Post maintenance retest and special testing are identified and scheduled correctly with instructions in place.

Planned walkdowns are scheduled appropriately a

0 Personnel, materials and special test equipment necessary to support power ascension retest and walkdown activities have been identified and availability is ensured during power ascension. (Attachment 2-9 Contingency plans are established for immediate response to plan and repair steam leaks or high-risk test failures. (Attachment 2-g)

Standing orders have been reviewed for continued applicability and system status sheets completed as required by DB-OP-06911, Pre-Startup Checklist. (Attachment System walkdowns have been performed by Plant Engineering and Maintenance, as directed by Operations, to ensure system readiness for restart.

Operating Experience reports have been reviewed to ensure no potential operability concerns.

2-h)

Procedure alterationslPCRs are ready for mode change or restart.

Work around and burdens identified prior to or during shutdown and not corrected have been confirmed acceptable. (Attachment 24)

Acceptable Restart?

Yes/No/NA to support

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Number:

1 DBBP-VP-0002 Revision:

Page 05 Page 8 of 57 ATTACHMENT 1 : RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATORS (Continued)

Page 2 of 2 Plant Section or 0350 Checklist Item Mode 13 14 15 16 17 All Management and Human Performance Improvement Plan items required for restart are complete. (Attachment 2-j)

All 0350 Discovery Action Plan milestones identified as required for restart are complete. (Attachment 2-k)

All 0350 Implementation Action Plan milestones identified as required for restart are complete. (Attachment 2-1)

All Section Corrective Action Program Improvement Plan activities required for restart have been validated as ready to support restart. (Attachment 24)

All Condition Reports and corrective actions, work orders, modifications (including EWRs and ECRs) categorized as 0350 are completed. (Attachment 2-m, n, 0) 18 All Condition Reports and corrective actions, work orders, and modifications (including EWRs and ECRs) designated as required for restart by the Restart Station Review Board are complete. (Attachment 2-q, r, s)

Any required for restart Condition Report or corrective action, work order or modification (including EWRs and ECRs), which cannot be completed prior to restart, has a written exemption from the RSRB. (Attachment 2-u)

All pending allegations have been reviewed and determined not to affect the restart of the plant. (Attachment 2-v)

Integrated Restart Report per NG-VP-00100 signed by the SMT. (Attachment 2-w) 19 20 21 Acceptable Restart?

Yes/No/NA to support Check one Preliminary: I have reviewed the assessment of the Restart Readiness Review Indicators as indicated above and confirm that the attached plans will support plant restart when complete.

Final: I have reviewed the assessment of the Restart Readiness Review Indicators as indicated above and concur that the current conditions support plant restart.

Section Manager or 0350 Checklist Individual (Please Print Your Name)

Signature:

Date Section Manager or 0350 Checklist Individual

I Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE 1

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Revision:

Page 05 Page 9 of 57 AlTACHMENT 2:

PLANT RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX Page 1 of 3 Security Organizational Development Training Safety Emergency Preparedness Other Departments OPIDIWQC Supply Chain Client Services Business Services Human Resources X

1 X

X X

x x

X x

x x

X X

x x

X X

I x X

X

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE ATTACHMENT 2:

PLANT RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX Page 2 of 3 Number:

Revision:

DBBP-VP-0002 Page 05 Page 10 of 57 0350 CHECKLIST ITEM RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX 0350 Checklist Item

1. Adequacy of Root Cause Determinations-X S. Loehlein, M. Roder, D. Gudger, J. Powers, D. Eshelman, L. Myers'

2. Adequacy of Safety Significant Structures, X

Systems and Components-D. Baker, A.

Stallard, T. Chambers, R. Hovland, J.

O'Neill*

3. Adequacy of Safety Significant Programs--A.

X McAllister, L. Dohrmann, S. Loehlein, M.

Shepherd, J. Grabnar, R.Farrell, J. Lee, R.

Perry, K. Ostrowski*

and Human Performance-R. Fast, J.

Powers'

4. Adequacy of Organizational Effectiveness X

5. Readiness for Restart-C. Price, F. VonAhn, R. Hovland, R. Schrauder, A. Stallard, J.

Hirsch*

X X

X

Or an approved designated alternate

6. Licensing Issue Resolution-J. Powers, K.

Ostrowski*

7. Confirmatory Action Letter Resolution-L.

Myers, K. Ostrowski" X

Number.

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE I

Revision:

Page 05 Pane 11 of 57 ATTACHMENT 2: PLANT RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX Page 3 of 3 REQUIRED FOR RESTART READINESS REVIEW INDICATOR MATRIX Board 1

Quality Services Employee Concerns Program Station Review Board (Plant Operating Review Company Nuclear Review Board 1 Restart Overview Panel I

I X

v)

C 0.-

c.

P a

s X

X

-t.x I

X

Number.

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Revision:

Page 05 Page 12 of 57 ATTACHMENT 3:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW FOR PLANT STARTUP RestarVMode Chancle Recommended By:

Plant Manager-Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Date Director-Davis-Besse Nuclear Engineering Date Director-Davis-Besse Work Management Date Director-Davis-Besse Support Services Date Director-Davis-Besse Restart Date Director-Davis-Besse Organizational Development Date RESTART /MODE CHANGE APPROVAL:

Vice President-Nuclear Date 5

5 Chief Operating Officer Date

1 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE I me:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Paae 13 of 57 ATTACHMENT 4:

PLANT INSPECTIONMIALKDOWN DOCUMENTATION SHEET Page 1 of 1 Mode ASSET LABEL:

Or AREA INSPECTED:

NOUN NAME:

LO CAT1 0 N :

DESCRIPTION:

MAINTENANCE TAGWORK ORDER #:

CONDITION REPORT INITIATED (#)

5 No MODE RESTRAINT:

Yes SUBMITTED BY:

DATERIME I

(please print your name)

SIGNATURE:

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Number:

Revision:

DBBP-VP-0002 I Paae ATTACHMENT 5:

OPERATIONAL READINESS AFFIRMATION FORM RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Shift Designator:

05 Page 14 of 57 Shift Manager:

Mode (Please Print)

Review Summarv:

The Shift Manager should intlial each item below to affirm that he/she and the operating crew have completed the required actions:

Shift staffing levels, including personnel experience and qualification levels, are adequate.

No uneasiness remains among Operations personnel regarding the stations ability to operate safely. All safety concerns have been identified and addressed.

Appropriate refresher training of shift personnel, including training on plant, procedure and process changes, has been completed.

Appropriate training of shift personnel on the startup and power ascension plan, have been completed, including discussions on core behavior and characteristics for this startup.

The materiel condition of the plant, including the current status of operator work-arounds, is adequate to support safe and reliable restart and operation.

Affirmation:

Based upon an evaluation of the considerations set forth in Details, 4.0, and to the best of my knowledge and judgment, the plant is in a condition of materiel readiness to support the safe and reliable startup and power operation through the next operating cycle and the operating crew is ready to startup and operate the plant in a safe and reliable manner.

Shift Manager:

Print/Signature/Date I

Remarks: (Attach a continuation sheet if applicable)

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE ATTACHMENT 6:

CORE CONFIGURATION AFFIRMATION FORM Number:

Revision:

Page D B B P-VP-0002 05 Paae 15 of 57 Mode Review Summarv:

The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering, should initial each item below to a f i m that the required conditions exist following movement of fuel in the reactor core, changes to reactivity control components and/or changes to nuclear instrumentation in the reactor core. This affirmation is required prior to installation of the reactor head.

All new fuel assemblies loaded into the reactor core were inspected, as required, to ensure that the manufacturing and design specifications were met.

All irradiated fuel assemblies present in the reactor core were inspected, as required, and dispositioned as acceptable for operation through the cycle.

No fuet assemblies in the reactor core are known leaking assemblies.

A 1 OCFR50.59 Reload Safety Evaluation governing reactor core operation has been approved by the Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC)

The reactor core loading has been verified.

All reactivity control components in the reactor core will meet their design functions.

All nuclear instrumentation in the reactor core will meet their design functions.

Affirmation:

Based on my knowledge and judgment, the required conditions exist and the reactor core is configured to support safe and reliable operation through the cycle.

Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering Print/Signature/Date I

I Remarks: (Attach a continuation sheet if appropriate)

Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Revision:

I Page RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE ATTACHMENT 7: REACTOR STARTUP AFFIRMATION FORM 05 Page 16 of 57 Mode Review Surnmarv:

The Supervisor-DB Reactor Engineering should initial each item below to affirm that the required conditions exist prior to reactor startup.

Estimated Critical Conditions have been prepared and independently verified.

Preparations are complete for any necessary Low Power Physics Testing (i.e. equipment, procedures, calculations, training)

Personnel are available, as required, to support reactor startup and power ascension to 100%.

Required training has been completed for Nuclear Fuels personnel.

Reactivity plans are available, as required, to support reactor startup and power ascension to 100%. These plans include expectations for reactor behavior with emphasis on any behavior that is different from recent plant operation.

The Core Monitoring System is operable.

All reactivity control systems will meet their design functions.

Sufficient nuclear instrumentation is available to safely startup and operate the reactor core.

There are no outstanding reactivity management issues impacting the safe operation of the reactor core.

Affirmation:

Based on my knowledge and judgment, the required conditions exist and the reactor core is ready to support a safe startup and power ascension.

Remarks: (Attach a continuation sheet if appropriate)

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE

Title:

ATTACHMENT 8: SYSTEM ENGINEEWPROGRAM OWNER READINESS AFFIRMATION FORM Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 Revision:

Page 05 Page 17 of 57 Mode

1. Name of SystemlProgram:

2. The status of the system/program is (For systems, a brief description of the physical status of the system including System Health status and Maintenance Rule status. For programs, a brief status of the program):

3. System/Program is ready for Mode Yes-or No-

4. The system/program is ready for Mode because: (if not ready, skip to #5)

5. The system/program is not ready for Mode because:

and the following actions are in place to address these issues:

The system/program will be ready for Mode by:

(Date)

6. Items in abnormal status or configuration (workarounds, temporary modifications, Control Room deficiencies) identified and not corrected have been reviewed and determined to be acceptable: Yes-or No-(Attach a list of the above items)

7. Housekeeping issues associated with this system/program have been addressed for Mode

Yes-or No-(Attach a list of those not resolved)

8. 1 have the following concerns about my system and its readiness for Mode Briefly identify concerns. (The Restart Readiness Review process will not resolve these concerns at the meeting. They should be scheduled for presentation to the Plant Support Center if there is a concern relative to this mode change.)

9. Open CRs, CAS, Work Orders or Engineering modifications required for Mode (Attach a list).

5 Name:

Extension:

(Please Print)

Signature:

Date:

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Tine:

Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 Revision:

I page ATTACHMENT 9: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Page 1 of 2 05 Page 18 of 57 ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE Assessment Summaw:

Improving safety culture is a long-term activity that will be constantly monitored by Davis-Besse senior management. For Restart Readiness, it is important to show an improving safety culture. The individual indicators that make up the Commitment Areas may be green, white, yellow or red. Some of the Commitment Areas may be yellow (Policy or Corporate Commitment Area, Plant Management Commitment Area or Individual Commitment Area) however restart will not be approved if any of the three are red.

indicators with corrective actions to identify an existing or new plan for improvement. Corrective Actions may take credit for already existing activities. Red indicator corrective actions will be formally presented to the Senior 5

The criterion for ratings follows in Appendix A. These criteria are guidelines. Management may consider other factors and adjust the ratings accordingly. If other factors are considered, they shall be documented in an attachment to the Rating sheet. The ratings are based on convergent assessment such as: performance indicators, management observations, demonstrated performance during critical plant conditions ad hoc surveys, training and feedback from independent safety culture reviews and Nuclear Quality Assurance Assessments.

Safetv Culture Commitment Area Ratinqs:

Green:

White:

Yellow:

Red:

all major areas are acceptable with a few minor indicator deviations all major areas are acceptable with a few indicators requiring management attention all major areas are acceptable with several indicators requiring prompt management action several major areas do not meet acceptable standards and require immediate management action Each Section Manager will provide a Rating sheet (ATTACHMENT 9, Page 19,) with the Final Restart Readiness Indicators. For any individual attribute where only site-wide numbers are available (e.g. 4Cs surveys, ECP etc.), or for any individual attribute not applicable to a section (e.9. operator work-arounds for other than Operations), the Manager will NA that attribute on his backup sheets and that attribute will not be used as part of the site-wide tally for the indicator. At the final Restart Readiness Review meeting for any mode, a site-wide Rating sheet will be prepared by the Management Team using the individual section ratings as a guideline. The final Rating sheet will be signed by the Vice President-Nuclear and maintained with the other Restart Readiness documentation.

Determination of the individual indicator or the commitment area color will be based on the following:

Red=O points Yellow=l point White=:! points Green= 3 points Greater than one red attribute or indicator means the indicator or Commitment Area can be no better than yellow. If more than two or 1/3 (whichever is greater) of the attributes or indicators are red, the indicator or Commitment Area shall be red.

Red = 5.75 Yellow = >.75 to 4.75 White = 21.75 to ~ 2. 5 Green= 22.5

Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 lrlUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Revision:

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE 05 Page Page 19 of 57 ATTACHMENT 9:

ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE Page 2 of 2 Rating Safety Culture Mode -

Item Color

1. Policy or Corporate Commitment Area

a. Policies on Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment clearly state that safety is a core value and are understood by the organization

b. Management values are clearly reflected in the Business Plan and are understood by the organization

c.

d. Self-Assessment is a tool used to monitor, assess and improve our performance

e. Independent Oversight is a tool used to validate acceptable performance and Resources are available or can be obtained to ensure safe, reliable operations identify areas for improvement or corrective action

2. Plant Management Commitment Area

a.

b.

d.

e.

f.

9.

C.

ThGe is a visible commitment to safety: nuclear, industrial, radiological and environmental Goals and roles are clear and teamwork is reinforced Ownership and accountability is evident Training and Qualification are valued Commitment to continuous improvement is evident Cross-functional work management and communication Creating an environment of engagement and commitment

3. Individual Commitment Area

a. Drive for excellence-nuclear assets of people and plant are continuously improved to enhance margins of safety

b. Questioning attitude--challenges are welcomed

c.

Rigorous work control and prudent approamerforming activities in a quality manner is the standard

d. Open communications-associates are comfortable in voicing opinions, issues and concerns

e.

Nuclear Professionalism-persistence and urgency in identification and resolution of Problems is prevalent I have reviewed the Rating of Safety Culture as indicated above and concur that the current conditions support readiness for mode change.

Section Manager (Please Print Your Name)

Signature:

Date Section Manager Adjustments to ratings from the standard criteria should be documented and attached to this page.

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Number:

Revision:

I Page

+

DBBP-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page I of 38 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE POL ICY COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO STATEMENT OF SAFETY POLICY 05 Page 20 of 57 Policies on Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment clearly state that safety is a core value and are understood by the organization AlTRlBlJTE Policy statement on Safety Culture' Policy statement on Safety Conscious Work Environment (SC WE)

Making employees aware of policy statements

Employee understanding of policies Worker understanding of responsibility to raise safety concerns I

RED

~

~~

There is no policy.

Policy statements simply issued as part of FENOC Business Plan.

Surveydin terviews indicate less than 70% of employees understand the policies.

Surveys indicate that less than 85% of workers understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

YELLOW Policy statement is issued but only occasionally reinforced by management.

Policy statement is issued but only occasionally reinforced by management.

Policy statements distributed separately to employees in memo.

Surveys/interviews indicate that 70-80%

of the employees understand the policies and consider safety a FE value.

Surveys indicate that between 8590% of workers understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

WHITE Policy statement issued and is frequently reinforced by management.

Policy statement is issued and is frequently reinforced by management.

Policy statements are communicated by at least two means. (e.g., hard copy distribution, newsletters, group meetings, training, stand down).

Surveys/interviews indicate that 80-90%

of employees understand the policies and consider safety a FE value.

Surveys indicate that between 90-95% of workers understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

GREEN Policy statement is issued and is continuously reinforced by management.

Policy statement issued and is strong statement of safety conscious work environment and often reinforced.

Policy statements are communicated to employees and emphasized regularly in meetings and face to face communication.

Surveydinterviews indicate that more than 90% of employees understand the policies and consider safety a FE value and the normal way to do business.

Surveys indicate that more than 95% of workers understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

5

Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Senior Management

Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE I

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE

~

Revision:

Page 05 Page 21 of 57 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 2 of 38 POLICY COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO MANAGEMENT VALUES Management values are clearly reflected in the Business Plan and are understood by the organization YELLOW AlTRIBUTE WHITE Corporate values' There is a corporate level statement of commitment to safety.

FirstEnergy management meets infrequently with plant personnel to express its safety values.

The statement of Mission, Vision, and Values places some weight on safety but greater weight on production or profits Business Plan contains few Critical Success Area Initiatives on safety.

Statement of mission, vision, and values*

There is a corporate level statement of commitment to safety. FirstEnergy management meets occasionally with plant personnel to express its safety values.

The statement of Mission, Vision, and Values places approximately equal weight on safety and production/profits.

Business Plan contains Critical Success Area Initiatives on safety with implementation plans.

FENOC Business P tan' incentive program (FENOC Safety cunure Performance Indicator)*

RED There is no corporate level statement of safety values.

FirstEnergy management does not express its safety values to plant personnel.

There is no statement of Mission, Vision, and Values and employees believe focus is on production and profits.

Business Plan contains no Critical Success Area Initiatives on safety.

The Safety Culture Assessment value is 40 points or less.

The Safety Culture Assessment value is 40-60 points.

The Safety Culture Assessment value is 60-80 points.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Senior Management GREEN There is a corporate level statement of commitment to safety.

FirstEnergy management meets frequently with plant personnel to express its safety values.

The statement of Mission, Vision, and Values emphasizes safety over production and profits.

Business Plan contains Critical Success Area Initiatives on safety and all are being fully implemented.

The Safety Culture Assessment Value is above 80 points.

5

Number:

DBBP-VP-~UUZ NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

~

I tpaw I

Title:

Reviston:

I RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED I

I PLANT OUTAGE I

05 I Paae 22 of 571 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 3 of 38 POLICY COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO RESOURCES Resources are available or can be obtained to ensure safe, reliable operations 1 AlTRlBUTE Adequacy of management resources' Adequacy of personnel resources Adequacy of funding '*

I RED More than five manager or above positions are not filled with ANSI qualified FENOC individuals.

More than four sections do not have sufficient personnel to perform their assigned responsibilities.

Necessary activities, to improve nuclear safety, as defined by the Senior Leadership Team and Project Review Committee (PRC) we not being sompleted in a

imely manner due

o lack of funding

hat was requested md rejected by

=ENOC Executive Management.

YELLOW More than five supervisor or above positions are not filled with ANSI qualified FENOC individuals.

Three or four sections do not have sufficient personnel to perform their assigned responsibilities.

A number of identified improvements to nuclear safety, as identified by the PRC in the plant, programs, or other activities, are not completed in a timely manner due to lack of funding.

WHITE Five or less supervisor or above positions are filled with ANSI qualified FENOC individuals.

One or two sections do not have sufficient personnel to perform their assigned responsibilities.

Several identified improvements to nuclear safety, as identified by the PRC in the plant, programs, or other activities, are not sompleted in a timely manner due to lack of

'unding.

Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources "Site wide assessment only. Data provided by the chairman of the PRC

~~

GREEN All management positions are filled with ANSI qualified FENOC individuals.

Each section has a full complement of personnel (minus normal attrition) to perform its assigned responsibilities.

Sufficient funding exists to perform improvements, as identified by the PRC in plant, programs and other activities to improve nuclear safety.

5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 4 of 38 POLICY COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO RESOURCES (continued)

Resources are available or can be obtained to ensure safe, reliable operations Number:

DBB P-VP-0002 Revision:

Page 05 Page 23 of 57 Adequacy of tools, material and equipment Many necessary tasks (PMs, Work Orders, ECRs and projects) are not being completed in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.

A number of scheduled tasks (PMs, Work Orders, ECRs and projects) are not being completed in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.

Several scheduled tasks (PMs, Work Orders, ECRs and projects) are not being completed in a timely manner due to lack of tools, material or equipment.

Sufficient tools and equipment exist to perform assigned tasks for PMs, Work Orders, ECRs and projects.

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Number:

DB B P-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 5 of 38 POLICY COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO SELF-ASSESSMENT Self-Assessment is a toot used to monitor, assess and improve our performance

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE I ATTRIBUTE Revision:

Page 05 Page 24 of 57 Use of Nuclear Quality Assurance as part of the self-assessment process

Self-assessments Performance Indicators Personnel Performance Appraisals **

RED Less than 60% of the sections have used NQA as part of the self-assessment process.

Less than 50% of sections have scheduled self-assessments for 2003 and 2004.

Performance indicators related to safety and quality do not exist.

The performance appraisal program does not include assessments of safety or quality of 3erformance.

YELLOW Between 60-75% of the sections have used NQA as part of the self-assessment process.

Between 5045% of sections have scheduled self-assessments for 2003-2004.

~

A number of performance indicators do not exist (or need to be improved) for important activities affecting quality and safety.

The performance appraisal program includes assessments of safety or quality of performance but most employee appraisals have not been performed.

WHITE Between 7590% of the sections have used NQA as part of the self-assessment process.

Between 6580% of sections have scheduled self-assessments for 2003-2004.

Several performance indicators do not exist (or need to be improved) for important activities affecting quality and safety.

The performance appraisal program ncludes xsessments of safety or quality of ierformance but some appraisals lave not been Ierformed in timely nanner and some smployees do not lave a current 3ppraisal.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by NQA

-Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources GREEN More than 90% of the sections have used NQA as part of the self-assessment process.

More than 80% of sections have scheduled self-assessments for 2003-2004.

Performance indicators exist and are being regularly updated for important activities affecting safety and quality.

The performance appraisal program includes assessments of safety and quality of performance and the appraisals are being performed in timely manner and all employees have a current appraisal.

5

Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Revision:

Page 05 Page 25 of 57 I AlTRlBUTE The CNRB rarely 78s a safety assessment discussion on the agenda.

Nuclear Committee of Board of Directors Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB)+

The CNRB agendahasa safety discussion only once per year.

L

' A number of NQA audits or assessments were not performed when required or a number of important safety activities were not subject to audits or assessments.

Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA)'* L APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA POLICY COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO OVERSIGHT Page 6 of 38 Oversight is a tool used to show acceptable performance and identify areas for improvement and corrective actions.

RED 1

YELLOW The Nuclear Committee of the Board has little focus on safety in the agenda.

The CNRB has not implemented any of the recornmendations from the independent assessment of the CNRB.

The Nuclear Committee occasionally discusses safety as a topic in the agenda.

The CNRB has not implemented a number of the recommendations from the independent assessment of the CNRB.

W A is not Ierforming audits

)r assessments of m portan t safety 3ctivities.

WHITE The Nuclear Committee has safety as a part of the agenda at least once per quarter.

The CNRB has implemented all but one or two of the recommendations from the independent assessment of the CNRB.

The CNRB agenda has a safety discussion two out of three meetings per year.

NQA audits or assessments were performed when required, but several important safety activities were not subject to audits or assessments.

GREEN The Nuclear Committee has safety as a part of the agenda every meeting.

The CNRB has implemented the recommendations from the independent assessment of the CNRB.

The CNRB agenda has a safety discussion every meeting.

NQA is regularly performing audits and assessments of important safety activities and identifying key issues for finding.

5

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Senior Management

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by NQA Manager or VP Oversight

'This item is assessed by NQA only.

Number:

D B B P-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Revision:

Page 05 Page 26 of 57 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 7 of 38 MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO SAFETY There is a visible commitment to safety: nuclear, industrial, radiological and environmental

'Site wide as585

t. Site wide AlTRl BUTE Management observations performed as scheduled' Leadership in 4ction training has not bean available for most supervisors and above.

ent only. Data providc assessment only. Data provi Management observations are seN' critical' 1

GREEN There is a management observation program and more than 90%

are performed as scheduled.

I Management emphasis on safety to employees; questioning attitude Leadership in Action training has been completed for more than 75% of supervisors and above within 12 months of new appointment.

Leadership in Action

Leadership in Action training has been completed for more than 90% of supervisors and above within 12 months of new appointment.

RED There is no management observation program.

Most management observations are not self-critical.

No method has been used in the last month to provide emphasis on safety to employees (e.g.,

town hall meetings, 4 Cs

meetings, newsletters, and training).

Leadership in Action does not include discussions on safety culture YELLOW

~~

There is a management observation program and more than 65%

of management observations are performed as scheduled.

More than 50% of the management observations performed are self-critical and corrective actions implemented.

One method has been used in the last month to provide emphasis on safety to employees (e.g.,

town hall meetings, 4 Cs meetings, newsletters, and training).

Leadership in Action includes discussions on safety culture Leadership in Action training has been completed for more than 50% of supervisors and above within 12 monhs of new appointment.

by Management Obsen d by Human Resources WHITE There is a management observation program and more than 75%

are performed as scheduled.

More than 75% of the management observations performed are self-critical and corrective actions implemented.

Two means have been used in the last month to provide emphasis on safety to employees (e.g., town hall meetings, 4 Cs

meetings, newsletters, and training).

More than 90% of the management observations performed are self-critical and corrective actions implemented.

Multiple means have been used by management in the last month to provide emphasis on safety to employees (e.9.. town hall meetings, 4 Cs meetings, newsletters, and training).

Leadership in Action includes discussions on safety culture Leadership in Action includes discussions on safety culture

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE

Title:

APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO SAFETY (continued)

Page 8 of 38 Number.

Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 05 Paae 27 of 57 There is a visible commitment to safety: nuclear, industrial, radiolog

~~~

Significant plant 3ctivities have a nanagement plan with a nanagement sponsor and management lversight scheduled for he duration of the activity.

Problem solving Decision making Improvements in safety margin

Vant activities eceive proper nanagement 3ttention and safety focus A problem solving process exists but there is no use of the document.

Safety significant decisions are made in isolation without adequate information, oversight, involvement and peer checking.

None of the improvements in safety margin are complete (e.9. emergency sump, cavity seal, decay heat pit modification, refurbishment of reactor coolant pumps, Flus monitors, diesel air starting system).

Significant plant event occurs due to lack of management attention or safety focus.

In several cases, the problem solving process NOP-EN-3001 has not been properly implemented for applicable conditions.

Safety significant decisions are made with minimal information, oversight, involvement and peer checking.

Most of the improvements in safety margin are not complete (e.g. emergency sump, cavity seal, decay heat pit modification, refurbishment of reactor coolant pumps, Flus monitors, diesel air starting system).

Condition Adverse to Quality CR written due to lack of management attention or lack of safety focus.

With one or two exceptions, the problem solving process, NOP-EN-3001hasbeen properly implemented for applicable conditions.

Safety significant decisions, with few exceptions, are made with adequate information, oversight, involvement and peer checking.

Most of the improvements in safety margin are complete (e.g.

emergency sump, zvity seal, decay

?eat pit modification,

?efurbishment of

eactor coolant

,umps, Flus nonitors, diesel air starting system).

Significant plant activities have nanagement iversight scheduled or the duration of he activity.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Outage Management and Work Con al and environmental The problem solving process, N OP-EN-3001 has been properly implemented for applicable conditions.

Safety significant decisions are made with adequate information, oversight, involvement and peer checking.

All improvements in safety margin are complete (e.g.

emergency sump, cavity seal, decay heat pit modification,

efurbishment of reactor

oolant pumps, Flus nonitors, diesel air starting system).

5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Number:

Revision:

D6BP-VP-0002 Paw 05 Paae 28 of 57 Page 9 of 38 MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO ROLES AND TEAMWORK ATTRIBUTE Understanding that safety is highest priority Program ownership Ownership of corrective actions Ownership of engineering products as measured by fhe Engineering Assessment Board (EA 8 )

Goals RED Ad hoc surveys show that less than 70% of employees understand that safety is the highest priority.

The majority of programs do not have assigned owners and program owners are not implementing their assigned responsibilities.

More than 5% of SCAQ remedial and preventive corrective actions and more than 10% of CAQ remedial and preventive corrective actions are overdue for the previous quarter.

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is greater than 3.0.

ind roles are clear YELLOW Ad hoc surveys show that 70-80%

of employees understands that safety is the highest priority.

Some programs do not have assigned owners and many program owners are not implementing their assigned responsibilities.

Between 24% of SCAQ remedial or preventive corrective actions and 510% of CAQ remedial and preventive corrective actions are overdue for the previous quarter.

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is between 3.0 and 2.1.

Id teamwork is reinfi WHITE Ad hoc surveys show that 80-90% of employees understands that safety is the highest priority.

~~

~

With one or two exceptions, all programs have assigned owners.

With several exceptions, program owners are implementing their assigned responsibilities.

~

Less than 2% of SCAQ remedial or preventive corrective actions and between remedial and preventive corrective actions are overdue for the previous quarter.

2-5% Of CAQ The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is between 2.0 and 1.l.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Director-Nuclear Engineering ced GREEN Ad hoc surveys show that more than 90%

of employees understand that safety is the highest priority.

All programs have assigned owners. In general, program owners are implementing their assigned responsibilities.

There are no SCAQ remedial and preventive corrective actions overdue and less than 2% of CAQ remedial and preventive corrective actions are overdue for the previous quarter.

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 1.O or less.

5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 Revision:

I page APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 10 of 38 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA 05 Page 29 of 57 CRITERIA RELATED TO ROLES AND TEAMWORK (continued)

Goals and roles are clear and teamwork is reinforced Efiectiveness of supervision of individuals' lntra-department teamwork and alignment Expectations Trust, openness and focused commitment *'

The individual error rate is

>0.30 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

Ad hoc survey indicates there is no alignment and little teamwork among managers.

There are statements of expectations for individual sections but employees routinely ignore them.

4Cs surveys show less than 50% of employees feel that work groups display high levels of trust, opennessand commitment.

The individual error rate is ~0.31 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

Ad hoc survey indicates there is minimal alignment and some teamwork among managers.

Although there are statements of expectations for some sections, they are weakly implemented.

4cs surveys show 50-70% Of employees feel that work groups display high levels of trust, opennessand commitment.

The individual error rate is0.29 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

Ad hoc survey indicates alignment is improving and teamwork can be seen in some key activities.

There are statements of expectations for most sections, and they are being implemented.

4Cs surveys show employees feel that work groups display high levels of trust, opennessand commitment.

70-90% Of The individual error rate isc0.26 individual errors per 10.000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

Ad hoc survey indicates alignment and teamwork are obvious in all activities at the site.

There are statements of expectations for each section and managers are reinforcing and ensuring employees understand and implement them.

4Cs surveys show more than 90% of employees feel that work groups display high levels of trust, openness and commitment.

1

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Performance Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chief Operating Officer

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED Number:

Revision:

Paw DBBP-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 11 of 38 MANAGERS COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO ROLES AND TEAMWORK (continued)

Goals and roles are clear and teamwork is reinforced Clear goals and priofiies Input and involvemeni No clear goals and priorities have been established.

No employee input and involvement occurs in the development of department business plans, setting goals and establishing work priorities.

Goals and priorities exist but are not adequately understood and owned by employees.

Only managers and supervisors are involved in the development of department business plans, setting goals and establishing work priorities.

Goals and priorities exist at most levels and some employees understand and own them.

Managers and supervisors occasionally request in putlinvolvement in the development of department business plans, setting goals and establishing work priorities.

Most employees are clear about goals and priorities as well as how their role contributes to achieving them.

Employees are appropriately involved in developing the department business plans, setting goals and establishing work priorities.

DBBP-VP-NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE I Number:

I YELLOW Between 70-80%

of performance appraisals are completed on schedule.

Between 70-80%

of managers and supervisors have development plans.

A restart readiness review process exists but implementation is poor as shown by lack of management participation.

Surveys indicate that between 80-90% of workers understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

Title:

Revision:

I REST,4RT READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED I

WHITE Between 80-90% of performance appraisals are completed on schedule.

Between 80-90% of managers and supervisors have development plans.

A restart readiness review process exists and is implemented with the majority of management participation.

Surveys indicate that between 90-95% of workers understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

I PLANT OUTAGE I

05 I Paae31 of571 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 12 of 38 MANAGERS COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY Ownership and accountability is evident I ATTRIBUTE Performance appraisals Development plans Restart Readiness Worker understanding of their responsibility to raise safety concerns RED Less than 70% of Performance appraisals are completed on schedule.

Less than 70% of managers and supervisors have development plans.

There is no restart readiness review process.

Surveys indicate that less than 80% of workers understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

GREEN More than 90% of performance appraisals are completed on schedule.

More than 90% of managers and supervisors have development plans.

A restart readiness review process exists and is implemented efficiently and with strong management participation.

Surveys indicate that more than 95% of workers understand their responsibility to raise nuclear safety or quality concerns.

Number:

D B B P-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE

~~

Revision:

Page 05 Page 32 of 57 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 13 of 38 Willingness to raise safety concerns MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA Surveys show Surveys show Surveys show that that less than that between 85-between 90-95% of 85% of personnel 90% of personnel personnel are willing are willing to are willing to to raise safety raise safety raise safety concerns through concerns through concerns through their supervisor, a their supervisor, a their supervisor, a CR or ECP.

CR or ECP.

CRITERIA RELATED TO OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY SRO reviews for Less than 80 %

Operability are were completed performed in a within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

timely manner*

Between 80-85%

Between 8595%

were completed were completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Surveys show that more than 95% of personnel are willing to raise safety concerns through their supervisor, a CR or ECP.

More than 95% were completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

'This item assessed by Operations only

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Number.

DBB P-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 14 of 38

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY (continued)

Ownership and accountability is evident Revision:

Page Sysfem assessments*

PLANT OUTAGE 05 NQA field assessments **

Page 33 of 57 Management 3bservations

'eading to

oaching Timeliness of

orrective actions None of the improvements in safety are complete (e.g.

emergency sump, cavity seal, decay heat pit modification, refurbishment of reactor coolant pumps, Flus monitors, diesel air starting system).

NQA field assessments show that managers and supervisors are generally ineffective.

Less than 50%

of management has held a coaching session in the last month.

Less than 50%

of my section's corrective actions designated as required for restart are mmplete.

Most of the improvements in safety are not complete (e.g.

emergency sump, cavity seal, decay heat pit modification, refurbishment of reactor coolant pumps, Flus monitors, diesel air starting system).

NQA field assessments show that managers and supervisors are generally effective, with several noteworthy exceptions.

Between 50-74%

of management has held a coaching session in the last month.

Between SO%

and 74% of my section's corrective actions designated as required for restart are complete.

Most of the improvements in safety are complete (e.g. emergency sump, cavity seal, decay heat pit modification, refurbishment of reactor coolant pumps, Flus monitors, diesel air starting system).

NQA field assessments show that managers and supervisors are generally effective, with a few exceptions.

Between 7549% of management has held a coaching session in the last month.

Between 75% and 89% of my section's corrective actions designated as required for restart, are complete.

The improvements in safety are complete (e.g.

emergency sump, cavity seal, decay heat pit modification, refurbishment of reactor coolant pumps, Flus monitors, diesel air starting system).

NQA field assessments show that managers and supervisors are generally effective.

More than 90% of management has held a coaching session in the last month.

More than 90% of my section's corrective actions designated as required for restart, are complete.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Outage Management and Work Control

" This Item assessed by NQA only 5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 ATTRIBUTE Supervisory evaluations

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 15 of 38 MANAGERS COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION Training and Qualification are valued Revision:

Paw 05 Page 34 of 57 Restart training YELLOW Between 50-74%

of supervisors and managers have been evaluated to assess their competence for their current positions.

Between 50-74%

of required restart training is complete.

Between 70-84%

of new operators passed their initial license for the most recent class examination.

Between 70-84%

of the licensed operators have passed their requalification training.

Between 50%

and 74% of root cause evaluation personnel have received training on TapRoot, Initial Operator training**

WHITE Between 75439% of supervisors and managers have been evaluated to assess their competence for their current positions.

Between 7599% of required restart training is complete.

Between 85-95% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.

Between 85-95% of the licensed operators have passed their requalification training.

Between 75% and 89% of root cause evaluation personnel have received training on TapRoot.

Qequalification raining**

Poof cause raining RED Most supervisors and managers have not been evaluated to assess their competence for their current positions.

Most required restart training is not complete.

Less than 70% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.

~~~

Less than 70% of licensed operators have passed their requalification training.

Less than 50% of root cause evaluation personnel have received training on TapRoot.

GREEN More than 90% of supervisors and managers have been evaluated to assess their competence for their current positions.

100% of required restart training is complete.

More than 95% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.

Wore than 95% of the icensed operators have iassed their squalification training.

More than 90% of root m s e evaluation

)ersonnel have

,eceived training on rapRoot.

5 5

Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources T h i s item assessed by Operations only

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED Titie:

I PLANT OUTAGE I

05 1 Page 35 of 571 Number:

Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 16 of 38 Less than 50% of applicable operators and engineers have received training on operability determinations.

Less than 70% of

managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA Between 50-74%

of applicable operators and engineers have received training on operability determinations.

Between 70-79%

of managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

CRITERIA RELATED TO TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION (continued)

Training and Qualification are valued Operability determination training*

Training on SC WE **

Training on decision making process'*

Training on standards and expectations Less than 70 %

of applicable personnel have received training on the decision making process.

Between 70-80%

of applicable personnel have received training on the decision making process.

Less than 70% of applicable personnel have received training on standards and expectations.

Between 7040%

of applicable personnel have received training on standards and expectations.

Less than 70% of scheduled training identified by the CRC is completed in a timely manner.

Between 70-80%

of scheduled training identified by the CRC is completed in a timely manner.

Between 7590% of applicable operators and engineers have received training on operability determinations.

Between 80-89% of

managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

Between 80-90% of applicable personnel have received training on the decision making process.

Between 80-90% of applicable personnel have received training on standards and expectations.

Continuing training identified by Cumculum Review Committee (CRC) **

'This item assessed by Operations and Engineering only "Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Nuclear Training Between 80-90%of scheduled training identified by the CRC is completed in a timely manner.

~

~~~

~

More than 90% of applicable operators and engineers have received training on operability determinations.

More than 90% of managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

More than 90% of applicable personnel have received training on the decision making process.

More than 90% of applicable personnel have received training on standards and expectations.

More than 90% of scheduled training identified by the CRC is completed in a timely manner.

I Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Revision:

Page RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED

,PLANT OUTAGE 05 Page 36 of 57 The CARB has been enhanced with director-level personnel.

APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 17 of 38 The CARB has been enhanced with director-level personnel.

MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT Commitment to continuous improvement is evident ATTRIBUTE Improvements in management staffing' Restart Overview Panel (ROP) *'

Corrective Action Review Board (CARB)+

Engineering Assessment Board (AB)++

Benchmarking against industry standards RED Most requisitions for management positions have not been filled in the past month.

The ROP does not believe DB is ready to restart.

There are no directors on the CARB.

The backlog of documents awaiting CARB review is more than four weeks.

The backlog of documents awaiting EAB review is greater than four weeks.

Less than 60% of the programs have been benchmarked against industry standards.

YELLOW About 50% of open requisitions for management positions have been filled in the past month.

WHITE About 75% of open requisitions for management positions have been filled in the past month.

The ROP has expressed concerns over DB restart.

The ROP has expressed some minor concerns and believes DB can restart.

The backlog of documents awaiting CARB review is less than four weeks.

The backlog of documents awaiting CARB review is less than two weeks.

The backlog of documents awaiting EAB review is less than four weeks.

Between 60-74%

of the programs have been benchmarked against industry standards.

The backlog of documents awaiting EAB review is less than two weeks.

I Between 7589% of the programs have been benchmarked against industry standards.

GREEN At least 85% of open requisitions for management positions have been filled in the past month.

The ROP is satisfied with DB progress to restart.

The CARB has been enhanced with director-level personnel.

The backlog of documents awaiting CARB review is less than one week.

The backlog of documents awaiting EAB review is less than one week.

More than 90% of the programs have been benchmarked against industry standards.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Resources "Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chief Operating Officer or Executive Vice President

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance Improvement

++Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Director-Nuclear Engineering 5

5

Number.

DBB P-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE 1

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Revision:

Page 05 Page 37 of 57 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 18 of 38 MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA CRtTERlA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT (continued)

Commitment to continuous improvement is evident Operator crew benchmarking' Management obsetvations**

Temporary modifications+

Number of Operator work-arounds*

Vumber of Control Room 3e ficiencies' Less than 50% of the operators have visited other plants to benchmark Davis-Besse operations.

A management ObseNa tion program has been established. Less than 70% of management observations are performed as scheduled, and Dbservations are ueak.

There are more han I 1 temporary modifications.

rhere are more han 2 operator workarounds.

rhere are more han 4 Control ioom ieficiencies.

Between 50 -

74% of the operators have visited other plants to benchmark Davis-Besse operations.

A management observation program has been established.

More than 70% of management observations are performed as scheduled, and observations are weak.

There are 11 or less temporary modifications.

There are 2 Dperator uorkarounds.

There are 4 2ontrol Room jeficiencies.

Between 75 - 90% of the operators have visited other plants to benchmark Davis-Besse operations.

A management observation program has been established.

More than 80% of management observations are performed as scheduled and most are considered acceptable.

There are 8 or less temporary modifications.

There is 1 operator uorkarounds.

~~

There are 1-3 Control ioom deficiencies.

More than 90% of the operators have visited other plants to benchmark Davis-Besse operations.

A management observation program has been established.

More than 90% of management observations are performed as scheduled and contain quality information.

There are 5 or less temporary modifications.

There are no operator workarounds.

There are no Control Room deficiencies.

This item assessed by Operations only "Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation program

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Engineering 5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE TiUe:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Number:

Revision:

DBBP-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 19 of 38 MANAGERS COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT(continued)

Commitment to continuous improvement is evident Training on SCWE Licensed operator pipeline

Less than 70% of

managers, supervisors and operators have received training on SCWE.

Less than 70% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.

Between 70-79%

of managers, supervisors and operators have received training on SCWE.

Between 7044%

of new operators passed their initial license for the most recent class examination.

Between 80-90% of

managers, supervisors and operators have received training on SCWE.

Between 8545% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.

Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Nuclear Training This item assessed by Operations only.

managers, supervisors and operators have received training on SCWE.

~~

More than 95% of new operators passed their initial license examination for the most recent class.

I 5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 Revision:

I Page APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 20 of 38 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA 05 Page 39 of 57 CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT(continued)

SAFETY CONSCIOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT (SCWE)

CRITERIA RELATED TO SCWE REVIEW TEAM (SCWERT)

Commitment to continuous improvement is evident AITRIBUTE use of SCWERT' Effectiveness of SC WERT in avoiding discrimination claims*

Effecfiveness in avoiding NRC or ECP substantiated discrimination claims+

RED More than 4 CRs issued within the past year related to failure to properly conduct SCWERT review of Davis-Besse work disciplinary actions prior to the action.

There are more than 5 NRC allegations or ECP concerns of discrim ination submitted within the past year.

There is more than one substantiated NRC or ECP discrimination

laim within the 3ast year.

YELLOW Between 4-2 CRs issued within the past year related to failure to properly conduct SCWERT review of Davis-Besse work disciplinary actions prior to the action.

There are 5 NRC allegations or ECP concerns of discrimination submitted within the past year.

There is one substantiated NRC or ECP discrimination claim within the past year.

WHITE Less than 2 CRs issued within the past year related to failure to properly conduct SCWERT review of Davis-Besse work disciplinary actions prior to the action.

There are 4 NRC allegations or ECP concerns of discrimination submitted within the past year.

There are no substantiated NRC or ECP discrimination claims within the past year.

Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Employee Concerns Program GREEN No CRs issued within the past year related to failure to properly conduct SCWERT review of Davis-Besse work disciplinary actions prior to the action.

There are 2 or fewer NRC allegations or ECP concerns of discrimination submitted within the past year.

There are no substantiated NRC or ECP discrimination claims within the past 2 years.

5

Number:

Revision:

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE I Paw

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE 05 Page 40 of 57 APPENDfX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page21 of38 MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CROSS-FUNCTIONAL WORK MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION Commitment to cross functional work management and communication is evident I ATTRIBUTE Cross-functional team work L--

Department interfaces I performance to schedule

Interdepartmental communication RED No cross-functional teamwork is evident.

Many process breakdowns occur with extensive amounts of rework needed.

Less than 70% of work is completed on time, as scheduled, causing major consequences to overall site performance.

Information that impacts downstream implementation is not shared, causing significant negative consequences to other departments.

YELLOW Some cross-functional teamwork exists but work is sub-optimized.

Some process breakdowns occur with frequent amounts of rework needed.

Between 70-80%

of work is completed on time, as scheduled, with major adjustments to resource capacity required to improve performance.

Information that impacts downstream implementation is inconsistently shared, which keeps departments in a

?eactive mode.

WHITE Cross-functional teamwork frequently occurs, enabling efficient and effective workflow.

Minimal process breakdowns and rework occur with effective and efficient resolution of emergency issues.

Between 80 -90% of work is completed on time, as scheduled, with minimal adjustments to resource capacity required to improve performance.

Information that impacts downstream implementation is frequently shared on a timely basis, enabling department to proactively plan and respond.

GREEN Cross-functional teams are constantly formingheforming around the best way to get work done.

Department interfaces are seamless; work flows efficiently between departments throughout the entire organization.

More than 90% of work is completed on time, as scheduled, within current resource capacity.

Information that impacts downstream implementation is mmmunicated as soon as it's known, Enabling all jepartments to work xoactively on a mnsistent basis.

5

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Outage Management and Work Control

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Number:

Revision:

I Paw DBBP-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 22 of 38 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE 1

05 MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA Paae 41 of 57 CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CROSS-FUNCTIONAL WORK MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION (continued)

Commitment to cross functional work management and communication is evident lnterdepartmentai problem solving and decision making Systemic learning Incorporating industry Operating Experience*

Problem solving and decision making occurs in isolation; non-involvement of other department stakeholders.

Things are broken down, focus is on the pieces and discrete problems are fixed with no understanding of interdependencies.

Industry operating experience is not actively evaluated and used to enhance site performance.

Cross-functional stakeholders are seldom involved when problems are being solved and decisions are made.

Discrete problems are fixed with minimal understanding of interdependencies There is less than full implementation and minimal compliance to our Operating Experience Program.

Cross-functional stakeholders are frequently involved when problems are being solved and decisions are made.

Attention is focused on learning and discovering fundamental solutions to resolving long-standing andlor complex problems.

There is full compliance with the Operating Experience Program.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Operating Experience Program

~

Cross-functional stakeholders are consistently involved when problems are being solved and decisions are made.

Streamlining and improving systems and process is constant to resolve long-standing andlor complex problems.

3perating Experience s consistently and fully utilized in every jepartment and is ivell integrated into sveryday activities to mhance plant ierformance.

5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 23 of 38 MANAGERS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT OF ENGAGEMENT AND COMMITMENT An environment of engagement and commitment is evident Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 Revision:

Paw 05 Page 42 of 57 AITRIBUTE FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies Employees Concerns Program, Quality Assessment and 4Cs survey data indicates that more than 80% of employees will bring concerns to management.

Management frequently supports doing what is in the best interest of the whole organization rather than what is in the best interest of their department.

Quality of management and employee relatiofiships*

Employee Concerns Program, Quality Assessment and 4Cs survey data indicate more than 90% of employees raise issues directly with management, work collaboratively to resolves issues and reflect favorable improvement.

Management consistently supports doing what is in the best interest for the whole organization rather than what is in the best interest for their department.

Organizational commitment and shared success criteria RED FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies are not used by management person net.

Employee Concerns Program, Quality Assessment and 4Cs survey data indicates that employees openly express fear of retaliation and will not raise safety concerns with management.

Management focuses on what is in the best interest of their department at the expense of what is in the best interest of the whole organization.

~~

~

YELLOW FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies are inconsistently demonstrated by some management personnel.

Employee Concerns Program, Quality Assessment and 4Cs survey data indicates that more than 70%

of employees will bring safety concerns to management.

Management occasionally supports what is in the best interest of their department without consideration to what is in the best interest of the whole organization.

WHITE I

GREEN FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies are frequently demonstrated by some management personnel.

Most management personnel have internalized and are living the FENOC values, basic principles and leadership strategies as demonstrated in their day to day actions.

I 5

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by ECP, NQA and 4Cs

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Revision:

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Page Number:

1 05 I Paae 43 of 571 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 24 of 38 MANAGERS COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO COMMITMENT TO CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT OF ENGAGEMENT AND COMMITMENT (continued)

An environment of engagement and commitment is evident Ownership for Excellence Performance Appraisals Less than 70% of performance appraisals are completed on schedule.

Ownership for Excellence Development Plans Less than 70% of managers and supervisors have development plans.

Between 70-80%

of performance appraisals are completed on schedule.

Between 80-90% of performance appraisals are completed on schedule.

Between 70-80%

of managers and supervisors have development plans.

Between 80-90% of managers and supervisors have development plans.

More than 90% of performance appraisals are completed on schedule.

More than 90% of managers and supervisors have development plans.

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED

Title:

Number:

Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 25 of 38 INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO DRIVE FOR EXCELLENCE Nuclear assets of people and plant are continuously improved to enhance margins of safety RED There are more than 3 Red (a)(l) systems.

There are more than 2 operator workarounds.

There are more than 4 Control Room deficiencies.

AlTRlBUTE Maintenance Rule (a)( 1) Systems YELLOW There are 2 Red (a)(l) systems.

There are 2 operator workarounds.

There are 4 Control Room deficiencies.

Number of Operator workarounds *'

Number of Control Room deficiencies" Number of temporary modifications+

Individual Error Rate++

There are more than 11 temporary modifications.

The individual error rate is

> 0.30 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

There are 11 or less temporary modif ications.

The individual error rate is

-=0.3lindividual errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

WHITE There is one Red (a)(l) system.

There is 1 operator workarounds.

~~~

~~

There are 1-3 Control Room deficiencies.

There are 8 or less temporary modifications.

The individual error rate is ~ 0. 2 9 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Plant Engineering T h i s item assessed by Operations only

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Engineering

++Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Performance GREEN There are zero Red (a)(l) systems.

There are no operator workarounds.

~

There are no Control Room deficiencies.

There are 5 or less temporary modifications.

The individual error rate is ~0.26 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE

Title:

APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 26 of 38 I NDlVl DUALS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO DRIVE FOR EXCELLENCE (continued)

Nuclear assets of people and plant are continuously improved to enhance margins of safety Number:

Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 05 Paae 45 of 57 Percent of self-identified Condition Repods (CRs)'

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EA6 is greater than 3.0.

Number of open Condition Report evaluations '

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 3.0 or less.

Engineering Assessment Board (EAB) index**

Performance during major plant evolutions+

Operational trans Less than 80% of the CRs originated are self-identified.

Less than 80% of SCAQ evaluations and less than 70% of CAQ evaluations were completed on schedule for the previous quarter.

80% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified, At least 80-90%

of SCAQ evaluations and evaluations were completed on schedule for the previous quarter.

7040% Of CAQ More than one significant event has occurred during a plant evolution in the past month One significant event has occurred during a plant evolution in the past month 90% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.

At least 90% of SCAQ evaluations and 80-90% of CAQ evaluations were completed on schedule for the previous quarter.

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 2.0 or less.

Major plant evolutions have been performed in the past month with some less than significant challenges or transients.

95% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.

All SCAQ evaluations and 90% of CAQ evaluations were completed on schedule for the previous I

quarter.

~~

..~

The quality of engineering products as measured by the AI3 is 1.O or less.

Major plant evolutions have been performed in the past month as planned.

nt is defined by INPO as a plant transient that occurs (reactor critical or while shutdown) and results in significant changes in primary or secondary plant parameters or results in significant changes in mechanical or electrical lineups.

Significant is defined by INPO as an event which caused or had the potential to cause an appreciable reduction in plant safety or reliability, excessive radiation exposure, the discharge of radioactivity offsite or serious harm to individuals. The significance of a particular event (including the discovery of a serious deficiency, lies in the actual or potential consequences of the event or in the likelihood that it is a precursor to a more serious event.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance Improvement

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Director-Nuclear Engineering

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Operations 5

5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUStNESS PRACTICE

Title:

Number:

Revision:

I Page D BB P-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA RESTART READINESS REV1 EW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Page 27 of 38 05 Page 46 of 57 INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO QUESTONING ATTITUDE I ATTRIBUTE Percent of CRs per person per group**

programmatic CRs**

Program and process error rate+

C RED Management observations and QA field observations show that most pre-job briefs are not acceptable.

Less than 13% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.

The number of programmatic CRs indicates that individuals in general are reluctant to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.

>0.48 program and process errors per 10.000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are not raising problems encountered in the field.

allenges are welc YELLOW Management observations and QA field observations show that most pre-job briefs are acceptable.

Between 13-1 5%

of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.

The number of programmatic CRs indicates that most individuals are willing to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.

<0.48 program and process errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are raising problems encountered in the field.

ned WHITE Management observations and QA field observations show that, with some exceptions, pre-job briefs are acceptable.

Between 15-1 7% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.

The number of programmatic CRs indicates that a large majority of individuals are willing to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.

<0.30 program and process errors per 10.000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that a large majority of individuals are raising problems encountered in the field.

GREEN Management observations and QA field observations show that pre-job briefs in general are acceptable.

More than 17% of individuals wrote CRs during the past month.

The number of programmatic CRs indicates that individuals in general are willing to write CRs on programmatic and management issues.

~ 0. 2 7 program and process errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that individuals in general are raising problems encountered in the field.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program and NQA.

'Site wide assessment only. Data pmvided by Performance Improvement

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Performance 5

I Number:

D BB P-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE 05 Page 47 of 57

Title:

Revision:

Page APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 28 of 38 INDIVIDUALS COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO RIGOROUS WORK CONTROL AND PRUDENT APPROACH Performing activities in a quality manner is the standard RED I ATTRIBUTE YELLOW Event Free Clock*

The event free clock is less than 20 days on average.

Industrial safety performance **

The event free clock is between 20 and 30 days on average.

I Individual error There are more than 200 open PCRs.

rate

There are less than 200 open PCRs.

Program and process error rate Significant human performance errors resulting in plant transients (see page 43 for definition of transient)

Backlog of procedure change requests (PCRs)+

c There are more than 10 OSHA recordables per year.

The individual error rate is

>0.30 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

>0.48 program and process errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

There are more than 3 significant human performance errors per year resulting in plant transients.

There are between 10 and 8 OSHA recordables per year.

The individual error rate is c0.31 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

~ 0. 4 8 program and process errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

There are fewer than 3 significant human performance errors per year resulting in plant transients.

1 WHITE The event free clock is 30 to 39 days on average.

There are 7 OSHA recordables per year.

The individual error rate is c0.29 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

c.30 program and process errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

There are fewer than 2 significant human performance errors per year resulting in plant transients.

There are less than 150 open PCRs.

Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Human Performance Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Industrial Safely

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance fmprovement GREEN The event free clock is greater than 40 days on average.

There are no more than 3 OSHA recordables per year.

The individual error rate is ~0.26 individual errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

~0.27 program and process errors per 10,000 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months worked.

There were no significant human performance errors per year resulting in plant transients.

There are less than1 00 open PCRs.

5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Number:

Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 05 Page 48 of 57 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA INDIVIDUALS COMMITMENT AREA Page 29 of 38 CRITERIA RELATED TO RIGOROUS WORK CONTROL AND PRUDENT APPROACH (continued)

Performing activities in a quality manner is the standard Deficiency rate for QCho/ds*

Deficiency rate for QC hold points is more than 25%.

The deficiency rate for QC hold points is less than 25%.

The deficiency rate for QC holds point is less than 15 %.

The deficiency rate for QC hold points is less than 7 %.

Rework rate**

Rework rate is more than 3%.

The rework rate is 2.5-3.0%.

The rework rate is 2.1-2.5%.

The rework rate is

<2.0%.

5 Ratio of completed to scheduled works orders per week+

Less than 50%

of scheduled work orders are completed.

More than 75% of scheduled work orders are completed.

More than 90% of scheduled work orders are completed.

More than 50% of scheduled work orders are completed.

More than 50% of scheduled PMs are completed.

~

Number of late preventive maintenance (PM) activities +

~

Less than 50%

of scheduled work orders are completed.

More than 75% of scheduled PM are completed.

More than 90% of scheduled PMs are completed.

Backlog of corrective maintenance (CM) activities+

There are more than 230 CM activities outstanding.

There are less than 134 CM activities outstanding.

There are between 149 and 134 CM activities outstanding.

There is one Red are one or two (a)( 1 )

systems.

Major plant evolutions have been performed with some transients or one significant event during major plant evolutions prior to restart.

There are between 229 and 150 CM activities outstanding.

There are 2 Red (a)(l) systems.

Number of Maintenance Rule (a)(7) systems++

Performance during major plant evolutions. (see page 43 for definitions) @

There are zero Red (a)(l) systems.

There are more than 3 Red (a)(l) systems.

More than one significant event has occurred during a plant evolution in the past month.

There are more than three transients during major plant evolutions prior to restart.

y QC only.

One significant event has occurred during a plant evolution in the past month.

There are three or fewer transients during major plant evolutions prior to restart.

Major plant evolutions have been performed as planned. There are no transients or significant events during major plant evolutions prior to restart.

This item assessed This item assessed by Maintenance only

++Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Plant Engineering Q Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Operation

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Outage Management and Work Control

I Number:

D B B P-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE 1

Tine:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE Revision:

Page 05 Page 49 of 57 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 30 of 38

~

Management observations and NQA field observations show that a large majority of individuals are using procedures or work orders.

IN DIVl D UALS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO RIGOROUS WORK CONTROL AND PRUDENT APPROACH (continued)

Performing activities in a quality manner is the standard Use of procedures and work orders*

Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are not using procedures or work orders.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are using procedures or work orders.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that individuals in general are using procedures or work orders.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program and NQA

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Tine:

Number:

Revision:

I Pam DBBP-VP-0002 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE I

05 Paae 50 of 57 ATTRIBUTE RED APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 31 of 38 I NDlVl DUALS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO OPEN COMMUNICATIONS 2 in voicing opinions, YELLOW ssues and concerns WHITE GREEN Number of CRs per person per group Less than 13% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.

Between 13-1 5% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.

. Between 15-1 7% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.

More than 17% of individuals wrote CRs during the past 30 days.

There are more NRC allegations than ECP concerns.

There are more ECP concerns than NRC allegations.

There are at least 4 times more ECP concerns than NRC allegations.

There are at least 8 times more ECP concerns than NRC allegations.

Ratio of concerns submitted lo Employee Concerns Program (ECP) vs.

NRC allegations" Worker confidence in raising safety concerns 5

~

Surveys indicate that more than 95% of workers believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

Feedback from the 4Cs meetings indicates that more than 90% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to management.

Surveys indicate that less than 80% of workers believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

Feedback from the 4Cs meetings indicates that most individuals are not willing to raise concerns to management.

Surveys indicate that between 80-90% of workers believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

Feedback from the 4Cs meetings indicates that more than 70% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to management.

Surveys indicate that between 90-95% of workers believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

Feedback from the 4Cs meetings indicates that more than 80% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to management.

Feedback from 4Cs meetings+

Each month's total Safe behavior is 59%

or less.

Each month's total Safe behavior is 60%

to 69%.

Each month's total Safe behavior is 70% to 79%.

Each months total Safe behavior is 80% or higher.

Keep Improving Performance (KIP) program++

Pre-job briefings@

~

~~~

Management observations and QA field observations show that most pre-job briefs are not acceptable.

Management observations and QA field observations show that most pre-job briefs are acceptable.

Management observations and QA field observations show that, with some exceptions, pre-job briefs are acceptable.

Management observations and QA field observations show that pre-job briefs in general are acceptable.

~~ *Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Performance improvement "Site wide assessment only, Data provided by Employee Concerns Program

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chief Operating Officer

++site wide assessment only. Data provided by industrial Safety

@site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program and NQA

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE Tltle:

Number:

DB BP-VP-0002 Revision:

I Page APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 32 of 38 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA 05 Page 51 of 57 CRITERIA RELATED TO OPEN COMMUNICATIONS (continued)

~~

Formal communication structures exist and are occasionally used to share information within departments.

Associates are comfortable in voicing o Formal communication structures exist and are consistently used to share information within departments.

Intra-department information sharing Quality of communication*

4Cs surveys indicate 70-90% believe communication is good.

No formal communication structures exist for sharing information within departments.

4Cs surveys indicate less than 40%

believe communication is good.

4Cs surveys indicate more than 90% believe communication is good.

Infrequent information sharing exists within departments.

4Cs surveys indicate 40-70%

believe communication is good.

inions, issues and concerns

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chief Operating Officer 5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Number:

Revision:

I Pam DBBP-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 33 of 38 RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO OPEN COMMUNICATIONS SAFETY CONSCIOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT (SCWE) 05 Page 52 of 57 Employee awareness of SC WE policy Training on SCWE +

Ratio ot concerns submitted to ECPvs. NRC allegations **

NQA interviews+

Worker confidence in raising safety Concerns 1IA RELATED TO R RED

~~

Surveyslinterviews indicate that less than 80% of employees are aware of policy.

Less than 70% of

managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

There are less than 2 times more NRC allegations than ECP concerns.

NQA interviews indicate that less than 85% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to their supervisors or ECP.

Surveys indicate that less than 80% of workers believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear Df retaliation.

SING CONCERNS WITHOUT FEAR OF E I

YELLOW Surveyslin terviews indicate that 80-90% of employees are aware of policy and consider it a FE value.

WHITE Surveyslinterviews indicate that 90-95%

of employees are aware of policy and consider it an FE value.

Between 7079% of

managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

There are at least 2 times more ECP concerns than NRC allegations.

Between 80-89% of

managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

There are at least 4 times more ECP concerns than NRC allegations.

NQA interviews indicate that between 8590% of individuals are willing to raise concerns to their supervisors or ECP.

NQA interviews indicate that between 90-95% of Individuals are willing to raise concerns to their supervisors or ECP.

Surveys indicate that between 80-90% of workers believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

Surveys indicate that between 90-95% of workers believe they can raise nuclear safety or quality concerns without fear of retaliation.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Nuclear Training "Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Employee Concerns Program

+Site wide assessment only. Data provided by NQA TALI AT1 0 N GREEN Surveyslinterviews indicate that more thar 95% of employees are aware of policy and consider it an FE value and the normal way to do business.

More than 90% of

managers, supervisors, and operators have received training on SCWE.

There are at least 8 times more ECP concerns than NRC allegations.

NQA interviews indicate that more than 95% of individuals are willing to raise wncerns to their supervisors or ECP.

Surveys indicate that more than 95% of Norkers believe they

=n raise nuclear safety or quality mncerns without fear

)f retaliation.

Number:

Revision:

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE I paw

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE 05 Page 53 of 57 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 34 of 38 INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO OPEN COMMUNICATIONS SAFETY CONSCIOUS WORK ENVIRONMENT (SCWE)

CRITERIA RELATED TO EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM (ECP) 1 ATTRIBUTE Ratio of concerns submitted to ECP vs. NRC allegations' Satisfaction of employees using the ECP*

I Complaints of breach of confidentiality of ECP' Management support for ECP' RED There are more NRC allegations than ECP concerns.

Less than 70% of employees that use the ECP report being satisfied with the process.

There are more than 2 complaints per year.

Employee surveys indicate less than 70% of individuals believe management supports ECP.

YELLOW There are more ECP concerns than NRC allegations.

Between 70-80 %

of employees that use the ECP report being satisfied with the process.

There are 2 complaints per year.

Employee surveys indicate between 70-80%

of individuals believe management supports ECP.

WHITE There are at least 4 times more ECP concerns than NRC allegations.

Between 80-90% of employees that use the ECP report being satisfied with the process.

There is 1 complaint per year.

Employee surveys indicate between 80-90% of individuals believe management supports ECP.

GREEN There are at least 8 times more ECP concerns than NRC allegations.

More than 90% of employees that use the ECP report being satisfied with the process.

There are zero complaints per year.

Employee surveys indicate more than 90%

of individuals believe management supports ECP.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Employee Concerns Program 5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE

Title:

Number:

Revision:

DBBP-VP-0002 pase 05 Page 54 of 57 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 35 of 38 INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO NUCLEAR PROFESSIONALISM 1 of problems is preb WHITE urgency in identific RED ition and resoluti YELLOW ent GREEN Persistence ani ATTRIBUTE Ownership for Excellence Less than 70% of applicable employees have completed the Ownership for Excellence development plans.

Between 70-80 %

of applicable employees have completed the Ownership for Excellence development plans.

Between 80-90% of applicable employees have completed the Ownership for Excellence development plans.

More than 90% of applicable employees have completed the Ownership for Excellence development plans.

Training aftendance*

Training attendance is less than 85%.

Training attendance is between 91-98%.

Training attendance is greater than 98%.

Training attendance is between 8590%.

The rework rate is 253.0%.

Rework rate+

The rework rate is more than 3%.

5 The rework rate is

<2.0%.

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 1.O or less.

The rework rate is 2.1 -2.5%.

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 2.0 or less.

Results of EAB assessments++

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is greater than 3.0.

The quality of engineering products as measured by the EAB is 3.0 or less.

There are less than 6 yellow or red windows in training. (90% or better).

Red and Yellow windows in training *+

There are 13-19 yellow or red windows in training. (70-80%).

There are 6-1 3 yellow or red windows in training. (80-90%).

There are more than 19 yellow or red windows in training. (Less than 70%).

There are more than 3 radiation protection events per quarter.

There is 1 radiation protection event per quarter.

There are no radiation protection events per quarter.

Radiation Protection events @!

There are 1-3 radiation protection events per quarter.

The index is equal to or less than 1.036.

The index is equal to or less than 1.000.

Chemistry Petfomance Index"'

The index is greater than 1.036.

The index is equal to or less than 1.004.

,ining

'Site wide assessment onlv. Data Drovided by Nuclear 1

+This item assessed by Miintenan'ce only

++This item assessed by Engineering only. Data provided by Director-Nuclear Engineering This item assessed by Nuclear Training only

@Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Radiation Protection

"'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Chemistry

I Number:

DBBP-VP-0002 NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PWCTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED PLANT OUTAGE J

Revision:

Page 05 Page 55 of 57 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 36 of 38 IN D IVI DUALS COMM lTM ENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO NUCLEAR PROFESSIONALISM {continued)

Persistence and urgency in identification and resolution of problems is prevalent Procedure compliance*

Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are not com plying with procedures.

Few employees routinely express why work cant be done or improved.

Employees dont follow through on assigned commitments and seldom volunteer for ownership.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that most individuals are complying with procedures.

Employees work hard to do whats expected.

Employees are inconsistent in following through to meet quality and timing of assigned commitments.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that a large majority of individuals are complying with procedures.

Employees do what it takes to get the job done.

Personal initiative Ownership

Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Management Observation Program Employees follow through and do what is asked of them and do what is defined within their job description.

Management observations and NQA field observations show that individuals in general are complying with procedures.

Employees at all levels take personal initiative to invent methods to achieve higher quality and greater efficiency.

Most employees regularly volunteer to ownllead project, develop plans, coordinate efforts and see work through to completion.

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED Number:

Revision:

Page DBBP-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 37 of 38 I NDlVl DUALS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO NUCLEAR PROFESSIONALISM (continued)

Persistence in identification and resolution of problems is prevalent CRITERIA RELATED TO THE CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM AlTRlBUTE RED impiementa tion of CAP improvements '

YELLOW Root cause evaiuation quality' WHITE 1 Implementation of the CAP improvements designated for restart has not started.

The root cause evaluation approval rate as determined by the CARB is less than 50%.

Implementation of the CAP improvements designated for restart is started but none are completed.

CR category accuracy' Implementation of the CAP improvements for restart is completed but the associated training is not completed.

CR self-identification rate '

I The CR category accuracy rate is less than 70% or greater.

Less than 80% of the CRs originated are self-identified.

Employee 5urvey.p Employee surveys indicate that more than 10 %of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

The root cause evaluation approval rate as determined by the CARB is between 50-74%.

The CR category accuracy rate is between 7040%.

80% or more of the CRs originated are self-iden tified.

The root cause evaluation approval rate as determined by the CARB is between 7590%.

The CR category accuracy rate is between 80-90%.

90% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.

Employee surveys indicate that between 10-5% of individuals are not willing to use'the CAP.

Employee surveys indicate that between 5-2% of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

I

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by Perfonnance Improvement 6ite wide assessment only. Data provided by Employee Concerns Program GREEN The CAP improvements designated for restart are completed and associated training is completed.

The root cause evaluation approval rate as determined by the CARB is 90% or greater.

The CR category accuracy rate is 90% or greater.

95% or more of the CRs originated are self-identified.

~~

Employee surveys indicate that less than 2% of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

5

NUCLEAR OPERATING BUSINESS PRACTICE

Title:

Number.

Revision:

I Page DBBP-VP-0002 APPENDIX A: ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CULTURE CRITERIA Page 38 of 38 INDIVIDUALS' COMMITMENT AREA CRITERIA RELATED TO NUCLEAR PROFESSIONALISM (continued)

Persistence in identification and resolution of problems is prevalent CRITERIA RELATED TO THE CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM RESTART READINESS REVIEW EXTENDED LPLANT OUTAGE 05 Page 57 of 57 NQA interviews*

NQA interviews indicate that more than 10%

of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

Timeliness of corrective actions Less than 50% of corrective actions are completed on schedule without extensions.

NQA interviews indicate that between 104% of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

Between 50-74%

of corrective actions are completed on schedule without extensions.

'Site wide assessment only. Data provided by NQA NQA interviews indicate that between -

5-2% of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

Between 75-89%of corrective actions are completed on schedule without extensions.

NQA interviews indicate that less than 2 % of individuals are not willing to use the CAP.

More than 90% of corrective actions are completed on schedule without extensions.

ML032380527

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