ML031630920
| ML031630920 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 08/12/2002 |
| From: | Haag R NRC/EDO |
| To: | Russ Bywater, Starefos J NRC/EDO |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2003-0018 | |
| Download: ML031630920 (3) | |
Text
From:
Robert Haag,
£ 6 To:
Joelle Starefos; Russ Bywater Date:
8/12/02 12:14PM
Subject:
more interview forms Information in this rmcord was da!-ted in accordance Mith the Freedom of Information.
Act, exemptions_
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- 1. Recollections from Fall 2001 timeframe regarding DB outage deferral and videotapes:
"1 recalled the Nov 2001 meeting, chaired by Brian Sheron, where a vote was taken regarding whether the staff had "sru reservations" with DB continuing to operate beyond Dec 31, 2001. Wconfirmed that he did have seribus reservations and was actually in favor of the plant coming down much sooner to address potential VHP cracking. His rationale was that all other B&W units had experienced cracking, DB would be the last one to inspect and CiA they had thJ,est head temp g B units - hence cracking was very likely.
confirmed that had reservatioNl also recalled a ollow-up am Collins, who wanted to make sure he understood the concems accurately.
Similart
_ecal aed seeing videotapes of DB head cleaning opent ions and tapes showing "clean" head during this timefram Fal 2001. His recollections were very similar to and supported those o
lthough his recollections were not as detailed.
- 2. For the RO oted (as others have), that the cladding is not structural and the Iyalu ishould consider that a of the safety margins had been eroded.
as also aware of intemational acdvities, particularly wrt the French program.
He was part of a delegation that discussed CRDM cracking wlthe French in 1995 and recalled that there was an "Intent" to Issue a GL on the issue as early as that bmeframe. As to why we didn't focus more on the issue he cited that the pilot experience In the U.S. (Oconee, Point Beach and Cook), had not flagged up evidence pt sgificant cracking and It was not considered highly safety significanL onsidered that the "culture" at NRC is also at fauK in that we are not quesboning and following-through. For the future, he cited a specific concem with possibilities for circ. cracking In piping, particularly with regard to the pressurizer/surge line nozzle connection - hottest point, cast SS and welds, very difficuft to nspecL
t Joelle btartos - ~5U4U
~trosniOer.Wpa Pa~i_-1 NRC DAVIS-BESSE LLTF RECORD OF INTERVIEW FORM (RIF)
NRC PREDECISIONAL DATE: 7115102 RIF NO.
INTERNAL RIF NO. 3040 TEAM MEMBER: Ed Hackett INTERVIEWEE - INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL NAMErTiTLE/ORGANIZATION:
Jack Strosnider, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research - formerly Division Director of NRRiDE during timeframe for Bulletins 2001.01 and 2002-02 Indicate section of Report Outline n evaluation plan) In right ma in.
I Narrative should properly characterize licensee's or NRC's staff prior knowledge of issue.
Refer to Interview Checklist.
- 1. 1993 OG Evaluations Submitted to NRC via NUMARC Jack recalled that general BA corrosion (wastage) of CS was addressed n submittals and in the subsequent SE (we have confirmed this). However, his recollection were that high temps would provide a dry environment on top of the head and that corrosion would not take place or be very slow to progress, even If there was attack, It would take a long time to progress to a significant stage and that visual observation of leakage would be evident long before significant degradaton of margins. This Is the story that Is recounted in the 1993 B&WOG submittal and accepted by the staff in the SE (11/19193). Jack Elso recalled that he didn't like the initial version of the staff SE and wanted additional evaluation added regarding the need for separate assessment of circ. cracking and the need to Inspect and verify findings.
- 2. Recollections from FalI/2001 Regarding Davis-Besse Jack remembered that FENOC was attempting ;o do a PRA on DB wrt the potential for and progression of cracking. He recalled that they were attempting to build on a relatively simplistic model from Dr. Bill Shack at ANL. However, due to lack of appropriate staff review of Dr.
Shack's analysis, Jack did not approve nitial release of the details at that time (September/October, 2001). He recalled that were meeting w/NRREMCB to attempt to obtain "credit" for inspections, but that EMCB did not filhd th ir.evidence hotos, videotape) to be persuasive. Ts Is consistqyAth recollections from_
this subject. Jack also mentioned thaQGuy Campbelt pFENOC was particularly aggressive in trying to convince himself and NRR1DE staff of Ie "credit' they should get for previous Inspections of the head.
His recollections regarding the outage deferral decision are consistent with those from Brian Sheron.
- 3. Risk-informing (in general)
Jack used the DB experience to focus on the Importance of qualitative aspects of risk assessment in addition to quantitative analysis. He stated that this Is how uncertainties that do lend themselves to quanUfication (e.g., aging degradation of passlve components) get captured.
Therefore any quantitative assessment of an Issue that is "on the line" should not on 's own, be the basis for determination of regulatory action.
- 4. Intemational Activities t Joelie tbtareto trosn 1cer.wpc Pagqe 13